@selvajs/selva 4.17.0 → 4.18.0

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/compute.js-DiErFl_p.js

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+import './src.js-Cf1j97Z6.js';
+import { N as NoopLogger } from './definitions.js-DK6GL3vh.js';
+import { b as resolveServerForOrg$1 } from './limits.js-chQOq2eQ.js';
+import { h as apiError, b as ApiErrorCode } from './access.js-DFbcJ7ZG.js';
+import { C as ComputeServerUnconfiguredError } from './api.js-BF_dHNnR.js';
+import { lookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
+import { isIP } from 'node:net';
+
+//#region ../server/src/compute/safe-url.ts
+/**
+* SSRF guard for the remote-definition fetch. Without it an authenticated user
+* could submit `http://169.254.169.254/...` (cloud metadata) or any intranet
+* endpoint and the server would fetch it on their behalf.
+*
+* Two layers:
+*
+*   1. `isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl` — synchronous, DNS-free literal filter.
+*      Rejects the protocol, hostname literals, and every IP *encoding* that
+*      maps to a blocked address: dotted-decimal, integer, octal, hex,
+*      short-form, IPv4-mapped IPv6.
+*   2. `assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl` — resolves the hostname and re-checks the
+*      *resolved* IP, catching a public name that points at a private one.
+*
+* Neither is bulletproof against DNS rebinding — the IP can change between our
+* lookup and fetch's own. Closing that needs the caller to connect to the
+* resolved IP directly, a much larger change; these two layers close the
+* bypasses an attacker actually reaches for (literal encodings, and a public
+* name whose record points inward).
+*/
+/**
+* True when `ip` (a normalized IPv4 or IPv6 literal from `isIP`/`dns.lookup`)
+* is loopback, private, link-local, or otherwise must-not-fetch. IPv4-mapped
+* IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is unwrapped first so the v4 rules apply.
+*/
+function isBlockedIp(ip) {
+	let addr = ip.toLowerCase();
+	const mappedDotted = /^::ffff:(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/.exec(addr);
+	if (mappedDotted) addr = mappedDotted[1];
+	else {
+		const mappedHex = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/.exec(addr);
+		if (mappedHex) {
+			const hi = parseInt(mappedHex[1], 16);
+			const lo = parseInt(mappedHex[2], 16);
+			addr = [
+				hi >> 8 & 255,
+				hi & 255,
+				lo >> 8 & 255,
+				lo & 255
+			].join(".");
+		}
+	}
+	if (isIP(addr) === 4) {
+		const octets = addr.split(".").map(Number);
+		if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((o) => o > 255)) return true;
+		const [a, b] = octets;
+		if (a === 0) return true;
+		if (a === 127) return true;
+		if (a === 10) return true;
+		if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
+		if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
+		if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true;
+	if (/^(fc|fd)[0-9a-f]{0,2}:/.test(addr)) return true;
+	if (/^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(addr)) return true;
+	return false;
+}
+/**
+* Parse a bare-IPv4 hostname in any encoding browsers/glibc accept — integer
+* (`2130706433`), octal (`0177.0.0.1`), hex (`0x7f000001`), and short forms
+* (`127.1`) — into canonical dotted-decimal. An already-valid dotted-quad comes
+* back unchanged. Returns null only when the host is not a numeric IPv4 literal
+* at all, i.e. it's a real name — which is what callers use to decide whether
+* DNS resolution is needed.
+*/
+function canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host) {
+	if (isIP(host) === 4) return host;
+	const rawParts = host.split(".");
+	if (rawParts.length === 0 || rawParts.length > 4) return null;
+	const parseUInt = (s) => {
+		if (s === "") return null;
+		let n;
+		if (/^0x[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(s)) n = parseInt(s, 16);
+		else if (/^0[0-7]+$/.test(s)) n = parseInt(s, 8);
+		else if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(s)) n = parseInt(s, 10);
+		else return null;
+		return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
+	};
+	const nums = rawParts.map(parseUInt);
+	if (nums.some((n) => n === null)) return null;
+	const parts = nums;
+	let value;
+	switch (parts.length) {
+		case 1:
+			value = parts[0];
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			if (parts[0] > 255 || parts[1] > 16777215) return null;
+			value = parts[0] << 24 | parts[1];
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			if (parts[0] > 255 || parts[1] > 255 || parts[2] > 65535) return null;
+			value = parts[0] << 24 | parts[1] << 16 | parts[2];
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (parts.some((p) => p > 255)) return null;
+			value = parts[0] << 24 | parts[1] << 16 | parts[2] << 8 | parts[3];
+	}
+	value = value >>> 0;
+	if (value > 4294967295) return null;
+	return [
+		value >>> 24 & 255,
+		value >>> 16 & 255,
+		value >>> 8 & 255,
+		value & 255
+	].join(".");
+}
+/**
+* Synchronous literal pre-filter: rejects bad schemes, loopback hostnames, and
+* any IP literal (in any encoding) that maps to a blocked address. Does NOT
+* perform DNS — a public *name* that points at a private IP passes here and is
+* caught only by `assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl`.
+*/
+function isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(raw) {
+	let parsed;
+	try {
+		parsed = new URL(raw);
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") return false;
+	let host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
+	if (!host) return false;
+	if (host === "localhost" || host.endsWith(".localhost")) return false;
+	if (host.startsWith("[") && host.endsWith("]")) host = host.slice(1, -1);
+	if (isIP(host) === 6) return !isBlockedIp(host);
+	const canonical = canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host);
+	if (canonical) return !isBlockedIp(canonical);
+	return true;
+}
+/**
+* True when `raw` targets the link-local range (`169.254.0.0/16`), which
+* carries the cloud metadata service at `169.254.169.254` — the endpoint that
+* hands out a host's own IAM credentials to anything on the box.
+*
+* A far narrower judgement than {@link isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl}, for the one
+* caller that must tolerate private addresses: an operator's own compute server
+* legitimately lives on `localhost` or a LAN, so blocking RFC1918 there would
+* reject the ordinary self-hosted layout. Nothing legitimate is ever reached
+* over link-local, so this stays blocked with no opt-out.
+*
+* Shares `canonicalizeNumericIpv4`, so the encodings that bypass a naive string
+* comparison — `http://2852039166/`, `http://0251.0376.0251.0376/`,
+* `http://0xa9fea9fe/` — all resolve to the same verdict.
+*/
+function isLinkLocalUrl(raw) {
+	let host;
+	try {
+		host = new URL(raw).hostname.toLowerCase();
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (!host) return false;
+	if (host.startsWith("[") && host.endsWith("]")) host = host.slice(1, -1);
+	if (isIP(host) === 6) return /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(host);
+	const canonical = canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host);
+	if (!canonical) return false;
+	const [a, b] = canonical.split(".").map(Number);
+	return a === 169 && b === 254;
+}
+/**
+* Full SSRF check: literal pre-filter, then resolve every A/AAAA record and
+* reject if *any* resolved IP is blocked. Returns the original URL on success
+* so callers can `await assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(url)` inline.
+*
+* Every rejection throws the same generic message so the caller gets no oracle;
+* which host was blocked and by which layer is logged server-side instead.
+*/
+async function assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(raw, logger = new NoopLogger()) {
+	if (!isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(raw)) {
+		logger.warn("Blocked remote definition URL", {
+			component: "Compute/ssrf",
+			reason: "literal-filter",
+			host: hostOf(raw)
+		});
+		throw new Error("Remote definition URL is not allowed");
+	}
+	const host = new URL(raw).hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
+	if (isIP(host) !== 0 || canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host)) return raw;
+	let resolved;
+	try {
+		resolved = await lookup(host, { all: true });
+	} catch {
+		logger.warn("Blocked remote definition URL", {
+			component: "Compute/ssrf",
+			reason: "dns-lookup-failed",
+			host
+		});
+		throw new Error("Remote definition URL is not allowed");
+	}
+	if (resolved.length === 0 || resolved.some((r) => isBlockedIp(r.address))) {
+		const blocked = resolved.filter((r) => isBlockedIp(r.address)).map((r) => r.address);
+		logger.warn("Blocked remote definition URL", {
+			component: "Compute/ssrf",
+			reason: "resolves-to-blocked-ip",
+			host,
+			blockedIps: blocked
+		});
+		throw new Error("Remote definition URL is not allowed");
+	}
+	return raw;
+}
+/** Best-effort hostname for logging; falls back to a truncated raw string. */
+function hostOf(raw) {
+	try {
+		return new URL(raw).hostname;
+	} catch {
+		return raw.slice(0, 120);
+	}
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region ../server/src/compute/remote-definition.ts
+/**
+* Remote-definition fetch: SSRF-guarded, size-capped, timed, and TTL-cached.
+*
+* A solve can reference its `.gh` by remote URL instead of a stored blob, and
+* that URL is attacker-controllable — a share-token caller supplies
+* `definitionUrl`. Hence {@link assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl}, the early size
+* cap, and the deadline.
+*/
+/** Once the cache exceeds this many entries, evict the oldest 10 by `fetchedAt`. */
+var CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES = 50;
+var CACHE_EVICT_BATCH = 10;
+/**
+* Read a response body into memory, aborting (and throwing) as soon as the
+* running byte total exceeds `maxBytes`. Falls back to `arrayBuffer()` only when
+* the body isn't a readable stream (older fetch impls).
+*/
+async function readBodyWithCap(response, maxBytes, controller) {
+	if (!response.body) {
+		const buffer = await response.arrayBuffer();
+		if (buffer.byteLength > maxBytes) throw new Error("Remote definition exceeds size limit");
+		return new Uint8Array(buffer);
+	}
+	const reader = response.body.getReader();
+	const chunks = [];
+	let total = 0;
+	while (true) {
+		const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+		if (done) break;
+		total += value.byteLength;
+		if (total > maxBytes) {
+			controller.abort();
+			throw new Error("Remote definition exceeds size limit");
+		}
+		chunks.push(value);
+	}
+	const out = new Uint8Array(total);
+	let offset = 0;
+	for (const chunk of chunks) {
+		out.set(chunk, offset);
+		offset += chunk.byteLength;
+	}
+	return out;
+}
+/**
+* Build a remote-definition fetcher owning its own TTL cache. Each fetcher's
+* cache is independent, so one per process shares warm bytes while test fetchers
+* stay isolated.
+*/
+function createRemoteDefinitionFetcher(config) {
+	const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const logger = config.logger ?? new NoopLogger();
+	return { async load(url) {
+		await assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(url, logger);
+		const now = config.now();
+		const cached = cache.get(url);
+		if (cached && now - cached.fetchedAt < config.cacheTtlMs) return cached.data;
+		const controller = new AbortController();
+		const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), config.fetchTimeoutMs);
+		let data;
+		try {
+			const response = await fetch(url, {
+				signal: controller.signal,
+				redirect: "error"
+			});
+			if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}`);
+			const declared = Number(response.headers.get("content-length"));
+			if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > config.maxBytes) throw new Error("Remote definition exceeds size limit");
+			data = await readBodyWithCap(response, config.maxBytes, controller);
+		} finally {
+			clearTimeout(timeout);
+		}
+		cache.set(url, {
+			data,
+			fetchedAt: now
+		});
+		if (cache.size > CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {
+			const entries = Array.from(cache.entries());
+			entries.sort((a, b) => a[1].fetchedAt - b[1].fetchedAt);
+			for (let i = 0; i < CACHE_EVICT_BATCH; i++) cache.delete(entries[i][0]);
+		}
+		return data;
+	} };
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region ../server/src/compute/resolve-server.ts
+/**
+* Pick the right Rhino.Compute server for an (org, definition) pair.
+*
+* Resolution order, narrowest wins:
+*   1. `definitionPin` if it points at a server visible to `orgId`.
+*   2. `orgDefaults[orgId]` if set and visible.
+*   3. Global `defaultServerId`.
+*
+* The store returns the full config; the visibility predicate runs in the pure
+* helper so callers don't reimplement it. Re-throws the pure helper's "nothing
+* visible" failure as a typed `ComputeServerUnconfiguredError`.
+*
+* Reads a key-free config and fetches the `apiKey` only for the server that
+* actually wins, instead of decrypting every configured server's key to use
+* exactly one of them.
+*/
+async function resolveServerForOrg(ctx, orgId, store, opts = {}) {
+	const config = await store.getConfig(ctx);
+	let server;
+	try {
+		server = resolveServerForOrg$1(config, orgId, { definitionPin: opts.definitionPin });
+	} catch (err) {
+		throw new ComputeServerUnconfiguredError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : void 0);
+	}
+	if (!server.hasApiKey) return server;
+	return {
+		...server,
+		apiKey: await store.getServerApiKey(ctx, server.id)
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region ../server/src/compute/server-config-write.ts
+/**
+* Shared write-path rules for compute server config.
+*
+* Two routes accept a server set: `/api/admin/compute` (platform scope,
+* `manage_compute`) and `/api/v1/orgs/{orgId}/compute` (org scope,
+* `manage_org_compute`). They differ in who may call them, what extra fields
+* they carry (`sharedWith` vs `ownerOrgId`), and how they validate the default
+* selection — but the field validation and the apiKey merge below must behave
+* identically in both, so they live here rather than in either handler.
+*
+* The apiKey merge is why this file exists: if the two copies disagree, a
+* stored credential silently gets cleared or leaked, and nothing fails at
+* build time.
+*/
+/**
+* A stored `serverUrl` is fetched server-side on every status probe, every
+* purge/shutdown action, and every solve, so an unfiltered one is an SSRF
+* primitive handed to whoever holds `manage_compute`. Two rules:
+*
+*   - Scheme allowlist: `http`/`https`. `file:`, `gopher:` and friends are never
+*     a Rhino.Compute endpoint.
+*   - Link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`) is refused. That range carries the cloud
+*     metadata service at `169.254.169.254`, which hands out the host's own IAM
+*     credentials to anything running on the box.
+*
+* **Loopback and RFC1918 are deliberately allowed.** Running compute on
+* `localhost:6500` or a LAN box is the ordinary self-hosted layout, not an
+* attack — most deployments reach their compute server over exactly those
+* addresses. Blocking them by default would break those instances on upgrade
+* and push every operator toward an opt-out flag, and a guard that everyone
+* disables protects nobody. So the check is narrowed to the range where no
+* legitimate compute server ever lives.
+*
+* What this does not stop: a privileged admin pointing the app at an internal
+* host to probe it. That is a real but much weaker concern than credential
+* theft, it needs `manage_compute` already, and it is inseparable from the
+* legitimate case. Revisit if `manage_org_compute` is ever delegated widely on
+* a multi-tenant instance.
+*
+* `isLinkLocalUrl` is reused rather than hand-rolled because a string compare
+* against `169.254.169.254` misses the encodings that reach the same address:
+* `http://2852039166/`, `http://0xa9fea9fe/`, `http://0251.0376.0251.0376/`.
+*/
+function assertUsableServerUrl(serverUrl) {
+	let parsed;
+	try {
+		parsed = new URL(serverUrl);
+	} catch {
+		apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, `Invalid serverUrl: ${serverUrl}`);
+	}
+	if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, `serverUrl must use http or https: ${serverUrl}`);
+	if (isLinkLocalUrl(serverUrl)) apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, `serverUrl points at the link-local range, which carries the cloud metadata service: ${serverUrl}`);
+}
+/**
+* Validates the scope-independent fields of every submitted server. Throws the
+* first failure as a 400; scope-specific fields (`sharedWith`, `ownerOrgId`)
+* are the caller's business.
+*/
+function validateIncomingServers(servers) {
+	for (const s of servers) {
+		if (!s.id || typeof s.id !== "string") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, "Each server needs an id");
+		if (!s.label || typeof s.label !== "string") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, "Each server needs a label");
+		if (!s.serverUrl || typeof s.serverUrl !== "string") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, "Each server needs a serverUrl");
+		assertUsableServerUrl(s.serverUrl);
+		if (s.apiKey !== void 0 && s.apiKey !== null && typeof s.apiKey !== "string") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, "apiKey must be a string, null, or omitted");
+	}
+}
+/**
+* The UI never receives stored keys — it sends back `hasApiKey` and omits the
+* field for servers the operator didn't touch. So "omitted" cannot mean "clear":
+* it has to preserve, or every save through the settings form would wipe the
+* keys of every server the operator left alone. Clearing is explicit (`null`);
+* an empty string is treated as "not provided" since that's what an untouched
+* password input submits.
+*/
+function resolveApiKey(submitted, storedKey) {
+	if (submitted === null) return void 0;
+	return submitted ? submitted : storedKey;
+}
+/**
+* Builds the id → stored-key lookup the merge reads. The caller passes only the
+* servers in its own scope, so one scope's write can never resolve a key from
+* another's rows.
+*/
+function storedKeysById(scopedServers) {
+	return new Map(scopedServers.map((s) => [s.id, s.apiKey]));
+}
+
+export { resolveApiKey as a, createRemoteDefinitionFetcher as c, resolveServerForOrg as r, storedKeysById as s, validateIncomingServers as v };
+//# sourceMappingURL=compute.js-DiErFl_p.js.map

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/compute.js-DiErFl_p.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"compute.js-DiErFl_p.js","sources":["../../../../.svelte-kit/output/server/chunks/compute.js"],"sourcesContent":["import \"./src.js\";\nimport { d as NoopLogger } from \"./definitions.js\";\nimport { o as resolveServerForOrg$1 } from \"./limits.js\";\nimport { M as ApiErrorCode, N as apiError } from \"./access.js\";\nimport { _ as ComputeServerUnconfiguredError } from \"./api.js\";\nimport { lookup } from \"node:dns/promises\";\nimport { isIP } from \"node:net\";\n//#region ../server/src/compute/safe-url.ts\n/**\n* SSRF guard for the remote-definition fetch. Without it an authenticated user\n* could submit `http://169.254.169.254/...` (cloud metadata) or any intranet\n* endpoint and the server would fetch it on their behalf.\n*\n* Two layers:\n*\n*   1. `isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl` — synchronous, DNS-free literal filter.\n*      Rejects the protocol, hostname literals, and every IP *encoding* that\n*      maps to a blocked address: dotted-decimal, integer, octal, hex,\n*      short-form, IPv4-mapped IPv6.\n*   2. `assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl` — resolves the hostname and re-checks the\n*      *resolved* IP, catching a public name that points at a private one.\n*\n* Neither is bulletproof against DNS rebinding — the IP can change between our\n* lookup and fetch's own. Closing that needs the caller to connect to the\n* resolved IP directly, a much larger change; these two layers close the\n* bypasses an attacker actually reaches for (literal encodings, and a public\n* name whose record points inward).\n*/\n/**\n* True when `ip` (a normalized IPv4 or IPv6 literal from `isIP`/`dns.lookup`)\n* is loopback, private, link-local, or otherwise must-not-fetch. IPv4-mapped\n* IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is unwrapped first so the v4 rules apply.\n*/\nfunction isBlockedIp(ip) {\n\tlet addr = ip.toLowerCase();\n\tconst mappedDotted = /^::ffff:(\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})$/.exec(addr);\n\tif (mappedDotted) addr = mappedDotted[1];\n\telse {\n\t\tconst mappedHex = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/.exec(addr);\n\t\tif (mappedHex) {\n\t\t\tconst hi = parseInt(mappedHex[1], 16);\n\t\t\tconst lo = parseInt(mappedHex[2], 16);\n\t\t\taddr = [\n\t\t\t\thi >> 8 & 255,\n\t\t\t\thi & 255,\n\t\t\t\tlo >> 8 & 255,\n\t\t\t\tlo & 255\n\t\t\t].join(\".\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif (isIP(addr) === 4) {\n\t\tconst octets = addr.split(\".\").map(Number);\n\t\tif (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((o) => o > 255)) return true;\n\t\tconst [a, b] = octets;\n\t\tif (a === 0) return true;\n\t\tif (a === 127) return true;\n\t\tif (a === 10) return true;\n\t\tif (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;\n\t\tif (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;\n\t\tif (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n\tif (addr === \"::1\" || addr === \"::\") return true;\n\tif (/^(fc|fd)[0-9a-f]{0,2}:/.test(addr)) return true;\n\tif (/^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(addr)) return true;\n\treturn false;\n}\n/**\n* Parse a bare-IPv4 hostname in any encoding browsers/glibc accept — integer\n* (`2130706433`), octal (`0177.0.0.1`), hex (`0x7f000001`), and short forms\n* (`127.1`) — into canonical dotted-decimal. An already-valid dotted-quad comes\n* back unchanged. Returns null only when the host is not a numeric IPv4 literal\n* at all, i.e. it's a real name — which is what callers use to decide whether\n* DNS resolution is needed.\n*/\nfunction canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host) {\n\tif (isIP(host) === 4) return host;\n\tconst rawParts = host.split(\".\");\n\tif (rawParts.length === 0 || rawParts.length > 4) return null;\n\tconst parseUInt = (s) => {\n\t\tif (s === \"\") return null;\n\t\tlet n;\n\t\tif (/^0x[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(s)) n = parseInt(s, 16);\n\t\telse if (/^0[0-7]+$/.test(s)) n = parseInt(s, 8);\n\t\telse if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(s)) n = parseInt(s, 10);\n\t\telse return null;\n\t\treturn Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;\n\t};\n\tconst nums = rawParts.map(parseUInt);\n\tif (nums.some((n) => n === null)) return null;\n\tconst parts = nums;\n\tlet value;\n\tswitch (parts.length) {\n\t\tcase 1:\n\t\t\tvalue = parts[0];\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase 2:\n\t\t\tif (parts[0] > 255 || parts[1] > 16777215) return null;\n\t\t\tvalue = parts[0] << 24 | parts[1];\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tcase 3:\n\t\t\tif (parts[0] > 255 || parts[1] > 255 || parts[2] > 65535) return null;\n\t\t\tvalue = parts[0] << 24 | parts[1] << 16 | parts[2];\n\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\tif (parts.some((p) => p > 255)) return null;\n\t\t\tvalue = parts[0] << 24 | parts[1] << 16 | parts[2] << 8 | parts[3];\n\t}\n\tvalue = value >>> 0;\n\tif (value > 4294967295) return null;\n\treturn [\n\t\tvalue >>> 24 & 255,\n\t\tvalue >>> 16 & 255,\n\t\tvalue >>> 8 & 255,\n\t\tvalue & 255\n\t].join(\".\");\n}\n/**\n* Synchronous literal pre-filter: rejects bad schemes, loopback hostnames, and\n* any IP literal (in any encoding) that maps to a blocked address. Does NOT\n* perform DNS — a public *name* that points at a private IP passes here and is\n* caught only by `assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl`.\n*/\nfunction isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(raw) {\n\tlet parsed;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(raw);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n\tif (parsed.protocol !== \"http:\" && parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") return false;\n\tlet host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();\n\tif (!host) return false;\n\tif (host === \"localhost\" || host.endsWith(\".localhost\")) return false;\n\tif (host.startsWith(\"[\") && host.endsWith(\"]\")) host = host.slice(1, -1);\n\tif (isIP(host) === 6) return !isBlockedIp(host);\n\tconst canonical = canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host);\n\tif (canonical) return !isBlockedIp(canonical);\n\treturn true;\n}\n/**\n* True when `raw` targets the link-local range (`169.254.0.0/16`), which\n* carries the cloud metadata service at `169.254.169.254` — the endpoint that\n* hands out a host's own IAM credentials to anything on the box.\n*\n* A far narrower judgement than {@link isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl}, for the one\n* caller that must tolerate private addresses: an operator's own compute server\n* legitimately lives on `localhost` or a LAN, so blocking RFC1918 there would\n* reject the ordinary self-hosted layout. Nothing legitimate is ever reached\n* over link-local, so this stays blocked with no opt-out.\n*\n* Shares `canonicalizeNumericIpv4`, so the encodings that bypass a naive string\n* comparison — `http://2852039166/`, `http://0251.0376.0251.0376/`,\n* `http://0xa9fea9fe/` — all resolve to the same verdict.\n*/\nfunction isLinkLocalUrl(raw) {\n\tlet host;\n\ttry {\n\t\thost = new URL(raw).hostname.toLowerCase();\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n\tif (!host) return false;\n\tif (host.startsWith(\"[\") && host.endsWith(\"]\")) host = host.slice(1, -1);\n\tif (isIP(host) === 6) return /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(host);\n\tconst canonical = canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host);\n\tif (!canonical) return false;\n\tconst [a, b] = canonical.split(\".\").map(Number);\n\treturn a === 169 && b === 254;\n}\n/**\n* Full SSRF check: literal pre-filter, then resolve every A/AAAA record and\n* reject if *any* resolved IP is blocked. Returns the original URL on success\n* so callers can `await assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(url)` inline.\n*\n* Every rejection throws the same generic message so the caller gets no oracle;\n* which host was blocked and by which layer is logged server-side instead.\n*/\nasync function assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(raw, logger = new NoopLogger()) {\n\tif (!isSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(raw)) {\n\t\tlogger.warn(\"Blocked remote definition URL\", {\n\t\t\tcomponent: \"Compute/ssrf\",\n\t\t\treason: \"literal-filter\",\n\t\t\thost: hostOf(raw)\n\t\t});\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"Remote definition URL is not allowed\");\n\t}\n\tconst host = new URL(raw).hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, \"\");\n\tif (isIP(host) !== 0 || canonicalizeNumericIpv4(host)) return raw;\n\tlet resolved;\n\ttry {\n\t\tresolved = await lookup(host, { all: true });\n\t} catch {\n\t\tlogger.warn(\"Blocked remote definition URL\", {\n\t\t\tcomponent: \"Compute/ssrf\",\n\t\t\treason: \"dns-lookup-failed\",\n\t\t\thost\n\t\t});\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"Remote definition URL is not allowed\");\n\t}\n\tif (resolved.length === 0 || resolved.some((r) => isBlockedIp(r.address))) {\n\t\tconst blocked = resolved.filter((r) => isBlockedIp(r.address)).map((r) => r.address);\n\t\tlogger.warn(\"Blocked remote definition URL\", {\n\t\t\tcomponent: \"Compute/ssrf\",\n\t\t\treason: \"resolves-to-blocked-ip\",\n\t\t\thost,\n\t\t\tblockedIps: blocked\n\t\t});\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"Remote definition URL is not allowed\");\n\t}\n\treturn raw;\n}\n/** Best-effort hostname for logging; falls back to a truncated raw string. */\nfunction hostOf(raw) {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn new URL(raw).hostname;\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn raw.slice(0, 120);\n\t}\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../server/src/compute/remote-definition.ts\n/**\n* Remote-definition fetch: SSRF-guarded, size-capped, timed, and TTL-cached.\n*\n* A solve can reference its `.gh` by remote URL instead of a stored blob, and\n* that URL is attacker-controllable — a share-token caller supplies\n* `definitionUrl`. Hence {@link assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl}, the early size\n* cap, and the deadline.\n*/\n/** Once the cache exceeds this many entries, evict the oldest 10 by `fetchedAt`. */\nvar CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES = 50;\nvar CACHE_EVICT_BATCH = 10;\n/**\n* Read a response body into memory, aborting (and throwing) as soon as the\n* running byte total exceeds `maxBytes`. Falls back to `arrayBuffer()` only when\n* the body isn't a readable stream (older fetch impls).\n*/\nasync function readBodyWithCap(response, maxBytes, controller) {\n\tif (!response.body) {\n\t\tconst buffer = await response.arrayBuffer();\n\t\tif (buffer.byteLength > maxBytes) throw new Error(\"Remote definition exceeds size limit\");\n\t\treturn new Uint8Array(buffer);\n\t}\n\tconst reader = response.body.getReader();\n\tconst chunks = [];\n\tlet total = 0;\n\twhile (true) {\n\t\tconst { done, value } = await reader.read();\n\t\tif (done) break;\n\t\ttotal += value.byteLength;\n\t\tif (total > maxBytes) {\n\t\t\tcontroller.abort();\n\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Remote definition exceeds size limit\");\n\t\t}\n\t\tchunks.push(value);\n\t}\n\tconst out = new Uint8Array(total);\n\tlet offset = 0;\n\tfor (const chunk of chunks) {\n\t\tout.set(chunk, offset);\n\t\toffset += chunk.byteLength;\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n/**\n* Build a remote-definition fetcher owning its own TTL cache. Each fetcher's\n* cache is independent, so one per process shares warm bytes while test fetchers\n* stay isolated.\n*/\nfunction createRemoteDefinitionFetcher(config) {\n\tconst cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();\n\tconst logger = config.logger ?? new NoopLogger();\n\treturn { async load(url) {\n\t\tawait assertSafeRemoteDefinitionUrl(url, logger);\n\t\tconst now = config.now();\n\t\tconst cached = cache.get(url);\n\t\tif (cached && now - cached.fetchedAt < config.cacheTtlMs) return cached.data;\n\t\tconst controller = new AbortController();\n\t\tconst timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), config.fetchTimeoutMs);\n\t\tlet data;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst response = await fetch(url, {\n\t\t\t\tsignal: controller.signal,\n\t\t\t\tredirect: \"error\"\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (!response.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}`);\n\t\t\tconst declared = Number(response.headers.get(\"content-length\"));\n\t\t\tif (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > config.maxBytes) throw new Error(\"Remote definition exceeds size limit\");\n\t\t\tdata = await readBodyWithCap(response, config.maxBytes, controller);\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timeout);\n\t\t}\n\t\tcache.set(url, {\n\t\t\tdata,\n\t\t\tfetchedAt: now\n\t\t});\n\t\tif (cache.size > CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {\n\t\t\tconst entries = Array.from(cache.entries());\n\t\t\tentries.sort((a, b) => a[1].fetchedAt - b[1].fetchedAt);\n\t\t\tfor (let i = 0; i < CACHE_EVICT_BATCH; i++) cache.delete(entries[i][0]);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn data;\n\t} };\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../server/src/compute/resolve-server.ts\n/**\n* Pick the right Rhino.Compute server for an (org, definition) pair.\n*\n* Resolution order, narrowest wins:\n*   1. `definitionPin` if it points at a server visible to `orgId`.\n*   2. `orgDefaults[orgId]` if set and visible.\n*   3. Global `defaultServerId`.\n*\n* The store returns the full config; the visibility predicate runs in the pure\n* helper so callers don't reimplement it. Re-throws the pure helper's \"nothing\n* visible\" failure as a typed `ComputeServerUnconfiguredError`.\n*\n* Reads a key-free config and fetches the `apiKey` only for the server that\n* actually wins, instead of decrypting every configured server's key to use\n* exactly one of them.\n*/\nasync function resolveServerForOrg(ctx, orgId, store, opts = {}) {\n\tconst config = await store.getConfig(ctx);\n\tlet server;\n\ttry {\n\t\tserver = resolveServerForOrg$1(config, orgId, { definitionPin: opts.definitionPin });\n\t} catch (err) {\n\t\tthrow new ComputeServerUnconfiguredError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : void 0);\n\t}\n\tif (!server.hasApiKey) return server;\n\treturn {\n\t\t...server,\n\t\tapiKey: await store.getServerApiKey(ctx, server.id)\n\t};\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region ../server/src/compute/server-config-write.ts\n/**\n* Shared write-path rules for compute server config.\n*\n* Two routes accept a server set: `/api/admin/compute` (platform scope,\n* `manage_compute`) and `/api/v1/orgs/{orgId}/compute` (org scope,\n* `manage_org_compute`). They differ in who may call them, what extra fields\n* they carry (`sharedWith` vs `ownerOrgId`), and how they validate the default\n* selection — but the field validation and the apiKey merge below must behave\n* identically in both, so they live here rather than in either handler.\n*\n* The apiKey merge is why this file exists: if the two copies disagree, a\n* stored credential silently gets cleared or leaked, and nothing fails at\n* build time.\n*/\n/**\n* A stored `serverUrl` is fetched server-side on every status probe, every\n* purge/shutdown action, and every solve, so an unfiltered one is an SSRF\n* primitive handed to whoever holds `manage_compute`. Two rules:\n*\n*   - Scheme allowlist: `http`/`https`. `file:`, `gopher:` and friends are never\n*     a Rhino.Compute endpoint.\n*   - Link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`) is refused. That range carries the cloud\n*     metadata service at `169.254.169.254`, which hands out the host's own IAM\n*     credentials to anything running on the box.\n*\n* **Loopback and RFC1918 are deliberately allowed.** Running compute on\n* `localhost:6500` or a LAN box is the ordinary self-hosted layout, not an\n* attack — most deployments reach their compute server over exactly those\n* addresses. Blocking them by default would break those instances on upgrade\n* and push every operator toward an opt-out flag, and a guard that everyone\n* disables protects nobody. So the check is narrowed to the range where no\n* legitimate compute server ever lives.\n*\n* What this does not stop: a privileged admin pointing the app at an internal\n* host to probe it. That is a real but much weaker concern than credential\n* theft, it needs `manage_compute` already, and it is inseparable from the\n* legitimate case. Revisit if `manage_org_compute` is ever delegated widely on\n* a multi-tenant instance.\n*\n* `isLinkLocalUrl` is reused rather than hand-rolled because a string compare\n* against `169.254.169.254` misses the encodings that reach the same address:\n* `http://2852039166/`, `http://0xa9fea9fe/`, `http://0251.0376.0251.0376/`.\n*/\nfunction assertUsableServerUrl(serverUrl) {\n\tlet parsed;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(serverUrl);\n\t} catch {\n\t\tapiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, `Invalid serverUrl: ${serverUrl}`);\n\t}\n\tif (parsed.protocol !== \"http:\" && parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, `serverUrl must use http or https: ${serverUrl}`);\n\tif (isLinkLocalUrl(serverUrl)) apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, `serverUrl points at the link-local range, which carries the cloud metadata service: ${serverUrl}`);\n}\n/**\n* Validates the scope-independent fields of every submitted server. Throws the\n* first failure as a 400; scope-specific fields (`sharedWith`, `ownerOrgId`)\n* are the caller's business.\n*/\nfunction validateIncomingServers(servers) {\n\tfor (const s of servers) {\n\t\tif (!s.id || typeof s.id !== \"string\") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, \"Each server needs an id\");\n\t\tif (!s.label || typeof s.label !== \"string\") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, \"Each server needs a label\");\n\t\tif (!s.serverUrl || typeof s.serverUrl !== \"string\") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, \"Each server needs a serverUrl\");\n\t\tassertUsableServerUrl(s.serverUrl);\n\t\tif (s.apiKey !== void 0 && s.apiKey !== null && typeof s.apiKey !== \"string\") apiError(400, ApiErrorCode.VALIDATION_FAILED, \"apiKey must be a string, null, or omitted\");\n\t}\n}\n/**\n* The UI never receives stored keys — it sends back `hasApiKey` and omits the\n* field for servers the operator didn't touch. So \"omitted\" cannot mean \"clear\":\n* it has to preserve, or every save through the settings form would wipe the\n* keys of every server the operator left alone. Clearing is explicit (`null`);\n* an empty string is treated as \"not provided\" since that's what an untouched\n* password input submits.\n*/\nfunction resolveApiKey(submitted, storedKey) {\n\tif (submitted === null) return void 0;\n\treturn submitted ? submitted : storedKey;\n}\n/**\n* Builds the id → stored-key lookup the merge reads. The caller passes only the\n* servers in its own scope, so one scope's write can never resolve a key from\n* another's rows.\n*/\nfunction storedKeysById(scopedServers) {\n\treturn new Map(scopedServers.map((s) => [s.id, s.apiKey]));\n}\n//#endregion\nexport { createRemoteDefinitionFetcher as a, resolveServerForOrg as i, storedKeysById as n, validateIncomingServers as r, resolveApiKey as t 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package/build/server/chunks/chunks/computeLimits.js-CPfd6XdT.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import { b as private_env } from './shared-server.js-BGs15m2r.js';
+import { q as lazyLogger } from './providers.server.js-DQ1uVPlR.js';
+import { c as resolveComputeLimits } from './limits.js-chQOq2eQ.js';
+import './src.js-Cf1j97Z6.js';
+import './access.js-DFbcJ7ZG.js';
+import './schema.js-YChb_4u9.js';
+import 'node:crypto';
+import './api.js-BF_dHNnR.js';
+import 'node:dns/promises';
+import 'node:net';
+
+//#region src/lib/server/computeLimits.ts
+/**
+* Thin adapter over `@selvajs/server`'s `resolveComputeLimits`: reads SvelteKit's
+* dynamic private env once and re-exports the resolved values as named constants.
+*
+* Uses `$env/dynamic/private`, not bare `process.env`: under `vite dev`, Vite
+* loads `.env` into this module but does NOT mirror it into `process.env`, so a
+* raw `process.env[name]` is undefined in dev and every knob silently falls back
+* to its default regardless of `.env`.
+*
+* Client-side counterparts (in-flight compute throttle, slider debounce) are
+* bundled into the client and can't read env — see `async-throttle.ts` in
+* `@selvajs/solve/client` and the input components.
+*/
+var limits = resolveComputeLimits(private_env, lazyLogger);
+/** The whole resolved object — passed wholesale to `SolveEngine` (`compute/engine.server.ts`). */
+var computeLimits = limits;
+var SOLVE_DEADLINE_MS = limits.solveDeadlineMs;
+var RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = limits.rateLimitWindowMs;
+var RATE_LIMIT_MAX_REQUESTS = limits.rateLimitMaxRequests;
+var MAX_DEFINITION_FILE_SIZE = limits.maxDefinitionFileSize;
+var MAX_IMAGE_FILE_SIZE = limits.maxImageFileSize;
+var COMPUTE_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES = limits.computeRequestMaxBytes;
+var COMPUTE_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES = limits.computeResponseMaxBytes;
+var REMOTE_DEFINITION_MAX_BYTES = limits.remoteDefinitionMaxBytes;
+var REMOTE_DEFINITION_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = limits.remoteDefinitionFetchTimeoutMs;
+var REMOTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_TTL_MS = limits.remoteDefinitionCacheTtlMs;
+limits.computeReuseDefinitionCache;
+limits.computeServerCachesolve;
+limits.computeCacheErroredSolves;
+limits.computeMaxQueueDepth;
+limits.computeQueueWaitMs;
+var COMPUTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_BYTES = limits.computeDefinitionCacheBytes;
+var COMPUTE_SOLVE_CACHE_BYTES = limits.computeSolveCacheBytes;
+
+export { COMPUTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_BYTES as C, MAX_IMAGE_FILE_SIZE as M, REMOTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_TTL_MS as R, SOLVE_DEADLINE_MS as S, COMPUTE_SOLVE_CACHE_BYTES as a, REMOTE_DEFINITION_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS as b, computeLimits as c, REMOTE_DEFINITION_MAX_BYTES as d, COMPUTE_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES as e, COMPUTE_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES as f, MAX_DEFINITION_FILE_SIZE as g, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_REQUESTS as h, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS as i };
+//# sourceMappingURL=computeLimits.js-CPfd6XdT.js.map

package/build/server/chunks/chunks/computeLimits.js-CPfd6XdT.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"computeLimits.js-CPfd6XdT.js","sources":["../../../../.svelte-kit/output/server/chunks/computeLimits.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { t as private_env } from \"./shared-server.js\";\nimport { w as lazyLogger } from \"./providers.server.js\";\nimport { n as resolveComputeLimits } from \"./limits.js\";\nimport \"./compute.js\";\n//#region src/lib/server/computeLimits.ts\n/**\n* Thin adapter over `@selvajs/server`'s `resolveComputeLimits`: reads SvelteKit's\n* dynamic private env once and re-exports the resolved values as named constants.\n*\n* Uses `$env/dynamic/private`, not bare `process.env`: under `vite dev`, Vite\n* loads `.env` into this module but does NOT mirror it into `process.env`, so a\n* raw `process.env[name]` is undefined in dev and every knob silently falls back\n* to its default regardless of `.env`.\n*\n* Client-side counterparts (in-flight compute throttle, slider debounce) are\n* bundled into the client and can't read env — see `async-throttle.ts` in\n* `@selvajs/solve/client` and the input components.\n*/\nvar limits = resolveComputeLimits(private_env, lazyLogger);\n/** The whole resolved object — passed wholesale to `SolveEngine` (`compute/engine.server.ts`). */\nvar computeLimits = limits;\nvar SOLVE_DEADLINE_MS = limits.solveDeadlineMs;\nvar RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = limits.rateLimitWindowMs;\nvar RATE_LIMIT_MAX_REQUESTS = limits.rateLimitMaxRequests;\nvar MAX_DEFINITION_FILE_SIZE = limits.maxDefinitionFileSize;\nvar MAX_IMAGE_FILE_SIZE = limits.maxImageFileSize;\nvar COMPUTE_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES = limits.computeRequestMaxBytes;\nvar COMPUTE_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES = limits.computeResponseMaxBytes;\nvar REMOTE_DEFINITION_MAX_BYTES = limits.remoteDefinitionMaxBytes;\nvar REMOTE_DEFINITION_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = limits.remoteDefinitionFetchTimeoutMs;\nvar REMOTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_TTL_MS = limits.remoteDefinitionCacheTtlMs;\nlimits.computeReuseDefinitionCache;\nlimits.computeServerCachesolve;\nlimits.computeCacheErroredSolves;\nlimits.computeMaxQueueDepth;\nlimits.computeQueueWaitMs;\nvar COMPUTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_BYTES = limits.computeDefinitionCacheBytes;\nvar COMPUTE_SOLVE_CACHE_BYTES = limits.computeSolveCacheBytes;\n//#endregion\nexport { MAX_DEFINITION_FILE_SIZE as a, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS as c, REMOTE_DEFINITION_MAX_BYTES as d, SOLVE_DEADLINE_MS as f, COMPUTE_SOLVE_CACHE_BYTES as i, REMOTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_TTL_MS as l, COMPUTE_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES as n, MAX_IMAGE_FILE_SIZE as o, computeLimits as p, COMPUTE_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES as r, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_REQUESTS as s, COMPUTE_DEFINITION_CACHE_BYTES as t, REMOTE_DEFINITION_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS as u };\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AAIA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;AAC1D;AACG,IAAC,aAAa,GAAG;AACjB,IAAC,iBAAiB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC5B,IAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC/B,IAAC,uBAAuB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAClC,IAAC,wBAAwB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACnC,IAAC,mBAAmB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC9B,IAAC,yBAAyB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACpC,IAAC,0BAA0B,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACrC,IAAC,2BAA2B,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACtC,IAAC,kCAAkC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC7C,IAAC,8BAA8B,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAC5C,MAAM,CAAC,2BAA2B;AAClC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB;AAC9B,MAAM,CAAC,yBAAyB;AAChC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB;AACtB,IAAC,8BAA8B,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACzC,IAAC,yBAAyB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;;;;"}