@sendoracloud/sdk-react-native 0.12.0 → 0.13.0

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -719,6 +719,20 @@ var Auth = class {
     this.inflight = next.catch(() => void 0);
     return next;
   }
+  /**
+   * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+   * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+   * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+   * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+   *
+   * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+   * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+   * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+   * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+   * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+   * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+   * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+   */
   async refreshAccessToken() {
     if (this.refreshInflight) return this.refreshInflight;
     const refresh = this.hooks.storage.get(REFRESH_KEY);
@@ -727,14 +741,18 @@ var Auth = class {
       try {
         const data = await this.callAuth("/api/v1/auth-service/token/refresh", {
           refreshToken: refresh
-        }).catch(() => null);
-        if (!data) return null;
+        });
         this.accessToken = data.tokens.accessToken;
         this.accessExpiresAt = Date.now() + data.tokens.expiresIn * 1e3;
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_KEY, data.tokens.accessToken);
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_EXPIRES_KEY, String(this.accessExpiresAt));
         this.hooks.storage.set(REFRESH_KEY, data.tokens.refreshToken);
         return data.tokens.accessToken;
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof AuthError && isDeadRefreshError(err.code)) {
+          await this.wipeLocalIdentity().catch(() => void 0);
+        }
+        return null;
       } finally {
         this.refreshInflight = null;
       }
@@ -785,6 +803,10 @@ var Auth = class {
     await this.hooks.onAnonymousWipe();
   }
 };
+function isDeadRefreshError(code) {
+  if (!code) return false;
+  return code === "INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN" || code === "HTTP_401" || code === "UNAUTHORIZED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT";
+}
 function decodeJwtPayload(token) {
   try {
     const parts = token.split(".");

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -270,6 +270,20 @@ declare class Auth {
      */
     signOut(): Promise<void>;
     private serialize;
+    /**
+     * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+     * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+     * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+     * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+     *
+     * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+     * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+     * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+     * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+     * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+     * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+     * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+     */
     private refreshAccessToken;
     private callAuth;
     private persist;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -270,6 +270,20 @@ declare class Auth {
      */
     signOut(): Promise<void>;
     private serialize;
+    /**
+     * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+     * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+     * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+     * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+     *
+     * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+     * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+     * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+     * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+     * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+     * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+     * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+     */
     private refreshAccessToken;
     private callAuth;
     private persist;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -679,6 +679,20 @@ var Auth = class {
     this.inflight = next.catch(() => void 0);
     return next;
   }
+  /**
+   * Hot-path token refresh. Single-flight via `refreshInflight` so a
+   * UI batch firing 10 simultaneous reads never produces 10 /refresh
+   * round-trips. Returns null on any failure so callers can decide
+   * whether to surface a sign-in prompt or proceed anonymously.
+   *
+   * s58.46 — on a `INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN` (new backend error code) or
+   * HTTP 401 we WIPE the stored refresh token. Pre-s58.46 we caught
+   * the error and returned null but kept the stored token intact, so
+   * the very next caller would re-attempt the same dead token in an
+   * infinite loop (Pulse News iOS hammered /refresh ~1×/s for hours).
+   * The wipe forces the next op to fall through to /anonymous or
+   * surface NOT_SIGNED_IN to the host app instead of looping.
+   */
   async refreshAccessToken() {
     if (this.refreshInflight) return this.refreshInflight;
     const refresh = this.hooks.storage.get(REFRESH_KEY);
@@ -687,14 +701,18 @@ var Auth = class {
       try {
         const data = await this.callAuth("/api/v1/auth-service/token/refresh", {
           refreshToken: refresh
-        }).catch(() => null);
-        if (!data) return null;
+        });
         this.accessToken = data.tokens.accessToken;
         this.accessExpiresAt = Date.now() + data.tokens.expiresIn * 1e3;
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_KEY, data.tokens.accessToken);
         this.hooks.storage.set(TOKEN_EXPIRES_KEY, String(this.accessExpiresAt));
         this.hooks.storage.set(REFRESH_KEY, data.tokens.refreshToken);
         return data.tokens.accessToken;
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof AuthError && isDeadRefreshError(err.code)) {
+          await this.wipeLocalIdentity().catch(() => void 0);
+        }
+        return null;
       } finally {
         this.refreshInflight = null;
       }
@@ -745,6 +763,10 @@ var Auth = class {
     await this.hooks.onAnonymousWipe();
   }
 };
+function isDeadRefreshError(code) {
+  if (!code) return false;
+  return code === "INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN" || code === "HTTP_401" || code === "UNAUTHORIZED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED" || code === "RATE_LIMIT";
+}
 function decodeJwtPayload(token) {
   try {
     const parts = token.split(".");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sendoracloud/sdk-react-native",
-  "version": "0.12.0",
+  "version": "0.13.0",
   "description": "Sendora Cloud React Native + Expo SDK — analytics, identity, push-token registration, auth. Expo Go compatible, no native modules beyond AsyncStorage.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.cjs",