@sema-agent/core 7.9.0 → 7.9.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,28 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 7.9.1 — 2026-09-08
+
+### Wire (additive) — `mcp.injection_dropped`: the request-lane MCP drop reaches the user (L-167; @server @cli @client-core)
+- **One mint, host facts.** A host that drops an entry of the user's own request-lane MCP injection (a `.mcp.json` row) now hands the FACTS to core — `mcpInjectionDroppedNotice({ sessionId, server, reason, field? })` — and core composes the notice: code `mcp.injection_dropped`, audience `user`, one sentence per reason naming the recovery. The host spells no code, audience or text (`@contract mcp.injection_dropped.single_mint`); a fact outside the vocabulary (an unlisted reason, an empty session or server name) is refused at the mint with a `TypeError`, never shaped into a notice that routes nowhere.
+- **Closed set** `McpInjectionDropReason` = `malformed_entry` / `name_reserved_by_deployment` / `gate_closed` / `over_cap` (`MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS`, registered in CLOSED-SETS with its text table's fence); `detail: { sessionId, server, reason, field? }` — `sessionId` is REQUIRED (the routing half of a user row) and lifted onto the typed key by the one delivery throat; `field` present only for a non-empty host-supplied key. Dedup unit is the host's: per leg per server name.
+- **Consumers:** `ENGINE_NOTICE_CODES` +1 (`mcp.injection_dropped`, `NOTICE_AUDIENCE` row `user`) — a downstream audience mirror diffing against the catalog gains one row; server's `engine_notice` whitelist +1; cli renders one user-level transcript line off `detail.reason`. Exports +5 (`MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS`, `MCP_INJECTION_DROP_TEXT`, `mcpInjectionDroppedNotice`, `McpInjectionDropReason`, `McpInjectionDropFacts`).
+
+### Narrowing — a path rule is judged against the path the tool really opens (#635)
+- **One effective-target resolver, shared with tool execution.** `ToolPathTarget` gains three resolution members — `base` (`"cwd" | "root"`, absent ⇒ `cwd`), `absent` (`"none" | "base"`, absent ⇒ `none`) and `patternParam` (the parameter whose ABSOLUTE glob pattern carries its own base directory) — declared by Read/Edit/Write/NotebookEdit (`cwd`/`none`) and Grep/Glob (`root`/`base`; Glob + `pattern`). `effectivePathTargetOf` (new export, with `pathTargetBaseOf`, `pathTargetSlotOnly` and the closed sets `TOOL_PATH_BASES` / `TOOL_PATH_ABSENCES`) is the one reader: both permission-rule lanes judge a call with it, and the four canonicalizing write fences plus the two search tools share the BASE SELECTION (and, for Glob, the absolute-pattern split) before applying their own identity to it — lexical-normal for a rule, canonical for a tool. One declaration, one selection, so a fence and the tool it fences can no longer resolve one call to two files. **Three shapes now REACH the rules that name them** (each was silently unreachable before): `Grep(//proj/**)` vs a Grep with the path omitted (the tool searches the root); `Glob(//proj/secret/**)` vs `{pattern:"/proj/secret/**"}` (the absolute pattern is the base); and a relative Grep `path`, which resolves against the ROOT as the tool does rather than against the live `cd`. The file tools are byte-unchanged (their declared `cwd` base is the old guess). One honesty change: a relative spelling with NO usable base is now "no verdict" instead of being fabricated into `/<spelling>`.
+- **Wire (additive, @server @cli @client-core @web-admin):** `ToolRosterEntry.pathTarget` carries optional `base` / `absent` / `patternParam` (present only when the definition declares them), and so do `ToolCallFace.pathTarget` and the parked row's face — without them the gate's stamped face loses the facts that say which file a call is about. A mirrored row schema with `additionalProperties: false` must admit the three keys. `ToolPathTarget` / `ToolCallFace.pathTarget` / `ToolCallLike.face.pathTarget` / the checkpoint parked-face row now all name ONE shape: `ToolCallPathTarget` is the READER type (both spellings satisfy it) and `ToolRosterPathTarget` its NORMALIZED spelling (`aliases` and `skillScopeEligible` always present, as the mint has always filled them) — both new exports; the call face and the parked row keep the normalized one, so a consumer already reading `face.pathTarget.aliases` compiles unchanged. `@server` `pathBases` is unchanged.
+- **The declaration door** (`toolFaceProblem`, caller faces and MCP `toolFaces` alike) refuses a `base` or `absent` word outside its closed set, a `patternParam` that is not a top-level schema property, a `patternParam` declared while `absent` is not `"base"` (it could never be read), **`base: "root"` on a face whose `access` is not `"read"`** — two write guards not taught by this change (the session-transcript directory guard, which is handed no root at all, and the frozen-spec deny) resolve a write target against the call's working directory alone, so a write face declaring a root base would be judged on two different files; refused until #638 threads the base through both, with no built-in affected (the three write tools declare `base: "cwd"`, the two search tools are reads) — and **`absent: "base"` on a face whose `access` is not `"read"`** — that word says "with no path, the call is about the whole base directory", which is a search SCOPE; a write with no path names no file, and a write face declaring it would be judged on its base by the rule lanes and on nothing by the containment fences (a writer could then evade the sensitive-path guard by omitting its path). A refused face does not mount, as before.
+- **An EMPTY path slot is absent on both sides.** Grep and Glob read their scope argument with the engine's own slot reader (first NON-EMPTY string under the declared param) instead of `!== undefined`. Behavior change, small and in the closing direction: `Glob({pattern:"/proj/secret/**", path:""})` now decomposes the absolute pattern exactly as an omitted `path` does (it used to fold `""` to the root and match the absolute pattern there, while every fence judged the pattern's own base — one call, two directories, which is how a root deny could be walked past). `Grep` with `path:""` still searches the whole root, as it did.
+- **A win-family spelling lands where the env puts it.** `canonicalizeTarget` never joins a spelling it calls absolute (a drive letter, a UNC root) to the base a tool hands it — it passes the spelling through and the execution env resolves it against its own working directory. So the resolver does not apply the DECLARED base to such a spelling either; it uses the tracked cwd with the root as the floor, which is what the tool's env will do. Without this, `Grep({path:"C:/secret.txt"})` under root `/` with a live `cd` to `/proj` was judged `/C:/secret.txt` while the tool read `/proj/C:/secret.txt`, and `Grep(//proj/**)` — a deny that fired in 7.9.0 — missed. The source-side fix is #637 (the canonicalizer's absoluteness is family-blind); this branch retires with it.
+- **The protective floor hands over the slot, not the resolution.** A call whose face declares no path target of its own is judged against the catalog's declaration for the NAME (design/388 B6) — a floor whose whole justification is "naming a slot can only tighten a deny". Naming a slot does; claiming how a FOREIGN tool of the same name resolves that slot does not, so the floor now supplies `param`/`aliases`/`access` and lets the resolution members default (`pathTargetSlotOnly`, new export). Net effect versus 7.9.0 for a call that carries a face: none — this keeps the floor where it was while the declarations moved. A BARE request (no face at all — a policy invoked outside a Runner) does read the catalog whole, resolution members included, which is the point: there the catalog IS the tool being judged.
+
+### Narrowing — the tightening (deny/ask) reach reads a real shell lexer (#631)
+- **Reach.** `programRunReachOf(rule, command)` answers the closed set `ProgramRunReach` = `reached` / `not_reached` / `unreadable` (registered in CLOSED-SETS); `ruleReachesProgramRun` is its boolean face (unchanged signature, `reached` only). The command is read by `src/core/shell-lexer.ts` (no grammar library): quotes and escapes, every expansion form, the full redirection operator set (IO_NUMBER, `&>`/`&>>`, `N>&M-`, `>&-`, `<>`, `<<<`, here-documents whose bodies are skipped), every connector (`&` and a newline bound segments), subshell/group boundaries, leading keywords (`if rm -r x; then …` runs `rm`), leading assignments, and the closed wrapper table `SHELL_WRAPPER_TABLE` (`command`/`builtin`/`exec`/`env`/`sudo`/`doas`/`pkexec`/`nohup`/`time`/`nice`/`timeout`/`stdbuf`/`xargs`/`watch`/`ionice`/`setsid`/`taskset`/`chrt`/`strace`/`ltrace`/`flock`/`script`/`unshare`/`nsenter`/`noglob`/`nocorrect` — upstream's three strips as one table). Peeling is ADDITIVE (`ShellSegment.peeled`): `sudo rm -r x` is a run of `sudo …` and of `rm -r x`, so a deny on either reaches, and a rule body is never peeled (`Bash(sudo rm -r x)` denies exactly that). A command/process substitution anywhere in a segment (`$(…)`, backticks, `<(…)`, inside `${…}`/`$((…))`, a redirection operand, an unquoted here-document body) marks the segment `peelUnreadable`: the runs it spells are still compared (`echo "$(rm -r x)"` reaches `Bash(echo:*)`), and every other deny/ask reads `unreadable` — the commands INSIDE a substitution are deliberately not read (an approval prompt, never a guessed boundary). Words are compared argv-wise with quotes removed on BOTH sides: `rm "-r" x`, `sudo rm -r x`, `command rm -r x`, `rm -r x; echo "$HOME"`, `rm -r x &> log`, `rm -r x 2>&-`, `npm test & curl x`, `do curl x; done`, `timeout -- 5 rm -r x` now REACH a `Bash(rm -r:*)` / `Bash(curl:*)` deny or ask (7.9.0: silence on every one of them). A `#` comment and a quoted-delimiter here-document body are not runs (7.9.0 judged `echo ok # ; curl x` as a curl run — a limitation, not over-approximation). A leading `~` is an expansion of one word (an exact deny on the expanded path asks; a prefix deny reaches). Module split beside the lexer: `shell-scan.ts` (the byte-walking scanners) and `shell-wrapper-table.ts` (the table).
+- **Unreadable is a fail-closed ask, never silence — and only when a standing deny/ask rule could not be judged** (zero tightening rules ⇒ the lane stays silent, as before). Unreadable = an expansion where the rule reads a word (`rm $X` vs `Bash(rm -r:*)`; `"$@"` / `"${a[@]…}"` after an exact body — they may be zero words), an unterminated quote/substitution, a syntax error (`> ;`, a dangling `&&`), a `for`/`case`/`function` header, a wrapper handed its command as one string (`env -S`, `flock -c`, `script -c`) or to a shell (`watch`, `script`), a wrapper option outside the row's CLOSED option sets (short or long — the table names every option it reads; an unknown one asks rather than guessing its arity), an expanding option value or operand, a positional that does not match (`taskset zz`), more than 8 wrapper layers, a here-document delimiter spelled with an expansion, a command over 10 000 characters (`MAX_SHELL_READ_CHARS`, upstream's own bound). Per lane: the PERSISTED store answers `{ unreadable: true, reason }` — the same shape as an unreadable store (origin `rule_store_unavailable`, real-approval, the classifier never answers; the message says the reason instead of "the store could not be read"); the ORG verdict carries `unreadable: <reason>` beside the first rule it could not judge (`behavior: "ask"`, origin `org_rule`, message names rule + reason); the rule DSL mints `{ action: "ask", matchedAskRule, requiresRealApproval: true }`. Precedence: a deny that cannot be judged outranks an ask that can; within one behavior a reach settles it. **No new AskOrigin word** — `rule_store_unavailable`'s meaning is widened to "the person's deny/ask rows cannot be enforced for this call" (store unreadable OR call unreadable against them; JSDoc amended).
+- **Wire (additive):** `PersistedRuleUnreadable.reason?: string`; `OrgGateVerdict.verdict.unreadable?: string` (only beside `behavior: "ask"`; both screened by the normalizers, a non-string dropped); `PersistedRuleVerdict.unreadable?: string`; `orgRuleVerdictFor` returns `OrgRuleVerdict` (the same two members plus the optional third). New exports: `programRunReachOf`, `PROGRAM_RUN_REACHES`, `ProgramRunReach`, `ProgramRunReachOutcome`, `readShellCommand`, `isFullyReadable`, `MAX_SHELL_READ_CHARS`, `SHELL_WRAPPER_TABLE`, `ShellCommandShape`/`ShellSegment`/`ShellWord`/`ShellWrapperName`, `OrgRuleVerdict`. Retired (internal, never exported): `stripRedirections`, `stripFdDuplications`, `ruleLaneSegmentsOf`, `ruleAdmitsProgramRun`.
+- **The allow side is byte-untouched:** `ruleAdmitsCommand` keeps its whole-string refusal of every shell construct (`rm -r x > f` is admitted by nothing; a quoted spelling is not an allow's equal) — and the deny now reads the quoted spelling, so an exact allow row minted for `rm "-r" x` no longer outruns a `Bash(rm -r:*)` deny.
+- **Merged-tree round (four `not_reached` blind spots, each now `unreadable` or reached at all three lanes, the classifier never consulted):** ① an extended glob's INTERIOR is read for substitutions (`echo @($(rm -r x))` — the pattern's interior runs a program). ② a clustered `xargs -tI R` records the replacement token by the resolved letter (`-tI R rm -R x` no longer reads `rm -R x` as literal). ③ **executors are rows of the same closed table**: `viaShell` now means "evaluates its operands as shell input" (a command string, a script file, an expression) and covers `eval`, `source`, `.`, `trap`, `let`, `sh`/`bash`/`zsh`/`dash`/`ksh`/`fish`/`csh`/`tcsh` beside `watch`/`script` — the string is not split and judged (upstream splits on whitespace; the strict word stands), so `bash -c 'rm -r x'`, `eval 'rm -r x'`, `bash cleanup.sh`, `sudo bash -c …` ask once when a deny/ask rule stands (7.9.0: silence); a new row member `executes` names the words after which a NON-wrapper runs a command anywhere in its argv — `find` with `-exec`/`-execdir`/`-ok`/`-okdir` (such a word, or any expansion among `find`'s arguments, asks; `find . -name '*.ts'` stays silent). The executor's own run is still read (`Bash(eval:*)`, `Bash(find:*)` reach). ④ indirect arithmetic through a parameter SUBSCRIPT (`${arr[a]}`, `${arr[$i]}`, `${#arr[n]}` — bash evaluates an indexed subscript recursively, so a stored `arr[$(…)]` runs; `[@]`/`[*]`/a number name nothing) and through the `(( … ))` command (read as the arithmetic command — a run-less piece — instead of two boundaries around a phantom program) are unreadable, the same law as `$((a))`. `isFullyReadable` (exported; not read by the offer lane, which mints from its own reader) answers false for every shape above. **The round's two adversarial passes (all findings adopted):** a `$…` inside arithmetic or a subscript is a name too (`(( $1 ))`, `${arr[$1]}`); the arithmetic command is read after `time`/`time -p`/`{`/an adjacent `!`, and its interior is judged safe only when it is digits, operators and spaces — `((:);)` (nested subshells bash re-reads after the arithmetic parse fails) asks instead of vanishing; an `xargs -I` token carrying an expansion stops the peel; `$[…]` (legacy arithmetic) and a slice offset/length naming a variable (`${x:a}`, `${x:0:a}`) are hidden runs like a subscript; **builtins whose operands NAME variables** (`VARIABLE_OPERAND_BUILTINS` in the table module: `printf`, `unset`, `read`, `mapfile`/`readarray`, `declare`/`typeset`/`local`/`export`/`readonly`, `test`/`[`/`[[`) mark a hidden run when an operand spells an array element with a non-numeric subscript (`printf -v 'arr[a]'`, `-v'arr[a]'`, `unset arr[a]`, `declare arr[a]=1`, `[[ -v arr[a] ]]`) or an integer-attribute assignment (`declare -i x=a`) — judged at every peel candidate (`command printf -v …`); `compgen`/`complete` with `-C`/`-F` join the `executes` rows; an unclosed `((` is an unreadable tail in linear time. Not judged (documented, deliberate — the price would be a prompt on every `export FOO="$BAR"` / `[[ $n -gt 0 ]]`): an operand that is WHOLLY an expansion to one of those builtins, and an arithmetic comparison's operands.
+- **@cli** (card copy): an ask of origin `rule_store_unavailable` may now be "your command could not be read against your deny/ask rules (<reason>)", not only "the rule store could not be read" — the decision's `message` carries the reason; a card that hard-codes store wording for the origin should read the message. An org ask's message has a second form (`… may reach this call, which could not be read against it (<reason>)`). **@server**: zero required changes (both new members are optional and screened; `OrgGateVerdict` producers may add `unreadable` on an ask verdict).
+
 ## 7.9.0 — 2026-09-08
 
 The resume decision ladder leaves runtask.ts, and the two `runtask.ts` seams design/388 slice 1 shipped unwired in 7.8.0 are wired.

package/dist/core/ask-origin.d.ts

@@ -42,9 +42,13 @@ import type { PermissionResult } from "./tool-policy.js";
  *  - `org_rule` — an organization policy rule asked (or stamped an existing ask): "no configuration
  *    clears this, a person nods".
  *  - `rule_store_unavailable` — the deployment wired a persisted-rule store and could not READ it for
- *    this call (a read failure, a timeout): the person's own deny/ask rows cannot be enforced, so the
- *    call fails closed the way an unreadable org snapshot does — an allow tightens to an ask a person
- *    must clear, and no automatic lane may answer ("does one of my rules forbid this?" is unanswered).
+ *    this call (a read failure, a timeout), OR could not read the CALL against the person's standing
+ *    deny/ask rows (the tightening lexer's `unreadable` word: an expansion where a rule reads a word, an
+ *    unterminated quote, a syntax error — the answer's `reason`): the person's own deny/ask rows cannot
+ *    be enforced for this call, so it fails closed the way an unreadable org snapshot does — an allow
+ *    tightens to an ask a person must clear, and no automatic lane may answer ("does one of my rules
+ *    forbid this?" is unanswered). One word for both, deliberately: the AUTHORITY semantics (who may
+ *    answer, what clears it, what the evidence records) are identical, and only the mechanism differs.
  *  - `hook` — a deployment's PreToolUse screening face raised or co-raised the ask; the word is
  *    engine-stamped at the fold and is the deployment's own per-call adjudication.
  *  - `ask_rule` — an EXPLICIT `ask` permission rule matched: a person's standing "ask me each time",

package/dist/core/checkpoint-store.d.ts

@@ -843,15 +843,10 @@ export type PendingAction = {
      * display `family` + declared `pathTarget` — off the same roster row at the same mint. The pre-CAS resume-edit
      * recheck has no roster yet; it rebuilds the call face from these (`parkedCallFaceOf`) and judges the edit as
      * the live gate judged the original (merge-seam H1: without them a caller slot fell to the catalog's slot for
-     * the NAME). Any member absent ⇒ pre-388 row ⇒ the recheck falls to the catalog, never a widened grant.
+     * the NAME). Any member absent ⇒ pre-388 row ⇒ the recheck falls to the catalog, never a widened grant — including #635's resolution members, which a row written before them simply lacks (they then read as their documented defaults).
      */
     family?: import("./tool-face.js").ToolFamily;
-    pathTarget?: {
-        param: string;
-        aliases: string[];
-        access: "read" | "create" | "edit";
-        skillScopeEligible: boolean;
-    };
+    pathTarget?: import("./tool-face.js").ToolRosterPathTarget;
     /**
      * #438 (additive; no checkpoint-version bump — the `reminderMark` precedent: an optional field an
      * older reader ignores. Unlike that precedent seat — which resume DOES read, through its

package/dist/core/effective-path-target.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import type { ToolCallPathTarget } from "./tool-face.js";
+import { type ToolCallLike } from "./tool-registry.js";
+/** The bases of ONE CALL a target resolves against: the task root, and the live tracked working directory
+ *  (absent when no tracker moved or the caller keeps none). Facts of the call, never of the tool. */
+export interface ToolPathBases {
+    readonly root?: string | undefined;
+    readonly cwd?: string | undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * WHICH base this target's relative spellings resolve against, as SPELLED by the caller (no normalization:
+ * the tool hands this straight to `canonicalizeTarget`, which resolves win-form and symlinked spellings the
+ * fences must not pre-fold). `undefined` ⇒ the deployment gave no such base, so a relative spelling in this
+ * slot names nothing this reader can locate.
+ */
+export declare function pathTargetBaseOf(pt: Pick<ToolCallPathTarget, "base"> | undefined, bases: ToolPathBases): string | undefined;
+/**
+ * design/116 批④ #8 (CC 2.1.198 RWp, bundle :332987) — decompose an ABSOLUTE glob pattern into a base
+ * directory + relative pattern: cut at the last separator before the first glob metachar (`* ? [ {`); a
+ * pattern with no metachar splits dirname/basename. `undefined` for a relative pattern (the caller keeps it
+ * as-is) or when no usable base can be derived.
+ *
+ * Lives HERE rather than beside the search engine because two readers need the identical cut: Glob's own
+ * scope resolution and the path fences that must know which directory an absolute pattern really searches.
+ */
+export declare function splitAbsoluteGlobPattern(pattern: string): {
+    baseDir: string;
+    relativePattern: string;
+} | undefined;
+/**
+ * The absolute, LEXICAL-NORMAL path this call is about under ONE reading of its path slot, or `undefined`
+ * when that reading locates none. `pt` is the reading (design/388 B6/B17: the PROTECTIVE target for a
+ * tightening fence, the DECLARED target for a grant) — this function never picks between the two.
+ *
+ * The order is the tool's own:
+ *  ① a spelling in the slot wins — absolute as spelled, relative against {@link pathTargetBaseOf}'s base;
+ *  ② otherwise, when the declaration says an absent slot means `none`, the call is about no path;
+ *  ③ otherwise a `patternParam`'s ABSOLUTE pattern supplies its own base directory;
+ *  ④ otherwise the base itself (the tool searches all of it).
+ *
+ * A base the deployment did not supply yields `undefined`: a relative spelling with nothing to resolve
+ * against names no file, and claiming it names `/<spelling>` was a fabrication no fence should judge.
+ */
+export declare function effectivePathTargetOf(call: ToolCallLike, pt: ToolCallPathTarget | undefined, bases: ToolPathBases): string | undefined;

package/dist/core/effective-path-target.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import { isAbsolutePathForm } from "../tools/fs/safety.js";
+import { lexicalNormalAbsolutePathOf } from "./permission-rule-model.js";
+import { pathTargetValue } from "./tool-registry.js";
+export function pathTargetBaseOf(pt, bases) {
+    return (pt?.base ?? "cwd") === "root" ? bases.root : (bases.cwd ?? bases.root);
+}
+export function splitAbsoluteGlobPattern(pattern) {
+    if (!isAbsolutePathForm(pattern))
+        return undefined;
+    const m = /[*?[{]/.exec(pattern);
+    if (!m) {
+        const i = Math.max(pattern.lastIndexOf("/"), pattern.lastIndexOf("\\"));
+        if (i <= 0)
+            return undefined;
+        return { baseDir: pattern.slice(0, i), relativePattern: pattern.slice(i + 1) };
+    }
+    const prefix = pattern.slice(0, m.index);
+    const cut = Math.max(prefix.lastIndexOf("/"), prefix.lastIndexOf("\\"));
+    if (cut === -1)
+        return undefined;
+    let baseDir = pattern.slice(0, cut);
+    if (baseDir === "" && cut === 0)
+        baseDir = "/";
+    if (/^[A-Za-z]:$/.test(baseDir))
+        baseDir = baseDir + pattern[cut];
+    if (!baseDir)
+        return undefined;
+    return { baseDir, relativePattern: pattern.slice(cut + 1) };
+}
+function under(base, rest) {
+    return `${base === "/" ? "" : base}/${rest}`;
+}
+export function effectivePathTargetOf(call, pt, bases) {
+    if (pt === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    const declaredBase = pathTargetBaseOf(pt, bases);
+    const spelled = pathTargetValue(call.args, pt);
+    if (spelled !== undefined)
+        return resolveSpelling(spelled, declaredBase, bases);
+    if ((pt.absent ?? "none") === "none")
+        return undefined;
+    if (pt.patternParam !== undefined) {
+        const pattern = pathTargetValue(call.args, { param: pt.patternParam });
+        const split = pattern === undefined ? undefined : splitAbsoluteGlobPattern(pattern);
+        if (split !== undefined)
+            return resolveSpelling(split.baseDir, declaredBase, bases);
+    }
+    return declaredBase === undefined ? undefined : lexicalNormalAbsolutePathOf(declaredBase);
+}
+function resolveSpelling(spelled, declaredBase, bases) {
+    if (spelled.startsWith("/"))
+        return lexicalNormalAbsolutePathOf(spelled);
+    const landsOn = isAbsolutePathForm(spelled) ? pathTargetBaseOf(undefined, bases) : declaredBase;
+    const normalBase = landsOn === undefined ? undefined : lexicalNormalAbsolutePathOf(landsOn);
+    return normalBase === undefined ? undefined : lexicalNormalAbsolutePathOf(under(normalBase, spelled));
+}

package/dist/core/engine-notice.d.ts

@@ -61,6 +61,14 @@ export interface EngineNotice {
      *    its explicit {@link NOTICE_AUDIENCE} row (#433 made the registry total over the catalog —
      *    no engine-minted code is audience-defaulted any more). The refusal itself
      *    (`mcp.server_revoked`) is a tool RESULT code, not a notice.
+     *  - `"mcp.injection_dropped"` (L-167) — an entry of the user's own request-lane MCP injection
+     *    was NOT mounted for the leg. The HOST owns the drop sites and supplies the facts; CORE composes
+     *    the notice ({@link import("./mcp-injection-drop.js").mcpInjectionDroppedNotice}, the one mint).
+     *    `detail: { sessionId, server, reason, field? }` — `reason` is the closed set
+     *    `malformed_entry` / `name_reserved_by_deployment` / `gate_closed` / `over_cap`
+     *    (`MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS`, CLOSED-SETS), `field` names the bad key for `malformed_entry`
+     *    when known. `"user"` audience; `sessionId` REQUIRED at the mint (a user row with no session
+     *    routes nowhere — refused, never fabricated). Dedup unit: per leg per server name, the host's.
      *  - `"config.models_swapped"` — `Runner.swapModels` replaced the model catalog generation
      *    (zero-restart model switching). `detail: { models, tiers, occurrenceId }` — key COUNTS only,
      *    never the

package/dist/core/fs-write-gate-policy.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { canonicalizeTarget, writeTargetPath } from "../tools/fs/safety.js";
 import { isWithin } from "./runner/session-rule-policy.js";
 import { declaredPathTargetOf, isProtectedWrite } from "./tool-registry.js";
+import { pathTargetBaseOf } from "./effective-path-target.js";
 const ask = (message) => ({ action: "ask", message, decisionReason: "rule" });
 export function createFsWriteGatePolicy(opts) {
     const { env, rootPath, defaultWrite } = opts;
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ export function createFsWriteGatePolicy(opts) {
             if (path === undefined) {
                 return ask(`write tool "${req.toolName}" requires approval: the call has no resolvable path target to confine${declared === undefined ? " (the tool declares no path target)" : ""}${advisory}`);
             }
-            const canon = await canonicalizeTarget(env, path, signal, req.cwd ?? rootPath);
+            const canon = await canonicalizeTarget(env, path, signal, pathTargetBaseOf(declared, { root: rootPath, cwd: req.cwd }));
             if (!canon.ok) {
                 return ask(`write to "${path}" requires approval: its real target could not be resolved (${canon.message})${advisory}`);
             }

package/dist/core/gate-lanes.d.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ export declare function normalizeOrgGateVerdict(answer: unknown, unreadable: str
 export declare function normalizePersistedRuleHit(hit: PersistedRuleAnswer): {
     hit?: PersistedRuleHit;
     unreadable?: true;
+    reason?: string;
     coverage?: readonly import("./permission-rule-model.js").SegmentCoverage[];
 };
 /**

package/dist/core/gate-lanes.js

@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ export function normalizeOrgGateVerdict(answer, unreadable) {
     const rule = ownDataValue(verdict, "rule");
     if ((behavior !== "deny" && behavior !== "ask") || typeof rule !== "string")
         return clean({ status: "unavailable", disclosures: [unreadable] });
-    return clean({ status: "available", verdict: clean({ behavior: behavior, rule }), ...revisionCell });
+    const reason = ownDataValue(verdict, "unreadable");
+    const unreadableCell = behavior === "ask" && typeof reason === "string" ? { unreadable: reason } : {};
+    return clean({ status: "available", verdict: clean({ behavior: behavior, rule, ...unreadableCell }), ...revisionCell });
 }
 function copiedUsableDots(dots) {
     let copied;
@@ -93,8 +95,10 @@ function copiedUsableDots(dots) {
 export function normalizePersistedRuleHit(hit) {
     if (!isPlainOwnRecord(hit))
         return {};
-    if (ownDataValue(hit, "unreadable") === true)
-        return { unreadable: true };
+    if (ownDataValue(hit, "unreadable") === true) {
+        const reason = ownDataValue(hit, "reason");
+        return typeof reason === "string" ? { unreadable: true, reason } : { unreadable: true };
+    }
     const rulesRaw = ownDataValue(hit, "rules");
     if (rulesRaw === undefined) {
         const coverageRaw = ownDataValue(hit, "segmentCoverage");
@@ -219,7 +223,7 @@ export async function runGateLanes(pass) {
             orgEvidence = { ...revisionCell, ruleAbsent: "no_match" };
             return { decision: decided, org: undefined };
         }
-        const { behavior, rule } = answer.verdict;
+        const { behavior, rule, unreadable } = answer.verdict;
         orgEvidence = { ...revisionCell, rule };
         if (behavior === "deny") {
             orgTightenCount += 1;
@@ -235,7 +239,9 @@ export async function runGateLanes(pass) {
                 ? { ...decided, requiresRealApproval: true }
                 : {
                     action: "ask",
-                    message: `an organization policy rule (${rule}) requires approval for this call`,
+                    message: unreadable !== undefined
+                        ? `an organization policy rule (${rule}) may reach this call, which could not be read against it (${unreadable}) — a person must decide`
+                        : `an organization policy rule (${rule}) requires approval for this call`,
                     decisionReason: ORG_RULE_DECISION_REASON,
                     requiresRealApproval: true,
                 },

package/dist/core/governance-codes.d.ts

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ export type NoticeAudience = "user" | "operator";
  * src/ for notice mint shapes and names any code that is minted but unregistered, or registered but
  * no longer minted.
  */
-export declare const ENGINE_NOTICE_CODES: readonly ["config.autocompact_window_clamped", "config.env_timeout_discarded", "config.materialize_env_discarded", "config.models_swapped", "config.read_face_deployment_clamped", "config.tool_model_gate_removed", "config.tool_model_gate_unknown_class", "config.tool_model_gate_env_invalid", "config.tool_card_undeclared", "config.tool_face_undeclared", "config.tool_face_invalid", "config.durable_gate_unavailable", "config.peer_admission_out_of_range", "config.peer_lane_unmounted", "peer.inbound_disposition", "peer.held_settled", "peer.idle_subscription", "classifier.denial_limit", "checkpoint.execution_outcome_unrecorded", "delegation.transcript_integrity", "mcp.revocation_probe_failed", "workflow.governance_key_stripped", "workflow.agent_option_ignored", "memory.session_polluted", "memory.harvest_quarantined", "memory.delegation_static_mark_waived", "memory.content_class_declared", "memory.hold_opened", "memory.hold_released", "memory.hold_disposed", "memory.consolidation_recommended", "memory.consolidation_committed", "memory.consolidation_conflict", "memory.consolidation_incomplete", "memory.consolidation_refused", "memory.consolidation_withheld", "route.fallback_to_primary", "route.base_url_changed_key_unchanged", "task.user_steer_undrained", "task.user_followup_undrained", "steering.parked_input_blocked", "task.turn_interrupted", "task.halt_unconsumed", "task.late_approval", "memory.capture_opted_out", "memory.capture_optout_unpersisted", "tool_result.offload_put_failed"];
+export declare const ENGINE_NOTICE_CODES: readonly ["config.autocompact_window_clamped", "config.env_timeout_discarded", "config.materialize_env_discarded", "config.models_swapped", "config.read_face_deployment_clamped", "config.tool_model_gate_removed", "config.tool_model_gate_unknown_class", "config.tool_model_gate_env_invalid", "config.tool_card_undeclared", "config.tool_face_undeclared", "config.tool_face_invalid", "config.durable_gate_unavailable", "config.peer_admission_out_of_range", "config.peer_lane_unmounted", "peer.inbound_disposition", "peer.held_settled", "peer.idle_subscription", "classifier.denial_limit", "checkpoint.execution_outcome_unrecorded", "delegation.transcript_integrity", "mcp.injection_dropped", "mcp.revocation_probe_failed", "workflow.governance_key_stripped", "workflow.agent_option_ignored", "memory.session_polluted", "memory.harvest_quarantined", "memory.delegation_static_mark_waived", "memory.content_class_declared", "memory.hold_opened", "memory.hold_released", "memory.hold_disposed", "memory.consolidation_recommended", "memory.consolidation_committed", "memory.consolidation_conflict", "memory.consolidation_incomplete", "memory.consolidation_refused", "memory.consolidation_withheld", "route.fallback_to_primary", "route.base_url_changed_key_unchanged", "task.user_steer_undrained", "task.user_followup_undrained", "steering.parked_input_blocked", "task.turn_interrupted", "task.halt_unconsumed", "task.late_approval", "memory.capture_opted_out", "memory.capture_optout_unpersisted", "tool_result.offload_put_failed"];
 /** A code this engine mints (see {@link ENGINE_NOTICE_CODES}). NOT the type of
  *  `EngineNotice.code`, which stays `string` — a host forwarding its own notices through the same
  *  sink is a supported shape, and narrowing that field would break it. */

package/dist/core/governance-codes.js

@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ export const ENGINE_NOTICE_CODES = [
     "classifier.denial_limit",
     "checkpoint.execution_outcome_unrecorded",
     "delegation.transcript_integrity",
+    "mcp.injection_dropped",
     "mcp.revocation_probe_failed",
     "workflow.governance_key_stripped",
     "workflow.agent_option_ignored",
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ const NOTICE_AUDIENCE_TABLE = {
     "peer.idle_subscription": "user",
     "delegation.transcript_integrity": "operator",
     "checkpoint.execution_outcome_unrecorded": "operator",
+    "mcp.injection_dropped": "user",
     "mcp.revocation_probe_failed": "operator",
     "workflow.governance_key_stripped": "operator",
     "workflow.agent_option_ignored": "operator",

package/dist/core/hooks.d.ts

@@ -993,10 +993,13 @@ export interface ParkAttemptFailed {
  */
 export type OrgGateVerdict = {
     status: "available";
-    /** The org rule that speaks for this call, if any. Deny outranks ask; there is no allow bucket. */
+    /** The org rule that speaks for this call, if any. Deny outranks ask; there is no allow bucket. An
+     *  `unreadable` member (the lexer's reason) says the call could not be READ against `rule` — an
+     *  org rule that may reach it — so `behavior` is `ask` and the message names the reason. */
     verdict?: {
         behavior: "deny" | "ask";
         rule: string;
+        unreadable?: string;
     };
     /** design/252 G-2 (additive): the REVISION of the snapshot this answer was read off — the
      *  published-policy version an auditor reconciles the resulting decision against. Present on the
@@ -1057,6 +1060,12 @@ export interface PersistedRuleHit {
  */
 export interface PersistedRuleUnreadable {
     readonly unreadable: true;
+    /** WHY the lane could not read: absent for a store read failure; for a call the lane could not READ
+     *  against the person's standing deny/ask rows (an expansion where a rule reads a word, an unterminated
+     *  quote, a syntax error — `programRunReachOf`'s `unreadable` word), the lexer's reason. The DECISION
+     *  is the same fail-closed one either way (the question "does one of my rules forbid this?" is
+     *  unanswered); the reason is what the ask's message says instead of "the store could not be read". */
+    readonly reason?: string;
 }
 /**
  * design/375 §5.2② — the CLEAN NEGATIVE that still carries the per-segment coverage table: no rule

package/dist/core/mcp-injection-drop.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/**
+ * `mcp.injection_dropped` — the one mint of the notice a host raises when an entry of the user's own
+ * MCP injection (a `.mcp.json` row handed to the engine through the host's request lane) was NOT
+ * mounted for the leg. L-167: three drop sites in the host's intake and one cap site each produced
+ * their own wording and none reached the user; the engine did not see the entry at all (it never
+ * reached `prepareTask`), so no core-side notice could stand for it.
+ *
+ * Division of labour, the settlement pattern (`settlement.single_mint`): the HOST supplies FACTS
+ * (which session, which server name, which of four reasons, optionally which field was bad) and
+ * CORE composes the notice — the code word, the audience row, the message text per reason. A host
+ * never spells the code or the text itself: a second wording is a second source that drifts, and a
+ * host-spelled code is not in {@link import("./governance-codes.js").ENGINE_NOTICE_CODES}'s
+ * mint scan, so its audience row could silently rot.
+ *
+ * Audience `"user"`: the dropped entry is the user's own configuration and the recovery (rename the
+ * server, fix the field, trim the list) is in their hands — an operator channel does not reach them.
+ * `sessionId` is therefore REQUIRED at the mint (the routing half of a user row: a user disclosure
+ * that cannot name its session has nowhere to be delivered) — a host with no session has no user to
+ * tell and must not mint. Dedup unit: per leg per server name — the HOST's obligation (it owns the
+ * leg's intake loop); this module is pure.
+ */
+import type { AssertAllKeysHandled } from "./ask-origin.js";
+import type { EngineNotice } from "./engine-notice.js";
+/**
+ * The closed set of drop reasons ({@link McpInjectionDropFacts.reason}) — the host's intake
+ * enumerates exactly these, and a consumer rendering the notice keys on the word:
+ *  · `malformed_entry`              — the entry did not parse as a server declaration (a missing
+ *                                     `command`/`url`, a `toolFaces` value of the wrong shape, …);
+ *                                     `field` names the offending key when the host knows it;
+ *  · `name_reserved_by_deployment`  — the entry's server name collides with one the deployment
+ *                                     itself mounts, and the deployment's wins;
+ *  · `gate_closed`                  — the deployment does not accept request-lane MCP injection on
+ *                                     this leg at all (a multi-tenant posture): the whole list is
+ *                                     ignored, one notice per entry;
+ *  · `over_cap`                     — the entry sits beyond the deployment's injection cap.
+ */
+export declare const MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS: readonly ["malformed_entry", "name_reserved_by_deployment", "gate_closed", "over_cap"];
+export type McpInjectionDropReason = (typeof MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS)[number];
+/**
+ * The user-facing sentence per reason — the disposition table over {@link MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS}
+ * (one reason, one wording; a consumer that wants its own phrasing keys on `detail.reason`, never on
+ * this text). Each names the recovery, because the reader is the person who can perform it.
+ */
+export declare const MCP_INJECTION_DROP_TEXT: {
+    readonly malformed_entry: "its declaration could not be read — fix the entry and start a new session";
+    readonly name_reserved_by_deployment: "the deployment mounts a server of that name and its own wins — rename the entry";
+    readonly gate_closed: "this deployment does not accept MCP servers from the request on this leg — ask the operator, or use the deployment's servers";
+    readonly over_cap: "the request named more MCP servers than this deployment mounts per leg — trim the list";
+};
+export type DropTextCoversEveryReason = AssertAllKeysHandled<Exclude<McpInjectionDropReason, keyof typeof MCP_INJECTION_DROP_TEXT>>;
+/** What a host knows at the drop site — facts only, no words of the engine's vocabulary composed. */
+export interface McpInjectionDropFacts {
+    /** The session whose injection carried the entry — the notice's routing key, required (see module note). */
+    readonly sessionId: string;
+    /** The entry's server name as the user spelled it (the message quotes it verbatim). */
+    readonly server: string;
+    readonly reason: McpInjectionDropReason;
+    /** `malformed_entry` only, optional: the key the host found bad, so the user knows what to edit. */
+    readonly field?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Compose the `mcp.injection_dropped` notice from a host's facts.
+ *
+ * @contract mcp.injection_dropped.single_mint — the `mcp.injection_dropped` notice is composed by CORE
+ * from a host's drop FACTS (session, server name, one of four reasons, optionally the bad field); a
+ * host never spells the code, the audience or the sentence, and a fact outside the vocabulary (an
+ * unlisted reason word, an empty session or server name) is refused at the mint with a `TypeError`
+ * rather than shaped into a notice that would route nowhere or read as an unknown word downstream.
+ *
+ * `detail: { sessionId, server, reason, field? }` — `sessionId` is lifted onto the typed key by
+ * {@link import("./engine-notice.js").deliverEngineNotice}, the one throat, so the two spellings
+ * cannot disagree; `field` is present only when the host supplied a non-empty one.
+ */
+export declare function mcpInjectionDroppedNotice(facts: McpInjectionDropFacts): EngineNotice;

package/dist/core/mcp-injection-drop.js

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+export const MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS = ["malformed_entry", "name_reserved_by_deployment", "gate_closed", "over_cap"];
+export const MCP_INJECTION_DROP_TEXT = {
+    malformed_entry: "its declaration could not be read — fix the entry and start a new session",
+    name_reserved_by_deployment: "the deployment mounts a server of that name and its own wins — rename the entry",
+    gate_closed: "this deployment does not accept MCP servers from the request on this leg — ask the operator, or use the deployment's servers",
+    over_cap: "the request named more MCP servers than this deployment mounts per leg — trim the list",
+};
+const isReason = (x) => typeof x === "string" && MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS.includes(x);
+export function mcpInjectionDroppedNotice(facts) {
+    const { sessionId, server, reason, field } = facts;
+    if (typeof sessionId !== "string" || sessionId.length === 0) {
+        throw new TypeError("mcp.injection_dropped: sessionId is required — a user-audience notice with no session routes nowhere");
+    }
+    if (typeof server !== "string" || server.length === 0) {
+        throw new TypeError("mcp.injection_dropped: server name is required");
+    }
+    if (!isReason(reason)) {
+        throw new TypeError(`mcp.injection_dropped: reason ${JSON.stringify(reason)} is not one of ${MCP_INJECTION_DROP_REASONS.join("/")}`);
+    }
+    const fieldSeat = typeof field === "string" && field.length > 0 ? { field } : {};
+    const where = reason === "malformed_entry" && typeof field === "string" && field.length > 0 ? ` (field \`${field}\`)` : "";
+    return {
+        code: "mcp.injection_dropped",
+        message: `MCP server "${server}" from this request was not mounted: ${MCP_INJECTION_DROP_TEXT[reason]}${where}.`,
+        detail: { sessionId, server, reason, ...fieldSeat },
+    };
+}