@serfab/cadre-core 1.16.0 → 1.17.0

package/dist/cadre-node.d.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
 import type { Libp2p, PeerId } from '@libp2p/interface';
 import type { Multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
-import type { CadreNodeConfig, StrandInstance, StrandRow, StrandConfig, FoundStrandConfig, FoundStrandResult, SAppConfig, CadreNodeEvents, ControlNetworkSeed, ApplySeedResult, SeedAckMessage, SeedDeliveryTarget, AddDroneOptions, DroneInitResult, OpenInvitation, FormStrandResult, StrandFormationDisclosure, StrandMembershipInvite, ResolveOpts, SelfRegistrationOutcome, ServiceWakeResult, PushPlatform, DeviceTokenRecord, CadreInviteStatus, CadreMachine, MachineRemovalPlan, MachineRemovalResult, RemoveMachineOptions, CadreRemoval, CadreInvitationReach, CreateCadreInvitationOptions, CreateCadreInvitationResult, RedeemCadreInvitationOptions, RedeemCadreInvitationResult, ResolveDeviceTokenOpts, PendingJoinStatus } from './types.js';
-import { type Ed25519KeyPair } from './ed25519-key.js';
+import type { CadreNodeConfig, StrandInstance, StrandRow, StrandConfig, FoundStrandConfig, FoundStrandResult, FoundStrandOptions, FoundStrandBackgroundResult, SAppConfig, CadreNodeEvents, ControlNetworkSeed, ApplySeedResult, SeedAckMessage, SeedDeliveryTarget, AddDroneOptions, DroneInitResult, OpenInvitation, FormStrandResult, StrandFormationDisclosure, StrandMembershipInvite, ResolveOpts, SelfRegistrationOutcome, ServiceWakeResult, PushPlatform, DeviceTokenRecord, CadreInviteStatus, CadreMachine, CadreOwnerKey, MachineRemovalPlan, MachineRemovalResult, OwnerKeyRemovalPlan, OwnerKeyRemovalResult, RemoveOwnerOptions, CadreRemoval, CadreInvitationReach, CreateCadreInvitationOptions, CreateCadreInvitationResult, RedeemCadreInvitationOptions, RedeemCadreInvitationResult, CreateOwnerGrantOptions, CreateOwnerGrantResult, OwnerGrantStatus, RedeemOwnerGrantOptions, RedeemOwnerGrantResult, JoinWithOwnerGrantResult, ResolveDeviceTokenOpts, PendingJoinStatus } from './types.js';
 import { type TrustedOwnerStore, type TrustSource } from './trusted-owner-store.js';
+import { type OwnerSign, type OwnerSigner } from './owner-signer.js';
 import { type BootstrapPeerStore } from './bootstrap-peer-store.js';
 import { type StrandNetworkStateStore } from './strand-network-state.js';
 import { type EnrolledMachineStore } from './enrolled-machine-store.js';
 import { type JoinedStrandRecord } from './joined-strand-store.js';
 import { type SAppIdLookup } from './strand-watcher.js';
+import type { CohortPeerRow } from './strand-cohort.js';
 import { type ControlCohortReconcileResult } from './control-cohort.js';
 import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.js';
 import { ControlDatabase } from './control-database.js';
 import { type CadreInvitation } from './cadre-invite-protocol.js';
+import { type OwnerGrantBundle } from './owner-grant-protocol.js';
 import { SeedBootstrapService } from './seed-bootstrap.js';
 import { type SeedTrustPolicy } from './seed-trust-policy.js';
 import { StrandSolicitationService, type StrandSolicitationServiceOptions } from './strand-solicitation.js';
@@ -41,13 +43,13 @@ export declare const STRAND_PEER_ADDR_REFRESH_MS: number;
  */
 export declare const STRAND_PEER_ADDR_RETRY_MS: number;
 /**
- * Default lifetime of an UNTARGETED, OWNER-GRANTING cadre invitation
- * ({@link CadreNode.createCadreInvitation}): whoever holds the bundle becomes an owner, so
- * it is a bearer credential for admin rights and lives only long enough to be pasted or
- * scanned by the device it was minted for.
+ * Default lifetime of an owner grant ({@link CadreNode.createOwnerGrant}): whoever holds the
+ * bundle can become an owner, so it is a bearer credential for admin rights and lives only
+ * long enough to be pasted or scanned by the device it was minted for. A backup grant is minted
+ * with no expiry, by explicit choice.
  */
-export declare const OWNER_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS: number;
-/** Default lifetime of every other cadre invitation: targeted, or granting membership only. */
+export declare const OWNER_GRANT_DEFAULT_TTL_MS: number;
+/** Default lifetime of a cadre invitation ({@link CadreNode.createCadreInvitation}): it admits a machine and grants nothing else, so it need not be short. */
 export declare const CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS: number;
 type EventHandler<T> = (data: T) => void;
 /**
@@ -134,6 +136,13 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * once that database is up, on every node.
      */
     private cadreInviteHandler;
+    /**
+     * Owner grant redemption handler (`/sereus/owner-grant/1.0.0`): a holder of a grant dials
+     * this machine and proves possession of the grant and of the key it seats; the handler seats
+     * the row and writes the `OwnerKey` row against this node's control database. Registered by
+     * {@link start} beside the invitation handler, on every node.
+     */
+    private ownerGrantHandler;
     /**
      * Server-side push-wake fan-out. Constructed by {@link start} only when
      * `config.push` (an injected `PushNotifier` + policy) is present — without it
@@ -335,6 +344,25 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * strand is no longer running are pruned on each reconcile pass.
      */
     private readonly delegateAnnounceAt;
+    /**
+     * Relay peerIds whose protocol negotiation refused the delegate announcement
+     * (strand-addr outcome `unsupported`), recorded and cleared by
+     * {@link recordDelegateAnnounces} from every announce pass's outcomes. Only a
+     * party-run relay has a membership gate that needs a grant, and it serves
+     * strand-addr, so a refusal marks a dedicated relay: {@link circuitRelayTargets}
+     * leaves it out of the founding/resume and periodic announcements, which would
+     * otherwise spend a protocol negotiation on it every time (gotchoices/sereus#49). Not
+     * pruned: one entry per relay this node ever named.
+     *
+     * {@link announceDelegateToRelay} still asks every relay, remembered or not, and
+     * its reply is what clears an entry. A party-run relay registers its strand-addr
+     * handler late in its own `start()`, after its libp2p node and relay server are
+     * up, so an announcement landing in that window is refused by a relay that serves
+     * the protocol a moment later. If the re-drive hook skipped remembered relays too,
+     * that relay would stay skipped until this node restarts and its gate would deny
+     * every reservation through it.
+     */
+    private readonly relaysRefusingStrandAddr;
     /**
      * When each connected sibling is next due a strand-addr RPC for each running
      * strand, keyed `peerStrandKey(siblingControlPeerId, strandId)` → epoch ms; a
@@ -460,7 +488,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     /**
      * Dial targets learned out of band, keyed by peer id, valued by the multiaddr
      * strings this node was handed (parsed lazily, at dial time). Two writers:
-     * {@link recordSeedBootstrapPeers} retains the owner-flagged peers of every seed
+     * {@link recordSeedBootstrapPeers} retains the preferred peers of every seed
      * this node applies, and {@link addDrone} retains the addresses of every node
      * this node adds. Two readers: {@link dialColdStartBootstrap} dials every entry
      * while the control database still has no siblings, and
@@ -777,7 +805,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     /**
      * Construct (or adopt) the node-local trusted-owner anchor and seed the
      * out-of-band pinned keys from `config.trustedOwners`. The anchor's BASE comes
-     * only from out of band — genesis self-trust ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}),
+     * only from out of band — genesis self-trust ({@link useOwnerSigner}),
      * config pins (here), runtime enrollment pins ({@link trustOwnerKeys}) and a
      * claim; everything else in it is derived from that base along verifiable
      * chains through the replicated `OwnerKey` table ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}),
@@ -943,12 +971,13 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     getTrustedOwnerStore(): TrustedOwnerStore | null;
     /**
      * Persist out-of-band-established owner keys into the node-local anchor —
-     * the runtime enrollment seam: {@link redeemCadreInvitation} calls it with the
-     * cadre invitation's `ownerKeys` BEFORE dialing a member (so the anchor already
-     * holds the pins when the reply and the rows that follow are judged), and an
+     * the runtime enrollment seam: {@link redeemCadreInvitation} and
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant} call it with their bundle's `ownerKeys` BEFORE dialing
+     * a member (so the anchor already holds the pins when the reply and the rows
+     * that follow are judged), and an
      * embedder calls it with an operator-supplied pin. Idempotent. ('genesis'
      * provenance is reserved for the node's own founding key, seeded internally by
-     * {@link initializeSeedBootstrap}; 'chain' is written only by {@link syncOwnerAnchor}.)
+     * {@link useOwnerSigner}; 'chain' is written only by {@link syncOwnerAnchor}.)
      *
      * Validates every key's shape before trusting any of them (all-or-nothing):
      * a malformed entry anywhere in `keys` rejects the whole call before a
@@ -1095,10 +1124,18 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *     own strand node, so a NAT'd member's strand node can hold a
      *     circuit-relay reservation here (see `delegate-admission.ts`).
      *     Connection only: the per-stream gate below never honors a grant;
-     *  3. the authorized-member set is empty — cold start: the rows that would
+     *  3. the peer is a device whose invitation or owner-grant redemption this
+     *     node has verified and is writing ({@link admittingDevices}): its
+     *     connection carries the exchange, which must not be cut at the
+     *     provisional deadline. A LIVE OWNER GRANT does not count as expecting a
+     *     stranger the way check 7's invitation does: a backup grant has no
+     *     expiry, and counting it would admit every stranger outright for the
+     *     party's life, so the holder rides the provisional admission until its
+     *     redemption verifies, then this;
+     *  4. the authorized-member set is empty — cold start: the rows that would
      *     authorize anyone arrive by replication over these very connections;
-     *  4. the peer IS an authorized member; or
-     *  5. an open invitation is OUTSTANDING — at least one unexpired,
+     *  5. the peer IS an authorized member; or
+     *  6. an open invitation is OUTSTANDING — at least one unexpired,
      *     not-fully-consumed invitation this node minted or persisted (see
      *     `StrandSolicitationService.hasOutstandingInvitation`). A formation
      *     initiator is another party's peer by design and its token is only
@@ -1106,19 +1143,19 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *     "does this node expect a stranger at all?". REGISTERING the responder
      *     does not count: every node registers one at {@link start}, and
      *     registering mints no invitation; or
-     *  6. a LIVE cadre invitation exists — a `CadreInvite` row this node holds
+     *  7. a LIVE cadre invitation exists — a `CadreInvite` row this node holds
      *     that is not withdrawn, unexpired, has uses left and whose issuer is
      *     still an owner (`ControlDatabase.hasLiveCadreInvite`). The device that
      *     redeems it is a stranger until the redemption writes its row, and its
      *     proof of possession is only checkable inside `/sereus/cadre-invite/1.0.0`;
-     *     same reasoning as check 5, and the same expectation-of-a-stranger key.
+     *     same reasoning as check 6, and the same expectation-of-a-stranger key.
      *
      * Ordering is semantically free (the checks are OR'd) but decides who pays:
-     * checks 1-2 are in-memory, 3/4 share one control-DB read, and only a peer
-     * that is otherwise headed for a provisional admission reaches check 5's and
-     * 6's invitation lookups.
+     * checks 1-3 are in-memory, 4/5 share one control-DB read, and only a peer
+     * that is otherwise headed for a provisional admission reaches check 6's and
+     * 7's invitation lookups.
      *
-     * Caveats of check 5:
+     * Caveats of check 6:
      *  - the in-memory mint registry dies with the process, so after a restart
      *    only invitations persisted as `FormationInvite` rows still hold the
      *    window open (re-mint otherwise);
@@ -1129,8 +1166,8 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * When every check falls through: `'admit-provisionally'`, on every node,
      * relay server or not. The gate sees only a peer id, so it cannot tell an
      * outsider from a device whose invitation row this node has not received yet
-     * (it redeems here by seating the row from its bundle, after which check 6
-     * admits) or from a sibling whose membership row is still replicating (check 4
+     * (it redeems here by seating the row from its bundle, after which check 7
+     * admits) or from a sibling whose membership row is still replicating (check 5
      * admits once it lands; if it has not landed by the deadline, the connection
      * is closed and either side's next reconcile dial re-forms it, since outbound
      * dials are never gated). The protocol guard refuses all of them every
@@ -1138,12 +1175,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * {@link admitControlRelayReservation} disarms the deadline (see
      * `membership-connection-gater.ts` → "The relay-reservation seam").
      *
-     * NOTE: check 3/4 runs a control-DB read per inbound connection
+     * NOTE: check 4/5 runs a control-DB read per inbound connection
      * (`listAuthorizedMembers`); connections are rare and cadres small, and this
      * layer is fail-open behind `ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`, so the live
      * read is safe here — unlike the per-stream gate, which must consult the
      * materialized {@link authorizedControlPeers} snapshot instead.
-     * NOTE: checks 5 and 6 add two more control reads (`hasOutstandingFormationInvite`,
+     * NOTE: checks 6 and 7 add two more control reads (`hasOutstandingFormationInvite`,
      * `hasLiveCadreInvite`) for a stranger with no locally minted invitation in play, on
      * every node, and a provisional connection's deadline runs the whole decision once
      * more. If stranger connections ever arrive fast enough for those reads — on arrival
@@ -1312,9 +1349,9 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *
      * The trusted-owner anchor sync ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) runs FIRST, so the snapshot
      * built here judges `CadrePeer` rows against the anchor as the `OwnerKey` table now
-     * has it. The invitation chain both reads may need, and the tombstone list the sync and
-     * the two end-of-refresh checks ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers}, then
-     * {@link noteOwnRemoval}) read, are each loaded at most once per refresh.
+     * has it. The tombstone list the sync and the two end-of-refresh checks
+     * ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers}, then {@link noteOwnRemoval}) read is loaded at most
+     * once per refresh, as is the invitation chain the membership read may need.
      */
     private refreshAuthorizedControlPeers;
     /**
@@ -1381,25 +1418,31 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     private createPartyJoinedStrandLedger;
     /**
-     * This machine's owner signing key when it can make owner-gated control writes: its seed
-     * bootstrap holds an owner key (`SeedBootstrapService.canAuthorize`) and the party's
-     * `OwnerKey` table enrolls it. A phone that ran self-genesis after another machine
-     * founded the party passes the first test and not the second (`runOwnerGenesis` in the
-     * reference apps), and a write it signed would only be refused.
+     * This machine's owner signer when it can make owner-gated control writes: one is wired
+     * ({@link useOwnerSigner}) and the party's `OwnerKey` table enrolls its key. A phone that
+     * ran self-genesis after another machine founded the party passes the first test and not
+     * the second (`runOwnerGenesis` in the reference apps), and a write it signed would only
+     * be refused.
      */
-    private enrolledOwnerSigningKey;
+    private enrolledOwnerSigner;
     /**
-     * Whether this node can act as an owner of its cadre: its identity key is wired as its
-     * owner signing key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}) and enrolled in the live `OwnerKey`
-     * set ({@link enrolledOwnerSigningKey}). What the owner-only flows (`createCadreInvitation`,
-     * `claimNode`, `rentNode`) need; false before `start()`, and on a machine that joined as a
-     * member. The reference apps' "is this device an owner" check.
+     * Whether this node can act as an owner of its cadre: an owner signer is wired
+     * ({@link useOwnerSigner}) and its key is in the live `OwnerKey` set. What the owner-only
+     * flows (`createCadreInvitation`, `claimNode`, `rentNode`) need; false before `start()`,
+     * and on a machine that joined as a member. The reference apps' "is this device an owner"
+     * check.
      */
     isOwner(): Promise<boolean>;
-    /** {@link enrolledOwnerSigningKey} judged against an owner set the caller has already read. */
-    private ownerSigningKeyEnrolledIn;
-    /** This machine's identity key as an owner signing key, when its seed bootstrap is wired to sign; enrollment not yet checked. */
-    private ownerSigningKeyCandidate;
+    /** {@link enrolledOwnerSigner} judged against an owner set the caller has already read. */
+    private ownerSignerEnrolledIn;
+    /**
+     * The owner signer {@link useOwnerSigner} wired, or null: every owner signature this node
+     * makes goes through it. Enrollment is not checked ({@link isOwner} does). A caller that
+     * makes several owner writes as one action opens one `approve` on it and hands the
+     * resulting `sign` to the methods that take one (`publishStrand`, `ensureStrandPartyKey`,
+     * `publishFormationInvite`), as `adoptStrandBundle` does.
+     */
+    getOwnerSigner(): OwnerSigner | null;
     /**
      * Schedule the node's initial self-record publish + ongoing refresh shortly
      * after start (non-blocking). {@link registerSelf} is idempotent and safely
@@ -1501,41 +1544,15 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     private getSelfSigningKey;
     /**
-     * Does the `Strand` row name THIS machine as its founder — i.e. is its
-     * `FounderOwnerKey` this node's own owner key (the key behind its PeerId)?
-     * A null/absent column (a consent-seated strand, or a hand-built row) and a
-     * node with no owner key both derive `false`: without a positive match this
-     * machine must attach, never bootstrap. Pure key derivation, no I/O — cheap
-     * enough for {@link launchStrand}'s tracked-instance early return.
-     *
-     * NOTE: reads "one owner key per machine" — the reference model, where the owner
-     * key IS the key behind the PeerId. Two machines running the SAME identity key
-     * would both derive `true` and each bootstrap on its own replica, which is the
-     * double-`Header` hazard this derivation exists to avoid. Unreachable today: that
-     * configuration also gives both machines one PeerId, which already breaks control
-     * networking well before any strand launches. Revisit if machines ever share an
-     * owner key while holding distinct transport identities — the derivation would
-     * then need a per-machine discriminator (the `CadrePeer` PeerId) on the row.
+     * Does the `Strand` row name THIS machine as its founder — is its `FounderPeerId` this
+     * node's peer id? A null column (a consent-seated strand, or a hand-built row) derives
+     * `false`: without a positive match this machine must attach, never bootstrap. A peer id
+     * rather than an owner key, so two machines holding one owner key never both bootstrap
+     * (the double-`Header` hazard), and a node derives it before any owner signer is wired.
+     * Pure comparison, no I/O — cheap enough for {@link launchStrand}'s tracked-instance
+     * early return.
      */
     private isSelfFoundedRow;
-    /**
-     * The owner keypair (base64url Ed25519) derived from this node's resolved
-     * identity key. In the single-key reference model the owner signing key is
-     * *derived from* the node identity (see {@link ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p}), so the
-     * same key material protected in a secure enclave backs both.
-     *
-     * Exposed so the hosting app retains control of owner genesis: cadre-core
-     * resolves + protects the identity, then the app sources this pair to drive
-     * `ensureOwnerKey(pub)` + `initializeSeedBootstrap(priv)` itself — cadre-core
-     * never silently runs genesis. A future separate-owner slot would return a
-     * distinct key here instead of the identity-derived one.
-     *
-     * @returns The base64url seed/public-key owner pair.
-     * @throws If called before {@link start} has resolved the identity, or when the
-     *   node runs on an ephemeral libp2p key (no `keyStore`/`privateKey` configured),
-     *   since that key is internal to libp2p and not exposed.
-     */
-    getIdentityOwnerKey(): Ed25519KeyPair;
     /**
      * Publish this node's own address record from the reconcile pass until its first publish of
      * this session lands. A node with no owner key — seeded (`addDrone`, `cadre enroll add`),
@@ -1847,8 +1864,8 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     private peerStoreAddrs;
     /**
-     * Retain a just-applied seed's owner-flagged peers as cold-start bootstrap
-     * dial targets (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}).
+     * Retain a just-applied seed's preferred peers (`SeedPeer.preferred`) as cold-start
+     * bootstrap dial targets (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}).
      *
      * Called for every seed this node accepts, on BOTH intake paths — the
      * {@link applySeed} wrapper (which may run on a throwaway service, so the
@@ -1856,7 +1873,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * `/sereus/seed/1.0.0` handler via `onSeedApplied`. Peers with no address are
      * skipped: there is nothing to dial.
      *
-     * `isOwner` is the seed's own claim about its peers, exactly as
+     * `preferred` is the seed's own claim about its peers, exactly as
      * `SeedBootstrapService.applySeed` uses it to choose its dial targets. That is
      * sound here for the same reason it is sound there — the whole seed is
      * signature-checked against a trust-anchored signer before this runs, and the
@@ -1886,12 +1903,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     private retainDialTarget;
     /**
      * Cold-start branch of the reconcile pass: re-dial every retained out-of-band
-     * dial target (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}) — in practice the owner peers of
-     * the seeds this node applied — while the control database still has no
+     * dial target (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}) — in practice the preferred peers
+     * of the seeds this node applied — while the control database still has no
      * siblings to dial.
      *
-     * `SeedBootstrapService.applySeed` dials those owners exactly ONCE, best-effort.
-     * When that single dial fails — owner momentarily down, relay reservation not
+     * `SeedBootstrapService.applySeed` dials those peers exactly ONCE, best-effort.
+     * When that single dial fails — peer momentarily down, relay reservation not
      * up yet, NAT traversal lost the race — the joining node has an empty
      * `CadrePeer` table and no connection, and the steady-state pass above cannot
      * help: it dials only siblings enumerated from that very table. Retrying here
@@ -1901,9 +1918,10 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * gated by "the control database has no siblings", so it stops the moment the
      * node is actually in the party, and a node that is stranded MUST keep trying —
      * a give-up rule would turn a transient outage into a permanent one. The steady
-     * cost is one dial per bootstrap peer per pass (seeds nominate one or a few
-     * owners), each failing fast against an unreachable address.
-     * NOTE: if seeds ever carry many owner peers, or the reconcile cadence tightens
+     * cost is one dial per bootstrap peer per pass (a seed prefers its minter and the
+     * party's always-on machines, a few at most), each failing fast against an
+     * unreachable address.
+     * NOTE: if seeds ever carry many preferred peers, or the reconcile cadence tightens
      * well below its 15 s default, add per-peer backoff here.
      *
      * Best-effort per peer, exactly like {@link dialControlSibling}: one dead
@@ -2322,7 +2340,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * `Strand` row. A joiner (the row arrived over the control network) wants exactly this; a
      * FOUNDER wants {@link foundStrand}, which publishes and attaches in one resumable call.
      * With no explicit `founder` flag, founder-ness is derived from the row's
-     * `FounderOwnerKey` (see {@link StrandConfig.founder}) — so attaching a row THIS machine
+     * `FounderPeerId` (see {@link StrandConfig.founder}) — so attaching a row THIS machine
      * published (e.g. re-attaching its own orphan after a restart) founds it, and attaching
      * anyone else's row joins, without the caller needing to know which it is.
      *
@@ -2393,11 +2411,11 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * fresh publish also clears it for an OPEN strand, but is destructive for a closed one
      * (the key exists nowhere else). No app-data wipe is needed for either.
      *
-     * The insert is signed with the ed25519 key behind this node's PeerId — which
-     * {@link ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p} also exposes as the node's owner keypair,
-     * so peer identity and owner key are one and the same. That key is also persisted on the
-     * row as `FounderOwnerKey` (the schema pins the column to the verified signer), which is
-     * what later lets any launch derive "this machine is the founder" from the row alone.
+     * The insert is signed through this node's owner signer ({@link getOwnerSigner}), in one
+     * approval with a closed strand's party-key mint. The signer's key is persisted on the row
+     * as `FounderOwnerKey` (the schema pins the column to the verified signer), and this node's
+     * peer id as `FounderPeerId` (bound into the signature), which is what later lets any
+     * launch derive "this machine is the founder" from the row alone.
      * The key must be enrolled in `OwnerKey` (e.g. via {@link ControlDatabase.ensureOwnerKey}
      * at genesis) or the schema's `Strand.AuthorizedInsert` constraint rejects the write.
      * Failing loudly here is intentional: a silently-unpublished strand would run
@@ -2413,15 +2431,23 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *   {@link addStrand}).
      * @param type - `'o'` for open (default) or `'c'` for closed.
      * @param memberPrivateKey - Optional shared membership (read) key for a closed strand.
+     * @param sign - The `sign` of an owner approval the caller already holds
+     *   ({@link getOwnerSigner}), so a larger action asks once; omitted, this asks for its own.
      * @returns The live `Strand` row — the one just inserted, or the matching one already
      *   there. A closed strand's caller should carry THIS row's `MemberPrivateKey` forward:
      *   on a repeat it is the stored key, not the argument.
-     * @throws if the node is not started, exposes no owner signing key, the id is blank or
+     * @throws if the node is not started, has no owner signer wired, the id is blank or
      *   unusable as a storage scope key (`InvalidStrandIdError` — see `storage-scope.ts`), a
      *   row with the same id holds different content, or the control DB rejects the
      *   (unauthorized) insert.
      */
-    publishStrand(strandId: string, type?: 'o' | 'c', memberPrivateKey?: string): Promise<StrandRow>;
+    publishStrand(strandId: string, type?: 'o' | 'c', memberPrivateKey?: string, sign?: OwnerSign): Promise<StrandRow>;
+    /**
+     * The write half of {@link publishStrand}: insert `desired`, adopting a matching row a
+     * concurrent founder landed first, then mint a closed strand's party key, all under one
+     * owner approval's `sign`.
+     */
+    private insertStrandRow;
     /**
      * Found a strand — publish its row cadre-wide AND start the local instance as its
      * founder — in one resumable call. The single entry point for creating a strand; a
@@ -2438,7 +2464,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *   attempt (as the reference apps do) would otherwise present a key that does not match
      *   the membership already seated in the strand.
      * - **instance already running** → the tracked instance is returned, and — because the
-     *   `Strand` row records its publishing machine (`FounderOwnerKey`) — a founder request
+     *   `Strand` row records its founding machine (`FounderPeerId`) — a founder request
      *   against an instance that was first launched as a joiner now runs the (idempotent,
      *   insert-if-absent) founder bootstrap on it rather than silently skipping it
      *   ({@link StrandInstanceManager.foundExistingStrand}). So a strand that something else
@@ -2447,7 +2473,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *   `resolveCohortSeed` window — still ends up with its `Strand.Header` written.
      *
      * Founder-ness is resolved FROM THE ROW, not assumed: this machine founds iff the
-     * resolved row's `FounderOwnerKey` is its own owner key. A fresh publish records this
+     * resolved row's `FounderPeerId` is its own peer id. A fresh publish records this
      * machine, so the common path founds; a machine that lost a concurrent founding race to
      * a sibling adopts the sibling's row and ATTACHES instead — deliberately, since two
      * machines bootstrapping the same strand on separate replicas is the double-`Header`
@@ -2456,12 +2482,41 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * `Type` is compared, not adopted: a stored row of the other type means the caller and
      * the control plane disagree about what this strand IS, so it throws.
      *
+     * **Returning after the publish.** `foundStrand(config, { background: true })` resolves
+     * once the row is published and continues the local start in
+     * {@link FoundStrandBackgroundResult.ready}, for a caller that needs only the row (an
+     * invitation reads just its id and membership key). Publish errors still reject the call
+     * itself. A joiner that redeems an invitation to a closed strand before its start finishes
+     * is refused with the retryable `host-strand-unavailable` and the token stays unspent:
+     * {@link requestJoin} retries that on its backoff, while {@link formStrand} throws it to its
+     * caller once every machine the invitation names has refused.
+     *
      * @returns The instance AND the row the strand actually runs under — read the membership
      *   key from the returned row, not from a freshly minted one ({@link FoundStrandResult}).
      * @throws if the node is not started, the id is blank, a published row of the same id has
      *   a different `Type`, or either half rejects.
      */
     foundStrand(config: FoundStrandConfig): Promise<FoundStrandResult>;
+    /**
+     * Publish the strand's row as {@link foundStrand} does, and resolve once it is published;
+     * the local start continues in {@link FoundStrandBackgroundResult.ready}.
+     *
+     * @throws as the default form does for the publish half; the start's own failure rejects
+     *   `ready` instead.
+     */
+    foundStrand(config: FoundStrandConfig, options: FoundStrandOptions): Promise<FoundStrandBackgroundResult>;
+    /**
+     * The publish half of {@link foundStrand}: adopt the stored row or publish a new one, and
+     * derive whether this machine founds it. Every check that can refuse the founding is here,
+     * so both forms of `foundStrand` reject on it before returning.
+     */
+    private publishFoundingRow;
+    /**
+     * The start half of {@link foundStrand}. Its timing lines (`addStrand: start`, then the
+     * duration or `failed after`) are logged when the start settles, also in the background
+     * form, so a start that hangs still shows as a start line with no end line.
+     */
+    private attachFoundingRow;
     /**
      * Resume onto an already-published `Strand` row: keep its stored content, reject a type
      * disagreement. The stored `MemberPrivateKey` is authoritative — see {@link foundStrand}
@@ -2521,7 +2576,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * step, not a widening of this method.
      *
      * @param strandId - The `Strand` row id to remove (as passed to {@link publishStrand}).
-     * @throws if the node is not started, exposes no owner signing key, the id is blank, or
+     * @throws if the node is not started, has no owner signer wired, the id is blank, or
      *   the signer is not an enrolled owner (the schema's `Strand.AuthorizedDelete` rejects
      *   the write and the row survives). A rejection does NOT imply the row survived: the
      *   local stop runs after the control-plane delete has already committed, so a failure
@@ -2552,15 +2607,17 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *   `generateStrandMemberKey` mints). When a row already holds a DIFFERENT key this
      *   throws — a party has one identity per strand; rotation is a deliberate
      *   remove-then-insert, not a silent swap.
+     * @param sign - The `sign` of an owner approval the caller already holds; omitted, a
+     *   mint asks for its own (a stored key asks for none).
      * @returns The live party key: the one just seated, or the stored one.
      */
-    ensureStrandPartyKey(strandId: string, partyMemberPrivateKey?: string): Promise<string>;
+    ensureStrandPartyKey(strandId: string, partyMemberPrivateKey?: string, sign?: OwnerSign): Promise<string>;
     /**
      * Resolve the party membership key a closed strand's launch threads into the founder
      * bootstrap: the explicit attach-time key when given, else the party's persisted
-     * `StrandPartyKey` row, else — on the one machine whose owner key the row names as
-     * founder — a freshly minted-and-persisted key, which seats the identity for a publish
-     * that was interrupted before its mint. Everyone else resolves undefined: non-founding
+     * `StrandPartyKey` row, else — on the one machine the row names as founder (`FounderPeerId`)
+     * — a freshly minted-and-persisted key, which seats the identity for a publish that was
+     * interrupted before its mint. Everyone else resolves undefined: non-founding
      * machines never mint (no mint race between a party's machines), and only a founder
      * bootstrap needs the key at all.
      *
@@ -2589,22 +2646,23 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * from this row. A host minting a closed-strand invite does both (mint +
      * publish), exactly as the integration harness's `createInvitation` does.
      *
-     * Signs with the same self-owner key as {@link publishStrand} (the ed25519
-     * key behind this node's PeerId, which must be an enrolled `OwnerKey`).
-     * Throws loudly if the node isn't started or exposes no signing key.
+     * Signs through the same owner signer as {@link publishStrand}, whose key must be an
+     * enrolled `OwnerKey`. Throws loudly if the node isn't started or has no owner signer wired.
      *
      * @param token - Invitation token (the `FormationInvite` primary key); use the
      *   `token` of the {@link OpenInvitation} from {@link createOpenInvitation}.
      * @param sAppId - The sApp a redeemed strand will use.
      * @param options - Optional `expiresAtMs` (epoch ms), `totalUses`, `validationUrl`,
      *   `strandId` (bind a closed/pre-existing host strand for provision-then-record).
+     * @param sign - The `sign` of an owner approval the caller already holds; omitted, this
+     *   asks for its own.
      */
     publishFormationInvite(token: string, sAppId: string, options?: {
         expiresAtMs?: number;
         totalUses?: number;
         validationUrl?: string;
         strandId?: string;
-    }): Promise<void>;
+    }, sign?: OwnerSign): Promise<void>;
     /**
      * Enroll an approver public key allowed to sign off on `ValidationUrl` redemptions.
      *
@@ -2613,10 +2671,10 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * — this is how a party says which outside approver it trusts. Without an enrollment,
      * every such invitation is unredeemable.
      *
-     * Signs with the same self-owner key as {@link publishStrand} (the ed25519 key behind
-     * this node's PeerId, which must be an enrolled `OwnerKey`). Throws loudly if the node
-     * isn't started, exposes no signing key, or the key is blank — a blank key would reach
-     * the database and fail the signature CHECK as an opaque constraint error.
+     * Signs through the same owner signer as {@link publishStrand}, whose key must be an
+     * enrolled `OwnerKey`. Throws loudly if the node isn't started, has no owner signer wired,
+     * or the key is blank — a blank key would reach the database and fail the signature CHECK
+     * as an opaque constraint error.
      *
      * Enrolling this node's OWN owner key is permitted and harmless: the domain/action tags
      * baked into each authorization digest mean an owner-key signature can never satisfy the
@@ -2650,22 +2708,22 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     removeValidationKey(key: string): Promise<void>;
     /**
      * The approver keys currently enrolled, sorted. Read-only, so unlike
-     * {@link enrollValidationKey} / {@link removeValidationKey} it needs no owner signing
-     * key — only a started node.
+     * {@link enrollValidationKey} / {@link removeValidationKey} it needs no owner signer —
+     * only a started node.
      */
     listValidationKeys(): Promise<string[]>;
     /**
-     * Resolve the owner keypair every owner-signed control write needs — {@link publishStrand},
-     * {@link unpublishStrand}, {@link publishFormationInvite}, {@link enrollValidationKey},
-     * {@link removeValidationKey}
-     * — failing loudly in one two-part shape (not started / no signing key, naming owner
-     * genesis as the fix). Narrows `controlDatabase` for the caller: a non-null return means
+     * The owner signer every owner-signed strand write needs — {@link publishStrand},
+     * {@link unpublishStrand}, {@link ensureStrandPartyKey}, {@link publishFormationInvite},
+     * {@link enrollValidationKey}, {@link removeValidationKey} — failing loudly in one two-part
+     * shape (not started / no signer wired, naming the wiring call as the fix). Enrollment is the
+     * schema's to judge. Narrows `controlDatabase` for the caller: a return means
      * `this.controlDatabase` is non-null too.
      *
      * @param action - Infinitive phrase naming the attempted write, e.g. `'enroll a
      *   validation key'`; interpolated into both messages.
      */
-    private requireOwnerSigningKey;
+    private requireOwnerSigner;
     /**
      * Shared strand launch path for both the explicit (`addStrand`) and the
      * control-discovered (`handleStrandAdded`) entry points. Resolves the cohort
@@ -2673,10 +2731,10 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * before emitting `strand:started`.
      *
      * Founder-ness: an explicit `founder` argument wins (the formation/responder flows pass
-     * one deliberately — their consent-seated rows carry a null `FounderOwnerKey`); when
+     * one deliberately — their consent-seated rows carry a null `FounderPeerId`); when
      * unset it is DERIVED from the row, so the control-discovered path
      * (`handleStrandAdded`) and a restart's re-attach found this machine's own strands
-     * without the caller having to know. The derivation is pure key comparison — no I/O.
+     * without the caller having to know. The derivation is a pure peer-id comparison — no I/O.
      *
      * Idempotent when the strand manager already tracks `strand.Id` — the watcher
      * rediscovers a row this node already started and calls this again via
@@ -2745,10 +2803,11 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * receiver records an admission grant BEFORE `libp2p.start()` (re-)dials the
      * relay reservation — the gate denial there is fatal, not degraded. A
      * party-member relay answers the RPC (its control node admits us as a
-     * member); a dedicated ops/ relay does not speak the protocol and the
-     * per-peer failure comes back `unreachable` — harmless, it has no membership gate and
-     * needs no grant. The relay's direct addr rides along as the dial fallback
-     * for a relay we are not yet connected to.
+     * member); a dedicated ops/ relay does not speak the protocol, comes back
+     * `unsupported`, and is left out of later passes
+     * ({@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr}) — it has no membership gate and needs no
+     * grant. The relay's direct addr rides along as the dial fallback for a relay
+     * we are not yet connected to.
      */
     private resolveCohortSeed;
     /**
@@ -2811,20 +2870,25 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * `libp2p.start()`. Kept because it costs one spread and this is the one place
      * that would silently stop announcing if that rejection is ever relaxed.
      *
+     * Less the relays remembered as refusing the strand-addr protocol
+     * ({@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr}): both callers are announcement passes, and
+     * those relays hold no grant.
+     *
      * NOTE: a relay the STRAND node discovers on its own (autorelay — in neither
      * source) gets no announcement, and a membership-gated one will deny it; fine
      * now, every realistic topology feeds one of the two sources.
      */
     private circuitRelayTargets;
     /**
-     * Record the announce timestamps {@link refreshDelegateGrants} throttles on,
-     * for every relay a delegate-carrying announce pass dialed.
+     * Record what a delegate-carrying announce pass learned about the relays it
+     * dialed: the announce timestamps {@link refreshDelegateGrants} throttles on,
+     * and from `outcomes` which relays refuse the strand-addr protocol
+     * ({@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr}). Every announce site records through here.
      *
-     * Recorded OPTIMISTICALLY at announce time, whatever `collectStrandAddrs`
-     * reports per peer: a dedicated `ops/` relay never speaks the strand-addr
-     * protocol, so recording only on success would re-announce to it on every
-     * reconcile tick, one wasted protocol negotiation each. A failed INITIAL announce
-     * costs the strand supervisor its first attempt only (the relay denies the
+     * Timestamps are recorded OPTIMISTICALLY, whatever `collectStrandAddrs` reports
+     * per peer: recording only on success would re-announce to an unreachable relay
+     * on every reconcile tick, one dial timeout each. A failed INITIAL announce costs
+     * the strand supervisor its first attempt only (the relay denies the
      * reservation; every re-drive re-announces first through
      * {@link announceDelegateToRelay}); a failed REFRESH retries within
      * `DELEGATE_GRANT_TTL_MS / 2` (15 min), still inside the 30 min TTL.
@@ -2860,11 +2924,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * The throttle map is updated afterwards, so the periodic pass does not announce
      * again right away.
      *
-     * Against a dedicated ops relay (no strand-addr RPC) the request fails per-peer
-     * and `collectStrandAddrs` reports it `unreachable`: one wasted protocol negotiation per
-     * re-drive attempt, bounded by the supervisor's backoff. Never throws on that
-     * path; a relay addr that names no peer id is logged and skipped (the hook's
-     * caller runs the drive regardless).
+     * Unlike the other announce passes, this asks a relay remembered in
+     * {@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr} too, and its reply clears the entry — see
+     * there for why. Against a dedicated ops relay (no strand-addr RPC) that costs
+     * one refused protocol negotiation (`unsupported`) per re-drive attempt, bounded
+     * by the supervisor's backoff. Never throws on that path; a relay addr that names
+     * no peer id is logged and skipped (the hook's caller runs the drive regardless).
      *
      * NOTE: against a relay that is DOWN this hook costs up to two strand-addr
      * timeouts (dial by peer id, then by addr; 28.5 s each at the default declared link round trip)
@@ -3342,10 +3407,26 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     getSAppConfig(strandId: string): SAppConfig | undefined;
     /**
-     * Initialize the seed bootstrap service with an owner key.
-     * Must be called before using seed-related methods that require signing.
+     * Make `signer` this node's owner signer (`owner-signer.ts`): every owner signature the node
+     * produces from now on goes through it — seeds, vouches, removals, invitations, strand and
+     * join rows, and the background re-issues. Builds the owner-capable seed bootstrap service
+     * around it, so this must come before any of those. One signer per node; a node started
+     * with `claim` is refused (its claimant owns it).
      *
-     * @param ownerPrivateKey - The owner's private key (base64url encoded)
+     * Anchors the signer's key in the node-local trusted-owner store as `genesis`: wiring a key
+     * declares it an authority of this party.
+     *
+     * @throws when the node is not started, was started with `claim`, or already holds the
+     *   seed protocol handler (a second wiring, or {@link enableSeedListener} first).
+     */
+    useOwnerSigner(signer: OwnerSigner): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * {@link useOwnerSigner} with a software signer over `ownerPrivateKey` (`softwareOwnerSigner`):
+     * the owner key held in this process's memory. Kept as a convenience because most tests and
+     * the embedders that hold the key themselves wire it this way; one that keeps the key
+     * elsewhere wires its own signer.
+     *
+     * @param ownerPrivateKey - The owner key's 32-byte Ed25519 seed, base64url.
      */
     initializeSeedBootstrap(ownerPrivateKey: string): Promise<void>;
     /**
@@ -3392,15 +3473,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * never reach here: {@link ControlDatabase.queryCadrePeers} excludes them, so a
      * revoked peer is not addressable either.
      *
-     * NOTE: answers the whole `CadrePeerRow`, past the two fields declared; the integration
+     * NOTE: answers the whole `CadrePeerRow`, past the fields declared; the integration
      * harness (`owner-cli-node.ts`, `OwnerCliMemberRow.sig`) reads `sig` off it through the admin
      * channel to tell a row another member seated from one the subject published itself. Narrow
      * this to the declared fields only together with that reader.
      */
-    listMembers(): Promise<Array<{
-        peerId: string;
-        multiaddr: string | null;
-    }>>;
+    listMembers(): Promise<CohortPeerRow[]>;
     /**
      * Probe whether a given peer is a `CadrePeer` member.
      *
@@ -3524,11 +3602,9 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * NOTE: cost per membership refresh is one `OwnerKey` read and one `Revocation` read (the
      * tombstone list, whose `OwnerKey` stamps are handed to `queryOwnerKeyRows` so it does not
      * read the retired set again, and which the hang-up of removed peers shares through
-     * `loadTombstones`), plus the invitation chain when some owner row is
-     * invitation-admitted — shared with the membership read through `loadChain`; the memo
-     * suggestion on {@link loadInvitationChain} covers that part. Before the Revocation ledger
-     * marker is filed that one read is a cohort consult per refresh, which
-     * `control-founding-consult-budget.spec.ts` pins.
+     * `loadTombstones`), plus the owner-grant chain when some owner row is grant-seated (the
+     * NOTE in the body). Before the Revocation ledger marker is filed that one read is a cohort
+     * consult per refresh, which `control-founding-consult-budget.spec.ts` pins.
      *
      * @param retry - forwarded to every read; `false` on the refresh path, for the reason on
      *   {@link refreshAuthorizedControlPeers}.
@@ -3558,9 +3634,9 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     /** A per-refresh {@link RevocationSource}: one `queryRevocations` read, shared by every caller in the pass. */
     private revocationSource;
     /**
-     * The usage and invitation rows {@link hasAnchoredProof} and {@link syncOwnerAnchor}
-     * resolve an invitation-admitted row through, keyed for lookup. Both reads honour `retry`
-     * for {@link listAuthorizedMembers}' reason.
+     * The usage and invitation rows {@link hasAnchoredProof} resolves an invitation-admitted
+     * `CadrePeer` row through, keyed for lookup. Both reads honour `retry` for
+     * {@link listAuthorizedMembers}' reason.
      *
      * NOTE: once invitations are the only admission route (ticket
      * `cadre-invitations-redeemable-by-any-member`), every cadre with a member not yet
@@ -3571,6 +3647,12 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * when every admitted row is already memoised.
      */
     private loadInvitationChain;
+    /**
+     * The usage and grant rows {@link syncOwnerAnchor} resolves a grant-seated `OwnerKey` row
+     * through, keyed for lookup: the owner-grant twin of {@link loadInvitationChain}, read only by
+     * the anchor sync, since a grant admits no machine.
+     */
+    private loadOwnerGrantChain;
     /**
      * The owner-voucher half of {@link hasAnchoredProof}: complete voucher, `VouchOwner` in
      * the node-local anchor, signature valid over the row's (PeerId, StampId) voucher digest.
@@ -3635,11 +3717,11 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     private installSeedBootstrapService;
     /**
      * The event callbacks every {@link SeedBootstrapService} this node owns is
-     * wired with — shared by the owner-capable service ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap})
+     * wired with — shared by the owner-capable service ({@link useOwnerSigner})
      * and the listener-only one ({@link enableSeedListener}) so the two cannot drift.
      *
      * A seed applied by the INBOUND protocol handler writes no `CadrePeer` row of
-     * its own (it merges the libp2p peer store and dials owners), so the automatic
+     * its own (it merges the libp2p peer store and dials the seed's preferred peers), so the automatic
      * write-driven refresh never fires for it — yet applying it can ANCHOR a new
      * owner key, which flips rows already present from unauthorized to authorized.
      * Hence the explicit refresh here; without it a peer the freshly anchored owner
@@ -3729,13 +3811,15 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * @param multiaddrs - Optional multiaddrs for the peer
      */
     authorizePeer(peerId: string, multiaddrs?: string[]): Promise<void>;
+    /** {@link authorizePeer}'s body, signing inside the caller's owner approval when it passes `sign` ({@link claimNode}). */
+    private vouchPeer;
     /**
      * Remove a previously-authorized peer from the cadre.
      * Signs the peer ID with the owner key and deletes the CadrePeer row.
      *
-     * Removes the `CadrePeer` row only. The call that removes a machine completely (its owner
-     * key, its push token and the invitations it could come back through, in one transaction)
-     * is {@link removeMachine}.
+     * Removes the `CadrePeer` row only. The call that removes a machine completely (its push
+     * token and the invitations it could come back through too, in one transaction) is
+     * {@link removeMachine}.
      *
      * @param peerId - The peer ID to remove
      */
@@ -3745,55 +3829,121 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * `OwnerKey.Authorized`; the row stores the vouching pair). The write notifies the
      * membership hub, so the refresh it triggers has run by the time this resolves.
      *
+     * Refused while alone ({@link ownerKeyWriteAlone}): an `OwnerKey` add has no re-issue path,
+     * so one committed with no control connection would stay on this node.
+     *
      * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the new owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
+     * @param options.label - the user's name for the key ("phone", "paper backup"), bound into
+     *   the signature; trimmed, at most 64 characters, blank meaning none.
      * @returns `true` when the row was seated, `false` when the key is already a live owner.
+     * @throws OwnerKeyAddRefusedError `alone`, before any write.
+     */
+    addOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64: string, options?: {
+        label?: string;
+    }): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Whether an `OwnerKey` add made now ({@link addOwner}, or the re-add of
+     * {@link removeOwner}'s re-vouch) is refused `alone`: this node holds no control connection
+     * while the party has other members. An `OwnerKey` row has no update to re-touch, so nothing
+     * re-issues it on cohort growth, and a row written now would fork this node's history. A
+     * party with no other members cannot fork, so a solo founder adding an owner key is not
+     * refused.
+     *
+     * Waits out an in-flight membership refresh first: until `start`'s first one lands the
+     * member snapshot is empty, which would read as a party with no other members.
+     */
+    private ownerKeyWriteAlone;
+    /**
+     * Every live owner key with its label, who vouched it, whether this node's owner signer
+     * holds it and whether this node's trusted-owner anchor trusts it ({@link CadreOwnerKey}),
+     * for an app's owner-key screen.
+     */
+    listOwnerKeys(): Promise<CadreOwnerKey[]>;
+    /**
+     * What {@link removeOwner} would do for `ownerPublicKeyB64`, read without writing, for an
+     * app's confirmation step ({@link OwnerKeyRemovalPlan}): whether this node may remove it,
+     * which rows the key vouched (so the app can offer to keep them by re-vouching), and how this
+     * node's own rows depend on it (`planOwnerKeyRemoval` in `owner-keys.ts`).
+     */
+    planOwnerKeyRemoval(ownerPublicKeyB64: string): Promise<OwnerKeyRemovalPlan>;
+    /**
+     * Remove an owner key, signed by this node's owner key (which must be a different owner): the
+     * `OwnerKey` row and its `Revocation` tombstone commit together, and the tombstone rides the
+     * committed-delete seam ({@link noteGuardedDelete}), so one committed while alone is re-issued
+     * on cohort growth like every other removal. The machines the key was used on stay members;
+     * removing one is {@link removeMachine}. The owner grants the key issued stop being redeemable
+     * (the plan's `grants` names the live ones) and are not withdrawn: a tombstone over a grant
+     * nobody can redeem would add nothing.
+     *
+     * Steps: re-plan ({@link planOwnerKeyRemoval}) and throw {@link OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError}
+     * on a refusal; check `options.revouch` against the plan's dependents and throw before any
+     * write when it names anything else; refuse `alone` ({@link ownerKeyWriteAlone}) when an
+     * `OwnerKey` row is to be re-vouched, since that re-add has no re-issue path; **re-vouch
+     * first**, under this node's key, the dependents the caller chose to keep and this node's own
+     * row when the key vouched it (`ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey`, `reauthorizePeer`), so they
+     * are never untrusted in between, and stop before the removal if one fails (re-vouches
+     * already made stay, harmlessly); then the removal. The re-vouches and the removal are one owner approval. The
+     * write notifies the membership hub, so the refresh it triggers has run by the time this
+     * resolves.
+     *
+     * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
+     * @returns what was written ({@link OwnerKeyRemovalResult}).
+     * @throws {OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError} `'not-an-owner'`, `'unknown'`, `'last-owner'`,
+     *   `'self'` or `'alone'`, before any write.
      */
-    addOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    removeOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64: string, options?: RemoveOwnerOptions): Promise<OwnerKeyRemovalResult>;
+    /** {@link planOwnerKeyRemoval} with the rows it was judged from, which {@link removeOwner} re-vouches dependents by. */
+    private planOwnerKeyRemovalWith;
     /**
-     * Remove an owner key, signed by this node's owner key (which must be a different owner):
-     * the delete and its `Revocation` tombstone commit together. Refused by name when the key
-     * is this node's own or the only live owner. The write notifies the membership hub; the
-     * tombstone rides the committed-delete seam ({@link noteGuardedDelete}), so one committed
-     * while alone is re-issued on cohort growth like every other removal.
+     * The re-vouch step of {@link removeOwner}: every chosen dependent row is rebound to this
+     * node's key BEFORE the removal, so no reader ever judges it against an owner that is gone.
+     * Owners through `ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey` (a delete-and-re-add under a fresh stamp,
+     * the only rebinding `OwnerKey.NoUpdate` allows); peers through the owner re-touch
+     * (`reauthorizePeer`), which rewrites `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` and clears `VouchUsage`.
      *
-     * Removes the `OwnerKey` row only. The call that removes a machine completely, its owner key
-     * included, is {@link removeMachine}.
+     * The peer re-touch keeps the row's `UpdatedAt` where it is. The owner branch of
+     * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` does not require a bump, and bumping a self-published row
+     * would leave its `Sig` unverifiable, so unresolvable and unlisted as self-published, until
+     * the machine's next heartbeat (the NOTE on that constraint); the write-while-alone drain
+     * bumps because it re-issues an otherwise unchanged row, whereas here the voucher itself
+     * changes. A row never self-published carries no stamp to keep and gets the clock.
      *
-     * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
-     * @returns `true` when the row was removed, `false` when the key is not a live owner here.
+     * A failure rethrows and stops the call before the removal; re-vouches already made stay
+     * (the row is only re-signed by a current owner) and the caller retries. An owner re-vouch
+     * is refused alone before this runs; one whose last connection drops while it runs is logged,
+     * as {@link addOwner}'s add is.
+     *
+     * NOTE: a peer re-touch committed alone is not queued, and the drain skips self-published
+     * rows anyway, so the other machines may get the removal's tombstone without the new voucher
+     * (`tickets/backlog/bug-owner-key-removal-revouch-made-alone-is-not-reissued`).
      */
-    removeOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    private revouchDependents;
     /**
      * The cadre's machines as an app lists them ({@link CadreMachine}): one entry per live
-     * `CadrePeer` row, judged by this node's membership predicate, plus one per live `OwnerKey`
-     * whose key names a machine with no row (`describeMachines` in `machine-removal.ts`).
+     * `CadrePeer` row, judged by this node's membership predicate (`describeMachines` in
+     * `machine-removal.ts`). Owner keys are not machines; {@link listOwnerKeys} lists them.
      * Unlocked reads with the default retry.
      */
     listMachines(): Promise<CadreMachine[]>;
     /**
      * What {@link removeMachine} would do for `peerId`, read without writing, for an app's
-     * confirmation step ({@link MachineRemovalPlan}): whether this node may remove it, whether its
-     * owner key goes with it, which rows that key vouched (so the app can offer to keep them by
-     * re-vouching), which invitations it could come back through, and whether this node's own
-     * rows depend on it (`planMachineRemoval` in `machine-removal.ts`).
+     * confirmation step ({@link MachineRemovalPlan}): whether this node may remove it and which
+     * invitations it could come back through (`planMachineRemoval` in `machine-removal.ts`).
      */
     planMachineRemoval(peerId: string): Promise<MachineRemovalPlan>;
     /**
      * Remove a machine from the cadre completely, signed by this node's owner key: its
-     * `CadrePeer` row, its `OwnerKey` row when its key is an owner, its `DeviceToken` row (a
-     * removed phone must not be push-woken) and a withdrawal of every live invitation it could
-     * redeem to come back, in ONE transaction ({@link ControlDatabase.removeMachine}), with a
-     * `Revocation` tombstone per row so the removal holds on every machine
-     * ("Deletes made while alone" in docs/architecture.md).
-     *
-     * Steps: re-plan ({@link planMachineRemoval}) and throw {@link MachineRemovalRefusedError} on a
-     * refusal; check `options.revouch` against the plan's dependents and throw before any write
-     * when it names anything else; **re-vouch first**, under this node's key, the dependents the
-     * caller chose to keep (`ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey`, `reauthorizePeer`), so they are
-     * never untrusted in between, and stop before the removal if one fails (re-vouches already
-     * made stay, harmlessly); then the removal transaction. Afterwards this node forgets the
-     * machine as a dial target, and the refresh the write notifies hangs up its control
-     * connection ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers}) before this resolves.
+     * `CadrePeer` row, its `DeviceToken` row (a removed phone must not be push-woken) and a
+     * withdrawal of every live invitation it could redeem to come back, in ONE transaction
+     * ({@link ControlDatabase.removeMachine}), with a `Revocation` tombstone per row so the
+     * removal holds on every machine ("Deletes made while alone" in docs/architecture.md), under
+     * one owner approval. Afterwards this node forgets the machine as a dial target, and the
+     * refresh the write notifies hangs up its control connection ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers})
+     * before this resolves.
+     *
+     * Owner keys stay: they are the person's, not the machine's. A lost phone that held one can
+     * still sign, a fresh machine invitation it could redeem included, so removing that key
+     * ({@link removeOwner}) is the step that locks it out.
      *
      * Not undone by this call: the machine keeps every row and strand block it already synced
      * and the party's strand member keys (`tickets/blocked/decide-removed-machine-strand-access`).
@@ -3801,37 +3951,14 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      *
      * @returns what was written ({@link MachineRemovalResult}); all false when no live row names
      *   the machine here (already removed elsewhere).
-     * @throws {MachineRemovalRefusedError} `'not-an-owner'`, `'self'` or `'last-owner'`.
+     * @throws {MachineRemovalRefusedError} `'not-an-owner'` or `'self'`, before any write.
      */
-    removeMachine(peerId: string, options?: RemoveMachineOptions): Promise<MachineRemovalResult>;
+    removeMachine(peerId: string): Promise<MachineRemovalResult>;
     /**
-     * The reads behind {@link listMachines}: the live `CadrePeer` and `OwnerKey` rows and the
-     * machines projected from them, with this node's membership predicate as the `trusted` test.
+     * The read behind {@link listMachines}: the live `CadrePeer` rows projected as machines, with
+     * this node's membership predicate as the `trusted` test.
      */
     private readMachines;
-    /** {@link planMachineRemoval} with the rows it was judged from, which {@link removeMachine} re-vouches dependents by. */
-    private planMachineRemovalWith;
-    /**
-     * The re-vouch step of {@link removeMachine}: every chosen dependent row is rebound to this
-     * node's key BEFORE the removal, so no reader ever judges it against an owner that is gone.
-     * Owners through `ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey` (a delete-and-re-add under a fresh stamp,
-     * the only rebinding `OwnerKey.NoUpdate` allows); peers through the owner re-touch
-     * (`reauthorizePeer`), which rewrites `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` and clears `VouchUsage`.
-     *
-     * The peer re-touch keeps the row's `UpdatedAt` where it is. The owner branch of
-     * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` does not require a bump, and bumping a self-published row
-     * would leave its `Sig` unverifiable, so unresolvable and unlisted as self-published, until
-     * the machine's next heartbeat (the NOTE on that constraint); the write-while-alone drain
-     * bumps because it re-issues an otherwise unchanged row, whereas here the voucher itself
-     * changes. A row never self-published carries no stamp to keep and gets the clock.
-     *
-     * A failure rethrows and stops the call before the removal; re-vouches already made stay
-     * (the row is only re-signed by a current owner) and the caller retries. An owner re-vouch
-     * committed alone is not re-issued on growth (the add half has no re-issue path,
-     * `tickets/backlog/debt-owner-key-add-while-alone-has-no-reissue`), so it is logged as
-     * {@link addOwner} logs it; the peer re-touches are re-issued by the existing drain.
-     */
-    private revouchDependents;
     /**
      * Create a seed from the current control network state.
      * The seed contains peer information and is signed by an owner.
@@ -3852,9 +3979,9 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
         trustPolicy?: SeedTrustPolicy;
     }): Promise<ApplySeedResult>;
     /**
-     * Post-process an {@link applySeed} outcome: retain the seed's owner peers as
+     * Post-process an {@link applySeed} outcome: retain the seed's preferred peers as
      * cold-start bootstrap targets, and surface a seed that was accepted but whose
-     * every owner dial failed — the node is now seeded yet unconnected, and the
+     * every dial failed — the node is now seeded yet unconnected, and the
      * cold-start reconcile branch is what gets it out of that state.
      */
     private noteAppliedSeed;
@@ -3910,9 +4037,10 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * vouch the node into this cadre and keep its addresses as a dial target. The owner
      * side of the claim-secret entry in the Seed Delivery Protocol (`docs/architecture.md`).
      *
-     * Requires the seed service with an owner key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}), as
-     * {@link addDrone} does. The order is the REVERSE of `addDrone`'s: seed first, row
-     * second. A refused claim or a failed delivery therefore leaves no `CadrePeer` row and
+     * Requires the seed service with an owner key ({@link useOwnerSigner}), as
+     * {@link addDrone} does, and like it is one owner approval (the seed and the vouch). The
+     * order is the REVERSE of `addDrone`'s: seed first, row second. A refused claim or a
+     * failed delivery therefore leaves no `CadrePeer` row and
      * no retained dial target behind on this node — a phone that typed the wrong secret,
      * or scanned a node someone else already owns, has nothing to clean up.
      *
@@ -3936,7 +4064,7 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * timed reconcile pass; a caller that wants to wait for the connection awaits
      * {@link reconcileControlCohort} itself, with `addDrone`'s caveat that a pass already
      * in flight is joined rather than restarted. The claimed node dials this one back too,
-     * from the seed's owner list, when this node has a listen or relay address; a phone
+     * as the seed's minter, when this node has a listen or relay address; a phone
      * with neither is reached by its own reconcile pass alone.
      *
      * @throws {ClaimRefusedError} when the node was reached and refused the claim.
@@ -3969,13 +4097,13 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
     /**
      * Mint an owner-signed cadre invitation that a device can redeem at ANY member machine of
      * this party, the owner offline included ({@link redeemCadreInvitation}). Requires the
-     * owner key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}).
+     * owner key ({@link useOwnerSigner}).
      *
      * The invitation is an ed25519 keypair: the public half is the `CadreInvite` row's key,
-     * the private half rides in the returned bundle as the proof of possession. Whoever holds
-     * the bundle can redeem it, so an UNTARGETED, OWNER-GRANTING invitation — a bearer
-     * credential for admin rights — defaults to a 15-minute lifetime; every other kind to 24
-     * hours. One use unless `uses` says otherwise. The bundle carries the signed row (so a
+     * the private half rides in the returned bundle as the proof of possession. It admits a
+     * machine and grants nothing else (ownership is {@link createOwnerGrant}'s), so it defaults
+     * to a 24-hour lifetime ({@link CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS}) and one use unless `uses`
+     * says otherwise. The bundle carries the signed row (so a
      * member that has not received it by replication seats it from the bundle), this node's
      * anchored owner keys — every current owner this node has verified, the out-of-band ones
      * and those derived along verifiable chains ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) — (the device pins
@@ -4000,7 +4128,15 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * @throws when no owner key is wired, the anchor is empty, `uses` is not a positive
      *   integer, or neither this machine nor any other member has an address.
      */
-    createCadreInvitation(options: CreateCadreInvitationOptions): Promise<CreateCadreInvitationResult>;
+    createCadreInvitation(options?: CreateCadreInvitationOptions): Promise<CreateCadreInvitationResult>;
+    /**
+     * What the two credentials an owner mints share ({@link createCadreInvitation},
+     * {@link createOwnerGrant}), checked in this order: the owner-capable service; the anchor's
+     * keys the holder pins (an empty anchor is refused rather than falling back to the table, since
+     * a reply could not be checked against it); the use count; and the member addresses with their
+     * reach, refused when neither this machine nor any other member has one.
+     */
+    private issuedBundleParts;
     /**
      * Every cadre invitation this node holds — minted here or replicated in — with its
      * standing ({@link CadreInviteStatus}: live, withdrawn, redemptions recorded).
@@ -4044,11 +4180,9 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      * pass whose reply was lost answers the next as already a member. `options.onProgress`
      * reports each pass and pause.
      *
-     * When the invitation grants ownership, the member seats this node's key as an `OwnerKey`
-     * row by consent. The caller still has to wire that key for signing afterwards, with
-     * {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}; never `ensureOwnerKey`, the row is already there. Other
-     * machines derive this node's key into their anchors from the row's stored proof on their
-     * next membership refresh ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}).
+     * The invitation admits this node as a machine and nothing else: ownership is an owner
+     * grant ({@link redeemOwnerGrant}, {@link joinWithOwnerGrant}). A key of this node's that is
+     * already an owner here is wired afterwards with {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer).
      *
      * Limit: the reply check ({@link verifyRedeemReply}) does not authenticate the member. A
      * forged bundle, or a legitimate one whose addresses were swapped, dials a machine that
@@ -4064,24 +4198,173 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     redeemCadreInvitation(invitation: CadreInvitation, options?: RedeemCadreInvitationOptions): Promise<RedeemCadreInvitationResult>;
     /**
-     * If this node's identity key is a live `OwnerKey` here, wire it for signing
-     * ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}) and return true; otherwise change nothing and return
-     * false. For a machine that joined someone else's cadre by invitation: after an
-     * owner-granting redemption, and on every later start. A redemption seats the request's
-     * `peerKey`, the key behind this node's peer id, so the identity key is the one to look for.
+     * If `signer`'s key is a live `OwnerKey` here, wire it ({@link useOwnerSigner}) and return
+     * true; otherwise change nothing and return false. For a machine that joined someone else's
+     * cadre: after an owner grant seated its key, and on every later start.
+     *
+     * Without `signer` the candidate is the signer already wired, so the call answers whether
+     * that key is still a live owner; with nothing wired it is false. The node's identity key is
+     * never a candidate: a machine's network identity is never an owner key.
      *
      * Unlike `ensureOwnerKey` it never inserts an `OwnerKey` row, so a machine that joined a
      * cadre can never genesis-insert itself into it, and a non-owner never anchors its own key.
      * An owner whose key is already wired (an earlier call) is answered true with nothing redone.
      *
      * NOTE: a node running the listener-only seed service ({@link enableSeedListener}) cannot be
-     * wired this way: libp2p takes one seed handler, and {@link initializeSeedBootstrap} would
-     * register a second. Nothing that joins by invitation enables the listener today; if one
-     * does, replace the listener here rather than beside it.
-     *
-     * @throws when the node is not started.
-     */
-    wireOwnKeyIfOwner(): Promise<boolean>;
+     * wired this way: libp2p takes one seed handler, and {@link useOwnerSigner} would register a
+     * second. Nothing that joins by invitation enables the listener today; if one does, replace
+     * the listener here rather than beside it.
+     *
+     * @throws when the node is not started, or when `signer` names a different key from the
+     *   signer already wired (one signer per node).
+     */
+    wireOwnKeyIfOwner(signer?: OwnerSigner): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Mint an owner-signed owner grant: whoever holds the returned bundle can seat an owner key of
+     * their own through ANY member machine of this party ({@link redeemOwnerGrant}), or join the
+     * party as a machine and an owner at once ({@link joinWithOwnerGrant}), the owner that minted
+     * it offline or not. Requires the owner key ({@link useOwnerSigner}); one owner approval.
+     *
+     * The grant is an ed25519 keypair: the public half is the `OwnerGrant` row's key, the private
+     * half rides in the bundle as the proof of possession. It admits no machine and names no peer
+     * id. Whoever holds the bundle can become an owner, so it defaults to a 15-minute lifetime
+     * ({@link OWNER_GRANT_DEFAULT_TTL_MS}) and one use; `expiresInMs: null` mints a BACKUP grant
+     * with no expiry, which must be asked for explicitly and kept as carefully as an owner key.
+     * The label is the issuer's choice and goes on every key the grant seats ({@link addOwner}'s
+     * rule: trimmed, at most 64 characters, blank meaning none). The bundle carries the signed
+     * row, this node's anchored owner keys and at most six member addresses, chosen as
+     * {@link createCadreInvitation} chooses them and for the same reasons; `reach` says where a
+     * holder could redeem it once this machine is gone. A backup's addresses are those at mint
+     * time, so it can go stale if every member's address changes.
+     *
+     * @throws when no owner key is wired, the anchor is empty, `uses` is not a positive integer,
+     *   the label is over 64 characters, or neither this machine nor any other member has an address.
+     */
+    createOwnerGrant(options?: CreateOwnerGrantOptions): Promise<CreateOwnerGrantResult>;
+    /**
+     * Every owner grant this node holds — minted here or replicated in — with its standing
+     * ({@link OwnerGrantStatus}: live, withdrawn, redemptions recorded).
+     */
+    listOwnerGrants(): Promise<OwnerGrantStatus[]>;
+    /**
+     * Withdraw an owner grant: an owner-signed `Revocation` tombstone over its row, which stays as
+     * the proof behind every key it seated; those keys stay owners (removing one is
+     * {@link removeOwner}). No further redemption succeeds anywhere the tombstone reaches, and a
+     * member holding it refuses the bundle's copy of the row. A withdrawal committed while alone is
+     * re-issued on cohort growth like any other tombstone.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` when this call filed the tombstone, `false` when the row is not held here or
+     *   was already withdrawn.
+     */
+    withdrawOwnerGrant(key: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Become an owner of this node's party with an owner grant: seat `signer`'s key as an
+     * `OwnerKey` row by consent, with no owner online. `signer` holds the key to seat; its one
+     * `approve` names the party and says the key becomes an owner of it, and signs the `'consent'`
+     * digest. The grant's `'redeem'` signature is made with the bundle's private key in memory.
+     * A bundle for another party is refused before anything is pinned, dialed or written.
+     *
+     * Two paths, chosen by whether this node is a live member of the party ({@link isLiveMemberSelf})
+     * or an enrolled owner of it ({@link isOwner}):
+     *
+     * - **Local**, on a member machine: the grant row is seated from the bundle when absent (its
+     *   own transaction) and the redemption written in this node's own control database
+     *   (`ControlDatabase.redeemOwnerGrant`), replicating like any other write. Refused `alone`
+     *   under {@link addOwner}'s rule, before the approval: an `OwnerKey` row has no re-issue
+     *   path, so one committed with no control connection while the party has other members would
+     *   stay here; connect, then try again. A grant that is not live here (withdrawn, expired,
+     *   spent, its issuer no longer an owner) is refused before the approval too, unless the key
+     *   is already an owner. The bundle's `ownerKeys` are NOT pinned: this node judges the issuer
+     *   by its own `OwnerKey` table, and its anchor must not be widened by pasted text.
+     * - **Protocol**, otherwise (a device with no machine in the cadre; a node started in the
+     *   party on an empty store): the bundle's `ownerKeys` are pinned into the node-local anchor
+     *   (`'invite'` provenance, the pin a credential the owner handed out carries, as
+     *   {@link redeemCadreInvitation} pins), then the members the bundle names are dialed over
+     *   `/sereus/owner-grant/1.0.0` (`redeemOwnerGrantInPasses`), one signed request for every
+     *   address and every pass as {@link redeemCadreInvitation} dials, so a retry after a lost
+     *   reply is answered `alreadyOwner`. The member that accepts pushes its control store here
+     *   and writes the row with this node counted in its write cohort, so a member alone with
+     *   this node still commits. `options` are the invitation's (`waitForMember`, `signal`,
+     *   `onProgress`).
+     *
+     * Neither path wires the signer: call {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer) afterwards — at once
+     * on the local path, and on the protocol path once the row has synced here. A key that is
+     * already a live owner is answered `alreadyOwner` with no use spent, on both paths. To join
+     * the party as a machine too, use {@link joinWithOwnerGrant}.
+     *
+     * @throws a plain `Error` for a node not started or a bundle naming another party;
+     *   {@link OwnerKeyAddRefusedError} `alone` on the local path, `OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError`
+     *   when the issuer is not an owner here, `OwnerGrantRejectedError` `grant-spent` for a
+     *   grant no longer live here, and `OwnerGrantRejectedError` `conflict` (retryable) when the
+     *   cadre holds the grant row and this node has not synced it yet; on the protocol path
+     *   `OwnerGrantRejectedError` on a final refusal, `OwnerGrantReplyInvalidError` on an
+     *   acceptance that fails the reply check,
+     *   `OwnerGrantUnreachableError` when every address was tried (one pass only), and the
+     *   signal's reason on an abort.
+     */
+    redeemOwnerGrant(bundle: OwnerGrantBundle, signer: OwnerSigner, options?: RedeemOwnerGrantOptions): Promise<RedeemOwnerGrantResult>;
+    /**
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s local path: the alone refusal, the seat, the liveness refusal,
+     * then one approval around the consent signature and the write. Every refusal comes before
+     * the approval, so a prompting signer never asks for a redemption this node would refuse.
+     */
+    private redeemOwnerGrantLocally;
+    /**
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s protocol path, given the signed request: dial the bundle's members
+     * in passes, then refresh the membership gate, since the rows the member pushed and wrote are
+     * judged against the pins and the anchor derives this node's key from them once its row is here.
+     */
+    private redeemOwnerGrantAtMembers;
+    /** The signed request for `bundle` seating `signer`'s key, under an open approval's `sign`; the nonce is minted here, by the holder. */
+    private signOwnerGrantRequest;
+    /**
+     * Join this node's party as a machine AND an owner with one owner grant, for a node started in
+     * the grant's party that is not a member: a fresh install recovering with a backup grant, an
+     * app joining as an owner. Needs a started node with a stable identity, as
+     * {@link redeemCadreInvitation} does, and a bundle for this party.
+     *
+     * Steps, the two signatures made under ONE approval of `signer` before any dial, so a
+     * prompting signer asks once and its prompt does not span the network:
+     *
+     * 1. {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s protocol path: the member that accepts seats `signer`'s key.
+     * 2. A **self-invitation**: a `CadreInvite` row targeted at this node's peer id, one use, a
+     *    short expiry ({@link SELF_INVITATION_TTL_MS}), signed by `signer`
+     *    (`ControlDatabase.signCadreInvite`; never inserted here, since this store holds no
+     *    `OwnerKey` row for the issuer yet). Its bundle carries the grant's owner keys plus the
+     *    new key (the device's reply check wants the row's issuer among the pins) and the grant's
+     *    members with the member that accepted the grant first, since that member holds the new
+     *    key as a live owner and seats the row from the bundle; one the row has not reached yet
+     *    answers `issuer-unknown`, which is retryable.
+     * 3. {@link redeemCadreInvitation} with it: the member admits this node.
+     * 4. {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer) once the `OwnerKey` row has synced here, asked every
+     *    {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_RECHECK_MS} up to {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS}; the result's
+     *    `ownerWired` says whether it did in time, and a later call wires it otherwise.
+     *
+     * @throws as {@link redeemOwnerGrant} (protocol path) and {@link redeemCadreInvitation} throw,
+     *   and a plain `Error` for an ephemeral identity.
+     */
+    joinWithOwnerGrant(bundle: OwnerGrantBundle, signer: OwnerSigner, options?: RedeemOwnerGrantOptions): Promise<JoinWithOwnerGrantResult>;
+    /**
+     * {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer) once `signer`'s `OwnerKey` row has reached this node, asked
+     * again every {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_RECHECK_MS} until it has, the node stops, or
+     * {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS} passes: false then, and a later call wires it. Usually
+     * immediate: the member pushed its whole store, the row included, before the admission write.
+     */
+    private wireOwnKeyOnceSynced;
+    /**
+     * The started node's handles for a grant call, the bundle's party checked first: a grant for
+     * another party is refused before any pin, dial or write.
+     */
+    private requireStartedForGrant;
+    /**
+     * Is this node a live member of its party: its own `CadrePeer` row is held here and passes the
+     * membership predicate ({@link hasAnchoredProof}, judged as {@link listAuthorizedMembers}
+     * judges every other row; that listing leaves this node out)? What decides
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s path. A machine's own row is written by its enrollment (or its
+     * first self-record, for an owner's machine), so a node on an empty store, or one holding only
+     * a store a member pushed it, is not one.
+     */
+    private isLiveMemberSelf;
     /**
      * Replace this node's strand solicitation service — the formation responder every node
      * installs at {@link start}, and the initiator side of {@link formStrand}. Optional: call it
@@ -4191,8 +4474,8 @@ export declare class CadreNode implements SAppIdLookup {
      */
     dismissPendingJoin(id: string): Promise<boolean>;
     private requirePendingJoins;
-    /** This machine's owner key and signer for an owner-signed control write, or a throw carrying `refusal`. */
-    private requireOwnerSigner;
+    /** This machine's enrolled owner signer ({@link enrolledOwnerSigner}), or a throw carrying `refusal`. */
+    private requireEnrolledOwnerSigner;
     /**
      * Write a join request, or adopt the party's existing request for the same invitation: a
      * pending one as it is, a finished one rewritten as `requested` (the user asked again).