@selvajs/selva 4.20.0-beta.3 → 4.20.0-beta.4

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/access.server.js-tpXCRD6W.js

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-import { l as requireEditableDefinition } from './access.js-Dzph17kk.js';
-import './src.js-bYgw0r8C.js';
-import './schema.js-CPjRq84j.js';
-import './api.js-DYHk_mqE.js';
-import '@sveltejs/kit';
-import './schema-extraction.js-_C5meGta.js';
-import 'zod';
-import './rate-limit.js-Br3luBbc.js';
-
-
-
-export { requireEditableDefinition };
-//# sourceMappingURL=access.server.js-tpXCRD6W.js.map

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/access.server.js-tpXCRD6W.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"access.server.js-tpXCRD6W.js","sources":[],"sourcesContent":[],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;"}

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/access2.server.js-Dp0BvHYv.js

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-import { l as OPERATOR_PLATFORM_PERMISSIONS, h as hasPermission } from './src.js-bYgw0r8C.js';
-import { r as requireAuthed } from './access.js-Dzph17kk.js';
-import { e as isApiError } from './schema-extraction.js-_C5meGta.js';
-import './api.js-DYHk_mqE.js';
-import { error, redirect } from '@sveltejs/kit';
-
-//#region src/lib/server/access.server.ts
-/**
-* The app's access guards: the framework-free ones re-exported from
-* `@selvajs/server/access`, plus the redirecting ones that only make sense here.
-*
-* A redirect is a browser-page outcome, and SvelteKit implements it by throwing
-* a value only SvelteKit recognizes — so these three cannot move into the
-* package without dragging the framework in with them. Every other guard did
-* move, and the handlers that call them no longer name SvelteKit at all.
-*
-* Guards raise `ApiError` now rather than SvelteKit's `error()`. API routes get
-* that folded into the envelope by `mapAppError`; **page loads must wrap the
-* call in {@link asHttpError}**. SvelteKit derives a response status by checking
-* `error instanceof HttpError` and returns 500 for everything else, and
-* `handleError` runs too late to change it — so an unwrapped guard renders the
-* right message under the wrong status, which looks like a crash rather than a
-* denial and never trips a test that only asserts on the message.
-*/
-/**
-* Run a guard outside `mount`, converting its `ApiError` into the `HttpError`
-* SvelteKit needs to produce a real status. Needed by page loads and by API
-* routes that build their own `Response` instead of going through `mount`,
-* since those never reach `mapAppError`.
-*/
-async function asHttpError(run) {
-	try {
-		return await run();
-	} catch (err) {
-		if (isApiError(err)) throw error(err.status, {
-			message: err.message,
-			code: err.code,
-			fields: err.fields,
-			details: err.details
-		});
-		throw err;
-	}
-}
-function assertPagePermission(locals, permission) {
-	const { user, ctx } = requireAuthed(locals);
-	if (!hasPermission(ctx, permission)) redirect(303, "/admin");
-	return user;
-}
-var assertManageInstanceUsers = (locals) => assertPagePermission(locals, "manage_instance_users");
-var assertManageCompute = (locals) => assertPagePermission(locals, "manage_compute");
-/**
-* Gate for pages reachable by any platform-class permission holder (the
-* `/admin` shell — `instance_admin`, `manage_compute`, `manage_instance_users`,
-* or `manage_updates` all qualify). Org-scope permissions never admit entry:
-* org admins do not belong on platform-scoped surfaces.
-*/
-function assertAnyPlatformPermission(locals) {
-	const { user, ctx } = requireAuthed(locals);
-	if (!OPERATOR_PLATFORM_PERMISSIONS.some((p) => hasPermission(ctx, p))) redirect(303, "/library");
-	return user;
-}
-
-export { assertAnyPlatformPermission as a, assertPagePermission as b, assertManageCompute as c, asHttpError as d, assertManageInstanceUsers as e };
-//# sourceMappingURL=access2.server.js-Dp0BvHYv.js.map

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/access2.server.js-Dp0BvHYv.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"access2.server.js-Dp0BvHYv.js","sources":["../../../../.svelte-kit/output/server/chunks/access2.server.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { L as OPERATOR_PLATFORM_PERMISSIONS, r as hasPermission } from \"./src.js\";\nimport { s as requireAuthed } from \"./access.js\";\nimport { p as isApiError } from \"./schema-extraction.js\";\nimport \"./api.js\";\nimport { error, redirect } from \"@sveltejs/kit\";\n//#region src/lib/server/access.server.ts\n/**\n* The app's access guards: the framework-free ones re-exported from\n* `@selvajs/server/access`, plus the redirecting ones that only make sense here.\n*\n* A redirect is a browser-page outcome, and SvelteKit implements it by throwing\n* a value only SvelteKit recognizes — so these three cannot move into the\n* package without dragging the framework in with them. Every other guard did\n* move, and the handlers that call them no longer name SvelteKit at all.\n*\n* Guards raise `ApiError` now rather than SvelteKit's `error()`. API routes get\n* that folded into the envelope by `mapAppError`; **page loads must wrap the\n* call in {@link asHttpError}**. SvelteKit derives a response status by checking\n* `error instanceof HttpError` and returns 500 for everything else, and\n* `handleError` runs too late to change it — so an unwrapped guard renders the\n* right message under the wrong status, which looks like a crash rather than a\n* denial and never trips a test that only asserts on the message.\n*/\n/**\n* Run a guard outside `mount`, converting its `ApiError` into the `HttpError`\n* SvelteKit needs to produce a real status. Needed by page loads and by API\n* routes that build their own `Response` instead of going through `mount`,\n* since those never reach `mapAppError`.\n*/\nasync function asHttpError(run) {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn await run();\n\t} catch (err) {\n\t\tif (isApiError(err)) throw error(err.status, {\n\t\t\tmessage: err.message,\n\t\t\tcode: err.code,\n\t\t\tfields: err.fields,\n\t\t\tdetails: err.details\n\t\t});\n\t\tthrow err;\n\t}\n}\nfunction assertPagePermission(locals, permission) {\n\tconst { user, ctx } = requireAuthed(locals);\n\tif (!hasPermission(ctx, permission)) redirect(303, \"/admin\");\n\treturn user;\n}\nvar assertManageInstanceUsers = (locals) => assertPagePermission(locals, \"manage_instance_users\");\nvar assertManageCompute = (locals) => assertPagePermission(locals, \"manage_compute\");\n/**\n* Gate for pages reachable by any platform-class permission holder (the\n* `/admin` shell — `instance_admin`, `manage_compute`, `manage_instance_users`,\n* or `manage_updates` all qualify). Org-scope permissions never admit entry:\n* org admins do not belong on platform-scoped surfaces.\n*/\nfunction assertAnyPlatformPermission(locals) {\n\tconst { user, ctx } = requireAuthed(locals);\n\tif (!OPERATOR_PLATFORM_PERMISSIONS.some((p) => hasPermission(ctx, p))) redirect(303, \"/library\");\n\treturn user;\n}\n//#endregion\nexport { assertPagePermission as a, assertManageInstanceUsers as i, assertAnyPlatformPermission as n, assertManageCompute as r, asHttpError as t };\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;AAKA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA,eAAe,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;AAChC,CAAC,IAAI;AACL,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AACpB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE;AACf,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;AAC/C,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO;AACvB,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI;AACjB,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM;AACrB,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC;AAChB,GAAG,CAAC;AACJ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG;AACX,CAAC;AACD;AACA,SAAS,oBAAoB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE;AAClD,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;AAC5C,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC7D,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACZ;AACG,IAAC,yBAAyB,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,oBAAoB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,uBAAuB;AAC7F,IAAC,mBAAmB,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,oBAAoB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB;AACnF;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA,SAAS,2BAA2B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;AAC7C,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;AAC5C,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;AACjG,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACZ;;;;"}

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/admin-auth.server.js-CIxtsIlU.js

@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-import { b as private_env } from './shared-server.js-BGs15m2r.js';
-import { S as SYSTEM_CONTEXT, n as narrowApiTokenContext } from './src.js-bYgw0r8C.js';
-import { A as ApiErrorCode } from './schema-extraction.js-_C5meGta.js';
-import { c as createComputeRateLimiter } from './rate-limit.js-Br3luBbc.js';
-import { l as looksLikeApiToken } from './api-token-codec.js-BEHsbOP6.js';
-import { error } from '@sveltejs/kit';
-
-//#region ../server/src/http/body-size.ts
-/**
-* True when the request's declared `Content-Length` exceeds `maxBytes`. Call it
-* BEFORE reading the body, so a huge payload aimed at a small-body endpoint
-* can't burn memory; the route maps `true` to its transport's 413.
-*
-* This is the per-route lower bound. A global limit (e.g. adapter-node's
-* `BODY_SIZE_LIMIT`) has to clear the largest legitimate upload, so every small
-* JSON endpoint would otherwise inherit that ceiling.
-*
-* Requests without `Content-Length` (chunked encoding) slip past this check —
-* the global limit is the backstop there.
-*/
-function declaredBodySizeExceeds(headers, maxBytes) {
-	const declared = Number(headers.get("content-length"));
-	return Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > maxBytes;
-}
-//#endregion
-//#region ../server/src/http/login-rate-limit.ts
-/**
-* Login rate limiting: two buckets per attempt, because neither dimension
-* covers the other.
-*
-*   - **Per-address** bounds one client hammering the form. It is only
-*     meaningful when the host resolves a real client address. Behind a reverse
-*     proxy that is not configured to forward one, every request reports the
-*     socket peer — `127.0.0.1` for all of them — which collapses the whole key
-*     space into a single bucket: five failed logins from anywhere lock out the
-*     entire instance, and only a success clears it, which nobody can now
-*     reach. That failure is completely silent, hence
-*     {@link addressKeysCollapsed}.
-*   - **Per-account** bounds a targeted guessing attack, which address limiting
-*     does not: an attacker spread across many source IPs contends with no
-*     shared counter at all, leaving password-hash cost as the only real bound
-*     on online guessing.
-*
-* An attempt must clear both and a failure charges both. A success clears the
-* account bucket and the calling address's — a *different* address that failed
-* against the same account keeps its own penalty.
-*
-* The flow counts failures rather than attempts: `check` gates without spending
-* budget, `recordFailure` spends, and `clear` forgives. A successful login
-* therefore costs nothing, so an ordinary user typing one wrong password never
-* walks toward a lockout.
-*/
-/** Loopback in the three spellings a Node server actually reports. */
-var LOOPBACK = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
-	"127.0.0.1",
-	"::1",
-	"::ffff:127.0.0.1"
-]);
-/** Normalized so case tricks (`Alice@` vs `alice@`) share one bucket. */
-function accountKey(email) {
-	return `account:${email.trim().toLowerCase()}`;
-}
-function createLoginRateLimiter(config = {}) {
-	const windowMs = config.windowMs ?? 9e5;
-	const byAddress = createComputeRateLimiter({
-		windowMs,
-		maxPerWindow: config.maxPerAddress ?? 5
-	});
-	const byAccount = createComputeRateLimiter({
-		windowMs,
-		maxPerWindow: config.maxPerAccount ?? 20
-	});
-	return {
-		check(address, email) {
-			const address_ = byAddress.peek(address);
-			if (!address_.allowed || !email) return address_;
-			return byAccount.peek(accountKey(email));
-		},
-		recordFailure(address, email) {
-			byAddress.check(address);
-			if (email) byAccount.check(accountKey(email));
-		},
-		clear(address, email) {
-			byAddress.clear(address);
-			if (email) byAccount.clear(accountKey(email));
-		},
-		reset() {
-			byAddress.reset();
-			byAccount.reset();
-		}
-	};
-}
-/**
-* Whether per-address limiting has degenerated into one shared bucket.
-*
-* True when the host reports a loopback address for a request it did not
-* originate — which means it sits behind a proxy and is reading the socket peer
-* instead of a forwarded client address. The host decides what to do about it;
-* warning once at startup is enough, and warning per request is not.
-*
-* `addressHeaderConfigured` is the host's answer to "am I reading a forwarded
-* header at all", since which header and how many hops to trust are deployment
-* config that no package can resolve for it.
-*/
-function addressKeysCollapsed(address, addressHeaderConfigured) {
-	if (addressHeaderConfigured) return false;
-	return LOOPBACK.has(address);
-}
-//#endregion
-//#region ../server/src/http/request-context.ts
-/**
-* One request's identity: the acting org and the permissions held there.
-*
-* Every sign-in path builds through here (cookie, forward-auth, API token, and
-* any host app's own hook), so they can't drift on what a context contains.
-*/
-async function buildRequestContext(input, deps) {
-	const { user, platformPermissions, membership, sessionToken, pinOrg } = input;
-	let actingOrgId = membership?.orgId;
-	const orgPermissions = membership ? [...membership.permissions] : [];
-	if (!actingOrgId && !pinOrg && platformPermissions.includes("instance_admin")) {
-		const firstOrg = (await deps.orgs.listOrgs(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, { limit: 1 })).items[0];
-		if (firstOrg) actingOrgId = firstOrg.id;
-	}
-	return {
-		userId: user.id,
-		actingOrgId,
-		platformPermissions,
-		orgPermissions,
-		adapterContext: sessionToken ? { sessionToken } : void 0
-	};
-}
-//#endregion
-//#region ../server/src/http/api-token.ts
-/** `lastUsedAt` is written at most this often per token, so a busy key isn't a write per request. */
-var LAST_USED_WRITE_INTERVAL_MS = 3e5;
-var UNAUTHORIZED = {
-	kind: "rejected",
-	status: 401,
-	code: ApiErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED,
-	message: "This API token is invalid, expired or revoked."
-};
-var UNAVAILABLE = {
-	kind: "rejected",
-	status: 503,
-	code: ApiErrorCode.API_TOKENS_UNAVAILABLE,
-	message: "API tokens are not available on this server."
-};
-var HOLDER_REFUSED = {
-	kind: "rejected",
-	status: 403,
-	code: ApiErrorCode.API_TOKEN_HOLDER_REFUSED,
-	message: "This API token’s owner may no longer use API tokens in this org."
-};
-/**
-* Authenticate a request by its `Authorization: Bearer selva_…` header.
-*
-* Call it before any cookie or proxy sign-in. Once a `selva_` key is sent the
-* outcome is final: a bad key gets 401 even if a valid session cookie rides
-* along, because running the request as the cookie's user would hide the
-* broken key and act as someone else.
-*
-* The owner is re-checked on every request (disabled, still a member of the
-* token's org, and the host's holder policy if any), then their live context
-* is narrowed to the token's scopes.
-*/
-async function resolveApiToken(request, deps, { pathPrefix = "/api/v1/" } = {}) {
-	const url = new URL(request.url);
-	for (const value of url.searchParams.values()) if (looksLikeApiToken(value)) return {
-		kind: "rejected",
-		status: 400,
-		code: ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED,
-		message: "API tokens go in the Authorization header, never the URL. URLs end up in logs and browser history; revoke this key."
-	};
-	const raw = bearerOf(request);
-	if (!raw?.startsWith("selva_")) return { kind: "none" };
-	if (!url.pathname.startsWith(pathPrefix)) return {
-		kind: "rejected",
-		status: 403,
-		code: ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN,
-		message: `API tokens only work under ${pathPrefix}.`
-	};
-	const store = deps.data.apiTokens;
-	if (!deps.codec || !store) return UNAVAILABLE;
-	const delegated = deps.auth.delegatedSession;
-	if (delegated && !(await delegated.status()).ok) return UNAVAILABLE;
-	if (!deps.codec.hasValidChecksum(raw)) return UNAUTHORIZED;
-	const token = await store.getByTokenHash(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, deps.codec.hashToken(raw));
-	if (!token) return UNAUTHORIZED;
-	const policy = deps.mayHoldApiTokens;
-	const [user, member, platformPermissions] = await Promise.all([
-		deps.auth.getUser(token.userId),
-		deps.data.orgs.getOrgMember(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, token.orgId, token.userId),
-		policy && deps.data.permissions ? deps.data.permissions.getFor(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, token.userId) : []
-	]);
-	if (!user || user.disabled || !member) return UNAUTHORIZED;
-	const live = await buildRequestContext({
-		user,
-		platformPermissions,
-		membership: member,
-		pinOrg: true
-	}, { orgs: deps.data.orgs });
-	if (policy && !policy(live)) return HOLDER_REFUSED;
-	let ctx = narrowApiTokenContext(live, token);
-	if (delegated) {
-		const sessionToken = await delegated.mint(user.id, { orgId: token.orgId });
-		ctx = {
-			...ctx,
-			adapterContext: { sessionToken }
-		};
-	}
-	const now = deps.now?.() ?? Date.now();
-	if (!token.lastUsedAt || now - Date.parse(token.lastUsedAt) >= LAST_USED_WRITE_INTERVAL_MS) store.touchLastUsed(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, token.id, new Date(now).toISOString()).catch((err) => {
-		deps.log?.warn("Failed to record API token use", {
-			component: "apiToken",
-			tokenId: token.id,
-			err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
-		});
-	});
-	return {
-		kind: "ok",
-		user,
-		ctx,
-		token
-	};
-}
-function bearerOf(request) {
-	const header = request.headers.get("authorization");
-	if (!header) return null;
-	const match = /^Bearer\s+(\S+)\s*$/i.exec(header);
-	return match ? match[1] : null;
-}
-//#endregion
-//#region src/lib/server/admin-auth.server.ts
-var SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "admin_session";
-var SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS = 288e5;
-var REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME = "admin_refresh";
-var REFRESH_MAX_AGE_MS = 2592e6;
-var loginRateLimiter = createLoginRateLimiter();
-function checkRateLimit(ip, email) {
-	return loginRateLimiter.check(ip, email);
-}
-function recordFailedAttempt(ip, email) {
-	loginRateLimiter.recordFailure(ip, email);
-}
-function clearRateLimit(ip, email) {
-	loginRateLimiter.clear(ip, email);
-}
-var addressWarningIssued = false;
-function warnIfAddressKeysCollapse(ip, log) {
-	if (addressWarningIssued) return;
-	if (!private_env.ORIGIN) return;
-	if (!addressKeysCollapsed(ip, Boolean(private_env.ADDRESS_HEADER))) return;
-	addressWarningIssued = true;
-	log.warn("Login rate limiting is keyed to the loopback address for every request. The app is behind a proxy but ADDRESS_HEADER is unset, so getClientAddress() returns the socket peer and all clients share one bucket — five failed logins lock out the whole instance. Set ADDRESS_HEADER=X-Forwarded-For and XFF_DEPTH to your proxy count (see .env.example).", { component: "auth/rate-limit" });
-}
-function setSessionCookie(cookies, sessionToken) {
-	const isSecure = process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" && private_env.ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES !== "true";
-	cookies.set(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, sessionToken, {
-		path: "/",
-		httpOnly: true,
-		sameSite: "lax",
-		secure: isSecure,
-		maxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS / 1e3
-	});
-}
-/** Call before `destroySession` — logout needs the token to revoke it provider-side. */
-function getSessionToken(cookies) {
-	return cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME);
-}
-function destroySession(cookies) {
-	cookies.delete(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-	cookies.delete(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-}
-/**
-* Refresh-token cookie for the OAuth/Supabase flow — `hooks.server.ts`'s
-* session-refresh middleware swaps an expired access token for a fresh one
-* using this. Local/HMAC sessions don't need it.
-*/
-function setRefreshCookie(cookies, refreshToken) {
-	const isSecure = process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" && private_env.ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES !== "true";
-	cookies.set(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, refreshToken, {
-		path: "/",
-		httpOnly: true,
-		sameSite: "lax",
-		secure: isSecure,
-		maxAge: REFRESH_MAX_AGE_MS / 1e3
-	});
-}
-function getRefreshToken(cookies) {
-	return cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME);
-}
-function clearRefreshCookie(cookies) {
-	cookies.delete(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-}
-/**
-* Rejects a request whose declared `Content-Length` exceeds `maxBytes` — a
-* per-route lower bound under the global adapter-node `BODY_SIZE_LIMIT`
-* (which must stay high enough for 50MB .gh uploads). Throws 413 before the
-* body is read; see `declaredBodySizeExceeds` for the chunked-encoding caveat.
-*/
-function requireMaxBodySize(request, maxBytes) {
-	if (declaredBodySizeExceeds(request.headers, maxBytes)) throw error(413, `Request body exceeds the limit for this endpoint.`);
-}
-
-export { setRefreshCookie as a, buildRequestContext as b, clearRefreshCookie as c, checkRateLimit as d, recordFailedAttempt as e, clearRateLimit as f, getRefreshToken as g, getSessionToken as h, destroySession as i, requireMaxBodySize as j, resolveApiToken as r, setSessionCookie as s, warnIfAddressKeysCollapse as w };
-//# sourceMappingURL=admin-auth.server.js-CIxtsIlU.js.map

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/admin-auth.server.js-CIxtsIlU.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"admin-auth.server.js-CIxtsIlU.js","sources":["../../../../.svelte-kit/output/server/chunks/admin-auth.server.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { t as private_env } from \"./shared-server.js\";\nimport { _ as narrowApiTokenContext, t as SYSTEM_CONTEXT } from \"./src.js\";\nimport { u as ApiErrorCode } from \"./schema-extraction.js\";\nimport { t as createComputeRateLimiter } from \"./rate-limit.js\";\nimport { r as looksLikeApiToken } from \"./api-token-codec.js\";\nimport { error } from \"@sveltejs/kit\";\n//#region ../server/src/http/body-size.ts\n/**\n* True when the request's declared `Content-Length` exceeds `maxBytes`. Call it\n* BEFORE reading the body, so a huge payload aimed at a small-body endpoint\n* can't burn memory; the route maps `true` to its transport's 413.\n*\n* This is the per-route lower bound. A global limit (e.g. adapter-node's\n* `BODY_SIZE_LIMIT`) has to clear the largest legitimate upload, so every small\n* JSON endpoint would otherwise inherit that ceiling.\n*\n* Requests without `Content-Length` (chunked encoding) slip past this check —\n* the global limit is the backstop there.\n*/\nfunction declaredBodySizeExceeds(headers, maxBytes) {\n\tconst declared = Number(headers.get(\"content-length\"));\n\treturn Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > maxBytes;\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../server/src/http/login-rate-limit.ts\n/**\n* Login rate limiting: two buckets per attempt, because neither dimension\n* covers the other.\n*\n*   - **Per-address** bounds one client hammering the form. It is only\n*     meaningful when the host resolves a real client address. Behind a reverse\n*     proxy that is not configured to forward one, every request reports the\n*     socket peer — `127.0.0.1` for all of them — which collapses the whole key\n*     space into a single bucket: five failed logins from anywhere lock out the\n*     entire instance, and only a success clears it, which nobody can now\n*     reach. That failure is completely silent, hence\n*     {@link addressKeysCollapsed}.\n*   - **Per-account** bounds a targeted guessing attack, which address limiting\n*     does not: an attacker spread across many source IPs contends with no\n*     shared counter at all, leaving password-hash cost as the only real bound\n*     on online guessing.\n*\n* An attempt must clear both and a failure charges both. A success clears the\n* account bucket and the calling address's — a *different* address that failed\n* against the same account keeps its own penalty.\n*\n* The flow counts failures rather than attempts: `check` gates without spending\n* budget, `recordFailure` spends, and `clear` forgives. A successful login\n* therefore costs nothing, so an ordinary user typing one wrong password never\n* walks toward a lockout.\n*/\n/** Loopback in the three spellings a Node server actually reports. */\nvar LOOPBACK = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([\n\t\"127.0.0.1\",\n\t\"::1\",\n\t\"::ffff:127.0.0.1\"\n]);\n/** Normalized so case tricks (`Alice@` vs `alice@`) share one bucket. */\nfunction accountKey(email) {\n\treturn `account:${email.trim().toLowerCase()}`;\n}\nfunction createLoginRateLimiter(config = {}) {\n\tconst windowMs = config.windowMs ?? 9e5;\n\tconst byAddress = createComputeRateLimiter({\n\t\twindowMs,\n\t\tmaxPerWindow: config.maxPerAddress ?? 5\n\t});\n\tconst byAccount = createComputeRateLimiter({\n\t\twindowMs,\n\t\tmaxPerWindow: config.maxPerAccount ?? 20\n\t});\n\treturn {\n\t\tcheck(address, email) {\n\t\t\tconst address_ = byAddress.peek(address);\n\t\t\tif (!address_.allowed || !email) return address_;\n\t\t\treturn byAccount.peek(accountKey(email));\n\t\t},\n\t\trecordFailure(address, email) {\n\t\t\tbyAddress.check(address);\n\t\t\tif (email) byAccount.check(accountKey(email));\n\t\t},\n\t\tclear(address, email) {\n\t\t\tbyAddress.clear(address);\n\t\t\tif (email) byAccount.clear(accountKey(email));\n\t\t},\n\t\treset() {\n\t\t\tbyAddress.reset();\n\t\t\tbyAccount.reset();\n\t\t}\n\t};\n}\n/**\n* Whether per-address limiting has degenerated into one shared bucket.\n*\n* True when the host reports a loopback address for a request it did not\n* originate — which means it sits behind a proxy and is reading the socket peer\n* instead of a forwarded client address. The host decides what to do about it;\n* warning once at startup is enough, and warning per request is not.\n*\n* `addressHeaderConfigured` is the host's answer to \"am I reading a forwarded\n* header at all\", since which header and how many hops to trust are deployment\n* config that no package can resolve for it.\n*/\nfunction addressKeysCollapsed(address, addressHeaderConfigured) {\n\tif (addressHeaderConfigured) return false;\n\treturn LOOPBACK.has(address);\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../server/src/http/request-context.ts\n/**\n* One request's identity: the acting org and the permissions held there.\n*\n* Every sign-in path builds through here (cookie, forward-auth, API token, and\n* any host app's own hook), so they can't drift on what a context contains.\n*/\nasync function buildRequestContext(input, deps) {\n\tconst { user, platformPermissions, membership, sessionToken, pinOrg } = input;\n\tlet actingOrgId = membership?.orgId;\n\tconst orgPermissions = membership ? [...membership.permissions] : [];\n\tif (!actingOrgId && !pinOrg && platformPermissions.includes(\"instance_admin\")) {\n\t\tconst firstOrg = (await deps.orgs.listOrgs(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, { limit: 1 })).items[0];\n\t\tif (firstOrg) actingOrgId = firstOrg.id;\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tuserId: user.id,\n\t\tactingOrgId,\n\t\tplatformPermissions,\n\t\torgPermissions,\n\t\tadapterContext: sessionToken ? { sessionToken } : void 0\n\t};\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../server/src/http/api-token.ts\n/** `lastUsedAt` is written at most this often per token, so a busy key isn't a write per request. */\nvar LAST_USED_WRITE_INTERVAL_MS = 3e5;\nvar UNAUTHORIZED = {\n\tkind: \"rejected\",\n\tstatus: 401,\n\tcode: ApiErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED,\n\tmessage: \"This API token is invalid, expired or revoked.\"\n};\nvar UNAVAILABLE = {\n\tkind: \"rejected\",\n\tstatus: 503,\n\tcode: ApiErrorCode.API_TOKENS_UNAVAILABLE,\n\tmessage: \"API tokens are not available on this server.\"\n};\nvar HOLDER_REFUSED = {\n\tkind: \"rejected\",\n\tstatus: 403,\n\tcode: ApiErrorCode.API_TOKEN_HOLDER_REFUSED,\n\tmessage: \"This API token’s owner may no longer use API tokens in this org.\"\n};\n/**\n* Authenticate a request by its `Authorization: Bearer selva_…` header.\n*\n* Call it before any cookie or proxy sign-in. Once a `selva_` key is sent the\n* outcome is final: a bad key gets 401 even if a valid session cookie rides\n* along, because running the request as the cookie's user would hide the\n* broken key and act as someone else.\n*\n* The owner is re-checked on every request (disabled, still a member of the\n* token's org, and the host's holder policy if any), then their live context\n* is narrowed to the token's scopes.\n*/\nasync function resolveApiToken(request, deps, { pathPrefix = \"/api/v1/\" } = {}) {\n\tconst url = new URL(request.url);\n\tfor (const value of url.searchParams.values()) if (looksLikeApiToken(value)) return {\n\t\tkind: \"rejected\",\n\t\tstatus: 400,\n\t\tcode: ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED,\n\t\tmessage: \"API tokens go in the Authorization header, never the URL. URLs end up in logs and browser history; revoke this key.\"\n\t};\n\tconst raw = bearerOf(request);\n\tif (!raw?.startsWith(\"selva_\")) return { kind: \"none\" };\n\tif (!url.pathname.startsWith(pathPrefix)) return {\n\t\tkind: \"rejected\",\n\t\tstatus: 403,\n\t\tcode: ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN,\n\t\tmessage: `API tokens only work under ${pathPrefix}.`\n\t};\n\tconst store = deps.data.apiTokens;\n\tif (!deps.codec || !store) return UNAVAILABLE;\n\tconst delegated = deps.auth.delegatedSession;\n\tif (delegated && !(await delegated.status()).ok) return UNAVAILABLE;\n\tif (!deps.codec.hasValidChecksum(raw)) return UNAUTHORIZED;\n\tconst token = await store.getByTokenHash(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, deps.codec.hashToken(raw));\n\tif (!token) return UNAUTHORIZED;\n\tconst policy = deps.mayHoldApiTokens;\n\tconst [user, member, platformPermissions] = await Promise.all([\n\t\tdeps.auth.getUser(token.userId),\n\t\tdeps.data.orgs.getOrgMember(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, token.orgId, token.userId),\n\t\tpolicy && deps.data.permissions ? deps.data.permissions.getFor(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, token.userId) : []\n\t]);\n\tif (!user || user.disabled || !member) return UNAUTHORIZED;\n\tconst live = await buildRequestContext({\n\t\tuser,\n\t\tplatformPermissions,\n\t\tmembership: member,\n\t\tpinOrg: true\n\t}, { orgs: deps.data.orgs });\n\tif (policy && !policy(live)) return HOLDER_REFUSED;\n\tlet ctx = narrowApiTokenContext(live, token);\n\tif (delegated) {\n\t\tconst sessionToken = await delegated.mint(user.id, { orgId: token.orgId });\n\t\tctx = {\n\t\t\t...ctx,\n\t\t\tadapterContext: { sessionToken }\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst now = deps.now?.() ?? Date.now();\n\tif (!token.lastUsedAt || now - Date.parse(token.lastUsedAt) >= LAST_USED_WRITE_INTERVAL_MS) store.touchLastUsed(SYSTEM_CONTEXT, token.id, new Date(now).toISOString()).catch((err) => {\n\t\tdeps.log?.warn(\"Failed to record API token use\", {\n\t\t\tcomponent: \"apiToken\",\n\t\t\ttokenId: token.id,\n\t\t\terr: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n\t\t});\n\t});\n\treturn {\n\t\tkind: \"ok\",\n\t\tuser,\n\t\tctx,\n\t\ttoken\n\t};\n}\nfunction bearerOf(request) {\n\tconst header = request.headers.get(\"authorization\");\n\tif (!header) return null;\n\tconst match = /^Bearer\\s+(\\S+)\\s*$/i.exec(header);\n\treturn match ? match[1] : null;\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region src/lib/server/admin-auth.server.ts\nvar SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = \"admin_session\";\nvar SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS = 288e5;\nvar REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME = \"admin_refresh\";\nvar REFRESH_MAX_AGE_MS = 2592e6;\nvar loginRateLimiter = createLoginRateLimiter();\nfunction checkRateLimit(ip, email) {\n\treturn loginRateLimiter.check(ip, email);\n}\nfunction recordFailedAttempt(ip, email) {\n\tloginRateLimiter.recordFailure(ip, email);\n}\nfunction clearRateLimit(ip, email) {\n\tloginRateLimiter.clear(ip, email);\n}\nvar addressWarningIssued = false;\nfunction warnIfAddressKeysCollapse(ip, log) {\n\tif (addressWarningIssued) return;\n\tif (!private_env.ORIGIN) return;\n\tif (!addressKeysCollapsed(ip, Boolean(private_env.ADDRESS_HEADER))) return;\n\taddressWarningIssued = true;\n\tlog.warn(\"Login rate limiting is keyed to the loopback address for every request. The app is behind a proxy but ADDRESS_HEADER is unset, so getClientAddress() returns the socket peer and all clients share one bucket — five failed logins lock out the whole instance. Set ADDRESS_HEADER=X-Forwarded-For and XFF_DEPTH to your proxy count (see .env.example).\", { component: \"auth/rate-limit\" });\n}\nfunction setSessionCookie(cookies, sessionToken) {\n\tconst isSecure = process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\" && private_env.ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES !== \"true\";\n\tcookies.set(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, sessionToken, {\n\t\tpath: \"/\",\n\t\thttpOnly: true,\n\t\tsameSite: \"lax\",\n\t\tsecure: isSecure,\n\t\tmaxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS / 1e3\n\t});\n}\n/** Call before `destroySession` — logout needs the token to revoke it provider-side. */\nfunction getSessionToken(cookies) {\n\treturn cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME);\n}\nfunction destroySession(cookies) {\n\tcookies.delete(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, { path: \"/\" });\n\tcookies.delete(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: \"/\" });\n}\n/**\n* Refresh-token cookie for the OAuth/Supabase flow — `hooks.server.ts`'s\n* session-refresh middleware swaps an expired access token for a fresh one\n* using this. Local/HMAC sessions don't need it.\n*/\nfunction setRefreshCookie(cookies, refreshToken) {\n\tconst isSecure = process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\" && private_env.ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES !== \"true\";\n\tcookies.set(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, refreshToken, {\n\t\tpath: \"/\",\n\t\thttpOnly: true,\n\t\tsameSite: \"lax\",\n\t\tsecure: isSecure,\n\t\tmaxAge: REFRESH_MAX_AGE_MS / 1e3\n\t});\n}\nfunction getRefreshToken(cookies) {\n\treturn cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME);\n}\nfunction clearRefreshCookie(cookies) {\n\tcookies.delete(REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: \"/\" });\n}\n/**\n* Rejects a request whose declared `Content-Length` exceeds `maxBytes` — a\n* per-route lower bound under the global adapter-node `BODY_SIZE_LIMIT`\n* (which must stay high enough for 50MB .gh uploads). Throws 413 before the\n* body is read; see `declaredBodySizeExceeds` for the chunked-encoding caveat.\n*/\nfunction requireMaxBodySize(request, maxBytes) {\n\tif (declaredBodySizeExceeds(request.headers, maxBytes)) throw error(413, `Request body exceeds the limit for this endpoint.`);\n}\n//#endregion\nexport { getRefreshToken as a, requireMaxBodySize as c, warnIfAddressKeysCollapse as d, resolveApiToken as f, destroySession as i, setRefreshCookie as l, clearRateLimit as n, getSessionToken as o, buildRequestContext as p, clearRefreshCookie as r, recordFailedAttempt as s, checkRateLimit as t, setSessionCookie as u 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package/build/server/chunks/chunks/alert-description.js-DiTNz-e4.js

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-import { al as attributes, am as clsx$1, at as bind_props } from './server.js-CUv4onuj.js';
-import { c as cn } from './utils3.js-D4hQ3EdJ.js';
-import { tv } from 'tailwind-variants';
-
-//#region ../ui/dist/components/primitives/alert/alert.svelte
-var alertVariants = tv({
-	base: "relative grid w-full grid-cols-[0_1fr] items-start gap-y-0.5 rounded-lg border px-4 py-3 text-sm has-[>svg]:grid-cols-[calc(var(--spacing)*4)_1fr] has-[>svg]:gap-x-3 [&>svg]:size-4 [&>svg]:translate-y-0.5 [&>svg]:text-current",
-	variants: { variant: {
-		default: "bg-card text-card-foreground",
-		destructive: "text-destructive bg-card *:data-[slot=alert-description]:text-destructive/90 [&>svg]:text-current"
-	} },
-	defaultVariants: { variant: "default" }
-});
-function Alert($$renderer, $$props) {
-	$$renderer.component(($$renderer) => {
-		let { ref = null, class: className, variant = "default", children, $$slots, $$events, ...restProps } = $$props;
-		$$renderer.push(`<div${attributes({
-			"data-slot": "alert",
-			class: clsx$1(cn(alertVariants({ variant }), className)),
-			...restProps,
-			role: "alert"
-		})}>`);
-		children?.($$renderer);
-		$$renderer.push(`<!----></div>`);
-		bind_props($$props, { ref });
-	});
-}
-//#endregion
-//#region ../ui/dist/components/primitives/alert/alert-description.svelte
-function Alert_description($$renderer, $$props) {
-	$$renderer.component(($$renderer) => {
-		let { ref = null, class: className, children, $$slots, $$events, ...restProps } = $$props;
-		$$renderer.push(`<div${attributes({
-			"data-slot": "alert-description",
-			class: clsx$1(cn("gap-1 text-sm [&_p]:leading-relaxed col-start-2 grid justify-items-start text-muted-foreground", className)),
-			...restProps
-		})}>`);
-		children?.($$renderer);
-		$$renderer.push(`<!----></div>`);
-		bind_props($$props, { ref });
-	});
-}
-
-export { Alert as A, Alert_description as a };
-//# sourceMappingURL=alert-description.js-DiTNz-e4.js.map

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/alert-description.js-DiTNz-e4.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"alert-description.js-DiTNz-e4.js","sources":["../../../../.svelte-kit/output/server/chunks/alert-description.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { O as clsx, i as bind_props, r as attributes } from \"./server.js\";\nimport { t as cn } from \"./utils3.js\";\nimport { tv } from \"tailwind-variants\";\n//#region ../ui/dist/components/primitives/alert/alert.svelte\nvar alertVariants = tv({\n\tbase: \"relative grid w-full grid-cols-[0_1fr] items-start gap-y-0.5 rounded-lg border px-4 py-3 text-sm has-[>svg]:grid-cols-[calc(var(--spacing)*4)_1fr] has-[>svg]:gap-x-3 [&>svg]:size-4 [&>svg]:translate-y-0.5 [&>svg]:text-current\",\n\tvariants: { variant: {\n\t\tdefault: \"bg-card text-card-foreground\",\n\t\tdestructive: \"text-destructive bg-card *:data-[slot=alert-description]:text-destructive/90 [&>svg]:text-current\"\n\t} },\n\tdefaultVariants: { variant: \"default\" }\n});\nfunction Alert($$renderer, $$props) {\n\t$$renderer.component(($$renderer) => {\n\t\tlet { ref = null, class: className, variant = \"default\", children, $$slots, $$events, ...restProps } = $$props;\n\t\t$$renderer.push(`<div${attributes({\n\t\t\t\"data-slot\": \"alert\",\n\t\t\tclass: clsx(cn(alertVariants({ variant }), className)),\n\t\t\t...restProps,\n\t\t\trole: \"alert\"\n\t\t})}>`);\n\t\tchildren?.($$renderer);\n\t\t$$renderer.push(`<!----></div>`);\n\t\tbind_props($$props, { ref });\n\t});\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../ui/dist/components/primitives/alert/alert-description.svelte\nfunction Alert_description($$renderer, $$props) {\n\t$$renderer.component(($$renderer) => {\n\t\tlet { ref = null, class: className, children, $$slots, $$events, ...restProps } = $$props;\n\t\t$$renderer.push(`<div${attributes({\n\t\t\t\"data-slot\": \"alert-description\",\n\t\t\tclass: clsx(cn(\"gap-1 text-sm [&_p]:leading-relaxed col-start-2 grid justify-items-start text-muted-foreground\", className)),\n\t\t\t...restProps\n\t\t})}>`);\n\t\tchildren?.($$renderer);\n\t\t$$renderer.push(`<!----></div>`);\n\t\tbind_props($$props, { ref });\n\t});\n}\n//#endregion\nexport { Alert as n, Alert_description as t };\n"],"names":["clsx"],"mappings":";;;;AAGA;AACA,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AACvB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,mOAAmO;AAC1O,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;AACtB,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,8BAA8B;AACzC,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;AACf,EAAE,EAAE;AACJ,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;AACtC,CAAC,CAAC;AACF,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;AACpC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK;AACtC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO;AAChH,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;AACpC,GAAG,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO;AACvB,GAAG,KAAK,EAAEA,MAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;AACzD,GAAG,GAAG,SAAS;AACf,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE;AACT,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACR,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AACxB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;AAClC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC9B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACH;AACA;AACA;AACA,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;AAChD,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK;AACtC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO;AAC3F,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;AACpC,GAAG,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB;AACnC,GAAG,KAAK,EAAEA,MAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,gGAAgG,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/H,GAAG,GAAG;AACN,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACR,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AACxB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;AAClC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC9B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACH;;;;"}