@seams/wallet 0.6.2 → 0.7.3

package/dist/esm/shared-ts/src/wallet-recovery/walletRecoveryCommittedProjection.js

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 import { parseEmailOtpProviderUserId, parseWalletAuthMethodId, parseWalletAuthorityId, parseWalletId, parseWalletRecoveryOperationId, parseWebAuthnCredentialIdB64u, parseWebAuthnRpId } from "../utils/domainIds.js";
 import { parseDeviceId } from "../authorization/capabilityKinds.js";
+import { requireTrimmedString } from "../utils/validation.js";
+import { parseWalletAuthMethodRecordV2 } from "../utils/walletAuthMethodRecord.js";
 import { isActiveRecoveredWalletAuthorityV1, parseWalletAuthorityV1, walletAuthorityDigestsMatchV1 } from "../authorization/walletAuthority.js";
-import { parseWalletAuthMethodRecordV2 } from "../utils/registrationIntent.js";
 //#region ../shared-ts/src/wallet-recovery/walletRecoveryCommittedProjection.ts
 function buildWalletRecoveryCommittedProjectionV1(input) {
 	if (input.kind === "passkey") return buildPasskeyProjection(input);
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ function buildWalletRecoveryCommittedProjectionV1(input) {
 function buildPasskeyProjection(input) {
 	const projection = {
 		version: "wallet_recovery_committed_projection_v1",
-		storeVersion: requireNonEmptyString(input.storeVersion, "storeVersion"),
+		storeVersion: requireTrimmedString(input.storeVersion, "storeVersion", "is invalid"),
 		walletId: input.walletId,
 		recoveryOperationId: input.recoveryOperationId,
 		targetDeviceId: input.targetDeviceId,
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ function buildPasskeyProjection(input) {
 function buildGoogleEmailOtpProjection(input) {
 	const projection = {
 		version: "wallet_recovery_committed_projection_v1",
-		storeVersion: requireNonEmptyString(input.storeVersion, "storeVersion"),
+		storeVersion: requireTrimmedString(input.storeVersion, "storeVersion", "is invalid"),
 		walletId: input.walletId,
 		recoveryOperationId: input.recoveryOperationId,
 		targetDeviceId: input.targetDeviceId,
@@ -45,8 +46,8 @@ function buildGoogleEmailOtpProjection(input) {
 			provider: "google",
 			providerSubject: input.providerSubject,
 			emailHashHex: requireEmailHash(input.emailHashHex),
-			registrationAuthorityId: requireNonEmptyString(input.registrationAuthorityId, "registrationAuthorityId"),
-			enrollment: buildEnrollmentReference(input.enrollment)
+			registrationAuthorityId: requireTrimmedString(input.registrationAuthorityId, "registrationAuthorityId", "is invalid"),
+			enrollment: parseEnrollmentReference(input.enrollment)
 		}
 	};
 	assertProjectionShape(projection);
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ async function parseWalletRecoveryCommittedProjectionV1(raw, expected) {
 	if (!authMethod || authMethod.status !== "active") throw new Error("wallet recovery auth method projection is invalid");
 	const common = {
 		version: "wallet_recovery_committed_projection_v1",
-		storeVersion: requireNonEmptyString(record.storeVersion, "storeVersion"),
+		storeVersion: requireTrimmedString(record.storeVersion, "storeVersion", "is invalid"),
 		walletId,
 		recoveryOperationId,
 		targetDeviceId,
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ function parseGoogleEmailOtpTarget(raw) {
 		provider: "google",
 		providerSubject: requireParsed(parseEmailOtpProviderUserId(record.providerSubject), "target.providerSubject"),
 		emailHashHex: requireEmailHash(record.emailHashHex),
-		registrationAuthorityId: requireNonEmptyString(record.registrationAuthorityId, "target.registrationAuthorityId"),
+		registrationAuthorityId: requireTrimmedString(record.registrationAuthorityId, "target.registrationAuthorityId", "is invalid"),
 		enrollment: parseEnrollmentReference(record.enrollment)
 	};
 }
@@ -128,13 +129,10 @@ function parseEnrollmentReference(raw) {
 	if (record.kind !== "email_otp_enrollment_reference_v1") throw new Error("wallet recovery Email OTP enrollment is invalid");
 	return {
 		kind: "email_otp_enrollment_reference_v1",
-		enrollmentId: requireNonEmptyString(record.enrollmentId, "enrollment.enrollmentId"),
-		enrollmentSealKeyVersion: requireNonEmptyString(record.enrollmentSealKeyVersion, "enrollment.enrollmentSealKeyVersion")
+		enrollmentId: requireTrimmedString(record.enrollmentId, "enrollment.enrollmentId", "is invalid"),
+		enrollmentSealKeyVersion: requireTrimmedString(record.enrollmentSealKeyVersion, "enrollment.enrollmentSealKeyVersion", "is invalid")
 	};
 }
-function buildEnrollmentReference(value) {
-	return parseEnrollmentReference(value);
-}
 function assertExpectedIdentity(projection, expected) {
 	if (projection.kind !== expected.kind || projection.walletId !== expected.walletId || projection.recoveryOperationId !== expected.recoveryOperationId || projection.targetDeviceId !== expected.targetDeviceId || projection.targetAuthorityId !== expected.targetAuthorityId || projection.targetWalletAuthMethodId !== expected.targetWalletAuthMethodId) throw new Error("wallet recovery committed projection identity changed");
 	if (projection.kind === "passkey" && expected.kind === "passkey") {
@@ -242,12 +240,8 @@ function requireParsed(result, label) {
 	if (!result.ok) throw new Error(`${label} is invalid`);
 	return result.value;
 }
-function requireNonEmptyString(value, label) {
-	if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim() === "") throw new Error(`${label} is invalid`);
-	return value.trim();
-}
 function requireEmailHash(value) {
-	const hash = requireNonEmptyString(value, "emailHashHex");
+	const hash = requireTrimmedString(value, "emailHashHex", "is invalid");
 	if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(hash)) throw new Error("emailHashHex is invalid");
 	return hash;
 }

package/dist/esm/shared-ts/src/wallet-recovery/walletRecoveryEcdsaPossession.js

@@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
+import { requireRecord } from "../utils/validation.js";
 import { base64UrlDecode, base64UrlEncode } from "../utils/base64.js";
-import { parseDigestB64u } from "../utils/canonicalPrimitives.js";
-import { sha256Bytes } from "../utils/digests.js";
+import { parseDigestB64u, sha256DigestB64u } from "../utils/canonicalPrimitives.js";
 //#region ../shared-ts/src/wallet-recovery/walletRecoveryEcdsaPossession.ts
 const POSSESSION_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN_V1 = "seams/wallet-recovery/ecdsa-existing-material-possession/v1";
 const POSSESSION_PROOF_SCHEME_V1 = "secp256k1_bip340_sha256_v1";
-function requireRecord(value, label) {
-	if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) throw new Error(`${label} must be an object`);
-	return value;
-}
 function requireExactKeys(record, label, keys) {
 	const allowed = new Set(keys);
 	for (const key of Object.keys(record)) if (!allowed.has(key)) throw new Error(`${label}.${key} is not a supported field`);
@@ -149,9 +145,9 @@ function expiryBytes(value) {
 	return bytes;
 }
 async function walletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeDigestB64uV1(challenge) {
-	return parseDigestB64u(base64UrlEncode(await sha256Bytes(walletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeCanonicalBytesV1(challenge))));
+	return sha256DigestB64u(walletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeCanonicalBytesV1(challenge));
 }
 //#endregion
-export { parseWalletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeV1, parseWalletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionProofV1, walletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeCanonicalBytesV1, walletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeDigestB64uV1 };
+export { parseWalletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeV1, parseWalletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionProofV1, walletRecoveryEcdsaPossessionChallengeDigestB64uV1 };
 
 //# sourceMappingURL=walletRecoveryEcdsaPossession.js.map

package/dist/esm/shared-ts/src/wallet-recovery/walletRecoveryEnvelopeSet.js

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 import { parseWalletId } from "../utils/domainIds.js";
-import { parseDigestField, parseEnvelopeCiphertextB64u, parseEnvelopeNonceB64u, rejectUnknownFields, requireRecord } from "../passkey-custody/primitives.js";
+import { requireRecord } from "../utils/validation.js";
+import { rejectUnknownFields } from "../utils/exactRecord.js";
+import { parseDigestField, parseEnvelopeCiphertextB64u, parseEnvelopeNonceB64u } from "../passkey-custody/primitives.js";
 import { parseDerivedWalletRecoveryKeyId } from "./recoveryKeyId.js";
 import "./recoveryCodes.js";
 import "../passkey-custody/index.js";

package/dist/esm/utils/menuItemBlink.js

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+//#region src/utils/menuItemBlink.ts
+const MENU_ITEM_BLINK_PHASE_MS = 90;
+const waitForBlinkPhase = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, MENU_ITEM_BLINK_PHASE_MS));
+/**
+* Blinks a chosen menu item once, highlight off and then on again, so the menu
+* confirms which item was picked before it closes, as macOS menus do. The item's
+* stylesheet renders `data-blink="off"` and `data-blink="on"`.
+*
+* Returns null while the item is already blinking, so a double click commits once.
+*/
+function blinkMenuItem(item) {
+	if (item.dataset.blink) return null;
+	item.dataset.blink = "off";
+	return waitForBlinkPhase().then(() => {
+		item.dataset.blink = "on";
+		return waitForBlinkPhase();
+	}).then(() => {
+		delete item.dataset.blink;
+	});
+}
+//#endregion
+export { blinkMenuItem };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=menuItemBlink.js.map

package/dist/esm/wasm/near_signer/pkg/wasm_signer_worker.d.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ export function passkey_custody_seal_v1(passkey_prf_first: Uint8Array, envelope_
  * Device 2 immediately factor-seals an opened Client root.
  */
 export function passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_under_factor_v1(handle: WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1, factor_secret: Uint8Array, envelope_binding_json: string): any;
+/**
+ * Opens this device's own Client-root envelope to link another device.
+ *
+ * The factor secret is the one this unlock already presented. The handle may
+ * seal the root only to the recipient of a further approved link for the
+ * same wallet key; it never reseals a factor or a wallet seed.
+ */
+export function passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_envelope_v1(factor_secret: Uint8Array, envelope_binding_json: string, nonce12: Uint8Array, sealed_custody_secret_b64u: string, aad_hash_b64u: string, ciphertext_digest_b64u: string): WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1;
 /**
  * Opens an envelope into a handle. Prefer the verified variant for anything
  * read from a browser cache.
@@ -63,11 +71,14 @@ export function passkey_custody_open_verified_v1(passkey_prf_first: Uint8Array,
  */
 export function ed25519_yao_client_root_transfer_recipient_v1(): WasmEd25519YaoClientRootTransferRecipientV1;
 /**
- * Device 1 derives and seals only the Ed25519 Yao Client root.
+ * Seals only the Ed25519 Yao Client root to an approved linked device.
  *
- * The input handle must have been opened from a verified local wallet custody
- * envelope. The wallet seed is read only inside this WASM call; the returned
- * value contains ciphertext and public binding facts only.
+ * A handle opened from a verified local wallet custody envelope derives the
+ * root from the seed. A handle opened from this device's own Client-root
+ * envelope seals that root, and only for the same wallet key. A root just
+ * received by transfer is never forwarded. The secret is read only inside
+ * this WASM call; the returned value contains ciphertext and public binding
+ * facts only.
  */
 export function passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_for_linked_device_v1(handle: WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1, transfer_binding_json: string): any;
 /**
@@ -456,7 +467,8 @@ export class WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1 {
   byte_length(): number;
   /**
    * Whether this handle may be resealed under another factor. False for a
-   * lane share, and false for a seed opened through the unverified path.
+   * lane share, for a seed opened through the unverified path, and for a
+   * root opened to link another device.
    */
   can_add_factor(): boolean;
   /**
@@ -714,6 +726,7 @@ export interface InitOutput {
   readonly init_worker: () => void;
   readonly keyactionresult_new: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number, f: number, g: number, h: number) => number;
   readonly passkey_custody_generate_secret_v1: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => [number, number, number];
+  readonly passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_envelope_v1: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number, f: number, g: number, h: number, i: number, j: number, k: number, l: number) => [number, number, number];
   readonly passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_from_linked_device_v1: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number, f: number, g: number, h: number, i: number, j: number, k: number, l: number, m: number) => [number, number, number];
   readonly passkey_custody_open_v1: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number, f: number, g: number, h: number) => [number, number, number];
   readonly passkey_custody_open_verified_v1: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number, f: number, g: number, h: number, i: number, j: number, k: number, l: number) => [number, number, number];
@@ -808,6 +821,7 @@ export interface InitOutput {
   readonly __wbg_get_workerprogressmessage_status: (a: number) => [number, number];
   readonly __wbg_get_wasmtransaction_publicKey: (a: number) => number;
   readonly __wbg_get_wasmtransaction_nonce: (a: number) => bigint;
+  readonly __wbg_set_wasmsignedtransaction_signature: (a: number, b: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_derivethresholded25519clientverifyingsharerequest_wrapKeySalt: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_keyactionresult_error: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_keyactionresult_transactionHash: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
@@ -817,7 +831,6 @@ export interface InitOutput {
   readonly __wbg_set_webauthnauthenticationcredentialstruct_user_handle: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_webauthnregistrationcredentialstruct_ed25519_prf_output: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
   readonly wasmsignature_new: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => number;
-  readonly __wbg_set_wasmsignedtransaction_signature: (a: number, b: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_wasmsignedtransaction_borshBytes: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_transactioncontext_nextNonce: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;
   readonly __wbg_set_rpccallpayload_nearAccountId: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => void;

package/dist/esm/wasm/near_signer/pkg/wasm_signer_worker.js

@@ -229,6 +229,37 @@ function passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_under_factor_v1(handle, fa
 	return takeFromExternrefTable0(ret[0]);
 }
 /**
+* Opens this device's own Client-root envelope to link another device.
+*
+* The factor secret is the one this unlock already presented. The handle may
+* seal the root only to the recipient of a further approved link for the
+* same wallet key; it never reseals a factor or a wallet seed.
+* @param {Uint8Array} factor_secret
+* @param {string} envelope_binding_json
+* @param {Uint8Array} nonce12
+* @param {string} sealed_custody_secret_b64u
+* @param {string} aad_hash_b64u
+* @param {string} ciphertext_digest_b64u
+* @returns {WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1}
+*/
+function passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_envelope_v1(factor_secret, envelope_binding_json, nonce12, sealed_custody_secret_b64u, aad_hash_b64u, ciphertext_digest_b64u) {
+	const ptr0 = passArray8ToWasm0(factor_secret, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc);
+	const len0 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+	const ptr1 = passStringToWasm0(envelope_binding_json, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc, wasm.__wbindgen_realloc);
+	const len1 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+	const ptr2 = passArray8ToWasm0(nonce12, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc);
+	const len2 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+	const ptr3 = passStringToWasm0(sealed_custody_secret_b64u, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc, wasm.__wbindgen_realloc);
+	const len3 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+	const ptr4 = passStringToWasm0(aad_hash_b64u, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc, wasm.__wbindgen_realloc);
+	const len4 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+	const ptr5 = passStringToWasm0(ciphertext_digest_b64u, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc, wasm.__wbindgen_realloc);
+	const len5 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+	const ret = wasm.passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_envelope_v1(ptr0, len0, ptr1, len1, ptr2, len2, ptr3, len3, ptr4, len4, ptr5, len5);
+	if (ret[2]) throw takeFromExternrefTable0(ret[1]);
+	return WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1.__wrap(ret[0]);
+}
+/**
 * Opens an envelope into a handle. Prefer the verified variant for anything
 * read from a browser cache.
 * @param {Uint8Array} passkey_prf_first
@@ -345,11 +376,14 @@ function ed25519_yao_client_root_transfer_recipient_v1() {
 	return WasmEd25519YaoClientRootTransferRecipientV1.__wrap(ret[0]);
 }
 /**
-* Device 1 derives and seals only the Ed25519 Yao Client root.
+* Seals only the Ed25519 Yao Client root to an approved linked device.
 *
-* The input handle must have been opened from a verified local wallet custody
-* envelope. The wallet seed is read only inside this WASM call; the returned
-* value contains ciphertext and public binding facts only.
+* A handle opened from a verified local wallet custody envelope derives the
+* root from the seed. A handle opened from this device's own Client-root
+* envelope seals that root, and only for the same wallet key. A root just
+* received by transfer is never forwarded. The secret is read only inside
+* this WASM call; the returned value contains ciphertext and public binding
+* facts only.
 * @param {WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1} handle
 * @param {string} transfer_binding_json
 * @returns {any}
@@ -630,7 +664,7 @@ function threshold_ed25519_finalize_delegate_from_signature(args) {
 function __wbg_adapter_52(arg0, arg1, arg2) {
 	wasm.closure67_externref_shim(arg0, arg1, arg2);
 }
-function __wbg_adapter_387(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3) {
+function __wbg_adapter_388(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3) {
 	wasm.closure60_externref_shim(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
 }
 /**
@@ -2804,7 +2838,8 @@ var WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1 = class WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1 {
 	}
 	/**
 	* Whether this handle may be resealed under another factor. False for a
-	* lane share, and false for a seed opened through the unverified path.
+	* lane share, for a seed opened through the unverified path, and for a
+	* root opened to link another device.
 	* @returns {boolean}
 	*/
 	can_add_factor() {
@@ -4043,7 +4078,7 @@ function __wbg_get_imports() {
 				const a = state0.a;
 				state0.a = 0;
 				try {
-					return __wbg_adapter_387(a, state0.b, arg0, arg1);
+					return __wbg_adapter_388(a, state0.b, arg0, arg1);
 				} finally {
 					state0.a = a;
 				}
@@ -4210,7 +4245,7 @@ function __wbg_get_imports() {
 		}
 		return false;
 	};
-	imports.wbg.__wbindgen_closure_wrapper2623 = function(arg0, arg1, arg2) {
+	imports.wbg.__wbindgen_closure_wrapper2627 = function(arg0, arg1, arg2) {
 		return makeMutClosure(arg0, arg1, 68, __wbg_adapter_52);
 	};
 	imports.wbg.__wbindgen_debug_string = function(arg0, arg1) {
@@ -4314,4 +4349,4 @@ async function __wbg_init(module_or_path) {
 	return __wbg_finalize_init(instance, module);
 }
 //#endregion
-export { AuthenticationResponse, AuthenticatorOptions, ClientExtensionResults, ConfirmationBehavior, ConfirmationConfig, ConfirmationUIMode, DelegateSignResult, DeriveThresholdEd25519ClientVerifyingShareRequest, DeriveThresholdEd25519ClientVerifyingShareResult, KeyActionResult, OriginPolicyInput, PrfOutputs, PrfResults, ProgressMessageType, ProgressStep, RegistrationPayload, RegistrationResponse, RpcCallPayload, SerializedCredential, SerializedRegistrationCredential, SignNep413Result, TransactionContext, TransactionSignResult, UserVerificationPolicy, WasmDelegateAction, WasmEd25519YaoClientRootTransferRecipientV1, WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1, WasmPublicKey, WasmSignature, WasmSignedDelegate, WasmSignedTransaction, WasmTransaction, WebAuthnAuthenticationCredentialStruct, WebAuthnRegistrationCredentialStruct, WorkerProgressMessage, WorkerRequestType, WorkerResponseType, __wbg_init as default, ed25519_yao_client_root_transfer_recipient_v1, handle_signer_message, initSync, init_worker, passkey_custody_generate_secret_v1, passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_from_linked_device_v1, passkey_custody_open_v1, passkey_custody_open_verified_v1, passkey_custody_open_wallet_seed_v1, passkey_custody_reseal_wallet_seed_v1, passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_for_linked_device_v1, passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_under_factor_v1, passkey_custody_seal_v1, threshold_ed25519_add_points_b64u, threshold_ed25519_build_delegate_signing_payload, threshold_ed25519_build_near_tx_unsigned_borsh, threshold_ed25519_compute_delegate_signing_digest, threshold_ed25519_compute_near_tx_signing_digests, threshold_ed25519_compute_nep413_signing_digest, threshold_ed25519_decode_signed_near_tx_borsh, threshold_ed25519_derive_relayer_cosigner_shares, threshold_ed25519_finalize_delegate_from_signature, threshold_ed25519_finalize_near_tx_from_signature, threshold_ed25519_finalize_signature, threshold_ed25519_keygen_from_client_verifying_share, threshold_ed25519_lagrange_coefficient_at_zero, threshold_ed25519_multiply_scalar_b64u_by_scalar_le32, threshold_ed25519_round1_commit, threshold_ed25519_round2_sign, threshold_ed25519_round2_sign_cosigner, threshold_ed25519_validate_near_tx_unsigned_borsh };
+export { AuthenticationResponse, AuthenticatorOptions, ClientExtensionResults, ConfirmationBehavior, ConfirmationConfig, ConfirmationUIMode, DelegateSignResult, DeriveThresholdEd25519ClientVerifyingShareRequest, DeriveThresholdEd25519ClientVerifyingShareResult, KeyActionResult, OriginPolicyInput, PrfOutputs, PrfResults, ProgressMessageType, ProgressStep, RegistrationPayload, RegistrationResponse, RpcCallPayload, SerializedCredential, SerializedRegistrationCredential, SignNep413Result, TransactionContext, TransactionSignResult, UserVerificationPolicy, WasmDelegateAction, WasmEd25519YaoClientRootTransferRecipientV1, WasmPasskeyCustodyHandleV1, WasmPublicKey, WasmSignature, WasmSignedDelegate, WasmSignedTransaction, WasmTransaction, WebAuthnAuthenticationCredentialStruct, WebAuthnRegistrationCredentialStruct, WorkerProgressMessage, WorkerRequestType, WorkerResponseType, __wbg_init as default, ed25519_yao_client_root_transfer_recipient_v1, handle_signer_message, initSync, init_worker, passkey_custody_generate_secret_v1, passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_envelope_v1, passkey_custody_open_ed25519_yao_client_root_from_linked_device_v1, passkey_custody_open_v1, passkey_custody_open_verified_v1, passkey_custody_open_wallet_seed_v1, passkey_custody_reseal_wallet_seed_v1, passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_for_linked_device_v1, passkey_custody_seal_ed25519_yao_client_root_under_factor_v1, passkey_custody_seal_v1, threshold_ed25519_add_points_b64u, threshold_ed25519_build_delegate_signing_payload, threshold_ed25519_build_near_tx_unsigned_borsh, threshold_ed25519_compute_delegate_signing_digest, threshold_ed25519_compute_near_tx_signing_digests, threshold_ed25519_compute_nep413_signing_digest, threshold_ed25519_decode_signed_near_tx_borsh, threshold_ed25519_derive_relayer_cosigner_shares, threshold_ed25519_finalize_delegate_from_signature, threshold_ed25519_finalize_near_tx_from_signature, threshold_ed25519_finalize_signature, threshold_ed25519_keygen_from_client_verifying_share, threshold_ed25519_lagrange_coefficient_at_zero, threshold_ed25519_multiply_scalar_b64u_by_scalar_le32, threshold_ed25519_round1_commit, threshold_ed25519_round2_sign, threshold_ed25519_round2_sign_cosigner, threshold_ed25519_validate_near_tx_unsigned_borsh };

package/dist/esm/wasm/router_ab_ecdsa_client/pkg/router_ab_ecdsa_client.d.ts

@@ -32,9 +32,17 @@ export class EcdsaLinkedHolderMaterialV1 {
    * SigningWorker envelope, and reconstructs the holder's additive key.
    */
   finalize_ordinary_export(input_json: string): string;
+  /**
+   * Prepares the source contribution for a device this linked device
+   * links in turn, from this holder's own share. The preparation must name
+   * this holder's activation as its source.
+   */
+  prepare_source_contribution(input_json: string): string;
   /**
    * Builds the ordinary explicit-export request with this holder's
-   * recipient. The request digest and transcript stay private to WASM.
+   * recipient. The request digest and transcript stay private to WASM, and
+   * the request must name this holder's own application binding, which the
+   * Derivers prove their bundles under.
    */
   build_ordinary_export_request(input_json: string): string;
   /**
@@ -190,6 +198,7 @@ export interface InitOutput {
   readonly ecdsalinkedholdermaterialv1_finalize_ordinary_export: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => [number, number, number, number];
   readonly ecdsalinkedholdermaterialv1_new: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number) => [number, number, number];
   readonly ecdsalinkedholdermaterialv1_ordinary_export_request_digest_b64u: (a: number) => [number, number, number, number];
+  readonly ecdsalinkedholdermaterialv1_prepare_source_contribution: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => [number, number, number, number];
   readonly ecdsalinkedholdermaterialv1_start_presign: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number) => [number, number, number];
   readonly ecdsarolelocalpresignsessionv1_candidate_big_r_33: (a: number) => [number, number, number, number];
   readonly ecdsarolelocalpresignsessionv1_compute_signature_share: (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number, e: number, f: number, g: number, h: number, i: number, j: number, k: number) => [number, number, number, number];

package/dist/esm/wasm/router_ab_ecdsa_client/pkg/router_ab_ecdsa_client.js

@@ -284,8 +284,38 @@ var EcdsaLinkedHolderMaterialV1 = class {
 		}
 	}
 	/**
+	* Prepares the source contribution for a device this linked device
+	* links in turn, from this holder's own share. The preparation must name
+	* this holder's activation as its source.
+	* @param {string} input_json
+	* @returns {string}
+	*/
+	prepare_source_contribution(input_json) {
+		let deferred3_0;
+		let deferred3_1;
+		try {
+			const ptr0 = passStringToWasm0(input_json, wasm.__wbindgen_malloc, wasm.__wbindgen_realloc);
+			const len0 = WASM_VECTOR_LEN;
+			const ret = wasm.ecdsalinkedholdermaterialv1_prepare_source_contribution(this.__wbg_ptr, ptr0, len0);
+			var ptr2 = ret[0];
+			var len2 = ret[1];
+			if (ret[3]) {
+				ptr2 = 0;
+				len2 = 0;
+				throw takeFromExternrefTable0(ret[2]);
+			}
+			deferred3_0 = ptr2;
+			deferred3_1 = len2;
+			return getStringFromWasm0(ptr2, len2);
+		} finally {
+			wasm.__wbindgen_free(deferred3_0, deferred3_1, 1);
+		}
+	}
+	/**
 	* Builds the ordinary explicit-export request with this holder's
-	* recipient. The request digest and transcript stay private to WASM.
+	* recipient. The request digest and transcript stay private to WASM, and
+	* the request must name this holder's own application binding, which the
+	* Derivers prove their bundles under.
 	* @param {string} input_json
 	* @returns {string}
 	*/

package/dist/esm/wasm/router_ab_ed25519_yao_client/pkg/router_ab_ed25519_yao_client.d.ts

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ export class WasmLaneHolderSigningMaterialV1 {
     key_family(): string;
     /**
      * Opens one digest-verified sealed holder record and binds it to the exact
-     * persisted R102 job and protocol receipt.
+     * persisted job and protocol receipt.
      */
     constructor(factor_secret: Uint8Array, sealed_holder_material_b64u: string, expected_record_digest_b64u: string, expected_holder_ciphertext_digest_set_b64u: string, job_json: string, receipt_json: string);
 }

package/dist/esm/wasm/router_ab_ed25519_yao_client/pkg/router_ab_ed25519_yao_client.js

@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ var WasmLaneHolderSigningMaterialV1 = class {
 	}
 	/**
 	* Opens one digest-verified sealed holder record and binds it to the exact
-	* persisted R102 job and protocol receipt.
+	* persisted job and protocol receipt.
 	* @param {Uint8Array} factor_secret
 	* @param {string} sealed_holder_material_b64u
 	* @param {string} expected_record_digest_b64u

package/dist/public/headers.manifest.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "schemaVersion": 1,
   "packageName": "@seams/wallet",
-  "packageVersion": "0.6.2",
+  "packageVersion": "0.7.3",
   "assetRoot": "dist/public",
   "routeClasses": [
     {

package/dist/public/sdk/{ConfirmationDrawer-G0bT0Dbu.js → ConfirmationDrawer-MgFTBwwK.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { i as M, r as C, t as u } from "./jsxRuntime.module-FAP0NE9p.js";
+import { i as M, r as C, t as u } from "./jsxRuntime.module-CuH5ZEIA.js";
 //#region src/core/signingEngine/uiConfirm/ui/preact/clipboard.ts
 async function copySurfaceText(root, value, signal) {
 	if (!root.isConnected || signal?.aborted) return false;
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ var ModalShell = class extends C {
 			children: /* @__PURE__ */ u("div", {
 				id: this.containerId,
 				class: "modal-container-root",
+				tabIndex: -1,
 				children: this.props.children
 			})
 		});

package/dist/public/sdk/{EvmClient-CHw6txjt.js → EvmClient-f3gUhS2L.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { t as decodeJsonRpcEnvelope } from "./jsonRpc-MUsR5-C6.js";
+import { t as decodeJsonRpcEnvelope } from "./jsonRpc-VVkaQkFD.js";
 //#region ../shared-ts/src/utils/evmRpcResults.ts
 function parseRpcHexQuantity(value, label) {
 	const normalized = typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";