@serfab/cadre-core 0.9.0 → 0.10.0

package/src/seed-bootstrap.ts

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ import debug from 'debug';
 import { toString as uint8ArrayToString, fromString as uint8ArrayFromString } from 'uint8arrays';
 import { digest, sign, verify, getPublicKey } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
 import type { Libp2p, Connection } from '@libp2p/interface';
-import { multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
+import { multiaddr, type Multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr';
 import { peerIdFromString } from '@libp2p/peer-id';
-import { type ControlStream, writeFrame, readStreamToEnd } from './control-stream.js';
+import { type ControlStream, writeFrame, withDeadline, exchangeFrame, readStreamToEnd } from './control-stream.js';
 import type {
   ControlNetworkSeed,
   SeedPeer,
@@ -18,16 +18,19 @@ import type {
   InviteResult,
   CadreInvite,
   PeerAddressRecord,
-  DeviceTokenRecord
+  DeviceTokenRecord,
+  RevocationRow
 } from './types.js';
 import type { ControlDatabase } from './control-database.js';
 import { generateStampId } from './control-database.js';
 import { canonicalJson } from './canonical-json.js';
-import { peerAuthorizationDigest, cadrePeerVoucherDigest, cadrePeerRemoveDigest } from './peer-authorization.js';
+import { deviceTokenAddDigest } from './peer-authorization.js';
 import {
   type SeedTrustPolicy,
-  dbAnchoredTrustPolicy,
+  type SeedTrustDecision,
+  anchoredTrustPolicy,
 } from './seed-trust-policy.js';
+import type { TrustedOwnerStore } from './trusted-owner-store.js';
 
 const log = debug('sereus:cadre:seed-bootstrap');
 
@@ -43,6 +46,9 @@ const DEFAULT_SEED_READ_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
 /** Default cap on concurrent inbound seed streams a single peer can pin open. */
 const DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SEEDS = 100;
 
+/** Default time the sender waits for a seed delivery (dial + ack read) before aborting (ms). */
+const DEFAULT_SEED_DELIVER_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
 /**
  * Decode a 4-byte big-endian length-prefixed frame; returns the body bytes.
  *
@@ -106,6 +112,14 @@ export function canonicalSeedPayload(
   return canonicalJson({ partyId: seed.partyId, peers: seed.peers });
 }
 
+/**
+ * An {@link ApplySeedResult} for a seed refused before the owner-dial loop ran,
+ * so the dial counters read zero rather than being absent.
+ */
+function seedRejected(error: string): ApplySeedResult {
+  return { success: false, peersAdded: 0, error, ownerDialsAttempted: 0, ownerDialsFailed: 0 };
+}
+
 /**
  * Configuration for the SeedBootstrapService
  */
@@ -125,9 +139,9 @@ export interface SeedBootstrapConfig {
   inviteAddressResolver?: () => Promise<string[]>;
   /**
    * Trust anchor for incoming seeds. Decides whether a signature-verified
-   * `signerKey` should be trusted, against the receiver's known owner
-   * keys (NOT the seed body). Defaults to `dbAnchoredTrustPolicy()`, which
-   * rejects any signer not already in the `OwnerKey` table. An enrollment
+   * `signerKey` should be trusted, against the receiver's anchored owner
+   * keys (NOT the seed body). Defaults to `anchoredTrustPolicy()`, which
+   * rejects any signer not already in {@link trustedOwners}. An enrollment
    * caller can pass a per-seed override to `applySeed` instead.
    *
    * A `CadreNode` forwards its node-wide `CadreNodeConfig.seedTrustPolicy` here
@@ -135,6 +149,19 @@ export interface SeedBootstrapConfig {
    * since a network-delivered seed has no per-call override.
    */
   trustPolicy?: SeedTrustPolicy;
+  /**
+   * The node-local, NON-replicated trusted-owner anchor. Supplies
+   * `SeedTrustContext.knownOwnerKeys` for every {@link applySeed}, and receives
+   * a key accepted via a pin/TOFU (see `SeedTrustDecision.anchorAs`).
+   *
+   * Deliberately NOT `ControlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()`: the replicated
+   * `OwnerKey` table is pollutable — any connecting node can genesis-insert its
+   * own key and let it replicate — so a seed signed by a stranger's self-issued
+   * owner key would pass a table-anchored check. A `CadreNode` passes its
+   * `getTrustedOwnerStore()` here. Unset (e.g. a directly-constructed service in
+   * a test) means an EMPTY anchor: only a pinned/TOFU policy can accept a seed.
+   */
+  trustedOwners?: TrustedOwnerStore;
   /**
    * Time the inbound seed handler waits for the seed frame before aborting the
    * read (ms). Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_SEED_READ_TIMEOUT_MS}. Bounds a
@@ -147,6 +174,15 @@ export interface SeedBootstrapConfig {
    * returned without applying any seed.
    */
   maxConcurrentSeeds?: number;
+  /**
+   * Time {@link SeedBootstrapService.deliverSeed} waits for the whole exchange —
+   * dial, write, ack read — before aborting (ms). Defaults to
+   * {@link DEFAULT_SEED_DELIVER_TIMEOUT_MS}. Bounds the SENDER against a seed
+   * target that accepts the stream and then never replies; the target is a
+   * not-yet-trusted node during onboarding, so this is the more exposed
+   * direction than the receiver knobs above.
+   */
+  seedDeliverTimeoutMs?: number;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -155,8 +191,15 @@ export interface SeedBootstrapConfig {
 export interface SeedEventCallbacks {
   /** Called when a seed is received via the protocol */
   onSeedReceived?: (partyId: string, peerId: string) => void;
-  /** Called when a seed is successfully applied */
-  onSeedApplied?: (partyId: string, peersAdded: number) => void;
+  /**
+   * Called when a seed is successfully applied.
+   *
+   * `seed` is the applied seed itself: the inbound protocol handler applies it
+   * INSIDE the service, so this callback is the only seam through which a
+   * `CadreNode` sees a wire-delivered seed's contents — which it needs to
+   * retain the owner-flagged peers as cold-start bootstrap dial targets.
+   */
+  onSeedApplied?: (partyId: string, peersAdded: number, seed: ControlNetworkSeed) => void;
   /** Called when seed application fails */
   onSeedError?: (partyId: string, error: string) => void;
 }
@@ -176,15 +219,17 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
   private readonly trustPolicy: SeedTrustPolicy;
   private readonly seedReadTimeoutMs: number;
   private readonly maxConcurrentSeeds: number;
+  private readonly seedDeliverTimeoutMs: number;
   /** In-flight inbound seed streams, used to enforce {@link maxConcurrentSeeds}. */
   private activeStreams = 0;
   private eventCallbacks: SeedEventCallbacks = {};
 
   constructor(config: SeedBootstrapConfig) {
     this.config = config;
-    this.trustPolicy = config.trustPolicy ?? dbAnchoredTrustPolicy();
+    this.trustPolicy = config.trustPolicy ?? anchoredTrustPolicy();
     this.seedReadTimeoutMs = config.seedReadTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_SEED_READ_TIMEOUT_MS;
     this.maxConcurrentSeeds = config.maxConcurrentSeeds ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CONCURRENT_SEEDS;
+    this.seedDeliverTimeoutMs = config.seedDeliverTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_SEED_DELIVER_TIMEOUT_MS;
 
     // Derive public key from private key if not provided
     if (config.ownerPrivateKey && !config.ownerPublicKey) {
@@ -251,7 +296,7 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
 
   /**
    * Authorize a new peer to join the cadre.
-   * Signs the peer ID with the owner key and inserts into CadrePeer table.
+   * Signs a membership voucher with the owner key and inserts into CadrePeer table.
    *
    * The owner vouches the `PublicKey <-> PeerId` binding: rather than trust a
    * caller-supplied key, the binding is enforced by construction — `PublicKey` is
@@ -284,9 +329,14 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
    * is its own owner (it holds the owner key): the row is owner-signed
    * (satisfying `AuthorizedInsert`) AND carries a valid self-`Sig`, so it resolves
    * immediately without a follow-up self-update.
+   *
+   * @returns `true` when this call seated the row, `false` when a concurrent writer
+   *   (e.g. an {@link authorizePeer} of this node's own id) had already seated it —
+   *   in which case the row in the database is NOT this record and carries whatever
+   *   `Sig` that writer had, so the caller must self-update to publish its signature.
    */
-  async insertSelfPeerRecord(record: PeerAddressRecord): Promise<void> {
-    await this.insertCadrePeerRow({
+  async insertSelfPeerRecord(record: PeerAddressRecord): Promise<boolean> {
+    return await this.insertCadrePeerRow({
       peerId: record.peerId,
       publicKey: record.publicKey,
       multiaddr: record.addrs.join(','),
@@ -296,13 +346,20 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
   }
 
   /**
-   * Shared owner-signed `CadrePeer` INSERT. Mints a fresh single-use `StampId`
-   * and signs the voucher digest `digest(peerId, stampId)` ({@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest})
-   * with the owner key (satisfying `AuthorizedInsert`), then writes the full record
-   * row with the vouching (owner, signature) persisted into VouchOwner/VouchSig.
-   * The owner signature does NOT cover the address columns — those are vouched only
-   * as far as the owner asserts them, and a peer's own `Sig` (when present) is what
-   * makes the row resolvable.
+   * Shared owner-signed `CadrePeer` INSERT — the row fields and the owner-key
+   * precondition; the stamp mint, voucher signature, write lock, existence check and
+   * membership notify are all {@link ControlDatabase.insertCadrePeer}'s (see there for
+   * the anti-replay and insert-race rationale). No `CadrePeer` write may bypass that
+   * method: the write is what admits the peer's traffic.
+   *
+   * The DB check precedes the owner-key check here, matching the order this method has
+   * always surfaced them (the owner-key error used to come out of the signer, after the
+   * DB check).
+   *
+   * @returns `true` when this call performed the INSERT, `false` when the row was
+   *   already seated by a concurrent writer. The loser needs to know: an authorize seats
+   *   a row with a null `Sig`, so a self-publish that lost the race must fall through to
+   *   a self-update or its record never lands.
    */
   private async insertCadrePeerRow(row: {
     peerId: string;
@@ -310,86 +367,78 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
     multiaddr: string;
     updatedAt: number;
     sig: string | null;
-  }): Promise<void> {
+  }): Promise<boolean> {
     if (!this.controlDatabase) {
       throw new Error('Control database not initialized');
     }
-    // Fresh single-use nonce; the voucher signs digest(peerId, stampId) so a captured
-    // insert can't be replayed (StampId is unique) and can't be repurposed as a delete
-    // (which signs a distinct 'remove'-scoped digest).
-    // NOTE: StampId uniqueness only blocks insert-replay while the row (or its StampId)
-    // is still present — a delete frees the StampId, so a captured authorized insert could
-    // be replayed to re-add a peer the owner had removed (a revocation bypass). Fully
-    // subsumed by the connection gater (ticket 6): with no outsider write there is no
-    // replay at all. If that gate ever proves insufficient, bind inserts to a persistent
-    // per-peer sequence / tombstone instead of a row-scoped nonce.
-    const stampId = generateStampId(row.peerId);
-    const signature = this.signDigest(cadrePeerVoucherDigest(row.peerId, stampId));
-    const db = this.controlDatabase.getDatabase();
-    // Persist the vouching (owner, signature) onto the row (VouchOwner/VouchSig)
-    // — identical to the context pair, which the AuthorizedInsert constraint binds — so a
-    // reader can later re-check the voucher against its node-local trusted-owner anchor.
-    await db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.CadrePeer (PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [this.ownerPublicKey, signature, row.peerId, row.publicKey, row.multiaddr, row.updatedAt, row.sig, stampId, this.ownerPublicKey, signature]);
+    const ownerKey = this.requireOwnerPublicKey();
+    return await this.controlDatabase.insertCadrePeer(
+      row, ownerKey, message => this.signMessageBytes(message),
+    );
   }
 
   /**
    * Owner-signed INSERT of a peer's OWN self-signed `DeviceToken` row.
    *
    * Counterpart to {@link insertSelfPeerRecord} for the device-token registry: the
-   * row is owner-signed (satisfying `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert`, which vouches
-   * membership exactly as `CadrePeer.AuthorizedInsert` does) AND carries the peer's
-   * own self-`Sig` over the token payload. The owner signature covers only the
-   * PeerId — it does NOT vouch the token contents; the peer's `Sig` (verified at
+   * row is owner-signed (satisfying `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert` via the
+   * 'add'-tagged digest, {@link deviceTokenAddDigest}) AND carries the peer's
+   * own self-`Sig` over the token payload. The owner signature covers the WHOLE row
+   * (every column, ending in a freshly minted single-use `StampId`) — but covering the
+   * token contents is not the same as vouching them: the peer's `Sig` (verified at
    * resolve time against the bound `CadrePeer.PublicKey`) is what makes the row
    * resolvable. Used by {@link CadreNode.registerDeviceToken} for the first publish
    * when the node is its own owner.
+   *
+   * The stamp is per-INSERT, so a re-register after a clear mints a fresh one and a
+   * fresh signature — unaffected by the cleared row's retired stamp
+   * (`DeviceToken.NotRevoked`).
    */
   async insertSelfDeviceToken(record: DeviceTokenRecord): Promise<void> {
-    const signature = this.signPeerAuthorization(record.peerId);
+    const stampId = generateStampId(record.peerId);
+    const signature = this.signDigest(deviceTokenAddDigest({ ...record, stampId }));
     if (!this.controlDatabase) {
       throw new Error('Control database not initialized');
     }
-    const db = this.controlDatabase.getDatabase();
-    await db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.DeviceToken (PeerId, Platform, Token, UpdatedAt, Sig)
+    await this.controlDatabase.execWrite(`
+      insert into CadreControl.DeviceToken (PeerId, Platform, Token, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId)
         with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [this.ownerPublicKey, signature, record.peerId, record.platform, record.token, record.updatedAt, record.sig]);
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [this.ownerPublicKey, signature, record.peerId, record.platform, record.token, record.updatedAt, record.sig, stampId]);
     log('Device token inserted (owner-signed): %s', record.peerId);
   }
 
   /**
    * Owner-signed DELETE of a peer's `DeviceToken` row (logout / token
-   * invalidation). The `DeviceToken.AuthorizedInsert` constraint gates both insert
-   * AND delete on an owner signature over `digest(old.PeerId)`, so — like
-   * {@link removePeer} for `CadrePeer` — clearing a token requires the owner key.
+   * invalidation). The `DeviceToken.AuthorizedDelete` constraint validates an owner
+   * signature over the 'remove'-tagged digest bound to the STORED row's
+   * (PeerId, StampId) — deliberately distinct from the insert digest, so a captured
+   * insert approval can never be replayed to clear a token. Like {@link removePeer}
+   * for `CadrePeer`, clearing a token requires the owner key.
+   *
+   * The delete and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the row's `StampId` commit in
+   * ONE transaction — `DeviceToken.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and
+   * without the tombstone the stamp would free up and the never-expiring insert
+   * approval (which the cleared device holds a copy of) would re-seat the token. The
+   * tombstone carries its OWN owner signature: retiring a stamp permanently forecloses
+   * that row, so it is an owner action in its own right.
+   *
+   * Both digests, the stamp read, and the transaction come from
+   * {@link ControlDatabase.deleteDeviceToken} — one shared implementation across
+   * `CadrePeer` / `DeviceToken` / `Strand` / `ValidationKey`. What stays here is the
+   * owner-key precondition; a no-op on an already-absent row is the shared body's
+   * behavior, and unlike {@link removePeer} nothing here rides on it.
    */
   async deleteDeviceToken(peerId: string): Promise<void> {
-    const signature = this.signPeerAuthorization(peerId);
+    // Fail fast on a keyless service BEFORE the DB read, so a non-owner gets the
+    // owner-key error rather than a silent no-op on an absent row.
+    const ownerKey = this.requireOwnerPublicKey();
     if (!this.controlDatabase) {
       throw new Error('Control database not initialized');
     }
-    const db = this.controlDatabase.getDatabase();
-    await db.exec(`
-      delete from CadreControl.DeviceToken
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [this.ownerPublicKey, signature, peerId]);
-    log('Device token removed (owner-signed): %s', peerId);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Sign a peer ID with the owner key for a `CadrePeer` / `DeviceToken`
-   * insert-or-delete. The signed bytes come from the shared
-   * {@link peerAuthorizationDigest} helper so the offline `cadre enroll register`
-   * verifier checks the exact same construction. Throws if no owner key is set.
-   */
-  private signPeerAuthorization(peerId: string): string {
-    return this.signDigest(peerAuthorizationDigest(peerId));
+    await this.controlDatabase.deleteDeviceToken(
+      peerId, ownerKey, message => this.signMessageBytes(message),
+    );
   }
 
   /**
@@ -407,11 +456,28 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
     return this.config.ownerPrivateKey;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * The owner PUBLIC key that rides in every owner-signed write's context, non-null.
+   *
+   * The field is nullable because a read-only service carries no owner key at all, but the
+   * constructor derives the public key whenever `ownerPrivateKey` is set — so gating on
+   * {@link requireOwnerPrivateKey} first makes the pair inseparable and the second throw
+   * unreachable. Callers that must reject a keyless service BEFORE any DB read use this as
+   * their first line and get the owner-key precondition for free.
+   */
+  private requireOwnerPublicKey(): string {
+    this.requireOwnerPrivateKey();
+    if (!this.ownerPublicKey) {
+      throw new Error('Owner public key required to authorize peers');
+    }
+    return this.ownerPublicKey;
+  }
+
   /**
    * Sign a base64url digest with the owner key (ed25519). The single place the
-   * owner private key is applied; callers pass the canonical digest for the specific
-   * action ({@link cadrePeerVoucherDigest} / {@link cadrePeerRemoveDigest} /
-   * {@link peerAuthorizationDigest}). Throws if no owner key is set.
+   * owner private key is applied; callers pass the canonical domain-tagged digest for
+   * the specific action ({@link deviceTokenAddDigest}), or the raw-bytes form via
+   * {@link signMessageBytes}. Throws if no owner key is set.
    */
   private signDigest(digestB64url: string): string {
     return sign(
@@ -424,60 +490,83 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
     ) as string;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Adapt the control database's raw-bytes `signMessage` callback (every guarded delete
+   * takes one) to {@link signDigest}'s base64url-string form. Both encodings hash to the
+   * same signed bytes (`sign` decodes its base64url input), so a signature minted here
+   * satisfies the same schema CHECK as one from the callers that sign the bytes directly — see
+   * `control-revocation-replay.spec.ts`'s "raw-bytes and digest-string signers agree".
+   */
+  private signMessageBytes(message: Uint8Array): string {
+    return this.signDigest(uint8ArrayToString(message, 'base64url'));
+  }
+
   /**
    * Remove a peer from the cadre by owner signature.
    *
    * The `CadrePeer.AuthorizedDelete` (`check on delete`) constraint validates a
-   * signature over the DISTINCT 'remove'-scoped digest `digest(old.PeerId, old.StampId,
-   * 'remove')` ({@link cadrePeerRemoveDigest}) by an owner key — deliberately NOT the
-   * insert voucher digest, so the row's stored `VouchSig` can never be replayed to delete.
+   * signature over the DISTINCT 'remove'-tagged digest
+   * `digest('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'remove', old.PeerId, old.StampId)` by an owner
+   * key — deliberately NOT the insert voucher digest, so the row's stored `VouchSig` can
+   * never be replayed to delete.
+   *
+   * The delete and the `Revocation` tombstone retiring the row's `StampId` commit in ONE
+   * transaction — `CadrePeer.RevocationRecorded` refuses a bare delete, and without the
+   * tombstone the stamp would free up and the original admission approval (which never
+   * expires, and which the removed peer holds a copy of) would re-seat the row.
+   *
+   * The tombstone is separately owner-signed (satisfying `Revocation.Authorized`):
+   * retiring a stamp evicts that peer party-wide and permanently forecloses re-admitting
+   * the row, so it is an owner action in its own right, not a side effect the delete's
+   * signature covers.
+   *
+   * Both digests, the stamp read, the transaction, and the post-commit membership notify
+   * come from {@link ControlDatabase.deleteCadrePeer} — one shared implementation across
+   * `CadrePeer` / `DeviceToken` / `Strand` / `ValidationKey`. What stays here is the
+   * owner-key precondition and the absent-row gate the notify depends on (below).
    */
   async removePeer(peerId: string): Promise<void> {
     // Fail fast on a keyless service BEFORE any DB read: a non-owner cannot sign the
     // remove digest, and this precedence (owner key, then control DB) is what the
     // unit contract asserts.
-    this.requireOwnerPrivateKey();
+    const ownerKey = this.requireOwnerPublicKey();
     if (!this.controlDatabase) {
       throw new Error('Control database not initialized');
     }
-    // Delete is authorized by a signature over a DISTINCT 'remove'-scoped digest bound to
-    // the row's CURRENT StampId — so the row's stored voucher (a signature over the
-    // voucher digest) can never be replayed to authorize a delete.
+    // This absent-row gate must stay OUTSIDE the delete, even though the delete repeats it
+    // internally: deleteCadrePeer's membership notify fires whenever its body resolves,
+    // with no idea whether the body wrote anything, so delegating an absent peer would
+    // fire a spurious membership notification.
+    // NOTE: deleteCadrePeer re-reads the StampId, so a peer removed by another writer
+    // between the two reads no-ops silently yet still notifies. Narrow concurrent-removal
+    // window only — the common "already absent" case is caught here.
     const stampId = await this.controlDatabase.queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId);
     if (stampId === null) {
       log('removePeer: no CadrePeer row for %s (already absent)', peerId);
       return;
     }
-    const signature = this.signDigest(cadrePeerRemoveDigest(peerId, stampId));
 
     log('Removing peer: %s', peerId);
 
-    const db = this.controlDatabase.getDatabase();
-    await db.exec(`
-      delete from CadreControl.CadrePeer
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [this.ownerPublicKey, signature, peerId]);
+    await this.controlDatabase.deleteCadrePeer(
+      peerId, ownerKey, message => this.signMessageBytes(message),
+    );
 
-    log('Peer %s removed successfully', peerId);
+    log('Peer %s removed successfully (stamp retired)', peerId);
   }
 
   /**
-   * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: bump
-   * `UpdatedAt` under the owner branch of `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` (a
-   * signature over `digest(peerId)` — the same construction {@link authorizePeer}
-   * uses) so the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting transaction.
+   * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: bump `UpdatedAt` and
+   * re-vouch the row so it is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting transaction. This is
+   * the write-while-alone re-replication primitive (`control-write-ensure-replicated`):
+   * a membership row that committed local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is
+   * pushed to the cohort once it grows.
+   *
+   * The stamp read, the voucher signature, the write lock and the membership notify are
+   * {@link ControlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer}'s — including the caveat that it rebinds
+   * `VouchOwner` to this node's owner key. What stays here is the owner-key precondition.
    *
-   * This is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive
-   * (`control-write-ensure-replicated`): a membership row that committed
-   * local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it
-   * grows, by re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original
-   * INSERT) because the row already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the
-   * `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness stamp changes — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` /
-   * `Sig` are left intact — so it is safe over a row whose peer has not
-   * self-published (`Sig` null); the caller must skip a row that already carries a
-   * self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and bumping `UpdatedAt`
-   * without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
+   * A no-op (no throw, no notify) when the row does not exist.
    *
    * @param peerId - the membership row to re-touch.
    * @param updatedAt - the strictly-increasing freshness stamp to write.
@@ -487,35 +576,48 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
   async reauthorizePeer(peerId: string, updatedAt: number): Promise<void> {
     // Fail fast on a keyless service before any DB read (see removePeer): a non-owner
     // cannot re-sign the voucher, and must not silently no-op on an absent row.
-    this.requireOwnerPrivateKey();
+    const ownerKey = this.requireOwnerPublicKey();
     if (!this.controlDatabase) {
       throw new Error('Control database not initialized');
     }
-    // The owner branch of AuthorizedUpdate verifies a voucher over digest(PeerId,
-    // StampId) and re-binds VouchOwner/VouchSig. Sign over the row's CURRENT StampId
-    // (unchanged by this re-touch) and re-set the voucher columns so the branch passes.
-    // NOTE: this rebinds VouchOwner to THIS node's owner key. Benign today — the
-    // write-while-alone drain only re-touches rows this node itself authored. If a future
-    // path lets one owner re-touch a row a DIFFERENT owner vouched, the voucher
-    // silently flips to this owner; that only matters once ticket-4's predicate checks
-    // VouchOwner against a node-local anchor, and only if the two owners differ in
-    // anchor membership.
-    const stampId = await this.controlDatabase.queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId);
-    if (stampId === null) {
+    const retouched = await this.controlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer(
+      peerId, updatedAt, ownerKey, message => this.signMessageBytes(message),
+    );
+    if (!retouched) {
       log('reauthorizePeer: no CadrePeer row for %s (nothing to re-touch)', peerId);
       return;
     }
-    const signature = this.signDigest(cadrePeerVoucherDigest(peerId, stampId));
-    const db = this.controlDatabase.getDatabase();
-    await db.exec(`
-      update CadreControl.CadrePeer
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        set UpdatedAt = ?, VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [this.ownerPublicKey, signature, updatedAt, this.ownerPublicKey, signature, peerId]);
     log('Peer %s re-authorized (UpdatedAt=%d) for write-while-alone re-replication', peerId, updatedAt);
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Owner re-issue of a batch of `Revocation` tombstones: bump each row's
+   * `ReissuedAt` so the storage layer re-broadcasts a tombstone that committed
+   * while the node was alone. The delete-while-alone counterpart of
+   * {@link reauthorizePeer} — a removed row cannot be re-touched (it is gone),
+   * but its tombstone can, and every membership read treats a retired stamp as
+   * absent.
+   *
+   * The signatures, the single transaction, and the strictly-monotonic
+   * `reissuedAt` contract are {@link ControlDatabase.reissueRevocations}'s. What
+   * stays here is the owner-key precondition.
+   *
+   * @returns how many tombstones were re-issued (`rows.length` on success).
+   * @throws if no owner private key is configured or the control database is not
+   *   initialized.
+   */
+  async reissueRevocations(rows: readonly RevocationRow[], reissuedAt: number): Promise<number> {
+    // Fail fast on a keyless service before any DB work (see removePeer): a
+    // non-owner cannot sign the reissue digests.
+    const ownerKey = this.requireOwnerPublicKey();
+    if (!this.controlDatabase) {
+      throw new Error('Control database not initialized');
+    }
+    return this.controlDatabase.reissueRevocations(
+      rows, reissuedAt, ownerKey, message => this.signMessageBytes(message),
+    );
+  }
+
   /**
    * Create a seed from the current control network state.
    * The seed contains peer information and is signed by an owner.
@@ -567,10 +669,15 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
    *
    * Validates the seed signature, then evaluates a trust anchor for the
    * `signerKey` that does NOT come from the seed body: the receiver's
-   * `OwnerKey` table (DB-anchored), optionally augmented by pinned keys or
-   * TOFU via the configured/overriding `SeedTrustPolicy`. A forged
-   * self-asserting seed — one that merely lists its own signer as an owner
-   * peer — no longer passes.
+   * node-local {@link SeedBootstrapConfig.trustedOwners} anchor, optionally
+   * augmented by pinned keys or TOFU via the configured/overriding
+   * `SeedTrustPolicy`. A forged self-asserting seed — one that merely lists its
+   * own signer as an owner peer — no longer passes, and neither does one signed
+   * by a key a stranger genesis-inserted into the replicated `OwnerKey` table.
+   *
+   * A key accepted via a pin/TOFU is persisted into the anchor (the policy says
+   * so via `SeedTrustDecision.anchorAs`), so the next seed from that owner is
+   * anchored without re-supplying the invite.
    *
    * @param seed - The seed to apply (already transport-decoded).
    * @param options.trustPolicy - Per-call policy override (e.g. a
@@ -582,22 +689,29 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
     options?: { trustPolicy?: SeedTrustPolicy }
   ): Promise<ApplySeedResult> {
     if (!this.libp2pNode) {
-      return { success: false, peersAdded: 0, error: 'Service not initialized' };
+      return seedRejected('Service not initialized');
     }
 
+    // NOTE: `seed.partyId` is never checked against `config.partyId`. Nothing
+    // downstream reads it — trust is keyed on `signerKey` vs the anchor, and the
+    // anchor a stray-party seed could write into belongs to THIS party, which
+    // only a caller-supplied pin for that signer can reach. If applying a seed
+    // ever branches on its partyId (or the anchor becomes multi-party), reject a
+    // mismatch here instead.
     log('Applying seed for party: %s', seed.partyId);
 
     // Validate the seed signature
     if (!this.validateSeedSignature(seed)) {
-      return { success: false, peersAdded: 0, error: 'Invalid seed signature' };
+      return seedRejected('Invalid seed signature');
     }
 
-    // Evaluate the trust anchor for the signer key. The known-owner set is
-    // sourced from the receiver's control DB, never from the seed itself; a
-    // cold-start node with no DB and no override therefore sees an empty set.
-    const knownOwnerKeys = this.controlDatabase
-      ? await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys()
-      : new Set<string>();
+    // Evaluate the trust anchor for the signer key. The known-owner set comes
+    // from the receiver's NODE-LOCAL anchor — never from the seed itself, and
+    // never from the replicated OwnerKey table (a stranger can genesis-insert
+    // its own key there and let it replicate into every peer's copy). A node
+    // whose anchor was never seeded, with no policy override, sees an empty set
+    // and rejects.
+    const knownOwnerKeys = this.config.trustedOwners?.all() ?? new Set<string>();
     const policy = options?.trustPolicy ?? this.trustPolicy;
     const decision = await policy.evaluate({
       partyId: seed.partyId,
@@ -605,12 +719,9 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
       knownOwnerKeys,
     });
     if (!decision.trusted) {
-      return {
-        success: false,
-        peersAdded: 0,
-        error: decision.reason ?? 'Signer key not trusted by trust policy',
-      };
+      return seedRejected(decision.reason ?? 'Signer key not trusted by trust policy');
     }
+    await this.anchorAcceptedSigner(seed.signerKey, decision);
 
     let peersAdded = 0;
 
@@ -634,23 +745,71 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
       }
     }
 
-    // Dial owner peers to establish connections
+    // Dial owner peers to establish connections. Best-effort and COUNTED: an
+    // owner that is momentarily down leaves this node seeded but unconnected,
+    // which the caller can only see if the outcome is reported (see
+    // `ApplySeedResult.ownerDialsFailed`). Recovery is not this loop's job —
+    // `CadreNode.dialColdStartBootstrap` retries these same addresses on every
+    // control-cohort reconcile pass until the control database has siblings.
+    // `createSeed` projects EVERY CadrePeer row, so an owner applying a seed
+    // minted after it joined finds ITSELF in the owner list. Dialing self always
+    // throws, which would report a healthy owner as "seeded but stranded".
+    // Optional-chained: partial libp2p handles (unit-test doubles) omit `peerId`,
+    // and an undefined self simply matches nothing.
+    const selfPeerId = this.libp2pNode.peerId?.toString();
+    let ownerDialsAttempted = 0;
+    let ownerDialsFailed = 0;
     for (const peer of seed.peers.filter(p => p.isOwner)) {
+      if (peer.multiaddrs.length === 0 || peer.peerId === selfPeerId) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      ownerDialsAttempted++;
       try {
-        if (peer.multiaddrs.length > 0) {
-          const addr = multiaddr(peer.multiaddrs[0]);
+        const addr = multiaddr(peer.multiaddrs[0]);
 
-          log('Dialing owner peer: %s', peer.peerId);
-          await this.libp2pNode.dial(addr);
-        }
+        log('Dialing owner peer: %s', peer.peerId);
+        await this.libp2pNode.dial(addr);
       } catch (error) {
+        ownerDialsFailed++;
         log('Failed to dial peer %s: %o', peer.peerId, error);
         // Continue - not all peers need to be reachable
       }
     }
 
-    log('Applied seed: %d peers added', peersAdded);
-    return { success: true, peersAdded };
+    log('Applied seed: %d peers added, %d/%d owner dial(s) failed',
+      peersAdded, ownerDialsFailed, ownerDialsAttempted);
+    return { success: true, peersAdded, ownerDialsAttempted, ownerDialsFailed };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Persist a signer that a pin/TOFU accepted into the node-local anchor, so a
+   * later seed from the same owner is anchored without re-supplying the invite
+   * or re-prompting. Only the policy decides this happens (`anchorAs` is unset
+   * when the key was already anchored, so a plain re-apply writes nothing) and
+   * `trust()` is idempotent, keeping the original provenance for a known key.
+   *
+   * Failure to PERSIST does not fail the seed: `trust()` reflects the key in the
+   * in-memory anchor synchronously, so this seed and the rest of the session are
+   * unaffected — only durability across a restart is lost, and that is logged.
+   *
+   * NOTE: anchoring a key can flip `CadrePeer` rows ALREADY present from
+   * unauthorized to authorized, which the write-driven membership-gate refresh
+   * (`ControlDatabase.mutateCadrePeer`) cannot see — no row was written. Every
+   * anchor mutation today rides seed application, and both seed paths refresh the
+   * gate explicitly afterwards (`CadreNode.applySeed`, `onSeedApplied`). If some
+   * future path anchors an owner OUTSIDE seed application, it owes the same
+   * `CadreNode.refreshMembershipGate()` — or the anchor needs its own hub.
+   */
+  private async anchorAcceptedSigner(signerKey: string, decision: SeedTrustDecision): Promise<void> {
+    if (!decision.anchorAs || !this.config.trustedOwners) {
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      await this.config.trustedOwners.trust(signerKey, decision.anchorAs);
+      log('Anchored seed signer %s as %s', signerKey, decision.anchorAs);
+    } catch (error) {
+      log('Failed to persist accepted seed signer into the trusted-owner anchor: %o', error);
+    }
   }
 
   /**
@@ -672,61 +831,86 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
 
   /**
    * Deliver a seed directly to a peer via the /sereus/seed/1.0.0 protocol.
+   *
+   * Sender hardening: the whole exchange — dial, write, ack read — is bounded by
+   * {@link seedDeliverTimeoutMs}, and the ack is capped at {@link MAX_SEED_SIZE}.
+   * The target is a NOT-YET-TRUSTED node the instigator chose to dial during
+   * onboarding, so an unbounded read here is strictly more exposed than the
+   * membership-gated receiver paths: without the bound a target that accepts the
+   * stream and never replies parks this call forever, and one that streams
+   * arbitrary bytes as a fake ack exhausts memory.
    */
   async deliverSeed(targetMultiaddr: string, seed: ControlNetworkSeed): Promise<SeedAckMessage> {
     if (!this.libp2pNode) {
       throw new Error('Service not initialized');
     }
-
+    // Capture the node so the closure below needs no non-null assertion.
+    const node = this.libp2pNode;
     const addr = multiaddr(targetMultiaddr);
 
     log('Delivering seed to: %s', targetMultiaddr);
 
-    // Dial the target and open a stream
-    const rawStream = await this.libp2pNode.dialProtocol(addr, SEED_PROTOCOL);
-    const stream = rawStream as unknown as ControlStream;
-
-    try {
-      // Send the seed message as one length-prefixed frame (shared writer).
-      const message: SeedMessage = {
-        partyId: seed.partyId,
-        peers: seed.peers,
-        signature: seed.signature,
-        signerKey: seed.signerKey,
-      };
-
-      writeFrame(stream, message);
-
-      // In libp2p v3.x, close() closes the write end only (signals EOF),
-      // while the read end remains open for receiving the ack.
-      await stream.close();
+    return await withDeadline(
+      this.seedDeliverTimeoutMs,
+      `Seed delivery to ${targetMultiaddr}`,
+      (signal) => this.sendSeed(node, addr, seed, signal),
+    );
+  }
 
-      // Read the acknowledgment (stream is AsyncIterable in libp2p 3.x)
-      const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-      for await (const chunk of stream) {
-        const bytes = chunk instanceof Uint8Array ? chunk : (chunk as { subarray(): Uint8Array }).subarray();
-        chunks.push(bytes);
-      }
+  /**
+   * Open one stream to the target, send the seed frame, half-close, and read the ack.
+   *
+   * `signal` is the deadline from {@link deliverSeed}: it goes to `dialProtocol` so
+   * a timeout during connect aborts the dial, and into {@link exchangeFrame} so a
+   * timeout after the stream is open resets it — releasing the otherwise unbounded
+   * ack-read.
+   *
+   * Deliberately NOT `runOnLimitedConnection`: a wake sets it because a wake is a
+   * tiny frame over a relay, whereas a seed is up to 1MB and this delivery path
+   * does not dial relay addresses today. Changing that is a separate decision.
+   */
+  private async sendSeed(
+    node: Libp2p,
+    addr: Multiaddr,
+    seed: ControlNetworkSeed,
+    signal: AbortSignal,
+  ): Promise<SeedAckMessage> {
+    const rawStream = await node.dialProtocol(addr, SEED_PROTOCOL, { signal });
 
-      const responseData = new Uint8Array(chunks.reduce((sum, c) => sum + c.length, 0));
-      let offset = 0;
-      for (const chunk of chunks) {
-        responseData.set(chunk, offset);
-        offset += chunk.length;
-      }
+    const message: SeedMessage = {
+      partyId: seed.partyId,
+      peers: seed.peers,
+      signature: seed.signature,
+      signerKey: seed.signerKey,
+    };
 
-      // Parse length-prefixed response
-      const responseBody = decodeLengthPrefixedFrame(responseData);
-      const responseJson = new TextDecoder().decode(responseBody);
-      const ack = JSON.parse(responseJson) as SeedAckMessage;
+    const ack = await exchangeFrame(
+      rawStream as unknown as ControlStream,
+      signal,
+      message,
+      (stream) => this.readSeedAck(stream),
+      'Seed delivery aborted by timeout',
+    );
 
-      log('Seed delivery response: accepted=%s', ack.accepted);
-      return ack;
+    log('Seed delivery response: accepted=%s', ack.accepted);
+    return ack;
+  }
 
-    } catch (err) {
-      stream.abort(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
-      throw err;
-    }
+  /**
+   * Read the ack frame a delivery target writes back, bounded by
+   * {@link seedDeliverTimeoutMs} and capped at {@link MAX_SEED_SIZE} — an
+   * untrusted target must not be able to stream unlimited bytes as a fake ack.
+   * Decoding runs inside {@link exchangeFrame}'s `try`, so a malformed or
+   * non-JSON ack resets the stream rather than leaking it.
+   */
+  private async readSeedAck(stream: ControlStream): Promise<SeedAckMessage> {
+    const data = await readStreamToEnd(stream, {
+      maxBytes: MAX_SEED_SIZE,
+      timeoutMs: this.seedDeliverTimeoutMs,
+      label: 'Seed ack',
+    });
+    const body = decodeLengthPrefixedFrame(data, MAX_SEED_SIZE);
+    return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(body)) as SeedAckMessage;
   }
 
   /**
@@ -781,6 +965,14 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
    * peer is an owner iff that derived key is in the `OwnerKey` set.
    * This makes any owner node markable — not just the local one — and ties
    * `isOwner` to the control table rather than to `peerId === self`.
+   *
+   * NOTE: this is the one owner lookup deliberately left on the REPLICATED
+   * table rather than the node-local anchor. `SeedPeer.isOwner` is a dial hint
+   * — the receiver dials owner-flagged peers first — not a trust decision, and
+   * the receiver re-derives real trust from its own anchor. So a polluted table
+   * costs at most a wasted dial, while anchoring here would silently drop
+   * legitimate co-owners this node never pinned. If `isOwner` ever gates
+   * anything the receiver TRUSTS, move it to the anchor.
    */
   private async queryPeers(): Promise<SeedPeer[]> {
     if (!this.controlDatabase) {
@@ -885,7 +1077,7 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
 
       // Emit appropriate event based on result
       if (result.success) {
-        this.eventCallbacks.onSeedApplied?.(seed.partyId, result.peersAdded);
+        this.eventCallbacks.onSeedApplied?.(seed.partyId, result.peersAdded, seed);
       } else {
         this.eventCallbacks.onSeedError?.(seed.partyId, result.error ?? 'Unknown error');
       }
@@ -997,11 +1189,19 @@ export class SeedBootstrapService {
       ownerAddrs = this.libp2pNode.getMultiaddrs().map(a => a.toString());
     }
 
-    // Carry the cadre's owner keys out-of-band so a cold-start invitee can
-    // pin the trusted owner set before applying any seed.
-    const ownerKeys = this.controlDatabase
-      ? Array.from(await this.controlDatabase.getOwnerKeys())
-      : [];
+    // Carry the cadre's owner keys out-of-band so a cold-start invitee can pin
+    // the trusted owner set before applying any seed.
+    //
+    // Sourced ONLY from this node's own anchor, never from the replicated
+    // OwnerKey table: the invitee anchors whatever arrives here
+    // (CadreNode.trustOwnerKeys with source 'invite'), so handing over the
+    // pollutable table would let a stranger's genesis-inserted key ride an
+    // otherwise-legitimate invite straight into the new node's anchor —
+    // poisoning the very store this whole trust chain rests on. No anchor wired
+    // (a directly-constructed service) means no pins to hand out: an invite
+    // without `ownerKeys` costs the invitee an extra out-of-band step, whereas a
+    // table-sourced one silently hands it an unanchored key.
+    const ownerKeys = Array.from(this.config.trustedOwners?.all() ?? []);
 
     const now = Date.now();
     const invite: CadreInvite = {