@seasonkoh/webaz 0.1.24 → 0.1.25

package/dist/layer1-agent/L1-2-external-anchor/anchor-engine.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
  */
 import crypto from 'crypto';
 import { generateId } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/schema.js';
+import { dbOne, dbAll } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/db.js'; // RFC-016 异步 seam(纯读)
 export function initExternalAnchorSchema(db) {
     db.exec(`
     CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS external_anchors (
@@ -164,14 +165,15 @@ export function createAnchor(db, args) {
   `).run(id, args.sellerId, args.productId || null, args.platform, args.externalUrl, canonJson, contentHash, signature, args.sellerNodeUrl || null, fee);
     return { id, content_hash: contentHash, signature, verification_fee: fee };
 }
-export function verifyAnchorSignature(db, anchorId) {
-    const r = db.prepare('SELECT seller_id, canonical_json, content_hash, signature FROM external_anchors WHERE id = ?').get(anchorId);
+// RFC-016 Phase 1:纯读 → 异步 seam(db 参数保留签名兼容;调用点 external-anchors.ts 均 inTx=false,无引擎内写调用)。
+export async function verifyAnchorSignature(_db, anchorId) {
+    const r = await dbOne('SELECT seller_id, canonical_json, content_hash, signature FROM external_anchors WHERE id = ?', [anchorId]);
     if (!r)
         return { ok: false, reason: 'not_found' };
     const reHash = sha256Hex(r.canonical_json);
     if (reHash !== r.content_hash)
         return { ok: false, reason: 'content_hash_mismatch' };
-    const seller = db.prepare('SELECT api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(r.seller_id);
+    const seller = await dbOne('SELECT api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?', [r.seller_id]);
     if (!seller)
         return { ok: false, reason: 'seller_not_found' };
     const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', seller.api_key).update(r.canonical_json).digest('hex');
@@ -307,18 +309,18 @@ export function distributeAnchorRewards(db, anchorId) {
     })();
     return Math.round(actualPaid * 100) / 100;
 }
-export function getAnchor(db, anchorId) {
-    const row = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM external_anchors WHERE id = ?').get(anchorId);
+export async function getAnchor(_db, anchorId) {
+    const row = await dbOne('SELECT * FROM external_anchors WHERE id = ?', [anchorId]);
     if (!row)
         return null;
-    const verifs = db.prepare('SELECT id, verifier_id, verifier_role, content_matches, token_found, verified_at FROM external_anchor_verifications WHERE anchor_id = ? ORDER BY verified_at DESC LIMIT 20').all(anchorId);
+    const verifs = await dbAll('SELECT id, verifier_id, verifier_role, content_matches, token_found, verified_at FROM external_anchor_verifications WHERE anchor_id = ? ORDER BY verified_at DESC LIMIT 20', [anchorId]);
     return { ...row, verifications: verifs };
 }
-export function listAnchorsByProduct(db, productId) {
-    return db.prepare(`SELECT id, seller_id, platform, external_url, content_hash, ownership_verified, verify_count, seller_node_url, posted_at, revoked
-                     FROM external_anchors WHERE product_id = ? AND revoked = 0 ORDER BY posted_at DESC`).all(productId);
+export async function listAnchorsByProduct(_db, productId) {
+    return await dbAll(`SELECT id, seller_id, platform, external_url, content_hash, ownership_verified, verify_count, seller_node_url, posted_at, revoked
+                     FROM external_anchors WHERE product_id = ? AND revoked = 0 ORDER BY posted_at DESC`, [productId]);
 }
-export function listAnchorsBySeller(db, sellerId) {
-    return db.prepare(`SELECT id, product_id, platform, external_url, content_hash, ownership_verified, verify_count, seller_node_url, posted_at, revoked
-                     FROM external_anchors WHERE seller_id = ? ORDER BY revoked ASC, posted_at DESC LIMIT 200`).all(sellerId);
+export async function listAnchorsBySeller(_db, sellerId) {
+    return await dbAll(`SELECT id, product_id, platform, external_url, content_hash, ownership_verified, verify_count, seller_node_url, posted_at, revoked
+                     FROM external_anchors WHERE seller_id = ? ORDER BY revoked ASC, posted_at DESC LIMIT 200`, [sellerId]);
 }

package/dist/layer2-business/L2-6-notifications/notification-engine.js

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * PWA 通过 SSE 实时接收；Agent 通过 dcp_notifications 工具轮询。
  */
 import { generateId } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/schema.js';
+import { dbOne, dbAll } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/db.js'; // RFC-016 异步 seam(纯读)
 // ─── Schema 初始化 ────────────────────────────────────────────
 export function initNotificationSchema(db) {
     db.exec(`
@@ -206,14 +207,16 @@ export function createNotification(db, userId, orderId, type, title, body) {
     return notif;
 }
 // ─── 查询 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-export function getNotifications(db, userId, onlyUnread = false, limit = 30) {
+// RFC-016 Phase 1:纯读 → 异步 seam。db 参数保留(签名兼容),内部走 dbAll/dbOne(同实例,setSeamDb)。
+// 调用点全部已确认不在 db.transaction 内(notifications.ts:43/60/61 + mcp server.ts:2770/2771)。
+export async function getNotifications(_db, userId, onlyUnread = false, limit = 30) {
     const sql = `SELECT * FROM notifications WHERE user_id = ?${onlyUnread ? ' AND read = 0' : ''}
     ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?`;
-    return db.prepare(sql).all(userId, limit);
+    return await dbAll(sql, [userId, limit]);
 }
-export function getUnreadCount(db, userId) {
-    const row = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM notifications WHERE user_id = ? AND read = 0').get(userId);
-    return row.n;
+export async function getUnreadCount(_db, userId) {
+    const row = await dbOne('SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM notifications WHERE user_id = ? AND read = 0', [userId]);
+    return row?.n ?? 0;
 }
 export function markRead(db, userId, notifId) {
     if (notifId) {

package/dist/layer2-business/L2-7-snf/snf-engine.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 import crypto from 'crypto';
 import { generateId } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/schema.js';
+import { dbOne, dbAll } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/db.js'; // RFC-016 异步 seam(纯读)
 export const SNF_TTL_DAYS = 30;
 export const SNF_MAX_PAYLOAD = 32 * 1024; // 32KB 单条上限（大附件走 manifest_registry，SNF 只传 hash）
 export const SNF_MAX_RETRIES = 5; // pull → nack 累计超过此次数 → 自动 dead-letter
@@ -115,8 +116,9 @@ export function snfSend(db, args) {
 }
 // 只读 list — 列出我作为收件人的近期消息（含已 delivered，TTL 内）
 // 用于 UI 显示。不消费 — 刷新 / 重进页面都能看到。
-export function snfListInbox(db, userId, limit = 80, sinceDays = 30) {
-    const rows = db.prepare(`
+// RFC-016 Phase 1:纯读 → 异步 seam(db 参数保留签名兼容;调用点 snf.ts 均 inTx=false,无引擎内写调用)。
+export async function snfListInbox(_db, userId, limit = 80, sinceDays = 30) {
+    const rows = await dbAll(`
     SELECT id, sender_id, message_type, payload, signature, created_at, delivered_at, priority, related_order_id
       FROM snf_messages
      WHERE recipient_id = ?
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ export function snfListInbox(db, userId, limit = 80, sinceDays = 30) {
        AND datetime(created_at)  > datetime('now', ?)
      ORDER BY priority DESC, created_at DESC
      LIMIT ?
-  `).all(userId, '-' + sinceDays + ' days', limit);
+  `, [userId, '-' + sinceDays + ' days', limit]);
     return rows.map(r => ({
         id: r.id,
         sender_id: r.sender_id,
@@ -221,14 +223,14 @@ export function snfNack(db, userId, msgIds, error) {
     return { reopened, deadLettered };
 }
 // 列出死信消息（人工 review 用 — admin / agent 异常排查）
-export function snfListDeadLetter(db, userId, limit = 50) {
-    return db.prepare(`
+export async function snfListDeadLetter(_db, userId, limit = 50) {
+    return await dbAll(`
     SELECT id, sender_id, message_type, delivery_attempts, last_error, last_attempt_at, created_at, related_order_id
       FROM snf_messages
      WHERE recipient_id = ? AND dead_letter = 1
      ORDER BY last_attempt_at DESC NULLS LAST, created_at DESC
      LIMIT ?
-  `).all(userId, limit);
+  `, [userId, limit]);
 }
 // 死信复活：清零 attempts + dead_letter + delivered_at，重新进 active 队列
 // 用于：手动审查发现 transient 错误后想再试
@@ -244,18 +246,18 @@ export function snfRevive(db, userId, msgId) {
     return { ok: true };
 }
 // 查看 inbox 未读数（不消费）
-export function snfPendingCount(db, userId) {
-    const r = db.prepare(`SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM snf_messages WHERE recipient_id = ? AND delivered_at IS NULL AND dead_letter = 0 AND datetime(expires_at) > datetime('now')`).get(userId);
-    return r.n;
+export async function snfPendingCount(_db, userId) {
+    const r = await dbOne(`SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM snf_messages WHERE recipient_id = ? AND delivered_at IS NULL AND dead_letter = 0 AND datetime(expires_at) > datetime('now')`, [userId]);
+    return r?.n ?? 0;
 }
 // 验证签名（用 sender 当时的 api_key — 若 key 旋转过则失败）
-export function snfVerify(db, msgId) {
-    const r = db.prepare(`SELECT sender_id, payload, signature FROM snf_messages WHERE id = ?`).get(msgId);
+export async function snfVerify(_db, msgId) {
+    const r = await dbOne(`SELECT sender_id, payload, signature FROM snf_messages WHERE id = ?`, [msgId]);
     if (!r)
         return { ok: false, reason: 'not_found' };
     if (!r.signature)
         return { ok: false, reason: 'no_signature' };
-    const sender = db.prepare('SELECT api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(r.sender_id);
+    const sender = await dbOne('SELECT api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?', [r.sender_id]);
     if (!sender)
         return { ok: false, reason: 'sender_gone' };
     const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', sender.api_key).update(r.payload).digest('hex');
@@ -268,8 +270,8 @@ export function snfDesignate(db, userId, peers) {
     ON CONFLICT(user_id) DO UPDATE SET snf_peers = excluded.snf_peers, updated_at = datetime('now')
   `).run(userId, JSON.stringify(peers.slice(0, 5))); // 上限 5 个
 }
-export function snfGetDesignation(db, userId) {
-    const r = db.prepare(`SELECT snf_peers FROM snf_designations WHERE user_id = ?`).get(userId);
+export async function snfGetDesignation(_db, userId) {
+    const r = await dbOne(`SELECT snf_peers FROM snf_designations WHERE user_id = ?`, [userId]);
     if (!r)
         return [];
     try {

package/dist/layer2-business/L2-8-feedback/build-feedback-engine.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { generateId } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/schema.js';
+import { dbOne, dbAll } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/db.js'; // RFC-016 异步 seam(纯读)
 // RFC-006 不变量 1:建设贡献记入【独立】build_reputation 池,不再写交易 reputation_scores
 //（旧:recordRepEvent('feedback_accepted') 会污染 verifier/arbitrator 准入,已隔离)。
 import { creditBuildReputation, BUILD_POINTS } from '../L2-9-contribution/build-reputation-engine.js';
@@ -139,10 +140,10 @@ function parse(row) {
     const { scene_json, ...rest } = row;
     return { ...rest, scene };
 }
-export function listMyBuildFeedback(db, userId) {
-    const rows = db.prepare(`SELECT id, type, area, severity, subject, body, status, dedup_of, resolution, credited_points, credit_pending_anchor, promoted_task_id, created_at, updated_at
-     FROM build_feedback WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 100`).all(userId);
-    return rows;
+// RFC-016 Phase 1:纯读 → 异步 seam(db 参数保留签名兼容;调用点 build-feedback.ts:62/68/77 已确认不在 db.transaction 内)。
+export async function listMyBuildFeedback(_db, userId) {
+    return await dbAll(`SELECT id, type, area, severity, subject, body, status, dedup_of, resolution, credited_points, credit_pending_anchor, promoted_task_id, created_at, updated_at
+     FROM build_feedback WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 100`, [userId]);
 }
 /**
  * RFC-004 体验补:提交者【事后】绑定 Passkey 时,追溯补发此前"已受理但因无锚点跳过记功"的贡献信誉。
@@ -167,19 +168,19 @@ export function grantPendingAnchorCredits(db, userId) {
     }
     return { granted, total_points: total };
 }
-export function getBuildFeedback(db, id, userId, isAdmin) {
-    const row = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM build_feedback WHERE id = ?').get(id);
+export async function getBuildFeedback(_db, id, userId, isAdmin) {
+    const row = await dbOne('SELECT * FROM build_feedback WHERE id = ?', [id]);
     if (!row)
         return null;
     if (!isAdmin && row.user_id !== userId)
         return null;
-    const events = db.prepare('SELECT from_status, to_status, note, created_at FROM build_feedback_events WHERE feedback_id = ? ORDER BY created_at').all(id);
+    const events = await dbAll('SELECT from_status, to_status, note, created_at FROM build_feedback_events WHERE feedback_id = ? ORDER BY created_at', [id]);
     return { ...parse(row), events };
 }
-export function adminListBuildFeedback(db, status) {
+export async function adminListBuildFeedback(_db, status) {
     const rows = (status && FB_STATUS.has(status))
-        ? db.prepare('SELECT * FROM build_feedback WHERE status = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200').all(status)
-        : db.prepare('SELECT * FROM build_feedback ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200').all();
+        ? await dbAll('SELECT * FROM build_feedback WHERE status = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200', [status])
+        : await dbAll('SELECT * FROM build_feedback ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200');
     return rows.map(parse);
 }
 export function adminUpdateBuildFeedback(db, u) {
@@ -188,6 +189,13 @@ export function adminUpdateBuildFeedback(db, u) {
         return { error: '反馈不存在' };
     const fromStatus = row.status;
     const newStatus = u.status && FB_STATUS.has(u.status) ? u.status : fromStatus;
+    // Codex #113 P2:promote 成 build_task 语义上是"采纳的 proposal → 来一起建设",通知文案也说"被采纳了"。
+    //   因此只允许在本次更新把状态置为 resolved(采纳)时 promote;否则 support admin 误传 promote_to_task=true
+    //   会把 received/triaged/rejected 的 proposal 建成 open task 并谎称"被采纳",破坏贡献漏斗语义。
+    //   先于任何写返回错误,避免部分副作用。
+    if (u.promoteToTask && newStatus !== 'resolved') {
+        return { error: 'PROMOTE_REQUIRES_RESOLVED' };
+    }
     // co-build 信誉:仅在置为 resolved + credit 且此前未记功时发放(防重复发放 / gaming)。
     // 分级门(RFC-004 精确化):信誉只发给【有 Passkey 锚点】的提交者 —— 奖励必须锚真人;
     // 无 Passkey 的报告者(报问题=用)可受理致谢,但无锚点不记分。

package/dist/layer2-business/L2-9-contribution/build-reputation-engine.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { generateId } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/schema.js';
+import { dbOne, dbAll } from '../../layer0-foundation/L0-1-database/db.js'; // RFC-016 异步 seam(纯读)
 // 建设贡献分值(独立计量,与交易分无关)
 export const BUILD_POINTS = {
     feedback_accepted: 8, // RFC-004 反馈/提案被采纳
@@ -36,17 +37,27 @@ export function initBuildReputationSchema(db) {
     )
   `);
     db.exec(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_build_rep_events ON build_reputation_events(user_id, created_at DESC)`);
+    // Codex #104 P3:DB 级去重 —— 同 (source, ref_id) 只记一次 build event(并发/双击/多 worker 安全;
+    //   仅约束 ref_id 非空,无 ref 的事件不去重)。先清历史重复行(每组保留最早 id)再建唯一索引,保证能建成。
+    db.exec(`DELETE FROM build_reputation_events WHERE ref_id IS NOT NULL AND id NOT IN (
+    SELECT MIN(id) FROM build_reputation_events WHERE ref_id IS NOT NULL GROUP BY source, ref_id)`);
+    db.exec(`CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uniq_build_rep_source_ref ON build_reputation_events(source, ref_id) WHERE ref_id IS NOT NULL`);
 }
 // 记入建设信誉(独立池)。防重复:同 (source, ref_id) 只记一次。
-// 注:调用方负责校验提交者【有 Passkey 锚点】(奖励锚真人);本函数只管入池。
+// 注:调用方负责校验提交者【有 Passkey 锚点】(可问责真人锚点);本函数只管入池。
 export function creditBuildReputation(db, userId, source, points, refId, note) {
+    // 去重权威靠 DB 级 partial UNIQUE(source, ref_id) + INSERT OR IGNORE:并发/双击/多 worker 下
+    //   同一 (source, ref_id) 只入一次 event,且仅当真正插入(changes===1)才加 build_points → 绝不重复计分。
     if (refId) {
-        const dup = db.prepare(`SELECT id FROM build_reputation_events WHERE source = ? AND ref_id = ?`).get(source, refId);
-        if (dup)
-            return { credited: 0, already: true };
+        const ins = db.prepare(`INSERT OR IGNORE INTO build_reputation_events (id, user_id, source, points, ref_id, note) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)`)
+            .run(generateId('brev'), userId, source, points, refId, note ?? null);
+        if (ins.changes === 0)
+            return { credited: 0, already: true }; // 唯一冲突 → 已记过,不重复加分
+    }
+    else {
+        db.prepare(`INSERT INTO build_reputation_events (id, user_id, source, points, ref_id, note) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)`)
+            .run(generateId('brev'), userId, source, points, null, note ?? null);
     }
-    db.prepare(`INSERT INTO build_reputation_events (id, user_id, source, points, ref_id, note) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)`)
-        .run(generateId('brev'), userId, source, points, refId ?? null, note ?? null);
     const existing = db.prepare(`SELECT build_points FROM build_reputation WHERE user_id = ?`).get(userId);
     if (!existing) {
         db.prepare(`INSERT INTO build_reputation (user_id, build_points) VALUES (?, ?)`).run(userId, Math.max(0, points));
@@ -63,32 +74,33 @@ export function creditBuildReputation(db, userId, source, points, refId, note) {
 // 看板这里只【展示】当事人的活跃 strike + 申诉入口(透明先于强制);真人申诉走现成 strikes/:id/appeal。
 // 贡献者【自查】档案 —— KPI + 等级 + 来源拆分 + provenance + 限制/惩罚 + 申诉入口。
 // 不变量 3:仅本人可调(路由层 auth);不做公开榜。
-export function getBuildProfile(db, userId) {
-    const num = (sql, ...p) => db.prepare(sql).get(...p).n;
+// RFC-016 Phase 1:纯读 → 异步 seam(db 参数保留签名兼容;调用点 build-reputation.ts:24 已确认不在 db.transaction 内)。
+export async function getBuildProfile(_db, userId) {
+    const num = async (sql, ...p) => ((await dbOne(sql, p))?.n ?? 0);
     // KPI(从 build_tasks + build_feedback 实算)
     const kpi = {
-        tasks_claimed: num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? AND status = 'claimed'`, userId),
-        tasks_in_review: num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? AND status = 'in_review'`, userId),
-        tasks_done: num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? AND status = 'done'`, userId),
-        tasks_created: num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE created_by = ?`, userId),
-        feedback_submitted: num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_feedback WHERE user_id = ?`, userId),
-        feedback_accepted: num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_feedback WHERE user_id = ? AND status = 'resolved' AND credited_points > 0`, userId),
+        tasks_claimed: await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? AND status = 'claimed'`, userId),
+        tasks_in_review: await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? AND status = 'in_review'`, userId),
+        tasks_done: await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? AND status = 'done'`, userId),
+        tasks_created: await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_tasks WHERE created_by = ?`, userId),
+        feedback_submitted: await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_feedback WHERE user_id = ?`, userId),
+        feedback_accepted: await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM build_feedback WHERE user_id = ? AND status = 'resolved' AND credited_points > 0`, userId),
     };
-    const summary = db.prepare(`SELECT build_points FROM build_reputation WHERE user_id = ?`).get(userId);
+    const summary = await dbOne(`SELECT build_points FROM build_reputation WHERE user_id = ?`, [userId]);
     const buildPoints = summary?.build_points ?? 0;
     const tier = tierFor(buildPoints);
-    const bySource = db.prepare(`SELECT source, COUNT(*) AS count, COALESCE(SUM(points),0) AS points
-     FROM build_reputation_events WHERE user_id = ? GROUP BY source`).all(userId);
+    const bySource = await dbAll(`SELECT source, COUNT(*) AS count, COALESCE(SUM(points),0) AS points
+     FROM build_reputation_events WHERE user_id = ? GROUP BY source`, [userId]);
     // provenance 透明(自报,非检测):我认领的任务里 human/ai_assisted/ai_authored 各多少
-    const provenance = db.prepare(`SELECT COALESCE(claimer_provenance,'unspecified') AS provenance, COUNT(*) AS count
-     FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? GROUP BY claimer_provenance`).all(userId);
+    const provenance = await dbAll(`SELECT COALESCE(claimer_provenance,'unspecified') AS provenance, COUNT(*) AS count
+     FROM build_tasks WHERE claimer_id = ? GROUP BY claimer_provenance`, [userId]);
     // 限制 / 惩罚(复用现有 agent_strikes;只读 + 申诉入口)。pre-launch 通常为空。
-    const strikes = db.prepare(`SELECT id, severity, reason_code, reason_detail, issued_at, expires_at, appeal_status
+    const strikes = await dbAll(`SELECT id, severity, reason_code, reason_detail, issued_at, expires_at, appeal_status
      FROM agent_strikes WHERE user_id = ?
        AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > datetime('now'))
        AND COALESCE(appeal_status,'') != 'upheld_removed'
-     ORDER BY issued_at DESC LIMIT 20`).all(userId);
-    const hasAnchor = num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = ?`, userId) > 0;
+     ORDER BY issued_at DESC LIMIT 20`, [userId]);
+    const hasAnchor = (await num(`SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = ?`, userId)) > 0;
     return {
         user_id: userId,
         build_points: buildPoints,
@@ -99,7 +111,9 @@ export function getBuildProfile(db, userId) {
         standing: strikes.length === 0 ? 'ok' : 'flagged',
         restrictions: strikes, // 当事人看得见自己的扣分 + 原因
         appeal_hint: strikes.length > 0 ? 'POST /api/me/agents/strikes/:id/appeal' : null,
-        reward_anchored: hasAnchor, // 无 Passkey → 受理致谢但不记分(奖励锚真人)
+        // 是否已绑定 Passkey 锚点(把贡献锚定到可问责的真人)。无锚点 → 受理致谢但不记入建设信誉。
+        // 此处不承诺任何经济回报,只表达"是否锚定了可问责真人"(PR-5A 边界);该字段由旧的 reward-anchor 命名更名而来。
+        passkey_anchor_present: hasAnchor,
         // 不变量提示:此 build_points 仅用于建设分层 + 本看板,绝不喂交易侧(verifier/arbitrator)准入。
         pool: 'build_reputation (separate from trade reputation — never gates verifier/arbitrator)',
     };

package/dist/layer2-business/L2-9-contribution/build-task-agent-metadata-store.js

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+export const RISK_LEVELS = ['low', 'medium', 'high', 'critical'];
+export const AUDIENCES = ['public', 'restricted', 'internal'];
+export const AUTONOMIES = ['autonomous', 'supervised', 'human_in_the_loop', 'human_only'];
+export const CONTEXT_SIZES = ['small', 'medium', 'large'];
+export const AGENT_BUDGETS = ['minimal', 'small', 'moderate', 'large', 'xlarge'];
+export const TASK_TYPES = ['docs', 'i18n', 'tests', 'sdk_example', 'ui', 'code', 'api', 'schema', 'infra', 'governance', 'audit', 'other']; // aligned with spec/agent-task/agent-task.schema.ts
+const HUMAN_AUTONOMY = new Set(['human_in_the_loop', 'human_only']);
+const CREATE_TABLE = `
+  CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS build_task_agent_metadata (
+    task_id                        TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES build_tasks(id),
+    task_type                      TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (task_type IN ('docs','i18n','tests','sdk_example','ui','code','api','schema','infra','governance','audit','other')),
+    source_ref                     TEXT,
+    version                        TEXT,
+    allowed_paths                  TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (allowed_paths <> '' AND allowed_paths <> '[]'),
+    forbidden_paths                TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
+    prohibited_actions             TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (prohibited_actions <> '' AND prohibited_actions <> '[]'),
+    risk_level                     TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (risk_level IN ('low','medium','high','critical')),
+    audience                       TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (audience IN ('public','restricted','internal')),
+    agent_autonomy                 TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (agent_autonomy IN ('autonomous','supervised','human_in_the_loop','human_only')),
+    auto_claimable                 INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (auto_claimable IN (0,1)),
+    human_confirmation_points      TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
+    required_capabilities          TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (required_capabilities <> '' AND required_capabilities <> '[]'),
+    acceptance_criteria            TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (acceptance_criteria <> '' AND acceptance_criteria <> '[]'),
+    verification_commands          TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (verification_commands <> '' AND verification_commands <> '[]'),
+    expected_results               TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(trim(expected_results)) > 0),
+    deliverables                   TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (deliverables <> '' AND deliverables <> '[]'),
+    definition_of_done             TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(trim(definition_of_done)) > 0),
+    estimated_duration_min_minutes INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (estimated_duration_min_minutes >= 0),
+    estimated_duration_max_minutes INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    estimated_context_size         TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (estimated_context_size IN ('small','medium','large')),
+    estimated_agent_budget         TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (estimated_agent_budget IN ('minimal','small','moderate','large','xlarge')),
+    dependencies                   TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
+    blocking_conditions            TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
+    value_state                    TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'uncommitted' CHECK (value_state = 'uncommitted'),
+    contribution_type              TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(trim(contribution_type)) > 0),
+    accountable_party_required     INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (accountable_party_required IN (0,1)),
+    created_at                     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
+    CHECK (estimated_duration_max_minutes >= estimated_duration_min_minutes),
+    CHECK (risk_level NOT IN ('high','critical') OR auto_claimable = 0),
+    CHECK (risk_level NOT IN ('high','critical') OR agent_autonomy IN ('human_in_the_loop','human_only')),
+    CHECK (risk_level NOT IN ('high','critical') OR (human_confirmation_points <> '[]' AND human_confirmation_points <> '')),
+    CHECK (risk_level <> 'critical' OR audience <> 'public')
+  )
+`;
+const CREATE_INDEX = `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_btam_discovery ON build_task_agent_metadata(risk_level, audience, auto_claimable)`;
+export function initBuildTaskAgentMetadataSchema(db) {
+    db.exec(CREATE_TABLE);
+    db.exec(CREATE_INDEX);
+}
+// ── JSON list helpers (the ONLY place list fields are stringified/parsed) ──
+function toJsonList(field, v, { allowEmpty }) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(v))
+        throw new Error(`${field} must be a string[]`);
+    // Every entry must be a non-blank string — a list with an empty/whitespace element is an unexecutable
+    // boundary (Codex P1: ['']/['   '] previously slipped past the coarse DB CHECK). This holds even for
+    // allowEmpty fields: the array may be empty, but it may not contain an empty element.
+    for (const x of v) {
+        if (typeof x !== 'string' || x.trim().length === 0)
+            throw new Error(`${field} entries must be non-empty strings`);
+    }
+    if (!allowEmpty && v.length === 0)
+        throw new Error(`${field} must be non-empty`);
+    return JSON.stringify(v);
+}
+export function parseJsonList(v) {
+    if (!v)
+        return [];
+    try {
+        const a = JSON.parse(v);
+        return Array.isArray(a) ? a.filter(x => typeof x === 'string') : [];
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+}
+function assertEnum(field, v, allowed) {
+    if (typeof v !== 'string' || !allowed.includes(v))
+        throw new Error(`${field} must be one of ${allowed.join('|')} (got ${String(v)})`);
+    return v;
+}
+function assertNonEmptyText(field, v) {
+    if (typeof v !== 'string' || v.trim().length === 0)
+        throw new Error(`${field} must be non-empty text`);
+    return v;
+}
+/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any */
+/**
+ * Validate + insert a task's agent metadata. The store is the FIRST guard (throws on any contract
+ * violation); the DB CHECK/FK are the backstop. Lists are stringified to JSON here — callers pass arrays,
+ * never raw JSON.
+ */
+export function insertBuildTaskAgentMetadata(db, taskId, m) {
+    if (!taskId)
+        throw new Error('taskId required');
+    const task_type = assertEnum('task_type', m.task_type, TASK_TYPES);
+    const risk_level = assertEnum('risk_level', m.risk_level, RISK_LEVELS);
+    const audience = assertEnum('audience', m.audience, AUDIENCES);
+    const agent_autonomy = assertEnum('agent_autonomy', m.agent_autonomy, AUTONOMIES);
+    const estimated_context_size = assertEnum('estimated_context_size', m.estimated_context_size, CONTEXT_SIZES);
+    const estimated_agent_budget = assertEnum('estimated_agent_budget', m.estimated_agent_budget, AGENT_BUDGETS);
+    if ((m.value_state ?? 'uncommitted') !== 'uncommitted')
+        throw new Error('value_state must be uncommitted');
+    const expected_results = assertNonEmptyText('expected_results', m.expected_results);
+    const definition_of_done = assertNonEmptyText('definition_of_done', m.definition_of_done);
+    const contribution_type = assertNonEmptyText('contribution_type', m.contribution_type);
+    const min = m.estimated_duration_min_minutes, max = m.estimated_duration_max_minutes;
+    if (!Number.isInteger(min) || min < 0)
+        throw new Error('estimated_duration_min_minutes must be a non-negative integer');
+    if (!Number.isInteger(max) || max < min)
+        throw new Error('estimated_duration_max_minutes must be an integer >= min');
+    const isHigh = risk_level === 'high' || risk_level === 'critical';
+    if (isHigh && m.auto_claimable === true)
+        throw new Error('high/critical risk_level requires auto_claimable=false');
+    if (isHigh && !HUMAN_AUTONOMY.has(agent_autonomy))
+        throw new Error('high/critical risk_level requires agent_autonomy human_in_the_loop|human_only');
+    if (risk_level === 'critical' && audience === 'public')
+        throw new Error('critical risk_level cannot have audience=public');
+    const hcp = m.human_confirmation_points ?? [];
+    if (isHigh && hcp.length === 0)
+        throw new Error('high/critical risk_level requires >=1 human_confirmation_points');
+    db.prepare(`INSERT INTO build_task_agent_metadata (
+      task_id, task_type, source_ref, version, allowed_paths, forbidden_paths, prohibited_actions,
+      risk_level, audience, agent_autonomy, auto_claimable, human_confirmation_points, required_capabilities,
+      acceptance_criteria, verification_commands, expected_results, deliverables, definition_of_done,
+      estimated_duration_min_minutes, estimated_duration_max_minutes, estimated_context_size,
+      estimated_agent_budget, dependencies, blocking_conditions, value_state, contribution_type,
+      accountable_party_required
+    ) VALUES (
+      @task_id, @task_type, @source_ref, @version, @allowed_paths, @forbidden_paths, @prohibited_actions,
+      @risk_level, @audience, @agent_autonomy, @auto_claimable, @human_confirmation_points, @required_capabilities,
+      @acceptance_criteria, @verification_commands, @expected_results, @deliverables, @definition_of_done,
+      @estimated_duration_min_minutes, @estimated_duration_max_minutes, @estimated_context_size,
+      @estimated_agent_budget, @dependencies, @blocking_conditions, 'uncommitted', @contribution_type,
+      @accountable_party_required
+    )`).run({
+        task_id: taskId,
+        task_type,
+        source_ref: m.source_ref ?? null,
+        version: m.version ?? null,
+        allowed_paths: toJsonList('allowed_paths', m.allowed_paths, { allowEmpty: false }),
+        forbidden_paths: toJsonList('forbidden_paths', m.forbidden_paths ?? [], { allowEmpty: true }),
+        prohibited_actions: toJsonList('prohibited_actions', m.prohibited_actions, { allowEmpty: false }),
+        risk_level, audience, agent_autonomy,
+        auto_claimable: m.auto_claimable ? 1 : 0,
+        human_confirmation_points: toJsonList('human_confirmation_points', hcp, { allowEmpty: true }),
+        required_capabilities: toJsonList('required_capabilities', m.required_capabilities, { allowEmpty: false }),
+        acceptance_criteria: toJsonList('acceptance_criteria', m.acceptance_criteria, { allowEmpty: false }),
+        verification_commands: toJsonList('verification_commands', m.verification_commands, { allowEmpty: false }),
+        expected_results,
+        deliverables: toJsonList('deliverables', m.deliverables, { allowEmpty: false }),
+        definition_of_done,
+        estimated_duration_min_minutes: min,
+        estimated_duration_max_minutes: max,
+        estimated_context_size, estimated_agent_budget,
+        dependencies: toJsonList('dependencies', m.dependencies ?? [], { allowEmpty: true }),
+        blocking_conditions: toJsonList('blocking_conditions', m.blocking_conditions ?? [], { allowEmpty: true }),
+        contribution_type,
+        accountable_party_required: m.accountable_party_required ? 1 : 0,
+    });
+}
+/** Read + parse a task's agent metadata (list fields parsed back to arrays). */
+export function getBuildTaskAgentMetadata(db, taskId) {
+    const row = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM build_task_agent_metadata WHERE task_id = ?').get(taskId);
+    if (!row)
+        return null;
+    for (const k of ['allowed_paths', 'forbidden_paths', 'prohibited_actions', 'human_confirmation_points',
+        'required_capabilities', 'acceptance_criteria', 'verification_commands', 'deliverables', 'dependencies',
+        'blocking_conditions'])
+        row[k] = parseJsonList(row[k]);
+    row.auto_claimable = row.auto_claimable === 1;
+    row.accountable_party_required = row.accountable_party_required === 1;
+    return row;
+}

package/dist/layer2-business/L2-9-contribution/build-task-participation.js

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { getBuildTaskWithAgentMetadata } from './build-task-read.js';
+import { getCanonicalContributionTarget } from './canonical-contribution-target.js';
+/** Gate a participation action on a task. restricted/internal/missing → 404 no-leak; auto_claimable=false → refuse claim. */
+export function guardParticipation(db, id, action) {
+    const task = getBuildTaskWithAgentMetadata(db, id, 'member'); // member scope hides restricted/internal; releaseExpiredClaims runs inside
+    if (!task)
+        return { ok: false, status: 404, code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: '任务不存在' }; // also covers restricted/internal → no existence leak
+    const meta = task.agent_metadata;
+    if (action === 'claim' && meta && meta.auto_claimable === false) {
+        return { ok: false, status: 409, code: 'NOT_AUTO_CLAIMABLE', message: '该任务不可自助认领,需真人在环(human_in_the_loop / human_only),不能由 agent 自动认领' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, task };
+}
+/**
+ * Anti GitHub-target-confusion (FAIL-CLOSED). A submitted `pr_ref` is accepted ONLY if it is either:
+ *   - a canonical PR shorthand: `#123` or `123` (a PR number on the canonical repo), or
+ *   - a strictly-parsed URL whose hostname is EXACTLY `github.com` AND whose first two path segments equal
+ *     `canonical_contribution_target.expected_pr_base_repo`.
+ * Everything else — a lookalike host (`evilgithub.com`), a non-GitHub host (`gitlab.com`), an unparseable /
+ * arbitrary string (`evil/repo#1`), or an empty ref — is REJECTED with a typed code. (Codex P1: substring
+ * matching let lookalike hosts and non-URL text through.)
+ */
+export function validatePrRefAgainstCanonical(prRef) {
+    const ref = String(prRef ?? '').trim();
+    const target = getCanonicalContributionTarget();
+    const expected = target.expected_pr_base_repo.toLowerCase();
+    if (ref === '')
+        return { ok: false, code: 'PR_REF_REQUIRED', message: `submit 需要一个指向 canonical repo ${target.expected_pr_base_repo} 的 PR(github.com URL 或 #编号)` };
+    if (/^#?\d+$/.test(ref))
+        return { ok: true }; // explicit canonical shorthand (#123 / 123)
+    let u;
+    try {
+        u = new URL(ref);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_PR_REF', message: 'PR 必须是 canonical github.com PR URL 或 #编号;不接受任意文本' };
+    }
+    if (u.hostname.toLowerCase() !== 'github.com') {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'WRONG_PR_BASE_REPO', message: `PR host 必须精确等于 github.com(检测到 ${u.hostname});不要把贡献提交到非 WebAZ 仓库` };
+    }
+    const m = u.pathname.match(/^\/([^/]+)\/([^/]+)(?:\/|$)/);
+    const repo = m ? `${m[1]}/${m[2]}`.replace(/\.git$/i, '').toLowerCase() : '';
+    if (repo !== expected) {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'WRONG_PR_BASE_REPO', message: `PR 必须提交到 canonical repo ${target.expected_pr_base_repo}(检测到 ${repo || '未知'});不要把贡献提交到非 WebAZ 仓库` };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+}