@sempdev/semp 0.4.3

package/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 SEMP Contributors
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

package/README.md

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+# semp
+
+TypeScript implementation of [SEMP](https://github.com/semp-dev/semp-spec)
+(Sealed Envelope Messaging Protocol). Compiles to plain JavaScript with
+TypeScript declaration files; the published npm package serves both
+JavaScript and TypeScript callers from the same artifact.
+
+Targets Node.js (>=20) and modern browsers. The crypto stack is the
+audited [@noble](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble) suite end to end:
+no native bindings, pure-JS, browser-compatible.
+
+## Status
+
+Pre-1.0 development. Implementation tracks the [`semp-spec`](https://github.com/semp-dev/semp-spec)
+test vectors at `vectors/v1.0.0/`. Conformance is gated on the cross-language
+vectors-runner under `test/vectors/`; a build is interop-ready when the
+runner reports all vectors green.
+
+| Layer | Coverage |
+|-------|----------|
+| 1 (cryptographic primitives)   | scaffolding |
+| 2 (deterministic protocol)     | TODO        |
+| 3 (envelope round-trip)        | TODO        |
+| 4 (handshake messages)         | TODO        |
+| 5 (signed documents)           | TODO        |
+
+## Repository layout
+
+Each `src/<layer>/` mirrors the corresponding semp-go package so anyone
+fluent in one can read the other.
+
+```
+src/
+  crypto/   (Layer 1 primitives: HKDF, HMAC, AEAD, KEM, signatures)
+  ...       (more as layers land)
+test/
+  vectors/  (JSON-driven cross-language vectors runner)
+```
+
+## Development
+
+```sh
+npm install
+npm test              # run vitest once
+npm run test:watch    # watch mode
+npm run typecheck     # strict tsc, no emit
+npm run build         # emit .js + .d.ts to dist/
+```
+
+The vectors runner expects `semp-spec/vectors/v1.0.0/` as a sibling
+checkout, or `SEMP_VECTORS_DIR` set explicitly:
+
+```sh
+SEMP_VECTORS_DIR=/path/to/semp-spec/vectors/v1.0.0 npm test
+```
+
+## License
+
+MIT. See [LICENSE](./LICENSE).

package/dist/brief/address.d.ts

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+/**
+ * SEMP user address per ENVELOPE.md §2.3.
+ *
+ * The wire form is `local-part@domain`:
+ *   - Local-part: Unicode NFC, case-sensitive on the wire, ≤64 bytes.
+ *   - Domain: A-label (Punycode) per IDNA2008, ASCII-only, lowercase
+ *     on the wire, ≤253 bytes, ≤63 bytes per DNS label.
+ *
+ * {@link validateAddress} enforces the canonical form at ingress;
+ * {@link canonicalizeAddress} converts possibly-denormalized input
+ * (mixed-case domain, U-label domain, non-NFC local-part) to the
+ * canonical wire form.
+ *
+ * IDNA2008 conversion uses Node's built-in `URL.domainToASCII` (which
+ * implements WHATWG URL's IDNA, a strict superset of RFC 5891).
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+/** Cap on the composed `local-part@domain` per §2.3.3 / RFC 5321. */
+export declare const MaxAddressLength = 254;
+/** Cap on the local-part per RFC 5321 §4.5.3.1.1. */
+export declare const MaxLocalPartLength = 64;
+/** DNS total-length ceiling per RFC 1035. */
+export declare const MaxDomainLength = 253;
+/** DNS per-label ceiling per RFC 1035. */
+export declare const MaxDomainLabelLength = 63;
+/**
+ * Return the local part of `addr` (everything before the final `@`).
+ * Returns the entire string if no `@` is present. Operates on raw
+ * bytes without validation.
+ */
+export declare function addressLocal(addr: string): string;
+/**
+ * Return the domain part of `addr` (everything after the final `@`).
+ * Returns the empty string if no `@` is present.
+ */
+export declare function addressDomain(addr: string): string;
+/**
+ * Validate `addr` against the canonical wire form per §2.3:
+ *
+ *  - Non-empty, valid UTF-8 (always true for JS strings — included
+ *    for symmetry with semp-go).
+ *  - Composed length ≤ {@link MaxAddressLength} bytes.
+ *  - No control characters (C0, DEL, C1).
+ *  - Exactly one `@` separator.
+ *  - Local-part non-empty, ≤ {@link MaxLocalPartLength} bytes, in
+ *    Unicode NFC.
+ *  - Domain non-empty, ≤ {@link MaxDomainLength} bytes, ASCII-only,
+ *    lowercase, well-formed DNS labels.
+ *
+ * Throws on the first violation. Pair with {@link canonicalizeAddress}
+ * if the input may be denormalized.
+ */
+export declare function validateAddress(addr: string): void;
+/**
+ * Return `addr` in canonical wire form:
+ *
+ *  - Local-part normalized to Unicode NFC.
+ *  - Domain converted to A-label (Punycode) per IDNA2008, folded to
+ *    lowercase.
+ *
+ * Does NOT enforce length or character bounds; pair with
+ * {@link validateAddress} on the returned value when ingesting
+ * untrusted input.
+ */
+export declare function canonicalizeAddress(addr: string): string;
+/**
+ * Report whether `a` and `b` denote the same address after
+ * canonicalization. Returns false if either side fails
+ * canonicalization.
+ *
+ * Does NOT collapse visually-similar (confusable) characters.
+ * Confusables defense is a UI-layer concern per Unicode Technical
+ * Standard #39.
+ */
+export declare function addressEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=address.d.ts.map

package/dist/brief/address.d.ts.map

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+{"version":3,"file":"address.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/brief/address.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AAIH,qEAAqE;AACrE,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,CAAC;AAEpC,qDAAqD;AACrD,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,CAAC;AAErC,6CAA6C;AAC7C,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,CAAC;AAEnC,0CAA0C;AAC1C,eAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,KAAK,CAAC;AAEvC;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAMjD;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAMlD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAiClD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAmBxD;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAc1D"}

package/dist/brief/address.js

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+/**
+ * SEMP user address per ENVELOPE.md §2.3.
+ *
+ * The wire form is `local-part@domain`:
+ *   - Local-part: Unicode NFC, case-sensitive on the wire, ≤64 bytes.
+ *   - Domain: A-label (Punycode) per IDNA2008, ASCII-only, lowercase
+ *     on the wire, ≤253 bytes, ≤63 bytes per DNS label.
+ *
+ * {@link validateAddress} enforces the canonical form at ingress;
+ * {@link canonicalizeAddress} converts possibly-denormalized input
+ * (mixed-case domain, U-label domain, non-NFC local-part) to the
+ * canonical wire form.
+ *
+ * IDNA2008 conversion uses Node's built-in `URL.domainToASCII` (which
+ * implements WHATWG URL's IDNA, a strict superset of RFC 5891).
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+import { domainToASCII } from "node:url";
+/** Cap on the composed `local-part@domain` per §2.3.3 / RFC 5321. */
+export const MaxAddressLength = 254;
+/** Cap on the local-part per RFC 5321 §4.5.3.1.1. */
+export const MaxLocalPartLength = 64;
+/** DNS total-length ceiling per RFC 1035. */
+export const MaxDomainLength = 253;
+/** DNS per-label ceiling per RFC 1035. */
+export const MaxDomainLabelLength = 63;
+/**
+ * Return the local part of `addr` (everything before the final `@`).
+ * Returns the entire string if no `@` is present. Operates on raw
+ * bytes without validation.
+ */
+export function addressLocal(addr) {
+    const at = addr.lastIndexOf("@");
+    if (at < 0) {
+        return addr;
+    }
+    return addr.slice(0, at);
+}
+/**
+ * Return the domain part of `addr` (everything after the final `@`).
+ * Returns the empty string if no `@` is present.
+ */
+export function addressDomain(addr) {
+    const at = addr.lastIndexOf("@");
+    if (at < 0) {
+        return "";
+    }
+    return addr.slice(at + 1);
+}
+/**
+ * Validate `addr` against the canonical wire form per §2.3:
+ *
+ *  - Non-empty, valid UTF-8 (always true for JS strings — included
+ *    for symmetry with semp-go).
+ *  - Composed length ≤ {@link MaxAddressLength} bytes.
+ *  - No control characters (C0, DEL, C1).
+ *  - Exactly one `@` separator.
+ *  - Local-part non-empty, ≤ {@link MaxLocalPartLength} bytes, in
+ *    Unicode NFC.
+ *  - Domain non-empty, ≤ {@link MaxDomainLength} bytes, ASCII-only,
+ *    lowercase, well-formed DNS labels.
+ *
+ * Throws on the first violation. Pair with {@link canonicalizeAddress}
+ * if the input may be denormalized.
+ */
+export function validateAddress(addr) {
+    if (addr === "") {
+        throw new Error("brief: empty address");
+    }
+    const byteLen = utf8ByteLength(addr);
+    if (byteLen > MaxAddressLength) {
+        throw new Error(`brief: address exceeds ${MaxAddressLength} bytes`);
+    }
+    rejectControlChars(addr, "address");
+    // SplitN(s, "@", 3) semantics: catch zero-or-multiple `@`.
+    const firstAt = addr.indexOf("@");
+    if (firstAt < 0) {
+        throw new Error("brief: address missing '@' separator");
+    }
+    const lastAt = addr.lastIndexOf("@");
+    if (firstAt !== lastAt) {
+        throw new Error("brief: address contains multiple '@' separators");
+    }
+    const local = addr.slice(0, firstAt);
+    const domain = addr.slice(firstAt + 1);
+    if (local === "") {
+        throw new Error("brief: address has empty local part");
+    }
+    if (utf8ByteLength(local) > MaxLocalPartLength) {
+        throw new Error(`brief: local part exceeds ${MaxLocalPartLength} bytes`);
+    }
+    if (local.normalize("NFC") !== local) {
+        throw new Error("brief: local part is not in Unicode Normalization Form C");
+    }
+    validateDomain(domain);
+}
+/**
+ * Return `addr` in canonical wire form:
+ *
+ *  - Local-part normalized to Unicode NFC.
+ *  - Domain converted to A-label (Punycode) per IDNA2008, folded to
+ *    lowercase.
+ *
+ * Does NOT enforce length or character bounds; pair with
+ * {@link validateAddress} on the returned value when ingesting
+ * untrusted input.
+ */
+export function canonicalizeAddress(addr) {
+    if (addr === "") {
+        throw new Error("brief: empty address");
+    }
+    const firstAt = addr.indexOf("@");
+    if (firstAt < 0) {
+        throw new Error("brief: address missing '@' separator");
+    }
+    const lastAt = addr.lastIndexOf("@");
+    if (firstAt !== lastAt) {
+        throw new Error("brief: address contains multiple '@' separators");
+    }
+    const local = addr.slice(0, firstAt).normalize("NFC");
+    const domain = addr.slice(firstAt + 1);
+    const aLabel = domainToASCII(domain);
+    if (aLabel === "") {
+        throw new Error(`brief: domain ${JSON.stringify(domain)} cannot be converted to A-label`);
+    }
+    return local + "@" + aLabel.toLowerCase();
+}
+/**
+ * Report whether `a` and `b` denote the same address after
+ * canonicalization. Returns false if either side fails
+ * canonicalization.
+ *
+ * Does NOT collapse visually-similar (confusable) characters.
+ * Confusables defense is a UI-layer concern per Unicode Technical
+ * Standard #39.
+ */
+export function addressEqual(a, b) {
+    let aa;
+    let bb;
+    try {
+        aa = canonicalizeAddress(a);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    try {
+        bb = canonicalizeAddress(b);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return aa === bb;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Internal helpers
+/** Reject any C0 (U+0000-U+001F), DEL (U+007F), or C1 (U+0080-U+009F). */
+function rejectControlChars(s, field) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
+        const cp = s.codePointAt(i);
+        if (cp === undefined) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (cp < 0x20 || cp === 0x7f || (cp >= 0x80 && cp <= 0x9f)) {
+            throw new Error(`brief: ${field} contains control character U+${cp.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(4, "0")} at byte ${i}`);
+        }
+        if (cp > 0xffff) {
+            i++; // step past the surrogate pair's low half
+        }
+    }
+}
+function validateDomain(domain) {
+    if (domain === "") {
+        throw new Error("brief: address has empty domain");
+    }
+    if (domain.length > MaxDomainLength) {
+        throw new Error(`brief: domain exceeds ${MaxDomainLength} bytes`);
+    }
+    for (let i = 0; i < domain.length; i++) {
+        const c = domain.charCodeAt(i);
+        if (c > 0x7f) {
+            throw new Error("brief: domain contains non-ASCII octet (A-label required on the wire)");
+        }
+        if (c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x5a) {
+            throw new Error("brief: domain contains uppercase letters (must be lowercase on the wire)");
+        }
+    }
+    if (domain.startsWith(".") || domain.endsWith(".")) {
+        throw new Error("brief: domain has leading or trailing dot");
+    }
+    if (domain.includes("..")) {
+        throw new Error("brief: domain has empty label (consecutive dots)");
+    }
+    for (const label of domain.split(".")) {
+        if (label === "") {
+            throw new Error("brief: domain has empty label");
+        }
+        if (label.length > MaxDomainLabelLength) {
+            throw new Error(`brief: domain label ${JSON.stringify(label)} exceeds ${MaxDomainLabelLength} bytes`);
+        }
+        if (label.startsWith("-") || label.endsWith("-")) {
+            throw new Error(`brief: domain label ${JSON.stringify(label)} has leading or trailing hyphen`);
+        }
+        for (const r of label) {
+            if (r === "@" || r === " " || r === "\t") {
+                throw new Error(`brief: domain label ${JSON.stringify(label)} contains disallowed character`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+function utf8ByteLength(s) {
+    if (typeof Buffer !== "undefined") {
+        return Buffer.byteLength(s, "utf8");
+    }
+    return new TextEncoder().encode(s).length;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=address.js.map

package/dist/brief/address.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/brief/brief.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/**
+ * The decrypted form of `envelope.brief` per ENVELOPE.md §5.1.
+ *
+ * The brief is encrypted in transit under K_brief; this module
+ * provides the typed shape of the JSON payload after decryption,
+ * plus the {@link splitForBCC} helper that materializes BCC
+ * recipients into per-recipient envelope copies (CLIENT.md §3.5,
+ * ENVELOPE.md §5.3).
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+/** Decrypted brief payload. */
+export interface Brief {
+    /**
+     * Globally unique message identifier. Distinct from
+     * `postmark.id`, which is a per-transaction routing id.
+     */
+    message_id: string;
+    /** Full sender address (canonical form per §2.3). */
+    from: string;
+    /** Primary recipient addresses. */
+    to: string[];
+    /** Optional carbon copy recipients. */
+    cc?: string[];
+    /**
+     * For an envelope copy delivered to a specific BCC recipient,
+     * contains only that recipient's address. MUST be absent from
+     * envelope copies delivered to to/cc recipients.
+     */
+    bcc?: string[];
+    /** Optional address that replies should target instead of `from`. */
+    reply_to?: string;
+    /** Wall-clock time of message creation at the sender, ISO 8601 UTC. */
+    sent_at: string;
+    /** Stable identifier of the conversation thread. */
+    thread_id?: string;
+    /** Group / mailing-list identifier. */
+    group_id?: string;
+    /** `message_id` of the message being replied to. */
+    in_reply_to?: string;
+    /**
+     * Recipient-server-and-client-visible private metadata extensions.
+     */
+    extensions?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+/**
+ * Materialize a {@link Brief} with BCC recipients into the set of
+ * per-recipient copies required by CLIENT.md §3.5 and ENVELOPE.md
+ * §5.3.
+ *
+ * SEMP's privacy model forbids server-side BCC stripping: a sending
+ * client MUST generate one distinct envelope copy per BCC recipient
+ * so that the `bcc` field contains only that recipient's address in
+ * each copy, and is absent entirely from the copy delivered to
+ * to/cc recipients. The sending server never sees the full BCC
+ * list.
+ *
+ * Returned copies:
+ *
+ *  1. If `b.bcc` is empty or undefined, returns `[b]` — a single
+ *     copy, returned unchanged.
+ *
+ *  2. Otherwise, returns `b.bcc.length + 1` elements:
+ *     - One "visible" copy for to + cc recipients, with `bcc`
+ *       removed entirely.
+ *     - One copy per original BCC recipient, each carrying that
+ *       single address in `bcc`. All other fields are preserved so
+ *       each recipient sees the same primary recipient list.
+ *
+ * The returned briefs share the underlying `extensions` map and
+ * address arrays with the input by reference. Callers that mutate
+ * a copy independently should clone first.
+ */
+export declare function splitForBCC(b: Brief): Brief[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=brief.d.ts.map

package/dist/brief/brief.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"brief.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/brief/brief.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,+BAA+B;AAC/B,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;IACpB;;;OAGG;IACH,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEnB,qDAAqD;IACrD,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEb,mCAAmC;IACnC,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAEb,uCAAuC;IACvC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAEd;;;;OAIG;IACH,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAEf,qEAAqE;IACrE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAElB,uEAAuE;IACvE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEhB,oDAAoD;IACpD,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEnB,uCAAuC;IACvC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAElB,oDAAoD;IACpD,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAErB;;OAEG;IACH,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CACtC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,wBAAgB,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAkB7C"}

package/dist/brief/brief.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * The decrypted form of `envelope.brief` per ENVELOPE.md §5.1.
+ *
+ * The brief is encrypted in transit under K_brief; this module
+ * provides the typed shape of the JSON payload after decryption,
+ * plus the {@link splitForBCC} helper that materializes BCC
+ * recipients into per-recipient envelope copies (CLIENT.md §3.5,
+ * ENVELOPE.md §5.3).
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+/**
+ * Materialize a {@link Brief} with BCC recipients into the set of
+ * per-recipient copies required by CLIENT.md §3.5 and ENVELOPE.md
+ * §5.3.
+ *
+ * SEMP's privacy model forbids server-side BCC stripping: a sending
+ * client MUST generate one distinct envelope copy per BCC recipient
+ * so that the `bcc` field contains only that recipient's address in
+ * each copy, and is absent entirely from the copy delivered to
+ * to/cc recipients. The sending server never sees the full BCC
+ * list.
+ *
+ * Returned copies:
+ *
+ *  1. If `b.bcc` is empty or undefined, returns `[b]` — a single
+ *     copy, returned unchanged.
+ *
+ *  2. Otherwise, returns `b.bcc.length + 1` elements:
+ *     - One "visible" copy for to + cc recipients, with `bcc`
+ *       removed entirely.
+ *     - One copy per original BCC recipient, each carrying that
+ *       single address in `bcc`. All other fields are preserved so
+ *       each recipient sees the same primary recipient list.
+ *
+ * The returned briefs share the underlying `extensions` map and
+ * address arrays with the input by reference. Callers that mutate
+ * a copy independently should clone first.
+ */
+export function splitForBCC(b) {
+    if (b.bcc === undefined || b.bcc.length === 0) {
+        return [b];
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    // Copy 0: visible to/cc recipients. The `bcc` field is removed so
+    // the canonical JSON does not include it.
+    const visible = { ...b };
+    delete visible.bcc;
+    out.push(visible);
+    // Copies 1..N: one per BCC recipient.
+    for (const recipient of b.bcc) {
+        out.push({ ...b, bcc: [recipient] });
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=brief.js.map

package/dist/brief/brief.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"brief.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/brief/brief.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AA+CH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,CAAC,CAAQ;IAClC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9C,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACb,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAY,EAAE,CAAC;IAExB,kEAAkE;IAClE,0CAA0C;IAC1C,MAAM,OAAO,GAAU,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;IACnB,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAElB,sCAAsC;IACtC,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9B,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;AACb,CAAC"}

package/dist/brief/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+/**
+ * Brief layer per ENVELOPE.md §2.3 + §5.1 + §5.3.
+ *
+ * Address canonicalization, validation, equality, and the typed
+ * brief payload shape with the BCC fan-out helper.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+export { MaxAddressLength, MaxDomainLabelLength, MaxDomainLength, MaxLocalPartLength, addressDomain, addressEqual, addressLocal, canonicalizeAddress, validateAddress, } from "./address.js";
+export { type Brief, splitForBCC } from "./brief.js";
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/brief/index.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/brief/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,gBAAgB,EAChB,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,kBAAkB,EAClB,aAAa,EACb,YAAY,EACZ,YAAY,EACZ,mBAAmB,EACnB,eAAe,GAChB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC"}

package/dist/brief/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+/**
+ * Brief layer per ENVELOPE.md §2.3 + §5.1 + §5.3.
+ *
+ * Address canonicalization, validation, equality, and the typed
+ * brief payload shape with the BCC fan-out helper.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+export { MaxAddressLength, MaxDomainLabelLength, MaxDomainLength, MaxLocalPartLength, addressDomain, addressEqual, addressLocal, canonicalizeAddress, validateAddress, } from "./address.js";
+export { splitForBCC } from "./brief.js";
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/brief/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/brief/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,gBAAgB,EAChB,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,kBAAkB,EAClB,aAAa,EACb,YAAY,EACZ,YAAY,EACZ,mBAAmB,EACnB,eAAe,GAChB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EAAc,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC"}

package/dist/canonical/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical JSON serialization per ENVELOPE.md §4.3. Used as the
+ * byte stream for every SEMP signature and MAC computation.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+export { marshal, marshalWithElision } from "./marshal.js";
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/canonical/index.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/canonical/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC"}

package/dist/canonical/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical JSON serialization per ENVELOPE.md §4.3. Used as the
+ * byte stream for every SEMP signature and MAC computation.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+export { marshal, marshalWithElision } from "./marshal.js";
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/canonical/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/canonical/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC"}

package/dist/canonical/marshal.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical JSON serialization per ENVELOPE.md §4.3.
+ *
+ * The canonical form is the byte stream over which signatures and
+ * MACs are computed. Two implementations producing different
+ * canonical bytes for the same logical document do not interoperate
+ * at the seal layer.
+ *
+ * Rules:
+ *   - Keys sorted lexicographically at every nesting level.
+ *   - No insignificant whitespace.
+ *   - UTF-8 encoding.
+ *   - Strings escaped per RFC 8259 §7.
+ *   - Numbers preserved exactly (no reformatting).
+ *
+ * Per-document elision rules (e.g. blanking `seal.signature`,
+ * omitting `postmark.hop_count` and `padding` for envelopes) are
+ * applied by callers via {@link marshalWithElision} before this
+ * generic marshal sees the value.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+/** Canonicalize a JSON-serializable value to UTF-8 bytes. */
+export declare function marshal(v: unknown): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Apply an in-place elision callback to a deep copy of `v`, then
+ * canonicalize. The elider can mutate `map[string]any` / `any[]`
+ * structures freely — the original is untouched.
+ *
+ * Use case: envelope canonicalization sets `seal.signature` and
+ * `seal.session_mac` to "", omits `postmark.hop_count`, omits
+ * `padding` — all by mutating the deep copy before serialization.
+ */
+export declare function marshalWithElision(v: unknown, elide: (clone: unknown) => void): Uint8Array;
+//# sourceMappingURL=marshal.d.ts.map

package/dist/canonical/marshal.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"marshal.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/canonical/marshal.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,6DAA6D;AAC7D,wBAAgB,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,CAU9C;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAChC,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EACV,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,GAC9B,UAAU,CAQZ"}