@seams/wallet-server 0.20.0 → 0.21.0

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/emailOtp/d1EmailOtpServerSealRuntime.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { normalizeOptionalTrimmedString } from "../../../../shared-ts/src/utils/normalize.js";
 import { failure } from "../../../../shared-ts/src/utils/failure.js";
-import { createSigningSessionSealShamir3PassCipherAdapter } from "../../../../threshold/session/signingSessionSeal/crypto/cipher.js";
+import { createEmailOtpEnrollmentShamir3PassCipherAdapter } from "../../../../threshold/session/signingSessionSeal/crypto/cipher.js";
 //#region src/router/cloudflare/d1/emailOtp/d1EmailOtpServerSealRuntime.ts
 const applyEmailOtpServerSealOperation = {
 	cipherOperation: "apply-server-seal",
@@ -19,14 +19,18 @@ var CloudflareD1EmailOtpServerSealRuntime = class {
 		this.cipherResult = this.createCipher();
 	}
 	async removeEmailOtpServerSeal(input) {
-		return await this.runServerSealOperation(input, removeEmailOtpServerSealOperation);
+		const keyVersion = normalizeOptionalTrimmedString(input.enrollmentSealKeyVersion);
+		if (!keyVersion) return failure("invalid_body", "Missing enrollmentSealKeyVersion");
+		return await this.runServerSealOperation(input.wrappedCiphertext, removeEmailOtpServerSealOperation, keyVersion);
 	}
 	async applyEmailOtpServerSeal(input) {
-		return await this.runServerSealOperation(input, applyEmailOtpServerSealOperation);
+		const shamir = this.cipherResult;
+		if (!shamir.ok) return shamir;
+		return await this.runServerSealOperation(input.wrappedCiphertext, applyEmailOtpServerSealOperation, shamir.keyVersion);
 	}
-	async runServerSealOperation(input, operation) {
+	async runServerSealOperation(wrappedCiphertextRaw, operation, keyVersion) {
 		try {
-			const wrappedCiphertext = normalizeOptionalTrimmedString(input.wrappedCiphertext);
+			const wrappedCiphertext = normalizeOptionalTrimmedString(wrappedCiphertextRaw);
 			if (!wrappedCiphertext) return failure("invalid_body", "Missing wrappedCiphertext");
 			const shamir = this.cipherResult;
 			if (!shamir.ok) return shamir;
@@ -34,14 +38,14 @@ var CloudflareD1EmailOtpServerSealRuntime = class {
 				operation: operation.cipherOperation,
 				thresholdSessionId: operation.thresholdSessionId,
 				ciphertext: wrappedCiphertext,
-				keyVersion: shamir.keyVersion,
+				keyVersion,
 				auth: { userId: "email_otp" }
 			});
 			if (!result.ok) return result;
 			return {
 				ok: true,
 				ciphertext: result.ciphertext,
-				enrollmentSealKeyVersion: result.keyVersion || shamir.keyVersion
+				enrollmentSealKeyVersion: result.keyVersion || keyVersion
 			};
 		} catch (error) {
 			return failure("internal", serverSealErrorMessage(error) || operation.failureMessage);
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var CloudflareD1EmailOtpServerSealRuntime = class {
 			return {
 				ok: true,
 				keyVersion: this.config.rootConfig.currentKeyVersion,
-				cipher: createSigningSessionSealShamir3PassCipherAdapter({ config: this.config.rootConfig })
+				cipher: createEmailOtpEnrollmentShamir3PassCipherAdapter({ config: this.config.rootConfig })
 			};
 		} catch (error) {
 			return failure("not_configured", serverSealErrorMessage(error) || "Email OTP Shamir configuration is invalid");

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/oidc/d1OidcBoundary.js

@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ function validateGoogleIdTokenClaims(input) {
 	const givenName = normalizeOptionalTrimmedString(payload.given_name);
 	const familyName = normalizeOptionalTrimmedString(payload.family_name);
 	const emailVerified = parseBooleanJwtClaim(payload.email_verified);
+	if (email && emailVerified !== true) return failedVerification("unverified_email", "Google id_token email is not verified");
 	const hostedDomain = normalizeOptionalTrimmedString(payload.hd);
 	return {
 		ok: true,

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/passkeyCustody/d1PasskeyCustodyRouteService.js

@@ -292,8 +292,21 @@ function createD1PasskeyCustodyRouteService(assembly) {
 				authenticatorStore,
 				logger: assembly.logger
 			});
-			if (response.status === 200 && request.locator.factor.kind === "passkey") await assembly.passkeyCustodyEnvelopes.recordWalletCredentialUse({
-				walletId: request.locator.walletId,
+			if (response.status !== 200) return response;
+			const method = await assembly.walletCustodyCommits.readPasskeyWalletAuthMethod({
+				rpId: String(locator.factor.rpId),
+				credentialIdB64u: String(locator.factor.credentialIdB64u)
+			});
+			if (!method || method.walletId !== locator.walletId) return {
+				status: 404,
+				body: failure("envelope_missing", "no custody envelope for this wallet and credential")
+			};
+			if (method.status !== "active") return {
+				status: 403,
+				body: failure("envelope_revoked", "this credential no longer opens the wallet")
+			};
+			await assembly.passkeyCustodyEnvelopes.recordWalletCredentialUse({
+				walletId: locator.walletId,
 				envelopeId: locator.envelopeId,
 				usedAtMs: (assembly.nowMs ?? Date.now)()
 			}).catch(() => void 0);
@@ -310,11 +323,12 @@ function createD1PasskeyCustodyRouteService(assembly) {
 			const stored = await assembly.walletCustodyCommits.readRecoveryEnvelopeSet(requireWalletId(request.walletId));
 			if (!stored) return { kind: "no_recovery_set" };
 			const issuedAtMs = Number(stored.record.issuedAtMs);
-			await assembly.walletCustodyCommits.writeBackupAcknowledgement(buildWalletRecoveryBackupAcknowledgementV1({
+			if (issuedAtMs !== request.expectedIssuedAtMs) return { kind: "conflict" };
+			if ((await assembly.walletCustodyCommits.writeBackupAcknowledgement(buildWalletRecoveryBackupAcknowledgementV1({
 				walletId: request.walletId,
-				issuedAtMs,
+				issuedAtMs: request.expectedIssuedAtMs,
 				acknowledgedAtMs: (assembly.nowMs ?? Date.now)()
-			}));
+			}))).kind === "conflict") return { kind: "conflict" };
 			return {
 				kind: "acknowledged",
 				issuedAtMs

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/passkeyCustody/d1WalletCustodyCommitStore.js

@@ -375,10 +375,26 @@ var CloudflareD1WalletCustodyCommitStore = class {
 			kind: "inconsistent",
 			reason: "recovery code locator already exists"
 		};
-		for (const entry of existing) if (entry.key === envelopeKey && entry.result.kind !== "missing") return { kind: "already_exists" };
-		if (existing.some(custodyRecordExists)) return { kind: "custody_already_established" };
+		let envelopeExists = false;
+		let existingRecordExists = false;
+		let existingRecoverySet = null;
+		for (const entry of existing) {
+			if (entry.result.kind === "missing") continue;
+			existingRecordExists = true;
+			if (entry.key === envelopeKey) envelopeExists = true;
+			if (entry.key === recoverySetKey && entry.result.value.kind === "wallet_recovery_envelope_set_v1") existingRecoverySet = entry.result.value;
+		}
+		if (envelopeExists) {
+			if (!existingRecoverySet || !sameRecoveryCodeKeys(existingRecoverySet, commit.recoverySet)) return { kind: "custody_already_established" };
+			return {
+				kind: "already_exists",
+				issuedAtMs: existingRecoverySet.issuedAtMs
+			};
+		}
+		if (existingRecordExists) return { kind: "custody_already_established" };
 		return {
 			kind: "reserved",
+			issuedAtMs: commit.recoverySet.issuedAtMs,
 			statements: [...this.records.prepareMutationStatements([
 				{
 					key: envelopeKey,
@@ -443,12 +459,9 @@ var CloudflareD1WalletCustodyCommitStore = class {
 		return parsed.ok ? parsed.record : null;
 	}
 	/**
-	* Records that the owner confirmed saving their codes.
-	*
-	* Written with no expected version, unlike the recovery set: this row is
-	* cosmetic, a repeat acknowledgement is not a conflict worth surfacing to
-	* someone pressing a button, and it shares no record with the wraps a spend
-	* updates — which is exactly why it is a separate key.
+	* Records the issuance that the owner confirmed saving. The caller selects
+	* that issuance before this write, so a concurrent rotation cannot make this
+	* acknowledgement apply to newer codes the owner did not see.
 	*/
 	async writeBackupAcknowledgement(record) {
 		const key = walletRecoveryBackupAcknowledgementRecordKey(requireWalletId(record.walletId));
@@ -783,8 +796,11 @@ var CloudflareD1WalletCustodyCommitStore = class {
 		};
 	}
 };
-function custodyRecordExists(entry) {
-	return entry.result.kind !== "missing";
+function sameRecoveryCodeKeys(left, right) {
+	if (left.walletId !== right.walletId) return false;
+	if (left.manifestKekWraps.length !== right.manifestKekWraps.length) return false;
+	for (let index = 0; index < left.manifestKekWraps.length; index += 1) if (left.manifestKekWraps[index]?.recoveryKeyId !== right.manifestKekWraps[index]?.recoveryKeyId) return false;
+	return true;
 }
 //#endregion
 export { CloudflareD1WalletCustodyCommitStore };

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/passkeyCustody/d1WalletRecoveryGoogleEmailOtpService.js

@@ -141,7 +141,10 @@ var CloudflareD1WalletRecoveryGoogleEmailOtpService = class {
 		if (!workerEphemeralPublicKey65B64u) return failure("invalid_body", "Email OTP recovery factor release key is required");
 		const enrollment = await this.enrollments.readEnrollment(String(attempt.walletId));
 		if (!enrollment || enrollment.orgId !== attempt.orgId || enrollment.providerUserId !== attempt.providerSubject || enrollment.verifiedEmail !== attempt.verifiedEmail || enrollment.enrollmentId !== attempt.targetEnrollment.enrollmentId || enrollment.enrollmentSealKeyVersion !== attempt.targetEnrollment.enrollmentSealKeyVersion) return failure("recovery_conflict", "Email OTP recovery enrollment changed after verification");
-		const unsealed = await this.serverSeal.removeEmailOtpServerSeal({ wrappedCiphertext: enrollment.serverSealedFactorCiphertextB64u });
+		const unsealed = await this.serverSeal.removeEmailOtpServerSeal({
+			wrappedCiphertext: enrollment.serverSealedFactorCiphertextB64u,
+			enrollmentSealKeyVersion: enrollment.enrollmentSealKeyVersion
+		});
 		if (!unsealed.ok) return unsealed;
 		if (unsealed.enrollmentSealKeyVersion !== enrollment.enrollmentSealKeyVersion) return failure("recovery_conflict", "Email OTP recovery enrollment seal changed after verification");
 		const sealed = await sealEmailOtpFactorSecretForWorker({

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/wallet/d1WalletAuthMethodService.js

@@ -1390,6 +1390,12 @@ var CloudflareD1WalletAuthMethodService = class {
 			code: "unauthorized",
 			message: "Wallet Email OTP authority is unavailable"
 		};
+		const walletAuthority = await this.walletAuthorityStore.readById(record.walletAuthorityId);
+		if (!walletAuthority || walletAuthority.state !== "active" || walletAuthority.walletId !== record.walletId || !isFullOwnerAuthorityV1(walletAuthority)) return {
+			ok: false,
+			code: "forbidden",
+			message: "Full owner authority is required"
+		};
 		const provider = providerUserId.startsWith("google:") ? "google" : "email";
 		try {
 			return {

package/dist/esm/router/cloudflare/d1/wallet/d1WalletRelocationApprovals.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { base64UrlEncode } from "../../../../shared-ts/src/utils/base64.js";
 import { parseDigestB64u } from "../../../../shared-ts/src/utils/canonicalPrimitives.js";
 import { D1_BATCH_CAS_GUARD_SQL } from "../../../../storage/d1Sql.js";
 import { readWalletRelocationOwner } from "./d1WalletRelocationOwner.js";
@@ -99,6 +100,12 @@ var D1WalletRelocationApprovals = class {
 		if (!approval || !Number.isSafeInteger(nowMs) || nowMs < approval.approvedAtMs || nowMs >= approval.expiresAtMs) return null;
 		const owner = await readWalletRelocationOwner(this.database, this.scope, binding);
 		if (!owner || owner.authority.authorityDigestB64u !== approval.authorityDigestB64u || owner.authority.revocationEpoch !== approval.authorityRevocationEpoch) return null;
+		if (!await this.database.prepare(`SELECT 1 FROM wallet_session_authorizations_v2
+      WHERE namespace = ?1 AND org_id = ?2 AND project_id = ?3 AND env_id = ?4
+        AND wallet_id = ?5 AND authority_id = ?6 AND wallet_auth_method_id = ?7
+        AND operation_credential_hash = ?8 AND expires_at_ms = ?9
+        AND retired_at_ms IS NULL AND expires_at_ms > ?10
+        AND expires_at_ms > CAST(unixepoch('subsec') * 1000 AS INTEGER)`).bind(this.scope.namespace, this.scope.orgId, this.scope.projectId, this.scope.envId, binding.walletId, binding.authorityId, binding.walletAuthMethodId, credentialDigestB64u(binding.credentialDigestHex), binding.credentialExpiresAtMs, nowMs).first()) return null;
 		return approval;
 	}
 	async read(binding) {
@@ -134,6 +141,11 @@ var D1WalletRelocationApprovals = class {
 function failedStatement(result) {
 	return result.success !== true;
 }
+function credentialDigestB64u(hex) {
+	const bytes = new Uint8Array(32);
+	for (let index = 0; index < bytes.length; index += 1) bytes[index] = Number.parseInt(hex.slice(index * 2, index * 2 + 2), 16);
+	return parseDigestB64u(base64UrlEncode(bytes));
+}
 //#endregion
 export { D1WalletRelocationApprovals };