@sema-agent/server 7.105.0 → 7.107.0

package/dist/trace/project.d.ts

@@ -296,9 +296,10 @@ export declare function toolEndEventData(ev: {
  * **不等于** `tool_end` 的 duration)。
  *
  * ## 信任划线
- *  · `toolCallId` / `toolName` —— 调用 id(🔴 S-283 订正:**服务商**在 tool_use / tool_calls 里给的,引擎只在缺席时自铸兜底 ——
- *    此前写「引擎铸」不实)与名册里的工具名(与 `tool_start` 逐字同源)⇒ verbatim。调用 id 这一族在**逐帧面**上的形状闸
- *    不在 S-283 射程(它是全 wire 的 join 键,要闸得所有面一起闸,见 run-terminal `admitProviderEcho` 顶注与车QO 收车档)。
+ *  · `toolCallId` / `toolName` —— 调用 id(🔴 S-283 订正:出身是**服务商**在 tool_use / tool_calls 里给的,引擎缺席时自铸兜底、越界时折叠 ——
+ *    此前写「引擎铸」不实)与名册里的工具名(与 `tool_start` 逐字同源)⇒ verbatim。调用 id 这一族的形状在**全部面的共同入口**一次施加 ——
+ *    core 7.36.0(#1207)brain 建调用那一行的准入(在形原样 / 越界单射折叠,原字节只在转录 `ToolCall.wireId`),逐帧面收到的恒是在形的引擎 id;
+ *    本仓不设第二道闸(见 run-terminal `admitProviderEcho` 顶注;S-890 关)。
  *  · `elapsedTimeSeconds` —— 引擎铸的整秒,单调、一 call 一个原点 ⇒ 有限数才铸键。
  *  · `output` —— 🔴 **UNTRUSTED RAW**,core 逐字「exactly as `tool_end.output`: process output that may
  *    carry secrets, paths or PII; core bounds only its SIZE, and a consumer MUST redact before persisting
@@ -578,8 +579,9 @@ export declare function workspaceChangedEventData(ev: {
  *       两词:core 只看合成后的 caps deny 位,本仓分得出这个 false 是 center 下发的还是本地 env 写的)。
  *       ⚠️ **`settings_denied` 不折进 `denied`,它折进 `no_intent`**(codex 车BO r1 [medium] 验真后纠):
  *       settings 层的 kill-switch 折的是**模式**(`effectivePermissionMode`:auto → default),于是 resolve-spec
- *       阶段④ 压根不写意图座 `TaskSpec.autoModeRequested` ⇒ core 的武装谓词第一项就落空;而本地 env 腿折的是
- *       **caps**(`applyLocalAutoModeDeny`),模式不动、座照写 ⇒ core 才报 `denied`。两条腿在 manifest 上
+ *       阶段④ 写的 `TaskSpec.permissionMode` 是 `"default"`(S-877 前是「不写意图座 `autoModeRequested`」)⇒ core 的武装谓词第一项就落空;
+ *       而本地 env 腿折的是 **caps**(`applyLocalAutoModeDeny`),模式照写 `"auto"` ⇒ core 才报 `denied`(并按 `operator_deny` 折 default、发
+ *       `config.permission_mode_unavailable`)。两条腿在 manifest 上
  *       **分不开**,要分辨得读 `/v1/capabilities`。对照表与保鲜钉在 `test/wiring-manifest-projection.test.ts`
  *       的 147③ 节,分岔的行为面格在 `test/permission-mode-shell-gate-translation.test.ts`;
  *       本函数**只透传**,一个字都不换。

package/dist/trace/project.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { admitProviderEcho, redactErrorMessage, redactModelText } from "../observability/run-terminal.js";
-import { MCP_DELIVERY_VERDICTS, MCP_LIVENESS_STATES, screenGateOutcome, TEAM_ROLES, ToolRoster, ToolRosterDelta, WRITE_PROTECTION_TARGET_VIEWS } from "@sema-agent/core";
+import { isAskClass, isAskOrigin, isPermissionMode, isPersistedRuleMandate, MCP_DELIVERY_VERDICTS, MCP_LIVENESS_STATES, screenGateOutcome, TEAM_ROLES, ToolRoster, ToolRosterDelta, WRITE_PROTECTION_TARGET_VIEWS } from "@sema-agent/core";
 import { Value } from "typebox/value";
 import { recordFailOpen } from "../observability/fail-open.js";
 import { redactSecrets, redactDeep } from "./redact.js";
@@ -103,6 +103,34 @@ export function screenedGate(v) {
         return undefined;
     }
 }
+function modeLedgerDefect(d) {
+    const classesOk = (v) => Array.isArray(v) && v.every((c) => isAskClass(c));
+    if (d.kind === "denied") {
+        if (d.mode !== undefined && !isPermissionMode(d.mode))
+            return "disposition.mode is outside the closed set";
+        if (d.askClass !== undefined && !isAskClass(d.askClass))
+            return "disposition.askClass is outside the closed set";
+        if (d.classes !== undefined && !classesOk(d.classes))
+            return "disposition.classes is not a list of ask classes";
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (d.released === undefined)
+        return false;
+    const r = d.released;
+    if (r === null || typeof r !== "object")
+        return "disposition.released is not an object";
+    const o = r;
+    if (!isPermissionMode(o.mode) || !isAskClass(o.askClass) || !classesOk(o.classes))
+        return "disposition.released.mode / askClass / classes is outside its closed set";
+    if (o.origin !== undefined && !isAskOrigin(o.origin))
+        return "disposition.released.origin is outside the closed set";
+    if (o.mandate !== undefined && !isPersistedRuleMandate(o.mandate))
+        return "disposition.released.mandate is outside the closed set";
+    if (o.reason !== undefined && !(typeof o.reason === "string" && Object.hasOwn(RELEASE_REASON_WORDS, o.reason)))
+        return "disposition.released.reason is outside the closed set";
+    return false;
+}
+const RELEASE_REASON_WORDS = { rule_unreadable: true };
 function screenedGateOrThrow(v) {
     if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") {
         if (v !== undefined)
@@ -121,6 +149,7 @@ function screenedGateOrThrow(v) {
         (d.classifier !== undefined && (d.classifier === null || typeof d.classifier !== "object") && "disposition.classifier is not an object") ||
         (classifierFallbackRaw !== undefined && (classifierFallbackRaw === null || typeof classifierFallbackRaw !== "object") && "disposition.classifier.fallback is not an object") ||
         (classifierFallbackRaw !== undefined && classifierFallbackRaw !== null && typeof classifierFallbackRaw === "object" && typeof classifierFallbackRaw.cause !== "string" && "disposition.classifier.fallback.cause is not a string") ||
+        modeLedgerDefect(d) ||
         (g.settlement !== undefined && (g.settlement === null || typeof g.settlement !== "object") && "settlement is not an object") ||
         (g.settlement !== undefined && g.settlement !== null && typeof g.settlement.kind !== "string" && "settlement.kind is not a string") ||
         (g.origin !== undefined && typeof g.origin !== "string" && "origin is not a string") ||
@@ -149,10 +178,29 @@ function screenedGateOrThrow(v) {
         recordFailOpen("server.trace.gate-outcome-defective", "settlement.who is not an object with a party in the closed set");
         return undefined;
     }
+    const rel = d.kind === "allowed" ? d.released : undefined;
+    const released = rel === undefined
+        ? undefined
+        : {
+            mode: rel.mode,
+            askClass: rel.askClass,
+            classes: [...rel.classes],
+            ...(rel.origin === undefined ? {} : { origin: rel.origin }),
+            ...(rel.mandate === undefined ? {} : { mandate: rel.mandate }),
+            ...(rel.reason === undefined ? {} : { reason: rel.reason }),
+        };
     return {
         disposition: d.kind === "denied"
-            ? { kind: "denied", deniedBy: d.deniedBy, ...(d.cause === undefined ? {} : { cause: d.cause }), ...(classifier === undefined ? {} : { classifier }) }
-            : { kind: "allowed", ...(classifier === undefined ? {} : { classifier }) },
+            ? {
+                kind: "denied",
+                deniedBy: d.deniedBy,
+                ...(d.cause === undefined ? {} : { cause: d.cause }),
+                ...(classifier === undefined ? {} : { classifier }),
+                ...(d.mode === undefined ? {} : { mode: d.mode }),
+                ...(d.askClass === undefined ? {} : { askClass: d.askClass }),
+                ...(d.classes === undefined ? {} : { classes: [...d.classes] }),
+            }
+            : { kind: "allowed", ...(classifier === undefined ? {} : { classifier }), ...(released === undefined ? {} : { released }) },
         ...(settlement === undefined ? {} : { settlement }),
         ...(g.origin === undefined ? {} : { origin: g.origin }),
     };

package/dist/trace/wire-projection-faces.d.ts

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ export declare const WIRE_PROJECTION_FACES: {
     readonly wiring_manifest_tenant: {
         readonly projector: "wiringManifestEventData";
         readonly coreType: `WiringManifest & ${string}`;
-        readonly excluded: readonly ["governance", "configFingerprint", "autoConsolidation", "readDeny", "peerPresence"];
+        readonly excluded: readonly ["governance", "configFingerprint", "autoConsolidation", "readDeny", "peerPresence", "permissionMode"];
         readonly unwrapped: readonly ["manifest"];
         readonly minted: readonly [];
     };

package/dist/trace/wire-projection-faces.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export const WIRE_PROJECTION_FACES = {
     wiring_manifest_tenant: {
         projector: "wiringManifestEventData",
         coreType: `WiringManifest & ${arm("wiring_manifest")}`,
-        excluded: ["governance", "configFingerprint", "autoConsolidation", "readDeny", "peerPresence"],
+        excluded: ["governance", "configFingerprint", "autoConsolidation", "readDeny", "peerPresence", "permissionMode"],
         unwrapped: ["manifest"],
         minted: [],
     },

package/dist/unattended-permission-mode.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/**
+ * S-877 候裁 15 → B(主会话裁定 2026-09-29,收车档 ⑩)—— `UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE`:**无人值守腿的模式,运维一处表态**。
+ *
+ * ## 规则(一句)
+ * 本仓**自己铸** spec、**没有调用方**能在请求上表态模式、也**没有审批席**的腿 —— leader worker(`src/leader/wire.ts`
+ * provisionWorker 两车道)、leader 的两只修复腿(集成沙箱修复 `mkRepair`、模块门修复 `runModuleGate` / 单代理修复环
+ * `attachRepairLoopDeps`)、run-local(`src/run-local.ts`,一次性 CLI)—— 它们的 `TaskSpec.permissionMode` 由本旋钮给,
+ * 经 {@link unattendedPermissionMode} 这**一只**读函数取值,各腿不各读 config、不各写默认。
+ *
+ * ## 为什么要有它(对 v7.105.0 回归的修,codex 对抗复审 F1 [high] 亲核成立)
+ * core 7.34.0 [ref]「Absent = `default`」:不带 `permissionMode` 的 spec 按 `default` 跑 —— 模式写门对每一次写先问、
+ * 形状层对非只读 shell 先问。上面三类腿**没有人**能答那一问(leader 的 Runner 不接 `onAsk`,零名单部署也不给 durable 席;
+ * run-local 无 TTY 时同形)⇒ headless 当场拒:worker `completed`、零写入。7.105.0 上这些腿不带模式也不问
+ * (缺席臂只给 base、`shellGate` 不写)。core 同段逐字给出路:「A library embedder that writes files with no approver
+ * now declares `permissionMode: "acceptEdits"` … or `"bypassPermissions"` … or wires an approver」——本仓对自己铸的
+ * 那几条 spec 就是那个 embedder。
+ *
+ * ## 三问
+ *  · **谁需要**:用 leader / run-local 的部署(零审批名单是常态)—— 缺省值必须等于 7.105.0 的行为,否则升级即断。
+ *  · **谁受伤**:想让无人值守腿更严的运维 —— **补偿** = 把旋钮设成 `acceptEdits`(根内写不问、非只读命令仍问 ⇒ 无人可答即拒)
+ *    / `default` / `dontAsk`(一切会问的都拒)/ `plan`。部署的审批名单(`APPROVAL_REQUIRE` 等)与治理层的问(运维强制、ask 规则、
+ *    hook)在任何一个词下都**照问**:bypassPermissions 只放行「普通」一类(core 7.34.0 [ref] 仲裁表,本仓不重推)。
+ *  · **什么补偿**:缺省 = `bypassPermissions` —— 写门 / 形状层与 7.105.0 同(不问);词表外的值起服拒启([ref],不静默回缺省)。
+ *    候裁 18 → D:缺省 bypass 会释放写保护 ⇒ 本腿把写保护从问改成拒({@link createUnattendedWriteProtectionPolicy});另六类释放 = 相对 7.105.0 的宽化,
+ *    如实披露(见那只函数的「射程外」)。**过渡形**:core 7.37.0(S-906)后退成 `default` + 按类作答的 onAsk,旋钮硬删(拒启点名)。
+ *
+ * ## 写面:本旋钮只给模式的**仲裁**,不给 bypassPermissions 在 core 模式表里的**写面 open**
+ * core 7.34.0 起 `modePolicyOf("bypassPermissions").writeFace === "open"`(工作区根之外也能写)。7.105.0 上这几条腿**没有模式**,
+ * 写面恒是引擎缺省 `"roots"`。所以 {@link buildUnattendedLegSpec} 同时在任务席写 `writeFace: "roots"`(core 容纳面解析序:
+ * 显式任务席在模式那一行**之前**,`dist/tools/fs/containment-face.d.ts` resolveContainmentFace 第 3 / 3′ 行)—— 缺省与 7.105.0
+ * **逐字**同形,运维把旋钮设成任何词也不会顺手拿到根外写面(那是 HTTP 腿上 `TASK_WRITE_FACE_ESCALATION` 管的另一件事,
+ * S-591;这几条腿不是请求,不经那道门)。⚠️ 这一格是按裁定的**意图**(「= 7.105.0 行为」)施工、比裁定字面多出的一半,
+ * 收车档 ⑩ 单列,主会话可翻。
+ *
+ * ## 射程外(成文)
+ *  · HTTP 腿(`POST /v1/tasks|runs`):模式在请求上(`permissionMode` / `settings.permissions.defaultMode`),缺席 = core `default`
+ *    原样过境(候裁 5 裁 A)—— 那里有调用方能表态,本旋钮不参与。
+ *  · leader 的 planner 路由(无手 Runner,没有写 / shell 可问)不读本旋钮。
+ *  · 中心下发 `RuntimeCaps.bypassPermissions === false` 时 core 把 bypass 折回 `default` 并发 `config.permission_mode_unavailable`
+ *    —— 组织级拒优先。本仓今天不写这一位([ref] 未闭环),故这条今天只在 core 侧可达。
+ */
+import { type PermissionMode, type RunnerDeps, type TaskSpec, type ToolPolicy } from "@sema-agent/core";
+/** 旋钮的出厂值(主会话裁定候裁 15 B / 18 D)。写面由 {@link buildUnattendedLegSpec} 钉 roots;写保护由 {@link createUnattendedWriteProtectionPolicy} 改拒。 */
+export declare const UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE_DEFAULT: "bypassPermissions";
+/** 解析结果:值 + 它从哪来(boot 一行 `unattended_permission_mode` 的两个字段)。 */
+export interface UnattendedPermissionModeSetting {
+    readonly value: PermissionMode;
+    readonly source: "env" | "default";
+}
+/**
+ * `UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE` 的**唯一**解析口。词表 = core `PERMISSION_MODES` 本尊(不手抄 —— core 加词本口随之受理,
+ * 减词本口随之拒启);两侧空白裁掉后**逐字**比较(不折大小写:`Default` / `BYPASS` 落拒启臂)。
+ * 未设 / 空串 ⇒ 出厂值,来源 `default`;词表外 ⇒ **拒启**,拒因点名旋钮与全部合法词([ref]:安全轴旋钮不许「以为设了其实没设」)。
+ */
+export declare function parseUnattendedPermissionMode(raw: string | undefined): UnattendedPermissionModeSetting;
+/** 三类无人值守腿的**唯一**读函数(见模块头注「规则」)。 */
+export declare function unattendedPermissionMode(config: {
+    readonly unattendedPermissionMode: PermissionMode;
+}): PermissionMode;
+/** 无人值守腿铸进 spec 的两键(纯数据 ⇒ `build*`):模式 = 旋钮值;写面 = `"roots"`(理由见模块头注「写面」)。 */
+export declare function buildUnattendedLegSpec(mode: PermissionMode): Required<Pick<TaskSpec, "permissionMode" | "writeFace">>;
+/**
+ * 🔴 **S-877 候裁 18 → D(主会话续裁 2026-09-29)—— 无审批席的腿上,写保护从「问」改成「拒」**。
+ *
+ * **病**(codex 续车轮 R2-F1):core `MODE_ARBITRATION` 里 `bypassPermissions` 释放 `write_protection` 一类(`bypassImmune:false`)⇒ 旋钮缺省下写保护表里的
+ * 目标零询问放行;7.105.0 这些腿无模式 ⇒ 写保护是一问 ⇒ 无人可答 ⇒ 拒。core 7.35 没有「放普通问、留保护问」的模式,也没有限定模式可释放类的座。
+ *
+ * **规则(一条)**:本腿的模式**会释放**写保护一问时(读 core 仲裁本尊 `arbitrateByMode`,不手抄模式词),把**本腿引擎判官用的同一张写保护表**
+ * (`runnerSeats` = 构造本腿 Runner 的那份 deps 的两只座 {@link UnattendedLegRunnerSeats};`writeProtectedPaths` 缺席 = core 源表 `WRITE_PROTECTED_DEFAULT_TABLE`)经 core 的
+ * `compileWriteProtection` 编成判官,每一行铸成一条 **core 路径拒行**(`ToolPolicy.pathDenyRules`,`faces:["write"]`)—— 引擎的写面把它们并进本腿的拒表:
+ * 写工具的路径解析与 shell 站(重定向 / `tee` / `sed -i` / `cp`·`mv`·`touch` 操作数)都按拒表拒,模式**不释放拒**。**路径匹配全在 core**:每行的
+ * `reaches` 就是判官自己的 `matchPath`(同一只折叠、同一只数据根放行 —— `dataRoot` 与引擎判官同源:本腿 Runner 的 `memoryEngineDir`),本仓不写一个字的
+ * 路径比较。模式不释放写保护(`default` / `acceptEdits` / `plan` / `auto` / `dontAsk`)⇒ 不铸(那一问照旧问,有席的腿上人能答 —— run-local 有 TTY 时)。
+ *
+ * **射程外**(如实,收车档 ⑩ 候裁 18):缺省 bypass 还释放 `probe` / `tool_marks_mcp` / `tool_marks_a2a` / `transcript_write` / `rule_unreadable` /
+ * `artifact_shared_read` 六类(core 对它们没有「拒」的座),相对 7.105.0 是宽化 —— CHANGELOG「谁受伤」与 MIGRATION 写明,补偿 = 旋钮 `acceptEdits` / `default`。
+ * **过渡形**:core 7.37.0(S-906,`AskRequest.askClass?` / `classes?` 到货)后本仓改成 `default` 模式 + fail-closed 按类作答的 `onAsk`,本座与旋钮一并硬删。
+ * **续跑**(codex r3 F1):本层是活闭包、进不了 checkpoint,而 core 续跑在 spec 不说模式时取 checkpoint 记下的模式 ⇒ durable 续跑必须重挂整条腿 ——
+ * leader worker 的续跑上下文带 `CheckpointCtx.unattendedLeg`,续跑家族据此让 `resolveSpec` 在全部折叠之后调 {@link createUnattendedLeg} / {@link withUnattendedLeg}。
+ * **已知过拒**(codex r3 F2,fail-closed 方向,随过渡形退役):core 的路径拒座在 shell 站把 `cp` 的**源**操作数也按写目标判(CC 同形,cli280.js:216993
+ * `cp:"write"`),引擎写保护判官只判真写目标 ⇒ 从写保护目标复制出来在本层下被拒、7.105.0 上照跑。本仓不补路径比较(那是第二个判官),特征化钉在
+ * test/run-local.test.ts「🚧 codex r3 F2」。
+ * **附带效果**(S-877 四续 ⑫b,随过渡形退役):本层只能是一只 `ToolPolicy`(路径拒座挂在策略上,`check` 必填 —— 这里恒 `allow`),原先没有 toolPolicy
+ * 的腿因此被引擎读成「有策略层」:系统提示多 `# Execution environment` 一块、UNGATED 告警不再发。7.35.2 上表达不了「只供拒行、不算策略层」;
+ * 特征化钉在 test/unattended-permission-mode.test.ts「🚧 四续 ⑫b」。
+ *
+ * 返回 `undefined` = 本腿不需要这一层(模式不释放写保护,或运维把表清空 `[]`)。活对象(带判官闭包)⇒ `create*`。
+ */
+export declare function createUnattendedWriteProtectionPolicy(mode: PermissionMode, runnerSeats: UnattendedLegRunnerSeats): ToolPolicy | undefined;
+/** 无人值守腿的全部铸件:模式 + 写面(纯数据)与写保护拒层(活对象,可缺席)。由 {@link createUnattendedLeg} 铸、{@link withUnattendedLeg} 并进 spec。 */
+export interface UnattendedLeg {
+    readonly spec: Required<Pick<TaskSpec, "permissionMode" | "writeFace">>;
+    readonly writeProtection: ToolPolicy | undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * 引擎写保护判官读的两只 Runner 座(`RunnerDeps` 的同名切片):表(`writeProtectedPaths`,缺席 = core 源表)与数据根放行(`memoryEngineDir`,缺席 = 引擎缺省)。
+ * 调用方递**构造本腿 Runner 的那一份** deps(或它的展开源)—— 表与根从哪来、根要不要在,都由那份 deps 说了算,腿的接线处不再单独读任何一只坐标
+ * (本模块是唯一读者;S-877 四续:接线处各读一份就是「两边同一张表、同一个根」这句话的第二、三个写者)。
+ */
+export type UnattendedLegRunnerSeats = Pick<RunnerDeps, "writeProtectedPaths" | "memoryEngineDir">;
+/** 三处无人值守腿(leader worker / 修复腿 / run-local)与续跑重挂的**唯一**铸点:`mode` 取 {@link unattendedPermissionMode},`runnerSeats` = 本腿 Runner 的 deps
+ *  (引擎写保护判官与本层拒行同一张表、同一个数据根)。 */
+export declare function createUnattendedLeg(mode: PermissionMode, runnerSeats: UnattendedLegRunnerSeats): UnattendedLeg;
+/**
+ * 把无人值守腿并进一条 spec —— 三处腿的**唯一**合并口:两键覆盖(本腿的模式与写面由旋钮说了算),写保护拒层与 spec 已有的 `toolPolicy` **合成**
+ * (`combinePolicies`,deny-wins,携带 `pathDenyRules`)而不是覆盖(leader worker 的 durable 名单门、run-local 的治理链都在那里)。
+ * 调用点必须在 spec 其余键(含治理折叠)**之后**调它,否则后铸的 `toolPolicy` 会把拒层盖掉。
+ */
+export declare function withUnattendedLeg<S extends Partial<TaskSpec>>(spec: S, leg: UnattendedLeg): S & Required<Pick<TaskSpec, "permissionMode" | "writeFace">>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=unattended-permission-mode.d.ts.map

package/dist/unattended-permission-mode.js

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { ASK_CLASSES, PERMISSION_MODES, arbitrateByMode, combinePolicies, compileWriteProtection, foldArbitrationRow } from "@sema-agent/core";
+import { recordFailOpen } from "./observability/fail-open.js";
+export const UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE_DEFAULT = "bypassPermissions";
+export function parseUnattendedPermissionMode(raw) {
+    const trimmed = (raw ?? "").trim();
+    if (trimmed === "")
+        return { value: UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE_DEFAULT, source: "default" };
+    const word = PERMISSION_MODES.find((m) => m === trimmed);
+    if (word === undefined) {
+        throw new Error(`env UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE="${trimmed.slice(0, 120)}" is not a permission mode — use one of: ${PERMISSION_MODES.join(", ")} ` +
+            `(or leave it unset for the default "${UNATTENDED_PERMISSION_MODE_DEFAULT}", which keeps the unattended legs — leader workers / repairs and run-local — acting as they did before server 7.106.0). ` +
+            `The word is matched EXACTLY (surrounding whitespace trimmed, no case folding). ` +
+            `Refusing to boot rather than treating it as unset: that would run those legs under a mode the operator did not choose`);
+    }
+    return { value: word, source: "env" };
+}
+export function unattendedPermissionMode(config) {
+    return config.unattendedPermissionMode;
+}
+export function buildUnattendedLegSpec(mode) {
+    return { permissionMode: mode, writeFace: "roots" };
+}
+export function createUnattendedWriteProtectionPolicy(mode, runnerSeats) {
+    if (!modeReleases(mode, "write_protection"))
+        return undefined;
+    const dataRoot = runnerSeats.memoryEngineDir;
+    const judge = compileWriteProtection(runnerSeats.writeProtectedPaths, dataRoot !== undefined ? { dataRoot } : undefined);
+    if (judge === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    const pathDenyRules = judge.rows.map((row) => ({
+        rule: `WriteProtected(${row.name})`,
+        tool: "Edit",
+        pattern: row.name,
+        faces: ["write"],
+        reaches: (absolutePath) => judge.matchPath(absolutePath)?.name === row.name,
+    }));
+    return {
+        check: () => ({ action: "allow" }),
+        pathDenyRules,
+    };
+}
+function modeReleases(mode, askClass) {
+    const classes = new Set([askClass]);
+    return arbitrateByMode(mode, { classes, askClass, row: foldArbitrationRow(classes) }).kind === "released";
+}
+const INTENDED_RELEASES = new Set(["ordinary", "mode"]);
+function releasedProtectiveClasses(mode) {
+    return ASK_CLASSES.filter((c) => !INTENDED_RELEASES.has(c) && c !== "write_protection" && modeReleases(mode, c));
+}
+const RELEASED_PROTECTIVE_ASKS_TAG = "server.unattended-leg.mode-releases-protective-asks";
+export function createUnattendedLeg(mode, runnerSeats) {
+    const debt = releasedProtectiveClasses(mode);
+    if (debt.length > 0)
+        recordFailOpen(RELEASED_PROTECTIVE_ASKS_TAG, `mode=${mode} released=${debt.join(",")}`);
+    return { spec: buildUnattendedLegSpec(mode), writeProtection: createUnattendedWriteProtectionPolicy(mode, runnerSeats) };
+}
+export function withUnattendedLeg(spec, leg) {
+    const wp = leg.writeProtection;
+    return {
+        ...spec,
+        ...leg.spec,
+        ...(wp !== undefined ? { toolPolicy: spec.toolPolicy !== undefined ? combinePolicies(spec.toolPolicy, wp) : wp } : {}),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=unattended-permission-mode.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sema-agent/server",
-  "version": "7.105.0",
+  "version": "7.107.0",
   "description": "Sema Server — the server/API implementation layer for Sema, wiring core, registry, model providers, and cloud agent execution. Built on @sema-agent/core.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "BUSL-1.1",
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
     "build:binary:run-local:darwin-arm64": "bun build --compile --target=bun-darwin-arm64 src/run-local.ts --outfile dist/run-local-darwin-arm64"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@sema-agent/core": "7.33.8",
+    "@sema-agent/core": "7.36.0",
     "@sema-agent/settings-schema": "6.3.0",
     "e2b": "^2.28.0",
     "libsodium-wrappers": "^0.8.4",
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
     "sharp": "^0.35.3"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@sema-agent/sdk": "12.0.1",
+    "@sema-agent/sdk": "13.1.0",
     "@types/libsodium-wrappers": "^0.7.14",
     "@types/node": "22.10.2",
     "@types/pg": "^8.20.0",

package/dist/boot/session-shell-gate-registry.d.ts

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * [ref] 件⑤(core PM 三仓扫查 [ref] server 条 ③,并入 [ref])—— 「本 run 是否**显式**声明了 bypassPermissions」的
- * per-session 登记簿,供 `boot/runner-deps.ts` 的 `onError(phase:"config")` 汇点给 core 的 `shell-gate-off`
- * 忠告定级。
- *
- * ## 为什么需要它
- * core 在「shell 门 doctrine=off ∧ 挂了真可写 Bash」时经 `onError(phase:"config", classification:"shell-gate-off")`
- * 发一条忠告(`prepare-hands-readface.js`),但它分不清 off 是**调用方显式选的**(server 把 `permissionMode:
- * "bypassPermissions"` 翻成 `shellGate:"off"`,[ref] 表)还是**没表态落到 core 默认**(无壳直连部署,真值得
- * 一条 warn)。这正是真实用户提案里「bypass 下照打 shell gate doctrine is off 告警」的根:正常态被当异常打。
- * 汇点只拿到 `ctx.sessionId`,而生效模式是 server 在 resolve-spec 阶段④ 单点算出的(`effectivePermissionMode`),
- * 所以由 resolve-spec 在算出 effMode 的那一行登记、汇点按 sessionId 回查。
- *
- * ## 键
- * `auth.sessionId`:authorizer 在服务路径上**恒**铸 session id(`security.ts` `uuidv7()`,core 的无 sessionId
- * 分支在服务路径不可达),且 spec.sessionId = 同一值 ⇒ core 回调的 `ctx.sessionId` 与登记键同源。
- * 缺 authorizer 的裸装配(测试桩)拿不到键 ⇒ 不登记 ⇒ 汇点按「未声明」处理 = 仍 warn(退化方向=多一条告警,
- * 不是少一条)。
- *
- * ## 已知界(codex r2 [medium],登记不修:属主在 core 回调契约)
- * 键是 session 而非**执行**:同 session 并发第二次提交在 resolveSpec 后才被 409 拒,其登记已覆盖前一次——若被拒的
- * 那次是 bypass 而在跑的那次不是,且忠告恰在这一窗内发出,则一条本该 warn 的 `shell-gate-off` 被降成 info(仍整行
- * 落日志、字段齐全,执法零变)。窗 = 在跑 run 的 resolveSpec 到其 prepare 期忠告之间(毫秒级,且要同 session 并发
- * 提交 + 模式相反)。执行唯一的归因需要 core 回调 `ctx` 带 taskId / shellGate 出处(已作 core 侧诉求登记),
- * 到货后本簿退役。
- *
- * ## 界
- * 有界 Map(插入序淘汰,默认 10k 条,与 caps 缓存同量级):session id 是开集,长命 worker 不能无界累积。
- * 淘汰掉的旧会话再来忠告时同样回落「未声明」⇒ warn(同一退化方向)。每次 resolve 覆写(同 session 后一轮改
- * 模式时以最近一轮为准;续跑四条 rebuild 腿都经 resolveSpec ⇒ 同律登记)。
- */
-export interface SessionShellGateRegistry {
-    /** resolve-spec 阶段④:登记本 session 这一轮是否显式声明 bypassPermissions(= server 翻成 shellGate:"off")。 */
-    note(sessionId: string | undefined, explicitOff: boolean): void;
-    /** runner-deps 汇点:本 session 最近一轮是否显式声明了 off。未登记/已淘汰 ⇒ false(退化=照 warn)。 */
-    explicitlyOff(sessionId: string): boolean;
-}
-export declare function createSessionShellGateRegistry(cap?: number): SessionShellGateRegistry;
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-shell-gate-registry.d.ts.map

package/dist/boot/session-shell-gate-registry.js

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-export function createSessionShellGateRegistry(cap = 10_000) {
-    const off = new Map();
-    return {
-        note(sessionId, explicitOff) {
-            if (sessionId === undefined)
-                return;
-            if (off.has(sessionId))
-                off.delete(sessionId);
-            else if (off.size >= cap) {
-                const oldest = off.keys().next();
-                if (!oldest.done)
-                    off.delete(oldest.value);
-            }
-            off.set(sessionId, explicitOff);
-        },
-        explicitlyOff(sessionId) {
-            return off.get(sessionId) === true;
-        },
-    };
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-shell-gate-registry.js.map

package/dist/roster-bound-http-status.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-export declare const ROSTER_BOUND_HTTP_STATUS: {
-    readonly "config.tool_name_too_long": 503;
-    readonly "config.tool_contract_too_long": 503;
-    readonly "config.tool_roster_bound": 503;
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=roster-bound-http-status.d.ts.map

package/dist/roster-bound-http-status.js

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-export const ROSTER_BOUND_HTTP_STATUS = {
-    "config.tool_name_too_long": 503,
-    "config.tool_contract_too_long": 503,
-    "config.tool_roster_bound": 503,
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=roster-bound-http-status.js.map