@sekyro/node 0.1.0-rc.1 → 0.1.0-rc.10

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,30 +1,35 @@
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  # @sekyro/node
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- Server SDK for [Sekyro](https://sekyro.ai) identity verification. Zero runtime
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- dependencies, Node.js ≥ 20, ESM + CommonJS, typed.
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+ Server SDK for [Sekyro AI](https://sekyro.ai) identity verification. One runtime
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+ dependency (`jose`, for result tokens), Node.js ≥ 20, ESM + CommonJS, typed.
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5
 
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- Two jobs, nothing else:
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+ Three jobs, nothing else:
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- 1. **Sessions** — create a verification session from your backend and read its
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+ 1. **Sessions**: create a verification session from your backend and read its
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  result. The API key never leaves your server.
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- 2. **Webhooks** — verify the `x-sekyro-signature` header on deliveries (the
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+ 2. **Webhooks**: verify the `x-sekyro-signature` header on deliveries (the
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  legacy `x-ibtikar-signature` name is still sent) and get a typed envelope
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  back.
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+ 3. **Result tokens**: verify the signed result token of a finished session
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+ (`verifyResultToken`) and read its level, assurance and outcome.
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  The SDK does **not** orchestrate checks or retry for you; the partner owns the
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  retry policy (`SekyroApiError.retryable` tells you when a retry is sensible).
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- **Integration guide:** [docs/partner/web-sdk.md](../../docs/partner/web-sdk.md)
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+ **Integration guide:** [Web SDK guide](https://docs.sekyro.ai/en/web/embedded-sdk)
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  (server-bound NNI, display vs authoritative results, webhook receivers for
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  Next.js and Express, billing). The hosted-flow path is in the
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- [quickstart](../../docs/partner/quickstart.md).
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+ [quickstart](https://docs.sekyro.ai/en/getting-started/quickstart).
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23
 
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  ## Install
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25
 
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  ```sh
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- npm install @sekyro/node
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+ npm install @sekyro/node@next
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  ```
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+ The SDK is licensed under the
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+ [Sekyro AI SDK License](https://sekyro.ai/legal/sdk-license).
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+
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  ## Sessions
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  ```ts
@@ -32,41 +37,193 @@ import { Sekyro } from "@sekyro/node";
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  const sekyro = new Sekyro({
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  apiKey: process.env.SEKYRO_API_KEY!,
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- // baseUrl: "https://api.sekyro.ai/api/v2", // default; use the staging origin for sandbox work
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+ // baseUrl: "https://api.sekyro.ai/api/v2", // default; use https://api-staging.sekyro.ai/api/v2 for sandbox work
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  // timeoutMs: 30_000, // default
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  });
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  // Throws `SekyroConfigError` (a TypeError; `code` = 'missing_api_key' | 'invalid_base_url')
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- // when apiKey is missing or baseUrl is not https: — plain http: is accepted only for
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- // localhost / 127.0.0.1 / [::1], since the API key rides on every request.
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+ // when apiKey is missing or baseUrl is not https: (plain http: is accepted only for
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+ // localhost / 127.0.0.1 / [::1], since the API key rides on every request).
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- // Create — returns the one-time client token your front end hands to @sekyro/web.
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- // `input.nni` BINDS the session to that identity: the browser never sends the
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- // NNI (a different one is refused with 409 nni_locked).
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+ // Create: returns the one-time client token your front end hands to @sekyro/web.
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+ // `flow` picks one of the app's flows (omit it for the default flow).
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+ // `subject.idNumber` BINDS the session to that identity: the browser never sends
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+ // the number (a different one is refused with 409 id_number_locked, formerly nni_locked).
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  const created = await sekyro.sessions.create(
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- { flow: "biometric", locale: "ar", input: { nni: "1357924632" } },
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+ {
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+ flow: "default",
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+ locale: "ar",
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+ subject: { idNumber: { type: "national_id", issuingCountry: "<ISO alpha-2>", number: "<id number>" } },
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+ },
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  { idempotencyKey: `signup:${userId}` },
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  );
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  created.id; // persist against your user before returning to the page
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  created.clientToken; // give this to the browser; it is returned ONCE
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  created.hostedUrl; // the hosted-flow link, if you use that path instead
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  created.expiresAt; // ISO 8601
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+ created.flow; // { id, slug, version }: the flow version the session runs
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+ created.subjectUse; // 'reference' | 'prefill': whether the flow believes or checks your subject data
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+ created.warnings; // one { code: 'deprecated_field', field, replacement } per deprecated key you sent
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66
 
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- // Read — the whitelisted session view (never contains the client token).
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+ // Read: the whitelisted session view (never contains the client token).
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68
  const session = await sekyro.sessions.get(created.id);
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  session.status; // 'created' | 'in_progress' | 'review_pending' | 'completed' | 'expired' | 'failed'
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  session.outcome; // 'approved' | 'review' | 'rejected' | null
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- session.steps; // [{ checkType, state, reason?, calibratedScore? }]
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+ session.flow; // { id: 'flw_…', slug: 'default', version: 3 }: the flow version the session runs
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+ session.steps; // [{ checkType, state, nodeId?, service?, handled?, reason?, calibratedScore? }]
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73
  ```
60
74
 
61
- Exactly one of `flow` or `templateId` must be given (the API rejects both or
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- neither with `400`). `input` carries the step anchors — `nni`, `phone`,
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- `fullName`, `birthDate`, all **strings** (an NNI is a 10-digit string, never a
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- number) — plus any further keys your flow needs; `input.nni` binds the session
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- to that identity.
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+ Your API key belongs to an **app**. The app's **flows**, designed in the Sekyro AI
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+ dashboard (app page → **Flows**), decide which steps run; a session runs the
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+ flow you name in `flow`, or the app's default flow. To list the published flows
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+ of the key's app, call `sekyro.listFlows()`: it resolves to
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+ `FlowSummary[]` (`[{ id, slug, name, version, isDefault }]`), the default flow
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+ first (`GET /api/v2/flows` under the hood, scope `sessions:create`;
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+ see the [quickstart](https://docs.sekyro.ai/en/getting-started/quickstart#choose-a-flow)).
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+ Every field is optional:
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+
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+ | field | meaning |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | `flow` | the flow's identifier (slug, e.g. `foreigners`) or id (`flw_…`); omit for the app's default flow. `404 flow_not_found`, `409 flow_not_published`, `409 flow_archived` |
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+ | `overrides` | `{ settings?, services? }`: changes the flow for this session only (see below; `403 override_widens_flow` for a looser change unless the flow allows it, `400 override_invalid` for an invalid one) |
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+ | `locale` | `ar`, `fr` or `en`: pins the hosted-flow language |
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+ | `ttlMinutes` | session lifetime, within the flow's link range (`400 ttl_out_of_policy` otherwise); omit for the flow default |
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+ | `subject` | what you know about the person: `idNumber` (`{ type, issuingCountry, number }`, binds the session), `fullName`, `names` (per script), `birthDate`, `birthPlace`, `sex`, `nationality`, `phone`, `email`, and for a reference record `photo`, `photoDate`, `fetchedAt`; your own id for them (`externalRef`), or `reuse` for a [returning user](#subjects). The flow decides whether the data is checked or believed (`created.subjectUse`) |
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+ | `input` | an open record of branch facts your flow's conditions read. Its person keys (`nni`, `phone`, `email`, `fullName`, `birthDate`, `suppliedIdentity`) are deprecated: send them in `subject` (`subject.nni` and `subject.documentNumber` are deprecated too, for `subject.idNumber`) |
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+ | `identityMethod` | `national_number`, `document_photo`, `document_chip` or `national_eid`: pre-chooses the option of the flow's identity choice |
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+ | `deliver` | `{ channel: "sms" \| "whatsapp", to: "+1555…" }`: also send the hosted link to the person |
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+
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+ ```ts
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+ // The app's flows (published only, default first): pick one at runtime.
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+ const flows = await sekyro.listFlows(); // [{ id, slug, name, version, isDefault }]
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+
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+ await sekyro.sessions.create({
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+ flow: "foreigners",
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+ overrides: {
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+ settings: { eligibility: { minAge: 21 } }, // general settings
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+ services: { liveness: { attempts: 2 } }, // per-service settings
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+ },
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+ });
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+ ```
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+
108
+ `overrides.settings` changes the flow's general settings (eligibility,
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+ decisions, data consistency, returning users, documents); `overrides.services`
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+ changes a service's settings, keyed by service id (`liveness`, `phone_otp`,
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+ `device_network`, …), or removes it with `'off'`. An override may only make
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+ the flow stricter unless the flow allows widening; turning a service `'off'`
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+ always widens. The changed paths come back on `session.overriddenFields`.
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+
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+ > **Sekyro flows breaking change.** The `profile` override is gone: use
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+ > `overrides`. `flow` is accepted again, now as the app's flow slug or id.
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+
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+ The session view also carries `failureReason` (a policy stop such as
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+ `location_not_allowed` or `underage`), `failureDetail` (why, when that reason
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+ is `camera_unavailable`: `denied` or `no_camera`), `overriddenFields`, `riskSignals`,
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+ `subjectId` / `externalRef`, `verifiedContacts`, `eid`, and the end user's
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+ `network` and `device`. A step with `handled: true` failed, but the flow's
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+ fallback took over.
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+
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+ Two more session calls:
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126
 
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- `sekyro.sessions` is a `SessionsApi` — exported as a type only; you get the
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+ - `sekyro.sessions.selectMethod(id, method)` chooses the identity method of a
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+ session on the person's behalf (`POST /sessions/:id/method`): `409 choice_locked`
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+ once the flow's identity choice can no longer change, `409 choice_option_unavailable`
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+ for a method the flow does not offer this session, `409 choice_not_found` when the
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+ flow has no identity choice.
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+ - `sekyro.sessions.portrait(id)` returns a 5-minute link to the ICAO portrait of
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+ a session whose `portrait_icao` check passed (`portraitAvailable`; scope
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+ `portrait:read`).
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+
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+ `sekyro.sessions` is a `SessionsApi`, exported as a type only: you get the
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137
  instance from the client, never by constructing one.
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138
 
139
+ ### Person data
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+
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+ Send what you know about the person in `subject`: `idNumber`
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+ (`{ type, issuingCountry, number }`), `fullName` or `names` (given, family and
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+ patronymic per ISO 15924 script), `birthDate`, `nationality`, `phone`, `email`,
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+ and for a flow that verifies identity from your data, `photo` and `fetchedAt`.
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+ The session's flow decides how Sekyro AI uses it, never the request: when a step
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+ reads partner-supplied data (an environment Sekyro AI set to the `supplied`
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+ mode), the record is the **reference** to believe; otherwise it is a
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+ **prefill** checked against what the person shows. `created.subjectUse` says
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+ which (`"reference"` or `"prefill"`). The rules, the trust table and every
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+ error are on the [Person data](https://docs.sekyro.ai/en/guides/person-data)
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+ page.
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+
153
+ ```ts
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+ // A prefill: the flow checks it against the registry or the document.
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+ await sekyro.sessions.create({
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+ subject: {
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+ externalRef: userId,
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+ idNumber: { type: "passport", issuingCountry: "<ISO alpha-2>", number: "<id number>" },
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+ birthDate: "<YYYY-MM-DD>",
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+ },
161
+ });
162
+ ```
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+
164
+ If your data comes from your own call to a national registry,
165
+ `subjectFromNationalRegistry()` converts that answer locally into the
166
+ reference keys. Sekyro AI treats the result as identity data supplied by your
167
+ organization: it makes no registry call, and it never receives or stores any
168
+ registry key.
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+
170
+ ```ts
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+ import { subjectFromNationalRegistry } from "@sekyro/node";
172
+
173
+ const answer = await myRegistryClient.lookup(idNumber); // your call, your key
174
+ const receivedAt = new Date();
175
+ const created = await sekyro.sessions.create({
176
+ subject: {
177
+ externalRef: userId,
178
+ // fetchedAt: when YOUR system received this answer (required; > 24 h old is refused)
179
+ ...subjectFromNationalRegistry("MR", answer, { fetchedAt: receivedAt }),
180
+ },
181
+ });
182
+ created.subjectUse; // "reference" in a supplied-mode environment whose flow reads it
183
+ ```
184
+
185
+ The first argument is the registry's country (ISO alpha-2) and types the
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+ answer: `"MR"` takes the ANRPTS `getPersonne` answer
187
+ (`AnrptsPersonneResponse`). The result is a `SubjectRecord`: `idNumber`,
188
+ `names` (one entry per script found), `birthDate`, `birthPlace`, `sex`,
189
+ `nationality` (alpha-2), `photo`, `photoDate` and `fetchedAt`. A record without
190
+ a number, a birth date, a photo or any name, or with an invalid `fetchedAt`,
191
+ throws `SekyroConfigError` `invalid_registry_record` naming the field (never
192
+ its value); a country without an adapter throws `registry_country_unsupported`.
193
+ An answer that states a nationality none of whose values the SDK can map throws
194
+ `registry_nationality_unmapped` (the message never carries the value): map it
195
+ yourself and pass `options.nationality` (ISO alpha-2), so the stated nationality
196
+ is never dropped.
197
+ `subjectFromNationalRegistry()` replaces `registryFromAnrpts()`.
198
+
199
+ Refusals of a reference, in this order: `403 supplied_identity_not_entitled`
200
+ (the environment is not in `supplied` mode), `422 subject_record_incomplete`
201
+ (`error.details.fields` names the missing keys), `422 subject_record_stale`
202
+ (obtained more than 24 h ago, or more than 5 min ahead) and
203
+ `422 subject_photo_unusable` (not a JPEG or PNG of at most 1 MB within the size
204
+ bounds). A `photo` on a session that cannot use it (a prefill, a returning
205
+ user) answers `422 subject_photo_not_used`.
206
+
207
+ No face processing runs at create. The face on the supplied photo is checked after
208
+ the person consents, at the face match: a photo without one usable face fails that
209
+ step with `no_face_reference` (or `low_quality_reference`). That step runs after liveness, so check
210
+ that the photo shows exactly one clear face before you send it.
211
+
212
+ Partner-supplied identity data is not billed: the identity step in `supplied` mode
213
+ records no usage event (other steps, such as the face match, bill as usual).
214
+
215
+ **Deprecated keys.** `input.nni`, `input.fullName`, `input.birthDate`,
216
+ `input.phone`, `input.email`, `input.suppliedIdentity`, `subject.nni`,
217
+ `subject.documentNumber`, `subject.reuse.nni` and `subject.reuse.document`
218
+ still work. A create that uses one gets a `Deprecation` header and one
219
+ `created.warnings` entry per key (`{ code: "deprecated_field", field,
220
+ replacement }`). The step reasons and codes about the number get generic names
221
+ (`registry_record_not_found` for `nni_not_found`, `id_number_locked` for
222
+ `nni_locked`, `document_id_number_mismatch` for `document_nni_mismatch`, ...):
223
+ the API still sends the previous names, so accept both. The full migration
224
+ table is on the [Person data](https://docs.sekyro.ai/en/guides/person-data#deprecated-keys)
225
+ page.
226
+
70
227
  ### Errors
71
228
 
72
229
  Every non-2xx response, network failure and timeout throws `SekyroApiError`:
@@ -77,20 +234,89 @@ Every non-2xx response, network failure and timeout throws `SekyroApiError`:
77
234
  | `code` | API error code, or `network` / `timeout` / `http_error` / `malformed_response` |
78
235
  | `message` | human-readable, from the API when available |
79
236
  | `requestId` | the API's `request_id`, quote it to support |
237
+ | `details` | the API's `error.details` when sent, else `undefined`; typed for the flow codes through `isFlowError()` |
80
238
  | `retryable` | `true` for `network`, `timeout`, `429`, `5xx` and `idempotency_in_progress` |
239
+ | `retryAfterSeconds` | seconds to wait from the response's `Retry-After` header (seconds or an HTTP date), else `undefined` |
81
240
 
82
241
  ```ts
83
242
  import { SekyroApiError } from "@sekyro/node";
84
243
 
85
244
  try {
86
- await sekyro.sessions.create({ flow: "onboarding" });
245
+ await sekyro.sessions.create({ subject: { idNumber } });
87
246
  } catch (err) {
88
247
  if (err instanceof SekyroApiError && err.retryable) {
89
- // back off and retry with the SAME idempotencyKey
248
+ // wait err.retryAfterSeconds when set, else back off; retry with the SAME idempotencyKey
90
249
  }
91
250
  }
92
251
  ```
93
252
 
253
+ Flow codes (`SekyroFlowErrorCode`) carry machine-readable `details`:
254
+ `details.issues[]` (`{ code, message, path?, nodeId?, service?, field? }`,
255
+ never a value you sent), plus `fields` on `override_widens_flow` and `flow`
256
+ (`{ id, slug }`) on `flow_not_published`, `flow_archived` and `reuse_disabled`.
257
+ `isFlowError(err, ...codes)` narrows `err.details` to the code's shape; it
258
+ returns `false` when the details are missing or not in that shape, so read
259
+ `err.code` as the fallback.
260
+
261
+ | code | from | `details` |
262
+ |---|---|---|
263
+ | `404 flow_not_found` | `sessions.create` | `issues` (`path: "flow"`) |
264
+ | `409 flow_not_published`, `409 flow_archived` | `sessions.create` | `issues`, `flow` |
265
+ | `400 override_invalid` | `sessions.create` | `issues`, one per problem (`path: "overrides.services.liveness.attempts"`, …) |
266
+ | `403 override_widens_flow` | `sessions.create` | `issues` (`field_widens_flow`), `fields` |
267
+ | `409 reuse_disabled` | `sessions.create` with `subject.reuse` | `issues`, `flow` |
268
+ | `409 choice_not_found`, `choice_locked`, `choice_option_unavailable` | `sessions.selectMethod` | `issues` |
269
+
270
+ ```ts
271
+ import { isFlowError } from "@sekyro/node";
272
+
273
+ try {
274
+ await sekyro.sessions.create({ flow: "foreigners", overrides });
275
+ } catch (err) {
276
+ if (isFlowError(err, "override_widens_flow")) {
277
+ console.warn("widening refused", err.details.fields);
278
+ } else if (isFlowError(err, "override_invalid")) {
279
+ for (const issue of err.details.issues) console.warn(issue.path, issue.message);
280
+ } else throw err;
281
+ }
282
+ ```
283
+
284
+ ## Subjects
285
+
286
+ A **subject** is the same person across all of your apps. Reads need the
287
+ `subjects:read` scope; `revoke` and `delete` need `subjects:write` (keys minted
288
+ from the dashboard carry both; mint a new key if an older one answers
289
+ `403 insufficient_scope`).
290
+
291
+ ```ts
292
+ const subject = await sekyro.subjects.get(subjectId);
293
+ subject.status; // 'active' | 'revoked'
294
+ subject.reference; // { source: 'registry' | 'doc_registry' | 'chip' | 'document', capturedAt } | null
295
+ subject.assurance; // 'registry_biometric' | 'chip_biometric' | 'document_biometric' | 'registry_only' | 'document_only' | null
296
+ subject.returningReady; // a returning-user session can be created now
297
+ subject.level; // the highest level proved: 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 (0 once revoked), null before any, absent on an older API
298
+
299
+ const recent = await sekyro.sessions.list({ externalRef: userId, status: "completed" }); // newest first, at most 100; filters re-applied client-side
300
+
301
+ const [byRef] = await sekyro.subjects.list({ externalRef: userId });
302
+
303
+ // Returning user: liveness + face match against the stored reference photo.
304
+ // Name exactly one of subjectId, externalRef or idNumber (nni and document are deprecated).
305
+ await sekyro.sessions.create({ subject: { reuse: { subjectId } } });
306
+
307
+ // The same in one call, with a mode: `recheck` (verify the same person again)
308
+ // or `step_up` (raise a level 1 subject to identity level). A 24-hex string is
309
+ // a subject id; anything else is your external reference.
310
+ await sekyro.subjects.createSession(userId, { mode: "step_up", flow: "identity" });
311
+
312
+ await sekyro.subjects.revoke(subjectId, { reason: "account closed" }); // idempotent
313
+ await sekyro.subjects.delete(subjectId); // photos, face templates and identifiers; cannot be undone
314
+ ```
315
+
316
+ `subject.enrolled` (first reference photo stored), `subject.updated` (a linked
317
+ session finished, or `status: 'revoked'`) and `subject.deleted` webhooks are
318
+ typed on the envelope.
319
+
94
320
  ## Webhooks
95
321
 
96
322
  Verify with the **raw** request body (bytes as received, before any JSON
@@ -112,13 +338,13 @@ app.post("/webhooks/sekyro", express.raw({ type: "application/json" }), (req, re
112
338
  switch (envelope.event) {
113
339
  case "session.completed":
114
340
  case "session.failed":
115
- envelope.data; // SessionLifecycleEventData — { sessionId, status, outcome, steps }
341
+ envelope.data; // SessionLifecycleEventData: { sessionId, status, outcome, flow, steps, … }
116
342
  break;
117
343
  case "session.review_decided":
118
- envelope.data; // SessionReviewDecidedEventData — { sessionId, outcome: 'pass' | 'fail', reason }
344
+ envelope.data; // SessionReviewDecidedEventData: { sessionId, outcome: 'pass' | 'fail', reason, flow }
119
345
  break;
120
346
  case "session.step.completed":
121
- envelope.data; // SessionStepCompletedEventData — { sessionId, checkType, state }
347
+ envelope.data; // SessionStepCompletedEventData: { sessionId, checkType, state, nodeId, service, flow }
122
348
  break;
123
349
  }
124
350
  res.sendStatus(200);
@@ -130,7 +356,7 @@ app.post("/webhooks/sekyro", express.raw({ type: "application/json" }), (req, re
130
356
  ```
131
357
 
132
358
  - The header is `t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>[,v1=<hex>]`. During a secret
133
- rotation Sekyro signs with both the current and the previous secret, so the
359
+ rotation Sekyro AI signs with both the current and the previous secret, so the
134
360
  delivery is accepted when **any** `v1` matches the secret you hold.
135
361
  - **Header names.** Deliveries carry the signature in `x-sekyro-signature`
136
362
  (`SEKYRO_SIGNATURE_HEADER`) and, for the transition, the identical legacy
@@ -144,7 +370,164 @@ app.post("/webhooks/sekyro", express.raw({ type: "application/json" }), (req, re
144
370
  `stale`; pass `{ now }` to inject a clock in tests.
145
371
  - Retried deliveries carry the same envelope `id`; de-duplicate on it.
146
372
 
373
+ ## Result tokens
374
+
375
+ A finished session carries a short-lived ES256 JWT: `resultToken` on the
376
+ `session.completed` and `session.failed` webhooks, or on demand with
377
+ `sekyro.sessions.resultToken(id)`. Verify it against the public key set before
378
+ trusting it:
379
+
380
+ ```ts
381
+ import { verifyResultToken, SekyroResultTokenError } from "@sekyro/node";
382
+
383
+ const result = await verifyResultToken(token, { appId: process.env.SEKYRO_APP_ID!, env: "live" });
384
+ result.level; // 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | null (1 human, 2 identity, 3 corroborated)
385
+ result.assurance; // 'live_only' | 'document_biometric' | 'registry_biometric' | ...
386
+ result.outcome; // 'approved' | 'rejected' | ...
387
+ result.subjectId; // the person, when known
388
+ ```
389
+
390
+ - Keys come from `https://api.sekyro.ai/.well-known/sekyro/jwks.json` and are
391
+ cached for 10 minutes; an unknown key id fetches the set again.
392
+ - `aud` must be your app id (pass an array to accept several; `result.appId`
393
+ says which), and the token expires 10 minutes after signing.
394
+ - Sandbox tokens are signed with sandbox keys (`sbx-` key ids); pass
395
+ `env: "live"` to refuse them in production.
396
+ - Failures throw `SekyroResultTokenError` with a `code`: `invalid_token`,
397
+ `expired`, `wrong_audience`, `wrong_issuer`, `wrong_env`,
398
+ `key_env_mismatch`, `jwks_unavailable` or `invalid_options`.
399
+
400
+ When the flow sets a minimum age, `result.age` is `{ over, method }` from the
401
+ `sekyro.age` claim: `over` is the flow's minimum age (never the person's age)
402
+ and `method` says how it was proved (`estimated` by the age check (selfie)
403
+ step, or `document`, `chip`, `registry`, `eid`). The token never carries the
404
+ estimated age; with the step's "Keep and show the estimated age" setting on,
405
+ `estimate` and `sigma` arrive on the session (`sekyro.sessions.get`) and the
406
+ `session.completed` / `session.failed` webhooks only. To carry the answer into
407
+ an identity provider, map it to the claims `sekyro_age_over` (`result.age.over`)
408
+ and `sekyro_age_method` (`result.age.method`).
409
+
410
+ ## Connect
411
+
412
+ `@sekyro/node/connect` carries the Sekyro proof into your auth provider as one
413
+ small claim, `sekyro`, on the provider's user, and gates routes on it. A
414
+ provider package supplies the adapter that reads and writes the claim
415
+ (`@sekyro/connect-zitadel`, `@sekyro/connect-supabase`, `@sekyro/connect-clerk`,
416
+ `@sekyro/connect-auth0`, `@sekyro/connect-firebase`, `@sekyro/connect-keycloak`); any object with the
417
+ `ProviderAdapter` shape works too. Nothing else to install: the subpaths ship
418
+ inside `@sekyro/node`.
419
+
420
+ ```ts
421
+ import { Sekyro } from "@sekyro/node";
422
+ import { createConnector } from "@sekyro/node/connect";
423
+
424
+ const connector = createConnector({
425
+ sekyro: new Sekyro({ apiKey: process.env.SEKYRO_API_KEY! }),
426
+ appId: process.env.SEKYRO_APP_ID!, // or an array of app ids
427
+ env: "live",
428
+ webhookSecret: process.env.SEKYRO_WEBHOOK_SECRET!,
429
+ provider, // from a provider package
430
+ onUserDeleted: "ignore", // 'ignore' | 'revoke' | 'delete'
431
+ });
432
+
433
+ // Start a verification for your user: their id becomes the session's externalRef.
434
+ const session = await connector.start(userId, { returnUrl, state });
435
+ // Store session.id with the state: the return must name this session.
436
+ // Later: connector.recheck(userId) or connector.stepUp(userId, { flow: "identity" }).
437
+ ```
438
+
439
+ The webhook route writes the claim. Mount it on the raw body:
440
+
441
+ ```ts
442
+ import express from "express";
443
+ import { SekyroResultTokenError, SekyroWebhookError } from "@sekyro/node";
444
+ import { SekyroConnectError } from "@sekyro/node/connect";
445
+
446
+ app.post("/webhooks/sekyro", express.raw({ type: "application/json" }), async (req, res) => {
447
+ try {
448
+ await connector.webhook((req.body as Buffer).toString("utf8"), req.headers);
449
+ res.sendStatus(200);
450
+ } catch (err) {
451
+ if (err instanceof SekyroWebhookError || err instanceof SekyroResultTokenError || err instanceof SekyroConnectError) {
452
+ // `unavailable`: the key set is unreachable, a 503 makes Sekyro retry. Anything else is refused: 400.
453
+ res.status(err instanceof SekyroConnectError && err.code === "unavailable" ? 503 : 400).send(err.code);
454
+ return;
455
+ }
456
+ throw err;
457
+ }
458
+ });
459
+
460
+ // The return URL: check `state` and the session id against the values you stored, then
461
+ // sync reads the session and its signed result token server-side (a session of another
462
+ // app, or created without one, is refused).
463
+ await connector.sync(userId, sessionIdFromQuery);
464
+ ```
465
+
466
+ Gate a route on the claim in the session token (no network call):
467
+
468
+ ```ts
469
+ import { requireLevel } from "@sekyro/node/connect/express";
470
+
471
+ app.get(
472
+ "/payouts",
473
+ requireLevel(connector, { level: 2, maxAgeDays: 365 }, { claims: (req) => (req as { auth?: Record<string, unknown> }).auth }),
474
+ handler,
475
+ );
476
+ // Fails with 403 { error: "sekyro_gate", reason, action }; action is verify | step_up | recheck | block.
477
+ // Next.js: sekyroGate() and gateRoute() from "@sekyro/node/connect/next".
478
+ ```
479
+
480
+ The claim (unix seconds; never a name, a document number, a photo or a score):
481
+
482
+ ```json
483
+ { "v": 1, "level": 2, "assurance": "document_biometric", "verified_at": 1790000000, "rechecked_at": 1790003600,
484
+ "session_id": "<session id>", "subject_id": "<subject id>", "env": "live", "flags": ["face_mismatch"] }
485
+ ```
486
+
487
+ Trust rules:
488
+
489
+ - A webhook writes only after its HMAC signature verified; retries are de-duplicated on the envelope id, which is never left recorded for a delivery whose handling failed (see the `store` contract in the guide).
490
+ - A key set outage while checking a result token throws `SekyroConnectError` with code `unavailable`: answer `503` so Sekyro retries, and `400` for every other refusal.
491
+ - When the webhook carries a result token it must verify too (audience, environment, same session, same user), and it is the source of the level, the assurance and the time.
492
+ - The return URL is a hint: store the session id with your `state` at start and compare both on return; `sync` then reads the session and its signed result token with your API key, verifies the token (your app ids, your environment) and refuses a session of another user, of another app or created without one.
493
+ - Every input goes through one merge: a failed attempt never erases a proof, a weaker proof never lowers the level, an older result never overwrites a newer one, and a result from the other environment is refused.
494
+ - Writes for one user are serialised: each one reads the stored claim, merges and writes it back through the adapter's optional `update` when it has one (the Firebase adapter does), otherwise under a lock per user inside the connector. That lock is per process: two server instances can still interleave for one user, and a re-check result read just before a revocation could write over it. When that matters, send the webhook route to one instance or queue its deliveries per user id.
495
+ - A revocation or deletion of the subject sets the level to 0 with the `revoked` flag (a claim stored without `subject_id` too, when the event's `externalRefs` include the user's id); the gate blocks `revoked` and `face_mismatch` by default. A revoked claim stays revoked: a later result of the same subject, or one without a subject id, is `revoked_ignored`; only an approved session of another subject writes a level again.
496
+
497
+ Telemetry: the six Sekyro provider packages tell Sekyro the connector is wired, so the dashboard's
498
+ Connectors page can show it as connected. Every API call carries an `x-sekyro-connector` header
499
+ (`<provider>/<version>`), and after each claim write, and each revocation the connector could not
500
+ resolve to a user (`revocation_unresolved`), it posts an event with ids only: the event type, the
501
+ provider, the session id, the subject id and the time. Never the claim, a token, a secret or user
502
+ data. Events go in the background with a 2-second timeout and no retry, and never slow or fail a
503
+ webhook. A custom adapter sends nothing. Turn both off with `telemetry: false`:
504
+
505
+ ```ts
506
+ const connector = createConnector({ /* ... */ provider, telemetry: false });
507
+ ```
508
+
509
+ Outside a connector, `new Sekyro({ apiKey, connector: { provider, version } })` sends the same header.
510
+
511
+ Revocations it cannot resolve: when Sekyro revokes or deletes a subject and the connector finds no
512
+ user for it (no `externalRefs`, no `store` entry), no claim is cleared and the connector logs
513
+ `revocation_unresolved`. Pass `onRevocationUnresolved` to act on it. The event carries ids only
514
+ (`subjectId`, `provider`, `reason`: `revoked` or `deleted`), never provider data. It runs after the
515
+ log line and telemetry event, in the background; a throw or rejection is caught and reported to
516
+ `logger` as `revocation_handler_failed`.
517
+
518
+ ```ts
519
+ const connector = createConnector({
520
+ /* ... */
521
+ provider,
522
+ onRevocationUnresolved: async ({ subjectId, reason }) => {
523
+ // Find the user for subjectId and remove their access.
524
+ },
525
+ });
526
+ ```
527
+
528
+ The full guide, with the Zitadel and Supabase setups, is in [Auth connectors](https://docs.sekyro.ai/en/connectors/overview).
529
+
147
530
  ## Compatibility
148
531
 
149
- Only `node:crypto` and the global `fetch` are used. You can inject a `fetch`
532
+ Only `node:crypto`, the global `fetch` and `jose` (result tokens) are used. You can inject a `fetch`
150
533
  implementation via `new Sekyro({ fetch })` for tests or custom agents.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ var CLAIM_VERSION=1,KNOWN_FLAGS=["face_mismatch","duplicate","revoked"];function isRecord(v){return typeof v=="object"&&v!==null&&!Array.isArray(v)}function isFiniteNumber(v){return typeof v=="number"&&Number.isFinite(v)}function build(c){let out={v:1,level:c.level,assurance:c.assurance,verified_at:c.verified_at};c.rechecked_at!==void 0&&(out.rechecked_at=c.rechecked_at),out.session_id=c.session_id,c.subject_id!==void 0&&(out.subject_id=c.subject_id),out.env=c.env;let flags=new Set;for(let f of c.flags??[])KNOWN_FLAGS.includes(f)&&flags.add(f);return flags.size>0&&(out.flags=[...flags].sort()),out}function parseClaim(value){let v=value;if(typeof v=="string")try{v=JSON.parse(v)}catch{return null}if(!isRecord(v)||!isFiniteNumber(v.v))return null;if(v.v>1)return v;if(v.v!==1)return null;let level=v.level;return level!==0&&level!==1&&level!==2&&level!==3||typeof v.assurance!="string"||!isFiniteNumber(v.verified_at)||typeof v.session_id!="string"||v.env!=="live"&&v.env!=="sandbox"?null:build({level,assurance:v.assurance,verified_at:v.verified_at,rechecked_at:isFiniteNumber(v.rechecked_at)?v.rechecked_at:void 0,session_id:v.session_id,subject_id:typeof v.subject_id=="string"?v.subject_id:void 0,env:v.env,flags:Array.isArray(v.flags)?v.flags:void 0})}function toUnix(isoTime,now){let ms=Date.parse(isoTime);return Math.floor((Number.isFinite(ms)?ms:now())/1e3)}var same=(claim,rule)=>({claim,changed:!1,rule}),wrote=(claim,rule)=>({claim,changed:!0,rule});function mergeClaim(previous,event,opts){let now=opts.now??Date.now,prev=parseClaim(previous);if(prev&&prev.v>1)return same(prev,"unsupported_version");if(event.kind==="revoked"||event.kind==="deleted"){if(!prev)return same(null,"no_change");if(!(prev.subject_id===void 0?event.userInExternalRefs===!0:prev.subject_id===event.subjectId))return same(prev,"subject_mismatch");if(prev.level===0&&prev.flags?.includes("revoked"))return same(prev,"no_change");let{rechecked_at:_cleared,...kept}=prev;return wrote(build({...kept,level:0,subject_id:event.subjectId,flags:["revoked"]}),"revoked")}let r=event.result;if(r.env!==opts.env)return same(prev,"env_mismatch");let t=toUnix(r.verifiedAt,now);if(prev&&t<prev.verified_at)return same(prev,"stale_ignored");let revokedPrev=prev?.flags?.includes("revoked")===!0;if(prev&&revokedPrev&&(r.subjectId===void 0||r.subjectId===prev.subject_id))return same(prev,"revoked_ignored");if(r.outcome==="rejected"&&r.subjectConflict===!0)return!prev||prev.flags?.includes("face_mismatch")?same(prev,"no_change"):wrote(build({...prev,flags:[...prev.flags??[],"face_mismatch"]}),"face_mismatch");if(r.outcome!=="approved"||r.level===null||r.level===0)return same(prev,"not_approved");let level=r.level,assurance=r.assurance??"none",duplicate=r.duplicates===!0?["duplicate"]:[];if(!prev)return wrote(build({level,assurance,verified_at:t,session_id:r.sessionId,subject_id:r.subjectId,env:r.env,flags:duplicate}),"created");if(!revokedPrev&&(r.reuseMode==="recheck"||r.returning===!0&&level<=prev.level))return prev.rechecked_at!==void 0&&t<=prev.rechecked_at?same(prev,t<prev.rechecked_at?"stale_ignored":"no_change"):wrote(build({...prev,rechecked_at:t,subject_id:prev.subject_id??r.subjectId}),"rechecked");if(level>prev.level){let kept=(prev.flags??[]).filter(f=>f!=="face_mismatch"&&f!=="revoked");return wrote(build({...prev,level,assurance,verified_at:t,session_id:r.sessionId,subject_id:r.subjectId??prev.subject_id,flags:[...kept,...duplicate]}),"raised")}return level===prev.level&&t>prev.verified_at?wrote(build({...prev,assurance,verified_at:t,session_id:r.sessionId,subject_id:prev.subject_id??r.subjectId,flags:[...prev.flags??[],...duplicate]}),"renewed"):same(prev,"no_change")}var DEFAULT_DENY_FLAGS=["revoked","face_mismatch"],fail=(reason,action,claim)=>({ok:!1,reason,action,claim});function evaluateGate(claim,policy,nowSec=Math.floor(Date.now()/1e3)){let parsed=parseClaim(claim);if(!parsed)return fail("no_claim","verify",null);if(parsed.v>1)return fail("unsupported_version","verify",parsed);if(policy.env!==void 0&&parsed.env!==policy.env)return fail("wrong_env","verify",parsed);let deny=policy.denyFlags??DEFAULT_DENY_FLAGS;return parsed.flags?.some(f=>deny.includes(f))?fail("flagged","block",parsed):parsed.level<policy.level?fail("level_too_low",parsed.level>=1?"step_up":"verify",parsed):policy.maxAgeDays!==void 0&&nowSec-parsed.verified_at>policy.maxAgeDays*86400?fail("stale","recheck",parsed):policy.maxRecheckAgeMinutes!==void 0&&nowSec-(parsed.rechecked_at??parsed.verified_at)>policy.maxRecheckAgeMinutes*60?fail("recheck_stale","recheck",parsed):policy.assurance&&!policy.assurance.includes(parsed.assurance)?fail("assurance_not_allowed","step_up",parsed):{ok:!0,claim:parsed}}export{CLAIM_VERSION,parseClaim,mergeClaim,evaluateGate};
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ import{evaluateGate}from"./chunk-O5GJ3YJV.js";function sekyroGate(source,tokenClaims,policy){let claims=tokenClaims??{};if("gate"in source)return source.gate(claims,policy);let effective=source.env!==void 0&&policy.env===void 0?{...policy,env:source.env}:policy;return evaluateGate(source.provider.readClaimFromToken(claims),effective)}function gateRoute(result,routes){if(result.ok)return null;switch(result.action){case"verify":return routes.verify;case"step_up":return routes.stepUp;case"recheck":return routes.recheck;case"block":return routes.block}}export{sekyroGate,gateRoute};