@serfab/cadre-core 1.15.0 → 1.17.0

package/dist/cadre-node.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { createLibp2pNode } from '@optimystic/db-p2p';
 import { wrapStorageWithCache, disposeStorageCache } from '@serfab/quereus-plugin-sereus';
 import { multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
 import { controlClusterPolicy, CONTROL_REPLICATION_BREADTH, DEFAULT_CHECKIN_WINDOW_MS, DEFAULT_CONNECTION_MONITOR } from './types.js';
-import { generatePrivateKey, sign } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { generatePrivateKey } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
 import { ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p, ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate, requireEd25519PublicKeyB64 } from './ed25519-key.js';
 import { strandTransportKey } from './strand-transport-key.js';
 import { assertScopeKeyCharset, assertStrandScopeKey, controlStorageScope, InvalidStrandIdError, isValidStrandScopeKey } from './storage-scope.js';
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import { MEMBERSHIP_INVITE_TTL_MS } from './strand-formation-manager.js';
 import { DEFAULT_IDENTITY_KEY_ID } from './key-store.js';
 import { loadOrCreateIdentityKey } from './identity-key.js';
 import { MemoryTrustedOwnerStore } from './trusted-owner-store.js';
+import { softwareOwnerSigner, withinOwnerApproval } from './owner-signer.js';
 import { MemoryBootstrapPeerStore } from './bootstrap-peer-store.js';
 import { MemoryStrandNetworkStateStore } from './strand-network-state.js';
 import { MemoryEnrolledMachineStore } from './enrolled-machine-store.js';
@@ -24,7 +25,8 @@ import { mergePeerAddrs, groupAddrsByPeerId } from './peer-addr-book.js';
 import { strandFretPeerAddrs } from './strand-fret-addrs.js';
 import { verifyCadrePeerVoucher, verifyInvitationAdmission, verifyRevocationSigner } from './peer-authorization.js';
 import { deriveOwnerAnchor } from './owner-anchor-sync.js';
-import { describeMachines, planMachineRemoval, revouchWithinPlan, MachineRemovalRefusedError } from './machine-removal.js';
+import { describeMachines, planMachineRemoval, MachineRemovalRefusedError } from './machine-removal.js';
+import { describeOwnerKeys, namedOwnerKey, planOwnerKeyRemoval, revouchWithinPlan, OwnerKeyAddRefusedError, OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError } from './owner-keys.js';
 import { ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId } from './ed25519-key.js';
 import { signPeerRecord, verifyPeerRecordSignature, isPeerRecordFresh, orderSignalingFirst, isSignalingAddr, currentMemberTrustPolicy, DEFAULT_PEER_RECORD_MAX_AGE_MS, DEFAULT_PEER_RECORD_HEARTBEAT_MS } from './peer-record.js';
 import { signDeviceTokenRecord, verifyDeviceTokenSignature, isPushPlatform } from './device-token.js';
@@ -37,8 +39,9 @@ import { dialPeerAddrs, SelfRelayOnlyError, CONTROL_COHORT_DIAL_ADDRESS_ATTEMPTS
 import { ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS, declaredCohortReadDeadlineMs, optimysticDialLimits, peerJoinPushBudget, relayReservationBudgetMs, relayedDialBudgetMs, relayedRequestBudgetMs, resolveLinkRoundTripMs } from './link-budget.js';
 import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.js';
 import { HibernationManager } from './hibernation-manager.js';
-import { ControlDatabase, generateStampId, isPendingJoinConflict, isStrandIdConflict, pendingJoinId } from './control-database.js';
+import { ControlDatabase, generateStampId, isPendingJoinConflict, isStrandIdConflict, IssuedRowNotHereYetError, pendingJoinId } from './control-database.js';
 import { CadreInviteHandler, encodeCadreInvitation, redeemInPasses, signRedeemRequest } from './cadre-invite-protocol.js';
+import { OwnerGrantHandler, OwnerGrantRejectedError, encodeOwnerGrant, redeemOwnerGrantInPasses, signOwnerGrantRequest } from './owner-grant-protocol.js';
 import { FormationPostApprovalError } from './strand-formation-rejection.js';
 import { PendingJoinRunner, membershipInvitesToStage, parseStoredDisclosure, requestedPendingJoin } from './pending-join-runner.js';
 import { SeedBootstrapService, mergeSeedPeers, seedDigest } from './seed-bootstrap.js';
@@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ import { createMembershipConnectionGater, UnauthorizedReservationBudget } from '
 import { controlNetworkName, installControlProtocolGuard } from './control-protocol-guard.js';
 import { StrandWakeService, dialWake } from './strand-wake-protocol.js';
 import { StrandAddrService, collectStrandAddrs } from './strand-addr-protocol.js';
-import { DelegateAdmissionStore, extractCircuitRelayTargets, dueRelayAnnounces, prunePeerStrandKeys, peerStrandKey } from './delegate-admission.js';
+import { DelegateAdmissionStore, extractCircuitRelayTargets, dueRelayAnnounces, prunePeerStrandKeys, peerStrandKey, recordRelayRefusals, relaysNotRefusing } from './delegate-admission.js';
 import { relayCircuitAddrs, resolveListenAddrs, resolveTransportOptions, RelayReservationFailedError } from './relay-addrs.js';
 import { nodeTransportsOption } from './node-transports.js';
 import { resolveRelayServer } from './relay-server.js';
@@ -85,13 +88,28 @@ export const STRAND_PEER_ADDR_REFRESH_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
  */
 export const STRAND_PEER_ADDR_RETRY_MS = 60 * 1000;
 /**
- * Default lifetime of an UNTARGETED, OWNER-GRANTING cadre invitation
- * ({@link CadreNode.createCadreInvitation}): whoever holds the bundle becomes an owner, so
- * it is a bearer credential for admin rights and lives only long enough to be pasted or
- * scanned by the device it was minted for.
+ * Default lifetime of an owner grant ({@link CadreNode.createOwnerGrant}): whoever holds the
+ * bundle can become an owner, so it is a bearer credential for admin rights and lives only
+ * long enough to be pasted or scanned by the device it was minted for. A backup grant is minted
+ * with no expiry, by explicit choice.
  */
-export const OWNER_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
-/** Default lifetime of every other cadre invitation: targeted, or granting membership only. */
+export const OWNER_GRANT_DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Lifetime of the invitation {@link CadreNode.joinWithOwnerGrant} issues to itself: redeemed in
+ * the same call at the member that just wrote the grant, so the grant's short default is plenty,
+ * and a later call signs a fresh one.
+ */
+const SELF_INVITATION_TTL_MS = OWNER_GRANT_DEFAULT_TTL_MS;
+/** How often {@link CadreNode.joinWithOwnerGrant} asks again whether its own `OwnerKey` row has reached this node. */
+const OWNER_ROW_SYNC_RECHECK_MS = 2000;
+/**
+ * Bound on that wait, the edge node's owner-step bound (`DEFAULT_OWNER_GENESIS_TIMEOUT_MS` in
+ * `edge-node/config.ts`): the join has already succeeded at the member, so past it the call
+ * returns with the key unwired rather than wait out a stalled sync.
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- cuts off by design: the call goes on with the key unwired rather than wait out a stalled control sync; `wireOwnKeyIfOwner` wires it later
+const OWNER_ROW_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS = 60000;
+/** Default lifetime of a cadre invitation ({@link CadreNode.createCadreInvitation}): it admits a machine and grants nothing else, so it need not be short. */
 export const CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 /**
  * A circuit relay as a strand-addr RPC target: dialed by peerId, with its
@@ -100,6 +118,42 @@ export const CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 function relayStrandAddrPeer(relay) {
     return { peerId: relay.relayPeerId, addrs: [multiaddr(relay.relayAddr)] };
 }
+/**
+ * What the holder of an owner grant approves on the signer whose key it seats: one request for
+ * the whole action, naming the party (as every owner signing request does) and the grant.
+ */
+function ownerGrantApproval(bundle, scope = 'redeem') {
+    const grant = namedOwnerKey(bundle.grant.key, bundle.grant.label);
+    return {
+        partyId: bundle.partyId,
+        action: scope === 'join'
+            ? `Join the cadre with this device and make this key one of its owners, with the owner grant ${grant}`
+            : `Make this key an owner of the cadre, with the owner grant ${grant}`,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Run one of the local grant path's writes, refusing `conflict` (retryable) when the grant row
+ * the cadre holds is not readable here yet, as a member answers the same failure over the protocol.
+ */
+async function refusingUnsyncedGrant(write) {
+    try {
+        return await write();
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof IssuedRowNotHereYetError) {
+            log('owner grant write refused until this node syncs: %s', error.message);
+            throw new OwnerGrantRejectedError('conflict', 'The cadre holds the grant, and this node has not synced it yet; try again shortly');
+        }
+        throw error;
+    }
+}
+/** `members` with the addresses naming `peerId` (by their trailing `/p2p/`) first, order otherwise kept; unchanged for a null `peerId`. */
+function addressesOfFirst(members, peerId) {
+    if (peerId === null)
+        return [...members];
+    const names = (addr) => addr.endsWith(`/p2p/${peerId}`);
+    return [...members.filter(names), ...members.filter((addr) => !names(addr))];
+}
 /**
  * Whether a sibling actually answered a strand-addr RPC — with addresses or
  * without — as opposed to being unreachable, unavailable, or refusing us. Decides
@@ -132,13 +186,14 @@ function unionAddrs(primary, extra) {
     }
     return out;
 }
-/** Whether a `CadrePeer` or `OwnerKey` row's proof is an invitation admission rather than an owner voucher (`types.ts` → `CadrePeerRow`, `OwnerKeyRow`). */
-function isInvitationAdmitted(row) {
+/**
+ * Whether a `CadrePeer` or `OwnerKey` row's proof is a consent admission rather than an owner
+ * voucher (`types.ts` → `CadrePeerRow`, `OwnerKeyRow`): a machine invitation for a `CadrePeer`
+ * row, an owner grant for an `OwnerKey` row.
+ */
+function isConsentSeated(row) {
     return row.vouchSig === null && row.vouchUsage !== null;
 }
-function signMessageWith(privateKeyB64) {
-    return (message) => sign(message, privateKeyB64, 'ed25519', 'bytes', 'base64url', 'base64url');
-}
 /**
  * Reject a blank identifier before it reaches the control database, where it would fail an
  * authorization CHECK as an opaque constraint error rather than an actionable message.
@@ -155,13 +210,13 @@ function requireNonBlank(value, label) {
  * Is the live `Strand` row the one a publish of `desired` would have produced?
  *
  * "Identical content" means `(Type, MemberPrivateKey)` and deliberately NOT
- * `FounderOwnerKey`: that column is provenance (WHICH machine published the row), not
- * content. Two machines of one party racing to found the same id must keep resolving as
- * "the winner's row stands" — the loser adopts the row and, since the winner's key is on
- * it, correctly comes up as a joiner (see `launchStrand`'s founder derivation). Comparing
- * it here would turn that benign race into a hard throw. `Id` is the lookup key and
- * `StampId` is a single-use nonce, so the two compared columns are all the content there
- * is. A live row matching on both is, by construction, the state a repeat publish would
+ * `FounderOwnerKey` or `FounderPeerId`: those columns are provenance (WHICH owner signed the
+ * row and WHICH machine founds it), not content. Two machines of one party racing to found
+ * the same id must keep resolving as "the winner's row stands" — the loser adopts the row
+ * and, since the winner's peer id is on it, correctly comes up as a joiner (see
+ * `launchStrand`'s founder derivation). Comparing them here would turn that benign race
+ * into a hard throw. `Id` is the lookup key and `StampId` is a single-use nonce, so the two
+ * compared columns are all the content there is. A live row matching on both is, by construction, the state a repeat publish would
  * have reached, whichever branch of `Strand.AuthorizedInsert` seated it (owner-signed, or
  * the unsigned consent branch an invite redemption uses).
  *
@@ -301,6 +356,13 @@ export class CadreNode {
          * once that database is up, on every node.
          */
         this.cadreInviteHandler = null;
+        /**
+         * Owner grant redemption handler (`/sereus/owner-grant/1.0.0`): a holder of a grant dials
+         * this machine and proves possession of the grant and of the key it seats; the handler seats
+         * the row and writes the `OwnerKey` row against this node's control database. Registered by
+         * {@link start} beside the invitation handler, on every node.
+         */
+        this.ownerGrantHandler = null;
         /**
          * Server-side push-wake fan-out. Constructed by {@link start} only when
          * `config.push` (an injected `PushNotifier` + policy) is present — without it
@@ -473,6 +535,25 @@ export class CadreNode {
          * strand is no longer running are pruned on each reconcile pass.
          */
         this.delegateAnnounceAt = new Map();
+        /**
+         * Relay peerIds whose protocol negotiation refused the delegate announcement
+         * (strand-addr outcome `unsupported`), recorded and cleared by
+         * {@link recordDelegateAnnounces} from every announce pass's outcomes. Only a
+         * party-run relay has a membership gate that needs a grant, and it serves
+         * strand-addr, so a refusal marks a dedicated relay: {@link circuitRelayTargets}
+         * leaves it out of the founding/resume and periodic announcements, which would
+         * otherwise spend a protocol negotiation on it every time (gotchoices/sereus#49). Not
+         * pruned: one entry per relay this node ever named.
+         *
+         * {@link announceDelegateToRelay} still asks every relay, remembered or not, and
+         * its reply is what clears an entry. A party-run relay registers its strand-addr
+         * handler late in its own `start()`, after its libp2p node and relay server are
+         * up, so an announcement landing in that window is refused by a relay that serves
+         * the protocol a moment later. If the re-drive hook skipped remembered relays too,
+         * that relay would stay skipped until this node restarts and its gate would deny
+         * every reservation through it.
+         */
+        this.relaysRefusingStrandAddr = new Set();
         /**
          * When each connected sibling is next due a strand-addr RPC for each running
          * strand, keyed `peerStrandKey(siblingControlPeerId, strandId)` → epoch ms; a
@@ -598,7 +679,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
         /**
          * Dial targets learned out of band, keyed by peer id, valued by the multiaddr
          * strings this node was handed (parsed lazily, at dial time). Two writers:
-         * {@link recordSeedBootstrapPeers} retains the owner-flagged peers of every seed
+         * {@link recordSeedBootstrapPeers} retains the preferred peers of every seed
          * this node applies, and {@link addDrone} retains the addresses of every node
          * this node adds. Two readers: {@link dialColdStartBootstrap} dials every entry
          * while the control database still has no siblings, and
@@ -1062,10 +1143,20 @@ export class CadreNode {
             // After the control database is up, since the handler seats and redeems against it.
             this.cadreInviteHandler = new CadreInviteHandler({
                 partyId: this.config.controlNetwork.partyId,
+                peerId: this.controlNode.peerId.toString(),
                 store: this.controlDatabase,
                 admitDevice: (peerId) => this.admitRedeemingDevice(peerId),
             });
             await this.cadreInviteHandler.register(this.controlNode);
+            // Answer owner grant redemptions likewise: a holder dials any member and proves possession
+            // of the grant and of the key it seats; no machine is admitted, so the holder's identity
+            // is not checked.
+            this.ownerGrantHandler = new OwnerGrantHandler({
+                partyId: this.config.controlNetwork.partyId,
+                store: this.controlDatabase,
+                admitDevice: (peerId) => this.admitRedeemingDevice(peerId),
+            });
+            await this.ownerGrantHandler.register(this.controlNode);
             // A node waiting to be claimed listens for its claim seed from the start: nobody
             // else will turn the listener on, and a node no seed can reach cannot be claimed.
             // Before `control:connected`, so an embedder that reports "awaiting claim" on that
@@ -1244,7 +1335,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
     /**
      * Construct (or adopt) the node-local trusted-owner anchor and seed the
      * out-of-band pinned keys from `config.trustedOwners`. The anchor's BASE comes
-     * only from out of band — genesis self-trust ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}),
+     * only from out of band — genesis self-trust ({@link useOwnerSigner}),
      * config pins (here), runtime enrollment pins ({@link trustOwnerKeys}) and a
      * claim; everything else in it is derived from that base along verifiable
      * chains through the replicated `OwnerKey` table ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}),
@@ -1524,12 +1615,13 @@ export class CadreNode {
     }
     /**
      * Persist out-of-band-established owner keys into the node-local anchor —
-     * the runtime enrollment seam: {@link redeemCadreInvitation} calls it with the
-     * cadre invitation's `ownerKeys` BEFORE dialing a member (so the anchor already
-     * holds the pins when the reply and the rows that follow are judged), and an
+     * the runtime enrollment seam: {@link redeemCadreInvitation} and
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant} call it with their bundle's `ownerKeys` BEFORE dialing
+     * a member (so the anchor already holds the pins when the reply and the rows
+     * that follow are judged), and an
      * embedder calls it with an operator-supplied pin. Idempotent. ('genesis'
      * provenance is reserved for the node's own founding key, seeded internally by
-     * {@link initializeSeedBootstrap}; 'chain' is written only by {@link syncOwnerAnchor}.)
+     * {@link useOwnerSigner}; 'chain' is written only by {@link syncOwnerAnchor}.)
      *
      * Validates every key's shape before trusting any of them (all-or-nothing):
      * a malformed entry anywhere in `keys` rejects the whole call before a
@@ -1948,10 +2040,18 @@ export class CadreNode {
      *     own strand node, so a NAT'd member's strand node can hold a
      *     circuit-relay reservation here (see `delegate-admission.ts`).
      *     Connection only: the per-stream gate below never honors a grant;
-     *  3. the authorized-member set is empty — cold start: the rows that would
+     *  3. the peer is a device whose invitation or owner-grant redemption this
+     *     node has verified and is writing ({@link admittingDevices}): its
+     *     connection carries the exchange, which must not be cut at the
+     *     provisional deadline. A LIVE OWNER GRANT does not count as expecting a
+     *     stranger the way check 7's invitation does: a backup grant has no
+     *     expiry, and counting it would admit every stranger outright for the
+     *     party's life, so the holder rides the provisional admission until its
+     *     redemption verifies, then this;
+     *  4. the authorized-member set is empty — cold start: the rows that would
      *     authorize anyone arrive by replication over these very connections;
-     *  4. the peer IS an authorized member; or
-     *  5. an open invitation is OUTSTANDING — at least one unexpired,
+     *  5. the peer IS an authorized member; or
+     *  6. an open invitation is OUTSTANDING — at least one unexpired,
      *     not-fully-consumed invitation this node minted or persisted (see
      *     `StrandSolicitationService.hasOutstandingInvitation`). A formation
      *     initiator is another party's peer by design and its token is only
@@ -1959,19 +2059,19 @@ export class CadreNode {
      *     "does this node expect a stranger at all?". REGISTERING the responder
      *     does not count: every node registers one at {@link start}, and
      *     registering mints no invitation; or
-     *  6. a LIVE cadre invitation exists — a `CadreInvite` row this node holds
+     *  7. a LIVE cadre invitation exists — a `CadreInvite` row this node holds
      *     that is not withdrawn, unexpired, has uses left and whose issuer is
      *     still an owner (`ControlDatabase.hasLiveCadreInvite`). The device that
      *     redeems it is a stranger until the redemption writes its row, and its
      *     proof of possession is only checkable inside `/sereus/cadre-invite/1.0.0`;
-     *     same reasoning as check 5, and the same expectation-of-a-stranger key.
+     *     same reasoning as check 6, and the same expectation-of-a-stranger key.
      *
      * Ordering is semantically free (the checks are OR'd) but decides who pays:
-     * checks 1-2 are in-memory, 3/4 share one control-DB read, and only a peer
-     * that is otherwise headed for a provisional admission reaches check 5's and
-     * 6's invitation lookups.
+     * checks 1-3 are in-memory, 4/5 share one control-DB read, and only a peer
+     * that is otherwise headed for a provisional admission reaches check 6's and
+     * 7's invitation lookups.
      *
-     * Caveats of check 5:
+     * Caveats of check 6:
      *  - the in-memory mint registry dies with the process, so after a restart
      *    only invitations persisted as `FormationInvite` rows still hold the
      *    window open (re-mint otherwise);
@@ -1982,8 +2082,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * When every check falls through: `'admit-provisionally'`, on every node,
      * relay server or not. The gate sees only a peer id, so it cannot tell an
      * outsider from a device whose invitation row this node has not received yet
-     * (it redeems here by seating the row from its bundle, after which check 6
-     * admits) or from a sibling whose membership row is still replicating (check 4
+     * (it redeems here by seating the row from its bundle, after which check 7
+     * admits) or from a sibling whose membership row is still replicating (check 5
      * admits once it lands; if it has not landed by the deadline, the connection
      * is closed and either side's next reconcile dial re-forms it, since outbound
      * dials are never gated). The protocol guard refuses all of them every
@@ -1991,12 +2091,12 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * {@link admitControlRelayReservation} disarms the deadline (see
      * `membership-connection-gater.ts` → "The relay-reservation seam").
      *
-     * NOTE: check 3/4 runs a control-DB read per inbound connection
+     * NOTE: check 4/5 runs a control-DB read per inbound connection
      * (`listAuthorizedMembers`); connections are rare and cadres small, and this
      * layer is fail-open behind `ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`, so the live
      * read is safe here — unlike the per-stream gate, which must consult the
      * materialized {@link authorizedControlPeers} snapshot instead.
-     * NOTE: checks 5 and 6 add two more control reads (`hasOutstandingFormationInvite`,
+     * NOTE: checks 6 and 7 add two more control reads (`hasOutstandingFormationInvite`,
      * `hasLiveCadreInvite`) for a stranger with no locally minted invitation in play, on
      * every node, and a provisional connection's deadline runs the whole decision once
      * more. If stranger connections ever arrive fast enough for those reads — on arrival
@@ -2013,6 +2113,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
         if (this.delegateAdmission.has(remotePeerId)) {
             return 'admit';
         }
+        if (this.admittingDevices.has(remotePeerId)) {
+            return 'admit';
+        }
         const authorized = await this.listAuthorizedMembers();
         if (authorized.length === 0) {
             return 'admit';
@@ -2250,18 +2353,18 @@ export class CadreNode {
      *
      * The trusted-owner anchor sync ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) runs FIRST, so the snapshot
      * built here judges `CadrePeer` rows against the anchor as the `OwnerKey` table now
-     * has it. The invitation chain both reads may need, and the tombstone list the sync and
-     * the two end-of-refresh checks ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers}, then
-     * {@link noteOwnRemoval}) read, are each loaded at most once per refresh.
+     * has it. The tombstone list the sync and the two end-of-refresh checks
+     * ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers}, then {@link noteOwnRemoval}) read is loaded at most
+     * once per refresh, as is the invitation chain the membership read may need.
      */
     async refreshAuthorizedControlPeers(reason) {
         if (!this._running || !this.controlDatabase) {
             return;
         }
         try {
-            const loadChain = this.invitationChainSource(this.controlDatabase, false);
             const loadTombstones = this.revocationSource(this.controlDatabase, false);
-            await this.syncOwnerAnchor(reason, false, loadChain, loadTombstones);
+            await this.syncOwnerAnchor(reason, false, loadTombstones);
+            const loadChain = this.invitationChainSource(this.controlDatabase, false);
             const rows = await this.controlDatabase.queryCadrePeers(false);
             const members = this.authorizedAmong(rows, await this.chainFor(rows, loadChain));
             this.authorizedControlPeers = new Set(members.map((m) => m.peerId));
@@ -2552,14 +2655,14 @@ export class CadreNode {
             list: () => database().queryJoinedStrands(),
             names: async (strandId) => (await database().queryStrand(strandId)) !== null
                 || (await database().queryJoinedStrand(strandId)) !== null,
-            canSign: async () => (await this.enrolledOwnerSigningKey()) !== null,
+            canSign: async () => (await this.enrolledOwnerSigner()) !== null,
             publish: async (record) => {
-                const signingKey = await this.enrolledOwnerSigningKey();
-                if (!signingKey) {
+                const signer = await this.enrolledOwnerSigner();
+                if (!signer) {
                     throw new Error(`Cannot publish joined strand ${record.Id}: this machine is not an enrolled owner`);
                 }
                 try {
-                    await database().insertJoinedStrand(record, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64));
+                    await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Record the joined strand ${record.Id} for the whole cadre` }, (sign) => database().insertJoinedStrand(record, signer.publicKey, sign));
                 }
                 catch (error) {
                     // Another machine of the party published this join first; its row wins.
@@ -2569,9 +2672,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
                 }
             },
             remove: async (strandId) => {
-                const signingKey = await this.enrolledOwnerSigningKey();
-                if (signingKey) {
-                    return database().deleteJoinedStrand(strandId, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64));
+                const signer = await this.enrolledOwnerSigner();
+                if (signer) {
+                    return await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Leave the joined strand ${strandId} for the whole cadre` }, (sign) => database().deleteJoinedStrand(strandId, signer.publicKey, sign));
                 }
                 if (await database().queryJoinedStrand(strandId)) {
                     throw new Error(`Cannot leave strand ${strandId} for the whole party: the join is recorded party-wide, and ` +
@@ -2583,37 +2686,43 @@ export class CadreNode {
         };
     }
     /**
-     * This machine's owner signing key when it can make owner-gated control writes: its seed
-     * bootstrap holds an owner key (`SeedBootstrapService.canAuthorize`) and the party's
-     * `OwnerKey` table enrolls it. A phone that ran self-genesis after another machine
-     * founded the party passes the first test and not the second (`runOwnerGenesis` in the
-     * reference apps), and a write it signed would only be refused.
+     * This machine's owner signer when it can make owner-gated control writes: one is wired
+     * ({@link useOwnerSigner}) and the party's `OwnerKey` table enrolls its key. A phone that
+     * ran self-genesis after another machine founded the party passes the first test and not
+     * the second (`runOwnerGenesis` in the reference apps), and a write it signed would only
+     * be refused.
      */
-    async enrolledOwnerSigningKey() {
-        const signingKey = this.ownerSigningKeyCandidate();
-        if (!signingKey || !this.controlDatabase) {
+    async enrolledOwnerSigner() {
+        const signer = this.getOwnerSigner();
+        if (!signer || !this.controlDatabase) {
             return null;
         }
-        return (await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()).has(signingKey.publicKeyB64) ? signingKey : null;
+        return (await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()).has(signer.publicKey) ? signer : null;
     }
     /**
-     * Whether this node can act as an owner of its cadre: its identity key is wired as its
-     * owner signing key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}) and enrolled in the live `OwnerKey`
-     * set ({@link enrolledOwnerSigningKey}). What the owner-only flows (`createCadreInvitation`,
-     * `claimNode`, `rentNode`) need; false before `start()`, and on a machine that joined as a
-     * member. The reference apps' "is this device an owner" check.
+     * Whether this node can act as an owner of its cadre: an owner signer is wired
+     * ({@link useOwnerSigner}) and its key is in the live `OwnerKey` set. What the owner-only
+     * flows (`createCadreInvitation`, `claimNode`, `rentNode`) need; false before `start()`,
+     * and on a machine that joined as a member. The reference apps' "is this device an owner"
+     * check.
      */
     async isOwner() {
-        return (await this.enrolledOwnerSigningKey()) !== null;
+        return (await this.enrolledOwnerSigner()) !== null;
     }
-    /** {@link enrolledOwnerSigningKey} judged against an owner set the caller has already read. */
-    ownerSigningKeyEnrolledIn(ownerKeys) {
-        const signingKey = this.ownerSigningKeyCandidate();
-        return signingKey !== null && ownerKeys.has(signingKey.publicKeyB64) ? signingKey : null;
+    /** {@link enrolledOwnerSigner} judged against an owner set the caller has already read. */
+    ownerSignerEnrolledIn(ownerKeys) {
+        const signer = this.getOwnerSigner();
+        return signer !== null && ownerKeys.has(signer.publicKey) ? signer : null;
     }
-    /** This machine's identity key as an owner signing key, when its seed bootstrap is wired to sign; enrollment not yet checked. */
-    ownerSigningKeyCandidate() {
-        return this.seedBootstrapService?.canAuthorize() ? this.getSelfSigningKey() : null;
+    /**
+     * The owner signer {@link useOwnerSigner} wired, or null: every owner signature this node
+     * makes goes through it. Enrollment is not checked ({@link isOwner} does). A caller that
+     * makes several owner writes as one action opens one `approve` on it and hands the
+     * resulting `sign` to the methods that take one (`publishStrand`, `ensureStrandPartyKey`,
+     * `publishFormationInvite`), as `adoptStrandBundle` does.
+     */
+    getOwnerSigner() {
+        return this.seedBootstrapService?.ownerSigner ?? null;
     }
     /**
      * Schedule the node's initial self-record publish + ongoing refresh shortly
@@ -2870,51 +2979,16 @@ export class CadreNode {
         return null;
     }
     /**
-     * Does the `Strand` row name THIS machine as its founder — i.e. is its
-     * `FounderOwnerKey` this node's own owner key (the key behind its PeerId)?
-     * A null/absent column (a consent-seated strand, or a hand-built row) and a
-     * node with no owner key both derive `false`: without a positive match this
-     * machine must attach, never bootstrap. Pure key derivation, no I/O — cheap
-     * enough for {@link launchStrand}'s tracked-instance early return.
-     *
-     * NOTE: reads "one owner key per machine" — the reference model, where the owner
-     * key IS the key behind the PeerId. Two machines running the SAME identity key
-     * would both derive `true` and each bootstrap on its own replica, which is the
-     * double-`Header` hazard this derivation exists to avoid. Unreachable today: that
-     * configuration also gives both machines one PeerId, which already breaks control
-     * networking well before any strand launches. Revisit if machines ever share an
-     * owner key while holding distinct transport identities — the derivation would
-     * then need a per-machine discriminator (the `CadrePeer` PeerId) on the row.
+     * Does the `Strand` row name THIS machine as its founder — is its `FounderPeerId` this
+     * node's peer id? A null column (a consent-seated strand, or a hand-built row) derives
+     * `false`: without a positive match this machine must attach, never bootstrap. A peer id
+     * rather than an owner key, so two machines holding one owner key never both bootstrap
+     * (the double-`Header` hazard), and a node derives it before any owner signer is wired.
+     * Pure comparison, no I/O — cheap enough for {@link launchStrand}'s tracked-instance
+     * early return.
      */
     isSelfFoundedRow(strand) {
-        if (strand.FounderOwnerKey == null) {
-            return false;
-        }
-        return strand.FounderOwnerKey === this.getSelfSigningKey()?.publicKeyB64;
-    }
-    /**
-     * The owner keypair (base64url Ed25519) derived from this node's resolved
-     * identity key. In the single-key reference model the owner signing key is
-     * *derived from* the node identity (see {@link ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p}), so the
-     * same key material protected in a secure enclave backs both.
-     *
-     * Exposed so the hosting app retains control of owner genesis: cadre-core
-     * resolves + protects the identity, then the app sources this pair to drive
-     * `ensureOwnerKey(pub)` + `initializeSeedBootstrap(priv)` itself — cadre-core
-     * never silently runs genesis. A future separate-owner slot would return a
-     * distinct key here instead of the identity-derived one.
-     *
-     * @returns The base64url seed/public-key owner pair.
-     * @throws If called before {@link start} has resolved the identity, or when the
-     *   node runs on an ephemeral libp2p key (no `keyStore`/`privateKey` configured),
-     *   since that key is internal to libp2p and not exposed.
-     */
-    getIdentityOwnerKey() {
-        if (!this.identityKey) {
-            throw new Error('getIdentityOwnerKey: node identity not resolved — call start() first, and ' +
-                'configure `keyStore` or `privateKey` (an ephemeral libp2p identity exposes no owner key)');
-        }
-        return ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p(this.identityKey);
+        return strand.FounderPeerId !== null && strand.FounderPeerId === this.peerId?.toString();
     }
     /**
      * Publish this node's own address record from the reconcile pass until its first publish of
@@ -3407,22 +3481,13 @@ export class CadreNode {
         if (!this._running || !this.controlNode || !this.controlDatabase) {
             return { dialed: [] };
         }
-        // 2. Classify backbone (owner) members and select a bounded dial set.
-        // NOTE: deliberately the REPLICATED table, not the node-local anchor — this
-        // only *prefers* owner peers as dial targets, so pollution costs a wasted
-        // dial while anchoring would drop legitimate co-owners this node never
-        // pinned. Same call as `SeedPeer.isOwner` in seed-bootstrap.ts. Move it to
-        // the anchor if owner status here ever gates something trusted.
-        const ownerKeys = await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys();
-        if (!this._running || !this.controlNode) {
-            return { dialed: [] };
-        }
+        // 2. Classify backbone (always-on) members and select a bounded dial set.
         const targetDegree = this.config.network?.controlCohort?.targetDegree
             ?? DEFAULT_CONTROL_COHORT_TARGET_DEGREE;
-        const { dials, cappedNonOwner } = selectControlCohortDials(siblings, ownerKeys, targetDegree);
-        if (cappedNonOwner > 0) {
+        const { dials, cappedNonBackbone } = selectControlCohortDials(siblings, targetDegree);
+        if (cappedNonBackbone > 0) {
             // Don't silently bound coverage — surface what the out-degree cap dropped.
-            log('reconcileControlCohort: capped %d non-owner sibling(s) at targetDegree=%d', cappedNonOwner, targetDegree);
+            log('reconcileControlCohort: capped %d non-backbone sibling(s) at targetDegree=%d', cappedNonBackbone, targetDegree);
         }
         // 3. Warm the libp2p address book with EVERY sibling's verified addresses,
         //    keeping what resolved for the dial loop below.
@@ -3754,8 +3819,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
         }
     }
     /**
-     * Retain a just-applied seed's owner-flagged peers as cold-start bootstrap
-     * dial targets (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}).
+     * Retain a just-applied seed's preferred peers (`SeedPeer.preferred`) as cold-start
+     * bootstrap dial targets (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}).
      *
      * Called for every seed this node accepts, on BOTH intake paths — the
      * {@link applySeed} wrapper (which may run on a throwaway service, so the
@@ -3763,7 +3828,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * `/sereus/seed/1.0.0` handler via `onSeedApplied`. Peers with no address are
      * skipped: there is nothing to dial.
      *
-     * `isOwner` is the seed's own claim about its peers, exactly as
+     * `preferred` is the seed's own claim about its peers, exactly as
      * `SeedBootstrapService.applySeed` uses it to choose its dial targets. That is
      * sound here for the same reason it is sound there — the whole seed is
      * signature-checked against a trust-anchored signer before this runs, and the
@@ -3773,7 +3838,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
      */
     recordSeedBootstrapPeers(seed) {
         for (const peer of seed.peers) {
-            if (peer.isOwner) {
+            if (peer.preferred) {
                 this.retainDialTarget(peer.peerId, peer.multiaddrs, 'recordSeedBootstrapPeers');
             }
         }
@@ -3815,12 +3880,12 @@ export class CadreNode {
     }
     /**
      * Cold-start branch of the reconcile pass: re-dial every retained out-of-band
-     * dial target (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}) — in practice the owner peers of
-     * the seeds this node applied — while the control database still has no
+     * dial target (see {@link bootstrapPeerStore}) — in practice the preferred peers
+     * of the seeds this node applied — while the control database still has no
      * siblings to dial.
      *
-     * `SeedBootstrapService.applySeed` dials those owners exactly ONCE, best-effort.
-     * When that single dial fails — owner momentarily down, relay reservation not
+     * `SeedBootstrapService.applySeed` dials those peers exactly ONCE, best-effort.
+     * When that single dial fails — peer momentarily down, relay reservation not
      * up yet, NAT traversal lost the race — the joining node has an empty
      * `CadrePeer` table and no connection, and the steady-state pass above cannot
      * help: it dials only siblings enumerated from that very table. Retrying here
@@ -3830,9 +3895,10 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * gated by "the control database has no siblings", so it stops the moment the
      * node is actually in the party, and a node that is stranded MUST keep trying —
      * a give-up rule would turn a transient outage into a permanent one. The steady
-     * cost is one dial per bootstrap peer per pass (seeds nominate one or a few
-     * owners), each failing fast against an unreachable address.
-     * NOTE: if seeds ever carry many owner peers, or the reconcile cadence tightens
+     * cost is one dial per bootstrap peer per pass (a seed prefers its minter and the
+     * party's always-on machines, a few at most), each failing fast against an
+     * unreachable address.
+     * NOTE: if seeds ever carry many preferred peers, or the reconcile cadence tightens
      * well below its 15 s default, add per-peer backoff here.
      *
      * Best-effort per peer, exactly like {@link dialControlSibling}: one dead
@@ -4114,9 +4180,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
      */
     async drainPendingRevocations() {
         const sweep = !this.reissuedHeldRevocations;
-        // A removed machine's owner key went with its row (`removeMachine`), so the schema's
-        // live-owner clause refuses every re-issue it could sign; reconstructAuthoredMembership
-        // and drainPendingPeerWrites stop on the same test.
+        // A removed machine is no longer a member, whatever owner key it holds: the others hang up
+        // on it and refuse its control streams, so a re-issue it signs reaches no one.
+        // reconstructAuthoredMembership and drainPendingPeerWrites stop on the same test.
         if (this.removal !== null || (!sweep && this.pendingRevocations.size === 0)) {
             return;
         }
@@ -4144,8 +4210,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
             }
         }
         catch (error) {
-            // NOTE: an owner whose key alone was removed (`removeOwner`, its machine still a member,
-            // so not a removal this node reports) keeps running these drains, and every attempt
+            // NOTE: a machine whose owner key was removed (`removeOwner`; the machine stays a member,
+            // so this is not a removal it reports) keeps running these drains, and every attempt
             // fails the schema's live-owner clause and lands here on each growth edge. Noise, not
             // harm; if it shows up, gate the drains on this node's key being a live owner.
             log('drain: revocation re-issue failed; leaving queued for next growth: %o', error);
@@ -4700,11 +4766,15 @@ export class CadreNode {
             await this.strandAddrService.shutdown();
             this.strandAddrService = null;
         }
-        // Unregister the cadre invitation redemption handler, for the same reason.
+        // Unregister the two redemption handlers, for the same reason.
         if (this.cadreInviteHandler && this.controlNode) {
             await this.cadreInviteHandler.unregister(this.controlNode);
         }
         this.cadreInviteHandler = null;
+        if (this.ownerGrantHandler && this.controlNode) {
+            await this.ownerGrantHandler.unregister(this.controlNode);
+        }
+        this.ownerGrantHandler = null;
         // Tear down the push-wake fan-out (releases the notifier's APNs HTTP/2 session).
         if (this.pushFanoutService) {
             await this.pushFanoutService.close().catch((err) => log('Push fan-out close failed: %o', err));
@@ -4733,9 +4803,11 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // Drop delegate-admission state: the grants are scoped to the session that
         // recorded them, so a stop()/start() cycle on this object must not keep
         // admitting delegates announced under the previous one, nor carry stale
-        // announce timestamps that would suppress the next session's refresh.
+        // announce timestamps or relay refusals that would suppress the next
+        // session's announcements.
         this.delegateAdmission.clear();
         this.delegateAnnounceAt.clear();
+        this.relaysRefusingStrandAddr.clear();
         // Control backfill first — before the database closes and the control node
         // stops — so no NEW catch-up push is issued against a torn-down transport.
         // A push already in flight is not awaited; it fails into the module's own
@@ -5072,7 +5144,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * `Strand` row. A joiner (the row arrived over the control network) wants exactly this; a
      * FOUNDER wants {@link foundStrand}, which publishes and attaches in one resumable call.
      * With no explicit `founder` flag, founder-ness is derived from the row's
-     * `FounderOwnerKey` (see {@link StrandConfig.founder}) — so attaching a row THIS machine
+     * `FounderPeerId` (see {@link StrandConfig.founder}) — so attaching a row THIS machine
      * published (e.g. re-attaching its own orphan after a restart) founds it, and attaching
      * anyone else's row joins, without the caller needing to know which it is.
      *
@@ -5114,7 +5186,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // A row this node offered itself came from the control table or is already a
         // remembered join, and a row this node founds is not a join, so only a joined row
         // from elsewhere can be a new join to remember. A founded row recorded here would
-        // come back after a restart with `FounderOwnerKey: null` and relaunch as a joiner.
+        // come back after a restart with null founder columns and relaunch as a joiner.
         // Captured before the backlog delete below.
         const rememberable = founder !== true && !this.discoveredStrands.has(strandRow.Id);
         // Store sApp config for this strand. The strand is claimed now, so it leaves the
@@ -5131,7 +5203,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
             await this.rememberForeignStrand(strandRow);
         }
         // An unset `founder` is DERIVED from the row inside launchStrand (this node founds
-        // iff the row's FounderOwnerKey is its own owner key); an explicit flag wins — the
+        // iff the row's FounderPeerId is its own peer id); an explicit flag wins — the
         // formation/responder flows pass one deliberately, since their consent-seated rows
         // carry a null column. See StrandConfig.founder. Same rule for the explicit
         // partyMemberPrivateKey: it wins over the StrandPartyKey control-row read.
@@ -5155,7 +5227,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
             // from the row and arguments passed here — so a caller that enriched either (a
             // synthetic `MemberPrivateKey`, an explicit `founder` or `partyMemberPrivateKey`)
             // is retried with less than it asked for. Inert today: founder-ness re-derives from
-            // `FounderOwnerKey`, the party key re-reads from `StrandPartyKey`, and the row's
+            // `FounderPeerId`, the party key re-reads from `StrandPartyKey`, and the row's
             // shared `MemberPrivateKey` is read only by the founder bootstrap. If a joiner
             // launch ever starts depending on that key, gate this hand-back on the passed row
             // matching the control one.
@@ -5227,11 +5299,11 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * fresh publish also clears it for an OPEN strand, but is destructive for a closed one
      * (the key exists nowhere else). No app-data wipe is needed for either.
      *
-     * The insert is signed with the ed25519 key behind this node's PeerId — which
-     * {@link ed25519KeyPairFromLibp2p} also exposes as the node's owner keypair,
-     * so peer identity and owner key are one and the same. That key is also persisted on the
-     * row as `FounderOwnerKey` (the schema pins the column to the verified signer), which is
-     * what later lets any launch derive "this machine is the founder" from the row alone.
+     * The insert is signed through this node's owner signer ({@link getOwnerSigner}), in one
+     * approval with a closed strand's party-key mint. The signer's key is persisted on the row
+     * as `FounderOwnerKey` (the schema pins the column to the verified signer), and this node's
+     * peer id as `FounderPeerId` (bound into the signature), which is what later lets any
+     * launch derive "this machine is the founder" from the row alone.
      * The key must be enrolled in `OwnerKey` (e.g. via {@link ControlDatabase.ensureOwnerKey}
      * at genesis) or the schema's `Strand.AuthorizedInsert` constraint rejects the write.
      * Failing loudly here is intentional: a silently-unpublished strand would run
@@ -5247,16 +5319,18 @@ export class CadreNode {
      *   {@link addStrand}).
      * @param type - `'o'` for open (default) or `'c'` for closed.
      * @param memberPrivateKey - Optional shared membership (read) key for a closed strand.
+     * @param sign - The `sign` of an owner approval the caller already holds
+     *   ({@link getOwnerSigner}), so a larger action asks once; omitted, this asks for its own.
      * @returns The live `Strand` row — the one just inserted, or the matching one already
      *   there. A closed strand's caller should carry THIS row's `MemberPrivateKey` forward:
      *   on a repeat it is the stored key, not the argument.
-     * @throws if the node is not started, exposes no owner signing key, the id is blank or
+     * @throws if the node is not started, has no owner signer wired, the id is blank or
      *   unusable as a storage scope key (`InvalidStrandIdError` — see `storage-scope.ts`), a
      *   row with the same id holds different content, or the control DB rejects the
      *   (unauthorized) insert.
      */
-    async publishStrand(strandId, type = 'o', memberPrivateKey) {
-        const signingKey = this.requireOwnerSigningKey(`publish strand ${strandId}`);
+    async publishStrand(strandId, type = 'o', memberPrivateKey, sign) {
+        const signer = this.requireOwnerSigner(`publish strand ${strandId}`);
         // Trim/reject here so the id that lands matches the one unpublishStrand looks up: it
         // trims too, and an untrimmed row would be unreachable by the same string.
         const trimmed = requireNonBlank(strandId, 'strand id');
@@ -5265,13 +5339,14 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // a storage scope key would otherwise reach the whole party's control database and be
         // declined once per member. Asserted after the trim so the id checked is the id stored.
         assertStrandScopeKey(trimmed);
-        // FounderOwnerKey records THIS machine as the row's publisher (the schema pins it to
-        // the signing owner), which is what later lets a relaunch derive founder-ness.
+        // FounderPeerId records THIS machine as the founder, which is what later lets a relaunch
+        // derive founder-ness; ControlDatabase.insertStrand writes the same id (its own node's).
         const desired = {
             Id: trimmed,
             Type: type,
             MemberPrivateKey: memberPrivateKey ?? null,
-            FounderOwnerKey: signingKey.publicKeyB64,
+            FounderOwnerKey: signer.publicKey,
+            FounderPeerId: this.controlNode.peerId.toString(),
         };
         // Read first rather than leaning on the insert's collision for BOTH readings. The
         // ordinary resume (an app killed after its own publish committed) then needs no error
@@ -5295,12 +5370,21 @@ export class CadreNode {
             // is a read-only no-op and a publish interrupted between the row insert and the
             // mint heals here. A row another machine published is that machine's to mint for.
             if (type === 'c' && this.isSelfFoundedRow(matched)) {
-                await this.ensureStrandPartyKey(trimmed);
+                await this.ensureStrandPartyKey(trimmed, undefined, sign);
             }
             return matched;
         }
+        return await withinOwnerApproval(signer, { partyId: this.partyId, action: `Publish the strand ${trimmed} to the cadre` }, sign, (approved) => this.insertStrandRow(desired, signer, approved));
+    }
+    /**
+     * The write half of {@link publishStrand}: insert `desired`, adopting a matching row a
+     * concurrent founder landed first, then mint a closed strand's party key, all under one
+     * owner approval's `sign`.
+     */
+    async insertStrandRow(desired, signer, sign) {
+        const { Id: trimmed, Type: type } = desired;
         try {
-            await this.controlDatabase.insertStrand(trimmed, type, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64), memberPrivateKey);
+            await this.controlDatabase.insertStrand(trimmed, type, signer.publicKey, sign, desired.MemberPrivateKey ?? undefined);
         }
         catch (error) {
             // Only the uniqueness collision is a candidate for the idempotent reading; every
@@ -5318,65 +5402,49 @@ export class CadreNode {
             log('publishStrand(%s): lost a concurrent founding race; re-read the landed row', trimmed);
             return requireMatchingStrandRow(landed, desired, 'landed concurrently from another founder');
         }
-        log('Published strand %s (type %s) to control DB under owner %s', trimmed, type, signingKey.publicKeyB64);
+        log('Published strand %s (type %s) to control DB under owner %s', trimmed, type, signer.publicKey);
         // A closed strand's publish also mints this party's own membership identity key
         // (StrandPartyKey) — the key the founder bootstrap derives Member/Manager from,
-        // deliberately distinct from the shared memberPrivateKey argument above. A failure
+        // deliberately distinct from the row's shared MemberPrivateKey read secret. A failure
         // here surfaces (the strand row has already committed, so a retried publish takes
         // the idempotent branch and heals the mint; so does the next founder launch).
         if (type === 'c') {
-            await this.ensureStrandPartyKey(trimmed);
+            await this.ensureStrandPartyKey(trimmed, undefined, sign);
         }
         return desired;
     }
+    async foundStrand(config, options) {
+        const tTotal = performance.now();
+        const published = await this.publishFoundingRow(config);
+        const { strandRow, founded } = published;
+        const logTotal = () => timing(`[foundStrand:${strandRow.Id}] total: ${Math.round(performance.now() - tTotal)}ms`);
+        if (options?.background) {
+            const ready = this.attachFoundingRow(published, config);
+            // Without a handler here, a caller that only wanted the row would get an unhandled
+            // rejection. The caller still sees the rejection on `ready` itself.
+            void ready.catch((error) => {
+                log('foundStrand(%s): background start did not complete; the strand stays published: %o', strandRow.Id, error);
+            });
+            logTotal();
+            return { strandRow, founded, ready };
+        }
+        const instance = await this.attachFoundingRow(published, config);
+        logTotal();
+        return { instance, strandRow, founded };
+    }
     /**
-     * Found a strand — publish its row cadre-wide AND start the local instance as its
-     * founder — in one resumable call. The single entry point for creating a strand; a
-     * caller joining one someone else founded uses {@link addStrand} alone.
-     *
-     * Safe to re-run from any point of interruption, which hand-rolling
-     * {@link publishStrand} + {@link addStrand} is not. Either half can already have
-     * happened:
-     *
-     * - **row already published** → the stored row is adopted rather than re-published, so a
-     *   run killed after the insert committed no longer dies on
-     *   `UNIQUE constraint failed: Strand.Id`. For a closed strand the row's STORED
-     *   `MemberPrivateKey` wins over `config.memberPrivateKey`: a caller that mints a key per
-     *   attempt (as the reference apps do) would otherwise present a key that does not match
-     *   the membership already seated in the strand.
-     * - **instance already running** → the tracked instance is returned, and — because the
-     *   `Strand` row records its publishing machine (`FounderOwnerKey`) — a founder request
-     *   against an instance that was first launched as a joiner now runs the (idempotent,
-     *   insert-if-absent) founder bootstrap on it rather than silently skipping it
-     *   ({@link StrandInstanceManager.foundExistingStrand}). So a strand that something else
-     *   attached first — the reference RN app's `strand:discovered` handler after a restart,
-     *   or this node's own {@link StrandWatcher} poll winning `launchStrand`'s
-     *   `resolveCohortSeed` window — still ends up with its `Strand.Header` written.
-     *
-     * Founder-ness is resolved FROM THE ROW, not assumed: this machine founds iff the
-     * resolved row's `FounderOwnerKey` is its own owner key. A fresh publish records this
-     * machine, so the common path founds; a machine that lost a concurrent founding race to
-     * a sibling adopts the sibling's row and ATTACHES instead — deliberately, since two
-     * machines bootstrapping the same strand on separate replicas is the double-`Header`
-     * hazard. The returned {@link FoundStrandResult.founded} says which happened.
-     *
-     * `Type` is compared, not adopted: a stored row of the other type means the caller and
-     * the control plane disagree about what this strand IS, so it throws.
-     *
-     * @returns The instance AND the row the strand actually runs under — read the membership
-     *   key from the returned row, not from a freshly minted one ({@link FoundStrandResult}).
-     * @throws if the node is not started, the id is blank, a published row of the same id has
-     *   a different `Type`, or either half rejects.
-     */
-    async foundStrand(config) {
-        const { strandId, type = 'o', memberPrivateKey, sAppConfig, awaitFirstSync } = config;
+     * The publish half of {@link foundStrand}: adopt the stored row or publish a new one, and
+     * derive whether this machine founds it. Every check that can refuse the founding is here,
+     * so both forms of `foundStrand` reject on it before returning.
+     */
+    async publishFoundingRow(config) {
+        const { strandId, type = 'o', memberPrivateKey } = config;
         if (!this._running || !this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error(`CadreNode must be started before attempting to found strand ${strandId}`);
         }
         const controlDatabase = this.controlDatabase;
         const trimmed = requireNonBlank(strandId, 'strand id');
         const timed = (step, op) => timedStep('foundStrand', trimmed, step, op);
-        const tTotal = performance.now();
         const published = await timed('queryStrand', () => controlDatabase.queryStrand(trimmed));
         const strandRow = published
             ? this.adoptPublishedStrand(published, type, memberPrivateKey)
@@ -5385,13 +5453,19 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // machine runs the bootstrap — this one must attach or it would write a second Header.
         const founded = this.isSelfFoundedRow(strandRow);
         if (!founded) {
-            log('foundStrand(%s): the stored row was published by a different machine ' +
-                '(FounderOwnerKey is not this node\'s owner key) — attaching as a joiner; ' +
-                'the founder bootstrap runs on the publishing machine', trimmed);
+            log('foundStrand(%s): the stored row names a different machine as founder ' +
+                '(FounderPeerId is not this node\'s peer id) — attaching as a joiner; ' +
+                'the founder bootstrap runs on that machine', trimmed);
         }
-        const instance = await timed('addStrand', () => this.addStrand({ strandRow, sAppConfig, founder: founded, awaitFirstSync }));
-        timing(`[foundStrand:${trimmed}] total: ${Math.round(performance.now() - tTotal)}ms`);
-        return { instance, strandRow, founded };
+        return { strandRow, founded };
+    }
+    /**
+     * The start half of {@link foundStrand}. Its timing lines (`addStrand: start`, then the
+     * duration or `failed after`) are logged when the start settles, also in the background
+     * form, so a start that hangs still shows as a start line with no end line.
+     */
+    attachFoundingRow({ strandRow, founded }, { sAppConfig, awaitFirstSync }) {
+        return timedStep('foundStrand', strandRow.Id, 'addStrand', () => this.addStrand({ strandRow, sAppConfig, founder: founded, awaitFirstSync }));
     }
     /**
      * Resume onto an already-published `Strand` row: keep its stored content, reject a type
@@ -5466,16 +5540,17 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * step, not a widening of this method.
      *
      * @param strandId - The `Strand` row id to remove (as passed to {@link publishStrand}).
-     * @throws if the node is not started, exposes no owner signing key, the id is blank, or
+     * @throws if the node is not started, has no owner signer wired, the id is blank, or
      *   the signer is not an enrolled owner (the schema's `Strand.AuthorizedDelete` rejects
      *   the write and the row survives). A rejection does NOT imply the row survived: the
      *   local stop runs after the control-plane delete has already committed, so a failure
      *   there throws over a completed removal.
      */
     async unpublishStrand(strandId) {
-        const signingKey = this.requireOwnerSigningKey(`unpublish strand ${strandId}`);
+        const signer = this.requireOwnerSigner(`unpublish strand ${strandId}`);
         const trimmed = requireNonBlank(strandId, 'strand id');
-        const removed = await this.controlDatabase.deleteStrand(trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64));
+        // One approval: the strand delete and its party key's, each with its tombstone.
+        const removed = await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Remove the strand ${trimmed} from the cadre` }, (sign) => this.controlDatabase.deleteStrand(trimmed, signer.publicKey, sign));
         // Gate on `removed`: the absent-row no-op wrote nothing, so warning about an
         // unreplicated deletion there would send an operator chasing a phantom.
         if (removed && this.committedAlone()) {
@@ -5518,12 +5593,12 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // row is already gone — there is nothing to suppress — and an id re-published before
         // the next poll's suppression cleanup would then never be offered again this session.
         // (Same reasoning as handleStrandRemoved, which also avoids stopStrand's `_running`
-        // guard; here the guard is already satisfied by requireOwnerSigningKey above.)
+        // guard; here the guard is already satisfied by requireOwnerSigner above.)
         await this.strandWatcher?.forcePoll();
         if (this.strandManager.getInstance(trimmed)) {
             await this.detachStrand(trimmed);
         }
-        log('Unpublished strand %s from control DB under owner %s', trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64);
+        log('Unpublished strand %s from control DB under owner %s', trimmed, signer.publicKey);
     }
     /**
      * Seat this party's own strand membership identity key — the `StrandPartyKey` row —
@@ -5549,11 +5624,13 @@ export class CadreNode {
      *   `generateStrandMemberKey` mints). When a row already holds a DIFFERENT key this
      *   throws — a party has one identity per strand; rotation is a deliberate
      *   remove-then-insert, not a silent swap.
+     * @param sign - The `sign` of an owner approval the caller already holds; omitted, a
+     *   mint asks for its own (a stored key asks for none).
      * @returns The live party key: the one just seated, or the stored one.
      */
-    async ensureStrandPartyKey(strandId, partyMemberPrivateKey) {
+    async ensureStrandPartyKey(strandId, partyMemberPrivateKey, sign) {
         const trimmed = requireNonBlank(strandId, 'strand id');
-        const signingKey = this.requireOwnerSigningKey(`seat a party key for strand ${trimmed}`);
+        const signer = this.requireOwnerSigner(`seat a party key for strand ${trimmed}`);
         const existing = await this.controlDatabase.queryStrandPartyKey(trimmed);
         if (existing !== null) {
             if (partyMemberPrivateKey !== undefined && partyMemberPrivateKey !== existing) {
@@ -5566,7 +5643,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
         }
         const key = partyMemberPrivateKey ?? await generateStrandMemberKey();
         try {
-            await this.controlDatabase.insertStrandPartyKey(trimmed, key, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64));
+            await withinOwnerApproval(signer, { partyId: this.partyId, action: `Seat this cadre's membership key for the strand ${trimmed}` }, sign, (approved) => this.controlDatabase.insertStrandPartyKey(trimmed, key, signer.publicKey, approved));
         }
         catch (error) {
             // The read and the insert are not atomic; a concurrent seat of the same strand's
@@ -5580,15 +5657,15 @@ export class CadreNode {
             log('ensureStrandPartyKey(%s): lost a concurrent seat race; adopting the landed key', trimmed);
             return landed;
         }
-        log('Seated strand party key for %s under owner %s', trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64);
+        log('Seated strand party key for %s under owner %s', trimmed, signer.publicKey);
         return key;
     }
     /**
      * Resolve the party membership key a closed strand's launch threads into the founder
      * bootstrap: the explicit attach-time key when given, else the party's persisted
-     * `StrandPartyKey` row, else — on the one machine whose owner key the row names as
-     * founder — a freshly minted-and-persisted key, which seats the identity for a publish
-     * that was interrupted before its mint. Everyone else resolves undefined: non-founding
+     * `StrandPartyKey` row, else — on the one machine the row names as founder (`FounderPeerId`)
+     * — a freshly minted-and-persisted key, which seats the identity for a publish that was
+     * interrupted before its mint. Everyone else resolves undefined: non-founding
      * machines never mint (no mint race between a party's machines), and only a founder
      * bootstrap needs the key at all.
      *
@@ -5618,6 +5695,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
         if (!this.isSelfFoundedRow(strand)) {
             return undefined;
         }
+        // NOTE: founder-ness no longer waits for the owner signer, so a founding machine's launch
+        // that runs before the embedder wires it throws here and the watcher retries on its backoff;
+        // if that shows up as restart noise, skip the heal until `getOwnerSigner()` is set.
         return await this.ensureStrandPartyKey(strand.Id);
     }
     /**
@@ -5632,24 +5712,25 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * from this row. A host minting a closed-strand invite does both (mint +
      * publish), exactly as the integration harness's `createInvitation` does.
      *
-     * Signs with the same self-owner key as {@link publishStrand} (the ed25519
-     * key behind this node's PeerId, which must be an enrolled `OwnerKey`).
-     * Throws loudly if the node isn't started or exposes no signing key.
+     * Signs through the same owner signer as {@link publishStrand}, whose key must be an
+     * enrolled `OwnerKey`. Throws loudly if the node isn't started or has no owner signer wired.
      *
      * @param token - Invitation token (the `FormationInvite` primary key); use the
      *   `token` of the {@link OpenInvitation} from {@link createOpenInvitation}.
      * @param sAppId - The sApp a redeemed strand will use.
      * @param options - Optional `expiresAtMs` (epoch ms), `totalUses`, `validationUrl`,
      *   `strandId` (bind a closed/pre-existing host strand for provision-then-record).
+     * @param sign - The `sign` of an owner approval the caller already holds; omitted, this
+     *   asks for its own.
      */
-    async publishFormationInvite(token, sAppId, options = {}) {
-        const signingKey = this.requireOwnerSigningKey(`publish formation invite ${token}`);
-        await this.controlDatabase.insertFormationInvite(token, sAppId, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64), options);
+    async publishFormationInvite(token, sAppId, options = {}, sign) {
+        const signer = this.requireOwnerSigner(`publish formation invite ${token}`);
+        await withinOwnerApproval(signer, { partyId: this.partyId, action: `Publish an invitation to the app ${sAppId}` }, sign, (approved) => this.controlDatabase.insertFormationInvite(token, sAppId, signer.publicKey, approved, options));
         // A host may publish an invite whose token was minted elsewhere; registering
         // it locally opens the connection gate's formation exemption immediately
         // rather than waiting for the durable row to become readable.
         this.strandSolicitationService?.registerMintedInvitation(token, options.expiresAtMs ?? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY);
-        log('Published formation invite %s (sApp %s) under owner %s', token, sAppId, signingKey.publicKeyB64);
+        log('Published formation invite %s (sApp %s) under owner %s', token, sAppId, signer.publicKey);
     }
     /**
      * Enroll an approver public key allowed to sign off on `ValidationUrl` redemptions.
@@ -5659,10 +5740,10 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * — this is how a party says which outside approver it trusts. Without an enrollment,
      * every such invitation is unredeemable.
      *
-     * Signs with the same self-owner key as {@link publishStrand} (the ed25519 key behind
-     * this node's PeerId, which must be an enrolled `OwnerKey`). Throws loudly if the node
-     * isn't started, exposes no signing key, or the key is blank — a blank key would reach
-     * the database and fail the signature CHECK as an opaque constraint error.
+     * Signs through the same owner signer as {@link publishStrand}, whose key must be an
+     * enrolled `OwnerKey`. Throws loudly if the node isn't started, has no owner signer wired,
+     * or the key is blank — a blank key would reach the database and fail the signature CHECK
+     * as an opaque constraint error.
      *
      * Enrolling this node's OWN owner key is permitted and harmless: the domain/action tags
      * baked into each authorization digest mean an owner-key signature can never satisfy the
@@ -5677,10 +5758,10 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * @param key - Approver public key to enroll (base64url ed25519 public key).
      */
     async enrollValidationKey(key) {
-        const signingKey = this.requireOwnerSigningKey('enroll a validation key');
+        const signer = this.requireOwnerSigner('enroll a validation key');
         const trimmed = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(key, 'validation key');
-        await this.controlDatabase.insertValidationKey(trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64));
-        log('Enrolled validation key %s under owner %s', trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64);
+        await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Trust the approver key ${trimmed}` }, (sign) => this.controlDatabase.insertValidationKey(trimmed, signer.publicKey, sign));
+        log('Enrolled validation key %s under owner %s', trimmed, signer.publicKey);
     }
     /**
      * Remove an approver public key.
@@ -5699,15 +5780,15 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * @param key - Approver public key to remove (base64url ed25519 public key).
      */
     async removeValidationKey(key) {
-        const signingKey = this.requireOwnerSigningKey('remove a validation key');
+        const signer = this.requireOwnerSigner('remove a validation key');
         const trimmed = requireNonBlank(key, 'validation key');
-        await this.controlDatabase.deleteValidationKey(trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64));
-        log('Removed validation key %s under owner %s', trimmed, signingKey.publicKeyB64);
+        await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Stop trusting the approver key ${trimmed}` }, (sign) => this.controlDatabase.deleteValidationKey(trimmed, signer.publicKey, sign));
+        log('Removed validation key %s under owner %s', trimmed, signer.publicKey);
     }
     /**
      * The approver keys currently enrolled, sorted. Read-only, so unlike
-     * {@link enrollValidationKey} / {@link removeValidationKey} it needs no owner signing
-     * key — only a started node.
+     * {@link enrollValidationKey} / {@link removeValidationKey} it needs no owner signer —
+     * only a started node.
      */
     async listValidationKeys() {
         if (!this._running || !this.controlDatabase) {
@@ -5716,28 +5797,27 @@ export class CadreNode {
         return await this.controlDatabase.queryValidationKeys();
     }
     /**
-     * Resolve the owner keypair every owner-signed control write needs — {@link publishStrand},
-     * {@link unpublishStrand}, {@link publishFormationInvite}, {@link enrollValidationKey},
-     * {@link removeValidationKey}
-     * — failing loudly in one two-part shape (not started / no signing key, naming owner
-     * genesis as the fix). Narrows `controlDatabase` for the caller: a non-null return means
+     * The owner signer every owner-signed strand write needs — {@link publishStrand},
+     * {@link unpublishStrand}, {@link ensureStrandPartyKey}, {@link publishFormationInvite},
+     * {@link enrollValidationKey}, {@link removeValidationKey} — failing loudly in one two-part
+     * shape (not started / no signer wired, naming the wiring call as the fix). Enrollment is the
+     * schema's to judge. Narrows `controlDatabase` for the caller: a return means
      * `this.controlDatabase` is non-null too.
      *
      * @param action - Infinitive phrase naming the attempted write, e.g. `'enroll a
      *   validation key'`; interpolated into both messages.
      */
-    requireOwnerSigningKey(action) {
+    requireOwnerSigner(action) {
         if (!this._running || !this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error(`CadreNode must be started before attempting to ${action}`);
         }
-        const signingKey = this.getSelfSigningKey();
-        if (!signingKey) {
-            throw new Error(`Cannot ${action}: no owner signing key available ` +
-                '(node identity is unavailable or does not match the node PeerId). Run owner ' +
-                'genesis (ensureOwnerKey + initializeSeedBootstrap) before writing owner-signed ' +
-                'control state.');
+        const signer = this.getOwnerSigner();
+        if (!signer) {
+            throw new Error(`Cannot ${action}: the owner signer is not initialized. Wire this node's owner key ` +
+                '(useOwnerSigner, or initializeSeedBootstrap for a key held in memory) before writing ' +
+                'owner-signed control state.');
         }
-        return signingKey;
+        return signer;
     }
     /**
      * Shared strand launch path for both the explicit (`addStrand`) and the
@@ -5746,10 +5826,10 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * before emitting `strand:started`.
      *
      * Founder-ness: an explicit `founder` argument wins (the formation/responder flows pass
-     * one deliberately — their consent-seated rows carry a null `FounderOwnerKey`); when
+     * one deliberately — their consent-seated rows carry a null `FounderPeerId`); when
      * unset it is DERIVED from the row, so the control-discovered path
      * (`handleStrandAdded`) and a restart's re-attach found this machine's own strands
-     * without the caller having to know. The derivation is pure key comparison — no I/O.
+     * without the caller having to know. The derivation is a pure peer-id comparison — no I/O.
      *
      * Idempotent when the strand manager already tracks `strand.Id` — the watcher
      * rediscovers a row this node already started and calls this again via
@@ -5998,10 +6078,11 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * receiver records an admission grant BEFORE `libp2p.start()` (re-)dials the
      * relay reservation — the gate denial there is fatal, not degraded. A
      * party-member relay answers the RPC (its control node admits us as a
-     * member); a dedicated ops/ relay does not speak the protocol and the
-     * per-peer failure comes back `unreachable` — harmless, it has no membership gate and
-     * needs no grant. The relay's direct addr rides along as the dial fallback
-     * for a relay we are not yet connected to.
+     * member); a dedicated ops/ relay does not speak the protocol, comes back
+     * `unsupported`, and is left out of later passes
+     * ({@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr}) — it has no membership gate and needs no
+     * grant. The relay's direct addr rides along as the dial fallback for a relay
+     * we are not yet connected to.
      */
     async resolveCohortSeed(strandId, delegatePeerId) {
         const siblings = await this.resolveSiblingSeed(strandId, delegatePeerId);
@@ -6028,16 +6109,17 @@ export class CadreNode {
                 targets.push(relayStrandAddrPeer(relay));
             }
         }
-        const bootstrapNodes = targets.length
-            ? (await this.collectSiblingStrandAddrs(this.controlNode, targets, strandId, delegatePeerId)).addrs
-            : [];
+        if (targets.length === 0) {
+            return [];
+        }
+        const { addrs, outcomes } = await this.collectSiblingStrandAddrs(this.controlNode, targets, strandId, delegatePeerId);
         // Throttle state for the RELAY targets only — refreshDelegateGrants never
         // looks up a sibling key, so recording one would only be dead weight. The
         // siblings' refresh due times are deliberately left alone too: stamping here
         // would race the refresh pass's pruning while the strand node is still coming
         // up, and all it would save is one extra RPC per sibling on the first tick.
-        this.recordDelegateAnnounces(relays.map((r) => r.relayPeerId), strandId);
-        return bootstrapNodes;
+        this.recordDelegateAnnounces(relays.map((r) => r.relayPeerId), strandId, outcomes);
+        return addrs;
     }
     /**
      * The co-cadre siblings worth sending a strand-addr RPC to right now: cohort
@@ -6102,34 +6184,41 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * `libp2p.start()`. Kept because it costs one spread and this is the one place
      * that would silently stop announcing if that rejection is ever relaxed.
      *
+     * Less the relays remembered as refusing the strand-addr protocol
+     * ({@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr}): both callers are announcement passes, and
+     * those relays hold no grant.
+     *
      * NOTE: a relay the STRAND node discovers on its own (autorelay — in neither
      * source) gets no announcement, and a membership-gated one will deny it; fine
      * now, every realistic topology feeds one of the two sources.
      */
     circuitRelayTargets() {
-        return extractCircuitRelayTargets([
+        const relays = extractCircuitRelayTargets([
             ...relayCircuitAddrs(this.config.network?.relayAddrs ?? []),
             ...(this.config.network?.listenAddrs ?? []),
             ...(this.controlNode?.getMultiaddrs().map(String) ?? [])
         ]);
+        return relaysNotRefusing(relays, this.relaysRefusingStrandAddr);
     }
     /**
-     * Record the announce timestamps {@link refreshDelegateGrants} throttles on,
-     * for every relay a delegate-carrying announce pass dialed.
+     * Record what a delegate-carrying announce pass learned about the relays it
+     * dialed: the announce timestamps {@link refreshDelegateGrants} throttles on,
+     * and from `outcomes` which relays refuse the strand-addr protocol
+     * ({@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr}). Every announce site records through here.
      *
-     * Recorded OPTIMISTICALLY at announce time, whatever `collectStrandAddrs`
-     * reports per peer: a dedicated `ops/` relay never speaks the strand-addr
-     * protocol, so recording only on success would re-announce to it on every
-     * reconcile tick, one wasted protocol negotiation each. A failed INITIAL announce
-     * costs the strand supervisor its first attempt only (the relay denies the
+     * Timestamps are recorded OPTIMISTICALLY, whatever `collectStrandAddrs` reports
+     * per peer: recording only on success would re-announce to an unreachable relay
+     * on every reconcile tick, one dial timeout each. A failed INITIAL announce costs
+     * the strand supervisor its first attempt only (the relay denies the
      * reservation; every re-drive re-announces first through
      * {@link announceDelegateToRelay}); a failed REFRESH retries within
      * `DELEGATE_GRANT_TTL_MS / 2` (15 min), still inside the 30 min TTL.
      */
-    recordDelegateAnnounces(relayPeerIds, strandId, now = Date.now()) {
+    recordDelegateAnnounces(relayPeerIds, strandId, outcomes, now = Date.now()) {
         for (const relayPeerId of relayPeerIds) {
             this.delegateAnnounceAt.set(peerStrandKey(relayPeerId, strandId), now);
         }
+        recordRelayRefusals(this.relaysRefusingStrandAddr, relayPeerIds, outcomes);
     }
     /**
      * Re-announce every running strand's delegate peerId to this node's circuit
@@ -6182,11 +6271,12 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * The throttle map is updated afterwards, so the periodic pass does not announce
      * again right away.
      *
-     * Against a dedicated ops relay (no strand-addr RPC) the request fails per-peer
-     * and `collectStrandAddrs` reports it `unreachable`: one wasted protocol negotiation per
-     * re-drive attempt, bounded by the supervisor's backoff. Never throws on that
-     * path; a relay addr that names no peer id is logged and skipped (the hook's
-     * caller runs the drive regardless).
+     * Unlike the other announce passes, this asks a relay remembered in
+     * {@link relaysRefusingStrandAddr} too, and its reply clears the entry — see
+     * there for why. Against a dedicated ops relay (no strand-addr RPC) that costs
+     * one refused protocol negotiation (`unsupported`) per re-drive attempt, bounded
+     * by the supervisor's backoff. Never throws on that path; a relay addr that names
+     * no peer id is logged and skipped (the hook's caller runs the drive regardless).
      *
      * NOTE: against a relay that is DOWN this hook costs up to two strand-addr
      * timeouts (dial by peer id, then by addr; 28.5 s each at the default declared link round trip)
@@ -6208,8 +6298,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
             log('announceDelegateToRelay: relay addr %s names no peer id; strand %s not announced', relayAddr, strandId);
             return;
         }
-        await this.collectSiblingStrandAddrs(controlNode, [{ peerId: relayPeerId, addrs: [multiaddr(relayAddr)] }], strandId, delegatePeerId);
-        this.recordDelegateAnnounces([relayPeerId], strandId);
+        const { outcomes } = await this.collectSiblingStrandAddrs(controlNode, [{ peerId: relayPeerId, addrs: [multiaddr(relayAddr)] }], strandId, delegatePeerId);
+        this.recordDelegateAnnounces([relayPeerId], strandId, outcomes);
     }
     /** One strand's share of {@link refreshDelegateGrants}: announce to the relays whose grant is due. */
     async announceDelegateToDueRelays(strandId, delegatePeerId, relays, now) {
@@ -6221,8 +6311,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
         if (due.length === 0) {
             return;
         }
-        await this.collectSiblingStrandAddrs(controlNode, due.map(relayStrandAddrPeer), strandId, delegatePeerId);
-        this.recordDelegateAnnounces(due.map((relay) => relay.relayPeerId), strandId, now);
+        const { outcomes } = await this.collectSiblingStrandAddrs(controlNode, due.map(relayStrandAddrPeer), strandId, delegatePeerId);
+        this.recordDelegateAnnounces(due.map((relay) => relay.relayPeerId), strandId, outcomes, now);
     }
     /**
      * Keep each running strand's own libp2p address book warm: re-merge the address
@@ -7081,12 +7171,19 @@ export class CadreNode {
     // Seed Bootstrap API
     // ============================================================================
     /**
-     * Initialize the seed bootstrap service with an owner key.
-     * Must be called before using seed-related methods that require signing.
+     * Make `signer` this node's owner signer (`owner-signer.ts`): every owner signature the node
+     * produces from now on goes through it — seeds, vouches, removals, invitations, strand and
+     * join rows, and the background re-issues. Builds the owner-capable seed bootstrap service
+     * around it, so this must come before any of those. One signer per node; a node started
+     * with `claim` is refused (its claimant owns it).
+     *
+     * Anchors the signer's key in the node-local trusted-owner store as `genesis`: wiring a key
+     * declares it an authority of this party.
      *
-     * @param ownerPrivateKey - The owner's private key (base64url encoded)
+     * @throws when the node is not started, was started with `claim`, or already holds the
+     *   seed protocol handler (a second wiring, or {@link enableSeedListener} first).
      */
-    async initializeSeedBootstrap(ownerPrivateKey) {
+    async useOwnerSigner(signer) {
         if (!this.controlNode || !this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before initializing seed bootstrap');
         }
@@ -7096,9 +7193,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
         if (this.config.claim) {
             throw new Error('CadreNode: a node started with `claim` is owned by its claimant and cannot initialize seed bootstrap with an owner key');
         }
-        // A node wiring seed-bootstrap with an owner PRIVATE key is declaring that
-        // key an authority of its own party (founder genesis / self-signing owner)
-        // — anchor it in the node-local store. The in-memory set updates
+        // A node wiring an owner signer is declaring its key an authority of its own
+        // party (founder genesis / self-signing owner) — anchor it in the node-local
+        // store. The in-memory set updates
         // synchronously (see TrustedOwnerStore.trust); only the file persist is
         // fire-and-forget, logged on failure.
         // NOTE: wiring a key that is not a live owner here self-anchors a key that is
@@ -7106,11 +7203,11 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // it: a `genesis` entry is base, kept whether or not a live `OwnerKey` row
         // vouches it. A machine that joined by invitation reaches this only through
         // `wireOwnKeyIfOwner`, which checks the row first, so a joined non-owner never
-        // self-anchors. Three callers still wire unconditionally on every start, so a
-        // node of theirs started for a party founded elsewhere does: the phone kit's
-        // `runOwnerGenesis` (cadre-rn; only for a party its saved start does not record
-        // as joined, whose starts call `wireOwnKeyIfOwner` instead), the web reference
-        // app's start (`cadre-web.ts`) and `cadre start --owner`. Contained while the store does
+        // self-anchors. The founded-party starts (cadre-cli `start-owner.ts`, the phone
+        // kit's `runOwnerGenesis`, the web app's `cadre-web.ts`) wire a key only after
+        // inserting it as the founding row or finding it a live owner, but they judge
+        // "founding" on local rows, so one started on a store that has not synced a party
+        // founded elsewhere genesis-inserts and self-anchors its key. Contained while the store does
         // not replicate and such a node cannot mint: `createCadreInvitation` hands out
         // the anchor as the device's pins, but the `CadreInvite` insert needs a live
         // owner as issuer. If anything hands out the anchor without that check, gate
@@ -7120,23 +7217,34 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // identity key alone.
         if (this.trustedOwnerStore) {
             void this.trustedOwnerStore
-                .trust(ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate(ownerPrivateKey), 'genesis')
+                .trust(signer.publicKey, 'genesis')
                 .catch((error) => log('Trusted-owner genesis anchor persist failed: %o', error));
         }
         await this.installSeedBootstrapService(new SeedBootstrapService({
             partyId: this.config.controlNetwork.partyId,
-            ownerPrivateKey,
+            ownerSigner: signer,
             ...this.seedServiceBudgets(),
             trustPolicy: this.inboundSeedTrustPolicy(),
             // Seed trust anchors on the node-local store (seeded just above with this
             // node's own genesis key), never on the replicated OwnerKey table.
             ...(this.trustedOwnerStore ? { trustedOwners: this.trustedOwnerStore } : {}),
         }), this.controlNode, this.controlDatabase);
-        log('Seed bootstrap service initialized');
+        log('Owner signer wired (owner key %s)', signer.publicKey);
         // Embedders wire the owner key after start(), so the runner's first pass usually found
         // this machine not yet an owner; without this it would wait a full poll interval.
         this.pendingJoinRunner?.kick();
     }
+    /**
+     * {@link useOwnerSigner} with a software signer over `ownerPrivateKey` (`softwareOwnerSigner`):
+     * the owner key held in this process's memory. Kept as a convenience because most tests and
+     * the embedders that hold the key themselves wire it this way; one that keeps the key
+     * elsewhere wires its own signer.
+     *
+     * @param ownerPrivateKey - The owner key's 32-byte Ed25519 seed, base64url.
+     */
+    async initializeSeedBootstrap(ownerPrivateKey) {
+        await this.useOwnerSigner(softwareOwnerSigner(ownerPrivateKey));
+    }
     /**
      * Push the multiaddrs that future invites should advertise. Pass `null` to
      * revert to the libp2p-reported addresses (the default). The host calls this
@@ -7211,7 +7319,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * never reach here: {@link ControlDatabase.queryCadrePeers} excludes them, so a
      * revoked peer is not addressable either.
      *
-     * NOTE: answers the whole `CadrePeerRow`, past the two fields declared; the integration
+     * NOTE: answers the whole `CadrePeerRow`, past the fields declared; the integration
      * harness (`owner-cli-node.ts`, `OwnerCliMemberRow.sig`) reads `sig` off it through the admin
      * channel to tell a row another member seated from one the subject published itself. Narrow
      * this to the declared fields only together with that reader.
@@ -7308,7 +7416,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
     }
     /** The invitation chain, loaded only when some row in `rows` is invitation-admitted. */
     async chainFor(rows, loadChain) {
-        return rows.some(isInvitationAdmitted) ? await loadChain() : null;
+        return rows.some(isConsentSeated) ? await loadChain() : null;
     }
     /**
      * The authorized members among `rows`, already read: checks 1 to 4 of
@@ -7339,7 +7447,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * one an owner re-vouch leaves behind.
      */
     hasAnchoredProof(row, chain) {
-        if (!isInvitationAdmitted(row)) {
+        if (!isConsentSeated(row)) {
             return this.hasAnchoredVoucher(row);
         }
         const usage = chain?.usages.get(row.vouchUsage);
@@ -7378,17 +7486,15 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * NOTE: cost per membership refresh is one `OwnerKey` read and one `Revocation` read (the
      * tombstone list, whose `OwnerKey` stamps are handed to `queryOwnerKeyRows` so it does not
      * read the retired set again, and which the hang-up of removed peers shares through
-     * `loadTombstones`), plus the invitation chain when some owner row is
-     * invitation-admitted — shared with the membership read through `loadChain`; the memo
-     * suggestion on {@link loadInvitationChain} covers that part. Before the Revocation ledger
-     * marker is filed that one read is a cohort consult per refresh, which
-     * `control-founding-consult-budget.spec.ts` pins.
+     * `loadTombstones`), plus the owner-grant chain when some owner row is grant-seated (the
+     * NOTE in the body). Before the Revocation ledger marker is filed that one read is a cohort
+     * consult per refresh, which `control-founding-consult-budget.spec.ts` pins.
      *
      * @param retry - forwarded to every read; `false` on the refresh path, for the reason on
      *   {@link refreshAuthorizedControlPeers}.
      * @param loadTombstones - the refresh's shared tombstone read ({@link revocationSource}).
      */
-    async syncOwnerAnchor(reason, retry, loadChain, loadTombstones) {
+    async syncOwnerAnchor(reason, retry, loadTombstones) {
         const store = this.trustedOwnerStore;
         const controlDatabase = this.controlDatabase;
         if (!store || !controlDatabase) {
@@ -7403,8 +7509,11 @@ export class CadreNode {
             const tombstones = await loadTombstones();
             const retired = new Set(tombstones.filter(tombstone => tombstone.tableName === 'OwnerKey').map(tombstone => tombstone.stampId));
             const rows = await controlDatabase.queryOwnerKeyRows(retry, retired);
-            const chain = rows.some(isInvitationAdmitted) ? await loadChain() : null;
-            const derivation = deriveOwnerAnchor({ partyId: this.partyId, anchor: before, rows, tombstones, chain });
+            // NOTE: the grant chain is two whole-table reads per membership refresh while any owner
+            // row is grant-seated, over tables that are append-only; the memo suggested on
+            // loadInvitationChain would cover it too.
+            const grantChain = rows.some(isConsentSeated) ? await this.loadOwnerGrantChain(controlDatabase, retry) : null;
+            const derivation = deriveOwnerAnchor({ partyId: this.partyId, anchor: before, rows, tombstones, grantChain });
             if (derivation.refusedRemovals.length > 0) {
                 log('syncOwnerAnchor(%s): refused %d owner removal(s) that would empty the anchor: %o', reason, derivation.refusedRemovals.length, derivation.refusedRemovals);
             }
@@ -7458,9 +7567,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
         return () => (loading ?? (loading = controlDatabase.queryRevocations(retry)));
     }
     /**
-     * The usage and invitation rows {@link hasAnchoredProof} and {@link syncOwnerAnchor}
-     * resolve an invitation-admitted row through, keyed for lookup. Both reads honour `retry`
-     * for {@link listAuthorizedMembers}' reason.
+     * The usage and invitation rows {@link hasAnchoredProof} resolves an invitation-admitted
+     * `CadrePeer` row through, keyed for lookup. Both reads honour `retry` for
+     * {@link listAuthorizedMembers}' reason.
      *
      * NOTE: once invitations are the only admission route (ticket
      * `cadre-invitations-redeemable-by-any-member`), every cadre with a member not yet
@@ -7480,6 +7589,21 @@ export class CadreNode {
             invites: new Map(invites.map(invite => [invite.key, invite])),
         };
     }
+    /**
+     * The usage and grant rows {@link syncOwnerAnchor} resolves a grant-seated `OwnerKey` row
+     * through, keyed for lookup: the owner-grant twin of {@link loadInvitationChain}, read only by
+     * the anchor sync, since a grant admits no machine.
+     */
+    async loadOwnerGrantChain(controlDatabase, retry) {
+        const [usages, grants] = await Promise.all([
+            controlDatabase.queryOwnerGrantUsages(retry),
+            controlDatabase.queryOwnerGrants(retry),
+        ]);
+        return {
+            usages: new Map(usages.map(usage => [usage.usageStampId, usage])),
+            grants: new Map(grants.map(grant => [grant.key, grant])),
+        };
+    }
     /**
      * The owner-voucher half of {@link hasAnchoredProof}: complete voucher, `VouchOwner` in
      * the node-local anchor, signature valid over the row's (PeerId, StampId) voucher digest.
@@ -7599,11 +7723,11 @@ export class CadreNode {
     }
     /**
      * The event callbacks every {@link SeedBootstrapService} this node owns is
-     * wired with — shared by the owner-capable service ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap})
+     * wired with — shared by the owner-capable service ({@link useOwnerSigner})
      * and the listener-only one ({@link enableSeedListener}) so the two cannot drift.
      *
      * A seed applied by the INBOUND protocol handler writes no `CadrePeer` row of
-     * its own (it merges the libp2p peer store and dials owners), so the automatic
+     * its own (it merges the libp2p peer store and dials the seed's preferred peers), so the automatic
      * write-driven refresh never fires for it — yet applying it can ANCHOR a new
      * owner key, which flips rows already present from unauthorized to authorized.
      * Hence the explicit refresh here; without it a peer the freshly anchored owner
@@ -7615,7 +7739,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
             onSeedApplied: (partyId, peersAdded, seed) => {
                 this.emit('seed:applied', { partyId, peersAdded });
                 // A wire-delivered seed never passes through the `applySeed` wrapper, so
-                // this is where its owner peers become cold-start bootstrap targets.
+                // this is where its preferred peers become cold-start bootstrap targets.
                 this.recordSeedBootstrapPeers(seed);
                 void this.refreshMembershipGate('seed-applied');
             },
@@ -7751,12 +7875,16 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * @param multiaddrs - Optional multiaddrs for the peer
      */
     async authorizePeer(peerId, multiaddrs) {
+        await this.vouchPeer(peerId, multiaddrs);
+    }
+    /** {@link authorizePeer}'s body, signing inside the caller's owner approval when it passes `sign` ({@link claimNode}). */
+    async vouchPeer(peerId, multiaddrs, sign) {
         if (!this.seedBootstrapService) {
             throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
         }
         // The insert notifies the control DB's membership hub, so the per-stream gate
         // has already admitted the just-vouched peer by the time this resolves.
-        await this.seedBootstrapService.authorizePeer({ peerId, multiaddrs });
+        await this.seedBootstrapService.authorizePeer({ peerId, multiaddrs }, sign);
         // Queue for re-replication if this committed local-only (no connected cohort).
         this.noteControlWrite(peerId, 'authorize');
         // NOTE: unlike addDrone, `multiaddrs` is not retained as a dial target: the
@@ -7768,9 +7896,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * Remove a previously-authorized peer from the cadre.
      * Signs the peer ID with the owner key and deletes the CadrePeer row.
      *
-     * Removes the `CadrePeer` row only. The call that removes a machine completely (its owner
-     * key, its push token and the invitations it could come back through, in one transaction)
-     * is {@link removeMachine}.
+     * Removes the `CadrePeer` row only. The call that removes a machine completely (its push
+     * token and the invitations it could come back through too, in one transaction) is
+     * {@link removeMachine}.
      *
      * @param peerId - The peer ID to remove
      */
@@ -7796,85 +7924,227 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * `OwnerKey.Authorized`; the row stores the vouching pair). The write notifies the
      * membership hub, so the refresh it triggers has run by the time this resolves.
      *
+     * Refused while alone ({@link ownerKeyWriteAlone}): an `OwnerKey` add has no re-issue path,
+     * so one committed with no control connection would stay on this node.
+     *
      * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the new owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
+     * @param options.label - the user's name for the key ("phone", "paper backup"), bound into
+     *   the signature; trimmed, at most 64 characters, blank meaning none.
      * @returns `true` when the row was seated, `false` when the key is already a live owner.
+     * @throws OwnerKeyAddRefusedError `alone`, before any write.
      */
-    async addOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64) {
+    async addOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64, options = {}) {
         if (!this.seedBootstrapService) {
             throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
         }
         const key = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(ownerPublicKeyB64, 'owner key');
-        const added = await this.seedBootstrapService.addOwner(key);
-        // NOTE: an OwnerKey add committed alone is local-only and nothing re-issues it (no
-        // update branch to re-touch, unlike CadrePeer), so it is only logged;
-        // tickets/backlog/debt-owner-key-add-while-alone-has-no-reissue.md owns the fix.
+        if (await this.ownerKeyWriteAlone()) {
+            throw new OwnerKeyAddRefusedError(key, 'alone');
+        }
+        const added = await this.seedBootstrapService.addOwner(key, options.label);
+        // NOTE: the refusal is checked before the approval, and a connection can drop while the
+        // user approves; an add that still commits alone is logged. If that window ever loses an
+        // owner key in practice, re-check inside the write and roll back.
         if (added && this.committedAlone()) {
-            log('addOwner(%s) committed while ALONE (0 control connections): the new owner row is ' +
-                'local-only and is not re-issued on cohort growth, so other machines may never see it.', key);
+            log('addOwner(%s) committed while ALONE (the last control connection dropped during the add): ' +
+                'the new owner row is local-only and is not re-issued on cohort growth.', key);
         }
         return added;
     }
     /**
-     * Remove an owner key, signed by this node's owner key (which must be a different owner):
-     * the delete and its `Revocation` tombstone commit together. Refused by name when the key
-     * is this node's own or the only live owner. The write notifies the membership hub; the
-     * tombstone rides the committed-delete seam ({@link noteGuardedDelete}), so one committed
-     * while alone is re-issued on cohort growth like every other removal.
+     * Whether an `OwnerKey` add made now ({@link addOwner}, or the re-add of
+     * {@link removeOwner}'s re-vouch) is refused `alone`: this node holds no control connection
+     * while the party has other members. An `OwnerKey` row has no update to re-touch, so nothing
+     * re-issues it on cohort growth, and a row written now would fork this node's history. A
+     * party with no other members cannot fork, so a solo founder adding an owner key is not
+     * refused.
      *
-     * Removes the `OwnerKey` row only. The call that removes a machine completely, its owner key
-     * included, is {@link removeMachine}.
+     * Waits out an in-flight membership refresh first: until `start`'s first one lands the
+     * member snapshot is empty, which would read as a party with no other members.
+     */
+    async ownerKeyWriteAlone() {
+        await this.membershipGateDrain;
+        return this.committedAlone() && this.authorizedControlPeers.size > 0;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Every live owner key with its label, who vouched it, whether this node's owner signer
+     * holds it and whether this node's trusted-owner anchor trusts it ({@link CadreOwnerKey}),
+     * for an app's owner-key screen.
+     */
+    async listOwnerKeys() {
+        if (!this.controlDatabase) {
+            throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before listing owner keys');
+        }
+        const rows = await this.controlDatabase.queryOwnerKeyRows();
+        return describeOwnerKeys(rows, this.getOwnerSigner()?.publicKey ?? null, this.trustedOwnerStore?.all() ?? new Set());
+    }
+    /**
+     * What {@link removeOwner} would do for `ownerPublicKeyB64`, read without writing, for an
+     * app's confirmation step ({@link OwnerKeyRemovalPlan}): whether this node may remove it,
+     * which rows the key vouched (so the app can offer to keep them by re-vouching), and how this
+     * node's own rows depend on it (`planOwnerKeyRemoval` in `owner-keys.ts`).
+     */
+    async planOwnerKeyRemoval(ownerPublicKeyB64) {
+        if (!this.controlDatabase) {
+            throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before planning an owner key removal');
+        }
+        const key = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(ownerPublicKeyB64, 'owner key');
+        return (await this.planOwnerKeyRemovalWith(this.controlDatabase, key)).plan;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Remove an owner key, signed by this node's owner key (which must be a different owner): the
+     * `OwnerKey` row and its `Revocation` tombstone commit together, and the tombstone rides the
+     * committed-delete seam ({@link noteGuardedDelete}), so one committed while alone is re-issued
+     * on cohort growth like every other removal. The machines the key was used on stay members;
+     * removing one is {@link removeMachine}. The owner grants the key issued stop being redeemable
+     * (the plan's `grants` names the live ones) and are not withdrawn: a tombstone over a grant
+     * nobody can redeem would add nothing.
+     *
+     * Steps: re-plan ({@link planOwnerKeyRemoval}) and throw {@link OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError}
+     * on a refusal; check `options.revouch` against the plan's dependents and throw before any
+     * write when it names anything else; refuse `alone` ({@link ownerKeyWriteAlone}) when an
+     * `OwnerKey` row is to be re-vouched, since that re-add has no re-issue path; **re-vouch
+     * first**, under this node's key, the dependents the caller chose to keep and this node's own
+     * row when the key vouched it (`ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey`, `reauthorizePeer`), so they
+     * are never untrusted in between, and stop before the removal if one fails (re-vouches
+     * already made stay, harmlessly); then the removal. The re-vouches and the removal are one owner approval. The
+     * write notifies the membership hub, so the refresh it triggers has run by the time this
+     * resolves.
      *
      * @param ownerPublicKeyB64 - the owner's ed25519 public key (base64url).
-     * @returns `true` when the row was removed, `false` when the key is not a live owner here.
+     * @returns what was written ({@link OwnerKeyRemovalResult}).
+     * @throws {OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError} `'not-an-owner'`, `'unknown'`, `'last-owner'`,
+     *   `'self'` or `'alone'`, before any write.
      */
-    async removeOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64) {
-        if (!this.seedBootstrapService) {
+    async removeOwner(ownerPublicKeyB64, options = {}) {
+        const service = this.seedBootstrapService;
+        if (!service || !this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
         }
         const key = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(ownerPublicKeyB64, 'owner key');
-        return await this.seedBootstrapService.removeOwner(key);
+        const { plan, rows } = await this.planOwnerKeyRemovalWith(this.controlDatabase, key);
+        if (plan.refusal !== null) {
+            throw new OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError(key, plan.refusal);
+        }
+        const revouch = revouchWithinPlan(plan, options.revouch, this.peerId?.toString() ?? null);
+        if (revouch.owners.length > 0 && await this.ownerKeyWriteAlone()) {
+            throw new OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError(key, 'alone');
+        }
+        // The plan already refused 'not-an-owner' when no enrolled signer is wired.
+        const signer = service.ownerSigner;
+        if (!signer) {
+            throw new OwnerKeyRemovalRefusedError(key, 'not-an-owner');
+        }
+        const action = `Remove the owner key ${namedOwnerKey(key, plan.ownerKey?.label ?? null)} from the cadre`;
+        const removed = await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action }, async (sign) => {
+            await this.revouchDependents(service, revouch, rows, sign);
+            return await service.removeOwner(key, sign);
+        });
+        log('removeOwner(%s): removed=%s revouched owners=%d peers=%d', key, removed, revouch.owners.length, revouch.peers.length);
+        return { removed, revouched: revouch };
+    }
+    /** {@link planOwnerKeyRemoval} with the rows it was judged from, which {@link removeOwner} re-vouches dependents by. */
+    async planOwnerKeyRemovalWith(controlDatabase, key) {
+        const [rows, owners, grants] = await Promise.all([
+            controlDatabase.queryCadrePeers(), controlDatabase.queryOwnerKeyRows(), controlDatabase.listOwnerGrantStatuses()
+        ]);
+        const plan = planOwnerKeyRemoval({
+            key,
+            rows,
+            owners,
+            grants,
+            selfPeerId: this.peerId?.toString() ?? null,
+            selfOwnerKey: this.ownerSignerEnrolledIn(new Set(owners.map((owner) => owner.key)))?.publicKey ?? null,
+            anchor: this.trustedOwnerStore?.all() ?? new Set(),
+        });
+        return { plan, rows };
+    }
+    /**
+     * The re-vouch step of {@link removeOwner}: every chosen dependent row is rebound to this
+     * node's key BEFORE the removal, so no reader ever judges it against an owner that is gone.
+     * Owners through `ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey` (a delete-and-re-add under a fresh stamp,
+     * the only rebinding `OwnerKey.NoUpdate` allows); peers through the owner re-touch
+     * (`reauthorizePeer`), which rewrites `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` and clears `VouchUsage`.
+     *
+     * The peer re-touch keeps the row's `UpdatedAt` where it is. The owner branch of
+     * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` does not require a bump, and bumping a self-published row
+     * would leave its `Sig` unverifiable, so unresolvable and unlisted as self-published, until
+     * the machine's next heartbeat (the NOTE on that constraint); the write-while-alone drain
+     * bumps because it re-issues an otherwise unchanged row, whereas here the voucher itself
+     * changes. A row never self-published carries no stamp to keep and gets the clock.
+     *
+     * A failure rethrows and stops the call before the removal; re-vouches already made stay
+     * (the row is only re-signed by a current owner) and the caller retries. An owner re-vouch
+     * is refused alone before this runs; one whose last connection drops while it runs is logged,
+     * as {@link addOwner}'s add is.
+     *
+     * NOTE: a peer re-touch committed alone is not queued, and the drain skips self-published
+     * rows anyway, so the other machines may get the removal's tombstone without the new voucher
+     * (`tickets/backlog/bug-owner-key-removal-revouch-made-alone-is-not-reissued`).
+     */
+    async revouchDependents(service, revouch, rows, sign) {
+        for (const key of revouch.owners) {
+            await service.revouchOwner(key, sign);
+            if (this.committedAlone()) {
+                log('removeOwner: re-vouch of owner %s committed while ALONE (the last control connection dropped during the call): ' +
+                    'the re-added owner row is local-only and is not re-issued on cohort growth.', key);
+            }
+        }
+        for (const dependent of revouch.peers) {
+            const row = rows.find((candidate) => candidate.peerId === dependent);
+            const updatedAt = row !== undefined && row.updatedAt > 0 ? row.updatedAt : Date.now();
+            await service.reauthorizePeer(dependent, updatedAt, sign);
+        }
     }
     /**
      * The cadre's machines as an app lists them ({@link CadreMachine}): one entry per live
-     * `CadrePeer` row, judged by this node's membership predicate, plus one per live `OwnerKey`
-     * whose key names a machine with no row (`describeMachines` in `machine-removal.ts`).
+     * `CadrePeer` row, judged by this node's membership predicate (`describeMachines` in
+     * `machine-removal.ts`). Owner keys are not machines; {@link listOwnerKeys} lists them.
      * Unlocked reads with the default retry.
      */
     async listMachines() {
         if (!this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before listing machines');
         }
-        return (await this.readMachines(this.controlDatabase)).machines;
+        return await this.readMachines(this.controlDatabase);
     }
     /**
      * What {@link removeMachine} would do for `peerId`, read without writing, for an app's
-     * confirmation step ({@link MachineRemovalPlan}): whether this node may remove it, whether its
-     * owner key goes with it, which rows that key vouched (so the app can offer to keep them by
-     * re-vouching), which invitations it could come back through, and whether this node's own
-     * rows depend on it (`planMachineRemoval` in `machine-removal.ts`).
+     * confirmation step ({@link MachineRemovalPlan}): whether this node may remove it and which
+     * invitations it could come back through (`planMachineRemoval` in `machine-removal.ts`).
      */
     async planMachineRemoval(peerId) {
         if (!this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before planning a machine removal');
         }
-        return (await this.planMachineRemovalWith(this.controlDatabase, peerId)).plan;
+        const machines = await this.readMachines(this.controlDatabase);
+        const [invites, usages, owners] = await Promise.all([
+            this.controlDatabase.listCadreInviteStatuses(),
+            this.controlDatabase.queryCadreInviteUsages(),
+            this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys(),
+        ]);
+        return planMachineRemoval({
+            peerId,
+            machines,
+            selfPeerId: this.peerId?.toString() ?? null,
+            canSign: this.ownerSignerEnrolledIn(owners) !== null,
+            invites,
+            usages,
+        });
     }
     /**
      * Remove a machine from the cadre completely, signed by this node's owner key: its
-     * `CadrePeer` row, its `OwnerKey` row when its key is an owner, its `DeviceToken` row (a
-     * removed phone must not be push-woken) and a withdrawal of every live invitation it could
-     * redeem to come back, in ONE transaction ({@link ControlDatabase.removeMachine}), with a
-     * `Revocation` tombstone per row so the removal holds on every machine
-     * ("Deletes made while alone" in docs/architecture.md).
-     *
-     * Steps: re-plan ({@link planMachineRemoval}) and throw {@link MachineRemovalRefusedError} on a
-     * refusal; check `options.revouch` against the plan's dependents and throw before any write
-     * when it names anything else; **re-vouch first**, under this node's key, the dependents the
-     * caller chose to keep (`ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey`, `reauthorizePeer`), so they are
-     * never untrusted in between, and stop before the removal if one fails (re-vouches already
-     * made stay, harmlessly); then the removal transaction. Afterwards this node forgets the
-     * machine as a dial target, and the refresh the write notifies hangs up its control
-     * connection ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers}) before this resolves.
+     * `CadrePeer` row, its `DeviceToken` row (a removed phone must not be push-woken) and a
+     * withdrawal of every live invitation it could redeem to come back, in ONE transaction
+     * ({@link ControlDatabase.removeMachine}), with a `Revocation` tombstone per row so the
+     * removal holds on every machine ("Deletes made while alone" in docs/architecture.md), under
+     * one owner approval. Afterwards this node forgets the machine as a dial target, and the
+     * refresh the write notifies hangs up its control connection ({@link hangUpRevokedControlPeers})
+     * before this resolves.
+     *
+     * Owner keys stay: they are the person's, not the machine's. A lost phone that held one can
+     * still sign, a fresh machine invitation it could redeem included, so removing that key
+     * ({@link removeOwner}) is the step that locks it out.
      *
      * Not undone by this call: the machine keeps every row and strand block it already synced
      * and the party's strand member keys (`tickets/blocked/decide-removed-machine-strand-access`).
@@ -7882,28 +8152,22 @@ export class CadreNode {
      *
      * @returns what was written ({@link MachineRemovalResult}); all false when no live row names
      *   the machine here (already removed elsewhere).
-     * @throws {MachineRemovalRefusedError} `'not-an-owner'`, `'self'` or `'last-owner'`.
+     * @throws {MachineRemovalRefusedError} `'not-an-owner'` or `'self'`, before any write.
      */
-    async removeMachine(peerId, options = {}) {
+    async removeMachine(peerId) {
         const service = this.seedBootstrapService;
         if (!service || !this.controlDatabase) {
             throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
         }
-        const { plan, rows } = await this.planMachineRemovalWith(this.controlDatabase, peerId);
+        const plan = await this.planMachineRemoval(peerId);
         if (plan.refusal !== null) {
             throw new MachineRemovalRefusedError(peerId, plan.refusal);
         }
-        const revouch = revouchWithinPlan(plan, options.revouch);
         if (plan.machine === null) {
             log('removeMachine(%s): no live row names it here; nothing to remove', peerId);
-            return { removedPeer: false, removedOwnerKey: false, removedDeviceToken: false, withdrawnInvitations: [], revouched: { owners: [], peers: [] } };
+            return { removedPeer: false, removedDeviceToken: false, withdrawnInvitations: [] };
         }
-        await this.revouchDependents(service, revouch, rows);
-        const writes = await service.removeMachine({
-            peerId,
-            ownerKey: plan.removesOwnerKey ? plan.machine.publicKey : null,
-            inviteKeys: plan.invitations,
-        });
+        const writes = await service.removeMachine({ peerId, inviteKeys: plan.invitations });
         if (writes.removedPeer) {
             // Track + loudly flag a delete that committed local-only (security-relevant).
             this.noteControlWrite(peerId, 'remove');
@@ -7913,75 +8177,23 @@ export class CadreNode {
         void this.bootstrapPeerStore?.forget(peerId).catch((error) => {
             log('removeMachine: persisting the removal of dial target %s failed (forgotten in memory): %o', peerId, error);
         });
-        log('removeMachine(%s): peer=%s ownerKey=%s deviceToken=%s invitations=%d revouched owners=%d peers=%d', peerId, writes.removedPeer, writes.removedOwnerKey, writes.removedDeviceToken, writes.withdrawnInvitations.length, revouch.owners.length, revouch.peers.length);
-        return { ...writes, revouched: revouch };
+        log('removeMachine(%s): peer=%s deviceToken=%s invitations=%d', peerId, writes.removedPeer, writes.removedDeviceToken, writes.withdrawnInvitations.length);
+        return writes;
     }
     /**
-     * The reads behind {@link listMachines}: the live `CadrePeer` and `OwnerKey` rows and the
-     * machines projected from them, with this node's membership predicate as the `trusted` test.
+     * The read behind {@link listMachines}: the live `CadrePeer` rows projected as machines, with
+     * this node's membership predicate as the `trusted` test.
      */
     async readMachines(controlDatabase) {
-        const [rows, owners] = await Promise.all([controlDatabase.queryCadrePeers(), controlDatabase.queryOwnerKeyRows()]);
+        const rows = await controlDatabase.queryCadrePeers();
         const chain = await this.chainFor(rows, this.invitationChainSource(controlDatabase, true));
         const selfPeerId = this.peerId?.toString() ?? null;
-        const machines = describeMachines({
+        return describeMachines({
             partyId: this.partyId,
             selfPeerId,
             rows,
-            owners,
             trusted: (row) => row.peerId !== selfPeerId && this.hasAnchoredProof(row, chain),
         });
-        return { machines, rows, owners };
-    }
-    /** {@link planMachineRemoval} with the rows it was judged from, which {@link removeMachine} re-vouches dependents by. */
-    async planMachineRemovalWith(controlDatabase, peerId) {
-        const { machines, rows, owners } = await this.readMachines(controlDatabase);
-        const [invites, usages] = await Promise.all([controlDatabase.listCadreInviteStatuses(), controlDatabase.queryCadreInviteUsages()]);
-        const plan = planMachineRemoval({
-            peerId,
-            machines,
-            rows,
-            owners,
-            selfPeerId: this.peerId?.toString() ?? null,
-            selfOwnerKey: this.ownerSigningKeyEnrolledIn(new Set(owners.map((owner) => owner.key)))?.publicKeyB64 ?? null,
-            invites,
-            usages,
-        });
-        return { plan, rows };
-    }
-    /**
-     * The re-vouch step of {@link removeMachine}: every chosen dependent row is rebound to this
-     * node's key BEFORE the removal, so no reader ever judges it against an owner that is gone.
-     * Owners through `ControlDatabase.revouchOwnerKey` (a delete-and-re-add under a fresh stamp,
-     * the only rebinding `OwnerKey.NoUpdate` allows); peers through the owner re-touch
-     * (`reauthorizePeer`), which rewrites `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` and clears `VouchUsage`.
-     *
-     * The peer re-touch keeps the row's `UpdatedAt` where it is. The owner branch of
-     * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` does not require a bump, and bumping a self-published row
-     * would leave its `Sig` unverifiable, so unresolvable and unlisted as self-published, until
-     * the machine's next heartbeat (the NOTE on that constraint); the write-while-alone drain
-     * bumps because it re-issues an otherwise unchanged row, whereas here the voucher itself
-     * changes. A row never self-published carries no stamp to keep and gets the clock.
-     *
-     * A failure rethrows and stops the call before the removal; re-vouches already made stay
-     * (the row is only re-signed by a current owner) and the caller retries. An owner re-vouch
-     * committed alone is not re-issued on growth (the add half has no re-issue path,
-     * `tickets/backlog/debt-owner-key-add-while-alone-has-no-reissue`), so it is logged as
-     * {@link addOwner} logs it; the peer re-touches are re-issued by the existing drain.
-     */
-    async revouchDependents(service, revouch, rows) {
-        for (const key of revouch.owners) {
-            await service.revouchOwner(key);
-            if (this.committedAlone()) {
-                log('removeMachine: re-vouch of owner %s committed while ALONE (0 control connections): the re-added ' +
-                    'owner row is local-only and is not re-issued on cohort growth, so other machines may never see it.', key);
-            }
-        }
-        for (const dependent of revouch.peers) {
-            const row = rows.find((candidate) => candidate.peerId === dependent);
-            const updatedAt = row !== undefined && row.updatedAt > 0 ? row.updatedAt : Date.now();
-            await service.reauthorizePeer(dependent, updatedAt);
-        }
     }
     /**
      * Create a seed from the current control network state.
@@ -8043,9 +8255,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
         return result;
     }
     /**
-     * Post-process an {@link applySeed} outcome: retain the seed's owner peers as
+     * Post-process an {@link applySeed} outcome: retain the seed's preferred peers as
      * cold-start bootstrap targets, and surface a seed that was accepted but whose
-     * every owner dial failed — the node is now seeded yet unconnected, and the
+     * every dial failed — the node is now seeded yet unconnected, and the
      * cold-start reconcile branch is what gets it out of that state.
      */
     noteAppliedSeed(result, seed) {
@@ -8053,8 +8265,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
             return;
         }
         this.recordSeedBootstrapPeers(seed);
-        if (result.ownerDialsAttempted > 0 && result.ownerDialsFailed === result.ownerDialsAttempted) {
-            log('applySeed: seeded but no owner reachable (%d/%d dial(s) failed) — cold-start reconcile will retry', result.ownerDialsFailed, result.ownerDialsAttempted);
+        if (result.preferredDialsAttempted > 0 && result.preferredDialsFailed === result.preferredDialsAttempted) {
+            log('applySeed: seeded but no preferred peer reachable (%d/%d dial(s) failed) — cold-start reconcile will retry', result.preferredDialsFailed, result.preferredDialsAttempted);
         }
     }
     /**
@@ -8143,9 +8355,10 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * vouch the node into this cadre and keep its addresses as a dial target. The owner
      * side of the claim-secret entry in the Seed Delivery Protocol (`docs/architecture.md`).
      *
-     * Requires the seed service with an owner key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}), as
-     * {@link addDrone} does. The order is the REVERSE of `addDrone`'s: seed first, row
-     * second. A refused claim or a failed delivery therefore leaves no `CadrePeer` row and
+     * Requires the seed service with an owner key ({@link useOwnerSigner}), as
+     * {@link addDrone} does, and like it is one owner approval (the seed and the vouch). The
+     * order is the REVERSE of `addDrone`'s: seed first, row second. A refused claim or a
+     * failed delivery therefore leaves no `CadrePeer` row and
      * no retained dial target behind on this node — a phone that typed the wrong secret,
      * or scanned a node someone else already owns, has nothing to clean up.
      *
@@ -8169,27 +8382,34 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * timed reconcile pass; a caller that wants to wait for the connection awaits
      * {@link reconcileControlCohort} itself, with `addDrone`'s caveat that a pass already
      * in flight is joined rather than restarted. The claimed node dials this one back too,
-     * from the seed's owner list, when this node has a listen or relay address; a phone
+     * as the seed's minter, when this node has a listen or relay address; a phone
      * with neither is reached by its own reconcile pass alone.
      *
      * @throws {ClaimRefusedError} when the node was reached and refused the claim.
      * @throws {PeerUnreachableError} when the node was never reached.
      */
     async claimNode(target) {
-        if (!this.seedBootstrapService) {
+        const service = this.seedBootstrapService;
+        if (!service) {
             throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
         }
         const secret = parseClaimSecret(target.secret);
-        const seed = await this.seedBootstrapService.createSeed();
-        const proof = claimProof(secret, target.peerId, seed.signerKey, seedDigest(seed));
-        const ack = await this.seedBootstrapService.deliverSeed({ peerId: target.peerId, multiaddrs: target.multiaddrs }, seed, { claimProof: proof });
-        if (!ack.accepted) {
-            throw new ClaimRefusedError(target.peerId, ack.reason ?? 'no reason given', ack.code);
-        }
-        log('claimNode: %s accepted the claim; vouching it into the cadre', target.peerId);
-        // The wrapper queues the write for re-replication: a phone claiming its first
-        // always-on node has no control connection yet, so the insert commits local-only.
-        await this.authorizePeer(target.peerId, target.multiaddrs);
+        const signer = service.ownerSigner;
+        if (!signer) {
+            throw new Error('Owner key required to create seeds');
+        }
+        await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Claim the node ${target.peerId} for the cadre` }, async (sign) => {
+            const seed = await service.createSeed(sign);
+            const proof = claimProof(secret, target.peerId, seed.signerKey, seedDigest(seed));
+            const ack = await service.deliverSeed({ peerId: target.peerId, multiaddrs: target.multiaddrs }, seed, { claimProof: proof });
+            if (!ack.accepted) {
+                throw new ClaimRefusedError(target.peerId, ack.reason ?? 'no reason given', ack.code);
+            }
+            log('claimNode: %s accepted the claim; vouching it into the cadre', target.peerId);
+            // The wrapper queues the write for re-replication: a phone claiming its first
+            // always-on node has no control connection yet, so the insert commits local-only.
+            await this.vouchPeer(target.peerId, target.multiaddrs, sign);
+        });
         this.retainDialTarget(target.peerId, target.multiaddrs, 'claimNode');
         void this.reconcileControlCohort().catch((error) => log('claimNode: reconcile kick after claiming %s failed: %o', target.peerId, error));
     }
@@ -8236,13 +8456,13 @@ export class CadreNode {
     /**
      * Mint an owner-signed cadre invitation that a device can redeem at ANY member machine of
      * this party, the owner offline included ({@link redeemCadreInvitation}). Requires the
-     * owner key ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}).
+     * owner key ({@link useOwnerSigner}).
      *
      * The invitation is an ed25519 keypair: the public half is the `CadreInvite` row's key,
-     * the private half rides in the returned bundle as the proof of possession. Whoever holds
-     * the bundle can redeem it, so an UNTARGETED, OWNER-GRANTING invitation — a bearer
-     * credential for admin rights — defaults to a 15-minute lifetime; every other kind to 24
-     * hours. One use unless `uses` says otherwise. The bundle carries the signed row (so a
+     * the private half rides in the returned bundle as the proof of possession. It admits a
+     * machine and grants nothing else (ownership is {@link createOwnerGrant}'s), so it defaults
+     * to a 24-hour lifetime ({@link CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS}) and one use unless `uses`
+     * says otherwise. The bundle carries the signed row (so a
      * member that has not received it by replication seats it from the bundle), this node's
      * anchored owner keys — every current owner this node has verified, the out-of-band ones
      * and those derived along verifiable chains ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}) — (the device pins
@@ -8267,30 +8487,13 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * @throws when no owner key is wired, the anchor is empty, `uses` is not a positive
      *   integer, or neither this machine nor any other member has an address.
      */
-    async createCadreInvitation(options) {
-        const service = this.seedBootstrapService;
-        if (!service?.canAuthorize()) {
-            throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized with an owner key. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
-        }
-        const ownerKeys = Array.from(this.trustedOwnerStore?.all() ?? []);
-        if (ownerKeys.length === 0) {
-            throw new Error('createCadreInvitation: this node anchors no owner key, and an invitation without owner keys cannot be verified by the device that redeems it');
-        }
-        const uses = options.uses ?? 1;
-        if (!Number.isInteger(uses) || uses < 1) {
-            throw new Error(`createCadreInvitation: uses must be a positive integer (received ${String(options.uses)})`);
-        }
-        const { members, reach } = await this.selectInvitationMembers();
-        if (members.length === 0) {
-            throw new Error('createCadreInvitation: neither this machine nor any other machine of the party has an address a device could dial');
-        }
-        const expiresInMs = options.expiresInMs
-            ?? (options.grantsOwner && !options.peerId ? OWNER_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS : CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS);
+    async createCadreInvitation(options = {}) {
+        const { service, ownerKeys, uses, members, reach } = await this.issuedBundleParts('createCadreInvitation', options.uses);
+        const expiresInMs = options.expiresInMs ?? CADRE_INVITATION_DEFAULT_TTL_MS;
         const invitePrivateKey = generatePrivateKey('ed25519', 'base64url');
         const row = await service.insertCadreInvite({
             key: ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate(invitePrivateKey),
             peerId: options.peerId ?? null,
-            grantsOwner: options.grantsOwner,
             expiresAtMs: Date.now() + expiresInMs,
             totalUses: uses,
         });
@@ -8302,9 +8505,35 @@ export class CadreNode {
             ownerKeys,
             members,
         };
-        log('Cadre invitation minted: %s (peer=%s owner=%s uses=%d, %d member address(es), reach=%s)', row.key, row.peerId ?? 'any', row.grantsOwner, uses, members.length, reach);
+        log('Cadre invitation minted: %s (peer=%s uses=%d, %d member address(es), reach=%s)', row.key, row.peerId ?? 'any', uses, members.length, reach);
         return { invitation, encoded: encodeCadreInvitation(invitation), reach };
     }
+    /**
+     * What the two credentials an owner mints share ({@link createCadreInvitation},
+     * {@link createOwnerGrant}), checked in this order: the owner-capable service; the anchor's
+     * keys the holder pins (an empty anchor is refused rather than falling back to the table, since
+     * a reply could not be checked against it); the use count; and the member addresses with their
+     * reach, refused when neither this machine nor any other member has one.
+     */
+    async issuedBundleParts(caller, uses) {
+        const service = this.seedBootstrapService;
+        if (!service?.canAuthorize()) {
+            throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized with an owner key. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
+        }
+        const ownerKeys = Array.from(this.trustedOwnerStore?.all() ?? []);
+        if (ownerKeys.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error(`${caller}: this node anchors no owner key, and a bundle without owner keys cannot be verified by the device that redeems it`);
+        }
+        const checkedUses = uses ?? 1;
+        if (!Number.isInteger(checkedUses) || checkedUses < 1) {
+            throw new Error(`${caller}: uses must be a positive integer (received ${String(uses)})`);
+        }
+        const { members, reach } = await this.selectInvitationMembers();
+        if (members.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error(`${caller}: neither this machine nor any other machine of the party has an address a device could dial`);
+        }
+        return { service, ownerKeys, uses: checkedUses, members, reach };
+    }
     /**
      * Every cadre invitation this node holds — minted here or replicated in — with its
      * standing ({@link CadreInviteStatus}: live, withdrawn, redemptions recorded).
@@ -8358,11 +8587,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
      * pass whose reply was lost answers the next as already a member. `options.onProgress`
      * reports each pass and pause.
      *
-     * When the invitation grants ownership, the member seats this node's key as an `OwnerKey`
-     * row by consent. The caller still has to wire that key for signing afterwards, with
-     * {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}; never `ensureOwnerKey`, the row is already there. Other
-     * machines derive this node's key into their anchors from the row's stored proof on their
-     * next membership refresh ({@link syncOwnerAnchor}).
+     * The invitation admits this node as a machine and nothing else: ownership is an owner
+     * grant ({@link redeemOwnerGrant}, {@link joinWithOwnerGrant}). A key of this node's that is
+     * already an owner here is wired afterwards with {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer).
      *
      * Limit: the reply check ({@link verifyRedeemReply}) does not authenticate the member. A
      * forged bundle, or a legitimate one whose addresses were swapped, dials a machine that
@@ -8400,7 +8627,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
             ...(options.signal ? { signal: options.signal } : {}),
             ...(options.onProgress ? { onProgress: options.onProgress } : {}),
         });
-        log('Cadre invitation %s redeemed at %s (owner=%s)', invitation.invite.key, memberAddr, reply.invite.grantsOwner);
+        log('Cadre invitation %s redeemed at %s', invitation.invite.key, memberAddr);
         const selfPeerId = controlNode.peerId.toString();
         await mergeSeedPeers(controlNode, reply.peers.filter((peer) => peer.peerId !== selfPeerId));
         if (memberPeerId !== null) {
@@ -8414,41 +8641,338 @@ export class CadreNode {
         // replicate in are judged against them; refresh so the snapshot is not stale when they land.
         await this.refreshMembershipGate('invitation-redeemed');
         void this.reconcileControlCohort().catch((error) => log('redeemCadreInvitation: the post-redemption reconcile pass failed: %o', error));
-        return { peerId: memberPeerId, grantsOwner: reply.invite.grantsOwner, redeemedAt: new Date().toISOString() };
+        return { peerId: memberPeerId, redeemedAt: new Date().toISOString() };
     }
     /**
-     * If this node's identity key is a live `OwnerKey` here, wire it for signing
-     * ({@link initializeSeedBootstrap}) and return true; otherwise change nothing and return
-     * false. For a machine that joined someone else's cadre by invitation: after an
-     * owner-granting redemption, and on every later start. A redemption seats the request's
-     * `peerKey`, the key behind this node's peer id, so the identity key is the one to look for.
+     * If `signer`'s key is a live `OwnerKey` here, wire it ({@link useOwnerSigner}) and return
+     * true; otherwise change nothing and return false. For a machine that joined someone else's
+     * cadre: after an owner grant seated its key, and on every later start.
+     *
+     * Without `signer` the candidate is the signer already wired, so the call answers whether
+     * that key is still a live owner; with nothing wired it is false. The node's identity key is
+     * never a candidate: a machine's network identity is never an owner key.
      *
      * Unlike `ensureOwnerKey` it never inserts an `OwnerKey` row, so a machine that joined a
      * cadre can never genesis-insert itself into it, and a non-owner never anchors its own key.
      * An owner whose key is already wired (an earlier call) is answered true with nothing redone.
      *
      * NOTE: a node running the listener-only seed service ({@link enableSeedListener}) cannot be
-     * wired this way: libp2p takes one seed handler, and {@link initializeSeedBootstrap} would
-     * register a second. Nothing that joins by invitation enables the listener today; if one
-     * does, replace the listener here rather than beside it.
+     * wired this way: libp2p takes one seed handler, and {@link useOwnerSigner} would register a
+     * second. Nothing that joins by invitation enables the listener today; if one does, replace
+     * the listener here rather than beside it.
      *
-     * @throws when the node is not started.
+     * @throws when the node is not started, or when `signer` names a different key from the
+     *   signer already wired (one signer per node).
      */
-    async wireOwnKeyIfOwner() {
+    async wireOwnKeyIfOwner(signer) {
         if (!this.controlDatabase || !this._running) {
             throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before wiring its owner key');
         }
-        const signingKey = this.getSelfSigningKey();
-        if (!signingKey || !(await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()).has(signingKey.publicKeyB64)) {
-            log('wireOwnKeyIfOwner: this node\'s key is not an owner here; not wiring it');
+        const wired = this.getOwnerSigner();
+        const candidate = signer ?? wired;
+        if (!candidate || !(await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()).has(candidate.publicKey)) {
+            log('wireOwnKeyIfOwner: the candidate owner key is not an owner here; not wiring it');
             return false;
         }
-        if (!this.seedBootstrapService?.canAuthorize()) {
-            await this.initializeSeedBootstrap(signingKey.privateKeyB64);
+        if (wired === null) {
+            await this.useOwnerSigner(candidate);
+        }
+        else if (wired.publicKey !== candidate.publicKey) {
+            throw new Error(`wireOwnKeyIfOwner: this node already has the owner key ${wired.publicKey} wired; one owner signer per node`);
         }
         return true;
     }
     // ============================================================================
+    // Owner Grant API (redeemable through any member, `/sereus/owner-grant/1.0.0`)
+    // ============================================================================
+    /**
+     * Mint an owner-signed owner grant: whoever holds the returned bundle can seat an owner key of
+     * their own through ANY member machine of this party ({@link redeemOwnerGrant}), or join the
+     * party as a machine and an owner at once ({@link joinWithOwnerGrant}), the owner that minted
+     * it offline or not. Requires the owner key ({@link useOwnerSigner}); one owner approval.
+     *
+     * The grant is an ed25519 keypair: the public half is the `OwnerGrant` row's key, the private
+     * half rides in the bundle as the proof of possession. It admits no machine and names no peer
+     * id. Whoever holds the bundle can become an owner, so it defaults to a 15-minute lifetime
+     * ({@link OWNER_GRANT_DEFAULT_TTL_MS}) and one use; `expiresInMs: null` mints a BACKUP grant
+     * with no expiry, which must be asked for explicitly and kept as carefully as an owner key.
+     * The label is the issuer's choice and goes on every key the grant seats ({@link addOwner}'s
+     * rule: trimmed, at most 64 characters, blank meaning none). The bundle carries the signed
+     * row, this node's anchored owner keys and at most six member addresses, chosen as
+     * {@link createCadreInvitation} chooses them and for the same reasons; `reach` says where a
+     * holder could redeem it once this machine is gone. A backup's addresses are those at mint
+     * time, so it can go stale if every member's address changes.
+     *
+     * @throws when no owner key is wired, the anchor is empty, `uses` is not a positive integer,
+     *   the label is over 64 characters, or neither this machine nor any other member has an address.
+     */
+    async createOwnerGrant(options = {}) {
+        const { service, ownerKeys, uses, members, reach } = await this.issuedBundleParts('createOwnerGrant', options.uses);
+        const expiresInMs = options.expiresInMs === undefined ? OWNER_GRANT_DEFAULT_TTL_MS : options.expiresInMs;
+        const grantPrivateKey = generatePrivateKey('ed25519', 'base64url');
+        const row = await service.insertOwnerGrant({
+            key: ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate(grantPrivateKey),
+            label: options.label,
+            expiresAtMs: expiresInMs === null ? null : Date.now() + expiresInMs,
+            totalUses: uses,
+        });
+        const grant = {
+            v: 1,
+            partyId: this.config.controlNetwork.partyId,
+            grantPrivateKey,
+            grant: row,
+            ownerKeys,
+            members,
+        };
+        log('Owner grant minted: %s (label=%s expires=%s uses=%d, %d member address(es), reach=%s)', row.key, row.label ?? 'none', row.expiresAt ?? 'never', uses, members.length, reach);
+        return { grant, encoded: encodeOwnerGrant(grant), reach };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Every owner grant this node holds — minted here or replicated in — with its standing
+     * ({@link OwnerGrantStatus}: live, withdrawn, redemptions recorded).
+     */
+    async listOwnerGrants() {
+        if (!this.controlDatabase) {
+            throw new Error('CadreNode must be started before listing owner grants');
+        }
+        return await this.controlDatabase.listOwnerGrantStatuses();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Withdraw an owner grant: an owner-signed `Revocation` tombstone over its row, which stays as
+     * the proof behind every key it seated; those keys stay owners (removing one is
+     * {@link removeOwner}). No further redemption succeeds anywhere the tombstone reaches, and a
+     * member holding it refuses the bundle's copy of the row. A withdrawal committed while alone is
+     * re-issued on cohort growth like any other tombstone.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` when this call filed the tombstone, `false` when the row is not held here or
+     *   was already withdrawn.
+     */
+    async withdrawOwnerGrant(key) {
+        if (!this.seedBootstrapService) {
+            throw new Error('Seed bootstrap service not initialized. Call initializeSeedBootstrap() first.');
+        }
+        return await this.seedBootstrapService.withdrawOwnerGrant(key);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Become an owner of this node's party with an owner grant: seat `signer`'s key as an
+     * `OwnerKey` row by consent, with no owner online. `signer` holds the key to seat; its one
+     * `approve` names the party and says the key becomes an owner of it, and signs the `'consent'`
+     * digest. The grant's `'redeem'` signature is made with the bundle's private key in memory.
+     * A bundle for another party is refused before anything is pinned, dialed or written.
+     *
+     * Two paths, chosen by whether this node is a live member of the party ({@link isLiveMemberSelf})
+     * or an enrolled owner of it ({@link isOwner}):
+     *
+     * - **Local**, on a member machine: the grant row is seated from the bundle when absent (its
+     *   own transaction) and the redemption written in this node's own control database
+     *   (`ControlDatabase.redeemOwnerGrant`), replicating like any other write. Refused `alone`
+     *   under {@link addOwner}'s rule, before the approval: an `OwnerKey` row has no re-issue
+     *   path, so one committed with no control connection while the party has other members would
+     *   stay here; connect, then try again. A grant that is not live here (withdrawn, expired,
+     *   spent, its issuer no longer an owner) is refused before the approval too, unless the key
+     *   is already an owner. The bundle's `ownerKeys` are NOT pinned: this node judges the issuer
+     *   by its own `OwnerKey` table, and its anchor must not be widened by pasted text.
+     * - **Protocol**, otherwise (a device with no machine in the cadre; a node started in the
+     *   party on an empty store): the bundle's `ownerKeys` are pinned into the node-local anchor
+     *   (`'invite'` provenance, the pin a credential the owner handed out carries, as
+     *   {@link redeemCadreInvitation} pins), then the members the bundle names are dialed over
+     *   `/sereus/owner-grant/1.0.0` (`redeemOwnerGrantInPasses`), one signed request for every
+     *   address and every pass as {@link redeemCadreInvitation} dials, so a retry after a lost
+     *   reply is answered `alreadyOwner`. The member that accepts pushes its control store here
+     *   and writes the row with this node counted in its write cohort, so a member alone with
+     *   this node still commits. `options` are the invitation's (`waitForMember`, `signal`,
+     *   `onProgress`).
+     *
+     * Neither path wires the signer: call {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer) afterwards — at once
+     * on the local path, and on the protocol path once the row has synced here. A key that is
+     * already a live owner is answered `alreadyOwner` with no use spent, on both paths. To join
+     * the party as a machine too, use {@link joinWithOwnerGrant}.
+     *
+     * @throws a plain `Error` for a node not started or a bundle naming another party;
+     *   {@link OwnerKeyAddRefusedError} `alone` on the local path, `OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError`
+     *   when the issuer is not an owner here, `OwnerGrantRejectedError` `grant-spent` for a
+     *   grant no longer live here, and `OwnerGrantRejectedError` `conflict` (retryable) when the
+     *   cadre holds the grant row and this node has not synced it yet; on the protocol path
+     *   `OwnerGrantRejectedError` on a final refusal, `OwnerGrantReplyInvalidError` on an
+     *   acceptance that fails the reply check,
+     *   `OwnerGrantUnreachableError` when every address was tried (one pass only), and the
+     *   signal's reason on an abort.
+     */
+    async redeemOwnerGrant(bundle, signer, options = {}) {
+        const { controlDatabase } = this.requireStartedForGrant(bundle, 'redeeming an owner grant');
+        // An enrolled owner machine is a party machine whether or not its own row is published yet
+        // (the first self-record lands a second after start), so it writes locally too.
+        if (await this.isLiveMemberSelf() || await this.isOwner()) {
+            return await this.redeemOwnerGrantLocally(controlDatabase, bundle, signer);
+        }
+        await this.trustOwnerKeys(bundle.ownerKeys, 'invite');
+        const request = await signer.approve(ownerGrantApproval(bundle), (sign) => this.signOwnerGrantRequest(bundle, signer, sign));
+        const { reply, memberPeerId } = await this.redeemOwnerGrantAtMembers(bundle, request, options);
+        return { ownerKey: signer.publicKey, alreadyOwner: reply.alreadyOwner, memberPeerId };
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s local path: the alone refusal, the seat, the liveness refusal,
+     * then one approval around the consent signature and the write. Every refusal comes before
+     * the approval, so a prompting signer never asks for a redemption this node would refuse.
+     */
+    async redeemOwnerGrantLocally(controlDatabase, bundle, signer) {
+        if (await this.ownerKeyWriteAlone()) {
+            throw new OwnerKeyAddRefusedError(signer.publicKey, 'alone');
+        }
+        await refusingUnsyncedGrant(() => controlDatabase.seatOwnerGrant(bundle.grant));
+        // The write answers a key that is already an owner without reading the grant, so only a
+        // key that is not one needs the grant live (the same permissive pre-check the handler's
+        // admission uses; the write enforces every condition).
+        if (!(await controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()).has(signer.publicKey) && !await controlDatabase.isOwnerGrantLive(bundle.grant)) {
+            throw new OwnerGrantRejectedError('grant-spent', 'The grant is expired, withdrawn, exhausted, or its issuer is no longer an owner');
+        }
+        const { alreadyOwner } = await signer.approve(ownerGrantApproval(bundle), async (sign) => {
+            const request = await this.signOwnerGrantRequest(bundle, signer, sign);
+            return await refusingUnsyncedGrant(() => controlDatabase.redeemOwnerGrant({
+                grantKey: bundle.grant.key,
+                seatedKey: signer.publicKey,
+                usageStampId: request.usageStampId,
+                grantSig: request.grantSig,
+                ownerSig: request.ownerSig,
+            }));
+        });
+        // NOTE: the refusal is checked before the approval, and a connection can drop while the user
+        // approves; a redemption that still commits alone is logged, as an add's is.
+        if (!alreadyOwner && this.committedAlone()) {
+            log('redeemOwnerGrant(%s) committed while ALONE (the last control connection dropped during the approval): ' +
+                'the new owner row is local-only and is not re-issued on cohort growth.', signer.publicKey);
+        }
+        log('Owner grant %s redeemed locally for %s (alreadyOwner=%s)', bundle.grant.key, signer.publicKey, alreadyOwner);
+        return { ownerKey: signer.publicKey, alreadyOwner, memberPeerId: null };
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s protocol path, given the signed request: dial the bundle's members
+     * in passes, then refresh the membership gate, since the rows the member pushed and wrote are
+     * judged against the pins and the anchor derives this node's key from them once its row is here.
+     */
+    async redeemOwnerGrantAtMembers(bundle, request, options) {
+        const pinned = new Set(bundle.ownerKeys);
+        const redemption = await redeemOwnerGrantInPasses(this.controlNode, {
+            bundle,
+            request,
+            isTrustedIssuer: (ownerKey) => pinned.has(ownerKey),
+            linkRoundTripMs: this.config.network?.linkRoundTripMs,
+            waitForMember: options.waitForMember ?? false,
+            ...(options.signal ? { signal: options.signal } : {}),
+            ...(options.onProgress ? { onProgress: options.onProgress } : {}),
+        });
+        log('Owner grant %s redeemed at %s for %s (alreadyOwner=%s)', bundle.grant.key, redemption.memberAddr, request.ownerKey, redemption.reply.alreadyOwner);
+        await this.refreshMembershipGate('owner-grant-redeemed');
+        return redemption;
+    }
+    /** The signed request for `bundle` seating `signer`'s key, under an open approval's `sign`; the nonce is minted here, by the holder. */
+    signOwnerGrantRequest(bundle, signer, sign) {
+        return signOwnerGrantRequest(bundle, signer.publicKey, sign, generateStampId(this.controlNode.peerId.toString()));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Join this node's party as a machine AND an owner with one owner grant, for a node started in
+     * the grant's party that is not a member: a fresh install recovering with a backup grant, an
+     * app joining as an owner. Needs a started node with a stable identity, as
+     * {@link redeemCadreInvitation} does, and a bundle for this party.
+     *
+     * Steps, the two signatures made under ONE approval of `signer` before any dial, so a
+     * prompting signer asks once and its prompt does not span the network:
+     *
+     * 1. {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s protocol path: the member that accepts seats `signer`'s key.
+     * 2. A **self-invitation**: a `CadreInvite` row targeted at this node's peer id, one use, a
+     *    short expiry ({@link SELF_INVITATION_TTL_MS}), signed by `signer`
+     *    (`ControlDatabase.signCadreInvite`; never inserted here, since this store holds no
+     *    `OwnerKey` row for the issuer yet). Its bundle carries the grant's owner keys plus the
+     *    new key (the device's reply check wants the row's issuer among the pins) and the grant's
+     *    members with the member that accepted the grant first, since that member holds the new
+     *    key as a live owner and seats the row from the bundle; one the row has not reached yet
+     *    answers `issuer-unknown`, which is retryable.
+     * 3. {@link redeemCadreInvitation} with it: the member admits this node.
+     * 4. {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer) once the `OwnerKey` row has synced here, asked every
+     *    {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_RECHECK_MS} up to {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS}; the result's
+     *    `ownerWired` says whether it did in time, and a later call wires it otherwise.
+     *
+     * @throws as {@link redeemOwnerGrant} (protocol path) and {@link redeemCadreInvitation} throw,
+     *   and a plain `Error` for an ephemeral identity.
+     */
+    async joinWithOwnerGrant(bundle, signer, options = {}) {
+        const { controlNode, controlDatabase } = this.requireStartedForGrant(bundle, 'joining with an owner grant');
+        if (!this.getSelfSigningKey()) {
+            throw new Error('joinWithOwnerGrant: this node runs on an ephemeral identity; configure `keyStore` or `privateKey` so its key can sign the admission');
+        }
+        await this.trustOwnerKeys(bundle.ownerKeys, 'invite');
+        const invitePrivateKey = generatePrivateKey('ed25519', 'base64url');
+        const { request, selfInvite } = await signer.approve(ownerGrantApproval(bundle, 'join'), async (sign) => ({
+            request: await this.signOwnerGrantRequest(bundle, signer, sign),
+            selfInvite: await controlDatabase.signCadreInvite({
+                key: ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate(invitePrivateKey),
+                peerId: controlNode.peerId.toString(),
+                expiresAtMs: Date.now() + SELF_INVITATION_TTL_MS,
+                totalUses: 1,
+            }, signer.publicKey, sign),
+        }));
+        const granted = await this.redeemOwnerGrantAtMembers(bundle, request, options);
+        const selfInvitation = {
+            v: 1,
+            partyId: bundle.partyId,
+            invitePrivateKey,
+            invite: selfInvite,
+            ownerKeys: [...bundle.ownerKeys, signer.publicKey],
+            members: addressesOfFirst(bundle.members, granted.memberPeerId),
+        };
+        const joined = await this.redeemCadreInvitation(selfInvitation, options);
+        const ownerWired = await this.wireOwnKeyOnceSynced(signer);
+        log('Joined with owner grant %s: member via %s, owner key %s (wired=%s)', bundle.grant.key, joined.peerId ?? 'unnamed member', signer.publicKey, ownerWired);
+        return { peerId: joined.peerId, redeemedAt: joined.redeemedAt, ownerKey: signer.publicKey, alreadyOwner: granted.reply.alreadyOwner, ownerWired };
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link wireOwnKeyIfOwner}(signer) once `signer`'s `OwnerKey` row has reached this node, asked
+     * again every {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_RECHECK_MS} until it has, the node stops, or
+     * {@link OWNER_ROW_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS} passes: false then, and a later call wires it. Usually
+     * immediate: the member pushed its whole store, the row included, before the admission write.
+     */
+    async wireOwnKeyOnceSynced(signer) {
+        const deadline = Date.now() + OWNER_ROW_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS;
+        while (!(await this.wireOwnKeyIfOwner(signer))) {
+            if (!this._running || Date.now() >= deadline) {
+                log('wireOwnKeyOnceSynced: the OwnerKey row for %s has not reached this node yet; not wired', signer.publicKey);
+                return false;
+            }
+            await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, OWNER_ROW_SYNC_RECHECK_MS));
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The started node's handles for a grant call, the bundle's party checked first: a grant for
+     * another party is refused before any pin, dial or write.
+     */
+    requireStartedForGrant(bundle, action) {
+        if (!this.controlNode || !this.controlDatabase || !this._running) {
+            throw new Error(`CadreNode must be started before ${action}`);
+        }
+        if (bundle.partyId !== this.config.controlNetwork.partyId) {
+            throw new Error(`Owner grant is for party ${bundle.partyId}; this node serves ${this.config.controlNetwork.partyId}`);
+        }
+        return { controlNode: this.controlNode, controlDatabase: this.controlDatabase };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Is this node a live member of its party: its own `CadrePeer` row is held here and passes the
+     * membership predicate ({@link hasAnchoredProof}, judged as {@link listAuthorizedMembers}
+     * judges every other row; that listing leaves this node out)? What decides
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s path. A machine's own row is written by its enrollment (or its
+     * first self-record, for an owner's machine), so a node on an empty store, or one holding only
+     * a store a member pushed it, is not one.
+     */
+    async isLiveMemberSelf() {
+        const controlDatabase = this.controlDatabase;
+        const self = this.controlNode?.peerId.toString();
+        if (!controlDatabase || self === undefined) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const own = (await controlDatabase.queryCadrePeers()).find((row) => row.peerId === self);
+        return own !== undefined && this.hasAnchoredProof(own, await this.chainFor([own], this.invitationChainSource(controlDatabase, true)));
+    }
+    // ============================================================================
     // Strand Solicitation API (native cadre-core formation transport)
     // ============================================================================
     /**
@@ -8661,7 +9185,7 @@ export class CadreNode {
      */
     async requestJoin(invitation, disclosure = {}) {
         const { database, runner } = this.requirePendingJoins();
-        const signer = await this.requireOwnerSigner('requestJoin needs an enrolled owner machine of this party, because the party-wide join request is ' +
+        const signer = await this.requireEnrolledOwnerSigner('requestJoin needs an enrolled owner machine of this party, because the party-wide join request is ' +
             'owner-signed. formStrand(invitation, disclosure) joins once from this machine, with no retries.');
         const now = Date.now();
         const expiresAt = invitation.expiration.getTime();
@@ -8672,7 +9196,9 @@ export class CadreNode {
             throw new Error(`The invitation expired at ${invitation.expiration.toISOString()}; ask the inviter for a fresh one`);
         }
         const requested = requestedPendingJoin(pendingJoinId(invitation.token), this.encodeInvitation(invitation), disclosure, expiresAt, now);
-        const row = await this.recordJoinRequest(database, requested, signer);
+        // The attempt below runs outside the approval: a formation can take a network timeout, and
+        // the outcome it records is the retry loop's own write.
+        const row = await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Ask to join a strand of the app ${invitation.sAppId}` }, (sign) => this.recordJoinRequest(database, requested, signer.publicKey, sign));
         log('requestJoin: pending join %s recorded; attempting now', row.Id);
         return runner.attemptNow(row);
     }
@@ -8692,8 +9218,8 @@ export class CadreNode {
      */
     async dismissPendingJoin(id) {
         const { database, runner } = this.requirePendingJoins();
-        const { ownerKey, signMessage } = await this.requireOwnerSigner('dismissPendingJoin needs an enrolled owner machine of this party: the removal is owner-signed');
-        const removed = await database.deletePendingJoin(id, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        const signer = await this.requireEnrolledOwnerSigner('dismissPendingJoin needs an enrolled owner machine of this party: the removal is owner-signed');
+        const removed = await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action: `Dismiss the pending join ${id}` }, (sign) => database.deletePendingJoin(id, signer.publicKey, sign));
         runner.forgetRow(id);
         return removed;
     }
@@ -8703,19 +9229,19 @@ export class CadreNode {
         }
         return { database: this.controlDatabase, runner: this.pendingJoinRunner };
     }
-    /** This machine's owner key and signer for an owner-signed control write, or a throw carrying `refusal`. */
-    async requireOwnerSigner(refusal) {
-        const signingKey = await this.enrolledOwnerSigningKey();
-        if (!signingKey) {
+    /** This machine's enrolled owner signer ({@link enrolledOwnerSigner}), or a throw carrying `refusal`. */
+    async requireEnrolledOwnerSigner(refusal) {
+        const signer = await this.enrolledOwnerSigner();
+        if (!signer) {
             throw new Error(refusal);
         }
-        return { ownerKey: signingKey.publicKeyB64, signMessage: signMessageWith(signingKey.privateKeyB64) };
+        return signer;
     }
     /**
      * Write a join request, or adopt the party's existing request for the same invitation: a
      * pending one as it is, a finished one rewritten as `requested` (the user asked again).
      */
-    async recordJoinRequest(database, requested, { ownerKey, signMessage }) {
+    async recordJoinRequest(database, requested, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         let written;
         try {
             written = await database.insertJoinRequest(requested, ownerKey, signMessage);
@@ -8745,29 +9271,24 @@ export class CadreNode {
             }
             return this.controlDatabase;
         };
-        const outcomeSigner = () => this.requireOwnerSigner('Cannot record a pending join outcome: this machine is not an enrolled owner of the party');
+        // Each write is its own approval: the retry loop runs unattended.
+        const ownerWrite = async (action, write) => {
+            const signer = await this.requireEnrolledOwnerSigner('Cannot record a pending join outcome: this machine is not an enrolled owner of the party');
+            return await signer.approve({ partyId: this.partyId, action }, (sign) => write(signer.publicKey, sign));
+        };
         this.pendingJoinRunner = new PendingJoinRunner({
             selfId: this.controlNode.peerId.toString(),
             linkRoundTripMs: this.config.network?.linkRoundTripMs,
-            isOwner: async () => (await this.enrolledOwnerSigningKey()) !== null,
+            isOwner: () => this.isOwner(),
             // NOTE: one owner-key read and one pending-join read (three tables) per pass (30 s); for a
             // party that never asked for a join the second reads never-written blocks, which consults
             // the cohort. If it shows up in a device profile, poll more slowly while the tables read empty.
             readRows: () => database().queryPendingJoins(),
             readRow: (id) => database().queryPendingJoin(id),
             attempt: (join) => this.formStrand(this.pendingJoinInvitation(join), parseStoredDisclosure(join)),
-            record: async (expected, outcome) => {
-                const { ownerKey, signMessage } = await outcomeSigner();
-                return database().recordJoinOutcome(expected, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage);
-            },
-            rewrite: async (expectedStampId, next) => {
-                const { ownerKey, signMessage } = await outcomeSigner();
-                return database().rewritePendingJoin(expectedStampId, next, ownerKey, signMessage);
-            },
-            remove: async (id) => {
-                const { ownerKey, signMessage } = await outcomeSigner();
-                return database().deletePendingJoin(id, ownerKey, signMessage);
-            },
+            record: (expected, outcome) => ownerWrite(`Record the outcome of the pending join ${expected.Id}`, (ownerKey, sign) => database().recordJoinOutcome(expected, outcome, ownerKey, sign)),
+            rewrite: (expectedStampId, next) => ownerWrite(`Re-send the pending join ${next.Id} to the cadre`, (ownerKey, sign) => database().rewritePendingJoin(expectedStampId, next, ownerKey, sign)),
+            remove: (id) => ownerWrite(`Clean up the finished pending join ${id}`, (ownerKey, sign) => database().deletePendingJoin(id, ownerKey, sign)),
             isAlone: () => this.committedAlone(),
             sAppIdOf: (row) => this.pendingJoinSAppId(row),
             observeRows: (rows) => this.stageMembershipInvitesFromPendingJoins(rows),