@serfab/cadre-core 1.10.0 → 1.11.0

package/src/strand-revocation-enforcer.ts

@@ -1,654 +1,654 @@
-/**
- * Strand revoked-peer enforcement: a per-strand deny gate that refuses the
- * network nodes of a REMOVED party, so removal means "we stop talking to you"
- * rather than only deleting a row.
- *
- * ## The deny set is revocation-keyed, never membership-keyed
- *
- * A strand node maintains a materialized in-memory set of revoked peer ids:
- * every `Strand.MemberPeer.PeerId` whose `MemberKey` has no live `Strand.Member`
- * row. `MemberPeer.MemberExists` runs on insert, so an orphaned binding can only
- * mean "this member existed and was removed" — it is exactly the durable,
- * replicated record of a removed party's machines. Everything NOT in the set is
- * admitted. Deliberate consequences:
- *
- * - **Open strands are untouched.** `Member`/`MemberPeer` carry `OnlyClosed`
- *   checks, so an open strand has no rows and the set is empty — and
- *   `StrandInstanceManager` additionally skips arming this enforcer entirely for
- *   `Type !== 'c'`, so an open strand does not even poll.
- * - **A joining party mid-admission is admitted** (it has no orphaned binding).
- *   An allowlist ("only peers bound to live members") was considered and
- *   rejected: a joiner's first membership writes must travel through the very
- *   cohort an allowlist would close to it — the same mutual-denial trap the
- *   control network's gater doc describes (`membership-connection-gater.ts`),
- *   with no enrollment window to carve out. A deny-list on positive evidence
- *   has no such trap.
- * - **Stale-view failure direction: fail-open.** A remaining member that has not
- *   yet replicated the revocation keeps serving the removed party until the
- *   tombstoned state arrives — bounded by replication, consistent with
- *   "revocation is forward-looking". The opposite error (denying a legitimate
- *   member) is only reachable for a revoked-then-re-admitted party at a node
- *   that saw the revoke but not the re-add; the re-add gives the member key a
- *   live `Member` row again, which removes its peers from the deny set as the
- *   row replicates — self-healing, and the re-adding manager's own node updates
- *   first, so the heal never depends on talking to the peer being wrongly denied.
- * - **Orphaned `MemberPeer` rows are load-bearing**: they ARE the deny record —
- *   the `Strand.Revocation` tombstone keeps only the stamp, not the peer id — so
- *   nothing here (or anywhere) tombstones or auto-cleans them at revocation.
- *   The manager-cleanup path (`removeMemberPeer`'s manager branch) stays as the
- *   only way to clear a wrongly-registered binding, and clearing an orphan
- *   forgets the denial (the NOTE at that branch says so).
- *
- * ## Removal cuts LIVE sessions too — the refresh IS the teardown seam
- *
- * Refusing NEW connections only half-honors "no longer be answered to or
- * communicated with": a long-lived strand connection may never re-dial, so
- * without teardown a removed party keeps whatever session it already holds.
- * There is no push notification to hang teardown off — a REPLICATED revocation
- * arrives with no change event (the strand database has no reactive
- * subscription; `StrandWatcher` polls for the same reason), and a LOCAL
- * `revokeMember`/`leaveStrand` writes through a bare `Database` handle this
- * runtime never sees — so teardown rides the snapshot refresh itself, with
- * `refresh()` exposed for immediacy
- * (`StrandInstanceManager.refreshRevocationEnforcement` →
- * `CadreNode.refreshRevocationEnforcement`).
- *
- * The sweep is driven by MEMBERSHIP in the deny set, never by an
- * entered-the-set diff: every refresh hangs up every currently-connected
- * revoked peer, so a resume, a crashed refresh, or a connection established
- * between two refreshes cannot leave a session standing (a diff would be a
- * strict subset of this, so none is kept). A peer with no open connection is
- * simply not swept, and a failed `hangUp` is logged, never thrown — the next
- * refresh retries it. `hangUp` closes DIRECT and RELAYED connections alike, and
- * on a strand node running the relay server it also drops any reservation the
- * revoked peer holds there (a reservation dies with its connection — see the
- * relay-seam doc in `membership-connection-gater.ts`).
- *
- * Teardown is also what stops OUTBOUND traffic. The gate is one-directional —
- * `authorizeStream` judges streams the revoked peer opens to US — so nothing
- * else prevents this node from pushing over an already-open connection, which
- * `PeerJoinBackfill` does for that connection's whole life. Closing the
- * connection stops both directions at once, which is why no separate outbound
- * gate exists.
- *
- * If this node's OWN peer id is in the set, it was itself removed (or it left —
- * a voluntary departure files the same tombstone). Nothing is torn down for
- * that: the other side's gate already refuses us, and every other revoked peer
- * is still swept. Instead `onSelfRevoked` fires ONCE per entry into the set
- * (re-armed if the party is re-admitted, so a second removal signals again),
- * which `CadreNode` surfaces as `strand:revoked` so the embedding app decides
- * what to do — this module never stops or leaves a strand on its own.
- * Best-effort by nature: a removed party learns only if the tombstone
- * replicated to it before the cut.
- *
- * ## What transfers from the control gater (`membership-connection-gater.ts`)
- *
- * Transfers: the two-layer shape (fail-closed per-stream gate as PRIMARY, an
- * opportunistic connection-level deny on top), the synchronous in-memory
- * snapshot judged by the stream gate (a live DB read inside a gate deadlocks —
- * the same argument as the control node's `authorizeInboundControlStream`), the
- * fail-open-on-error/timeout posture for the connection hooks
- * (`decideWithinDeadline`, reused as-is), and the "compose over the caller's
- * gater, every base hook preserved" mechanics.
- *
- * Does NOT transfer — the relay-reservation seam (`'admit-for-relay'` + the
- * unauthorized budget). That machinery exists because the control gate denies on
- * ABSENCE of placement, where a member whose row is in flight is
- * indistinguishable from an outsider and a wrong reservation deny is
- * unrecoverable. This gate denies on POSITIVE revocation evidence, so a
- * reservation deny is never that kind of wrong answer; the one stale-wrong case
- * (a missed re-add) heals via replication as above. `denyInboundRelayReservation`
- * here is therefore a plain "deny iff revoked" — no budget, no admit-for-relay
- * verdict, no reserve deadline.
- *
- * Does NOT transfer — the bring-up quiet period. A strand node's DB bring-up
- * NEEDS its cross-party cohort connections; this enforcer simply starts with an
- * empty snapshot (admit everything) until its first successful read — the same
- * fail-open posture as everywhere else here.
- *
- * Does NOT transfer — every stranger carve-out (enrollment window, formation
- * window, delegate grants). None of those protocols exist on a strand node.
- *
- * Unlike the control stream gate, no empty-snapshot carve-out is needed: an
- * empty deny set means "nothing revoked", which correctly admits everyone — the
- * deny-list shape makes the cold-start case and the steady case the same code
- * path.
- */
-
-import debug from 'debug';
-import type { ConnectionGater, PeerId, MultiaddrConnection } from '@libp2p/interface';
-import type { Database } from '@quereus/quereus';
-import { decideWithinDeadline } from './membership-connection-gater.js';
-import { ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS } from './link-budget.js';
-
-const log = debug('sereus:cadre:strand-revocation');
-
-/**
- * Default cadence of the deny-set refresh. Bounded staleness is the accepted
- * failure direction (see the module doc's stale-view paragraph); 30 s keeps a
- * revoked peer's post-replication admit window in the same order as the
- * replication delay itself. Overridable via
- * {@link StrandRevocationEnforcementConfig.pollIntervalMs}.
- */
-export const DEFAULT_REVOCATION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
-
-/**
- * Embedder tuning for the strand revoked-peer gate, threaded from
- * `CadreNodeConfig.strandRevocationEnforcement` to
- * `StartStrandConfig.revocationEnforcement` the way the backfill knob is.
- */
-export interface StrandRevocationEnforcementConfig {
-  /**
-   * Default true. False disarms the gate entirely for this node's strands —
-   * the pre-existing behaviour (a removed party's peers keep being served).
-   */
-  enabled?: boolean;
-  /** Deny-set refresh cadence, ms. Default {@link DEFAULT_REVOCATION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS}. */
-  pollIntervalMs?: number;
-}
-
-/** One `Strand.MemberPeer` row, as the deny-set derivation consumes it. */
-export interface StrandMemberPeerBinding {
-  memberKey: string;
-  peerId: string;
-}
-
-/** The membership rows one deny-set derivation reads. */
-export interface StrandRevocationRows {
-  /** Every live `Strand.Member.Key`. */
-  memberKeys: ReadonlySet<string>;
-  /** Every `Strand.MemberPeer` row (live-membered and orphaned alike). */
-  bindings: readonly StrandMemberPeerBinding[];
-}
-
-/**
- * Timer seam so the refresh cadence is testable without fake timers — the
- * injectable-clock idiom of `UnauthorizedReservationBudget`'s `now` argument,
- * shaped for an interval-driven component. The default schedules a real
- * interval and unrefs it so an armed enforcer never holds a process open.
- */
-export interface RevocationRefreshScheduler {
-  setInterval(fn: () => void, ms: number): unknown;
-  clearInterval(handle: unknown): void;
-}
-
-const defaultScheduler: RevocationRefreshScheduler = {
-  setInterval: (fn, ms) => {
-    const handle = setInterval(fn, ms);
-    (handle as { unref?: () => void }).unref?.();
-    return handle;
-  },
-  clearInterval: (handle) => clearInterval(handle as Parameters<typeof clearInterval>[0])
-};
-
-/**
- * The minimum of a libp2p node the teardown sweep needs: who WE are, what is
- * open, and how to close it. Deliberately not the node itself, so the sweep
- * unit-tests against a three-property stub; `Libp2p` (hence
- * `Libp2pNodeWithRepo`) satisfies it structurally, which is what
- * `StrandInstanceManager` passes.
- */
-export interface StrandRevocationNetwork {
-  /** This node's own peer id — how the enforcer recognizes ITSELF in the deny set. */
-  readonly peerId: PeerId;
-  /** Every open connection. Only `remotePeer` is read — and reused as the hangUp target. */
-  getConnections(): readonly { readonly remotePeer: PeerId }[];
-  /** Close every connection to `peer`: direct, relayed, and any reservation riding one. */
-  hangUp(peer: PeerId): Promise<void>;
-}
-
-export interface StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps {
-  /** Log tag naming which strand this enforcer serves (the strand id). */
-  label: string;
-  /**
-   * Read the membership rows the deny set is derived from. Injectable so the
-   * enforcer unit-tests without a strand database; production wires
-   * {@link readStrandRevocationRows} over the strand's live DB. A throw or
-   * rejection KEEPS the previous snapshot (never clears it) — the control
-   * model, `refreshAuthorizedControlPeers`.
-   */
-  readRows: () => Promise<StrandRevocationRows>;
-  /**
-   * Handle on the strand's libp2p node for the teardown sweep, read LAZILY on
-   * every sweep — never captured. It has to be: the enforcer is constructed
-   * BEFORE the node (the node's options embed the enforcer's predicates), and
-   * the node is dropped again on quiesce. Omit it, or return undefined, and the
-   * gate still refuses new connections — only teardown of OPEN ones is skipped.
-   */
-  getNetwork?: () => StrandRevocationNetwork | undefined;
-  /**
-   * Called ONCE each time this node's own peer id ENTERS the deny set — i.e.
-   * this node's party was removed from the strand, or left it. Not re-fired
-   * while it stays there; re-armed if the party is re-admitted, so a second
-   * removal signals again. Wired by `StrandInstanceManager` through to
-   * `CadreNode`'s `strand:revoked` event. A resume rebuilds the enforcer, so a
-   * still-revoked strand also legitimately re-fires once per resume. A throw is
-   * logged and swallowed — an embedder's handler must not derail the sweep.
-   */
-  onSelfRevoked?: () => void;
-  /** Timer seam; omit for real (unref'd) intervals. */
-  scheduler?: RevocationRefreshScheduler;
-}
-
-/** Every `Strand.MemberPeer` binding — live-membered and orphaned alike. */
-async function scanBindings(db: Database): Promise<StrandMemberPeerBinding[]> {
-  const bindings: StrandMemberPeerBinding[] = [];
-  for await (const row of db.eval('select MemberKey, PeerId from Strand.MemberPeer')) {
-    bindings.push({ memberKey: row.MemberKey as string, peerId: row.PeerId as string });
-  }
-  return bindings;
-}
-
-/** Every live `Strand.Member.Key`. */
-async function scanMemberKeys(db: Database): Promise<Set<string>> {
-  const memberKeys = new Set<string>();
-  for await (const row of db.eval('select Key from Strand.Member')) {
-    memberKeys.add(row.Key as string);
-  }
-  return memberKeys;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read the deny-set inputs from a strand database: full-scan
- * `Strand.MemberPeer` and `Strand.Member`, to be joined in JavaScript by the
- * enforcer. Scan-and-filter, never seek — the composite-PK point-lookup
- * unreliability documented at `scanMemberPeers` in `strand-membership-writer.ts`
- * applies, so correctness depends only on each scan returning a superset of the
- * live rows.
- *
- * **Scan order is load-bearing, and it is BINDINGS FIRST.** The two scans are
- * separate reads with nothing holding them to one snapshot, so a write that
- * lands between them is seen by the second scan and not the first. A member
- * joins as `Member` row then `MemberPeer` row (`MemberExists` forces that
- * order), so reading `Member` first would let a join that commits mid-read
- * produce a binding whose member key is absent from the key set — a brand-new
- * member classified as REVOKED, the one fail-CLOSED outcome this module exists
- * to avoid. Reading bindings first inverts the skew: the new binding is simply
- * not in the older bindings snapshot, so the joiner is unclassified and
- * admitted, and a revocation that lands mid-read is still seen (the key is
- * missing from the NEWER key scan). Every skew window then resolves fail-open,
- * matching the module doc.
- *
- * NOTE: two whole-table scans per refresh (default every 30 s per closed
- * strand). Fine at strand scale (a handful of members and bindings); if
- * membership churn ever makes these tables large, the fix is a reliable
- * filtered read — which needs the networked point-lookup gap closed
- * (`debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked`) — not a bigger scan.
- */
-export async function readStrandRevocationRows(db: Database): Promise<StrandRevocationRows> {
-  const bindings = await scanBindings(db);
-  const memberKeys = await scanMemberKeys(db);
-  return { memberKeys, bindings };
-}
-
-/**
- * The per-strand revoked-peer deny set and the synchronous predicates over it.
- *
- * Lifecycle mirrors `PeerJoinBackfill`: created in
- * `StrandInstanceManager.buildStrandRuntime` (closed strands only), started
- * after the strand database initializes, stopped and dropped in
- * `releaseRuntime` — so quiesce → resume rebuilds it with a fresh snapshot.
- * The snapshot starts EMPTY (admit everything) and repopulates on the first
- * successful read; a revoked peer therefore gets a short admit window per
- * resume at the connection level. Accepted: fail-open posture, and resume is
- * never blocked on a refresh.
- */
-export class StrandRevocationEnforcer {
-  /** The materialized deny set — peer ids with an orphaned binding and no live one. */
-  private revokedPeerIds: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set();
-  private readonly scheduler: RevocationRefreshScheduler;
-  private readonly pollIntervalMs: number;
-  /** Tail of the refresh chain — what serializes refreshes (no two reads in flight). */
-  private refreshTail: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();
-  private refreshing = false;
-  private intervalHandle: unknown;
-  private started = false;
-  private stopped = false;
-  /** Latch for the one-shot self-revocation signal — see {@link StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps.onSelfRevoked}. */
-  private selfRevokedSignaled = false;
-
-  constructor(
-    private readonly deps: StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps,
-    config?: StrandRevocationEnforcementConfig
-  ) {
-    this.scheduler = deps.scheduler ?? defaultScheduler;
-    this.pollIntervalMs = config?.pollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_REVOCATION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS;
-  }
-
-  /** Number of peers currently denied — test/diagnostic surface. */
-  get revokedCount(): number {
-    return this.revokedPeerIds.size;
-  }
-
-  /** Kick an immediate refresh (not awaited — bring-up never blocks on it) and arm the poll. */
-  start(): void {
-    if (this.started || this.stopped) return;
-    this.started = true;
-    void this.refresh();
-    this.intervalHandle = this.scheduler.setInterval(() => {
-      // Skip a tick while a refresh is in flight rather than queueing behind it —
-      // the interval exists to bound staleness, and a stack of queued reads
-      // bounds nothing extra. Explicit refresh() calls still chain (see refresh).
-      if (!this.refreshing) {
-        void this.refresh();
-      }
-    }, this.pollIntervalMs);
-    log('[%s] revocation enforcer started (poll %dms)', this.deps.label, this.pollIntervalMs);
-  }
-
-  /** Disarm the poll; a read already in flight completes but its result is discarded. */
-  stop(): void {
-    if (this.stopped) return;
-    this.stopped = true;
-    if (this.intervalHandle != null) {
-      this.scheduler.clearInterval(this.intervalHandle);
-      this.intervalHandle = undefined;
-    }
-    log('[%s] revocation enforcer stopped', this.deps.label);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Refresh the deny set now. Never rejects. Serialized: concurrent calls chain,
-   * so no two reads overlap, and each explicit call gets a read that STARTS
-   * after the call (an on-demand refresh after a revocation commit observes that
-   * commit). A failed or slow read keeps the previous snapshot — never clears it.
-   */
-  refresh(): Promise<void> {
-    const run = this.refreshTail.then(() => this.doRefresh());
-    this.refreshTail = run;
-    return run;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Is `remotePeerId` positively revoked in the current snapshot? Synchronous by
-   * design — this is judged inside libp2p gates where an await against the DB
-   * would deadlock (the control stream gate's argument).
-   */
-  isRevoked(remotePeerId: string): boolean {
-    return this.revokedPeerIds.has(remotePeerId);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * The fail-closed PRIMARY layer: the per-stream predicate wired as
-   * `createLibp2pNode({ authorizeInboundStream })`, gating all four
-   * `/optimystic/strand-<id>/{repo,cluster,sync,block-transfer}` protocols.
-   * Also what catches a revoked peer arriving over a RELAYED connection, or
-   * over a connection admitted before the revocation replicated here.
-   */
-  authorizeStream(remotePeerId: string, _protocol: string): boolean {
-    return !this.isRevoked(remotePeerId);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * One serialized snapshot rebuild; contains every failure (contract: never rejects).
-   *
-   * NOTE: nothing here carries a deadline — a `readRows` or a `hangUp` that never
-   * settles wedges the refresh chain, which freezes the deny set (the poll skips
-   * while `refreshing`, and every later `refresh()` chains behind the stuck one).
-   * Both are bounded in practice (Quereus reads settle; libp2p's connection close
-   * has its own timeout). If a strand is ever seen with a stale deny set and no
-   * refresh log line, wrap both awaits in a timeout rather than hunting further.
-   */
-  private async doRefresh(): Promise<void> {
-    if (this.stopped) return;
-    this.refreshing = true;
-    try {
-      const rows = await this.deps.readRows();
-      if (this.stopped) return;
-      this.revokedPeerIds = deriveRevokedPeerIds(rows);
-      log('[%s] deny set refreshed: %d revoked peer(s)', this.deps.label, this.revokedPeerIds.size);
-      // Awaited inside the refresh, so an on-demand refresh() resolves only once
-      // the cut has been made — that is what makes "revoke, then refresh" an
-      // immediate teardown for the caller rather than a scheduled one.
-      await this.tearDownRevoked(this.revokedPeerIds);
-    } catch (error) {
-      log('[%s] deny-set refresh failed — keeping previous snapshot: %o', this.deps.label, error);
-    } finally {
-      this.refreshing = false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Close what is already OPEN to the peers of `revoked` — the teardown half of
-   * enforcement (module doc: "Removal cuts LIVE sessions too"). Never rejects:
-   * every failure is contained, so the refresh loop survives and simply retries
-   * on the next tick.
-   *
-   * `revoked` is passed IN rather than read off the field, so the sweep judges
-   * the exact snapshot its own refresh produced; likewise the connection list is
-   * enumerated once, before any await, so a peer re-admitted mid-sweep is at
-   * worst hung up once and reconnects.
-   *
-   * NOTE: dropping the revoked peer from the strand's Optimystic cohort needs no
-   * separate action — machines quiesce strands routinely and the remaining cohort
-   * keeps committing, so an unreachable cohort peer is already tolerated, and
-   * `denyDialPeer` makes the exclusion fast (a local refusal, not a dial timeout).
-   * Two residual facts, both accepted: the removed node keeps every block it had
-   * already replicated (revocation is forward-looking), and a block whose only
-   * holders were the removed party's machines can be unavailable to the rest
-   * until repair.
-   *
-   * NOTE: post-removal commit latency is real and MEASURED, not hypothetical. On
-   * the two-parties-by-two-machines fixture in
-   * `integration-tests/src/scenarios/strand-removal-cuts-network.integration.ts`
-   * the remaining cohort's FIRST write after a cut fails repeatedly with
-   * `BlockUnavailableError: … (peers-unreachable)` before it commits — three or
-   * four failures, 3.5-4.3 s, over four runs — because the cohort still listed
-   * the removed party's now unreachable machines and had to downsize to the
-   * live holders first. It
-   * recovers on its own, so this is a latency cost, not a defect, and it is
-   * stated for app authors in `docs/strands.md` → Removing Members. If it ever
-   * stops recovering — a write that never commits, or `cluster-fetch:no-quorum` —
-   * that is an upstream (Optimystic) conversation, not a workaround here.
-   */
-  private async tearDownRevoked(revoked: ReadonlySet<string>): Promise<void> {
-    if (this.stopped) {
-      return;
-    }
-    const network = this.resolveNetwork();
-    if (!network) {
-      return;
-    }
-    const selfPeerId = network.peerId.toString();
-    // Judged on EVERY pass, including the empty-set one: leaving the set is what
-    // re-arms the signal (see trackSelfRevoked). Being revoked ourselves tears
-    // nothing down on our own behalf — the other side's gate already refuses us —
-    // so the sweep below still runs for every OTHER revoked peer in the pass.
-    this.trackSelfRevoked(revoked.has(selfPeerId));
-    if (revoked.size === 0) {
-      return;
-    }
-    for (const peer of connectedRevokedPeers(network, revoked, selfPeerId, this.deps.label)) {
-      await this.hangUpRevoked(network, peer);
-    }
-  }
-
-  /** The lazily-read network handle; an accessor that throws costs this pass only. */
-  private resolveNetwork(): StrandRevocationNetwork | undefined {
-    try {
-      return this.deps.getNetwork?.();
-    } catch (error) {
-      log('[%s] network handle unavailable — teardown skipped this pass: %o', this.deps.label, error);
-      return undefined;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /** One hangUp, contained: a stopping node or an already-closed connection is not an error here. */
-  private async hangUpRevoked(network: StrandRevocationNetwork, peer: PeerId): Promise<void> {
-    try {
-      await network.hangUp(peer);
-      log('[%s] hung up revoked peer %s', this.deps.label, peer.toString());
-    } catch (error) {
-      log('[%s] hangUp of revoked peer %s failed — next refresh retries: %o', this.deps.label, peer.toString(), error);
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Latch {@link StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps.onSelfRevoked} to the TRANSITION
-   * into the revoked state: fired once on entry, and re-armed the moment this
-   * node is out of the set again — a manager can re-admit a party it removed
-   * (a fresh `Member` row makes the orphaned bindings live again), and a second
-   * removal has to be reported like the first.
-   */
-  private trackSelfRevoked(selfRevoked: boolean): void {
-    if (!selfRevoked) {
-      this.selfRevokedSignaled = false;
-      return;
-    }
-    if (this.selfRevokedSignaled) {
-      return;
-    }
-    this.selfRevokedSignaled = true;
-    log('[%s] THIS node is revoked from the strand (removed or left) — signalling', this.deps.label);
-    try {
-      this.deps.onSelfRevoked?.();
-    } catch (error) {
-      log('[%s] onSelfRevoked handler threw: %o', this.deps.label, error);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * The distinct peer ids of `network`'s open connections that are in `revoked`,
- * as the `PeerId` objects `hangUp` takes — reusing each connection's own
- * `remotePeer` rather than parsing the string back, so no peer-id codec is
- * needed here. Self is excluded (a node holds no connection to itself, and
- * hanging one up would be nonsense if it did), and a peer connected twice — say
- * one direct and one relayed — yields ONE hangUp, which closes both. A throw
- * mid-enumeration is logged and keeps whatever was collected before it: a
- * partial sweep beats none, and the next refresh re-enumerates anyway.
- */
-function connectedRevokedPeers(
-  network: StrandRevocationNetwork,
-  revoked: ReadonlySet<string>,
-  selfPeerId: string,
-  label: string
-): PeerId[] {
-  const targets = new Map<string, PeerId>();
-  try {
-    for (const connection of network.getConnections()) {
-      const remotePeerId = connection.remotePeer.toString();
-      if (remotePeerId !== selfPeerId && revoked.has(remotePeerId)) {
-        targets.set(remotePeerId, connection.remotePeer);
-      }
-    }
-  } catch (error) {
-    log('[%s] connection enumeration failed — teardown skipped this pass: %o', label, error);
-  }
-  return [...targets.values()];
-}
-
-/**
- * Derive the deny set: a peer id is revoked iff it has at least one ORPHANED
- * binding (a `MemberPeer` row whose member key has no live `Member` row) AND no
- * live-membered binding. The second conjunct is what lets a peer id bound to
- * TWO member keys — revoked under one, live under the other — keep serving the
- * live member: a machine serving a live member must not be cut. Per-binding,
- * not per-member, so every machine of a multi-device removed party lands in
- * the set.
- */
-function deriveRevokedPeerIds(rows: StrandRevocationRows): Set<string> {
-  const orphaned = new Set<string>();
-  const live = new Set<string>();
-  for (const binding of rows.bindings) {
-    (rows.memberKeys.has(binding.memberKey) ? live : orphaned).add(binding.peerId);
-  }
-  for (const peerId of live) {
-    orphaned.delete(peerId);
-  }
-  return orphaned;
-}
-
-/** The one capability the gater composition needs from the enforcer. */
-export type StrandRevocationJudge = Pick<StrandRevocationEnforcer, 'isRevoked'>;
-
-/**
- * Build a closed strand's connection gater: the caller-supplied gater (if any)
- * with revoked-peer denial composed onto three hooks. The opportunistic
- * SECONDARY layer — the per-stream gate above is the fail-closed primary.
- *
- *  - `denyInboundEncryptedConnection`: deny iff revoked, so a removed party's
- *    node is refused before any protocol negotiation.
- *  - `denyDialPeer`: deny iff revoked — the owner ruling covers "communicated
- *    with", not just "answered to", and refusing the dial locally is instant,
- *    which keeps Optimystic from wasting a dial timeout on a peer this node
- *    will not talk to anyway.
- *  - `denyInboundRelayReservation`: deny iff revoked — matters when the strand
- *    node runs the relay server (the storage-profile default), where admitting
- *    the reservation would let a removed party keep using this node's
- *    forwarding capacity.
- *
- * Composition semantics: every hook of `base` is preserved as-is; on the three
- * composed hooks a deny from EITHER the base gater or the revocation check
- * denies, and an error (or a decision slower than `decisionTimeoutMs`) in
- * either is fail-open — the base error admits through to the revocation check,
- * a revocation-check error admits outright, and the fail-closed stream gate
- * still stands behind both. The deadline is belt-and-braces: the snapshot read
- * is synchronous.
- *
- * NOTE: accepted tradeoff — swallowing a BASE hook's throw diverges from
- * `createMembershipConnectionGater`, which lets it propagate to libp2p (a
- * fail-closed outcome there). Uniform fail-open was chosen for this module so
- * every hook has one failure direction, and it was the shape the plan specified;
- * the cost is that an embedder gater which throws is silently admitted here
- * while the same gater passed raw to an OPEN strand would refuse. Loud in the
- * log either way. Revisit if an embedder ever ships a gater whose throw is a
- * meaningful deny, or if the two gaters are unified.
- *
- * NOTE: `base` is spread, so a gater passed as a CLASS INSTANCE would lose its
- * prototype methods — same caveat as `createMembershipConnectionGater`; every
- * caller in this repo supplies a plain object (the RN/web permissive gaters,
- * e.g. `{ denyDialMultiaddr: () => false }`, keep working unchanged).
- */
-export function createRevocationConnectionGater(
-  enforcer: StrandRevocationJudge,
-  base?: ConnectionGater,
-  decisionTimeoutMs: number = ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS
-): ConnectionGater {
-  /** The base gater's verdict, fail-open: an error or absence is "not denied". */
-  const baseDenies = async (decide: () => Promise<boolean> | boolean | undefined, hook: string): Promise<boolean> => {
-    try {
-      return await decide() === true;
-    } catch (error) {
-      log('base gater %s threw — treating as not-denied (fail-open): %o', hook, error);
-      return false;
-    }
-  };
-  /** The revocation verdict, bounded and fail-open. */
-  const revokedDenies = async (peerId: PeerId, hook: string): Promise<boolean> => {
-    const remotePeerId = peerId.toString();
-    try {
-      const revoked = await decideWithinDeadline(
-        () => enforcer.isRevoked(remotePeerId), false, decisionTimeoutMs, `${hook}(${remotePeerId})`
-      );
-      if (revoked) {
-        log('%s: %s is revoked — denying', hook, remotePeerId);
-      }
-      return revoked;
-    } catch (error) {
-      log('%s revocation check threw for %s — admitting (fail-open; stream gate decides): %o', hook, remotePeerId, error);
-      return false;
-    }
-  };
-  return {
-    ...base,
-    denyDialPeer: async (peerId: PeerId): Promise<boolean> => {
-      if (await baseDenies(() => base?.denyDialPeer?.(peerId), 'denyDialPeer')) {
-        return true;
-      }
-      return revokedDenies(peerId, 'denyDialPeer');
-    },
-    denyInboundEncryptedConnection: async (peerId: PeerId, maConn: MultiaddrConnection): Promise<boolean> => {
-      if (await baseDenies(() => base?.denyInboundEncryptedConnection?.(peerId, maConn), 'denyInboundEncryptedConnection')) {
-        return true;
-      }
-      return revokedDenies(peerId, 'denyInboundEncryptedConnection');
-    },
-    denyInboundRelayReservation: async (peerId: PeerId): Promise<boolean> => {
-      if (await baseDenies(() => base?.denyInboundRelayReservation?.(peerId), 'denyInboundRelayReservation')) {
-        return true;
-      }
-      return revokedDenies(peerId, 'denyInboundRelayReservation');
-    }
-  };
-}
+/**
+ * Strand revoked-peer enforcement: a per-strand deny gate that refuses the
+ * network nodes of a REMOVED party, so removal means "we stop talking to you"
+ * rather than only deleting a row.
+ *
+ * ## The deny set is revocation-keyed, never membership-keyed
+ *
+ * A strand node maintains a materialized in-memory set of revoked peer ids:
+ * every `Strand.MemberPeer.PeerId` whose `MemberKey` has no live `Strand.Member`
+ * row. `MemberPeer.MemberExists` runs on insert, so an orphaned binding can only
+ * mean "this member existed and was removed" — it is exactly the durable,
+ * replicated record of a removed party's machines. Everything NOT in the set is
+ * admitted. Deliberate consequences:
+ *
+ * - **Open strands are untouched.** `Member`/`MemberPeer` carry `OnlyClosed`
+ *   checks, so an open strand has no rows and the set is empty — and
+ *   `StrandInstanceManager` additionally skips arming this enforcer entirely for
+ *   `Type !== 'c'`, so an open strand does not even poll.
+ * - **A joining party mid-admission is admitted** (it has no orphaned binding).
+ *   An allowlist ("only peers bound to live members") was considered and
+ *   rejected: a joiner's first membership writes must travel through the very
+ *   cohort an allowlist would close to it — the same mutual-denial trap the
+ *   control network's gater doc describes (`membership-connection-gater.ts`),
+ *   with no enrollment window to carve out. A deny-list on positive evidence
+ *   has no such trap.
+ * - **Stale-view failure direction: fail-open.** A remaining member that has not
+ *   yet replicated the revocation keeps serving the removed party until the
+ *   tombstoned state arrives — bounded by replication, consistent with
+ *   "revocation is forward-looking". The opposite error (denying a legitimate
+ *   member) is only reachable for a revoked-then-re-admitted party at a node
+ *   that saw the revoke but not the re-add; the re-add gives the member key a
+ *   live `Member` row again, which removes its peers from the deny set as the
+ *   row replicates — self-healing, and the re-adding manager's own node updates
+ *   first, so the heal never depends on talking to the peer being wrongly denied.
+ * - **Orphaned `MemberPeer` rows are load-bearing**: they ARE the deny record —
+ *   the `Strand.Revocation` tombstone keeps only the stamp, not the peer id — so
+ *   nothing here (or anywhere) tombstones or auto-cleans them at revocation.
+ *   The manager-cleanup path (`removeMemberPeer`'s manager branch) stays as the
+ *   only way to clear a wrongly-registered binding, and clearing an orphan
+ *   forgets the denial (the NOTE at that branch says so).
+ *
+ * ## Removal cuts LIVE sessions too — the refresh IS the teardown seam
+ *
+ * Refusing NEW connections only half-honors "no longer be answered to or
+ * communicated with": a long-lived strand connection may never re-dial, so
+ * without teardown a removed party keeps whatever session it already holds.
+ * There is no push notification to hang teardown off — a REPLICATED revocation
+ * arrives with no change event (the strand database has no reactive
+ * subscription; `StrandWatcher` polls for the same reason), and a LOCAL
+ * `revokeMember`/`leaveStrand` writes through a bare `Database` handle this
+ * runtime never sees — so teardown rides the snapshot refresh itself, with
+ * `refresh()` exposed for immediacy
+ * (`StrandInstanceManager.refreshRevocationEnforcement` →
+ * `CadreNode.refreshRevocationEnforcement`).
+ *
+ * The sweep is driven by MEMBERSHIP in the deny set, never by an
+ * entered-the-set diff: every refresh hangs up every currently-connected
+ * revoked peer, so a resume, a crashed refresh, or a connection established
+ * between two refreshes cannot leave a session standing (a diff would be a
+ * strict subset of this, so none is kept). A peer with no open connection is
+ * simply not swept, and a failed `hangUp` is logged, never thrown — the next
+ * refresh retries it. `hangUp` closes DIRECT and RELAYED connections alike, and
+ * on a strand node running the relay server it also drops any reservation the
+ * revoked peer holds there (a reservation dies with its connection — see the
+ * relay-seam doc in `membership-connection-gater.ts`).
+ *
+ * Teardown is also what stops OUTBOUND traffic. The gate is one-directional —
+ * `authorizeStream` judges streams the revoked peer opens to US — so nothing
+ * else prevents this node from pushing over an already-open connection, which
+ * `PeerJoinBackfill` does for that connection's whole life. Closing the
+ * connection stops both directions at once, which is why no separate outbound
+ * gate exists.
+ *
+ * If this node's OWN peer id is in the set, it was itself removed (or it left —
+ * a voluntary departure files the same tombstone). Nothing is torn down for
+ * that: the other side's gate already refuses us, and every other revoked peer
+ * is still swept. Instead `onSelfRevoked` fires ONCE per entry into the set
+ * (re-armed if the party is re-admitted, so a second removal signals again),
+ * which `CadreNode` surfaces as `strand:revoked` so the embedding app decides
+ * what to do — this module never stops or leaves a strand on its own.
+ * Best-effort by nature: a removed party learns only if the tombstone
+ * replicated to it before the cut.
+ *
+ * ## What transfers from the control gater (`membership-connection-gater.ts`)
+ *
+ * Transfers: the two-layer shape (fail-closed per-stream gate as PRIMARY, an
+ * opportunistic connection-level deny on top), the synchronous in-memory
+ * snapshot judged by the stream gate (a live DB read inside a gate deadlocks —
+ * the same argument as the control node's `authorizeInboundControlStream`), the
+ * fail-open-on-error/timeout posture for the connection hooks
+ * (`decideWithinDeadline`, reused as-is), and the "compose over the caller's
+ * gater, every base hook preserved" mechanics.
+ *
+ * Does NOT transfer — the relay-reservation seam (`'admit-for-relay'` + the
+ * unauthorized budget). That machinery exists because the control gate denies on
+ * ABSENCE of placement, where a member whose row is in flight is
+ * indistinguishable from an outsider and a wrong reservation deny is
+ * unrecoverable. This gate denies on POSITIVE revocation evidence, so a
+ * reservation deny is never that kind of wrong answer; the one stale-wrong case
+ * (a missed re-add) heals via replication as above. `denyInboundRelayReservation`
+ * here is therefore a plain "deny iff revoked" — no budget, no admit-for-relay
+ * verdict, no reserve deadline.
+ *
+ * Does NOT transfer — the bring-up quiet period. A strand node's DB bring-up
+ * NEEDS its cross-party cohort connections; this enforcer simply starts with an
+ * empty snapshot (admit everything) until its first successful read — the same
+ * fail-open posture as everywhere else here.
+ *
+ * Does NOT transfer — every stranger carve-out (enrollment window, formation
+ * window, delegate grants). None of those protocols exist on a strand node.
+ *
+ * Unlike the control stream gate, no empty-snapshot carve-out is needed: an
+ * empty deny set means "nothing revoked", which correctly admits everyone — the
+ * deny-list shape makes the cold-start case and the steady case the same code
+ * path.
+ */
+
+import debug from 'debug';
+import type { ConnectionGater, PeerId, MultiaddrConnection } from '@libp2p/interface';
+import type { Database } from '@quereus/quereus';
+import { decideWithinDeadline } from './membership-connection-gater.js';
+import { ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS } from './link-budget.js';
+
+const log = debug('sereus:cadre:strand-revocation');
+
+/**
+ * Default cadence of the deny-set refresh. Bounded staleness is the accepted
+ * failure direction (see the module doc's stale-view paragraph); 30 s keeps a
+ * revoked peer's post-replication admit window in the same order as the
+ * replication delay itself. Overridable via
+ * {@link StrandRevocationEnforcementConfig.pollIntervalMs}.
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_REVOCATION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
+
+/**
+ * Embedder tuning for the strand revoked-peer gate, threaded from
+ * `CadreNodeConfig.strandRevocationEnforcement` to
+ * `StartStrandConfig.revocationEnforcement` the way the backfill knob is.
+ */
+export interface StrandRevocationEnforcementConfig {
+  /**
+   * Default true. False disarms the gate entirely for this node's strands —
+   * the pre-existing behaviour (a removed party's peers keep being served).
+   */
+  enabled?: boolean;
+  /** Deny-set refresh cadence, ms. Default {@link DEFAULT_REVOCATION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS}. */
+  pollIntervalMs?: number;
+}
+
+/** One `Strand.MemberPeer` row, as the deny-set derivation consumes it. */
+export interface StrandMemberPeerBinding {
+  memberKey: string;
+  peerId: string;
+}
+
+/** The membership rows one deny-set derivation reads. */
+export interface StrandRevocationRows {
+  /** Every live `Strand.Member.Key`. */
+  memberKeys: ReadonlySet<string>;
+  /** Every `Strand.MemberPeer` row (live-membered and orphaned alike). */
+  bindings: readonly StrandMemberPeerBinding[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Timer seam so the refresh cadence is testable without fake timers — the
+ * injectable-clock idiom of `UnauthorizedReservationBudget`'s `now` argument,
+ * shaped for an interval-driven component. The default schedules a real
+ * interval and unrefs it so an armed enforcer never holds a process open.
+ */
+export interface RevocationRefreshScheduler {
+  setInterval(fn: () => void, ms: number): unknown;
+  clearInterval(handle: unknown): void;
+}
+
+const defaultScheduler: RevocationRefreshScheduler = {
+  setInterval: (fn, ms) => {
+    const handle = setInterval(fn, ms);
+    (handle as { unref?: () => void }).unref?.();
+    return handle;
+  },
+  clearInterval: (handle) => clearInterval(handle as Parameters<typeof clearInterval>[0])
+};
+
+/**
+ * The minimum of a libp2p node the teardown sweep needs: who WE are, what is
+ * open, and how to close it. Deliberately not the node itself, so the sweep
+ * unit-tests against a three-property stub; `Libp2p` (hence
+ * `Libp2pNodeWithRepo`) satisfies it structurally, which is what
+ * `StrandInstanceManager` passes.
+ */
+export interface StrandRevocationNetwork {
+  /** This node's own peer id — how the enforcer recognizes ITSELF in the deny set. */
+  readonly peerId: PeerId;
+  /** Every open connection. Only `remotePeer` is read — and reused as the hangUp target. */
+  getConnections(): readonly { readonly remotePeer: PeerId }[];
+  /** Close every connection to `peer`: direct, relayed, and any reservation riding one. */
+  hangUp(peer: PeerId): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export interface StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps {
+  /** Log tag naming which strand this enforcer serves (the strand id). */
+  label: string;
+  /**
+   * Read the membership rows the deny set is derived from. Injectable so the
+   * enforcer unit-tests without a strand database; production wires
+   * {@link readStrandRevocationRows} over the strand's live DB. A throw or
+   * rejection KEEPS the previous snapshot (never clears it) — the control
+   * model, `refreshAuthorizedControlPeers`.
+   */
+  readRows: () => Promise<StrandRevocationRows>;
+  /**
+   * Handle on the strand's libp2p node for the teardown sweep, read LAZILY on
+   * every sweep — never captured. It has to be: the enforcer is constructed
+   * BEFORE the node (the node's options embed the enforcer's predicates), and
+   * the node is dropped again on quiesce. Omit it, or return undefined, and the
+   * gate still refuses new connections — only teardown of OPEN ones is skipped.
+   */
+  getNetwork?: () => StrandRevocationNetwork | undefined;
+  /**
+   * Called ONCE each time this node's own peer id ENTERS the deny set — i.e.
+   * this node's party was removed from the strand, or left it. Not re-fired
+   * while it stays there; re-armed if the party is re-admitted, so a second
+   * removal signals again. Wired by `StrandInstanceManager` through to
+   * `CadreNode`'s `strand:revoked` event. A resume rebuilds the enforcer, so a
+   * still-revoked strand also legitimately re-fires once per resume. A throw is
+   * logged and swallowed — an embedder's handler must not derail the sweep.
+   */
+  onSelfRevoked?: () => void;
+  /** Timer seam; omit for real (unref'd) intervals. */
+  scheduler?: RevocationRefreshScheduler;
+}
+
+/** Every `Strand.MemberPeer` binding — live-membered and orphaned alike. */
+async function scanBindings(db: Database): Promise<StrandMemberPeerBinding[]> {
+  const bindings: StrandMemberPeerBinding[] = [];
+  for await (const row of db.eval('select MemberKey, PeerId from Strand.MemberPeer')) {
+    bindings.push({ memberKey: row.MemberKey as string, peerId: row.PeerId as string });
+  }
+  return bindings;
+}
+
+/** Every live `Strand.Member.Key`. */
+async function scanMemberKeys(db: Database): Promise<Set<string>> {
+  const memberKeys = new Set<string>();
+  for await (const row of db.eval('select Key from Strand.Member')) {
+    memberKeys.add(row.Key as string);
+  }
+  return memberKeys;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the deny-set inputs from a strand database: full-scan
+ * `Strand.MemberPeer` and `Strand.Member`, to be joined in JavaScript by the
+ * enforcer. Scan-and-filter, never seek — the composite-PK point-lookup
+ * unreliability documented at `scanMemberPeers` in `strand-membership-writer.ts`
+ * applies, so correctness depends only on each scan returning a superset of the
+ * live rows.
+ *
+ * **Scan order is load-bearing, and it is BINDINGS FIRST.** The two scans are
+ * separate reads with nothing holding them to one snapshot, so a write that
+ * lands between them is seen by the second scan and not the first. A member
+ * joins as `Member` row then `MemberPeer` row (`MemberExists` forces that
+ * order), so reading `Member` first would let a join that commits mid-read
+ * produce a binding whose member key is absent from the key set — a brand-new
+ * member classified as REVOKED, the one fail-CLOSED outcome this module exists
+ * to avoid. Reading bindings first inverts the skew: the new binding is simply
+ * not in the older bindings snapshot, so the joiner is unclassified and
+ * admitted, and a revocation that lands mid-read is still seen (the key is
+ * missing from the NEWER key scan). Every skew window then resolves fail-open,
+ * matching the module doc.
+ *
+ * NOTE: two whole-table scans per refresh (default every 30 s per closed
+ * strand). Fine at strand scale (a handful of members and bindings); if
+ * membership churn ever makes these tables large, the fix is a reliable
+ * filtered read — which needs the networked point-lookup gap closed
+ * (`debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked`) — not a bigger scan.
+ */
+export async function readStrandRevocationRows(db: Database): Promise<StrandRevocationRows> {
+  const bindings = await scanBindings(db);
+  const memberKeys = await scanMemberKeys(db);
+  return { memberKeys, bindings };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The per-strand revoked-peer deny set and the synchronous predicates over it.
+ *
+ * Lifecycle mirrors `PeerJoinBackfill`: created in
+ * `StrandInstanceManager.buildStrandRuntime` (closed strands only), started
+ * after the strand database initializes, stopped and dropped in
+ * `releaseRuntime` — so quiesce → resume rebuilds it with a fresh snapshot.
+ * The snapshot starts EMPTY (admit everything) and repopulates on the first
+ * successful read; a revoked peer therefore gets a short admit window per
+ * resume at the connection level. Accepted: fail-open posture, and resume is
+ * never blocked on a refresh.
+ */
+export class StrandRevocationEnforcer {
+  /** The materialized deny set — peer ids with an orphaned binding and no live one. */
+  private revokedPeerIds: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set();
+  private readonly scheduler: RevocationRefreshScheduler;
+  private readonly pollIntervalMs: number;
+  /** Tail of the refresh chain — what serializes refreshes (no two reads in flight). */
+  private refreshTail: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();
+  private refreshing = false;
+  private intervalHandle: unknown;
+  private started = false;
+  private stopped = false;
+  /** Latch for the one-shot self-revocation signal — see {@link StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps.onSelfRevoked}. */
+  private selfRevokedSignaled = false;
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly deps: StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps,
+    config?: StrandRevocationEnforcementConfig
+  ) {
+    this.scheduler = deps.scheduler ?? defaultScheduler;
+    this.pollIntervalMs = config?.pollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_REVOCATION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS;
+  }
+
+  /** Number of peers currently denied — test/diagnostic surface. */
+  get revokedCount(): number {
+    return this.revokedPeerIds.size;
+  }
+
+  /** Kick an immediate refresh (not awaited — bring-up never blocks on it) and arm the poll. */
+  start(): void {
+    if (this.started || this.stopped) return;
+    this.started = true;
+    void this.refresh();
+    this.intervalHandle = this.scheduler.setInterval(() => {
+      // Skip a tick while a refresh is in flight rather than queueing behind it —
+      // the interval exists to bound staleness, and a stack of queued reads
+      // bounds nothing extra. Explicit refresh() calls still chain (see refresh).
+      if (!this.refreshing) {
+        void this.refresh();
+      }
+    }, this.pollIntervalMs);
+    log('[%s] revocation enforcer started (poll %dms)', this.deps.label, this.pollIntervalMs);
+  }
+
+  /** Disarm the poll; a read already in flight completes but its result is discarded. */
+  stop(): void {
+    if (this.stopped) return;
+    this.stopped = true;
+    if (this.intervalHandle != null) {
+      this.scheduler.clearInterval(this.intervalHandle);
+      this.intervalHandle = undefined;
+    }
+    log('[%s] revocation enforcer stopped', this.deps.label);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Refresh the deny set now. Never rejects. Serialized: concurrent calls chain,
+   * so no two reads overlap, and each explicit call gets a read that STARTS
+   * after the call (an on-demand refresh after a revocation commit observes that
+   * commit). A failed or slow read keeps the previous snapshot — never clears it.
+   */
+  refresh(): Promise<void> {
+    const run = this.refreshTail.then(() => this.doRefresh());
+    this.refreshTail = run;
+    return run;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Is `remotePeerId` positively revoked in the current snapshot? Synchronous by
+   * design — this is judged inside libp2p gates where an await against the DB
+   * would deadlock (the control stream gate's argument).
+   */
+  isRevoked(remotePeerId: string): boolean {
+    return this.revokedPeerIds.has(remotePeerId);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The fail-closed PRIMARY layer: the per-stream predicate wired as
+   * `createLibp2pNode({ authorizeInboundStream })`, gating all four
+   * `/optimystic/strand-<id>/{repo,cluster,sync,block-transfer}` protocols.
+   * Also what catches a revoked peer arriving over a RELAYED connection, or
+   * over a connection admitted before the revocation replicated here.
+   */
+  authorizeStream(remotePeerId: string, _protocol: string): boolean {
+    return !this.isRevoked(remotePeerId);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * One serialized snapshot rebuild; contains every failure (contract: never rejects).
+   *
+   * NOTE: nothing here carries a deadline — a `readRows` or a `hangUp` that never
+   * settles wedges the refresh chain, which freezes the deny set (the poll skips
+   * while `refreshing`, and every later `refresh()` chains behind the stuck one).
+   * Both are bounded in practice (Quereus reads settle; libp2p's connection close
+   * has its own timeout). If a strand is ever seen with a stale deny set and no
+   * refresh log line, wrap both awaits in a timeout rather than hunting further.
+   */
+  private async doRefresh(): Promise<void> {
+    if (this.stopped) return;
+    this.refreshing = true;
+    try {
+      const rows = await this.deps.readRows();
+      if (this.stopped) return;
+      this.revokedPeerIds = deriveRevokedPeerIds(rows);
+      log('[%s] deny set refreshed: %d revoked peer(s)', this.deps.label, this.revokedPeerIds.size);
+      // Awaited inside the refresh, so an on-demand refresh() resolves only once
+      // the cut has been made — that is what makes "revoke, then refresh" an
+      // immediate teardown for the caller rather than a scheduled one.
+      await this.tearDownRevoked(this.revokedPeerIds);
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('[%s] deny-set refresh failed — keeping previous snapshot: %o', this.deps.label, error);
+    } finally {
+      this.refreshing = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Close what is already OPEN to the peers of `revoked` — the teardown half of
+   * enforcement (module doc: "Removal cuts LIVE sessions too"). Never rejects:
+   * every failure is contained, so the refresh loop survives and simply retries
+   * on the next tick.
+   *
+   * `revoked` is passed IN rather than read off the field, so the sweep judges
+   * the exact snapshot its own refresh produced; likewise the connection list is
+   * enumerated once, before any await, so a peer re-admitted mid-sweep is at
+   * worst hung up once and reconnects.
+   *
+   * NOTE: dropping the revoked peer from the strand's Optimystic cohort needs no
+   * separate action — machines quiesce strands routinely and the remaining cohort
+   * keeps committing, so an unreachable cohort peer is already tolerated, and
+   * `denyDialPeer` makes the exclusion fast (a local refusal, not a dial timeout).
+   * Two residual facts, both accepted: the removed node keeps every block it had
+   * already replicated (revocation is forward-looking), and a block whose only
+   * holders were the removed party's machines can be unavailable to the rest
+   * until repair.
+   *
+   * NOTE: post-removal commit latency is real and MEASURED, not hypothetical. On
+   * the two-parties-by-two-machines fixture in
+   * `integration-tests/src/scenarios/strand-removal-cuts-network.integration.ts`
+   * the remaining cohort's FIRST write after a cut fails repeatedly with
+   * `BlockUnavailableError: … (peers-unreachable)` before it commits — three or
+   * four failures, 3.5-4.3 s, over four runs — because the cohort still listed
+   * the removed party's now unreachable machines and had to downsize to the
+   * live holders first. It
+   * recovers on its own, so this is a latency cost, not a defect, and it is
+   * stated for app authors in `docs/strands.md` → Removing Members. If it ever
+   * stops recovering — a write that never commits, or `cluster-fetch:no-quorum` —
+   * that is an upstream (Optimystic) conversation, not a workaround here.
+   */
+  private async tearDownRevoked(revoked: ReadonlySet<string>): Promise<void> {
+    if (this.stopped) {
+      return;
+    }
+    const network = this.resolveNetwork();
+    if (!network) {
+      return;
+    }
+    const selfPeerId = network.peerId.toString();
+    // Judged on EVERY pass, including the empty-set one: leaving the set is what
+    // re-arms the signal (see trackSelfRevoked). Being revoked ourselves tears
+    // nothing down on our own behalf — the other side's gate already refuses us —
+    // so the sweep below still runs for every OTHER revoked peer in the pass.
+    this.trackSelfRevoked(revoked.has(selfPeerId));
+    if (revoked.size === 0) {
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const peer of connectedRevokedPeers(network, revoked, selfPeerId, this.deps.label)) {
+      await this.hangUpRevoked(network, peer);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** The lazily-read network handle; an accessor that throws costs this pass only. */
+  private resolveNetwork(): StrandRevocationNetwork | undefined {
+    try {
+      return this.deps.getNetwork?.();
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('[%s] network handle unavailable — teardown skipped this pass: %o', this.deps.label, error);
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** One hangUp, contained: a stopping node or an already-closed connection is not an error here. */
+  private async hangUpRevoked(network: StrandRevocationNetwork, peer: PeerId): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await network.hangUp(peer);
+      log('[%s] hung up revoked peer %s', this.deps.label, peer.toString());
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('[%s] hangUp of revoked peer %s failed — next refresh retries: %o', this.deps.label, peer.toString(), error);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Latch {@link StrandRevocationEnforcerDeps.onSelfRevoked} to the TRANSITION
+   * into the revoked state: fired once on entry, and re-armed the moment this
+   * node is out of the set again — a manager can re-admit a party it removed
+   * (a fresh `Member` row makes the orphaned bindings live again), and a second
+   * removal has to be reported like the first.
+   */
+  private trackSelfRevoked(selfRevoked: boolean): void {
+    if (!selfRevoked) {
+      this.selfRevokedSignaled = false;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (this.selfRevokedSignaled) {
+      return;
+    }
+    this.selfRevokedSignaled = true;
+    log('[%s] THIS node is revoked from the strand (removed or left) — signalling', this.deps.label);
+    try {
+      this.deps.onSelfRevoked?.();
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('[%s] onSelfRevoked handler threw: %o', this.deps.label, error);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The distinct peer ids of `network`'s open connections that are in `revoked`,
+ * as the `PeerId` objects `hangUp` takes — reusing each connection's own
+ * `remotePeer` rather than parsing the string back, so no peer-id codec is
+ * needed here. Self is excluded (a node holds no connection to itself, and
+ * hanging one up would be nonsense if it did), and a peer connected twice — say
+ * one direct and one relayed — yields ONE hangUp, which closes both. A throw
+ * mid-enumeration is logged and keeps whatever was collected before it: a
+ * partial sweep beats none, and the next refresh re-enumerates anyway.
+ */
+function connectedRevokedPeers(
+  network: StrandRevocationNetwork,
+  revoked: ReadonlySet<string>,
+  selfPeerId: string,
+  label: string
+): PeerId[] {
+  const targets = new Map<string, PeerId>();
+  try {
+    for (const connection of network.getConnections()) {
+      const remotePeerId = connection.remotePeer.toString();
+      if (remotePeerId !== selfPeerId && revoked.has(remotePeerId)) {
+        targets.set(remotePeerId, connection.remotePeer);
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    log('[%s] connection enumeration failed — teardown skipped this pass: %o', label, error);
+  }
+  return [...targets.values()];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derive the deny set: a peer id is revoked iff it has at least one ORPHANED
+ * binding (a `MemberPeer` row whose member key has no live `Member` row) AND no
+ * live-membered binding. The second conjunct is what lets a peer id bound to
+ * TWO member keys — revoked under one, live under the other — keep serving the
+ * live member: a machine serving a live member must not be cut. Per-binding,
+ * not per-member, so every machine of a multi-device removed party lands in
+ * the set.
+ */
+function deriveRevokedPeerIds(rows: StrandRevocationRows): Set<string> {
+  const orphaned = new Set<string>();
+  const live = new Set<string>();
+  for (const binding of rows.bindings) {
+    (rows.memberKeys.has(binding.memberKey) ? live : orphaned).add(binding.peerId);
+  }
+  for (const peerId of live) {
+    orphaned.delete(peerId);
+  }
+  return orphaned;
+}
+
+/** The one capability the gater composition needs from the enforcer. */
+export type StrandRevocationJudge = Pick<StrandRevocationEnforcer, 'isRevoked'>;
+
+/**
+ * Build a closed strand's connection gater: the caller-supplied gater (if any)
+ * with revoked-peer denial composed onto three hooks. The opportunistic
+ * SECONDARY layer — the per-stream gate above is the fail-closed primary.
+ *
+ *  - `denyInboundEncryptedConnection`: deny iff revoked, so a removed party's
+ *    node is refused before any protocol negotiation.
+ *  - `denyDialPeer`: deny iff revoked — the owner ruling covers "communicated
+ *    with", not just "answered to", and refusing the dial locally is instant,
+ *    which keeps Optimystic from wasting a dial timeout on a peer this node
+ *    will not talk to anyway.
+ *  - `denyInboundRelayReservation`: deny iff revoked — matters when the strand
+ *    node runs the relay server (the storage-profile default), where admitting
+ *    the reservation would let a removed party keep using this node's
+ *    forwarding capacity.
+ *
+ * Composition semantics: every hook of `base` is preserved as-is; on the three
+ * composed hooks a deny from EITHER the base gater or the revocation check
+ * denies, and an error (or a decision slower than `decisionTimeoutMs`) in
+ * either is fail-open — the base error admits through to the revocation check,
+ * a revocation-check error admits outright, and the fail-closed stream gate
+ * still stands behind both. The deadline is belt-and-braces: the snapshot read
+ * is synchronous.
+ *
+ * NOTE: accepted tradeoff — swallowing a BASE hook's throw diverges from
+ * `createMembershipConnectionGater`, which lets it propagate to libp2p (a
+ * fail-closed outcome there). Uniform fail-open was chosen for this module so
+ * every hook has one failure direction, and it was the shape the plan specified;
+ * the cost is that an embedder gater which throws is silently admitted here
+ * while the same gater passed raw to an OPEN strand would refuse. Loud in the
+ * log either way. Revisit if an embedder ever ships a gater whose throw is a
+ * meaningful deny, or if the two gaters are unified.
+ *
+ * NOTE: `base` is spread, so a gater passed as a CLASS INSTANCE would lose its
+ * prototype methods — same caveat as `createMembershipConnectionGater`; every
+ * caller in this repo supplies a plain object (the RN/web permissive gaters,
+ * e.g. `{ denyDialMultiaddr: () => false }`, keep working unchanged).
+ */
+export function createRevocationConnectionGater(
+  enforcer: StrandRevocationJudge,
+  base?: ConnectionGater,
+  decisionTimeoutMs: number = ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS
+): ConnectionGater {
+  /** The base gater's verdict, fail-open: an error or absence is "not denied". */
+  const baseDenies = async (decide: () => Promise<boolean> | boolean | undefined, hook: string): Promise<boolean> => {
+    try {
+      return await decide() === true;
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('base gater %s threw — treating as not-denied (fail-open): %o', hook, error);
+      return false;
+    }
+  };
+  /** The revocation verdict, bounded and fail-open. */
+  const revokedDenies = async (peerId: PeerId, hook: string): Promise<boolean> => {
+    const remotePeerId = peerId.toString();
+    try {
+      const revoked = await decideWithinDeadline(
+        () => enforcer.isRevoked(remotePeerId), false, decisionTimeoutMs, `${hook}(${remotePeerId})`
+      );
+      if (revoked) {
+        log('%s: %s is revoked — denying', hook, remotePeerId);
+      }
+      return revoked;
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('%s revocation check threw for %s — admitting (fail-open; stream gate decides): %o', hook, remotePeerId, error);
+      return false;
+    }
+  };
+  return {
+    ...base,
+    denyDialPeer: async (peerId: PeerId): Promise<boolean> => {
+      if (await baseDenies(() => base?.denyDialPeer?.(peerId), 'denyDialPeer')) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      return revokedDenies(peerId, 'denyDialPeer');
+    },
+    denyInboundEncryptedConnection: async (peerId: PeerId, maConn: MultiaddrConnection): Promise<boolean> => {
+      if (await baseDenies(() => base?.denyInboundEncryptedConnection?.(peerId, maConn), 'denyInboundEncryptedConnection')) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      return revokedDenies(peerId, 'denyInboundEncryptedConnection');
+    },
+    denyInboundRelayReservation: async (peerId: PeerId): Promise<boolean> => {
+      if (await baseDenies(() => base?.denyInboundRelayReservation?.(peerId), 'denyInboundRelayReservation')) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      return revokedDenies(peerId, 'denyInboundRelayReservation');
+    }
+  };
+}