@sema-agent/server 7.67.0 → 7.69.0

package/dist/task-mcp.js

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-import { resolveComplianceDenies } from "@sema-agent/core";
+import { mcpInjectionDroppedNotice, resolveComplianceDenies } from "@sema-agent/core";
 import { HttpError } from "./security.js";
 import { CONTENT_ORIGIN_WORDS, describeBadContentOrigin, isContentOriginWord } from "./mcp-content-origin.js";
 import { readMcpSourceLabel } from "./mcp-source-label.js";
 import { readMcpToolFaces } from "./mcp-tool-faces.js";
 export const MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS = 32;
+export const MAX_REQUEST_MCP_DROP_NAMES = MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS;
 export function mcpInjectionHonored(config) {
     if (config.lockedConfigKeys?.includes("mcp") === true)
         return false;
@@ -14,20 +15,27 @@ export function mcpInjectionHonored(config) {
 function isStringRecord(v) {
     return !!v && typeof v === "object" && !Array.isArray(v) && Object.values(v).every((x) => typeof x === "string");
 }
+const bad = (field) => ({ ok: false, field });
+const MALFORMED_NAME = "<malformed>";
+function declaredName(e) {
+    return e && typeof e === "object" && typeof e.name === "string" && e.name !== ""
+        ? String(e.name)
+        : MALFORMED_NAME;
+}
 function normalizeServer(e, noteBadOrigin) {
     if (!e || typeof e !== "object")
-        return null;
+        return bad("entry");
     const o = e;
     if (typeof o.name !== "string" || o.name.length === 0 || o.name.length > 128)
-        return null;
+        return bad("name");
     const t = o.transport;
     if (!t || typeof t !== "object")
-        return null;
+        return bad("transport");
     const tr = t;
     let transport;
     if (tr.kind === "stdio") {
         if (typeof tr.command !== "string" || tr.command.length === 0)
-            return null;
+            return bad("transport.command");
         transport = {
             kind: "stdio",
             command: tr.command,
@@ -37,7 +45,7 @@ function normalizeServer(e, noteBadOrigin) {
     }
     else if (tr.kind === "http") {
         if (typeof tr.url !== "string" || !/^https?:\/\//i.test(tr.url))
-            return null;
+            return bad("transport.url");
         transport = {
             kind: "http",
             url: tr.url,
@@ -46,12 +54,12 @@ function normalizeServer(e, noteBadOrigin) {
         };
     }
     else {
-        return null;
+        return bad("transport.kind");
     }
     const spec = { name: o.name, transport };
     if (o.allowTools !== undefined) {
         if (!Array.isArray(o.allowTools) || !o.allowTools.every((a) => typeof a === "string"))
-            return null;
+            return bad("allowTools");
         spec.allowTools = o.allowTools;
     }
     if (typeof o.elicitation === "boolean")
@@ -82,29 +90,32 @@ function normalizeServer(e, noteBadOrigin) {
     Object.assign(spec, readMcpSourceLabel(spec.name, o.source));
     const faces = readMcpToolFaces(o.toolFaces);
     if (!faces.ok)
-        return null;
+        return bad("toolFaces");
     if (faces.faces !== undefined)
         spec.toolFaces = faces.faces;
-    return spec;
+    return { ok: true, spec };
 }
 export function validateRequestMcp(raw) {
     if (raw === undefined || raw === null)
-        return { ok: [], dropped: [], badContentOrigin: [] };
+        return validateRequestMcpEntries([]);
     if (!Array.isArray(raw))
         return null;
+    return validateRequestMcpEntries(raw);
+}
+function validateRequestMcpEntries(raw) {
     const ok = [];
     const dropped = [];
     const badContentOrigin = [];
     for (const e of raw.slice(0, MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS)) {
         const v = normalizeServer(e, (server, value) => badContentOrigin.push({ server, value: describeBadContentOrigin(value) }));
-        if (v)
-            ok.push(v);
+        if (v.ok)
+            ok.push(v.spec);
         else
-            dropped.push(e && typeof e === "object" && typeof e.name === "string" ? String(e.name) : "<malformed>");
+            dropped.push({ server: declaredName(e), reason: "malformed_entry", field: v.field });
     }
-    if (raw.length > MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS)
-        dropped.push(`(+${raw.length - MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS} over cap of ${MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS})`);
-    return { ok, dropped, badContentOrigin };
+    for (const e of raw.slice(MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS, MAX_REQUEST_MCP_SERVERS + MAX_REQUEST_MCP_DROP_NAMES))
+        dropped.push({ server: declaredName(e), reason: "over_cap" });
+    return { ok, dropped, droppedTotal: Math.max(0, raw.length - ok.length), badContentOrigin };
 }
 export function assertRequestMcpUnlocked(bodyMcp, lockedKeys) {
     if (!lockedKeys.has("mcp"))
@@ -140,21 +151,33 @@ export function mergeRequestMcp(baseline, gated, reservedNames) {
     const add = gated.filter((s) => !closed.has(s.name));
     return add.length === 0 ? baseline : [...(baseline ?? []), ...add];
 }
-export function resolveRequestMcp(baseline, bodyMcp, config, logger) {
+export function resolveRequestMcp(baseline, bodyMcp, config, logger, notice) {
     if (bodyMcp === undefined || bodyMcp === null)
         return baseline;
-    const honored = mcpInjectionHonored(config);
-    if (!honored) {
-        logger?.warn("mcp_injection_ignored", { reason: "gate_closed (per-request MCP honored only on single-user host lane)" });
-        return baseline;
-    }
-    const v = validateRequestMcp(bodyMcp);
-    if (v === null) {
+    const { mcp, drops } = classifyRequestMcp(baseline, bodyMcp, config, logger);
+    mintInjectionDropNotices(drops, notice);
+    return mcp;
+}
+function classifyRequestMcp(baseline, bodyMcp, config, logger) {
+    if (bodyMcp !== undefined && bodyMcp !== null && !Array.isArray(bodyMcp)) {
         logger?.warn("mcp_injection_ignored", { reason: "mcpServers not an array" });
-        return baseline;
+        return { mcp: baseline, drops: [] };
     }
-    if (v.dropped.length > 0)
-        logger?.warn("mcp_injection_dropped", { dropped: v.dropped });
+    const entries = Array.isArray(bodyMcp) ? bodyMcp : [];
+    const outcome = mcpInjectionHonored(config) ? classifyHonored(baseline, entries, config, logger) : classifyGateClosed(baseline, entries);
+    if (outcome.drops.length > 0)
+        logger?.warn("mcp_injection_dropped", { dropped: outcome.drops, droppedTotal: outcome.droppedTotal });
+    return { mcp: outcome.mcp, drops: outcome.drops };
+}
+function classifyGateClosed(baseline, entries) {
+    return {
+        mcp: baseline,
+        drops: entries.slice(0, MAX_REQUEST_MCP_DROP_NAMES).map((e) => ({ server: declaredName(e), reason: "gate_closed" })),
+        droppedTotal: entries.length,
+    };
+}
+function classifyHonored(baseline, entries, config, logger) {
+    const v = validateRequestMcpEntries(entries);
     if (v.badContentOrigin.length > 0) {
         logger?.warn("mcp_content_class_dropped", {
             entries: v.badContentOrigin,
@@ -165,13 +188,26 @@ export function resolveRequestMcp(baseline, bodyMcp, config, logger) {
     const reservedNames = config.mcpServers?.reservedNames ?? [];
     const closed = deploymentClosedMcpNames(baseline, reservedNames);
     const blocked = v.ok.filter((s) => closed.has(s.name)).map((s) => s.name);
-    if (blocked.length > 0) {
-        logger?.warn("mcp_injection_dropped", {
-            reason: "name_reserved_by_deployment",
-            dropped: blocked,
-            note: "these names are declared by the deployment (center/config) — mounted or skipped, a caller can neither shadow nor refill them; rename the request-side server",
-        });
+    return {
+        mcp: mergeRequestMcp(baseline, v.ok, reservedNames),
+        drops: [...v.dropped, ...blocked.map((server) => ({ server, reason: "name_reserved_by_deployment" }))],
+        droppedTotal: v.droppedTotal + blocked.length,
+    };
+}
+function mintInjectionDropNotices(drops, notice) {
+    if (notice === undefined || drops.length === 0)
+        return;
+    const sessionId = notice.sessionId;
+    if (typeof sessionId !== "string" || sessionId.length === 0)
+        return;
+    const said = new Set();
+    for (const d of drops) {
+        if (d.server !== MALFORMED_NAME) {
+            if (said.has(d.server))
+                continue;
+            said.add(d.server);
+        }
+        notice.emit(mcpInjectionDroppedNotice({ sessionId, server: d.server, reason: d.reason, ...(d.field !== undefined ? { field: d.field } : {}) }));
     }
-    return mergeRequestMcp(baseline, v.ok, reservedNames);
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=task-mcp.js.map

package/dist/tool-approval.d.ts

@@ -143,6 +143,26 @@ export interface ToolApprovalFrame {
      * ask」,治理策略产的与普通策略产的在这一个词上同形 ⇒ 顶替不了(逐字论证见 `governance-ask-marks.ts` 顶注)。
      */
     origin?: string;
+    /**
+     * **S-185 / [ref]**(core 7.10.0;**ADDITIVE**,`"tool_approval"` only)—— 这一问**为什么**到了人手上:
+     * auto 档的分类器被咨询过、而它**跑不了**。`cause` = core 的闭三词
+     * (`AUTO_MODE_UNAVAILABLE_CAUSES` = `error` / `timeout` / `breaker_open`),`AskRequest.classifierUnavailable`
+     * 逐字透传。
+     *
+     * 🔴 **缺席 ≠「分类器好着呢」**:缺席同时覆盖三形 —— 分类器答上了 / 这只 ask 没资格走分类器
+     * (`classifierMayAnswer` 的闭表)/ 本部署压根没接分类器。消费端**禁**把缺席读成对分类器健康的断言。
+     * 另注:`parse_error`(分类器跑了但答得出格)**不盖这一位** —— 那是另一句话,core 顶注逐字。
+     *
+     * 🔴 **不枚举词表**(值形是 `{cause: string}` 而不是本仓自铸的联合):词表单一属主在 core,抄一份会把
+     * core 加的新词吞成缺席。窄读只判「对象 ∧ `cause` 非空串 ∧ 无多余成员」(`readClassifierUnavailable`,
+     * 帧与卡的**唯一**铸造点 ⇒ 两面结构性同值)。
+     *
+     * 🔴 **echo-only,零消费**:熔断/超时的处置全在 core 的分类器站,server 不许据本键自铸第二套回落判据
+     * —— 同 `origin` / `denialLimitFallback` 两条顶注的同一条禁令(同一语义面两个写者)。
+     */
+    classifierUnavailable?: {
+        cause: string;
+    };
     /**
      * **E-14**([ref]② Trojan Source 族;**ADDITIVE**,`"tool_approval"` only)—— 这只 ask 的**工具输入**
      * (`AskRequest.args`)里含 bidi 控制符(LRM/RLM、嵌入/覆写、隔离符;字符类属主 `text-bidi.ts`)。

package/dist/tool-approval.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { approvalPayloadFingerprint } from "./plugins/approval-payload-fingerpri
 import { createLogger } from "./observability/logger.js";
 import { recordFailOpen } from "./observability/fail-open.js";
 import { deriveAskId, deriveBatchId, MAX_DECISION_NOTE_CHARS } from "./approval-ask-machine.js";
-import { ApprovalCardEnvelopeSchema, MAX_RULE_OFFERS, buildApprovalCard, buildApprovalCardEnvelope, buildApprovalRequestFrame, buildRevokeFrame, readDenialLimitFallback, readProbeCause, readRuleEvidence, readRuleOffersAbsence, RuleOfferRawSchema, backfillLegacyBatchMemberKind, screenUncoveredDetailSeat, } from "./approval-card.js";
+import { ApprovalCardEnvelopeSchema, MAX_RULE_OFFERS, buildApprovalCard, buildApprovalCardEnvelope, buildApprovalRequestFrame, buildRevokeFrame, readDenialLimitFallback, readClassifierUnavailable, readProbeCause, readRuleEvidence, readRuleOffersAbsence, RuleOfferRawSchema, backfillLegacyBatchMemberKind, screenUncoveredDetailSeat, } from "./approval-card.js";
 import { projectAskTerminalClaimTruth } from "./plugins/approval-ask-store-sql.js";
 import { governanceAskMarksFor, runWithGovernanceAskScope } from "./governance-ask-marks.js";
 const defaultLogger = createLogger();
@@ -844,6 +844,7 @@ export class ToolApprovalCoordinator {
             ...(ruleLaneMaterial !== undefined ? { ruleOffers: ruleLaneMaterial.offers } : {}),
             ...((a) => (a !== undefined ? { ruleOffersAbsence: a } : {}))(readRuleOffersAbsence(req)),
             ...((f) => (f !== undefined ? { denialLimitFallback: f } : {}))(readDenialLimitFallback(req)),
+            ...((c) => (c !== undefined ? { classifierUnavailable: c } : {}))(readClassifierUnavailable(req)),
             ...((c) => (c !== undefined ? { probeCause: c } : {}))(readProbeCause(req)),
             ...((c) => (c !== undefined ? { ruleEvidence: c } : {}))(readRuleEvidence(req)),
             ...(bounded.omitted ? { argsOmitted: true } : { args: bounded.args }),

package/dist/trace/core-keyset-guard.d.ts

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ type BgNotifExcluded = "kind" | "sessionScoped" | "owner" | "scope" | "descripti
 type _GuardBgNotif = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof BackgroundChildEvent, BgNotifProjected | BgNotifExcluded>>;
 type RosterProjected = "name" | "agentId" | "sessionId" | "toolUseId" | "owner" | "scope" | "sessionScoped" | "rootSessionId" | "model" | "modelFallback" | "createdAt";
 type _GuardRoster = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof RosterEntry, RosterProjected>>;
-type AskProjected = "toolName" | "toolCallId" | "args" | "message" | "sourceTaskId" | "fromSubagent" | "sourceAgentName" | "delegation" | "ruleOffers" | "ruleOffersAbsence" | "persistedRuleShadowed" | "probeCause" | "ruleEvidence" | "requiresRealApproval" | "denialLimitFallback" | "origin";
+type AskProjected = "toolName" | "toolCallId" | "args" | "message" | "sourceTaskId" | "fromSubagent" | "sourceAgentName" | "delegation" | "ruleOffers" | "ruleOffersAbsence" | "persistedRuleShadowed" | "probeCause" | "ruleEvidence" | "requiresRealApproval" | "denialLimitFallback" | "origin" | "classifierUnavailable";
 type AskExcluded = "preview" | "principal" | "riskAxes" | "boundInputHash" | "isDelegatedChild" | "probeReason" | "hasBidiControls" | "previewWithheld" | "execCwd";
 type _GuardAsk = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof AskRequest, AskProjected | AskExcluded>>;
 type TaskEventHandled = "text_delta" | "reasoning_delta" | "tool_start" | "tool_end" | "turn_end" | "compacted" | "diagnostics" | "message_committed" | "status" | "task_notification" | "task_progress" | "steering_injected" | "workspace_changed" | "done" | "context_usage" | "compaction_outcome" | "human_input" | "wiring_manifest" | "text_end" | "tool_roster_delta";
@@ -38,14 +38,14 @@ type _GuardMailbox = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof MailboxMessage, MailboxP
 type MailboxAppendProjected = "from" | "content" | "sentAt" | "hopChain" | "peerMeta";
 type _GuardMailboxAppend = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof MailboxAppendMessage, MailboxAppendProjected>>;
 type PermissionTraceKind = Extract<TraceEvent["kind"], `permission.${string}`>;
-type PermissionTraceProjected = "permission.persisted_rule_allowed" | "permission.rule_store_unreadable";
+type PermissionTraceProjected = "permission.persisted_rule_allowed" | "permission.rule_store_unreadable" | "permission.read_only_allowed";
 type PermissionTraceDropped = "permission.sandbox_admitted" | "permission.rule_sync_resurrected" | "permission.rule_sync_dropped" | "permission.org_snapshot_unavailable";
 type _GuardPermissionTrace = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<PermissionTraceKind, PermissionTraceProjected | PermissionTraceDropped>>;
 type _GuardPermissionTraceReverse = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<PermissionTraceProjected | PermissionTraceDropped, PermissionTraceKind>>;
 /** `T` 非 `never` 时收敛到 `never`(空集 ⇒ 残留 `"EMPTY"` ⇒ tsc 红)。 */
 type AssertNonEmpty<T> = [T] extends [never] ? "EMPTY" : never;
 type _GuardPermissionTraceNonEmpty = AssertAllKeysHandled<AssertNonEmpty<PermissionTraceKind>>;
-type SummaryProjected = "sessionId" | "scope" | "createdAt" | "gateKind" | "severity" | "spentMicroUsd" | "deadline" | "hasBidiControls" | "requiresRealApproval" | "denialLimitFallback" | "origin";
+type SummaryProjected = "sessionId" | "scope" | "createdAt" | "gateKind" | "severity" | "spentMicroUsd" | "deadline" | "hasBidiControls" | "requiresRealApproval" | "denialLimitFallback" | "origin" | "classifierUnavailable";
 type SummaryExcluded = "token" | "toolInput" | "toolName" | "toolCallId" | "preview" | "principal" | "sourceTaskId" | "contentKind" | "restoreMode" | "checkpointId" | "previewWithheld";
 type _GuardInboxSummary = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof CheckpointSummary, SummaryProjected | SummaryExcluded>>;
 type TaskSpecWired = "objective" | "principal" | "images" | "sessionId" | "requireExistingSession" | "oneShot" | "clientContext" | "resumeAt" | "resumeAtMode" | "model" | "compactionModel" | "thinking" | "systemPrompt" | "appendSystemPrompt" | "promptProvider" | "memory" | "suggestNextPrompts" | "restoreFiles" | "acceptPartialRestore" | "rewindFilesTo" | "tools" | "excludeTools" | "deferTools" | "toolMaterializeStrategy" | "promptProfile" | "toolPolicy" | "onAsk" | "onQuestion" | "hooks" | "durableApproval" | "resourceSuspend" | "resilience" | "finalVerification" | "checkpointStore" | "handsReadOnly" | "memoryPersistenceCapable" | "additionalDirectories" | "additionalReadDirectories" | "enablePlanMode" | "interactiveTools" | "enableFork" | "shellGate" | "mcp" | "a2a" | "skills" | "backgroundScope" | "envFacts" | "limits" | "configOverrides" | "forwardSubagentEvents" | "retainSubagentSessions" | "retainBackgroundProcesses" | "outputSchema" | "outputRetries" | "compaction" | "attachments" | "selfOrchestration" | "getApiKeyAndHeaders" | "interactionPosture" | "agents" | "taskId" | "signal" | "preemptSignal" | "modelRole" | "enableBlockedReport" | "maxSuspends" | "autoModeRequested";

package/dist/trace/engine-notice-wire.d.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
  * 同文件 G1 e2e 的全码扇出夹具、以及契约文档附录 D.3 那张表(含**小节标题里的码数** —— 那道门本批
  * 刚立,立完就在下一次加码时自己咬住了)。
  */
-export declare const ENGINE_NOTICE_WIRE_CODES: readonly ["memory.session_polluted", "memory.harvest_quarantined", "memory.delegation_static_mark_waived", "memory.hold_opened", "memory.hold_released", "memory.hold_disposed", "task.turn_interrupted", "steering.parked_input_blocked", "task.user_steer_undrained", "task.user_followup_undrained", "memory.capture_opted_out", "memory.capture_optout_unpersisted", "task.halt_unconsumed", "task.late_approval", "config.durable_gate_unavailable", "peer.inbound_disposition", "peer.held_settled", "peer.idle_subscription", "classifier.denial_limit"];
+export declare const ENGINE_NOTICE_WIRE_CODES: readonly ["memory.session_polluted", "memory.harvest_quarantined", "memory.delegation_static_mark_waived", "memory.hold_opened", "memory.hold_released", "memory.hold_disposed", "task.turn_interrupted", "steering.parked_input_blocked", "task.user_steer_undrained", "task.user_followup_undrained", "memory.capture_opted_out", "memory.capture_optout_unpersisted", "task.halt_unconsumed", "task.late_approval", "config.durable_gate_unavailable", "peer.inbound_disposition", "peer.held_settled", "peer.idle_subscription", "classifier.denial_limit", "mcp.injection_dropped", "delegation.ask_unresolvable"];
 export type EngineNoticeWireCode = (typeof ENGINE_NOTICE_WIRE_CODES)[number];
 /** 白名单谓词(单点):路由与门都读这一个,不许第二处手抄码串。 */
 export declare function isEngineNoticeWireCode(code: string): code is EngineNoticeWireCode;
@@ -136,5 +136,21 @@ export declare function registerEngineNoticeLeg(opts: {
     live?: EngineNoticeWireSink;
     durable?: EngineNoticeWireSink;
     router?: EngineNoticeRouter;
+    /**
+     * L-167 —— **腿开张之前**就已经铸好的通告(装配期 `resolveSpec` 的产物,经
+     * `PreparedTaskSubmission.engineNotices` 递过来)。注册完口**立刻**经同一只 {@link EngineNoticeRouter.route}
+     * 投出:白名单、归属键、消毒、隔离四件判据一个都不绕,**不是**第二条投递机制 —— 只是把 `route()` 挪到
+     * 「这条会话已经有口在听」的那一拍。
+     *
+     * 🔴 为什么不让铸点自己 `route()`:装配(`prepareSpec`)跑在本函数**之前**,那一刻这条会话一只口都没有,
+     * `route()` 恒返 0 —— 一条结构上永远投不出去的用户面披露,就是本仓 `task.user_steer_undrained` 陈腐明拒
+     * 那一族的病。缺席/空数组 ⇒ 一个字节不投(既有腿逐字不变)。
+     */
+    pending?: readonly {
+        code: string;
+        message: string;
+        detail?: Record<string, unknown>;
+        sessionId?: unknown;
+    }[];
 }): () => void;
 //# sourceMappingURL=engine-notice-wire.d.ts.map

package/dist/trace/engine-notice-wire.js

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ export const ENGINE_NOTICE_WIRE_CODES = [
     "peer.held_settled",
     "peer.idle_subscription",
     "classifier.denial_limit",
+    "mcp.injection_dropped",
+    "delegation.ask_unresolvable",
 ];
 const WIRE_CODES = new Set(ENGINE_NOTICE_WIRE_CODES);
 export function isEngineNoticeWireCode(code) {
@@ -150,6 +152,10 @@ export function registerEngineNoticeLeg(opts) {
     const sinks = [...(live ? [live] : []), ...(durable ? [durable] : [])];
     if (sinks.length === 0)
         return () => undefined;
-    return (opts.router ?? defaultEngineNoticeRouter).registerLeg(sessionId, sinks);
+    const router = opts.router ?? defaultEngineNoticeRouter;
+    const unregister = router.registerLeg(sessionId, sinks);
+    for (const notice of opts.pending ?? [])
+        router.route(notice);
+    return unregister;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=engine-notice-wire.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sema-agent/server",
-  "version": "7.67.0",
+  "version": "7.69.0",
   "description": "Sema Server — the server/API implementation layer for Sema, wiring core, registry, model providers, and cloud agent execution. Built on @sema-agent/core.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "BUSL-1.1",
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@
     "build:binary:run-local:darwin-arm64": "bun build --compile --target=bun-darwin-arm64 src/run-local.ts --outfile dist/run-local-darwin-arm64"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@sema-agent/core": "7.9.0",
-    "@sema-agent/settings-schema": "1.9.0",
+    "@sema-agent/core": "7.11.2",
+    "@sema-agent/settings-schema": "1.10.0",
     "e2b": "^2.28.0",
     "libsodium-wrappers": "^0.8.4",
     "mysql2": "^3.22.4",
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
     "sharp": "^0.35.3"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@sema-agent/sdk": "8.6.0",
+    "@sema-agent/sdk": "8.8.0",
     "@types/libsodium-wrappers": "^0.7.14",
     "@types/node": "22.10.2",
     "@types/pg": "^8.20.0",