@sema-agent/core 5.42.0 → 5.44.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,102 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 5.44.0 — 2026-08-19
+
+### Added
+- Memory pollution is LOUD (#324a): two EngineNotice codes — `memory.session_polluted` (once per
+  session, minted on the wx-atomic first transition; states the VERDICT: content written after the
+  mark is not admitted to the long-term library at harvest) and `memory.harvest_quarantined`
+  (at most once per harvest when a polluted session's harvest withheld ≥1 entry file;
+  `detail: {count, moved, escalated, reason?, sessionId?}` — deduplicated-path counts, `moved` =
+  files that actually left the model-visible plane, `escalated` = quarantine failures). Both ride
+  `deliverEngineNotice` (seat / absent-warn / malformed-seat fallback, unchanged). The notices
+  state facts, not promises: writeScope-null and persistence-incapable arms take the zero-adoption
+  return and are NOT described as quarantined.
+- `MemoryEngine.markSessionPolluted` now returns `SessionPollutionMarkOutcome` (was `void`) —
+  additive; the wx-atomic marker distinguishes `"created" | "existed" | "unpersisted"`.
+- Release-criteria gate hardening (5.44 rescan disposal, 8 findings): the EngineNotice MINT
+  judgment is checker-based (the `code` value inside an object literal whose non-nullable
+  contextual type carries `code`+`message` on EVERY union arm, in files the shipped build
+  compiles) — a literal type, the `err.code=` refusal dialect, a comment, an examples-only mint
+  and a bare `{code,message}` const no longer count; a public CLASS is a legal citation root
+  (instance + declared statics, minus private/write-only/language-supplied); a disclosed release
+  (CHANGELOG section present) with no criteria document reds the gate.
+- design/278 recipe pins: the coordinator fresh-spawn recipe core arms (spawn-fresh imperative,
+  verbatim user quote, literal command, execute-only, relayed-consent line) are pinned six-ways —
+  the recipe the G6 classifier exception depends on can no longer drift silently. (The #278
+  product fix itself shipped in 5.38.0; the ledger row was stale and is now closed.)
+
+### Changed
+- Grep target-spelling flip completion (#318): `jsGrepDetailed` answers — including the rescan
+  legs an rg-present host falls back to — carry the single explicit FILE target's own spelling
+  (family-aware dot-segment collapse, one family judgment for the whole anchor; `..` cannot climb
+  past a namespace root). The two engines no longer disagree on path shape for the same call.
+- Grep structured rows completion (#313 remainder): the JS legs hand served rows too; the served-row
+  contract states its one measured exception.
+- `memory_get` not-found no longer blindly suggests `memory_search`; when the missing slug was
+  written THIS session the text states the mount-snapshot fact (new writes become retrievable
+  next session) and, in a polluted session, states that the write will be withheld at harvest.
+  `memory_search` zero-hit output appends the pollution disclosure line in polluted sessions only
+  (clean sessions byte-identical). Tool contract revisions move: search 1→2, get 2→3.
+- The 5.43.0 `-H` entry erratum (recorded in that section): the flip covers count mode too, and
+  the "without a deny judge" arm is not a configuration any public route produces.
+
+### Fixed
+- `docs/release-criteria/5.43.0.json` four unexecutable/false arms repaired (deny-less arm no
+  public route can produce; the deny-note flip F5 declared and claimed by G3; the per-process
+  console latch construction made blackbox-executable; the rg-leg note wording quoted as minted).
+
+## 5.43.0 — 2026-08-18
+
+### Added
+- `TaskResult.checkpointId` — the non-secret checkpoint identity now rides the suspended /
+  needs_review terminals beside `checkpointToken` (full chain: mint → publishCommittedSuspend →
+  suspend/review ref → runTask ref copy → assemble-result; the ref copy is an explicit-key
+  whitelist and the new key crosses it). **Erratum for the 5.42.0 entry**: that release minted
+  `checkpointId` on `Checkpoint`/`CheckpointSummary` only — it did NOT yet reach `TaskResult`;
+  the entry omitted that boundary. This release completes the face.
+- `NodeExecutionEnv` constructor seat `onSecretEnvScrub` (#316): the Bash exec site's secret-env
+  scrub decision is observable. Findings name the denylist-matched keys withheld from the child
+  env; a caller-overridden key (constructor `shellEnv` or per-exec `env`) is NOT reported withheld —
+  the child has it by the caller's explicit choice; an async seat's rejection is consumed (an announcement must
+  never become an exec failure); unwired builds print a once-per-process console summary.
+  Companion doc fix (#315, doc half): the scrub matches key NAMES against the denylist — a secret
+  VALUE under an innocent name is not detected; the doc now says so where the denylist lives.
+- Grep structured rows (#313, first stage): the ripgrep legs hand their served rows
+  (`{path?, text}`, post cap/offset) to the tool layer, and `grepDetailFields` prefers row
+  identity when every served row carries it — `details.filenames` on rg legs no longer re-parses
+  paths out of formatted text (a path containing `:digits:` can no longer split wrong). Text
+  parsing remains the honest fallback (JS fallback leg unchanged; its rows stage is a later
+  window).
+
+### Changed
+- Grep's ripgrep legs always pass `-H` (#311): a single explicit file target keeps its path
+  field, so a deny-guarded single-file grep keeps the rg fast path instead of abandoning rg for
+  the JS scanner's explicit-file lane (an engine swap over that one file, losing rg's
+  streaming/large-file handling). Observable flip: content-mode AND count-mode output for a
+  single explicit file target now carries a path prefix in the TARGET's spelling as passed (the
+  tool layer hands an absolute canonical path, so the prefix is ABSOLUTE; count mode reads
+  `<path>:<n>`); `files_with_matches` did not move. **Erratum (5.44 rescan)**: this entry
+  originally scoped the flip to content mode and described a "without a deny judge" arm — no
+  public route produces that arm (every route to the tool compiles a read-deny judge), and the
+  previous release answered the call from the JS lane with a ROOT-RELATIVE prefix in every deny
+  configuration a caller can produce; count mode flipped the same way. Multi-file and directory
+  targets: byte-identical (measured). The two engines still disagree on path shape for the same call (jsGrep emits
+  root-relative) — that alignment is tracked separately (#318), not silently changed here.
+- The deny-withholding note no longer fabricates on single-file scopes (5.43 rescan): `rg --files`
+  lists an explicitly named file argument regardless of glob filters, so the existence probe
+  behind the note would have claimed "entries were excluded" on every deny-wired single-file grep
+  the `-H` change made reachable. A target the stat probe proves is a FILE is judged clean without
+  the probe — the tool layer already judged that one target against the same deny table before
+  the engine ran, and a scope of exactly one served file has nothing else to withhold. Directory
+  scopes keep the probe unchanged.
+- A clean no-match ripgrep run now carries `rows: []` (5.43 rescan): the one rg terminal that
+  omitted the served-rows key, breaking the "rows present ⟺ ripgrep leg" reading.
+- `onSecretEnvScrub` judges its seat by FUNCTION-ness (5.43 rescan): a present non-function seat
+  (null, an untyped host's JSON wiring) no longer silences both channels at once — the findings
+  keep the seatless once-per-process console summary and the seat defect itself is announced once
+  per process (the #170 shape; loud-bad-value law).
+
 ## 5.42.0 — 2026-08-18
 
 ### Added

package/dist/core/governance-codes.js

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ export const NON_GOVERNANCE_MEMORY_CODES = new Set([
     "memory.partition_split",
     "memory.tail",
     "memory.pollution_mark_failed",
+    "memory.session_polluted",
+    "memory.harvest_quarantined",
     "memory.challenge_sweep_failed",
     "memory.lineage_settle_failed",
     "memory.challenge_ledger_corrupt",

package/dist/core/memory-engine/engine.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+import type { EngineNotice } from "../types.js";
 import { type CommittedBinding, type EraseMemoryEntriesInput, type MemoryErasureAttestation, type TransferEvidence } from "./file-backend.js";
 import { type MemoryExportBundle, type MemoryImportReport } from "./export-bundle.js";
-import { type ChallengeAssignment, type ChallengeEvent, type ControlPlaneRebuildReceipt, type StrictControlPlaneLedger, type ChallengedHistoryRow, type LineagePendingTxn, type LineagePromotion, type MemoryPartitionIncidentSink, type RetrievedAccountRow, type SessionPollutionRecord } from "./layout.js";
+import { type ChallengeAssignment, type ChallengeEvent, type ControlPlaneRebuildReceipt, type StrictControlPlaneLedger, type ChallengedHistoryRow, type LineagePendingTxn, type LineagePromotion, type MemoryPartitionIncidentSink, type RetrievedAccountRow, type SessionPollutionMarkOutcome, type SessionPollutionRecord } from "./layout.js";
 import type { HarvestReport, MemoryAnnouncement, MemoryBackend, MemorySessionHandle, ScanFinding } from "./types.js";
 /**
  * The CC `# Memory` instruction section — VERBATIM from the live capture
@@ -255,6 +256,91 @@ export interface EntryProvenanceAccount {
         reason?: string;
     };
 }
+/**
+ * The pollution mark's loud half ({@link EngineNotice}). The engine's own `onIncident` seat carries the
+ * FAILURES of this machinery (`memory.pollution_mark_failed`, `memory.challenge_sweep_failed`); this is
+ * the other fact — the machinery worked, and its verdict silently changed what every memory write in
+ * this session will do. Before this code existed the transition had no face at all: the session went on
+ * writing memory files, the harvest quarantined every one of them, and nothing said so while a host
+ * could still act on it.
+ *
+ * SCOPE OF THE CLAIM (adversarial-review round 1, P1 — the first cut PROMISED quarantine on every mark).
+ * This notice states the VERDICT, not the mechanism's outcome: "no longer eligible", plus what a harvest
+ * does WHEN IT COLLECTS. That distinction is load-bearing, because several real paths reach a polluted
+ * harvest that quarantines nothing — a `writeScope`-null layering and a declared-unavailable session
+ * both take `harvestCore`'s zero-admission return (nothing is collected, so nothing is captured), and a
+ * mark landing after the pre-commit pollution read leaves already-committed rows to the CHALLENGE sweep
+ * rather than to containment. What a given harvest actually contained is the other code's job
+ * (`memory.harvest_quarantined`), and the message says so instead of guessing here. The baseline clause
+ * is likewise scoped to a collecting harvest: containment judges a changed file against the
+ * MATERIALIZE-time baseline, not against the mark's timestamp, so pre-mark writes are covered too.
+ *
+ * The challenge clause is likewise a POLICY statement with its failure channel named (adversarial-review
+ * round 3): the mark-side sweep is best-effort — an unreadable or unwritable lineage ledger makes
+ * `markSessionPolluted` announce `memory.challenge_sweep_failed` and return normally — so this notice
+ * must not be read as a receipt that the sweep landed.
+ *
+ * Minted by the runner's mark seat (the one call site of the mark face), so an engine-direct host keeps
+ * the incident seat and gains no new obligation.
+ *
+ * `reason` names a TOOL, and tool names come from the host/protocol roster: neutralized and bounded
+ * here — the same treatment the report warnings give it — before it rides either the message or the
+ * detail (a host renders both).
+ */
+export declare function memorySessionPollutedNotice(input: {
+    reason: string;
+    sessionId?: string;
+}): EngineNotice;
+/**
+ * The polluted harvest's loud half ({@link EngineNotice}): what the containment actually did, minted
+ * once per harvest that withheld at least one ENTRY file. `count` is the withheld set (the
+ * `polluted`-coded rejections — entry files that diverged from the materialize baseline), `moved` the
+ * subset that also LEFT the model-visible plane, and `escalated` the subset carrying a
+ * `quarantineFailures` row.
+ *
+ * `escalated` is its own input rather than `count - moved` (adversarial-review round 3): the two are
+ * NOT the same set. A file whose delete fails but whose tombstone write succeeds counts as removed —
+ * it rides `movedToQuarantine` AND an escalation row saying it was tombstoned in place — so the
+ * arithmetic would report a clean containment while a known failure sat in the report. Every
+ * not-moved file does have an escalation row, so `escalated` is the superset and the honest clause.
+ *
+ * KNOWN GAP (adversarial-review round 1, P2 — registered, not closed here): the derived index is
+ * contained by a different path (`restorePollutedIndex` captures and restores `MEMORY.md`) that mints
+ * no rejection row, so a polluted session whose ONLY memory change was an index line produces no
+ * `count` and no notice — its containment is disclosed by the harvest report's warnings alone. Closing
+ * it needs a structured containment signal on `HarvestReport`, a public type this fix does not touch.
+ * The wording therefore says "entry file(s)" rather than implying the whole containment.
+ *
+ * `reason` is optional because the mark record is read separately from the report: a record that cannot
+ * be read must not turn a true "N files were withheld" into a lie about why.
+ */
+/**
+ * The three numbers {@link memoryHarvestQuarantinedNotice} reports, read off ONE harvest report. Pure
+ * and exported so the derivation is provable on its own (the tombstone case — moved AND escalated — is
+ * not constructible through a real filesystem without root-dependent permission tricks).
+ *
+ * Every number is scoped to the WITHHELD paths: a dual-root harvest merges the read plane's report in,
+ * and that plane's ordinary write gate quarantines on its own grounds — counting its rows would credit
+ * this session's pollution with containment it never performed.
+ *
+ * FILES, NOT ROWS (adversarial-review round 4). One path can appear twice in the same report: when the
+ * pre-commit pollution recheck flips a clean harvest to containment, a file the ordinary secret/filename
+ * gate already quarantined is contained again, and both passes append. Counting rows would then publish
+ * `moved`/`escalated` greater than `count` — an impossible statement about a set of files — so every
+ * number here is a count of DISTINCT paths.
+ */
+export declare function pollutionContainmentCounts(report: HarvestReport): {
+    count: number;
+    moved: number;
+    escalated: number;
+};
+export declare function memoryHarvestQuarantinedNotice(input: {
+    count: number;
+    moved: number;
+    escalated: number;
+    reason?: string;
+    sessionId?: string;
+}): EngineNotice;
 export declare class MemoryEngine {
     private readonly backend;
     private readonly memoryDir;
@@ -301,8 +387,14 @@ export declare class MemoryEngine {
      * record, and the durable marker survives restarts (control plane — never model-writable
      * frontmatter). A failed durable write is disclosed via `onIncident` (`memory.pollution_mark_failed`)
      * while the in-memory mark keeps THIS process fail-closed.
+     *
+     * RETURNS the durable marker's {@link SessionPollutionMarkOutcome} — `"created"` ⇔ this call made
+     * the transition. That is the ONE atomic answer to "was this the clean → polluted crossing", and the
+     * runner's once-per-session disclosure is keyed on it: a pre-read cannot decide it (two concurrent
+     * markers of one session would both read clean and both announce). Callers that do not disclose
+     * ignore it exactly as before.
      */
-    markSessionPolluted(sessionId: string, reason: string): void;
+    markSessionPolluted(sessionId: string, reason: string): SessionPollutionMarkOutcome;
     /** The session's pollution record (in-process mark first, then the durable marker) — undefined =
      *  clean. Reads are side-effect-free. */
     sessionPollution(sessionId: string): SessionPollutionRecord | undefined;

package/dist/core/memory-engine/engine.js

@@ -48,6 +48,47 @@ export const DEFAULT_HARVEST_DEADLINE_MS = 5_000;
 export const DEFAULT_HARVEST_FILE_BUDGET = 2_000;
 export const MASS_DELETION_FUSE_RATIO = 0.5;
 let indexCaptureSeq = 0;
+export function memorySessionPollutedNotice(input) {
+    const reason = inlineUntrusted(input.reason, 200);
+    return {
+        code: "memory.session_polluted",
+        message: `Memory for this session is marked polluted: ${reason}. Its memory writes are no longer eligible for the ` +
+            `long-term library — a harvest withholds what it collects (quarantined for host review, judged against the ` +
+            `session's opening baseline, so changes made before this point are withheld too), and contributions this ` +
+            `session already committed are challenged (a sweep that cannot run announces memory.challenge_sweep_failed). ` +
+            `What a given harvest actually contained is announced as memory.harvest_quarantined.`,
+        detail: { reason, ...(input.sessionId !== undefined ? { sessionId: input.sessionId } : {}) },
+    };
+}
+export function pollutionContainmentCounts(report) {
+    const withheld = new Set(report.rejections.filter((r) => r.code === "polluted").map((r) => r.path));
+    const distinct = (paths) => new Set(paths.filter((p) => withheld.has(p))).size;
+    return {
+        count: withheld.size,
+        moved: distinct(report.movedToQuarantine),
+        escalated: distinct((report.quarantineFailures ?? []).map((q) => q.path)),
+    };
+}
+export function memoryHarvestQuarantinedNotice(input) {
+    const reason = input.reason !== undefined ? inlineUntrusted(input.reason, 200) : undefined;
+    return {
+        code: "memory.harvest_quarantined",
+        message: `Memory harvest committed nothing for this polluted session${reason !== undefined ? ` (${reason})` : ""}: ` +
+            `${input.count} memory entry file(s) written or changed in it were withheld, ${input.moved} of them moved into ` +
+            `the control-plane quarantine directory for host review` +
+            (input.escalated > 0
+                ? `; ${input.escalated} carr${input.escalated === 1 ? "ies" : "y"} a containment escalation (a file that did not leave the ` +
+                    `model-visible plane, or one tombstoned in place rather than deleted) — the harvest report's quarantineFailures names them.`
+                : "."),
+        detail: {
+            count: input.count,
+            moved: input.moved,
+            escalated: input.escalated,
+            ...(reason !== undefined ? { reason } : {}),
+            ...(input.sessionId !== undefined ? { sessionId: input.sessionId } : {}),
+        },
+    };
+}
 export class MemoryEngine {
     backend;
     memoryDir;
@@ -115,14 +156,14 @@ export class MemoryEngine {
     markSessionPolluted(sessionId, reason) {
         if (!this.pollutedSessions.has(sessionId))
             this.pollutedSessions.set(sessionId, { at: this.now(), reason });
-        let durable = false;
+        let outcome;
         try {
-            durable = markSessionPolluted(this.controlDir, sessionId, reason, this.now);
+            outcome = markSessionPolluted(this.controlDir, sessionId, reason, this.now);
         }
         catch {
-            durable = false;
+            outcome = "unpersisted";
         }
-        if (!durable) {
+        if (outcome === "unpersisted") {
             const sink = this.onIncident;
             if (sink !== undefined) {
                 try {
@@ -156,6 +197,7 @@ export class MemoryEngine {
                 }
             }
         }
+        return outcome;
     }
     sessionPollution(sessionId) {
         const inProcess = this.pollutedSessions.get(sessionId);

package/dist/core/memory-engine/layout.d.ts

@@ -288,11 +288,18 @@ export interface SessionPollutionRecord {
 }
 /**
  * Mark `sessionId` polluted (idempotent; the FIRST record wins — `wx` create refuses overwrite).
- * Returns true when a durable marker exists after the call (created now or already present);
- * false ⇔ the marker could not be persisted — the caller must keep its own in-memory mark and
- * disclose (the session stays polluted for this process either way).
+ *
+ * The outcome distinguishes the two ways a durable marker can exist after the call, because the
+ * `wx` create is the only ATOMIC answer to "who made this transition" available anywhere in the
+ * stack (#324a, adversarial-review round 5): a check-then-act pre-read lets two concurrent markers
+ * of one session both believe they were first, and a once-per-session disclosure keyed on that would
+ * announce twice. `"created"` ⇔ THIS call minted the marker; `"existed"` ⇔ it was already there (a
+ * repeat mark, a resumed session, or a racing peer that won the create); `"unpersisted"` ⇔ the marker
+ * could not be written at all — the caller must keep its own in-memory mark and disclose (the session
+ * stays polluted for this process either way).
  */
-export declare function markSessionPolluted(controlDir: string, sessionId: string, reason: string, now: () => number): boolean;
+export type SessionPollutionMarkOutcome = "created" | "existed" | "unpersisted";
+export declare function markSessionPolluted(controlDir: string, sessionId: string, reason: string, now: () => number): SessionPollutionMarkOutcome;
 /** Read the durable pollution record for `sessionId` (undefined = no marker).
  *  A marker that EXISTS still reads as polluted whether or not its bytes can be read or parsed
  *  (fail-closed: neither corruption nor an unreadable node may launder the state) — a synthesized

package/dist/core/memory-engine/layout.js

@@ -740,12 +740,12 @@ export function markSessionPolluted(controlDir, sessionId, reason, now) {
         ensureDirExists(dirname(path));
         const record = { at: now(), reason };
         writeFileSync(path, `${JSON.stringify(record, null, 2)}\n`, { encoding: "utf8", flag: "wx" });
-        return true;
+        return "created";
     }
     catch (err) {
         if (err instanceof Error && "code" in err && err.code === "EEXIST")
-            return true;
-        return false;
+            return "existed";
+        return "unpersisted";
     }
 }
 export function readSessionPollution(controlDir, sessionId) {

package/dist/core/memory-engine/tools.d.ts

@@ -66,6 +66,18 @@ export interface MemoryEngineToolsOptions {
     planes: ReadonlyArray<MemoryEnginePlane>;
     /** Clock (tests); default Date.now. Drives the natural-language age rendering only. */
     now?: () => number;
+    /**
+     * design/178 §3 (#324b) — the session's pollution READ face: the record when this session is marked
+     * polluted, `undefined` when it is clean. Read-only and side-effect-free (the mark is one-way and
+     * lives at the runner's mark seat); consulted ONLY on the empty outcomes, where a session whose
+     * writes are being withheld deserves to hear it instead of being told to search again.
+     *
+     * Absent ⇒ no pollution face is wired (engine-direct hosts, tests): the empty-outcome wording is
+     * then exactly the clean-session wording — nothing is inferred from the seat's absence.
+     */
+    sessionPollution?: () => {
+        reason: string;
+    } | undefined;
 }
 export interface MemorySearchHit {
     id: string;

package/dist/core/memory-engine/tools.js

@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ export function skipBytes(text, startBytes) {
 export function createMemoryEngineTools(opts) {
     const { planes } = opts;
     const now = opts.now ?? Date.now;
+    const pollutionSentence = () => {
+        let reason;
+        try {
+            reason = opts.sessionPollution?.()?.reason;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return "";
+        }
+        if (reason === undefined)
+            return "";
+        return ` This session is marked polluted (${inlineUntrusted(reason, 200)}): the memory it writes is not admitted to the library at harvest, so writing this down now would not make it retrievable later either.`;
+    };
+    const noMatch = (query) => {
+        const details = { outcome: "ok", hits: [] };
+        return {
+            content: `No memory entries matched ${JSON.stringify(inlineUntrusted(query, 120))}. If the user expected you to know this, say that you checked memory and found nothing.` +
+                pollutionSentence(),
+            details,
+        };
+    };
     const getWithinScopes = async (plane, ids) => {
         const scopeSet = new Set(plane.scopes);
         return (await plane.backend.getByIds(ids)).filter((e) => scopeSet.has(e.scope) && e.frontmatter.deleted !== true);
@@ -102,7 +122,7 @@ export function createMemoryEngineTools(opts) {
         defer: true,
         offload: false,
         contentOrigin: "local",
-        contract: { contractId: "core.memory_search@1", implementationRevision: "1" },
+        contract: { contractId: "core.memory_search@1", implementationRevision: "2" },
         parameters: Type.Object({
             query: Type.String({ description: "Keywords to look for (lexical match against entry names, descriptions and bodies)." }),
             limit: Type.Optional(Type.Number({ description: `Maximum hits to return (default ${MEMORY_SEARCH_DEFAULT_LIMIT}, max ${MEMORY_SEARCH_MAX_LIMIT}).` })),
@@ -144,10 +164,8 @@ export function createMemoryEngineTools(opts) {
             }
             merged.sort(contractOrder);
             const top = merged.slice(0, limit);
-            if (top.length === 0) {
-                const details = { outcome: "ok", hits: [] };
-                return { content: `No memory entries matched ${JSON.stringify(inlineUntrusted(query, 120))}. If the user expected you to know this, say that you checked memory and found nothing.`, details };
-            }
+            if (top.length === 0)
+                return noMatch(query);
             const bodyById = new Map();
             try {
                 for (let i = 0; i < planes.length; i++) {
@@ -171,10 +189,8 @@ export function createMemoryEngineTools(opts) {
                 return refusedSearch("challenge_ledger_unavailable", "Memory search is unavailable: the challenge ledger for a mounted memory plane cannot be read (fail-closed). Report this to the operator.", "failed");
             }
             const live = top.filter((h) => bodyById.has(h.id) && terminalExclusions[h.planeIndex]?.has(h.id) !== true);
-            if (live.length === 0) {
-                const details = { outcome: "ok", hits: [] };
-                return { content: `No memory entries matched ${JSON.stringify(inlineUntrusted(query, 120))}. If the user expected you to know this, say that you checked memory and found nothing.`, details };
-            }
+            if (live.length === 0)
+                return noMatch(query);
             for (let i = 0; i < planes.length; i++) {
                 const ids = live.filter((h) => h.planeIndex === i).map((h) => h.id);
                 if (ids.length === 0)
@@ -219,7 +235,7 @@ export function createMemoryEngineTools(opts) {
         defer: true,
         offload: false,
         contentOrigin: "local",
-        contract: { contractId: "core.memory_get@1", implementationRevision: "2" },
+        contract: { contractId: "core.memory_get@1", implementationRevision: "3" },
         parameters: Type.Object({
             id: Type.Optional(Type.String({ description: "Entry id (exact lookup). Pass either id or slug, not both." })),
             slug: Type.Optional(Type.String({ description: "Entry slug (its file path without .md). Ambiguous across scopes unless scope is also passed." })),
@@ -275,7 +291,10 @@ export function createMemoryEngineTools(opts) {
                     }
                     if (matches.length === 0) {
                         const where = scope !== undefined ? ` in scope ${JSON.stringify(inlineUntrusted(scope, 80))}` : "";
-                        return refusedGet("not_found", `No memory entry with slug ${JSON.stringify(inlineUntrusted(slug, 160))}${where} is mounted in this session. Try ${MEMORY_SEARCH_TOOL_NAME}.`, "not_found", { slug: slug, ...(scope !== undefined ? { scope } : {}) });
+                        return refusedGet("not_found", `No memory entry with slug ${JSON.stringify(inlineUntrusted(slug, 160))}${where} is mounted in this session. ` +
+                            `Only entries carrying a committed entry id are served here, and a memory file written into the memory root during ` +
+                            `this session gets its id when the session-boundary harvest admits it — a file written in this session is not served here before then.` +
+                            pollutionSentence(), "not_found", { slug: slug, ...(scope !== undefined ? { scope } : {}) });
                     }
                     if (matches.length > 1) {
                         const candidates = matches.map((m) => ({ scope: m.header.scope, slug: m.header.slug, id: m.header.id }));

package/dist/core/runner/assemble-result.d.ts

@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ export interface ResultFlags {
      *  but does not set `threw`, so it never reaches the `flags.threw` branch. */
     suspendRef?: {
         token: import("../checkpoint-store.js").CheckpointToken;
+        /** The non-secret identity twin ({@link import("../checkpoint-store.js").Checkpoint.checkpointId}). */
+        checkpointId?: string;
         gate: import("../checkpoint-store.js").CheckpointGate;
         /** RB-439-b: how the paused workspace comes back (`"park_only"` = a non-suspendable target that was
          *  never actually paused). Echoed on `TaskResult.workspaceRestoreMode`; absent for a process-local
@@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ export interface ResultFlags {
      *  so it never hits the failure branches above. */
     reviewRef?: {
         token: import("../checkpoint-store.js").CheckpointToken;
+        checkpointId?: string;
         gate: import("../checkpoint-store.js").CheckpointGate;
         /** RB-439-b: the review pause pauses the same workspace the approval pause does — same discriminant. */
         restoreMode?: "snapshot" | "park_only";

package/dist/core/runner/assemble-result.js

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ export function assembleResult(spec, sessionId, final, stats, flags) {
     let blockedReason;
     let salvagedOutput;
     let checkpointToken;
+    let checkpointId;
     let checkpointGate;
     let workspaceRestoreMode;
     const isDegenerate = final?.stopReason === "error" && isDegenerateCutMessage(final);
@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ export function assembleResult(spec, sessionId, final, stats, flags) {
     else if (flags.suspendRef) {
         status = "suspended";
         checkpointToken = flags.suspendRef.token;
+        checkpointId = flags.suspendRef.checkpointId;
         checkpointGate = flags.suspendRef.gate;
         workspaceRestoreMode = flags.suspendRef.restoreMode;
     }
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ export function assembleResult(spec, sessionId, final, stats, flags) {
         status = "needs_review";
         errorCode = "review.pending";
         checkpointToken = flags.reviewRef.token;
+        checkpointId = flags.reviewRef.checkpointId;
         checkpointGate = flags.reviewRef.gate;
         workspaceRestoreMode = flags.reviewRef.restoreMode;
     }
@@ -162,5 +165,5 @@ export function assembleResult(spec, sessionId, final, stats, flags) {
     void _internalCompaction;
     if (flags.unpricedSpend)
         delete publicStats.costMicroUsd;
-    return { taskId, sessionId, status, ...(flags.model !== undefined ? { model: flags.model } : {}), result: result.trim(), salvagedOutput, blockedReason, errorMessage, errorCode, ...(retryAfterMs !== undefined ? { retryAfterMs } : {}), checkpointToken, checkpointGate, ...(workspaceRestoreMode !== undefined ? { workspaceRestoreMode } : {}), ...(flags.rewindNotes !== undefined && flags.rewindNotes.length > 0 ? { rewindNotes: flags.rewindNotes } : {}), ...(flags.remoteEnvFailures !== undefined && flags.remoteEnvFailures.length > 0 ? { remoteEnvFailures: flags.remoteEnvFailures } : {}), ...(flags.strandedHumanAnswers !== undefined && flags.strandedHumanAnswers.length > 0 ? { strandedHumanAnswers: flags.strandedHumanAnswers } : {}), ...(flags.effectiveReadFace !== undefined ? { effectiveReadFace: flags.effectiveReadFace } : {}), ...(flags.effectiveReadDenyPatterns !== undefined && flags.effectiveReadDenyPatterns.length > 0 ? { effectiveReadDenyPatterns: flags.effectiveReadDenyPatterns } : {}), ...(flags.effectiveMemoryScopes !== undefined ? { effectiveMemoryScopes: flags.effectiveMemoryScopes } : {}), stats: publicStats };
+    return { taskId, sessionId, status, ...(flags.model !== undefined ? { model: flags.model } : {}), result: result.trim(), salvagedOutput, blockedReason, errorMessage, errorCode, ...(retryAfterMs !== undefined ? { retryAfterMs } : {}), checkpointToken, ...(checkpointId !== undefined ? { checkpointId } : {}), checkpointGate, ...(workspaceRestoreMode !== undefined ? { workspaceRestoreMode } : {}), ...(flags.rewindNotes !== undefined && flags.rewindNotes.length > 0 ? { rewindNotes: flags.rewindNotes } : {}), ...(flags.remoteEnvFailures !== undefined && flags.remoteEnvFailures.length > 0 ? { remoteEnvFailures: flags.remoteEnvFailures } : {}), ...(flags.strandedHumanAnswers !== undefined && flags.strandedHumanAnswers.length > 0 ? { strandedHumanAnswers: flags.strandedHumanAnswers } : {}), ...(flags.effectiveReadFace !== undefined ? { effectiveReadFace: flags.effectiveReadFace } : {}), ...(flags.effectiveReadDenyPatterns !== undefined && flags.effectiveReadDenyPatterns.length > 0 ? { effectiveReadDenyPatterns: flags.effectiveReadDenyPatterns } : {}), ...(flags.effectiveMemoryScopes !== undefined ? { effectiveMemoryScopes: flags.effectiveMemoryScopes } : {}), stats: publicStats };
 }

package/dist/core/runner/prepare-memory.js

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 import { sep } from "node:path";
+import { deliverEngineNotice } from "../types.js";
 import { admitMemoryScopes } from "../memory-admission.js";
 import { adoptLegacyRepoDirs, canonicalize, deriveRepoControlPlaneDir, deriveProjectControlDir, deriveProjectMemoryDir, deriveRepoMemoryDir, drainMemoryAnnouncements, enqueueMemoryAnnouncement, isContainedIn, lookupProjectIdHint, recordProjectIdHint, resolveMemoryEngineRoot } from "../memory-engine/layout.js";
 import { classifyScopePlanes, derivePersonalControlDir, derivePersonalMemoryDir, mergeHarvestReports, mergeInjections, needsDualRoots, parsedProjectPlane } from "../memory-engine/dual-root.js";
 import { normalizeMemorySpec } from "../memory.js";
-import { MEMORY_ANNOUNCEMENT_READONLY_CODA, MEMORY_PREFERENCE_DISCIPLINE, MEMORY_READONLY_NOTICE, MEMORY_RECALL_DISCIPLINE, MemoryEngine } from "../memory-engine/engine.js";
+import { MEMORY_ANNOUNCEMENT_READONLY_CODA, MEMORY_PREFERENCE_DISCIPLINE, MEMORY_READONLY_NOTICE, MEMORY_RECALL_DISCIPLINE, MemoryEngine, memoryHarvestQuarantinedNotice, memorySessionPollutedNotice, pollutionContainmentCounts, } from "../memory-engine/engine.js";
 import { createMemoryEngineTools } from "../memory-engine/tools.js";
 import { assertScopeContractPlacement, parseScopeKey, resolveProjectId } from "../memory-engine/scope-contract.js";
 import { FileMemoryEngineBackend } from "../memory-engine/file-backend.js";
@@ -298,12 +299,26 @@ export async function prepareMemory(input) {
                 }
                 return writeEngine.gateWrite(writeHandle, w.key, w.content);
             };
+            let pollutionAnnounced = false;
+            const announceHarvestContainment = (report) => {
+                const { count, moved, escalated } = pollutionContainmentCounts(report);
+                if (count === 0)
+                    return;
+                let reason;
+                try {
+                    reason = writeEngine.sessionPollution(sessionId)?.reason;
+                }
+                catch {
+                }
+                deliverEngineNotice(deps.onNotice, memoryHarvestQuarantinedNotice({ count, moved, escalated, ...(reason !== undefined ? { reason } : {}), sessionId }));
+            };
             const harvestSafe = async (phase = "terminal") => {
                 try {
                     const report = await harvestBoth();
                     if (!report.ok && report.incident) {
                         deps.onError?.(new Error(`memory harvest refused (${report.incident.kind}): ${report.incident.detail}`), { phase: "memory", sessionId });
                     }
+                    announceHarvestContainment(report);
                     try {
                         deps.onMemoryHarvestReport?.(report, { sessionId, phase });
                     }
@@ -327,7 +342,13 @@ export async function prepareMemory(input) {
                 harvest: harvestSafe,
                 pollution: {
                     polluted: () => writeEngine.sessionPollution(sessionId),
-                    markPolluted: (reason) => writeEngine.markSessionPolluted(sessionId, reason),
+                    markPolluted: (reason) => {
+                        const outcome = writeEngine.markSessionPolluted(sessionId, reason);
+                        if (outcome === "existed" || (outcome === "unpersisted" && pollutionAnnounced))
+                            return;
+                        pollutionAnnounced = true;
+                        deliverEngineNotice(deps.onNotice, memorySessionPollutedNotice({ reason, sessionId }));
+                    },
                 },
                 contentSafety: {
                     trustedTools: new Set(memorySpec.trustedTools ?? []),
@@ -341,7 +362,7 @@ export async function prepareMemory(input) {
                 writeScope: memorySpec.writeScope,
             };
             if (input.memorySearchToolsPlanned)
-                memoryTools = createMemoryEngineTools({ planes: toolPlanes });
+                memoryTools = createMemoryEngineTools({ planes: toolPlanes, sessionPollution: () => writeEngine.sessionPollution(sessionId) });
         }
         catch (err) {
             if (typeof err.code === "string" &&

package/dist/core/runner/prepare-task.d.ts

@@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ export interface Prepared {
      *  fired this run. */
     suspendRef: {
         token?: CheckpointToken;
+        checkpointId?: string;
         gate?: CheckpointGate;
         scope?: string;
         restoreMode?: "snapshot" | "park_only";
@@ -453,6 +454,7 @@ export interface Prepared {
      *  `status:"needs_review"`. Empty unless a review pause fired this run. */
     reviewRef: {
         token?: CheckpointToken;
+        checkpointId?: string;
         gate?: CheckpointGate;
         scope?: string;
         restoreMode?: "snapshot" | "park_only";

package/dist/core/runner/prepare-task.js

@@ -3537,9 +3537,11 @@ export async function prepareTask(spec, deps, sessions, resume, internals, runne
                     return { ok: false, reason };
                 }
             };
-            const publishCommittedSuspend = (token, gate, scope, remoteHandle) => {
+            const publishCommittedSuspend = (token, gate, scope, remoteHandle, checkpointId) => {
                 const ref = gate.kind === "needs_review" || gate.kind === "plan_review" ? reviewRef : suspendRef;
                 ref.token = token;
+                if (checkpointId !== undefined)
+                    ref.checkpointId = checkpointId;
                 ref.gate = gate;
                 if (remoteHandle !== undefined)
                     ref.restoreMode = remoteHandle.restoreMode === "park_only" ? "park_only" : "snapshot";
@@ -3625,7 +3627,7 @@ export async function prepareTask(spec, deps, sessions, resume, internals, runne
                 };
                 if (!(await commitSuspendSaga(token, cp, suspendableEnv, remoteHandle)).ok)
                     return false;
-                publishCommittedSuspend(token, gate, scope, remoteHandle);
+                publishCommittedSuspend(token, gate, scope, remoteHandle, cp.checkpointId);
                 try {
                     await sessions.pin?.(sessionId);
                 }
@@ -3711,7 +3713,7 @@ export async function prepareTask(spec, deps, sessions, resume, internals, runne
                     };
                     if (!(await commitSuspendSaga(token, cp, suspendableEnv, remoteHandle)).ok)
                         return false;
-                    publishCommittedSuspend(token, gate, scope, remoteHandle);
+                    publishCommittedSuspend(token, gate, scope, remoteHandle, cp.checkpointId);
                     try {
                         await sessions.pin?.(sessionId);
                     }
@@ -4006,7 +4008,7 @@ export async function prepareTask(spec, deps, sessions, resume, internals, runne
                     if (!committed.ok) {
                         return committed.reason !== undefined ? { parkFailed: committed.reason } : undefined;
                     }
-                    publishCommittedSuspend(token, gate, cp.scope, remoteHandle);
+                    publishCommittedSuspend(token, gate, cp.scope, remoteHandle, cp.checkpointId);
                     try {
                         await sessions.pin?.(sessionId);
                     }

package/dist/core/runner/runtask.js

@@ -3472,6 +3472,7 @@ export class Runner {
                 suspendRef: prepared.suspendRef.token !== undefined && prepared.suspendRef.gate !== undefined
                     ? {
                         token: prepared.suspendRef.token,
+                        ...(prepared.suspendRef.checkpointId !== undefined ? { checkpointId: prepared.suspendRef.checkpointId } : {}),
                         gate: prepared.suspendRef.gate,
                         ...(prepared.suspendRef.restoreMode !== undefined ? { restoreMode: prepared.suspendRef.restoreMode } : {}),
                     }
@@ -3479,6 +3480,7 @@ export class Runner {
                 reviewRef: prepared.reviewRef.token !== undefined && prepared.reviewRef.gate !== undefined
                     ? {
                         token: prepared.reviewRef.token,
+                        ...(prepared.reviewRef.checkpointId !== undefined ? { checkpointId: prepared.reviewRef.checkpointId } : {}),
                         gate: prepared.reviewRef.gate,
                         ...(prepared.reviewRef.restoreMode !== undefined ? { restoreMode: prepared.reviewRef.restoreMode } : {}),
                     }