@serfab/cadre-core 1.14.0 → 1.15.0

package/src/formation-approval.ts

@@ -1,610 +1,604 @@
-import debug from 'debug';
-import {
-  concat as uint8ArrayConcat,
-  fromString as uint8ArrayFromString,
-  toString as uint8ArrayToString
-} from 'uint8arrays';
-import { sign, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
-import { formationVouchMessage } from './control-database.js';
-
-const log = debug('sereus:cadre:formation-approval');
-
-/**
- * Abort an unanswered approval request after this long when no `timeoutMs` is supplied.
- * Exported because the formation responder's provisioning budget has to contain it:
- * `formationDeadlines` (`strand-formation-deadlines.ts`) adds it as a flat term, since an HTTP
- * call to the hook does not cross the link between the two parties' machines.
- */
-// eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- link-independent: an outbound HTTP call to the approval hook, not the libp2p link between machines
-export const DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
-
-/**
- * Largest approval response body this client will read (64 KiB). An approval is two short
- * base64url strings; anything approaching this is a broken or hostile hook, and reading it
- * unbounded would let that hook stream a redeeming node out of memory mid-formation.
- */
-const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
-
-/**
- * Everything ONE approval is bound to — the five fields inside the approver's signed digest
- * (see `formationVouchMessage`), plus the hook to ask.
- *
- * Every field is fixed BEFORE the hook is contacted: the JOINER mints the nonce (and signs its
- * own consent over it) before its contact message is sent, and the redeeming node knows the
- * strand, the joiner's key, and the disclosure text it is about to write. That ordering is
- * what makes the resulting signature usable — an approval signed over a nonce the node did not
- * insert fails `FormationUsage.Authorized` at commit.
- */
-export interface FormationApprovalRequest {
-  /** Invitation token being redeemed. */
-  token: string;
-  /** Single-use nonce for THIS redemption, already minted by the JOINING peer. */
-  usageStampId: string;
-  /** The strand (network) being joined. */
-  strandId: string;
-  /** The joining peer's own ed25519 public key (written to `FormationUsage.PeerKey`). */
-  peerKey: string;
-  /**
-   * The EXACT text that will be written to `FormationUsage.Disclosure`. The approver signs
-   * these bytes verbatim and MUST NOT re-serialize them — the redeeming node computes this
-   * string once and uses the identical string for both the signature and the insert.
-   */
-  disclosure: string;
-  /**
-   * The invite's `ValidationUrl` (the hook to contact). NOT part of the signed digest: it says
-   * where to ask, not what is being approved.
-   */
-  validationUrl: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * The five signed fields on their own — what `formationVouchMessage` consumes, and the exact
- * JSON body posted to the hook. Derived from {@link FormationApprovalRequest} by subtraction so
- * a field added to the request must be consciously routed here (or the build breaks) rather
- * than silently dropping out of the digest.
- *
- * This is what an APPROVER receives: a hook is posted these five fields and nothing else, so it
- * has no `validationUrl` to supply and should type its request body as this, not as the full
- * {@link FormationApprovalRequest}.
- */
-export type FormationVouchFields = Omit<FormationApprovalRequest, 'validationUrl'>;
-
-/** An approver's answer: which key vouched, and its signature over the request's digest. */
-export interface FormationApproval {
-  /** Public key the approval claims; must match an enrolled `ValidationKey` row. */
-  validationKey: string;
-  /** base64url ed25519 signature over `formationVouchMessage(request)`. */
-  validationSignature: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Something that can obtain an approval for a redemption. The HTTP hook
- * ({@link createHttpFormationApprover}) is the production implementation; tests and embedded
- * deployments can supply their own.
- *
- * Rejects with a {@link FormationApprovalError} — never resolves to a "no". A caller that
- * receives a resolved {@link FormationApproval} may still find it does not verify; use
- * {@link verifyFormationApproval} before writing.
- */
-export interface FormationApprover {
-  /**
-   * `signal` is the caller's cancellation (the formation responder's work budget expiring):
-   * a pre-aborted or mid-flight abort rejects with an `unavailable`
-   * {@link FormationApprovalError} without (further) contacting the hook. Optional so
-   * signal-unaware implementations stay assignable.
-   */
-  requestApproval(request: FormationApprovalRequest, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<FormationApproval>;
-}
-
-/**
- * Why an approval could not be obtained. The cases route differently: `refused` is a
- * final answer, `unavailable` may succeed on a later attempt, and `malformed` /
- * `unenrolled` / `misconfigured` are operator errors that retrying never fixes.
- *
- * `unenrolled` is thrown by the redeeming node's LOCAL enrollment pre-check (the recorder
- * asking its control database whether the approval's key is an enrolled `ValidationKey`
- * row), never by the HTTP client — a hook cannot know or report it.
- */
-export type FormationApprovalFailure =
-  /** The hook answered, and the answer is no. */
-  | 'refused'
-  /** Could not get an answer (network error, timeout, non-2xx status, redirect). */
-  | 'unavailable'
-  /** Got an answer that is not a usable approval (not JSON, missing/blank fields, oversized). */
-  | 'malformed'
-  /** The approval's `validationKey` is not an enrolled `ValidationKey` row (local pre-check). */
-  | 'unenrolled'
-  /** The `ValidationUrl` or the runtime is unusable (bad scheme, no `fetch`). */
-  | 'misconfigured';
-
-/**
- * Failure to obtain an approval, carrying the {@link FormationApprovalFailure} category the
- * caller switches on to pick the rejection reason a would-be joiner is told.
- */
-export class FormationApprovalError extends Error {
-  constructor(
-    readonly failure: FormationApprovalFailure,
-    message: string,
-    options?: { cause?: unknown }
-  ) {
-    super(message, options);
-    this.name = 'FormationApprovalError';
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * The five fields the approver signs, lifted out of the request. Written as an explicit
- * destructure (not a spread-and-delete) so the object posted to the hook can never pick up a
- * field the digest does not cover — in particular the `validationUrl`.
- */
-function vouchFields(request: FormationApprovalRequest): FormationVouchFields {
-  const { token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure } = request;
-  return { token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure };
-}
-
-/**
- * Approver side: produce the approval for a request. Used by tests, and by anyone writing a
- * hook in TypeScript.
- *
- * `privateKeyB64`'s public half must be the key enrolled as the `ValidationKey` row the
- * redeeming node's control database will verify against — pass that same public key as
- * `validationKey` (derive it with `ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate` if you only hold the seed).
- * Signing with a key that is not enrolled produces a perfectly valid signature that the
- * database still rejects.
- *
- * Takes the five signed fields, not a full {@link FormationApprovalRequest}: an approver is
- * posted only those five and has no `validationUrl` to hand back. A redeeming node holding a
- * whole request can still pass it straight in.
- *
- * @param fields - The redemption being approved (the five signed fields).
- * @param validationKey - base64url ed25519 public key that this approval claims.
- * @param privateKeyB64 - base64url 32-byte ed25519 seed to sign with.
- */
-export function signFormationApproval(
-  fields: FormationVouchFields,
-  validationKey: string,
-  privateKeyB64: string
-): FormationApproval {
-  const validationSignature = sign(
-    formationVouchMessage(fields),
-    privateKeyB64,
-    'ed25519',
-    'bytes',
-    'base64url',
-    'base64url'
-  ) as string;
-  return { validationKey, validationSignature };
-}
-
-/**
- * Redeeming side: does this approval actually verify against the bytes we are about to write?
- *
- * A LOCAL PRE-CHECK, not the authority. It turns a bad approval into a legible rejection
- * instead of an opaque `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized` at commit, and it catches the
- * ordinary drift case (the hook signed a different nonce/strand/peer than the one we hold).
- * It cannot substitute for the database check: this verifies against the key the approval
- * itself names, whereas `FormationUsage.Authorized` verifies against the STORED
- * `ValidationKey` row — which is what stops a redeemer approving itself with a key of its own
- * choosing.
- *
- * Returns a boolean and never throws (same contract as `verifyPeerAuthorization`): malformed
- * base64url, a garbage key, or any crypto failure resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
- */
-export function verifyFormationApproval(
-  fields: FormationVouchFields,
-  approval: FormationApproval
-): boolean {
-  try {
-    return verify(
-      formationVouchMessage(fields),
-      approval.validationSignature,
-      approval.validationKey,
-      'ed25519',
-      'bytes',
-      'base64url',
-      'base64url'
-    );
-  } catch (error) {
-    log('verifyFormationApproval failed: %o', error);
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolve and validate the hook URL before anything is sent.
- *
- * `http:` stays permitted — a self-hosted hook on a LAN is a real deployment — but note that
- * it puts the disclosure text on the wire in clear, and lets anyone on the path see who is
- * joining which strand. Prefer `https:` for a hook reachable off-link.
- */
-function parseHookUrl(validationUrl: string): URL {
-  let url: URL;
-  try {
-    url = new URL(validationUrl);
-  } catch (error) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'misconfigured',
-      `ValidationUrl is not a valid URL: ${validationUrl}`,
-      { cause: error }
-    );
-  }
-  if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'misconfigured',
-      `ValidationUrl scheme "${url.protocol}" is not supported; use http: or https:`
-    );
-  }
-  return url;
-}
-
-/**
- * The `fetch` this approver will call: the injected one, else the global.
- *
- * Bound to `globalThis` because an unbound global `fetch` is an illegal invocation in browsers
- * (and in any runtime whose `fetch` is a branded method rather than a plain function).
- */
-function resolveFetch(fetchImpl?: typeof fetch): typeof fetch {
-  if (fetchImpl) {
-    return fetchImpl;
-  }
-  if (typeof globalThis.fetch !== 'function') {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'misconfigured',
-      'No fetch implementation: globalThis.fetch is missing and no fetchImpl was supplied'
-    );
-  }
-  return globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
-}
-
-/**
- * Read the response body as text, refusing anything over {@link MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES}.
- *
- * Two paths, because `Response.body` is not universally a stream (React Native's fetch has no
- * `body` reader): stream and stop at the cap where possible, otherwise read to completion and
- * measure. The declared `content-length` is checked first so an honest oversized response is
- * rejected without reading it at all — but it is only a hint, so the actual bytes are counted
- * either way.
- *
- * NOTE: on the no-reader path the cap is enforced only AFTER the runtime has buffered the whole
- * body, so a hook that under-declares its `content-length` can still make that runtime hold an
- * arbitrary amount. Harmless where it applies today (React Native clients are not formation
- * responders); if a responder ever runs on a platform without a body reader, that path needs a
- * real streaming read rather than a post-hoc measurement.
- */
-async function readCappedText(response: Response, budget: ApprovalBudget): Promise<string> {
-  const declared = Number(response.headers.get('content-length'));
-  if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'malformed',
-      `Approval response declares ${declared} bytes, over the ${MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES}-byte cap`
-    );
-  }
-
-  const body = response.body;
-  if (!body || typeof body.getReader !== 'function') {
-    // NOTE: nothing releases this body when the budget wins — `text()` has already locked it and
-    // the runtime owns the buffering. It only applies to readerless-fetch runtimes (React
-    // Native), which are not formation responders; a responder on such a platform would need a
-    // real streaming read here, as the cap note above already says.
-    const text = await budget.race(response.text());
-    assertUnderCap(uint8ArrayFromString(text, 'utf8').byteLength);
-    return text;
-  }
-  return readCappedStream(body.getReader(), budget);
-}
-
-/** Drain a body stream, aborting the read the moment the accumulated bytes pass the cap. */
-async function readCappedStream(
-  reader: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>,
-  budget: ApprovalBudget
-): Promise<string> {
-  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-  let total = 0;
-  try {
-    for (;;) {
-      // Raced, not just aborted: a `fetch` that drops the abort leaves this read pending
-      // forever, and the budget is the only thing that ends it. The `finally` below cancels
-      // the reader, which is what actually gives the connection back.
-      const { done, value } = await budget.race(reader.read());
-      if (done) {
-        break;
-      }
-      total += value.byteLength;
-      assertUnderCap(total);
-      chunks.push(value);
-    }
-  } finally {
-    // Releases the connection when we bailed early; a no-op on a fully-drained stream.
-    void reader.cancel().catch((error: unknown) => log('response cancel failed: %o', error));
-  }
-  return uint8ArrayToString(uint8ArrayConcat(chunks, total), 'utf8');
-}
-
-/**
- * Release a body we are never going to read, so the runtime can put the connection back in its
- * pool. Every failure decided from the status line (a refusal, a 5xx, a redirect) and the
- * declared-oversize rejection throw before touching the body, and an undrained body keeps a
- * socket checked out until GC — a node that asks a flapping hook once per redemption would
- * accumulate them. Skips a body already locked by {@link readCappedStream}, which cancels its
- * own reader.
- *
- * NOTE: awaited by `readApproval`, so it sits OUTSIDE the budget — a runtime whose `cancel()`
- * never settles would hold the caller past `timeoutMs` even though the deadline already fired.
- * Every runtime this ships on settles it promptly. If a request is ever seen outliving its budget
- * despite the budget firing, stop awaiting this; the two tests that assert the body is released
- * by the time the rejection surfaces would then have to poll instead.
- */
-async function discardBody(response: Response): Promise<void> {
-  const body = response.body;
-  if (!body || body.locked) {
-    return;
-  }
-  try {
-    await body.cancel();
-  } catch (error) {
-    log('discarding unread response body failed: %o', error);
-  }
-}
-
-function assertUnderCap(bytes: number): void {
-  if (bytes > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'malformed',
-      `Approval response exceeds the ${MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES}-byte cap`
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-/** A blank (or whitespace-only) field is as unusable as a missing one — both are `malformed`. */
-function requireField(body: Record<string, unknown>, field: string): string {
-  const value = body[field];
-  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.trim() === '') {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'malformed',
-      `Approval response is missing a usable "${field}"`
-    );
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-
-/** Parse a 2xx body into an approval, rejecting anything that is not the documented shape. */
-function parseApproval(text: string): FormationApproval {
-  let parsed: unknown;
-  try {
-    parsed = JSON.parse(text);
-  } catch (error) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError('malformed', 'Approval response is not JSON', { cause: error });
-  }
-  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError('malformed', 'Approval response is not a JSON object');
-  }
-  const body = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
-  return {
-    validationKey: requireField(body, 'validationKey'),
-    validationSignature: requireField(body, 'validationSignature')
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Map a response's STATUS — never its body shape — onto a failure. A `403` carrying a
- * well-formed approval is still a refusal: the hook said no, and a redeeming node that read
- * the body anyway would let a hook accidentally approve by echoing.
- */
-function assertApprovingStatus(response: Response, origin: string): void {
-  if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'refused',
-      `Approval hook ${origin} refused this redemption (HTTP ${response.status})`
-    );
-  }
-  if (!response.ok) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'unavailable',
-      `Approval hook ${origin} answered HTTP ${response.status}`
-    );
-  }
-  // Belt and braces for runtimes that ignore `redirect: 'error'` rather than rejecting.
-  if (response.redirected) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'unavailable',
-      `Approval hook ${origin} redirected; re-publish the ValidationUrl instead of chasing it`
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Turn a response into an approval, releasing the body on every path that rejects it.
- */
-async function readApproval(
-  response: Response,
-  origin: string,
-  budget: ApprovalBudget
-): Promise<FormationApproval> {
-  try {
-    assertApprovingStatus(response, origin);
-    return parseApproval(await readCappedText(response, budget));
-  } catch (error) {
-    await discardBody(response);
-    throw error;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * ONE deadline covering a whole approval exchange — connect, headers, AND body read — that fires
- * whether or not the runtime's `fetch` honours an abort.
- *
- * Aborting is still done (it is what releases the socket where it works), but it cannot be the
- * only bound: Node's `fetch` occasionally drops an abort that lands mid-body-read, leaving the
- * read pending until undici's own 300s body timeout. Every await that can outlive the budget is
- * raced against {@link ApprovalBudget.race} instead.
- */
-interface ApprovalBudget {
-  /** `work`, or the budget's `unavailable` rejection — whichever settles first. */
-  race<T>(work: Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
-  /** True once the deadline has fired, i.e. any result arriving now is unwanted. */
-  expired(): boolean;
-  /** Clears the timer and the caller's abort listener. Must run on every exit path. */
-  dispose(): void;
-}
-
-/**
- * Arm the budget for one request. The caller's `signal` is relayed by hand rather than with
- * `AbortSignal.any` (not reliably present on React Native/Hermes; this client commits to
- * `fetch` + `AbortController` only).
- */
-function startBudget(
-  timeoutMs: number,
-  origin: string,
-  controller: AbortController,
-  signal?: AbortSignal
-): ApprovalBudget {
-  let expired = false;
-  let expire!: (error: FormationApprovalError) => void;
-  const deadline = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => { expire = reject; });
-  // The deadline can fire between two raced awaits, with nothing attached to it; a bare handler
-  // keeps that from surfacing as an unhandled rejection without hiding it from `race`.
-  void deadline.catch(() => { /* observed by race() */ });
-
-  const fire = (reason: string): void => {
-    if (expired) {
-      return;
-    }
-    expired = true;
-    // Rejected BEFORE the abort, so this reason — not whatever a fetch that DOES honour the
-    // abort rejects with — is what the race settles on. Both are queued in the same turn, and
-    // the first one queued wins.
-    expire(new FormationApprovalError('unavailable', reason));
-    // Best-effort, and no longer load-bearing: where the runtime honours it, this hands the
-    // socket back instead of leaving it checked out until GC.
-    controller.abort();
-  };
-
-  const timer = setTimeout(
-    () => fire(`Approval hook ${origin} did not answer within ${timeoutMs}ms`),
-    timeoutMs
-  );
-  const onCallerAbort = (): void =>
-    fire(`Formation was cancelled while approval hook ${origin} was being asked`);
-  signal?.addEventListener('abort', onCallerAbort, { once: true });
-
-  return {
-    race: <T>(work: Promise<T>): Promise<T> => Promise.race([work, deadline]),
-    expired: () => expired,
-    dispose: (): void => {
-      // A leaked abort timer keeps a node's event loop alive.
-      clearTimeout(timer);
-      signal?.removeEventListener('abort', onCallerAbort);
-    }
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Await the response, giving up when the budget expires — and cleaning up after ourselves if it
- * does: a `fetch` that ignored the abort still delivers its response eventually, and an unread
- * body keeps a connection checked out. A late rejection is logged rather than left unhandled.
- */
-async function fetchWithinBudget(
-  pending: Promise<Response>,
-  budget: ApprovalBudget
-): Promise<Response> {
-  void pending.then(
-    (response) => {
-      if (budget.expired()) {
-        void discardBody(response);
-      }
-    },
-    (error: unknown) => {
-      if (budget.expired()) {
-        log('abandoned approval request rejected after its budget expired: %o', error);
-      }
-    }
-  );
-  return budget.race(pending);
-}
-
-/**
- * Ask an outside approval service, over HTTP, whether a would-be joiner may redeem an
- * invitation. Contacted by the INVITING party's node (the formation responder) during
- * redemption — never by the joiner, which neither mints the nonce nor performs the write.
- *
- * Wire contract (documented for hook operators in `docs/api.md`):
- *
- * - `POST <ValidationUrl>`, `content-type: application/json`, `accept: application/json`.
- * - Body is exactly the five signed fields — `{ token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey,
- *   disclosure }` — and nothing else. No owner keys, no bootstrap addresses, no membership
- *   keys ever reach the hook.
- * - `200` with `{ "validationKey": "...", "validationSignature": "..." }` is an approval.
- * - `401` / `403` is a refusal; any other non-2xx, a network error, a timeout, or a redirect
- *   is `unavailable`; a 2xx that is not a usable approval is `malformed`.
- *
- * Cross-platform by construction: global `fetch` + `AbortController` only, no `node:` imports.
- */
-export function createHttpFormationApprover(options?: {
-  /**
-   * Abort the request after this long, INCLUDING the body read. Default 10s. Must stay under
-   * the responder's provisioning budget — a hook that stalls must not stall formation.
-   */
-  timeoutMs?: number;
-  /** Injectable for tests / non-standard runtimes. Defaults to `globalThis.fetch`. */
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
-}): FormationApprover {
-  const timeoutMs = options?.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS;
-  // A non-positive or non-finite budget would abort every request before it left, turning a
-  // config typo into a hook that appears permanently down. Fail where the mistake was made.
-  if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {
-    throw new FormationApprovalError(
-      'misconfigured',
-      `timeoutMs must be a positive number of milliseconds, got ${timeoutMs}`
-    );
-  }
-  const fetchImpl = options?.fetchImpl;
-
-  return {
-    async requestApproval(request: FormationApprovalRequest, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<FormationApproval> {
-      const doFetch = resolveFetch(fetchImpl);
-      const url = parseHookUrl(request.validationUrl);
-      // Origin only in messages: a ValidationUrl's path/query may carry a hook secret, and
-      // these strings reach logs and the joiner's rejection reason.
-      const origin = url.origin;
-
-      if (signal?.aborted) {
-        throw new FormationApprovalError(
-          'unavailable',
-          `Formation was cancelled before approval hook ${origin} was asked`
-        );
-      }
-
-      const controller = new AbortController();
-      const budget = startBudget(timeoutMs, origin, controller, signal);
-
-      try {
-        const response = await fetchWithinBudget(
-          doFetch(url.toString(), {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', accept: 'application/json' },
-            body: JSON.stringify(vouchFields(request)),
-            redirect: 'error',
-            signal: controller.signal
-          }),
-          budget
-        );
-        const approval = await readApproval(response, origin, budget);
-        log('approval obtained from %s for token %s', origin, request.token);
-        return approval;
-      } catch (error) {
-        // Includes the budget's own rejection, which already carries the timeout/cancellation
-        // wording; anything else got here without the budget firing, so the hook is unreachable.
-        if (error instanceof FormationApprovalError) {
-          throw error;
-        }
-        throw new FormationApprovalError(
-          'unavailable',
-          `Approval hook ${origin} could not be reached`,
-          { cause: error }
-        );
-      } finally {
-        budget.dispose();
-      }
-    }
-  };
-}
+import debug from 'debug';
+import {
+  concat as uint8ArrayConcat,
+  fromString as uint8ArrayFromString,
+  toString as uint8ArrayToString
+} from 'uint8arrays';
+import { sign, verify } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { formationVouchMessage } from './control-database.js';
+import { resolveFetch as resolveFetchImpl } from './fetch-impl.js';
+
+const log = debug('sereus:cadre:formation-approval');
+
+/**
+ * Abort an unanswered approval request after this long when no `timeoutMs` is supplied.
+ * Exported because the formation responder's provisioning budget has to contain it:
+ * `formationDeadlines` (`strand-formation-deadlines.ts`) adds it as a flat term, since an HTTP
+ * call to the hook does not cross the link between the two parties' machines.
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- link-independent: an outbound HTTP call to the approval hook, not the libp2p link between machines
+export const DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
+/**
+ * Largest approval response body this client will read (64 KiB). An approval is two short
+ * base64url strings; anything approaching this is a broken or hostile hook, and reading it
+ * unbounded would let that hook stream a redeeming node out of memory mid-formation.
+ */
+const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+
+/**
+ * Everything ONE approval is bound to — the five fields inside the approver's signed digest
+ * (see `formationVouchMessage`), plus the hook to ask.
+ *
+ * Every field is fixed BEFORE the hook is contacted: the JOINER mints the nonce (and signs its
+ * own consent over it) before its contact message is sent, and the redeeming node knows the
+ * strand, the joiner's key, and the disclosure text it is about to write. That ordering is
+ * what makes the resulting signature usable — an approval signed over a nonce the node did not
+ * insert fails `FormationUsage.Authorized` at commit.
+ */
+export interface FormationApprovalRequest {
+  /** Invitation token being redeemed. */
+  token: string;
+  /** Single-use nonce for THIS redemption, already minted by the JOINING peer. */
+  usageStampId: string;
+  /** The strand (network) being joined. */
+  strandId: string;
+  /** The joining peer's own ed25519 public key (written to `FormationUsage.PeerKey`). */
+  peerKey: string;
+  /**
+   * The EXACT text that will be written to `FormationUsage.Disclosure`. The approver signs
+   * these bytes verbatim and MUST NOT re-serialize them — the redeeming node computes this
+   * string once and uses the identical string for both the signature and the insert.
+   */
+  disclosure: string;
+  /**
+   * The invite's `ValidationUrl` (the hook to contact). NOT part of the signed digest: it says
+   * where to ask, not what is being approved.
+   */
+  validationUrl: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The five signed fields on their own — what `formationVouchMessage` consumes, and the exact
+ * JSON body posted to the hook. Derived from {@link FormationApprovalRequest} by subtraction so
+ * a field added to the request must be consciously routed here (or the build breaks) rather
+ * than silently dropping out of the digest.
+ *
+ * This is what an APPROVER receives: a hook is posted these five fields and nothing else, so it
+ * has no `validationUrl` to supply and should type its request body as this, not as the full
+ * {@link FormationApprovalRequest}.
+ */
+export type FormationVouchFields = Omit<FormationApprovalRequest, 'validationUrl'>;
+
+/** An approver's answer: which key vouched, and its signature over the request's digest. */
+export interface FormationApproval {
+  /** Public key the approval claims; must match an enrolled `ValidationKey` row. */
+  validationKey: string;
+  /** base64url ed25519 signature over `formationVouchMessage(request)`. */
+  validationSignature: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Something that can obtain an approval for a redemption. The HTTP hook
+ * ({@link createHttpFormationApprover}) is the production implementation; tests and embedded
+ * deployments can supply their own.
+ *
+ * Rejects with a {@link FormationApprovalError} — never resolves to a "no". A caller that
+ * receives a resolved {@link FormationApproval} may still find it does not verify; use
+ * {@link verifyFormationApproval} before writing.
+ */
+export interface FormationApprover {
+  /**
+   * `signal` is the caller's cancellation (the formation responder's work budget expiring):
+   * a pre-aborted or mid-flight abort rejects with an `unavailable`
+   * {@link FormationApprovalError} without (further) contacting the hook. Optional so
+   * signal-unaware implementations stay assignable.
+   */
+  requestApproval(request: FormationApprovalRequest, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<FormationApproval>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why an approval could not be obtained. The cases route differently: `refused` is a
+ * final answer, `unavailable` may succeed on a later attempt, and `malformed` /
+ * `unenrolled` / `misconfigured` are operator errors that retrying never fixes.
+ *
+ * `unenrolled` is thrown by the redeeming node's LOCAL enrollment pre-check (the recorder
+ * asking its control database whether the approval's key is an enrolled `ValidationKey`
+ * row), never by the HTTP client — a hook cannot know or report it.
+ */
+export type FormationApprovalFailure =
+  /** The hook answered, and the answer is no. */
+  | 'refused'
+  /** Could not get an answer (network error, timeout, non-2xx status, redirect). */
+  | 'unavailable'
+  /** Got an answer that is not a usable approval (not JSON, missing/blank fields, oversized). */
+  | 'malformed'
+  /** The approval's `validationKey` is not an enrolled `ValidationKey` row (local pre-check). */
+  | 'unenrolled'
+  /** The `ValidationUrl` or the runtime is unusable (bad scheme, no `fetch`). */
+  | 'misconfigured';
+
+/**
+ * Failure to obtain an approval, carrying the {@link FormationApprovalFailure} category the
+ * caller switches on to pick the rejection reason a would-be joiner is told.
+ */
+export class FormationApprovalError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    readonly failure: FormationApprovalFailure,
+    message: string,
+    options?: { cause?: unknown }
+  ) {
+    super(message, options);
+    this.name = 'FormationApprovalError';
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The five fields the approver signs, lifted out of the request. Written as an explicit
+ * destructure (not a spread-and-delete) so the object posted to the hook can never pick up a
+ * field the digest does not cover — in particular the `validationUrl`.
+ */
+function vouchFields(request: FormationApprovalRequest): FormationVouchFields {
+  const { token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure } = request;
+  return { token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey, disclosure };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Approver side: produce the approval for a request. Used by tests, and by anyone writing a
+ * hook in TypeScript.
+ *
+ * `privateKeyB64`'s public half must be the key enrolled as the `ValidationKey` row the
+ * redeeming node's control database will verify against — pass that same public key as
+ * `validationKey` (derive it with `ed25519PublicKeyFromPrivate` if you only hold the seed).
+ * Signing with a key that is not enrolled produces a perfectly valid signature that the
+ * database still rejects.
+ *
+ * Takes the five signed fields, not a full {@link FormationApprovalRequest}: an approver is
+ * posted only those five and has no `validationUrl` to hand back. A redeeming node holding a
+ * whole request can still pass it straight in.
+ *
+ * @param fields - The redemption being approved (the five signed fields).
+ * @param validationKey - base64url ed25519 public key that this approval claims.
+ * @param privateKeyB64 - base64url 32-byte ed25519 seed to sign with.
+ */
+export function signFormationApproval(
+  fields: FormationVouchFields,
+  validationKey: string,
+  privateKeyB64: string
+): FormationApproval {
+  const validationSignature = sign(
+    formationVouchMessage(fields),
+    privateKeyB64,
+    'ed25519',
+    'bytes',
+    'base64url',
+    'base64url'
+  ) as string;
+  return { validationKey, validationSignature };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redeeming side: does this approval actually verify against the bytes we are about to write?
+ *
+ * A LOCAL PRE-CHECK, not the authority. It turns a bad approval into a legible rejection
+ * instead of an opaque `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized` at commit, and it catches the
+ * ordinary drift case (the hook signed a different nonce/strand/peer than the one we hold).
+ * It cannot substitute for the database check: this verifies against the key the approval
+ * itself names, whereas `FormationUsage.Authorized` verifies against the STORED
+ * `ValidationKey` row — which is what stops a redeemer approving itself with a key of its own
+ * choosing.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never throws (same contract as `verifyPeerAuthorization`): malformed
+ * base64url, a garbage key, or any crypto failure resolves to `false`, logged at debug.
+ */
+export function verifyFormationApproval(
+  fields: FormationVouchFields,
+  approval: FormationApproval
+): boolean {
+  try {
+    return verify(
+      formationVouchMessage(fields),
+      approval.validationSignature,
+      approval.validationKey,
+      'ed25519',
+      'bytes',
+      'base64url',
+      'base64url'
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('verifyFormationApproval failed: %o', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve and validate the hook URL before anything is sent.
+ *
+ * `http:` stays permitted — a self-hosted hook on a LAN is a real deployment — but note that
+ * it puts the disclosure text on the wire in clear, and lets anyone on the path see who is
+ * joining which strand. Prefer `https:` for a hook reachable off-link.
+ */
+function parseHookUrl(validationUrl: string): URL {
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(validationUrl);
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'misconfigured',
+      `ValidationUrl is not a valid URL: ${validationUrl}`,
+      { cause: error }
+    );
+  }
+  if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'misconfigured',
+      `ValidationUrl scheme "${url.protocol}" is not supported; use http: or https:`
+    );
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+/** The `fetch` this approver will call (`fetch-impl.ts`); none at all is a misconfiguration. */
+function resolveFetch(fetchImpl?: typeof fetch): typeof fetch {
+  const resolved = resolveFetchImpl(fetchImpl);
+  if (!resolved) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'misconfigured',
+      'No fetch implementation: globalThis.fetch is missing and no fetchImpl was supplied'
+    );
+  }
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the response body as text, refusing anything over {@link MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES}.
+ *
+ * Two paths, because `Response.body` is not universally a stream (React Native's fetch has no
+ * `body` reader): stream and stop at the cap where possible, otherwise read to completion and
+ * measure. The declared `content-length` is checked first so an honest oversized response is
+ * rejected without reading it at all — but it is only a hint, so the actual bytes are counted
+ * either way.
+ *
+ * NOTE: on the no-reader path the cap is enforced only AFTER the runtime has buffered the whole
+ * body, so a hook that under-declares its `content-length` can still make that runtime hold an
+ * arbitrary amount. Harmless where it applies today (React Native clients are not formation
+ * responders); if a responder ever runs on a platform without a body reader, that path needs a
+ * real streaming read rather than a post-hoc measurement.
+ */
+async function readCappedText(response: Response, budget: ApprovalBudget): Promise<string> {
+  const declared = Number(response.headers.get('content-length'));
+  if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'malformed',
+      `Approval response declares ${declared} bytes, over the ${MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES}-byte cap`
+    );
+  }
+
+  const body = response.body;
+  if (!body || typeof body.getReader !== 'function') {
+    // NOTE: nothing releases this body when the budget wins — `text()` has already locked it and
+    // the runtime owns the buffering. It only applies to readerless-fetch runtimes (React
+    // Native), which are not formation responders; a responder on such a platform would need a
+    // real streaming read here, as the cap note above already says.
+    const text = await budget.race(response.text());
+    assertUnderCap(uint8ArrayFromString(text, 'utf8').byteLength);
+    return text;
+  }
+  return readCappedStream(body.getReader(), budget);
+}
+
+/** Drain a body stream, aborting the read the moment the accumulated bytes pass the cap. */
+async function readCappedStream(
+  reader: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>,
+  budget: ApprovalBudget
+): Promise<string> {
+  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  try {
+    for (;;) {
+      // Raced, not just aborted: a `fetch` that drops the abort leaves this read pending
+      // forever, and the budget is the only thing that ends it. The `finally` below cancels
+      // the reader, which is what actually gives the connection back.
+      const { done, value } = await budget.race(reader.read());
+      if (done) {
+        break;
+      }
+      total += value.byteLength;
+      assertUnderCap(total);
+      chunks.push(value);
+    }
+  } finally {
+    // Releases the connection when we bailed early; a no-op on a fully-drained stream.
+    void reader.cancel().catch((error: unknown) => log('response cancel failed: %o', error));
+  }
+  return uint8ArrayToString(uint8ArrayConcat(chunks, total), 'utf8');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Release a body we are never going to read, so the runtime can put the connection back in its
+ * pool. Every failure decided from the status line (a refusal, a 5xx, a redirect) and the
+ * declared-oversize rejection throw before touching the body, and an undrained body keeps a
+ * socket checked out until GC — a node that asks a flapping hook once per redemption would
+ * accumulate them. Skips a body already locked by {@link readCappedStream}, which cancels its
+ * own reader.
+ *
+ * NOTE: awaited by `readApproval`, so it sits OUTSIDE the budget — a runtime whose `cancel()`
+ * never settles would hold the caller past `timeoutMs` even though the deadline already fired.
+ * Every runtime this ships on settles it promptly. If a request is ever seen outliving its budget
+ * despite the budget firing, stop awaiting this; the two tests that assert the body is released
+ * by the time the rejection surfaces would then have to poll instead.
+ */
+async function discardBody(response: Response): Promise<void> {
+  const body = response.body;
+  if (!body || body.locked) {
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    await body.cancel();
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('discarding unread response body failed: %o', error);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertUnderCap(bytes: number): void {
+  if (bytes > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'malformed',
+      `Approval response exceeds the ${MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES}-byte cap`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/** A blank (or whitespace-only) field is as unusable as a missing one — both are `malformed`. */
+function requireField(body: Record<string, unknown>, field: string): string {
+  const value = body[field];
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.trim() === '') {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'malformed',
+      `Approval response is missing a usable "${field}"`
+    );
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+/** Parse a 2xx body into an approval, rejecting anything that is not the documented shape. */
+function parseApproval(text: string): FormationApproval {
+  let parsed: unknown;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(text);
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError('malformed', 'Approval response is not JSON', { cause: error });
+  }
+  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError('malformed', 'Approval response is not a JSON object');
+  }
+  const body = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
+  return {
+    validationKey: requireField(body, 'validationKey'),
+    validationSignature: requireField(body, 'validationSignature')
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Map a response's STATUS — never its body shape — onto a failure. A `403` carrying a
+ * well-formed approval is still a refusal: the hook said no, and a redeeming node that read
+ * the body anyway would let a hook accidentally approve by echoing.
+ */
+function assertApprovingStatus(response: Response, origin: string): void {
+  if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'refused',
+      `Approval hook ${origin} refused this redemption (HTTP ${response.status})`
+    );
+  }
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'unavailable',
+      `Approval hook ${origin} answered HTTP ${response.status}`
+    );
+  }
+  // Belt and braces for runtimes that ignore `redirect: 'error'` rather than rejecting.
+  if (response.redirected) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'unavailable',
+      `Approval hook ${origin} redirected; re-publish the ValidationUrl instead of chasing it`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Turn a response into an approval, releasing the body on every path that rejects it.
+ */
+async function readApproval(
+  response: Response,
+  origin: string,
+  budget: ApprovalBudget
+): Promise<FormationApproval> {
+  try {
+    assertApprovingStatus(response, origin);
+    return parseApproval(await readCappedText(response, budget));
+  } catch (error) {
+    await discardBody(response);
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * ONE deadline covering a whole approval exchange — connect, headers, AND body read — that fires
+ * whether or not the runtime's `fetch` honours an abort.
+ *
+ * Aborting is still done (it is what releases the socket where it works), but it cannot be the
+ * only bound: Node's `fetch` occasionally drops an abort that lands mid-body-read, leaving the
+ * read pending until undici's own 300s body timeout. Every await that can outlive the budget is
+ * raced against {@link ApprovalBudget.race} instead.
+ */
+interface ApprovalBudget {
+  /** `work`, or the budget's `unavailable` rejection — whichever settles first. */
+  race<T>(work: Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+  /** True once the deadline has fired, i.e. any result arriving now is unwanted. */
+  expired(): boolean;
+  /** Clears the timer and the caller's abort listener. Must run on every exit path. */
+  dispose(): void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Arm the budget for one request. The caller's `signal` is relayed by hand rather than with
+ * `AbortSignal.any` (not reliably present on React Native/Hermes; this client commits to
+ * `fetch` + `AbortController` only).
+ */
+function startBudget(
+  timeoutMs: number,
+  origin: string,
+  controller: AbortController,
+  signal?: AbortSignal
+): ApprovalBudget {
+  let expired = false;
+  let expire!: (error: FormationApprovalError) => void;
+  const deadline = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => { expire = reject; });
+  // The deadline can fire between two raced awaits, with nothing attached to it; a bare handler
+  // keeps that from surfacing as an unhandled rejection without hiding it from `race`.
+  void deadline.catch(() => { /* observed by race() */ });
+
+  const fire = (reason: string): void => {
+    if (expired) {
+      return;
+    }
+    expired = true;
+    // Rejected BEFORE the abort, so this reason — not whatever a fetch that DOES honour the
+    // abort rejects with — is what the race settles on. Both are queued in the same turn, and
+    // the first one queued wins.
+    expire(new FormationApprovalError('unavailable', reason));
+    // Best-effort, and no longer load-bearing: where the runtime honours it, this hands the
+    // socket back instead of leaving it checked out until GC.
+    controller.abort();
+  };
+
+  const timer = setTimeout(
+    () => fire(`Approval hook ${origin} did not answer within ${timeoutMs}ms`),
+    timeoutMs
+  );
+  const onCallerAbort = (): void =>
+    fire(`Formation was cancelled while approval hook ${origin} was being asked`);
+  signal?.addEventListener('abort', onCallerAbort, { once: true });
+
+  return {
+    race: <T>(work: Promise<T>): Promise<T> => Promise.race([work, deadline]),
+    expired: () => expired,
+    dispose: (): void => {
+      // A leaked abort timer keeps a node's event loop alive.
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      signal?.removeEventListener('abort', onCallerAbort);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Await the response, giving up when the budget expires — and cleaning up after ourselves if it
+ * does: a `fetch` that ignored the abort still delivers its response eventually, and an unread
+ * body keeps a connection checked out. A late rejection is logged rather than left unhandled.
+ */
+async function fetchWithinBudget(
+  pending: Promise<Response>,
+  budget: ApprovalBudget
+): Promise<Response> {
+  void pending.then(
+    (response) => {
+      if (budget.expired()) {
+        void discardBody(response);
+      }
+    },
+    (error: unknown) => {
+      if (budget.expired()) {
+        log('abandoned approval request rejected after its budget expired: %o', error);
+      }
+    }
+  );
+  return budget.race(pending);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ask an outside approval service, over HTTP, whether a would-be joiner may redeem an
+ * invitation. Contacted by the INVITING party's node (the formation responder) during
+ * redemption — never by the joiner, which neither mints the nonce nor performs the write.
+ *
+ * Wire contract (documented for hook operators in `docs/api.md`):
+ *
+ * - `POST <ValidationUrl>`, `content-type: application/json`, `accept: application/json`.
+ * - Body is exactly the five signed fields — `{ token, usageStampId, strandId, peerKey,
+ *   disclosure }` — and nothing else. No owner keys, no bootstrap addresses, no membership
+ *   keys ever reach the hook.
+ * - `200` with `{ "validationKey": "...", "validationSignature": "..." }` is an approval.
+ * - `401` / `403` is a refusal; any other non-2xx, a network error, a timeout, or a redirect
+ *   is `unavailable`; a 2xx that is not a usable approval is `malformed`.
+ *
+ * Cross-platform by construction: global `fetch` + `AbortController` only, no `node:` imports.
+ */
+export function createHttpFormationApprover(options?: {
+  /**
+   * Abort the request after this long, INCLUDING the body read. Default 10s. Must stay under
+   * the responder's provisioning budget — a hook that stalls must not stall formation.
+   */
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+  /** Injectable for tests / non-standard runtimes. Defaults to `globalThis.fetch`. */
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+}): FormationApprover {
+  const timeoutMs = options?.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  // A non-positive or non-finite budget would abort every request before it left, turning a
+  // config typo into a hook that appears permanently down. Fail where the mistake was made.
+  if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {
+    throw new FormationApprovalError(
+      'misconfigured',
+      `timeoutMs must be a positive number of milliseconds, got ${timeoutMs}`
+    );
+  }
+  const fetchImpl = options?.fetchImpl;
+
+  return {
+    async requestApproval(request: FormationApprovalRequest, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<FormationApproval> {
+      const doFetch = resolveFetch(fetchImpl);
+      const url = parseHookUrl(request.validationUrl);
+      // Origin only in messages: a ValidationUrl's path/query may carry a hook secret, and
+      // these strings reach logs and the joiner's rejection reason.
+      const origin = url.origin;
+
+      if (signal?.aborted) {
+        throw new FormationApprovalError(
+          'unavailable',
+          `Formation was cancelled before approval hook ${origin} was asked`
+        );
+      }
+
+      const controller = new AbortController();
+      const budget = startBudget(timeoutMs, origin, controller, signal);
+
+      try {
+        const response = await fetchWithinBudget(
+          doFetch(url.toString(), {
+            method: 'POST',
+            headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', accept: 'application/json' },
+            body: JSON.stringify(vouchFields(request)),
+            redirect: 'error',
+            signal: controller.signal
+          }),
+          budget
+        );
+        const approval = await readApproval(response, origin, budget);
+        log('approval obtained from %s for token %s', origin, request.token);
+        return approval;
+      } catch (error) {
+        // Includes the budget's own rejection, which already carries the timeout/cancellation
+        // wording; anything else got here without the budget firing, so the hook is unreachable.
+        if (error instanceof FormationApprovalError) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        throw new FormationApprovalError(
+          'unavailable',
+          `Approval hook ${origin} could not be reached`,
+          { cause: error }
+        );
+      } finally {
+        budget.dispose();
+      }
+    }
+  };
+}