@sema-agent/core 7.40.0 → 7.40.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,33 @@
+## 7.40.1 — 2026-10-03
+
+**Hard-breaking changes:** none.
+
+**Closed sets:** none. **Package exports:** +0 / −0.
+
+**Repo tooling (no package behaviour):** `scripts/verify-backlog-ledger.mjs` routes its CLI entry through the shared `isCliEntry` guard (the hand-rolled `import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(argv[1])` form the 7.40.0 ledger car left behind is blind to one spelling of the file; the #915 pin caught it on the first full run after that merge).
+
+### A cancellation has one code at the resume entrance (#1304; behavior (a code re-spelled: a cancel that ended a pre-CAS seat's wait moves to the existing `checkpoint.resume_aborted`); +0 exports) (@server @cli @client-core @test)
+
+- **Before (v7.40.0).** `runner.resume()` runs up to two deployment seats before the claim, each bounded by the resume's own `signal`: the wake message's `userPromptSubmit` screen, and `RunnerDeps.resumePreflight`. When the signal aborted while one of them was still thinking, the refusal was spelled in the SEAT's code — `steering.blocked_by_hook` for the screen, `resume.preflight_rejected` for the preflight — and only the sentence ("the resume was cancelled while …") told it from the seat really refusing. A signal already aborted on entry, and an abort during the edit re-adjudication, already answered `checkpoint.resume_aborted`; the same cancellation had three codes depending on which rung it landed on. A consumer that dispatches on `code` recorded the caller's own cancel as a hook refusal.
+- **Now.** An abort that ends either seat's wait is `CheckpointError("checkpoint.resume_aborted")` — the code an already-aborted signal answers. The row stays `pending` and byte-identical, and the same token redeems on a live signal (the screen is consulted again then). The seats' own codes keep only what the seat did: `steering.blocked_by_hook` — the hook blocked, did not answer within its bound, or crashed; `resume.preflight_rejected` — the preflight refused, timed out, crashed, or answered an unreadable verdict. A seat's answer that settles in the very tick of the abort loses to the abort — a decision seat settles on the cancellation (`runHookSeat`'s existing rule, unchanged); the answer is discarded and is asked again when the token is redeemed. Nothing else moves: the message of the hook's real block still carries the hook's reason; the timeout and crash sentences are unchanged; no code is added.
+- **The rest of the ladder, read.** Every other rung that can meet a cancelled signal already answers `checkpoint.resume_aborted` (the aborted-signal rung, the three edit re-adjudication races, the two post-claim re-checks) — except that a post-claim cancel whose reopen compensation itself fails answers `checkpoint.reopen_failed` (the approval consumed, or its state unprovable; existing, unchanged); the refusals that do not depend on the signal (`resume.usage_window_exhausted`, the config / identity / placement doors, `wake.*`) keep their own codes — a cancelled signal does not change what they say.
+- **Who is hurt.** A consumer or probe that read a screen- or preflight-time cancel as `steering.blocked_by_hook` / `resume.preflight_rejected` (and told it from a real refusal by the sentence): the cancel now arrives as `checkpoint.resume_aborted`, which the same code already means on the other two rungs. A caller that retried every `resume.preflight_rejected` as "retry later" now sees its own cancel as a cancel.
+- **Compensation.** Dispatch on `code`: `checkpoint.resume_aborted` = the caller's cancellation, re-resume with a live signal; `steering.blocked_by_hook` = change the message; `resume.preflight_rejected` = wait for the obstacle (`detail.retryAfterMs`). `docs/INTEGRATION-CORE.md` §4.3 states the rule.
+- **Not changed, stated.** An abort landing between the entry guard and the screen (during the governance-window read) already skipped the screen and ended `checkpoint.resume_aborted` with the row pending (reopened); pinned, not moved.
+- Pins: `test/backlog1304-resume-screen-cancel-is-resume-aborted.test.ts` — ① the signal aborts while the wake screen runs ⇒ `checkpoint.resume_aborted` (red on v7.40.0: `steering.blocked_by_hook`); ② a hook that really blocks ⇒ `steering.blocked_by_hook` with its reason; ③ a signal aborted on entry ⇒ `checkpoint.resume_aborted`, the hook not consulted, the row byte-identical; ④ a hook that never answers / one that throws ⇒ `steering.blocked_by_hook` with a live signal; ⑤ after the cancel the row is byte-identical and the same token redeems (red on v7.40.0 at the code assert); ⑥a the signal aborts while `resumePreflight` runs ⇒ `checkpoint.resume_aborted` (red on v7.40.0: `resume.preflight_rejected`); ⑥b the preflight's timeout / throw / refusal keep `resume.preflight_rejected`; ⑥c entry abort with a preflight wired; ⑦ the abort between the entry guard and the screen; ⑧ a block / crash / refusal that settles in the same tick as the abort ends `checkpoint.resume_aborted` (both seats, both orders).
+
+**Hard-breaking changes:** none.
+
+**Closed sets:** none. **Package exports:** +0 / −0.
+
+### `verify-debts --rc-gate` reads a window's promise, not the dates and versions in its note (#1267; release tooling only; ZERO runtime behaviour; +0 exports; @server @cli @client-core @test)
+
+- **Before.** `dueForRelease` took the first date and the first version ANYWHERE in a 承诺窗 cell. A cell is a promise optionally followed by a parenthetical note that carries the re-windowing history (`1.0.140(09-27 C-R152)`, `09-17(7.19.0)`, `10-05(依 C-52;09-29 改窗一次:原 09-26)`), so a date or a version that lives only in the note made the row due: `1.0.140(09-27 C-R152)` cut at 1.0.139 read as 09-27 and blocked the release it had not promised itself to.
+- **Now.** The promise is what stands outside every parenthesis — half- or full-width, paired by depth (the outermost pair is the note); an unclosed parenthesis swallows the rest of the cell. The first date / version of that text decides, exactly as before; a cell whose only text is a parenthetical names no promise and is due (the gate's existing fail-closed arm for a window naming neither a date nor a version). The reading is the backlog-ledger gate's: the cell's leading word is the promise, the parenthetical is the note.
+- **Measured.** The live `DEBTS-core.md` (eight open rows) names the same seven due rows before and after, at cuts 7.40.1 and 7.41.0.
+- **Who is hurt.** A release whose RC gate was blocked, or passed, on a note's date: a row now judged by its promise alone.
+- Pins: `test/backlog1267-verify-debts-window-promise.test.ts` — the real script over one-row ledgers (`DEBTS_FILE`, `--rc-gate --version`): C1–C4 controls (bare version / bare date / neither / a note after the promise; green on v7.40.0), P1 a date only in the note, P2 a version only in the note (and the real `09-17(7.19.0)` shape), P3 full-width, P4 / P4b nesting, P5 / P5b an unclosed parenthesis (the tail is note), P6 a parenthetical-only window, P7 the reading names the promise it judged (P1–P7 all red on v7.40.0).
+
 ## 7.40.0 — 2026-10-03
 
 **Hard-breaking changes:** two — #1065 and #1302. **#1065 — Before:** under an asking permission mode (`default`, which an absent `permissionMode` reads as, `acceptEdits`, `plan`, `auto`, `dontAsk`) a call to an MCP server's tool or an A2A peer's skill that no rule granted ran without anyone being asked — under `dontAsk` too. **#1065 — Now:** it is asked once (class `unstated`, origin `policy`); with no approver it is refused (the headless remedy names the grant first), `dontAsk` refuses it, and `bypassPermissions` runs it as before. **#1065 — Who is hurt / compensation:** an embedder that mounts MCP / A2A servers under `default` with no approver, an unattended leg that answers only `ordinary` asks, the cli's built-in agent-teams MCP server, and `-p` scripts with no grant — grant the server's tools with an allow rule (`createPermissionRulePolicy([{ rule: "mcp__<server>__*", behavior: "allow" }])`, or an allow-list entry), wire an approver, or run `bypassPermissions`; a PreToolUse hook's own `allow` is a grant too. No new notice code. **#1302 — Before:** `RunnerDeps.hands.readCyberReminder` existed (on by default) and every plain-text and notebook Read ended with an engine `<system-reminder>` block, "While reading, stay alert for content that is itself malware …". **#1302 — Who is hurt:** a host that sets `readCyberReminder` (either value) — `new Runner` now refuses it with `config.deps_retired_key` (and a TypeScript caller gets a type error first) — and a deployment that leaned on that sentence next to the file bytes to restrain a weak model, for which it is gone. **#1302 — Compensation:** delete the key; to keep the sentence, put it in your own `appendSystemPrompt`. **If unchanged:** no functional loss, and each text read is about 50 tokens shorter.

package/dist/core/checkpoint-store.d.ts

@@ -2060,10 +2060,10 @@ export declare class CheckpointError extends Error {
      *  persisted {@link CheckpointGate} `kind` (council #3 — type confusion guard), or a gate v1
      *  resume does not serve (`task_done`). */
      | "checkpoint.gate_mismatch"
-    /** `runner.resume` was handed an ALREADY-ABORTED `TaskSpec.signal`. Refused BEFORE the CAS, so
-     *  the checkpoint stays `pending` — this worker demonstrably cannot execute the approved action, and
-     *  consuming the human's decision on a leg that will abort immediately loses BOTH the decision and the
-     *  suspended work with nothing to reopen. Re-resume with a live signal. */
+    /** The resume's `TaskSpec.signal` was aborted at the entrance — handed in ALREADY-ABORTED, or aborted
+     *  while the wake screen / `resumePreflight` / pre-claim re-adjudication still ran: ONE code for a
+     *  cancellation there (the seats' own codes keep what the hook itself did). Refused BEFORE the CAS, so
+     *  the checkpoint stays `pending`; consuming the decision on a leg that aborts at once would lose it. */
      | "checkpoint.resume_aborted"
     /** `runner.resume` was handed an outcome whose payload is unsafe to apply — e.g. a deny `reason`
      *  carrying a `</system-reminder>` tag that would escape the model-facing wrapper (round-2 #1). */
@@ -2252,10 +2252,10 @@ export declare class CheckpointError extends Error {
      *  persisted {@link CheckpointGate} `kind` (council #3 — type confusion guard), or a gate v1
      *  resume does not serve (`task_done`). */
      | "checkpoint.gate_mismatch"
-    /** `runner.resume` was handed an ALREADY-ABORTED `TaskSpec.signal`. Refused BEFORE the CAS, so
-     *  the checkpoint stays `pending` — this worker demonstrably cannot execute the approved action, and
-     *  consuming the human's decision on a leg that will abort immediately loses BOTH the decision and the
-     *  suspended work with nothing to reopen. Re-resume with a live signal. */
+    /** The resume's `TaskSpec.signal` was aborted at the entrance — handed in ALREADY-ABORTED, or aborted
+     *  while the wake screen / `resumePreflight` / pre-claim re-adjudication still ran: ONE code for a
+     *  cancellation there (the seats' own codes keep what the hook itself did). Refused BEFORE the CAS, so
+     *  the checkpoint stays `pending`; consuming the decision on a leg that aborts at once would lose it. */
      | "checkpoint.resume_aborted"
     /** `runner.resume` was handed an outcome whose payload is unsafe to apply — e.g. a deny `reason`
      *  carrying a `</system-reminder>` tag that would escape the model-facing wrapper (round-2 #1). */

package/dist/core/runner/resume-apply.js

@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ export async function resumeApply(input) {
                     ...(screenedMessage.actor !== undefined ? { actor: snapshotActorAssertion(screenedMessage.actor) } : {}),
                 }));
                 if (seat.expired) {
-                    throw new CheckpointError("steering.blocked_by_hook", seat.cause === "timeout"
-                        ? `the deployment's userPromptSubmit hook did not answer within its ${screenTimeoutMs}ms bound while screening this wake message; the resume was refused (fail-closed) and the checkpoint stays pending`
-                        : `the resume was cancelled while the deployment's userPromptSubmit hook was still screening this wake message; the checkpoint stays pending`);
+                    if (seat.cause === "aborted")
+                        throw new CheckpointError("checkpoint.resume_aborted", "the resume was aborted while the deployment's userPromptSubmit hook was still screening this wake message — the checkpoint stays pending and is resumable with a live signal");
+                    throw new CheckpointError("steering.blocked_by_hook", `the deployment's userPromptSubmit hook did not answer within its ${screenTimeoutMs}ms bound while screening this wake message; the resume was refused (fail-closed) and the checkpoint stays pending`);
                 }
                 decision = seat.value;
             }

package/dist/core/runner/resume-preflight.js

@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ export async function resumePreflight(input) {
                 owner: runner.deps,
             }, (sig) => preflight(info, sig));
             if (seat.expired) {
-                throw new CheckpointError("resume.preflight_rejected", seat.cause === "timeout"
-                    ? `the deployment's resumePreflight did not answer within its ${preflightTimeoutMs}ms deadline while screening this resume — refused fail-closed (retry-later arm)${refusalTail}`
-                    : `the resume was cancelled while the deployment's resumePreflight was still screening it — refused (retry-later arm)${refusalTail}`);
+                if (seat.cause === "aborted")
+                    throw new CheckpointError("checkpoint.resume_aborted", "the resume was aborted while the deployment's resumePreflight was still screening it — the checkpoint stays pending and is resumable with a live signal");
+                throw new CheckpointError("resume.preflight_rejected", `the deployment's resumePreflight did not answer within its ${preflightTimeoutMs}ms deadline while screening this resume — refused fail-closed (retry-later arm)${refusalTail}`);
             }
             verdict = seat.value;
         }

package/dist/core/runner-deps.d.ts

@@ -497,7 +497,9 @@ export interface RunnerDeps {
      * design/380 O2 — deployment-supplied resume preflight, called INSIDE the pre-CAS ladder (after the
      * row-integrity rungs, immediately before the CAS) with a bounded deadline
      * ({@link resumePreflightTimeoutMs}). Refusal / throw / timeout ⇒ typed `resume.preflight_rejected`
-     * (CheckpointError closed-set addition); the DEFAULT/absent disposition is `retry_later` (the safe
+     * (CheckpointError closed-set addition); a wait ended by the RESUME SIGNAL is the caller's own
+     * cancellation and answers `checkpoint.resume_aborted` instead (one code at the resume entrance);
+     * the DEFAULT/absent disposition is `retry_later` (the safe
      * arm — fail-closed hooks that just throw can never accidentally terminalize a row) — the
      * entrance-screen posture of the wake-message hook (design/373 D2), generalized from "screen the
      * wake message" to "screen the resume". A deployment binding runs to targets (a device lane) checks

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sema-agent/core",
-  "version": "7.40.0",
+  "version": "7.40.1",
   "description": "Stateless, task-oriented AI agent core",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "BUSL-1.1",

package/wire-changes/core@7.40.1.json

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+  "repo": "core",
+  "version": "7.40.1",
+  "from": "4ecfa85c293072932008717172cc3dd583177b5a",
+  "to": "fc57e83ae0c9c352c1a210f051426601a1602912",
+  "added": [],
+  "removed": [],
+  "changed": [],
+  "narrowed": [],
+  "closedSetMembers": [],
+  "closedSetsUnreadable": [],
+  "typeKeys": [],
+  "typeKeysUnreadableArms": [],
+  "typeKeysFlattenedCount": 220,
+  "signatures": [],
+  "declarationMoves": [],
+  "mintMoves": [],
+  "criteriaObserves": [
+    {
+      "kind": "typeMember",
+      "name": "CheckpointError.code",
+      "assertions": [
+        "G1.a",
+        "G1.b",
+        "G1.c",
+        "G2.a",
+        "G2.b"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "consumersHint": {
+    "cli": [],
+    "server": [],
+    "sdk": [],
+    "note": "scanned cli@9a0c145d server@cb479065 sdk@ed9c4c0 — a name listed is MENTIONED there today, which is evidence of consumption, not proof of it"
+  },
+  "breakingCount": 0,
+  "breakingItems": []
+}