@serfab/cadre-core 0.7.1 → 0.8.1

package/dist/control-database.js

@@ -4,110 +4,10 @@ import { Database, registerPlugin } from '@quereus/quereus';
 import cryptoPlugin from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto/plugin';
 import optimysticPlugin from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-optimystic/plugin';
 import { digest, randomBytes } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
+import { CONTROL_SCHEMA } from './control-schema.js';
+import { canonicalDatetime } from './canonical-datetime.js';
 const log = debug('sereus:cadre:control-db');
 const timing = debug('sereus:cadre:timing');
-/**
- * Embedded control schema for cross-platform compatibility.
- * This schema is embedded directly in the code to work in React Native and other
- * environments where file system access is not available.
- */
-const CONTROL_SCHEMA = `-- This manages a Sereus party's cadre, or set of nodes, and their participation in strands (networks)
-declare schema CadreControl {
-    -- A key that can authorize various control changes
-    table AuthorityKey (
-        Key text primary key,
-        constraint Authorized check (
-            -- Bootstrap: first authority key needs no existing authorization
-            (select count(1) from AuthorityKey) <= 1
-
-                -- Old authority can authorize by signature and transaction stamp id (not repeatable)
-                or (old.Key is not null and old.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(context.StampId, 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, old.Key, 'ed25519'))
-
-                -- or other authorities can authorize by signature and transaction stamp id (not repeatable)
-                or exists (select 1 from AuthorityKey A where A.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(context.StampId, 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519'))
-        )
-    ) with context (AuthorityKey text null, Signature text null, StampId text);
-
-    -- A key that can validate a strand formation disclosure
-    table ValidationKey (
-        Key text primary key,
-        constraint Authorized check (
-            -- Authorities can authorize by signature and transaction stamp id (not repeatable)
-            exists (select 1 from AuthorityKey A where A.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(context.StampId, 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519'))
-        )
-    ) with context (AuthorityKey text, StampId text, Signature text);
-
-    -- A network of members sharing an sApp database, each contributing peer nodes (their cadre) to the overall cohort
-    -- Cadre peers should participate in each of these strands
-    table Strand (
-        Id text primary key,    -- UUID
-        MemberPrivateKey text null unique,   -- Our private key as a member of this strand
-        Type text, -- Types: 'o' = Open, 'c' = Closed -- Open can still control writes in the sApp, but only Closed controls reads
-        constraint Authorized check (
-            -- Authorized by authority signature and transaction stamp id (not repeatable)
-            exists (select 1 from AuthorityKey A where A.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(context.StampId, 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519'))
-
-                -- or authorized by a cadre peer who has received a valid formation invitation
-                or exists (select 1 from FormationUsage FU where FU.StrandId = new.Id)
-        ),
-        -- TODO: constraint to ensure member private key only if closed
-    ) with context (AuthorityKey text, StampId text, Signature text);
-
-    -- A peer (node) that is part of the cadre
-    table CadrePeer (
-        PeerId text primary key,
-        Multiaddr text,
-        constraint AuthorizedInsert check on insert, delete (
-            -- Authorized by an authority key
-            -- Use utf8 input encoding since peer IDs are base58btc strings, not base64url
-            exists (select 1 from AuthorityKey A where A.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(coalesce(new.PeerId, old.PeerId), 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519'))
-        ),
-        constraint AuthorizedUpdate check on update (
-            -- Peer can change its own multiaddr (using utf8 encoding for both values)
-            verify(digest(new.PeerId, 'sha256', 'utf8') || digest(new.Multiaddr, 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, new.PeerId, 'ed25519')
-                -- or authorized by an authority key
-                or exists (select 1 from AuthorityKey A where A.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(new.PeerId, 'sha256', 'utf8'), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519'))
-        )
-    ) with context (AuthorityKey text null, Signature text);
-
-    -- An open invitation to form a strand with this party
-    table FormationInvite (
-        Token text primary key, -- Just a random string
-        sAppId text, -- The app for the strand that will be formed
-        ExpiresAt datetime null,
-        TotalUses int null check (TotalUses >= 0),
-        ValidationUrl text null,   -- Web hook - send disclosure, IP address...
-        constraint AuthorizedAddOrRemove check on insert, delete (
-            -- Authorized by an authority key to add or remove this invite
-            exists (select 1 from AuthorityKey A where A.Key = context.AuthorityKey and verify(digest(context.StampId), context.Signature, A.Key))
-        )
-    ) with context (AuthorityKey text, StampId text, Signature text);
-
-    table FormationUsage (
-        Token text,
-        UseNumber int,
-        Disclosure text,
-        StrandId text,
-        primary key (Token, UseNumber),
-        constraint InsertOnly check on update, delete (false),
-        constraint Monotonic check (
-            new.UseNumber = coalesce((select max(UseNumber) from FormationUsage U where U.Token = new.Token), 0) + 1
-        ),
-        constraint Authorized check on insert (
-            -- Satisfies an invitation
-            exists (
-                select 1 from FormationInvite FI
-                    where FI.Token = new.Token
-                        and (FI.TotalUses is null or FI.TotalUses >= new.UseNumber)
-                        and (FI.ExpiresAt is null or FI.ExpiresAt > context.Now)
-                        and (FI.ValidationUrl is null or verify(digest(new.Token, new.Disclosure), context.ValidationSignature, context.ValidationKey))
-            )
-        ),
-        constraint StrandExists check (exists (select 1 from Strand S where S.Id = new.StrandId)),
-    ) with context (PeerId text, PeerSignature text, Now datetime, ValidationKey text null, ValidationSignature text null);
-}
-
-apply schema CadreControl;`;
 /**
  * Generate a unique stamp ID for transaction authorization.
  * Format: 32 bytes base64url encoded
@@ -115,8 +15,10 @@ apply schema CadreControl;`;
  * - Last 16 bytes: Random bytes (for collision resistance)
  */
 function generateStampId(peerId) {
-    // Hash the peer ID and get first 16 bytes (128 bits)
-    const peerIdHash = digest(peerId, 'sha256', 'utf8', 'bytes');
+    // Hash the peer ID and get first 16 bytes (128 bits). A purely local ID
+    // generator: never signed/verified against SQL, so the framed single-field
+    // digest is fine (the changed framing is not cross-checked anywhere).
+    const peerIdHash = digest([peerId], 'sha256', 'bytes');
     const peerIdHashPart = peerIdHash.slice(0, 16);
     // Generate 16 random bytes
     const randomPart = randomBytes(128, 'bytes');
@@ -127,6 +29,54 @@ function generateStampId(peerId) {
     // Convert to base64url
     return uint8ArrayToString(combined, 'base64url');
 }
+/**
+ * Parse a stored Quereus `datetime` value into epoch milliseconds.
+ *
+ * Quereus canonicalises a `datetime` column to a bare UTC `PlainDateTime` string
+ * (e.g. `2026-06-04T12:34:56`, no `Z`). JS `Date` reads a timezone-less
+ * date-time as LOCAL, so we append `Z` when no offset/zone is present to keep the
+ * value anchored to UTC. Numbers (already epoch ms) pass through.
+ */
+function parseStoredDatetimeMs(value) {
+    if (typeof value === 'number')
+        return value;
+    const hasZone = /[zZ]$|[+-]\d\d:?\d\d$/.test(value);
+    return new Date(hasZone ? value : `${value}Z`).getTime();
+}
+/**
+ * Build the canonical authorization message that authority signatures are bound to.
+ *
+ * The message is a SINGLE framed SHA-256 digest over the ordered tuple of fields (the
+ * crypto plugin's injective multi-field encoding), in a fixed field order, with the
+ * single-use StampId as the final field:
+ *
+ *   message = sha256(encodeFields([field_1, field_2, ..., StampId]))   // raw digest bytes
+ *
+ * ed25519 signs these raw digest bytes DIRECTLY (no second hash). The SQL constraints
+ * verify the identical bytes with one variadic call
+ * (`verify(digest(field_1, ..., StampId), context.Signature, A.Key, 'ed25519')`): SQL
+ * `digest(...)` returns the base64url string of the same digest, which `verify`'s default
+ * base64url input encoding decodes back to those raw bytes — so signer and verifier
+ * operate on the same bytes. Every field is TEXT on both sides (the SQL columns are
+ * `cast(... as text)` / `coalesce(...,'')`; the TS args are strings), so the per-field
+ * type tags agree. This binds the signature to the row contents (not a bare stamp),
+ * closing the captured-stamp replay / privilege-escalation hole. Single source of truth:
+ * every signed writer (and every test/harness signer) MUST build the message through this
+ * function in the schema's field order, or `verify` will reject the row.
+ */
+export function buildAuthorizationMessage(fields) {
+    return digest([...fields], 'sha256', 'bytes');
+}
+/** Runtime guard mirroring {@link ControlTable} for the dynamic-`from` count. */
+const CONTROL_TABLES = new Set([
+    'AuthorityKey',
+    'ValidationKey',
+    'Strand',
+    'CadrePeer',
+    'DeviceToken',
+    'FormationInvite',
+    'FormationUsage',
+]);
 /**
  * ControlDatabase manages the CadreControl schema using Quereus with Optimystic backend.
  * It provides typed query methods for accessing control network data.
@@ -177,6 +127,29 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         this.collectionFactory.registerLibp2pNode(networkName, this.config.libp2pNode, this.config.coordinatedRepo);
         timing('[controlDb] registerLibp2pNode: %dms', Math.round(performance.now() - t0));
         log('Registered libp2p node with collection factory');
+        // Network-back the control tables. CONTROL_SCHEMA's `declare schema CadreControl
+        // { table ... }` tables carry NO per-table `using optimystic(...)`, so storage is
+        // chosen by the database's DEFAULT vtab. Routing the default to optimystic (with
+        // the network transactor + this party's control network) is what makes a control
+        // write replicate peer-to-peer — exactly what connectToStrand does for strand
+        // tables (compose-strand.ts). Without these two calls the tables fall back to
+        // Quereus's in-memory vtab and never converge across the cadre.
+        this.db.setDefaultVtabName('optimystic');
+        this.db.setDefaultVtabArgs({
+            networkName,
+            transactor: 'network',
+            keyNetwork: 'libp2p',
+        });
+        log('Set default vtab to optimystic (networkName=%s, transactor=network)', networkName);
+        // Hydrate Quereus's catalog from any persisted optimystic vtab schemas BEFORE
+        // applying CONTROL_SCHEMA, so a warm restart with persistent storage diffs the
+        // control DDL against the already-present tables and re-emits nothing — the same
+        // warm-start regression connectToStrand's hydrate-before-apply guards against.
+        // No-op on a cold / in-memory start (`{ tables: 0, indexes: 0 }`).
+        t0 = performance.now();
+        const hydrated = await pluginResult.hydrate(this.db);
+        timing('[controlDb] hydrate: %dms (tables=%d, indexes=%d)', Math.round(performance.now() - t0), hydrated.tables, hydrated.indexes);
+        log('Hydrated control catalog (tables=%d, indexes=%d)', hydrated.tables, hydrated.indexes);
         // Load and execute the schema
         t0 = performance.now();
         await this.loadSchema();
@@ -193,13 +166,16 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             // Check if we're in a Node.js environment
             if (typeof process !== 'undefined' && process.versions?.node) {
                 try {
-                    // Use require to conditionally load fs only in Node.js
-                    // This won't be bundled by React Native's Metro bundler
+                    // Use require to conditionally load fs only in Node.js.
+                    // This won't be bundled by React Native's Metro bundler — a dynamic
+                    // import() would be statically picked up by Metro, so require is
+                    // intentional here (cross-platform constraint, not lazy CommonJS).
+                    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
                     const fs = require('fs/promises');
                     schemaContent = await fs.readFile(this.config.schemaPath, 'utf-8');
                 }
                 catch (error) {
-                    throw new Error(`Failed to load schema from ${this.config.schemaPath}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
+                    throw new Error(`Failed to load schema from ${this.config.schemaPath}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, { cause: error });
                 }
             }
             else {
@@ -230,6 +206,44 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         }
         return results;
     }
+    /**
+     * Read a single strand row by id, or null when absent. Single-row sibling of
+     * {@link queryStrands}; the responder uses it to read a host strand's
+     * `MemberPrivateKey` (the closed-strand read-gating secret) for delivery to a
+     * validated invitee during provision-then-record formation.
+     */
+    async queryStrand(strandId) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select Id, MemberPrivateKey, Type from CadreControl.Strand where Id = ?', [strandId])) {
+            return {
+                Id: row.Id,
+                MemberPrivateKey: row.MemberPrivateKey,
+                Type: row.Type,
+            };
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Count rows in a CadreControl table as seen by THIS database instance.
+     *
+     * `table` is validated against {@link CONTROL_TABLES} before it is interpolated
+     * into the `from` clause: the names are not user input, but the check keeps the
+     * dynamic query off the injection surface and fails loudly on a typo instead of
+     * emitting a malformed statement. The count reflects only the rows this node's
+     * control DB has converged on — in the integration harness that is the authority
+     * node (one ControlDatabase per party), i.e. the authoritative control-network
+     * view, not a per-drone convergence guarantee.
+     */
+    async countRows(table) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        if (!CONTROL_TABLES.has(table)) {
+            throw new Error(`Unknown CadreControl table: ${table}`);
+        }
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval(`select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.${table}`)) {
+            return row.Count ?? 0;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
     /**
      * Get the underlying database for advanced queries
      */
@@ -237,48 +251,447 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         return this.db;
     }
+    /**
+     * Check whether any authority key exists in the control database.
+     * Used to decide whether a fresh-party genesis insert is required.
+     */
+    async hasAuthorityKey() {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.AuthorityKey')) {
+            return row.Count > 0;
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Idempotent genesis: insert `key` as the founding authority key only when
+     * the party has none yet. Returns true if it inserted, false if an authority
+     * key already existed (so a repeat `--authority` start is a no-op).
+     */
+    async ensureAuthorityKey(key) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        if (await this.hasAuthorityKey()) {
+            log('Authority key already present; skipping genesis insert');
+            return false;
+        }
+        await this.insertAuthorityKey(key);
+        return true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Collect every authority key (`CadreControl.AuthorityKey.Key`) as a set.
+     *
+     * This is the steady-state trust anchor for seeds: a seed's signer key is
+     * trusted only if it is already enrolled here (see `SeedTrustPolicy`). It is
+     * also the authority-identity source for `queryPeers`, decoupling authority
+     * status from the libp2p transport peer ID.
+     */
+    async getAuthorityKeys() {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const keys = new Set();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select Key from CadreControl.AuthorityKey')) {
+            keys.add(row.Key);
+        }
+        return keys;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Enumerate the CadrePeer rows (cadre membership) for admin/membership reads.
+     */
+    async queryCadrePeers() {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const rows = [];
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, Multiaddr from CadreControl.CadrePeer')) {
+            rows.push({
+                peerId: row.PeerId,
+                multiaddr: row.Multiaddr ?? null,
+            });
+        }
+        return rows;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId.
+     *
+     * Returns null when no row exists. Missing/legacy column values are coalesced
+     * to their empty form (`''` key/sig, `[]` addrs, `0` stamp) so the caller's
+     * verify/freshness gates uniformly reject an unpublished or malformed row.
+     * The split `addrs` re-join to the exact stored `Multiaddr` (split-on-`,` is
+     * the inverse of join-on-`,`), so the resolver re-verifies over the same bytes
+     * the publisher signed.
+     */
+    async queryPeerRecord(peerId) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig from CadreControl.CadrePeer where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
+            const multiaddr = row.Multiaddr ?? '';
+            return {
+                peerId: row.PeerId,
+                publicKey: row.PublicKey ?? '',
+                addrs: multiaddr.length > 0 ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
+                updatedAt: row.UpdatedAt ?? 0,
+                sig: row.Sig ?? '',
+            };
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Apply a peer's own self-signed address-record update to an existing row.
+     *
+     * Authorization is carried entirely by the record: the `Sig` column (verified
+     * by the `AuthorizedUpdate` self-branch against the stored `PublicKey`) plus
+     * the strictly-increasing `UpdatedAt`. No authority key is involved, so this
+     * is the refresh path for any member — authority or drone — once its row
+     * exists. `PublicKey` is intentionally not in the SET list (it is immutable on
+     * self-update and the constraint enforces `new.PublicKey = old.PublicKey`).
+     */
+    async updateSelfPeerRecord(record) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const multiaddr = record.addrs.join(',');
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+        with context AuthorityKey = null, Signature = ?
+        set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Sig = ?
+        where PeerId = ?
+    `, [record.sig, multiaddr, record.updatedAt, record.sig, record.peerId]);
+        log('Self peer record updated: %s (updatedAt=%d)', record.peerId, record.updatedAt);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Read a single peer's device push token (the full `DeviceToken` row) by PeerId.
+     *
+     * Returns null when no row exists. Missing/legacy column values are coalesced to
+     * their empty form (`''` token/sig, `0` stamp) so the caller's verify/freshness
+     * gates uniformly reject an unpublished or malformed row. `platform` is returned
+     * verbatim (the resolver validates it against {@link PushPlatform} and re-verifies
+     * the self-signature, which covers the platform field).
+     */
+    async queryDeviceToken(peerId) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select PeerId, Platform, Token, UpdatedAt, Sig from CadreControl.DeviceToken where PeerId = ?', [peerId])) {
+            return {
+                peerId: row.PeerId,
+                platform: (row.Platform ?? ''),
+                token: row.Token ?? '',
+                updatedAt: row.UpdatedAt ?? 0,
+                sig: row.Sig ?? '',
+            };
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Apply a peer's own self-signed device-token update to an existing row.
+     *
+     * Authorization is carried entirely by the record: the `Sig` column (verified by
+     * the `DeviceToken.AuthorizedUpdate` self-branch against the stored
+     * `CadrePeer.PublicKey`) plus the strictly-increasing `UpdatedAt`. No authority key
+     * is involved, so this is the refresh / rotation path for any member once both its
+     * `CadrePeer` row (for the PublicKey) and its `DeviceToken` row exist. `PeerId` is
+     * intentionally not in the SET list (immutable; the constraint enforces
+     * `new.PeerId = old.PeerId`). Mirrors {@link updateSelfPeerRecord}.
+     */
+    async updateSelfDeviceToken(record) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      update CadreControl.DeviceToken
+        with context AuthorityKey = null, Signature = ?
+        set Platform = ?, Token = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Sig = ?
+        where PeerId = ?
+    `, [record.sig, record.platform, record.token, record.updatedAt, record.sig, record.peerId]);
+        log('Self device token updated: %s (platform=%s, updatedAt=%d)', record.peerId, record.platform, record.updatedAt);
+    }
     /**
      * Insert the initial authority key (bootstrap - no existing authorities required)
      */
     async insertAuthorityKey(key) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         log('Inserting authority key: %s', key);
-        // For bootstrap, context values are not verified since no existing authorities
-        // Use fully qualified table name since schema is CadreControl
-        // StampId() provides the transaction's unique stamp from the optimystic transaction
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.AuthorityKey (Key)
-        with context AuthorityKey = null, Signature = null, StampId = StampId()
-        values (?)
-    `, [key]);
+        // Bootstrap is authorized by the schema's `(select count(1) from AuthorityKey) <= 1`
+        // branch, so no signature is needed. We still persist a fresh, unique StampId in the
+        // row's own column to satisfy the not-null/unique anti-replay constraint — the StampId
+        // is now a real column value, not the optimystic `StampId()` SQL function.
+        const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.AuthorityKey (Key, StampId)
+        with context AuthorityKey = null, Signature = null
+        values (?, ?)
+    `, [key, stampId]);
         log('Authority key inserted');
     }
     /**
-     * Insert a strand into the control database using authority signature.
-     * This starts a transaction, gets the StampId, signs it, and inserts the strand.
+     * Insert a strand into the control database using an authority signature.
+     *
+     * The authority signs the canonical row-bound authorization message (see
+     * {@link buildAuthorizationMessage}) — NOT a bare stamp — so the signature is bound to
+     * this strand's contents and cannot be transplanted onto an attacker-chosen row. The
+     * StampId is persisted as a unique column for single-use anti-replay.
      *
      * @param strandId - Unique identifier for the strand
      * @param type - Strand type: 'o' for open, 'c' for closed
      * @param authorityKey - Public key of the authorizing authority
-     * @param signStampId - Function to sign the stamp ID with the authority's private key
+     * @param signMessage - Function that ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash)
+     *   with the authority's private key, returning a base64url signature
      * @param memberPrivateKey - Optional private key for membership in closed strands
      */
-    async insertStrand(strandId, type, authorityKey, signStampId, memberPrivateKey) {
+    async insertStrand(strandId, type, authorityKey, signMessage, memberPrivateKey) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         log('Inserting strand: %s (type: %s)', strandId, type);
         // Generate a unique stamp ID using the peer ID for distributed uniqueness
         const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
         const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
-        // Sign the stamp ID with the authority key
-        const signature = signStampId(stampId);
-        // Insert with the signed stamp ID
-        await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey)
-        with context AuthorityKey = ?, Signature = ?, StampId = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?)
-    `, [authorityKey, signature, stampId, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null]);
+        // Field order MUST match the schema's Strand `Authorized` verify:
+        // Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey ('' when null), StampId.
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage([strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? '', stampId]);
+        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        // StampId is a real, unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
+        with context AuthorityKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [authorityKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId]);
         log('Strand inserted: %s', strandId);
     }
+    /**
+     * Insert a validation key into the control database using an authority signature.
+     *
+     * Mirrors {@link insertStrand}: the authority signs the canonical row-bound
+     * authorization message over (Key, StampId), and the StampId is persisted as a unique
+     * column for single-use anti-replay. A `ValidationKey` authorizes verifying strand
+     * formation disclosures.
+     *
+     * @param key - The validation public key to enroll
+     * @param authorityKey - Public key of the authorizing authority
+     * @param signMessage - Function that ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash)
+     *   with the authority's private key, returning a base64url signature
+     */
+    async insertValidationKey(key, authorityKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        log('Inserting validation key: %s', key);
+        const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
+        const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
+        // Field order MUST match the schema's ValidationKey `Authorized` verify: Key, StampId.
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage([key, stampId]);
+        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.ValidationKey (Key, StampId)
+        with context AuthorityKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?)
+    `, [authorityKey, signature, key, stampId]);
+        log('Validation key inserted: %s', key);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Insert an authority-signed `FormationInvite` (open invitation token).
+     *
+     * The invite is the on-network record that later authorizes an
+     * authority-signature-FREE `Strand` creation: an invited cadre peer redeems it
+     * by inserting a matching `FormationUsage` row (see {@link redeemInvitation}),
+     * which satisfies the consent branch of `Strand.Authorized`.
+     *
+     * Like {@link insertStrand}/{@link insertValidationKey}, the authority signs the
+     * canonical row-bound authorization message (see {@link buildAuthorizationMessage})
+     * over (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId) — NOT a
+     * bare stamp — so the signature is bound to this invite's contents and cannot be
+     * transplanted onto an attacker-chosen row. The StampId is persisted as a unique
+     * column for single-use anti-replay. `FormationInvite.AuthorizedAddOrRemove` gates
+     * both insert and delete; its `coalesce(new, old)` verify binds the NEW row on
+     * insert and the OLD row on delete.
+     *
+     * `StrandId` binds the invite to a pre-existing host strand (provision-then-record):
+     * when set, a responder redeeming this token records a `FormationUsage` against that
+     * strand and returns it (see {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand}); a
+     * null `StrandId` (the default) leaves the legacy responder-provisions path in place.
+     * Like ValidationUrl it is a nullable bound field, signed as `''` when absent.
+     *
+     * The ExpiresAt and TotalUses message fields must byte-match what the (auto-deferred,
+     * because it has a subquery) CHECK sees AFTER column coercion: TotalUses becomes a
+     * decimal string (`String(totalUses)` ⇔ `cast(new.TotalUses as text)`) and ExpiresAt
+     * becomes the engine's canonical `PlainDateTime` string — sourced here from
+     * {@link canonicalDatetime} (a `select datetime(?)` round-trip) rather than a hand-rolled
+     * ISO formatter, so signer and verifier agree exactly. A null ExpiresAt / TotalUses /
+     * ValidationUrl signs as `''`, matching the schema's `coalesce(..., '')`.
+     *
+     * @param token - Invitation token (the `FormationInvite` primary key)
+     * @param sAppId - The sApp a redeemed strand will use
+     * @param authorityKey - Public key of the authorizing authority
+     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash),
+     *   returning a base64url signature — the same callback shape {@link insertStrand} uses
+     * @param options - Optional `expiresAtMs` (epoch ms), `totalUses`, `validationUrl`,
+     *   `strandId` (bind to a pre-existing host strand for provision-then-record)
+     */
+    async insertFormationInvite(token, sAppId, authorityKey, signMessage, options = {}) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        log('Inserting formation invite: %s', token);
+        const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
+        // Build each bound field exactly as the deferred CHECK sees it post-coercion:
+        //   - ExpiresAt: engine-canonical datetime string (or '' when absent), sourced from
+        //     the engine so it byte-matches the column's stored/coerced form.
+        //   - TotalUses: decimal string via String(...) (⇔ cast(new.TotalUses as text)), '' when absent.
+        //   - ValidationUrl: the url or '' when absent.
+        //   - StrandId: the host strand id or '' when absent (text column, no coercion).
+        const expiresAtCanonical = options.expiresAtMs == null
+            ? null
+            : await canonicalDatetime(this.db, options.expiresAtMs);
+        const expiresAtField = expiresAtCanonical ?? '';
+        const totalUsesField = options.totalUses == null ? '' : String(options.totalUses);
+        const validationUrlField = options.validationUrl ?? '';
+        const strandIdField = options.strandId ?? '';
+        // Field order MUST match the schema's FormationInvite `AuthorizedAddOrRemove` verify:
+        // Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId.
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage([
+            token, sAppId, expiresAtField, totalUsesField, validationUrlField, strandIdField, stampId,
+        ]);
+        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        // Persist the canonical ExpiresAt string (datetime parse is idempotent on it) so the
+        // signed source-of-truth and the stored value are produced once. StampId is a real,
+        // unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
+        with context AuthorityKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [
+            authorityKey, signature,
+            token, sAppId,
+            expiresAtCanonical,
+            options.totalUses ?? null,
+            options.validationUrl ?? null,
+            options.strandId ?? null,
+            stampId,
+        ]);
+        log('Formation invite inserted: %s', token);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Redeem a `FormationInvite` by inserting the `Strand` row and a matching
+     * `FormationUsage` row **atomically, in one transaction**.
+     *
+     * The two CHECK constraints are mutually circular under immediate evaluation:
+     * `Strand.Authorized`'s consent branch requires the `FormationUsage` row, while
+     * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` requires the `Strand` row. Both CHECKs contain
+     * subqueries, so Quereus auto-defers them to transaction commit — wrapping both
+     * inserts in a single explicit `begin … commit` lets both deferred CHECKs see
+     * both rows at commit. The strand is authorised WITHOUT an authority signature
+     * (the `FormationUsage` branch of `Strand.Authorized`) but still gets a fresh,
+     * unique `StampId` column to satisfy the not-null/unique anti-replay column.
+     *
+     * `UseNumber` is computed as `max(UseNumber)+1` for the token (the `Monotonic`
+     * constraint); callers redeeming concurrently against the same token must
+     * serialise, since the next use number is read before the insert.
+     */
+    async redeemInvitation(params) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const { token, strandId, type = 'o', memberPrivateKey, disclosure = '', peerId, peerSignature, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, } = params;
+        log('Redeeming invitation %s -> strand %s', token, strandId);
+        const localPeerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
+        const strandStampId = generateStampId(localPeerId);
+        const useNumber = await this.nextUseNumber(token);
+        await this.db.beginTransaction();
+        try {
+            // 1. Strand row — authorised by the FormationUsage branch (no authority sig),
+            //    still carrying a fresh unique StampId for the anti-replay column.
+            await this.db.exec(`
+        insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
+          with context AuthorityKey = null, Signature = null
+          values (?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `, [strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, strandStampId]);
+            // 2. FormationUsage row — authorised by the matching FormationInvite.
+            await this.execFormationUsageInsert({
+                token, useNumber, disclosure, strandId,
+                peerId: peerId ?? localPeerId, peerSignature: peerSignature ?? null, nowMs: nowMs ?? Date.now(),
+                validationKey: validationKey ?? null, validationSignature: validationSignature ?? null,
+            });
+            await this.db.commit();
+            log('Redeemed invitation %s -> strand %s (use #%d)', token, strandId, useNumber);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            // A failed commit() already tears down the transaction, so rollback() would
+            // throw "No transaction active" and mask the real cause — swallow only that.
+            try {
+                await this.db.rollback();
+            }
+            catch (rollbackError) {
+                log('Rollback after redemption failure was a no-op: %s', rollbackError);
+            }
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Record a `FormationUsage` against an **already-existing** `Strand` (no strand
+     * insert). This is the redemption path when the strand was provisioned
+     * separately (e.g. authority-signed) and the consent record is added after the
+     * fact: the single insert auto-commits, and the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK
+     * is satisfied by the pre-existing committed strand row. Returns the assigned
+     * `UseNumber`.
+     *
+     * Use {@link redeemInvitation} instead when the strand must be created by
+     * consent atomically with the usage.
+     */
+    async recordFormationUsage(params) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const { token, strandId, disclosure = '', peerId, peerSignature, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, } = params;
+        const localPeerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
+        const useNumber = await this.nextUseNumber(token);
+        await this.execFormationUsageInsert({
+            token, useNumber, disclosure, strandId,
+            peerId: peerId ?? localPeerId, peerSignature: peerSignature ?? null, nowMs: nowMs ?? Date.now(),
+            validationKey: validationKey ?? null, validationSignature: validationSignature ?? null,
+        });
+        log('Recorded formation usage: token=%s strand=%s (use #%d)', token, strandId, useNumber);
+        return useNumber;
+    }
+    /** Parameterised `FormationUsage` insert shared by redeem + record paths. */
+    async execFormationUsageInsert(opts) {
+        // Derive `context.Now` through the same `canonicalDatetime` transform that
+        // produced the stored `ExpiresAt`, so the deferred CHECK's `FI.ExpiresAt >
+        // context.Now` compares two byte-identical engine-`datetime` strings. The
+        // previous `new Date(nowMs).toISOString()` form differed only by a trailing
+        // `.000Z` (the engine `datetime()` separator is `T`, not a space), which never
+        // flipped the strict `>` against a second-granular `ExpiresAt` — so this is a
+        // robustness/consistency change, matching the strand layer's `consumeInvite`,
+        // not a fix for an observable mis-ordering.
+        const nowCanonical = await canonicalDatetime(this.db, opts.nowMs);
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.FormationUsage (Token, UseNumber, Disclosure, StrandId)
+        with context PeerId = ?, PeerSignature = ?, Now = ?, ValidationKey = ?, ValidationSignature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [
+            opts.peerId, opts.peerSignature, nowCanonical,
+            opts.validationKey, opts.validationSignature,
+            opts.token, opts.useNumber, opts.disclosure, opts.strandId,
+        ]);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Read a `FormationInvite` row by token, or null when absent. `expiresAtMs` is
+     * the parsed epoch-ms of the stored `datetime` (null when the invite never
+     * expires); the caller compares it against the wall clock for freshness.
+     */
+    async queryFormationInvite(token) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId from CadreControl.FormationInvite where Token = ?', [token])) {
+            const expiresAt = row.ExpiresAt;
+            const expiresAtMs = expiresAt === null || expiresAt === undefined
+                ? null
+                : parseStoredDatetimeMs(expiresAt);
+            return {
+                token: row.Token,
+                sAppId: row.sAppId,
+                expiresAtMs: expiresAtMs !== null && Number.isNaN(expiresAtMs) ? null : expiresAtMs,
+                totalUses: row.TotalUses ?? null,
+                validationUrl: row.ValidationUrl ?? null,
+                strandId: row.StrandId ?? null,
+            };
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Count `FormationUsage` rows recorded against a token (uses consumed so far).
+     */
+    async countFormationUsage(token) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.FormationUsage where Token = ?', [token])) {
+            return row.Count ?? 0;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /** Next `UseNumber` for a token = max(existing)+1, per the `Monotonic` constraint. */
+    async nextUseNumber(token) {
+        for await (const row of this.db.eval('select coalesce(max(UseNumber), 0) as MaxUse from CadreControl.FormationUsage where Token = ?', [token])) {
+            return row.MaxUse + 1;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
     /**
      * Close the database and cleanup resources
      */
@@ -288,7 +701,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             this.collectionFactory = null;
         }
         if (this.db) {
-            this.db.close();
+            void this.db.close();
             this.db = null;
         }
         this.initialized = false;