@semalt-ai/code 1.19.0 → 1.20.0

package/docs/HISTORY.md

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+# semalt-code — History, Decisions & Rationale
+
+> Dependency-policy rationale, the full "Key Patterns & Invariants" reference,
+> and the "Deferred / Not Yet Implemented" roadmap. **Not auto-loaded** as project
+> memory. The lean `CLAUDE.md` carries the compressed, verified invariant set;
+> this file preserves the long-form rationale and the per-task history.
+
+> Per-task (Task X.Y) rationale and the "Tested by …" enumerations live inline in
+> `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` alongside each subsystem they describe.
+
+---
+
+## Dependency & Supply-Chain Policy (Task 3.2)
+
+The project ran **zero runtime dependencies** through Phase 2. Adopting the official
+MCP SDK (`@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`) in v1.9.0 ends that era. The invariant is now
+**minimal, vetted, pinned dependencies** — not "no dependencies."
+
+**When a runtime dependency is allowed.** Every new runtime dependency must be:
+
+1. **Minimal** — preferred only when a Node.js built-in genuinely cannot do the job.
+   The bar for the *first* dependency was high on purpose; the bar for the next one
+   is the same. Dev-only tooling is still avoided (we lint with `node --check` and
+   test with `node:test`).
+2. **Justified** — a one-line rationale recorded here (see below) and in the PR.
+3. **Pinned to an exact version** — no `^`/`~`/ranges in `package.json`. Upgrades are
+   deliberate, reviewed commits, never silent on `npm install`.
+4. **Reviewed** — adding/bumping a dependency is a reviewed change, and the
+   regenerated `package-lock.json` is committed in the same PR.
+
+**Rationale for the web-extraction deps (Task W.1, all pinned exact).** The
+web-fetch pipeline (see **Web Fetch Pipeline** below) turns raw HTML into
+main-content Markdown — reliably parsing real-world malformed HTML, scoring the
+main article over chrome, and emitting clean Markdown are each large, bug-prone
+surfaces where a hand-rolled regex approach is exactly the wrong call (quality is
+the whole point). The chosen libraries are the reference implementations:
+- **`@mozilla/readability` (`0.6.0`)** — Firefox Reader View's extractor; the
+  de-facto standard for "main content of a page." MIT. **Zero transitive deps.**
+- **`turndown` (`7.2.4`)** — the reference HTML→Markdown converter. MIT. One
+  transitive dep (`@mixmark-io/domino`, a DOM impl).
+- **`linkedom` (`0.18.12`)** — a light DOM for Readability to operate on
+  (`jsdom` is far heavier and unnecessary here). MIT. Transitive footprint:
+  `css-select`, `css-what`, `boolbase`, `nth-check`, `domhandler`,
+  `domelementtype`, `domutils`, `dom-serializer`, `entities`, `cssom`,
+  `htmlparser2`, `html-escaper`, `uhyphen` (`canvas` is an *optional* dep, left
+  uninstalled). **Total added: ~18 packages, `npm audit` clean (0 advisories).**
+All three are loaded directly (CommonJS-compatible) from `lib/web-extract.js` —
+no ESM boundary needed (unlike the MCP SDK).
+
+**Rationale for `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` (pinned `1.29.0`).** MCP is an open
+protocol with a non-trivial wire contract (JSON-RPC framing, capability negotiation,
+transport lifecycle, schema validation). Reimplementing it by hand would be a large,
+bug-prone surface to own and keep in spec. The **official** SDK is the reference
+implementation, MIT-licensed, and tracks the spec — exactly the case where a vetted
+dependency beats a built-in reimplementation. It is the foundation Task 3.3 builds the
+MCP client on.
+
+**ESM/CJS boundary.** The SDK is **ESM-only** (`"type": "module"`); this project is
+CommonJS. A CJS module cannot `require()` an ESM-only package. The entire codebase
+stays CommonJS — the SDK is loaded in exactly one place, `lib/mcp/boundary.js`, via
+dynamic `import()`, which re-exposes a CJS-friendly async surface (`loadSdk`,
+`createClient`, `createStdioTransport`). No other module imports the SDK directly.
+See **MCP Boundary** below.
+
+**Lockfile + CI guardrails.** `package-lock.json` is committed. CI (`.github/workflows/ci.yml`) runs:
+- `npm ci` — installs strictly from the lockfile; fails on package.json↔lockfile drift (integrity).
+- `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high` — fails the build on a **HIGH or CRITICAL**
+  advisory in the **runtime** (production) dependency tree. Dev deps are excluded
+  (there are none today).
+
+**Audit-findings policy.** When `npm audit` flags an advisory:
+
+- **Critical / High** → **blocking.** CI fails. Resolve before merge by bumping to a
+  patched pinned version (regenerate + commit the lockfile), or — if no fix exists —
+  removing/replacing the dependency. A temporary, time-boxed exception requires an
+  explicit `npm audit` allow-list entry **with a written justification and a tracking
+  issue**; it is not the default.
+- **Moderate / Low** → **non-blocking** (the `--audit-level=high` gate lets them pass)
+  but **tracked**: open an issue and address on the next dependency-maintenance pass.
+  Do not raise the gate to fail on these without agreement — noisy gates get ignored.
+- **Routine maintenance** → periodically run `npm audit` and `npm outdated`; dependency
+  bumps follow the pinning + review rules above.
+
+---
+
+
+## Key Patterns & Invariants
+
+- **Minimal, pinned dependencies**: prefer Node.js built-ins; a runtime dependency must be minimal, justified, pinned to an exact version, and reviewed (see **Dependency & Supply-Chain Policy**). Today: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` (MCP) and the web-extraction set `@mozilla/readability` + `linkedom` + `turndown` (Task W.1).
+- **CommonJS**: all files use `require()`/`module.exports`. Do not use ES `import`/`export`. The one exception is the **dynamic** `import()` inside `lib/mcp/boundary.js`, which is the sole bridge to the ESM-only MCP SDK — the project itself stays CommonJS.
+- **Streaming**: `api.js` manually parses `text/event-stream`. The parser in `chatStream()` handles partial JSON lines — be careful editing it.
+- **Permissions are per-session**: `PermissionManager` resets on each CLI invocation. Approvals never persist to disk. In non-TTY mode tool calls that would normally need interactive confirmation are **refused** (not auto-approved) unless `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is set, or the tag is pre-approved by an `--allow-*` tier flag.
+- **Destructive-command deny-list** (`lib/deny.js`): every shell call (`exec`/`shell`) passes through `classifyShellCommand()` at the single chokepoint in `agentExecShell`, in *all* modes and regardless of `--allow-*` flags. Handling depends on the **initiator**:
+  - **Agent-initiated** (the model asked, the default): any deny-list hit is a **hard block** — `rm -rf`, `curl … | sh`, disk-wipe/fork-bomb patterns, recursive chmod/chown on a system root, and writes to system paths.
+  - **User-initiated** (a human typed `!cmd` or `semalt-code shell`): the user owns their machine, so a deny-list hit is **not** hard-blocked. The exception is the **catastrophic subset** (`catastrophic: true` — disk-wipe / block-device write, fork bomb), which interposes a single y/N confirmation as a typo guard; all other deny-listed user commands run with a `bypassed` note.
+  - The only full bypass (skips classification entirely) is `--dangerously-skip-permissions`.
+  - **Cross-platform + canonicalized (Task 4.4):** the list now covers the
+    **Windows** destructive set (`del /s`, `rd`/`rmdir /s`, `Remove-Item -Recurse
+    -Force`, `format`, `Format-Volume`, `Clear-Disk`, `cipher /w`, `diskpart …
+    clean`) in addition to POSIX — relevant because native Windows has no OS
+    sandbox. Matching also runs against a **procfs-root-canonicalized** variant
+    (`/proc/self/root` and `/proc/<pid>/root` rewritten to `/`) so a
+    `/proc/self/root/etc/…` bypass is caught by the same system-path matchers
+    (the resolved-path principle, shared with the OS sandbox).
+- **Untrusted web content**: `http_get` runs the **web-fetch pipeline** (Task W.1 / W.1b, `mode` = summarized→extract→Markdown→secondary-LLM summary / extracted→Markdown / raw→original token-capped content) so by default only a compact result enters context (`raw` mode deliberately returns the original markup, still **token-capped**, for page analysis); the result in **every** mode is wrapped in the explicit `<<<UNTRUSTED_EXTERNAL_CONTENT>>>` block (`lib/agent.js`), and the secondary summarizer treats the page as data-only (a page injection could have steered it). The system prompt (`lib/prompts.js`) instructs the model never to act on instructions inside such a block. MCP tool results and **lifecycle-hook output** reuse the same fence. See **Web Fetch Pipeline**.
+- **Lifecycle hooks are deny-listed + sandboxed shell + untrusted output** (`lib/hooks.js`): a `PreToolUse` non-zero exit blocks the tool; every hook command passes through `checkShellDenylist` AND the **OS sandbox** (`resolveSandboxedSpawn`, Pre-Task 5.0a) before running; hook stdout is fenced as untrusted before it reaches the model; timeouts/sandbox-refusals/failures are contained and never crash the loop. **Project-layer command hooks and `verify.command` are quarantined** (`loadHookLayers`/`loadVerifyLayers`): a cloned-repo `.semalt/config.json` can never introduce host-privileged execution, only inert prompt text.
+- **`--readonly` blocks every file-mutating tool** (`READONLY_BLOCKED`, `lib/permissions.js`, completed in Pre-Task 5.0c): `write_file`, `append_file`, `edit_file`, `replace_in_file`, `delete_file`, `make_dir`, `remove_dir`, `move_file`, `copy_file`, `upload`, `download`. The block is enforced at the executor (`permissionManager.readonlyBlock(tag)`), so it holds for both the XML and native paths; `describePermission` also short-circuits the gate (no approval prompt precedes the deterministic block). **Scope decision (load-bearing): `--readonly` governs FILE TOOLS only.** Shell (`exec`/`shell`) is **not** in the set — a read-only session must still run read-only commands (`ls`, `git status`), and a shell command's arbitrary write side effects are the **OS sandbox + deny-list's** job to confine (the right layer post-Pre-Task 5.0a), not `--readonly`. So `--readonly` is an honest "no file-tool writes," not a false "no writes at all." Read-only file tools (`read_file`, `grep`, `glob`, `search_in_file`, `file_stat`, `list_dir`) work unchanged. Tested by `test/readonly-tools.test.js`.
+- **Secret-file read guard**: `isProtectedSecretPath()` in `tools.js` refuses reads/copies/moves of `config.json`, `memory.json`, and `audit.log` via file tools — **not** overridable by `--allow-anywhere` (only by `--dangerously-skip-permissions`).
+- **Config-write guard** (`isProtectedConfigPath()` in `tools.js`, Pre-Task 5.0b): the write-side companion to the read guard. Every write executor (`write_file`, `append_file`, `edit_file`, `replace_in_file`, `move_file`/`copy_file` **dst**, `upload`, `download`) refuses to write into the **protected-config set** — the whole `~/.semalt-ai` dir **and** every project `.semalt` dir from the CWD up to the repo root, **including files that do not yet exist** (directory-prefix matched on the resolved path, so a missing `.semalt/config.json`/`agents/*.md`/hook is covered). The set is defined once as `protectedConfigDirs` (`lib/constants.js`) and shared with the OS sandbox's `protectedPaths`. Same bypass policy as the read guard: **not** overridable by `--allow-anywhere`, only by `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (human-only). This guards the **agent's** file tools and the sandboxed shell — a human editing their own config in an editor is unaffected. Tested by `test/config-write-guard*.test.js`, `test/path-guards.test.js`, and the kernel case in `test/sandbox-integration.test.js`.
+- **Per-pattern permission rules** (`lib/permission-rules.js`, Task 4.1): allow/deny/ask rules matching tool + argument (glob/regex), layered user→project. **Project rules can only NARROW** — every project `allow` is structurally dropped before resolution, so a cloned-repo `.semalt/config.json` can never widen the user posture. Precedence is total/deterministic (deny>ask>allow, most-specific then most-restrictive). Arguments are canonicalized (`..`/symlink/abs-rel) before matching; pathological/malformed rules fail closed; an `allow` never bypasses the deny-list, secret guard, `--readonly`, or `isPathSafe` (those stay in the executors). A `deny` rule holds even under `--dangerously-skip-permissions`. See **Per-Pattern Permissions** above.
+- **Checkpoints & rewind** (`lib/checkpoints.js`, Task 4.3 / 4.3b): before each file-tool mutation the file's prior state is snapshotted (post-gate, pre-mutation, in `agentExecFile`) so `/rewind` can restore it — **file-tool changes only; shell side effects are not reversible.** Capture is fail-safe (a snapshot failure never blocks the mutation); a denied/withheld call produces no checkpoint; subagent mutations are checkpointed into the parent session. Delete/move are reversed explicitly; an external-modification check warns/asks before clobbering out-of-band edits. A per-file size cap and per-session retention are enforced. **Rewind is human-only (no rewind tool in the registry).** Task 4.3b: the restore path **re-validates the current guards** (`isPathSafe`/secret/protected-config/`deny` rule) per target — a now-forbidden path is refused/skipped, and `force` overrides only the external-mod check, not the guards; **three restore modes** `code`/`conversation`/`both` (default both) restore files, history, or the linked state, with conversation truncation cutting on **turn boundaries** (no orphaned `tool_call`; discard policy) — all on the **unchanged** on-disk schema. See **Checkpoints & Rewind** above.
+- **Native git tools** (`lib/tool_registry.js`, Task 5.1): eight first-class git tools shelling out through the **same** `agentExecShell` sandbox + deny-list chokepoint as `<shell>` (no privileged path around confinement), parsing output into structured results. Read-only (`git_status`/`git_diff`/`git_log`, plus the *list* ops of `git_branch`/`git_worktree`) return a null permission descriptor; mutating (`git_add`/`git_commit`/`git_branch`/`git_checkout`/`git_worktree` add/remove) require approval, honor `--readonly`, and pass the per-pattern rules. `git_commit` requires a real non-empty message (empty → error, never a placeholder). **Destructive-git ↔ checkpoint honesty:** git operations are NOT reversible via `/rewind` (checkpoints snapshot file-tool mutations only) — stated in the descriptions and prompt text. Not-a-repo / git-absent degrade gracefully. See **Native Git Tools** above.
+- **API-key sourcing** (`lib/secrets.js`): precedence is `SEMALT_API_KEY` env → OS keychain (macOS `security` / Linux `secret-tool` / Windows PasswordVault) → `config.json`. Keys from env/keychain are never written back to config; `configShow` reports only `api_key_source`. Store a key with `semalt-code auth set-key`.
+- **Token counting is approximate**: `estimateTokens()` divides char count by 4. It is used only for the `/compact` display — do not rely on it for hard limits.
+- **Context trimming is proactive when a limit is known**: `chatStream()` uses the in-process `_sessionInputLimits` learned from a prior 400 overflow first, then falls back to `config.context_length * 0.9`. When neither is set, no pre-flight trim runs and the client relies on the reactive 400/413 handler (which then persists the discovered window). `Metrics.tokenLimitStatus()` returns `{ used, limit: null }` until a limit is learned, so the status bar shows "N tok · limit unknown" instead of hiding the line.
+- **Shell/exec output entering context is bounded** (Task W.6, `capShellOutput` in `lib/agent.js`): the model-facing shell result is double-bounded — a **head+tail line cap** (`max_output_lines`, default 50, split first ~60% + last ~40% via `OUTPUT_HEAD_RATIO`) eliding the middle, **then** a **token safety net** (`max_output_tokens`, default 10000, reusing the web pipeline's `capToTokens`) so a few enormous lines (minified JS, a binary `cat`) can't blow context. The elision notice teaches the W.5-enabled redirect-to-file→grep pattern. **The exit code stays on its own line, so truncating output VOLUME never hides the command's OUTCOME** (a non-zero exit / failure is always surfaced). Applied at the context boundary in the agent loop — distinct from the **UI** cap (`lib/ui/diff.js`, display only), which stays. Before W.6 the cap was UI-only and the model received the **entire** unbounded stdout+stderr (the #1 context risk). Pure helper, unit-tested on the model-facing text + a real-loop assertion (`test/shell-output-cap.test.js`). MCP/subagent output bounding is Task W.8 (below); W.9 unifies all the paths into a shared chokepoint.
+- **MCP & subagent results entering context are bounded** (Task W.8, `formatMcpResult`/`formatSubagentResult` in `lib/agent.js`): the last two unbounded paths. Both apply `capToTokens` (the W.5–W.7 standard) to the result text **before** wrapping it in the `<<<UNTRUSTED_EXTERNAL_CONTENT>>>` fence, with **distinct budgets reflecting their nature**: **MCP is stricter** (`mcp.max_result_tokens`, default **10000**) because the payload size is third-party/server-controlled and untrusted — the riskiest path; **subagent is generous** (`subagents.max_result_tokens`, default **20000**) because the child's final text is our own deliberate, synthesized answer (a safety net against a verbose child). For MCP the truncation notice sits **inside** the fence with the capped content — capping never weakens the untrusted perimeter; subagent isolation / no-escalation (3.6/4.5) are unchanged (this bounds returned-text size only). A small result passes through fully, no notice. Pure helpers, unit-tested on the model-facing/parent-facing text incl. the fence-still-present and budgets-differ cases + real-loop assertions (`test/result-cap.test.js`).
+- **`read_file` is paginated** (Task W.7, `formatReadResult` in `lib/agent.js`): `read_file` used to dump the **whole file verbatim** into context (`File <path>:\n` + the entire content); the only guard was a hard byte refusal at `max_file_size_kb`. Worst case ~128k tokens for a 500 KB file. Now the **model-facing** result is paginated, mirroring the Claude Code standard: under a **line cap** (`read_line_cap`, default **2000**) the file reads **byte-for-byte as before** (no regression for the common small-file case); over the cap it returns the first page + a **`[PARTIAL]` notice** — `Showing lines 1–2000 of 5234. Read more with start_line=2001.` **`start_line`/`end_line`** (on both XML + native rails; absent → null, tuple parity) read an explicit slice, **also line-capped** so a huge explicit range can't dump everything. A **token safety net** (`read_max_tokens`, default **25000**, reusing the web pipeline's `capToTokens`) bounds the pathological few-but-enormous-lines case (one 100 KB minified line) the line cap misses — consistent with W.6's double-bound. The bound is applied at the **context boundary** in the formatter (the executor still returns the full content, like W.5/W.6); pagination — not the byte cap — is the primary bound, so `max_file_size_kb` is now a **backstop** (raised default **50 MB**) ruling out a multi-GB whole-file slurp (lower it to hard-refuse smaller files). **Line numbers are OPTIONAL, default OFF** (`show_line_numbers`): the **Step 0 finding** is that `edit_file` is **line-number-based** (`lines[N-1]=content`) while `replace_in_file` is **match-based** (regex on a search string) — a mix — so always-on numbers would corrupt copyable snippets for the match path **and** cost ~1.7× per read; the param turns absolute 1-based numbers on (aligned with `edit_file`'s addressing) for when the agent wants line refs to drive an edit. Line indexing matches `edit_file`'s `split('\n')` exactly, so the read→edit loop stays aligned. Pure helper, unit-tested on the model-facing text incl. the no-regression small-file case + the PARTIAL large-file case + rail parity + read→edit alignment (`test/read-paginate.test.js`).
+- **grep/glob results are serialized + bounded** (Task W.5, `formatGrepResult`/`formatGlobResult` in `lib/agent.js`): `formatFileResult` now has `case 'grep'`/`case 'glob'` that turn the structured engine result into model-facing text — closing a correctness bug where both fell through the default and the model received `"grep: done"`/`"glob: done"` (the data was computed and even shown in the UI, but never entered context, making grep-first navigation impossible). grep `output_mode` (`content`/`files_with_matches`/`count`) is model-selectable via the spec; `head_limit` (default `DEFAULT_GREP_HEAD_LIMIT`/`DEFAULT_GLOB_HEAD_LIMIT` = 100) + optional `offset` bound what reaches the model — the engine's 1000/5000 internal caps were never a context bound (the result was dropped before it reached context). Over-limit serialization carries a truncation notice telling the agent how to narrow (refine the pattern, switch to `count`/`files_with_matches`, or raise `head_limit`); under-limit results show fully with no notice. The executors (`lib/tool_registry.js`) normalize and attach `output_mode`/`head_limit`/`offset` onto the result; the serializers are pure and tested on the **model-facing** text (`test/grep-glob-serialize.test.js`, incl. the real-loop regression).
+- **Tool output enters context ONLY via the `boundToolOutput` chokepoint** (Task W.9, `lib/agent.js`): the size analogue of the `resolveSandboxedSpawn` sandbox chokepoint. W.5–W.8 each bounded a previously-unbounded path, but the `capToTokens`-+-fence step was duplicated ad-hoc in five places — the original bugs (grep/glob `"done"`, shell/MCP/subagent unbounded) were all the **same class**: a path that put output into context without bounding it. `boundToolOutput(text, { budget, notice, fenced })` is the **single application point**: it applies `capToTokens` with the path's **budget** and **notice** function and (when `fenced`) wraps in the `<<<UNTRUSTED_EXTERNAL_CONTENT>>>` fence. **grep/glob, shell, read_file, MCP, subagent — and http_get/web_search — all route through it.** The per-path policy is **deliberately distinct and NOT flattened**: budgets (MCP 10k < subagent 20k < read 25k; shell 10k; grep/glob `DEFAULT_GREP_GLOB_MAX_TOKENS` 10k — a new token net so a few huge minified match lines can't blow context, the W.6 lesson applied to grep's count-bound), notice wording (shell teaches redirect→grep, read teaches narrow-the-range, …), and the fence flag (MCP/subagent/web fenced; file/shell not). **Refactor-safe:** model-facing outputs are byte-identical to W.5–W.8 (the W.5–W.8 test suites pass unchanged); http_get/web_search bodies are already token-capped upstream so they pass **no budget** (fence only). **Structural regression prevention:** a new tool gets bounding by *routing* its output through the chokepoint, not by *remembering* to cap. Pure helper, unit-tested on the chokepoint behavior, per-path policy, the bound-by-construction invariant, and equivalence (`test/output-chokepoint.test.js`). The system prompt's `LOCAL_NAVIGATION_NOTICE` (`lib/prompts.js`, both templates) — now actionable post-W.5 — steers the grep-first / read-slice pattern: locate with `grep`/`glob` (`count`/`files_with_matches` modes), then `read_file` only the relevant `start_line`/`end_line` slice; redirect large command output to a file and grep it.
+- **Bounded agent iterations**: the primary loop caps at `config.max_iterations` (default 125, via `DEFAULT_MAX_ITERATIONS` in `constants.js`), overridable with `--max-iterations <n>`; `--max-iterations 0`/`"unlimited"` removes the cap deliberately. Reaching the cap stops gracefully (clear message + `stopReason: "max_iterations"`), never silently. Subagents have their own cap of 12.
+- **Malformed tags are skipped**: each tool dispatch in the agent loop is wrapped in try/catch; errors emit a warning line and continue to the next tool call.
+
+---
+
+## Deferred / Not Yet Implemented
+
+This section exists because false documentation has burned this project before (a
+"max 10 iterations" invariant that never existed; coverage assumed but absent). The
+items below are things a reader might reasonably expect from the docs or from peer
+tools but that the code **does not do today**. They are listed honestly so nobody
+builds on a feature that isn't there. Each is marked **Planned (Phase 4+)** —
+on the roadmap — or **Out of scope** — no current plan.
+
+**Gaps the re-audit found in existing behavior:**
+
+- **MCP in headless / one-shot** — *Planned (Phase 4+).* `connectAll()` runs only in
+  interactive `cmdChat` (and the `mcp` management commands); `code`/`edit`/`shell`/`-p`
+  never connect a manager, so MCP tools are unavailable there. See **MCP Client → Scope**.
+- **Session auto-resume** — *Planned (Phase 4+).* Sessions are saved, but there is no
+  startup prompt offering to resume the most recent (< 24 h) session. Resume is always
+  explicit: `/history` (local) or `--resume <id>` (dashboard). See **Session Storage**.
+- **Corporate-proxy consumption** — *Planned (Phase 4+).* `HTTPS_PROXY`/`HTTP_PROXY`
+  are parsed into config but `api.js` does not route requests through a proxy agent,
+  so they have no effect on outbound HTTP. See **Config hierarchy → Environment**.
+
+**Phase 4 roadmap (Planned, in the stated order):**
+
+- **Per-pattern permissions** — ✅ **Done (Task 4.1).** Rich allow/deny/ask rules
+  matching tool + argument (glob/regex), layered user→project. See **Per-Pattern
+  Permissions** above.
+- **Self-verification** — ✅ **Done (Task 4.2).** When the agent declares done,
+  optionally run a configured verify command (advisory feeds the result back;
+  enforcing returns the agent to the loop until verify passes, bounded by
+  `max_attempts` → `verify_failed`). See **Self-Verification** above.
+- **Checkpoints / rewind** — ✅ **Done (Task 4.3 file half + Task 4.3b
+  conversation + restore re-validation).** Per-write file snapshots before each
+  file-tool mutation; `/rewind` restores prior content (last or to a chosen
+  sequence), with delete/move handled and an external-modification check that never
+  silently clobbers out-of-band edits. **File-tool changes only — shell side
+  effects are not reversible.** Task 4.3b closed the last deferred 4.3 security
+  finding (the restore path now **re-validates the current
+  isPathSafe/secret/protected-config/`deny`-rule guards** per target — `force`
+  overrides only the external-mod check) and added **three restore modes**
+  (`code`/`conversation`/`both`, default both) using the existing turn-linkage,
+  with conversation truncation cutting on **turn boundaries** (no orphaned
+  `tool_call`; discard policy) on the **unchanged** on-disk schema. Rewind stays
+  **human-only** (no rewind tool registered). See **Checkpoints & Rewind** above.
+- **OS sandbox** — ✅ **Done (Task 4.4 filesystem + Task 4.4b network).** Real
+  OS-level confinement for shell commands: Seatbelt (macOS) / bubblewrap
+  (Linux/WSL2) jail every command and its children, confining writes to the working
+  dir and keeping `~/.semalt-ai`/secrets/`/etc` read-only (incl. not-yet-existing
+  files), with a fail-safe ask-or-block fallback when the primitive is absent and no
+  model-reachable way to disable it. **Network isolation is now done as well —
+  binary on/off** (bwrap `--unshare-net` / Seatbelt `(deny network*)`), no host
+  proxy / no domain allowlist / no TLS interception, anti-fail-open default. See
+  **OS Sandbox** above.
+
+**Done since:**
+
+- **Native git tooling** — ✅ **Done (Task 5.1).** Eight first-class git tools
+  (`git_status`/`git_diff`/`git_log` read-only; `git_add`/`git_commit`/`git_branch`/
+  `git_checkout` mutating; `git_worktree` infrastructure) shelling out through the
+  sandbox + deny-list chokepoint with structured results. The long tail stays in the
+  generic shell. See **Native Git Tools** above.
+- **Embedding SDK** — ✅ **Done (Task 5.2).** Two-tier library surface separated by
+  `package.json` `exports`: the stable `createAgent` facade (main entry) and the
+  unstable building blocks (`/internals`). Programmatic permission policy that
+  defaults to refusing mutations; sandbox/deny-list stay on with explicit opt-out;
+  `close()` teardown; per-instance config (process-global limits documented). See
+  **Embedding SDK** above.
+- **Background tasks** — ✅ **Done (Task 5.3).** `run --background` launches a
+  detached agent process (own process = own global state, reusing the
+  `createAgent` facade) with a launch-fixed, refuse-by-default policy and
+  sandbox/deny-list on; a file-based task registry (`~/.semalt-ai/tasks/`) drives
+  `tasks list|status|result|kill|prune`. Validation runs before detach (no
+  orphans); stale/dead tasks are detectable and prunable; kill tree-kills by PID.
+  Background-launch is intentionally NOT an agent tool. See **Background Tasks**
+  above.
+- **Multimodal image input** — ✅ **Done (Task 5.4).** PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF attach via
+  `--image` (repeatable), in-chat `/image`, and the SDK `images` option; read
+  through `isPathSafe`, size-capped (`image_max_bytes`), base64-encoded, media
+  type detected from magic bytes. The provider content-part shape (Anthropic-style
+  vs OpenAI-style) is selected per profile/heuristic; a text-only model fails loud
+  (the image is never silently dropped). PDF input deferred; generation out of
+  scope. See **Multimodal Image Input** above.
+
+**Planned, not yet scheduled:**
+
+- **Cost caps** — hard spend limits per session/turn (today cost is *displayed* via
+  `lib/pricing.js`, never enforced).
+- **Auto-update** — self-updating the CLI (today: `npm install -g` manually).
+- **XDG / `%APPDATA%` config dirs** — honoring platform config-dir conventions instead
+  of the fixed `~/.semalt-ai/`.
+- **Domain-allowlist network policy** — *deliberately deferred, may stay out of
+  scope.* Task 4.4b ships **binary** network isolation (on / kernel-level none); a
+  per-domain allowlist ("allow github.com, block the rest") is **not** implemented
+  and is **not** a planned increment by default. **Rationale:** domain-granularity
+  requires a host-side egress proxy with full network privileges, which is the
+  exact design the reference implementation shipped and that was **bypassed
+  completely, twice, over 5.5 months** (allowedDomains fail-open CVE-2025-66479, a
+  hostname-parser differential, and TLS-MITM breaking Go binaries). We will only
+  revisit this if it can be done **without** a host proxy / TLS interception (e.g.
+  a kernel/eBPF egress filter on resolved IPs) — until then, binary isolation is
+  the robust posture. See **OS Sandbox → Why binary**.
+- **Native-Windows / WSL1 sandbox** — no OS primitive today (bwrap needs the
+  user/mount namespaces WSL1 lacks; native Windows has none). On those platforms
+  the sandbox degrades to the fail-safe fallback (ask-or-block); the Windows
+  deny-list (now covered, Task 4.4) is the remaining shell guard there.
+
+**Out of scope (no current plan):**
+
+- **Multimodal — image *input*** is ✅ **Done (Task 5.4)** — PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF
+  attached via `--image` / `/image` / the SDK `images` option, sent provider-
+  specifically to vision models (text-only models fail loud). See **Multimodal
+  Image Input** above. Still out of scope: **PDF input** (deferred), **audio
+  input**, and **image/audio *generation* / output**.
+- **Background / cloud / scheduling** — long-running background agents, cloud execution,
+  or cron-style scheduling.
+- **OpenTelemetry** — OTel traces/metrics export.
+- **Managed policy** — centrally-administered org policy enforcement.
+- **Native notifications** — OS-level desktop notifications.
+
+---
+

package/index.js

@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ Options:
                           no host proxy, no domain allowlist, no TLS interception.
                           Same effect as sandbox.network "off" in config.
   --readonly              Block all write operations
-  --max-iterations <n>    Cap agent-loop iterations per turn (default 50);
+  --max-iterations <n>    Cap agent-loop iterations per turn (default 125);
                           0 or "unlimited" removes the cap (power-user choice)
   --no-verify             Skip self-verification (config.verify) for this run
   --dangerously-skip-permissions

package/lib/agent.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 const { logToolCall } = require('./audit');
 const { Metrics } = require('./metrics');
 const { getSystemPrompt, getPlanModeNotice } = require('./prompts');
-const { isNativeToolsActive } = require('./config');
+const { isNativeToolsActive, getInlineReasoning } = require('./config');
 const { TAG_REGISTRY, DEFAULT_MAX_ITERATIONS, DEFAULT_GREP_HEAD_LIMIT, DEFAULT_GLOB_HEAD_LIMIT, DEFAULT_GREP_GLOB_MAX_TOKENS, DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT_LINES, OUTPUT_HEAD_RATIO, DEFAULT_OUTPUT_MAX_TOKENS, DEFAULT_READ_LINE_CAP, DEFAULT_READ_MAX_TOKENS, DEFAULT_MCP_MAX_RESULT_TOKENS, DEFAULT_SUBAGENT_MAX_RESULT_TOKENS } = require('./constants');
 const { capToTokens, defaultEstimate, DEFAULT_CHARS_PER_TOKEN } = require('./web-extract');
 const { mapInvokeToCall } = require('./tools');
@@ -342,6 +342,19 @@ function truncateForDebug(text, maxLines = 40, maxChars = 2000) {
 // layer (commands.js) feeds the meta into formatToolLine together with
 // the tag, so the formatter can produce the 4-segment line in either the
 // pending (live region) or final (scrollback) context.
+// Phase 6a — build one native `{role:'tool'}` result message. `content` is the
+// model-facing bound result string, kept BYTE-IDENTICAL (Inv. 1). A serialized
+// display descriptor core (from onToolEnd), when present, rides along as a
+// sibling `_display` key — additive only, never part of `content`, and stripped
+// before the wire (see api.js) so it is never fed to the model. Replay
+// (chat-history.js) reads `_display` to render with full fidelity; its absence
+// falls back to the legacy summary.
+function _nativeToolMessage(toolCallId, content, displayCore) {
+  const msg = { role: 'tool', tool_call_id: toolCallId, content };
+  if (displayCore) msg._display = displayCore;
+  return msg;
+}
+
 function _metaForTool(tag, result) {
   if (!result || result.error) return null;
   switch (tag) {
@@ -383,6 +396,11 @@ function _metaForTool(tag, result) {
         bytes: result.size_kb ? Math.round(parseFloat(result.size_kb) * 1024) : 0,
         kind: result.type || null,
       };
+    case 'ask_user':
+      // Surface the user's chosen answer as display meta so the committed result
+      // line reads "✓ user · ask <question> · → <answer>". Display-only: the
+      // model-facing string (formatFileResult) still uses the full question.
+      return { answer: result.answer };
     default:
       return null;
   }
@@ -402,6 +420,7 @@ function _attrsFromCall(call) {
       return { command: args[0] || '' };
     case 'read':
     case 'read_file':
+    case 'view_image':
     case 'list_dir':
     case 'delete_file':
     case 'make_dir':
@@ -819,6 +838,15 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
           maxTokens: cfg.read_max_tokens,
         });
       }
+      case 'view_image':
+        // The encoded image rides on result.image and is attached to this turn's
+        // tool-result message by the loop below; the model-facing text is just a
+        // short confirmation. Wording is deliberate: the image is visible to the
+        // MODEL for analysis, NOT shown to the user — so the model must not refer
+        // to it as something the user can see.
+        return `Image ${result.path} (${result.media_type}, ${result.bytes} bytes) is now attached to your `
+          + `vision context — analyze it directly. It was made visible to YOU (the model) for analysis; it was `
+          + `NOT displayed to the user, so do not refer to it as something the user can see.`;
       case 'write':
         return `Wrote ${result.bytes} bytes to ${args[0]}`;
       case 'append':
@@ -982,6 +1010,11 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
     };
 
     const nativeTools = isNativeToolsActive(model);
+    // Live-narration safety signal (b): an explicit per-profile assertion that
+    // this model does NOT inline reasoning into delta.content. Only an explicit
+    // `false` is the eager-stream signal; undefined/true keep the safe buffered
+    // fallback. Threaded to the UI gate via onStreamStart alongside nativeTools.
+    const inlineReasoning = getInlineReasoning(model);
 
     // Checkpoint turn linkage (Task 4.3): tag every checkpoint captured during
     // this turn with the conversation point that produced it, so a future
@@ -1077,11 +1110,19 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
         ? (token) => {
             if (!streamStarted) {
               streamStarted = true;
-              if (cb.onStreamStart) cb.onStreamStart();
+              // Pass the rail + inline-reasoning assertion so the UI gate can
+              // decide whether it is safe to eager-open live narration on the
+              // native rail. The XML rail (nativeTools false) ignores both.
+              if (cb.onStreamStart) cb.onStreamStart(nativeTools, inlineReasoning);
             }
             parser.push(token);
           }
         : null;
+      // Live-narration safety signal (a): surface the first reasoning_content
+      // delta to the UI so it can eager-open the gate before content arrives.
+      const wrappedOnReasoning = cb.onReasoningStart
+        ? () => { cb.onReasoningStart(); }
+        : null;
 
       const MAX_RETRIES = 3;
       const RETRYABLE_STATUS = new Set([408, 425, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504]);
@@ -1108,6 +1149,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
               linePrefix: wrappedOnToken ? '' : linePrefix,
               showThink,
               onToken: wrappedOnToken,
+              onReasoning: wrappedOnReasoning,
               silent: !!wrappedOnToken,
               signal: controller.signal,
               onTrim: (info) => {
@@ -1312,7 +1354,19 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
           }
         }
       } else {
-        toolCalls = extractToolCalls(reply, { model });
+        // No structured native tool_calls this turn. Parse the text for tool
+        // calls — but on the NATIVE rail, suppress the soft TEXT HEURISTICS that
+        // infer commands from untagged prose (the bare ```bash/```sh/```shell
+        // fence pass). On the native rail a finish_reason=stop turn is usually a
+        // plain text final answer, and an illustrative ```bash block in that
+        // narration must NEVER be executed (the incident: a hung `su nobody` and
+        // two placeholder examples were run). EXPLICIT tool-tag dispatch
+        // (<exec>/<shell>/<write_file>/<minimax:tool_call>/<function=…>/MCP tags)
+        // is deliberate and unambiguous, so it stays active on BOTH rails — the
+        // native rail legitimately dispatches tools via those tags too. The XML
+        // rail keeps every heuristic (byte-identical to before): it has no
+        // structured channel, so the fence pass is part of its contract.
+        toolCalls = extractToolCalls(reply, { model, skipTextHeuristics: nativeTools });
       }
       const isNativeCall = nativeToolCalls.length > 0;
       const cleanedReply = cleanAssistantContent(reply);
@@ -1442,10 +1496,21 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
         assistantMsg.tool_calls = nativeToolCalls.filter((tc) => acceptedSet.has(tc.id));
       }
       messages.push(assistantMsg);
-      // When showThink is off and the turn has tool calls, suppress the text bubble —
-      // pre-tool reasoning is noise, tool result bubbles already convey what happened.
-      const displayReply = (!showThink && toolCalls.length > 0) ? '' : cleanedReply;
-      if (cb.onAssistantMessage) cb.onAssistantMessage(displayReply);
+      // Live narration (Claude-Code style): stream the model's pre-tool "what I'm
+      // about to do" text instead of blanking it when tools are present. `cleanedReply`
+      // has already had ALL reasoning stripped by cleanAssistantContent — the implicit
+      // </think> preamble (Qwen3-style) and any <think>/<reasoning>/<reflection>/<plan>
+      // blocks, plus the tool tags — so no hidden reasoning leaks into the bubble or
+      // persisted history. The implicit-think gate in chat-turn.js is the live-stream
+      // safety net for the token-by-token path; here we simply stop forcing the
+      // post-turn text to '' just because the iteration carried a tool call.
+      const displayReply = cleanedReply;
+      // `terminal` tells the UI a final answer from an intermediate tool-call
+      // iteration. Previously the UI used "content is empty" as that proxy (blanked
+      // tool iterations passed ''); now that intermediate iterations also carry
+      // narration, the proxy is gone — pass the real signal so web-activity collapse
+      // (which must only flush on the terminal answer) stays correct.
+      if (cb.onAssistantMessage) cb.onAssistantMessage(displayReply, { terminal: toolCalls.length === 0 });
 
       if (toolCalls.length === 0) {
         // Native mode: tool_calls came in but none could be converted (parse
@@ -1567,6 +1632,17 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
       }
 
       const results = [];
+      // view_image staging: encoded image records returned by view_image executors
+      // this turn. Collected here and attached to the tool-result message's
+      // `images[]` below, so api.js buildProviderMessages turns them into provider
+      // vision blocks on the NEXT model turn (the same wire path /image uses).
+      const stagedImages = [];
+      // Phase 6a — serialized display descriptor cores, pushed in LOCKSTEP with
+      // `results` (one entry per result, null when there is no descriptor — e.g.
+      // a denied/withheld/hook-blocked call never reaches onToolEnd). Since
+      // results[i] ↔ nativeToolCallIds[i] ↔ toolCalls[i], displayCores[i] aligns
+      // with the native tool message pushed below and rides along as `_display`.
+      const displayCores = [];
       const debugEntries = debug ? [] : null;
       let aborted = false;
 
@@ -1621,6 +1697,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
               if (cb.onError) cb.onError({ message: `PreToolUse hook blocked ${tag}.`, isWarning: true });
               logToolCall(tag, { args: call.slice(1) }, false, 'hook-blocked');
               results.push(resultStr);
+              displayCores.push(null);
               if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms: 0, status: 'hook_blocked', exitCode: null, result: resultStr });
               continue;
             }
@@ -1663,6 +1740,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
             if (cb.onError) cb.onError({ message: `Permission rule denied ${tag} (${ruleVerdict.reason}).`, isWarning: true });
             logToolCall((permDesc && permDesc.tag) || tag, { args: call.slice(1) }, false, `rule-denied:${ruleVerdict.reason}`);
             results.push(resultStr);
+            displayCores.push(null);
             if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms: 0, status: 'rule_denied', exitCode: null, result: resultStr, rule: ruleVerdict.reason });
             continue;
           }
@@ -1680,6 +1758,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
             if (cb.onPlanWithhold) cb.onPlanWithhold(tag, arg, permDesc);
             logToolCall(permDesc.tag || tag, { args: call.slice(1) }, false, 'withheld');
             results.push(resultStr);
+            displayCores.push(null);
             if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms: 0, status: 'withheld', exitCode: null, result: resultStr });
             continue;
           }
@@ -1707,6 +1786,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
                 : `${tag} ${arg}: Permission denied by user.${reasonSuffix}`;
               logToolCall(permTag, { args: call.slice(1) }, false, 'denied');
               results.push(resultStr);
+              displayCores.push(null);
               if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms: 0, status: 'denied', exitCode: null, result: resultStr, rule: ruleVerdict.reason || undefined });
               aborted = true;
               break;
@@ -1733,8 +1813,9 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
                 const oneLine = String(arg).replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
                 const truncatedCmd = oneLine.length > 80 ? oneLine.slice(0, 77) + '...' : oneLine;
                 const resultStr = `User interrupted execution after ${elapsedS}s. Tool was running: ${truncatedCmd}. Plan around this — do not retry the same long-running command.`;
-                if (cb.onToolEnd) cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta: null, error: { message: 'aborted' } });
+                const displayCore = cb.onToolEnd ? cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta: null, error: { message: 'aborted' } }) : null;
                 results.push(resultStr);
+                displayCores.push(displayCore || null);
                 if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms, status: 'aborted', exitCode: null, result: resultStr });
                 aborted = true;
                 break;
@@ -1754,8 +1835,9 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
                 const error = shellResult.exit_code !== 0
                   ? { message: `exit ${shellResult.exit_code}`, code: shellResult.exit_code }
                   : null;
-                if (cb.onToolEnd) cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta, error });
+                const displayCore = cb.onToolEnd ? cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta, error }) : null;
                 results.push(await augmentWithHooks(tag, attrs, resultStr, preFeedback));
+                displayCores.push(displayCore || null);
                 if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({
                   tag,
                   call,
@@ -1783,19 +1865,35 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
               const oneLine = String(arg).replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
               const truncatedArg = oneLine.length > 80 ? oneLine.slice(0, 77) + '...' : oneLine;
               const resultStr = `User interrupted execution after ${elapsedS}s. Tool was running: ${tag} ${truncatedArg}. Plan around this — do not retry the same long-running operation.`;
-              if (cb.onToolEnd) cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta: null, error: { message: 'aborted' } });
+              const displayCore = cb.onToolEnd ? cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta: null, error: { message: 'aborted' } }) : null;
               results.push(resultStr);
+              displayCores.push(displayCore || null);
               if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms, status: 'aborted', exitCode: null, result: resultStr });
               aborted = true;
               break;
             } else {
               const resultStr = formatFileResult(call, fileResult);
+              // view_image: stage the encoded image so it attaches to this turn's
+              // tool-result message (below) and reaches the model as a vision block
+              // next turn — same mechanism /image uses, no parallel encoder.
+              if (fileResult && fileResult.image && typeof fileResult.image.data === 'string') {
+                stagedImages.push(fileResult.image);
+              }
               const meta = _metaForTool(tag, fileResult);
               const error = fileResult.error
                 ? { message: fileResult.error, code: fileResult.error_code || null }
                 : null;
-              if (cb.onToolEnd) cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta, error });
+              // File-edit diff payload (execution-time rendering). Mutating file
+              // tools attach _diffBefore/_diffAfter; hand them to onToolEnd so the
+              // UI renders the diff for EVERY edit, independent of the permission
+              // modal or approval state. Absent on non-mutating/loaded calls → null.
+              const diff = (fileResult && typeof fileResult._diffBefore === 'string'
+                && typeof fileResult._diffAfter === 'string')
+                ? { before: fileResult._diffBefore, after: fileResult._diffAfter, path: fileResult.path || call[1] }
+                : null;
+              const displayCore = cb.onToolEnd ? cb.onToolEnd(tag, resultStr, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta, error, diff }) : null;
               results.push(await augmentWithHooks(tag, attrs, resultStr, preFeedback));
+              displayCores.push(displayCore || null);
               if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({
                 tag,
                 call,
@@ -1807,7 +1905,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
             }
           } catch (err) {
             const ms = Date.now() - toolStart;
-            if (cb.onToolEnd) cb.onToolEnd(tag, `Error: ${err.message}`, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta: null, error: err });
+            const displayCore = cb.onToolEnd ? cb.onToolEnd(tag, `Error: ${err.message}`, ms, { id: invocationId, call, attrs, meta: null, error: err }) : null;
             if (cb.onError) {
               cb.onError({ message: `Tool error (${tag}): ${err.message}`, isWarning: true });
             } else {
@@ -1815,6 +1913,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
             }
             logToolCall(tag, { args: call.slice(1) }, false, 'error');
             results.push(`${tag}: Error — ${err.message}`);
+            displayCores.push(displayCore || null);
             if (debugEntries) debugEntries.push({ tag, call, ms, status: 'exception', exitCode: null, result: `Error — ${err.message}` });
           }
         }
@@ -1891,7 +1990,7 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
           const reason = isAborted() ? 'user interrupted' : 'after user denied an action';
           if (isNativeCall) {
             for (let i = 0; i < results.length; i++) {
-              messages.push({ role: 'tool', tool_call_id: nativeToolCallIds[i], content: results[i] });
+              messages.push(_nativeToolMessage(nativeToolCallIds[i], results[i], displayCores[i]));
             }
           } else {
             messages.push({
@@ -1905,14 +2004,44 @@ function createAgentRunner({ chatStream, extractToolCalls, agentExecShell, agent
 
       if (isNativeCall) {
         for (let i = 0; i < results.length; i++) {
-          messages.push({ role: 'tool', tool_call_id: nativeToolCallIds[i], content: results[i] });
+          messages.push(_nativeToolMessage(nativeToolCallIds[i], results[i], displayCores[i]));
+        }
+        // view_image on the native rail: OpenAI `tool` messages can't carry image
+        // parts, so stage the encoded image(s) on a trailing user turn (exactly the
+        // /image mechanism). buildProviderMessages turns `images[]` into vision
+        // blocks on the next request; the text result already landed on the tool
+        // message above.
+        if (stagedImages.length) {
+          messages.push({
+            role: 'user',
+            content: 'The image(s) requested via view_image are attached to this message for your analysis. '
+              + 'They are visible to you (the model) only — not shown to the user.',
+            images: stagedImages,
+          });
         }
       } else {
         const feedback = results.join('\n\n');
-        messages.push({
+        // Phase 6b — XML rail replay parity. The feedback blob folds every tool
+        // result of this turn into ONE {role:'user'} message and cannot be split
+        // back by parsing (the only separator, \n\n, appears freely inside result
+        // bodies). So persist the per-call display descriptors as a sibling
+        // `_display[]` aligned 1:1 with `results` (same serialized cores the
+        // native rail attaches, see _nativeToolMessage), preserving `null`s for
+        // ops with no descriptor. `content` stays BYTE-IDENTICAL (Inv. 1) — the
+        // model never sees `_display` (stripInternalKeys drops it before the wire).
+        // Replay (chat-session.displayLoadedMessages) only renders per-call when
+        // EVERY slot is a non-null known-version core; a single `null` (e.g. a web
+        // op, out of scope until 6c) keeps the whole blob on the legacy summary.
+        const resultsMsg = {
           role: 'user',
           content: `Tool execution results:\n\n${feedback}\n\nContinue with the task. If everything is done, summarize what was accomplished.`,
-        });
+          _display: displayCores.slice(),
+        };
+        // view_image on the XML rail: the tool-result blob is a single user
+        // message, which CAN carry image parts — attach the staged image(s) so
+        // buildProviderMessages renders them as vision blocks next turn.
+        if (stagedImages.length) resultsMsg.images = stagedImages;
+        messages.push(resultsMsg);
       }
     }