@sema-agent/server 6.1.0 → 6.2.0

package/dist/capabilities/scenarios.d.ts

@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ export declare function semaIdentityProvider(): PromptProvider;
  * 无 systemPrompt 且无品牌时原样返回 core 常量(测试以引用比对锁 bench 同源,不做字符串快照)。
  */
 export declare function codePromptProvider(brand: boolean): PromptProvider;
-/** @deprecated [891] 改名 code——一版过渡期保留旧符号(与场景名 alias 同窗退役)。 */
 export declare function buildScenarios(deps: ScenarioDeps): Record<string, Scenario>;
 /** Resolve the scenario for a request (falls back to `default`). */
 export declare function selectScenario(scenarios: Record<string, Scenario>, name: string | undefined): Scenario;

package/dist/capabilities/scenarios.js

@@ -85,8 +85,9 @@ export function codePromptProvider(brand) {
         ],
     };
 }
-/** @deprecated [891] 改名 code——一版过渡期保留旧符号(与场景名 alias 同窗退役)。 */
 // [2400] CAPS-OPS-11:autonomousPromptProvider 别名导出已随场景退役删除(真身=codePromptProvider)。
+// 其 `@deprecated` JSDoc 曾残留于此,被 tsc 误挂到下方 buildScenarios(三处调用点全告 deprecated
+// ——TODO-3 立案的「迁移」实为孤儿注释,随删除清账;buildScenarios 本身非退役面)。
 export function buildScenarios(deps) {
     // The default scenario filters skills by "default" — NOT by req.scenario (which may be an unknown name
     // that fell back here): the bundle must be a coherent "default" set, matching how main.ts resolves an

package/dist/resource-suspend.d.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * `POST /v1/assistant/tasks/:id/resume`) instead of FAILING; absent ⇒ a limit still FAILS.
  *
  * 🔴 EXCLUDE verify/cascade tasks. Core runs their implementation via `runWithVerification`/`runCascade`, which
- * map an inner durable suspend to a FAILED result (`errorCode: "unexpected.suspended"`). The service would then
+ * map an inner durable suspend to a FAILED result (`errorCode: "suspended.awaiting_approval"`,core 5.9.0 W1 改名). The service would then
  * `setTerminal(failed)` while core had already minted a pending `resource_limit` checkpoint + suspended the
  * remote VM — ORPHANING both (the run row is terminal, so nothing resumes them). So a resource-limit hit on a
  * verify/cascade task must FAIL CLEANLY (no suspend), exactly as before the flag. This exclusion is the SAME

package/dist/resource-suspend.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * `POST /v1/assistant/tasks/:id/resume`) instead of FAILING; absent ⇒ a limit still FAILS.
  *
  * 🔴 EXCLUDE verify/cascade tasks. Core runs their implementation via `runWithVerification`/`runCascade`, which
- * map an inner durable suspend to a FAILED result (`errorCode: "unexpected.suspended"`). The service would then
+ * map an inner durable suspend to a FAILED result (`errorCode: "suspended.awaiting_approval"`,core 5.9.0 W1 改名). The service would then
  * `setTerminal(failed)` while core had already minted a pending `resource_limit` checkpoint + suspended the
  * remote VM — ORPHANING both (the run row is terminal, so nothing resumes them). So a resource-limit hit on a
  * verify/cascade task must FAIL CLEANLY (no suspend), exactly as before the flag. This exclusion is the SAME

package/dist/runs.d.ts

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ export declare class TurnAnchorCapture {
  * Strip the durable-resume capability token from a result before it is persisted to the replayable event
  * log / run row or returned to the submitter. The token IS the resume credential (token-as-auth, search
  * [18] Q1b) and must never leave the service. Safe on any result (no-op when absent) — notably core maps a
- * NESTED suspend under verify/cascade to status:"failed" + errorCode "unexpected.suspended" while still
+ * NESTED suspend under verify/cascade to status:"failed" + errorCode "suspended.awaiting_approval"(core 5.9.0 W1 改名)while still
  * spreading `checkpointToken`, so that "failed" path (unlike the stream path's explicit suspend handling)
  * would otherwise leak it into task_event / task_run.result / the sync 200 response. `checkpointGate` is
  * non-secret and intentionally kept.

package/dist/runs.js

@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ export class TurnAnchorCapture {
  * Strip the durable-resume capability token from a result before it is persisted to the replayable event
  * log / run row or returned to the submitter. The token IS the resume credential (token-as-auth, search
  * [18] Q1b) and must never leave the service. Safe on any result (no-op when absent) — notably core maps a
- * NESTED suspend under verify/cascade to status:"failed" + errorCode "unexpected.suspended" while still
+ * NESTED suspend under verify/cascade to status:"failed" + errorCode "suspended.awaiting_approval"(core 5.9.0 W1 改名)while still
  * spreading `checkpointToken`, so that "failed" path (unlike the stream path's explicit suspend handling)
  * would otherwise leak it into task_event / task_run.result / the sync 200 response. `checkpointGate` is
  * non-secret and intentionally kept.

package/dist/tool-approval.d.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,14 @@ export interface ToolApprovalFrame {
     /** [1550] 展示身份(子代 agent 名)——UNTRUSTED-for-display(core 未做秘密脱敏)→ redactSecrets 后渲。
      *  仅子代 ask 上可能在场(core 未必总能解析出名字)。 */
     sourceAgentName?: string;
+    /** core 5.9.0 W1([2535]):审批上浮的出处链——{parentToolCallId, depth, agentName?}(孙代最内层帧
+     *  胜出)。只读展示增强(cli [2516] 验收形=审批卡带子代出处);agentName UNTRUSTED → redactSecrets。
+     *  只在子代 ask 上在场(与 fromSubagent 同门)。 */
+    delegation?: {
+        parentToolCallId: string;
+        depth: number;
+        agentName?: string;
+    };
     message?: string;
     /** "tool_approval" only: the tool call's args, secret-redacted, UNTRUSTED-for-display. Absent (with
      *  `argsOmitted: true`) when over the byte cap or unserializable. */

package/dist/tool-approval.js

@@ -329,6 +329,16 @@ export class ToolApprovalCoordinator {
                     sourceTaskId: req.sourceTaskId,
                     fromSubagent: true,
                     ...(typeof req.sourceAgentName === "string" ? { sourceAgentName: redactSecrets(req.sourceAgentName) } : {}),
+                    // core 5.9.0 W1:出处链透传(agentName 同 sourceAgentName 待遇 redact;其余为 core-mint 标识非内容)。
+                    ...(req.delegation
+                        ? {
+                            delegation: {
+                                parentToolCallId: req.delegation.parentToolCallId,
+                                depth: req.delegation.depth,
+                                ...(typeof req.delegation.agentName === "string" ? { agentName: redactSecrets(req.delegation.agentName) } : {}),
+                            },
+                        }
+                        : {}),
                 }
                 : {}),
             message: typeof req.message === "string" ? redactDeep(req.message) : "",

package/dist/trace/core-keyset-guard.d.ts

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ type BgNotifExcluded = "kind" | "sessionScoped" | "owner" | "scope" | "descripti
 type _GuardBgNotif = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof BackgroundChildEvent, BgNotifProjected | BgNotifExcluded>>;
 type RosterProjected = "name" | "agentId" | "sessionId" | "toolUseId" | "owner" | "scope" | "sessionScoped" | "rootSessionId" | "model" | "createdAt";
 type _GuardRoster = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof RosterEntry, RosterProjected>>;
-type AskProjected = "toolName" | "args" | "message" | "sourceTaskId" | "fromSubagent" | "sourceAgentName";
+type AskProjected = "toolName" | "args" | "message" | "sourceTaskId" | "fromSubagent" | "sourceAgentName" | "delegation";
 type AskExcluded = "toolCallId" | "preview" | "principal" | "requiresRealApproval";
 type _GuardAsk = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<keyof AskRequest, AskProjected | AskExcluded>>;
 type TaskEventHandled = "text_delta" | "reasoning_delta" | "tool_start" | "tool_end" | "turn_end" | "compacted" | "diagnostics" | "message_committed" | "status" | "task_notification" | "task_progress" | "steering_injected" | "workspace_changed" | "done" | "context_usage" | "compaction_outcome";

package/dist/trace/project.d.ts

@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ export declare function toolEndEventData(ev: {
     truncated?: boolean;
     totalChars?: number;
     structured?: unknown;
+    errorCode?: string;
     eventId?: string;
     parentToolCallId?: string;
 }): Record<string, unknown>;

package/dist/trace/project.js

@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ export function toolEndEventData(ev) {
         // core 1.442([1898] RB-210):截断诚实体量(各 block 真实大小之和,不含 JSON 包装开销)。
         ...(Number.isFinite(ev.totalChars) ? { totalChars: ev.totalChars } : {}),
         ...(ev.structured !== undefined ? { structured: redactDeep(ev.structured) } : {}),
+        // core 5.9.0 W3([2535]):park/死投影结构化标记(引擎闭词表 `gate.parked`/`tool.not_found`,只在
+        // isError 时在场)——verbatim 透传,壳按它判别 park 毒化帧而不锚 abort 文案字面。
+        ...(typeof ev.errorCode === "string" ? { errorCode: ev.errorCode } : {}),
         ...identityFields(ev),
     };
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sema-agent/server",
-  "version": "6.1.0",
+  "version": "6.2.0",
   "description": "Sema Server — the server/API implementation layer for Sema, wiring core, registry, model providers, and cloud agent execution. Built on @sema-agent/core.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "BUSL-1.1",
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
     "build:binary:run-local:darwin-arm64": "bun build --compile --target=bun-darwin-arm64 src/run-local.ts --outfile dist/run-local-darwin-arm64"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@sema-agent/core": "^5.8.0",
+    "@sema-agent/core": "^5.9.0",
     "@sema-agent/registry-core": "^0.14.0",
     "e2b": "^2.28.0",
     "libsodium-wrappers": "^0.8.4",
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
     "sharp": "^0.35.3"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@sema-agent/sdk": "^6.0.0",
+    "@sema-agent/sdk": "^6.1.0",
     "@types/libsodium-wrappers": "^0.7.14",
     "@types/node": "22.10.2",
     "@types/pg": "^8.20.0",