@sdelsad/commodity-desk-daily 1.0.43 → 1.0.45

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/email.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
1
+ SOFT COMMODITY TRADING
2
+ Episode 14 · Monday 31 August 2026 · 13 min 11
3
+
4
+ Sugar: Two Contracts, the Switch and the Refiner
5
+ Sugar is quoted twice, one refining step apart, and the gap between the two
6
+ screens is what the market pays for refining. Then Brazil's mills, where
7
+ supply is a daily decision between food and fuel, and ethanol parity is the
8
+ price at which that decision flips.
9
+
10
+ Listen: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep14.mp3
11
+ Read online: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep14.html
12
+
13
+ MARKET PULSE
14
+ ============
15
+
16
+ Sugar gave back three and a half percent on Friday after a month in which it
17
+ rose twenty-one, and the grains went the other way — Chicago wheat closed at
18
+ a three-year high.
19
+
20
+ Market Contract Price Change
21
+ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
22
+ Raw sugar No. 11 (ICE) Oct 26 17.56 c/lb −0.63c / −3.5%
23
+ White sugar No. 5 (ICE London) Oct 26 $520.30/t −$8.50 / −1.6%
24
+ Chicago wheat Sep 26 767.00 c/bu +24¼c / +3.3%
25
+ Soybeans (CBOT) Sep 26 1276.25 c/bu +19¾c / +1.6%
26
+ Soybean meal Sep 26 $338.20/t +$8.00 / +2.4%
27
+ Corn (CBOT) Sep 26 512.00 c/bu +1¾c / +0.3%
28
+
29
+ Friday's sugar break reads as long liquidation into a weekend rather than a
30
+ change of story. The move that matters is the one behind it: raws printed a
31
+ fourteen-month high on 18 August and are still around twenty-one percent
32
+ higher on the month. Three supply lines moved the same way at once. Brazil's
33
+ Center-South made 3.903 million tonnes of sugar in June, down 26.3% year on
34
+ year. Thailand's 2026/27 crop is forecast at 9.5 million tonnes, down 15.6%.
35
+ EU and UK output is put at 14.98 million tonnes, the lowest in eleven years.
36
+ The analyst community has flipped 2026/27 from surplus to deficit — the ISO
37
+ now has −262,000 t, Green Pool −3.2 Mt, StoneX −1.7 Mt.
38
+
39
+ At 17.56 cents the screen sits about two cents above the roughly 15.7 c/lb
40
+ FOB cost of production for Brazilian raws. That is a market paying a real
41
+ incentive, not a market at cost.
42
+
43
+ The grain complex ignored all of it. Wheat led on Black Sea export risk,
44
+ beans followed the meal, and corn barely moved as a fast US harvest capped
45
+ it.
46
+
47
+ [chart] Grains bid, sugar sold — On the same session the two complexes
48
+ traded opposite stories: wheat priced an export threat, sugar priced
49
+ a long book being trimmed before a weekend. — CBOT and ICE
50
+ settlements, Friday 28 August 2026 —
51
+ https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-
52
+ desk-daily/ep14_chart1.png
53
+
54
+ The policy read: India turns a tariff off. India is the world's largest
55
+ sugar consumer, and this month it opened a duty-free import window of one
56
+ million tonnes running to 31 October against a standing 100% duty. The
57
+ mechanism, not the headline, is the trade. A cut domestic crop, a monsoon
58
+ running 13% below normal through 26 August, and retail sugar moving from 48
59
+ rupees a kilo in July to about 55 in August give a government little choice:
60
+ food inflation gets the tariff switched off. The instant it is, the largest
61
+ consumer stops being an occasional exporter and becomes a buyer, which moves
62
+ the world balance sheet in both directions from one administrative decision.
63
+ The caution is that a permission is not a purchase — one forecaster expects
64
+ no more than 500,000 t to actually clear by the deadline.
65
+
66
+ * Sugar is quoted twice, one refining step apart: raws in cents per pound
67
+ in New York, whites in dollars per tonne in London. The bridge is 22.05,
68
+ and getting it wrong is a factor-of-twenty-two error.
69
+
70
+ * The gap between the two screens is the white premium, and it is the
71
+ market's price for the act of refining.
72
+
73
+ * Center-South Brazil is the only origin at scale that can decide, daily,
74
+ whether its crop becomes food or fuel. That makes its supply a decision
75
+ rather than a harvest.
76
+
77
+ * ATR is the unit that makes the decision computable, because it is the
78
+ raw material for both products and the basis on which growers are paid.
79
+
80
+ * Ethanol parity is the sugar price at which a mill is indifferent. Below
81
+ it, mills make fuel; above it, they make sugar.
82
+
83
+ * When sugar trades far above parity, the switch has already been used. A
84
+ further rally pulls no additional tonnes out of Brazil and can only
85
+ ration demand.
86
+
87
+ * Sugar has two demand curves, food and fuel, and the fuel curve is a
88
+ floor rather than a source of demand growth.
89
+
90
+ * The floor moves with things that are not sugar: the blending mandate,
91
+ crude, and the Brazilian real.
92
+
93
+ * A refiner is not long sugar. He is long the spread between two contracts
94
+ and short his own cost stack.
95
+
96
+ * His break-even white premium rises with the raw price, because the
97
+ refining loss is a percentage of what he buys and not a fee.
98
+
99
+ Term What it means
100
+ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
101
+ No. 11 The ICE raw cane sugar futures contract, 112,000 lb
102
+ quoted in US cents per pound, FOB at origin, and the
103
+ world price of raw sugar
104
+ No. 5 The ICE London white sugar futures contract, 50 tonnes
105
+ quoted in US dollars per tonne, delivered, and the
106
+ world price of refined sugar
107
+ long ton 2,240 lb, the imperial weight unit the sugar No. 11
108
+ contract is still sized in at 50 long tons a lot
109
+ raws Raw cane sugar, the crystalline product a cane mill
110
+ exports before refining, traded at 96 degrees
111
+ polarisation
112
+ VHP Very high polarisation raw sugar, around 99 degrees,
113
+ the grade Brazil exports and which trades at a premium
114
+ to the No. 11 screen
115
+ polarisation (pol) The sucrose purity of a sugar measured by the rotation
116
+ of polarised light, expressed in degrees, and the
117
+ basis on which raw sugar is priced and settled
118
+ ICUMSA The colour scale for refined sugar, lower being
119
+ whiter, with the No. 5 contract requiring 45 ICUMSA or
120
+ better
121
+ white premium The price of the London white contract less the New
122
+ York raw contract converted to the same unit, which is
123
+ what the market pays for refining
124
+ ATR Açúcar Total Recuperável, total recoverable sugar, the
125
+ kilos of sugar recoverable from a tonne of cane and
126
+ the unit in which Brazilian growers are paid and mills
127
+ compare products
128
+ sugar mix The share of a mill's recoverable sugars turned into
129
+ sugar rather than ethanol, bounded above by the
130
+ plant's crystallisation capacity
131
+ hydrous ethanol Roughly 95 percent ethanol sold directly at the pump
132
+ for flex-fuel cars in Brazil, taking 1.6913 kg of ATR
133
+ per litre
134
+ anhydrous ethanol Near-water-free ethanol blended into petrol under a
135
+ mandate, taking 1.7651 kg of ATR per litre
136
+ ethanol parity The sugar price at which a mill earns the same per
137
+ unit of ATR from sugar as from ethanol, and the level
138
+ at which its production decision flips
139
+ Center-South The Brazilian sugarcane region running from São Paulo
140
+ through Minas Gerais and Goiás, about 90 percent of
141
+ the national crop and the world's swing supplier
142
+ destination refinery A standalone refinery at the consuming end that buys
143
+ raws on the water and sells whites locally, earning
144
+ the white premium less its costs rather than a crop
145
+ margin
146
+ melt loss The sugar lost between raws in and whites out, roughly
147
+ six percent, which makes a refiner's break-even
148
+ premium a function of the raw price
149
+ toll refining Refining someone else's raws for a fee per tonne,
150
+ which converts the white premium from a trading
151
+ position into a fixed margin
152
+
153
+
154
+ CONVERSION DRILL 2 OF 12 — BUSHELS ↔ TONNES, CORN
155
+ =================================================
156
+
157
+ Rule: 1 tonne of corn ≈ 39.4 bushels (a bushel of corn is 56 lb)
158
+
159
+ Fast method: tonnes → bushels: ×40, then shave 1.5%. Bushels → tonnes: ÷40,
160
+ then add 1.5%.
161
+
162
+ * 10,000 t → 400,000 − 6,000 = 394,000 bu
163
+
164
+ * 60,000 t Panamax → 2,400,000 − 36,000 ≈ 2.36 million bu
165
+
166
+ * 250,000 bu → 6,250 + 94 ≈ 6,344 t
167
+
168
+
169
+ QUIZ
170
+ ====
171
+
172
+ Q1. A Center-South mill will crush 3.6 million tonnes of cane this season at
173
+ 138 kg of ATR per tonne of cane. Its board is deciding the sugar mix. Raw
174
+ sugar is at 16.20 c/lb and the São Paulo hydrous ethanol indicator is at
175
+ $0.4100 a litre. Use the industry factors: 1.0495 kg of ATR per kg of sugar,
176
+ 1.6913 kg of ATR per litre of hydrous. Compute the ethanol parity price in
177
+ cents per pound, then the extra revenue the mill earns by moving five
178
+ percentage points of its mix from ethanol to sugar — and state the one
179
+ reason that figure overstates what actually lands in the accounts.
180
+
181
+ Q2. October whites settle at $520.30 a tonne. A destination refiner needs
182
+ 1.06 tonnes of raws for each tonne of white he sells, and his refining cost
183
+ is $70 a tonne of white. If raw sugar rallied to 20.00 c/lb, what white
184
+ premium would he need to break even?
185
+
186
+ Q3. (Ep 13) An exporter sells 15 lots of arabica price-to-be-fixed against
187
+ December, buyer's call. December was 302.00 when the contract was signed and
188
+ is 342.00 today, with the buyer still unfixed. Compute the exporter's mark-
189
+ to-market credit exposure to that buyer.
190
+
191
+ Q4. (Ep 11) In the middle of harvest week, a terminal elevator with no
192
+ funding problem posts a corn bid fifteen cents under the board when every
193
+ neighbouring bid is five under. Say what that bid is doing.
194
+
195
+ Conversion drill. A Handysize parcel of 28,500 t of corn is being offered.
196
+ Convert it to bushels using the mental method.
197
+
198
+
199
+ ============================================================================
200
+ SOLUTIONS BELOW — ANSWER FIRST
201
+ ============================================================================
202
+
203
+
204
+
205
+
206
+
207
+
208
+
209
+
210
+
211
+
212
+
213
+
214
+
215
+
216
+
217
+
218
+
219
+
220
+
221
+
222
+
223
+
224
+
225
+
226
+
227
+
228
+ SOLUTIONS
229
+ =========
230
+
231
+ A1. The mill is not choosing a price. It is choosing which product to make
232
+ out of a fixed pool of recoverable sugars, so every comparison has to be
233
+ made per tonne of ATR.
234
+
235
+ Step one — the pool. 3.6 million tonnes of cane at 138 kg of ATR per tonne
236
+ gives 496,800 tonnes of ATR for the season.
237
+
238
+ Step two — what one tonne of ATR is worth each way.
239
+
240
+ Factor Output per t of ATR Price Revenue
241
+ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
242
+ Sugar 1.0495 kg ATR per 952.8 kg $357.15/t $340.30
243
+ kg
244
+ Hydrous ethanol 1.6913 kg ATR per 591.3 L $0.4100/L $242.42
245
+ litre
246
+
247
+ The sugar price comes from the screen: 16.20 c/lb × 22.0462 = $357.15 a
248
+ tonne. Sugar beats ethanol by $97.88 per tonne of ATR, about 40 percent.
249
+
250
+ Step three — ethanol parity. Run the ethanol number backwards to find the
251
+ sugar price that would make the mill indifferent. Ethanol earns $0.4100 ÷
252
+ 1.6913 = $0.2424 per kg of ATR. One kg of ATR yields 0.9528 kg of sugar. So
253
+ parity is $0.2424 ÷ 0.9528 = $0.2544 per kg, which is $254.42 a tonne, or
254
+ 11.54 c/lb. The screen at 16.20 is 4.66 cents above parity.
255
+
256
+ Step four — the five points. Five percentage points of 496,800 t of ATR is
257
+ 24,840 t of ATR. At $97.88 a tonne of ATR, that is about $2.43 million of
258
+ extra revenue for the season.
259
+
260
+ The trap. The two prices are not measured at the same place. The ethanol
261
+ indicator is a mill-gate price. The No. 11 screen is FOB the port, so the
262
+ sugar route still has to pay road freight from the interior, port elevation
263
+ and terminal costs before it reaches the mill gate — several tens of dollars
264
+ a tonne of sugar, which eats a visible slice of the $97.88. The gap survives
265
+ that deduction comfortably at these prices, which is the real answer, but a
266
+ board paper that quotes $2.43 million without netting logistics is quoting a
267
+ gross number as if it were a margin.
268
+
269
+ Two second-order points worth having. The mix is bounded by crystallisation
270
+ capacity, so "move five points" is an engineering question before it is an
271
+ economic one — a mill already at its ceiling cannot take the trade at any
272
+ price. And the moment the mill sells more sugar it takes on price risk it
273
+ did not have, because ethanol is sold domestically in reais while sugar is
274
+ sold in dollars.
275
+
276
+ A2. One step, and the step is the loss factor.
277
+
278
+ 20.00 c/lb × 22.0462 = $440.92 a tonne of raws. He buys 1.06 tonnes for
279
+ every tonne he sells, so his raw cost is $467.38. Add $70 of refining and he
280
+ needs $537.38 for the white. The white premium he needs is therefore $537.38
281
+ − $440.92 = $96.46 a tonne.
282
+
283
+ The quick route is the same arithmetic in one line: the premium has to cover
284
+ the six percent he loses plus the fee, so 0.06 × $440.92 + $70 = $96.46.
285
+
286
+ What the question is testing is that the break-even premium is not a
287
+ constant. At Friday's 17.56 c/lb the same refiner breaks even at $93.23. At
288
+ 12 c/lb he breaks even at $85.87. Every cent the raw market rallies raises
289
+ his break-even, because the melt loss is a percentage of what he buys and
290
+ the refining fee is not. A refiner who watches the premium in dollars alone
291
+ believes a bull market is making him money, when part of the widening is
292
+ simply keeping him whole.
293
+
294
+ A3. 15 lots of arabica is 15 × 37,500 lb = 562,500 lb. The market has moved
295
+ 342.00 − 302.00 = 40.00 cents in the buyer's favour since the contract was
296
+ signed. At 40 cents on 562,500 lb, the buyer is sitting on an unrealised
297
+ gain of $225,000, and that is exactly the exporter's mark-to-market credit
298
+ exposure.
299
+
300
+ The reason it is credit and not market risk is that the exporter is fully
301
+ hedged on price. He sold futures against the sale, and whenever the buyer
302
+ fixes, the futures leg and the physical leg offset. What he is exposed to is
303
+ the buyer choosing not to fix at all — walking away from a contract that is
304
+ now $225,000 in the money to the exporter's disadvantage, or failing
305
+ altogether. The buyer has posted nothing against that gain. The exposure
306
+ grows with every cent the market rallies, and no market move can reduce it
307
+ to zero.
308
+
309
+ A4. The bid is not a price. It is a refusal.
310
+
311
+ An elevator that is ten cents worse than its neighbours in harvest week,
312
+ with money available, is not making a statement about the value of corn. It
313
+ is managing a queue. Its binding constraint is space, not capital: once the
314
+ bins are full, the next truck through the gate has nowhere to go, and taking
315
+ that corn means either turning it away later or piling it on the ground at a
316
+ cost. So the bid drops until the trucks go elsewhere.
317
+
318
+ Two consequences follow. First, the posted bid stops carrying information
319
+ about the basis and starts carrying information about capacity, so reading
320
+ it as a market signal is a mistake. Second, the elevator that still has
321
+ space in that week owns the bottleneck and can set replacement value for
322
+ everyone around it. That is the whole reason merchants rent ships and own
323
+ elevators.
324
+
325
+ Drill answer. 28,500 t of corn.
326
+
327
+ Mental method: multiply by 40 and shave 1.5 percent. 28,500 × 40 =
328
+ 1,140,000. One and a half percent of that is 17,100. So 1,140,000 − 17,100 =
329
+ 1,122,900 bushels.
330
+
331
+ Exact: 28,500 t × 39.368 = 1,121,988 bu, so the mental route is 0.08 percent
332
+ high. At 5,000 bushels to a Chicago lot, that parcel is about 224 lots —
333
+ worth checking, because a Handysize corn cargo hedged as 228 lots is four
334
+ lots of naked length nobody put on deliberately.
335
+
336
+
337
+ THE EPISODE, IN WRITING
338
+ =======================
339
+
340
+
341
+
342
+ Sugar is quoted twice, and the two quotes are not in the same language.
343
+
344
+ No. 11 is the ICE raw sugar contract in New York. It prices raw cane sugar
345
+ free on board at origin and it is the world price of the raw commodity. It
346
+ is quoted in US cents per pound. A lot is 112,000 lb, which is 50 long tons,
347
+ and the tick is one hundredth of a cent — a point, in the softs convention —
348
+ worth $11.20.
349
+
350
+ No. 5 is the ICE white sugar contract in London. It prices refined sugar,
351
+ delivered, in US dollars per tonne, with 50 tonnes to a lot.
352
+
353
+ One commodity, one refining step apart, quoted in two different units. The
354
+ bridge is the tonne itself: 2,204.6 lb, so cents per pound multiplied by
355
+ 22.0462 gives dollars per tonne. Friday's 17.56 c/lb is $387.13 a tonne.
356
+ London settled at $520.30. The difference, $133.17 a tonne, is the white
357
+ premium, and it is what the market pays for the act of refining.
358
+
359
+ Center-South Brazil is the swing supplier of the world sugar market, and its
360
+ mills have something no other origin has at scale: a choice.
361
+
362
+ A cane mill crushes cane, extracts the recoverable sugars, and then sends
363
+ those sugars down one of two pipes. Crystal sugar for export, or ethanol for
364
+ the pump. The choice is made continuously through the season, and the plant
365
+ is built to do both.
366
+
367
+ The unit that makes it computable is ATR — Açúcar Total Recuperável, total
368
+ recoverable sugar. ATR measures the kilos of sugar that could in principle
369
+ be recovered from a tonne of cane. It is neither sugar nor ethanol; it is
370
+ the feedstock for both, and it is the basis on which Brazilian growers are
371
+ paid, which is why the entire industry speaks in it.
372
+
373
+ The conversion factors are industry standard:
374
+
375
+ Product ATR required
376
+ ------------------------------------------
377
+ 1 kg of sugar 1.0495 kg
378
+ 1 litre of hydrous ethanol 1.6913 kg
379
+ 1 litre of anhydrous ethanol 1.7651 kg
380
+
381
+ Take one tonne of ATR and run it both ways at Friday's prices.
382
+
383
+ Route Output Price Revenue
384
+ -----------------------------------------------
385
+ Sugar 952.8 kg $387.13/t $368.87
386
+ Hydrous ethanol 591.3 L $0.4476/L $264.65
387
+ Anhydrous ethanol 566.5 L $0.5043/L $285.71
388
+
389
+ Sugar wins by $104.22 a tonne of ATR against hydrous — about 40 percent.
390
+
391
+ [chart] One tonne of ATR, three destinations — At Friday's prices the sugar
392
+ route earns forty percent more per unit of recoverable sugar than
393
+ hydrous ethanol. That gap, not the sugar price itself, is what sets
394
+ Brazil's export supply. — Computed from ICE No. 11 October
395
+ settlement 17.56 c/lb and CEPEA/ESALQ São Paulo ethanol indicators,
396
+ 28 August 2026, using CONSECANA conversion factors —
397
+ https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-
398
+ desk-daily/ep14_chart2.png
399
+
400
+ Run the ethanol number backwards and you get the figure a desk actually
401
+ quotes: ethanol parity, the sugar price at which the mill is indifferent
402
+ between the two pipes.
403
+
404
+ Hydrous earns $0.4476 ÷ 1.6913 = $0.2647 per kg of ATR. One kg of ATR makes
405
+ 0.9528 kg of sugar. So parity is $0.2647 ÷ 0.9528 = $0.2778 per kg, or
406
+ $277.75 a tonne — 12.60 c/lb. On anhydrous it is 13.60.
407
+
408
+ The screen was 17.56. Sugar is nearly five cents above parity, which in
409
+ tonnes is $109 of headroom.
410
+
411
+ That headroom is not free money. Everything between the mill gate and the
412
+ ship's rail has to fit inside it: truck freight from the interior, port
413
+ elevation, terminal costs. But it fits comfortably, and that is the point.
414
+ It is why Center-South mills have been running their sugar mix at the top of
415
+ their engineering limit — above half the crop — for two seasons.
416
+
417
+ Here is how the question gets asked on a desk:
418
+
419
+ | TRADER: Where's parity?
420
+
421
+ | ANALYST: Twelve sixty on hydrous. Thirteen sixty on anhydrous.
422
+
423
+ | TRADER: So they're maxed.
424
+
425
+ | ANALYST: Maxed since April. There's nothing left to switch.
426
+
427
+ Notice what that exchange settles. Nobody asked where sugar was going. The
428
+ question was whether Brazil has any switching left in it — and the answer
429
+ determines what a rally can do. When sugar trades far above parity, the
430
+ mills have already converted everything they can convert. The switch is
431
+ spent. A rally from there pulls no additional tonnes out of Brazil; all it
432
+ can do is ration demand. That is a structurally different market from one
433
+ where a rally brings supply forward.
434
+
435
+ This is what makes sugar odd. It has two demand curves.
436
+
437
+ Food demand is inelastic and grows roughly with population. Fuel demand is
438
+ not about sugar at all — it is about petrol prices, blending policy and the
439
+ Brazilian real.
440
+
441
+ The fuel curve does not usually add much growth. What it does is put a floor
442
+ under the price. If sugar falls to parity, the mill stops making sugar.
443
+ Supply does not taper politely; it switches, at a level you can compute in
444
+ advance.
445
+
446
+ And the floor moves. Brazil lifted its mandatory anhydrous blend to 32%.
447
+ Crude has rallied. The São Paulo hydrous indicator was up 2.85% last week
448
+ and anhydrous 2.35%. Each of those raises the floor under sugar without a
449
+ single tonne of sugar changing hands — which is why a sugar analyst spends
450
+ half their time on energy.
451
+
452
+ Back to the white premium: $133.17 a tonne on Friday.
453
+
454
+ A refiner buys raws, melts them, strips out the colour and the molasses
455
+ film, and sells whites. He is not long sugar. He is long the spread between
456
+ two contracts and short his own cost stack.
457
+
458
+ He also cannot make a tonne of white from a tonne of raws. Raws are 96
459
+ degrees polarisation; the No. 5 contract wants 45 ICUMSA and near-total
460
+ purity. Add process losses and call it 1.06 tonnes of raws for one tonne of
461
+ white.
462
+
463
+ [chart] A refiner's margin, Friday's screens — The whole business is the
464
+ white premium less the melt loss and the fee. Forty dollars a tonne
465
+ is what survives — and the loss line grows every time raws rally. —
466
+ Worked example, episode 14, using ICE No. 11 and No. 5 October
467
+ settlements of 28 August 2026 and an assumed $70/t refining cost —
468
+ https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-
469
+ desk-daily/ep14_chart3.png
470
+
471
+ Now the part people get wrong.
472
+
473
+ His break-even white premium is not a constant. The six percent he loses in
474
+ the melt is a percentage of the raw price, not a fee. At Friday's raws that
475
+ loss costs $23.23, so he breaks even at a premium of $93.23. If raws were at
476
+ 12 c/lb the same loss would cost $15.87 and break-even would be $85.87.
477
+
478
+ So when raws rally, the white premium has to widen just to leave the refiner
479
+ exactly where he was. A refiner who watches the premium in dollars rather
480
+ than against the raw price will believe he is earning more on the way up and
481
+ discover he is not.
482
+
483
+ That is the second reason a white premium blows out in a bull market. The
484
+ first is that everybody wants refined sugar at once, and refining capacity
485
+ is fixed in the short run. The second is arithmetic.
486
+
487
+ The India window and the Brazilian switch are the same story told from
488
+ opposite ends.
489
+
490
+ India turning off a 100% duty adds demand that no crop created. Brazil,
491
+ already at its mix ceiling, cannot answer it with more sugar. When a
492
+ market's swing supplier has spent its flexibility, incremental demand has to
493
+ be rationed by price rather than met by supply — and the rationing shows up
494
+ first in the white premium, because the consuming end wants refined sugar,
495
+ not raws.
496
+
497
+
498
+ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
499
+ Soft Commodity Trading — a daily briefing on physical commodity trading.
500
+
501
+ GLOSSARY
502
+ Every unit and expression the show has introduced lives on the episode page:
503
+ https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/ep14.html#glossary
504
+
505
+ All episodes: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/index.html
506
+ RSS: https://storage.googleapis.com/podcast-audio-2647223968/commodity-desk-daily/feed.xml