@sendoracloud/sdk-react-native 0.12.0 → 0.14.0

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -235,21 +235,41 @@ var Auth = class {
       this.resolveReady = res;
     });
   }
-  /** Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK
-   *  during init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the
-   *  internal ready promise as resolved so queued auth calls
-   *  unblock. */
+  /**
+   * Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK during
+   * init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the internal ready
+   * promise as resolved so queued auth calls unblock.
+   *
+   * s58.47 — restore the user even when the cached ACCESS token is
+   * missing/expired, as long as USER_KEY + REFRESH_KEY are present.
+   * Pre-s58.47 this required BOTH USER_KEY and TOKEN_KEY, which
+   * caused a cold-start regression: if the access token rotated out
+   * of storage (TTL elapsed, app killed between persists, partial
+   * write, AsyncStorage eviction) the user appeared signed out even
+   * though their refresh chain was still alive in storage. Hosts
+   * then called `signInAnonymously()` on every launch and minted a
+   * fresh anon user, fragmenting analytics across sessions
+   * (Pulse News symptom). With the refresh token present, the next
+   * `getAccessToken()` call will silently refresh + restore a valid
+   * access token without disturbing identity.
+   */
   hydrate() {
     const cachedUser = this.hooks.storage.get(USER_KEY);
     const cachedToken = this.hooks.storage.get(TOKEN_KEY);
+    const cachedRefresh = this.hooks.storage.get(REFRESH_KEY);
     const cachedExpires = this.hooks.storage.get(TOKEN_EXPIRES_KEY);
-    if (cachedUser && cachedToken) {
+    if (cachedUser && (cachedToken || cachedRefresh)) {
       try {
         const parsed = JSON.parse(cachedUser);
         if (typeof parsed.id !== "string" || parsed.id.length === 0) throw new Error("invalid cache");
         this.user = parsed;
-        this.accessToken = cachedToken;
-        this.accessExpiresAt = cachedExpires ? Number(cachedExpires) : 0;
+        if (cachedToken) {
+          this.accessToken = cachedToken;
+          this.accessExpiresAt = cachedExpires ? Number(cachedExpires) : 0;
+        } else {
+          this.accessToken = null;
+          this.accessExpiresAt = 0;
+        }
         this.hooks.onIdentityChange(this.user.id);
       } catch {
         this.hooks.storage.remove(USER_KEY);
@@ -719,6 +739,20 @@ var Auth = class {
     this.inflight = next.catch(() => void 0);
     return next;
   }
+  /**
+   * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+   * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+   * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+   * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+   *
+   * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+   * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+   * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+   * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+   * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+   * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+   * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+   */
   async refreshAccessToken() {
     if (this.refreshInflight) return this.refreshInflight;
     const refresh = this.hooks.storage.get(REFRESH_KEY);
@@ -727,14 +761,18 @@ var Auth = class {
       try {
         const data = await this.callAuth("/api/v1/auth-service/token/refresh", {
           refreshToken: refresh
-        }).catch(() => null);
-        if (!data) return null;
+        });
         this.accessToken = data.tokens.accessToken;
         this.accessExpiresAt = Date.now() + data.tokens.expiresIn * 1e3;
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_KEY, data.tokens.accessToken);
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_EXPIRES_KEY, String(this.accessExpiresAt));
         this.hooks.storage.set(REFRESH_KEY, data.tokens.refreshToken);
         return data.tokens.accessToken;
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof AuthError && isDeadRefreshError(err.code)) {
+          await this.wipeLocalIdentity().catch(() => void 0);
+        }
+        return null;
       } finally {
         this.refreshInflight = null;
       }
@@ -785,6 +823,10 @@ var Auth = class {
     await this.hooks.onAnonymousWipe();
   }
 };
+function isDeadRefreshError(code) {
+  if (!code) return false;
+  return code === "INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN" || code === "HTTP_401" || code === "UNAUTHORIZED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT";
+}
 function decodeJwtPayload(token) {
   try {
     const parts = token.split(".");

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -122,10 +122,24 @@ declare class Auth {
     private readyPromise;
     private resolveReady;
     constructor(hooks: AuthHooks);
-    /** Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK
-     *  during init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the
-     *  internal ready promise as resolved so queued auth calls
-     *  unblock. */
+    /**
+     * Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK during
+     * init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the internal ready
+     * promise as resolved so queued auth calls unblock.
+     *
+     * s58.47 — restore the user even when the cached ACCESS token is
+     * missing/expired, as long as USER_KEY + REFRESH_KEY are present.
+     * Pre-s58.47 this required BOTH USER_KEY and TOKEN_KEY, which
+     * caused a cold-start regression: if the access token rotated out
+     * of storage (TTL elapsed, app killed between persists, partial
+     * write, AsyncStorage eviction) the user appeared signed out even
+     * though their refresh chain was still alive in storage. Hosts
+     * then called `signInAnonymously()` on every launch and minted a
+     * fresh anon user, fragmenting analytics across sessions
+     * (Pulse News symptom). With the refresh token present, the next
+     * `getAccessToken()` call will silently refresh + restore a valid
+     * access token without disturbing identity.
+     */
     hydrate(): void;
     getCurrentUser(): AuthUser | null;
     /**
@@ -270,6 +284,20 @@ declare class Auth {
      */
     signOut(): Promise<void>;
     private serialize;
+    /**
+     * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+     * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+     * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+     * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+     *
+     * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+     * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+     * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+     * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+     * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+     * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+     * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+     */
     private refreshAccessToken;
     private callAuth;
     private persist;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -122,10 +122,24 @@ declare class Auth {
     private readyPromise;
     private resolveReady;
     constructor(hooks: AuthHooks);
-    /** Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK
-     *  during init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the
-     *  internal ready promise as resolved so queued auth calls
-     *  unblock. */
+    /**
+     * Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK during
+     * init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the internal ready
+     * promise as resolved so queued auth calls unblock.
+     *
+     * s58.47 — restore the user even when the cached ACCESS token is
+     * missing/expired, as long as USER_KEY + REFRESH_KEY are present.
+     * Pre-s58.47 this required BOTH USER_KEY and TOKEN_KEY, which
+     * caused a cold-start regression: if the access token rotated out
+     * of storage (TTL elapsed, app killed between persists, partial
+     * write, AsyncStorage eviction) the user appeared signed out even
+     * though their refresh chain was still alive in storage. Hosts
+     * then called `signInAnonymously()` on every launch and minted a
+     * fresh anon user, fragmenting analytics across sessions
+     * (Pulse News symptom). With the refresh token present, the next
+     * `getAccessToken()` call will silently refresh + restore a valid
+     * access token without disturbing identity.
+     */
     hydrate(): void;
     getCurrentUser(): AuthUser | null;
     /**
@@ -270,6 +284,20 @@ declare class Auth {
      */
     signOut(): Promise<void>;
     private serialize;
+    /**
+     * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+     * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+     * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+     * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+     *
+     * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+     * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+     * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+     * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+     * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+     * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+     * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+     */
     private refreshAccessToken;
     private callAuth;
     private persist;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -195,21 +195,41 @@ var Auth = class {
       this.resolveReady = res;
     });
   }
-  /** Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK
-   *  during init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the
-   *  internal ready promise as resolved so queued auth calls
-   *  unblock. */
+  /**
+   * Re-hydrate session from storage. Called by the parent SDK during
+   * init() after Storage.hydrate() has run. Marks the internal ready
+   * promise as resolved so queued auth calls unblock.
+   *
+   * s58.47 — restore the user even when the cached ACCESS token is
+   * missing/expired, as long as USER_KEY + REFRESH_KEY are present.
+   * Pre-s58.47 this required BOTH USER_KEY and TOKEN_KEY, which
+   * caused a cold-start regression: if the access token rotated out
+   * of storage (TTL elapsed, app killed between persists, partial
+   * write, AsyncStorage eviction) the user appeared signed out even
+   * though their refresh chain was still alive in storage. Hosts
+   * then called `signInAnonymously()` on every launch and minted a
+   * fresh anon user, fragmenting analytics across sessions
+   * (Pulse News symptom). With the refresh token present, the next
+   * `getAccessToken()` call will silently refresh + restore a valid
+   * access token without disturbing identity.
+   */
   hydrate() {
     const cachedUser = this.hooks.storage.get(USER_KEY);
     const cachedToken = this.hooks.storage.get(TOKEN_KEY);
+    const cachedRefresh = this.hooks.storage.get(REFRESH_KEY);
     const cachedExpires = this.hooks.storage.get(TOKEN_EXPIRES_KEY);
-    if (cachedUser && cachedToken) {
+    if (cachedUser && (cachedToken || cachedRefresh)) {
       try {
         const parsed = JSON.parse(cachedUser);
         if (typeof parsed.id !== "string" || parsed.id.length === 0) throw new Error("invalid cache");
         this.user = parsed;
-        this.accessToken = cachedToken;
-        this.accessExpiresAt = cachedExpires ? Number(cachedExpires) : 0;
+        if (cachedToken) {
+          this.accessToken = cachedToken;
+          this.accessExpiresAt = cachedExpires ? Number(cachedExpires) : 0;
+        } else {
+          this.accessToken = null;
+          this.accessExpiresAt = 0;
+        }
         this.hooks.onIdentityChange(this.user.id);
       } catch {
         this.hooks.storage.remove(USER_KEY);
@@ -679,6 +699,20 @@ var Auth = class {
     this.inflight = next.catch(() => void 0);
     return next;
   }
+  /**
+   * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+   * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+   * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+   * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+   *
+   * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+   * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+   * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+   * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+   * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+   * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+   * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+   */
   async refreshAccessToken() {
     if (this.refreshInflight) return this.refreshInflight;
     const refresh = this.hooks.storage.get(REFRESH_KEY);
@@ -687,14 +721,18 @@ var Auth = class {
       try {
         const data = await this.callAuth("/api/v1/auth-service/token/refresh", {
           refreshToken: refresh
-        }).catch(() => null);
-        if (!data) return null;
+        });
         this.accessToken = data.tokens.accessToken;
         this.accessExpiresAt = Date.now() + data.tokens.expiresIn * 1e3;
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_KEY, data.tokens.accessToken);
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_EXPIRES_KEY, String(this.accessExpiresAt));
         this.hooks.storage.set(REFRESH_KEY, data.tokens.refreshToken);
         return data.tokens.accessToken;
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof AuthError && isDeadRefreshError(err.code)) {
+          await this.wipeLocalIdentity().catch(() => void 0);
+        }
+        return null;
       } finally {
         this.refreshInflight = null;
       }
@@ -745,6 +783,10 @@ var Auth = class {
     await this.hooks.onAnonymousWipe();
   }
 };
+function isDeadRefreshError(code) {
+  if (!code) return false;
+  return code === "INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN" || code === "HTTP_401" || code === "UNAUTHORIZED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT";
+}
 function decodeJwtPayload(token) {
   try {
     const parts = token.split(".");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sendoracloud/sdk-react-native",
-  "version": "0.12.0",
+  "version": "0.14.0",
   "description": "Sendora Cloud React Native + Expo SDK — analytics, identity, push-token registration, auth. Expo Go compatible, no native modules beyond AsyncStorage.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.cjs",