@schema-weaver/pg-connector 0.0.0-stage → 2.0.1

package/dist/cjs/execution/migration-runner.js

@@ -0,0 +1,798 @@
+"use strict";
+var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
+    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
+      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
+    }
+    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
+}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    o[k2] = m[k];
+}));
+var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
+    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
+}) : function(o, v) {
+    o["default"] = v;
+});
+var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
+    var ownKeys = function(o) {
+        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
+            var ar = [];
+            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
+            return ar;
+        };
+        return ownKeys(o);
+    };
+    return function (mod) {
+        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
+        var result = {};
+        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
+        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
+        return result;
+    };
+})();
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.MigrationRunner = exports.MIGRATION_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS = exports.MAX_MIGRATION_DEADLINE_MS = exports.MAX_MIGRATION_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS = exports.MigrationTimeoutError = exports.MigrationPartiallyAppliedError = exports.MigrationPlanUnsafeError = exports.MigrationStrategyConflictError = exports.MigrationInProgressError = void 0;
+exports.resolveMigrationBudget = resolveMigrationBudget;
+exports.advisoryLockKey = advisoryLockKey;
+const crypto = __importStar(require("crypto"));
+const pool_1 = require("./pool");
+const machine_config_1 = require("../config/machine-config");
+const types_1 = require("./types");
+const non_tx_detector_1 = require("./non-tx-detector");
+const statement_classifier_1 = require("./statement-classifier");
+const redact_1 = require("../audit/redact");
+const sanitize_1 = require("../audit/sanitize");
+const constants_1 = require("../protocol/constants");
+class MigrationInProgressError extends Error {
+    /** Error catalog code. Not a SQLSTATE: `safePgCode` requires exactly 5. */
+    code = 'migration_in_progress';
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'MigrationInProgressError';
+    }
+}
+exports.MigrationInProgressError = MigrationInProgressError;
+class MigrationStrategyConflictError extends Error {
+    code = 'migration_strategy_conflict';
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'MigrationStrategyConflictError';
+    }
+}
+exports.MigrationStrategyConflictError = MigrationStrategyConflictError;
+/**
+ * The plan could not be verified: something in it does not parse, contains
+ * more than one statement, or is a statement form the agent cannot prove runs
+ * inside a transaction block. The run is refused rather than guessed at.
+ */
+class MigrationPlanUnsafeError extends Error {
+    code = 'migration_plan_unsafe';
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'MigrationPlanUnsafeError';
+    }
+}
+exports.MigrationPlanUnsafeError = MigrationPlanUnsafeError;
+/**
+ * The migration stopped partway with statements already committed.
+ *
+ * `MigrationRunner.run` never *resolves* with `status: 'partial'`: a caller
+ * that only inspects a returned value can therefore never mistake a
+ * half-applied schema for a success. The per-statement detail is on
+ * {@link MigrationPartiallyAppliedError.result} for a caller that wants to
+ * report it.
+ */
+class MigrationPartiallyAppliedError extends Error {
+    code = 'migration_partial';
+    result;
+    pg_error_code;
+    constructor(message, result) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'MigrationPartiallyAppliedError';
+        this.result = result;
+        const failed = result.statements.find((s) => s.status === 'failed');
+        this.pg_error_code = failed?.pg_error_code;
+    }
+}
+exports.MigrationPartiallyAppliedError = MigrationPartiallyAppliedError;
+/** The run exceeded its overall deadline and was abandoned. */
+class MigrationTimeoutError extends Error {
+    code = 'migration_timeout';
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'MigrationTimeoutError';
+    }
+}
+exports.MigrationTimeoutError = MigrationTimeoutError;
+/**
+ * Absolute ceiling on one migration statement, in milliseconds. A caller
+ * cannot raise it, and it can never exceed the agent-wide statement ceiling in
+ * `pool.ts` — nothing is allowed to turn `statement_timeout` off.
+ */
+exports.MAX_MIGRATION_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS = Math.min(constants_1.DEFAULTS.MIGRATION_TIMEOUT_MS, pool_1.MAX_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+/** Absolute ceiling on the whole migration run, in milliseconds. */
+exports.MAX_MIGRATION_DEADLINE_MS = constants_1.DEFAULTS.MIGRATION_TIMEOUT_MS;
+/** How long a migration statement may wait for a lock before it is cancelled. */
+exports.MIGRATION_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS = pool_1.LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS;
+/** PostgreSQL's SQLSTATE for a statement cancelled by a timeout or a cancel request. */
+const PG_QUERY_CANCELED = '57014';
+/**
+ * Internal marker: the run was torn down by a cancellation or by the overall
+ * deadline. It never leaves this module — callers see {@link
+ * MigrationTimeoutError} or {@link MigrationPartiallyAppliedError}.
+ */
+class RunInterrupted extends Error {
+    /** Which edge tore the run down. */
+    reason;
+    constructor(reason) {
+        super(`migration run interrupted: ${reason}`);
+        this.name = 'RunInterrupted';
+        this.reason = reason;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The exact integer that reaches `SET statement_timeout = …`.
+ *
+ * The value is interpolated into SQL, so it is re-validated where it is used
+ * instead of trusted from the caller: only a finite, positive, safe integer
+ * survives, and anything else becomes the server-owned ceiling. Nothing a remote
+ * caller can put in `timeout_ms` reaches the statement text verbatim, and a
+ * clamped value can never be `0` — which PostgreSQL reads as "no timeout".
+ */
+function safeTimeoutMs(value, ceilingMs) {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(value) || !Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value <= 0) {
+        return ceilingMs;
+    }
+    return Math.min(value, ceilingMs);
+}
+/**
+ * Turn a caller-supplied `timeout_ms` into the three server-side budgets.
+ *
+ * The number is never trusted: it is floored to an integer, and clamped to
+ * {@link MAX_MIGRATION_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS} / {@link MAX_MIGRATION_DEADLINE_MS}.
+ * `0`, a negative number, `NaN` and `Infinity` all mean "use the server
+ * default" — never "no timeout", which is how a remote caller would otherwise
+ * be able to remove the ceiling by asking for zero.
+ */
+function resolveMigrationBudget(requestedTimeoutMs) {
+    const requested = typeof requestedTimeoutMs === 'number' &&
+        Number.isFinite(requestedTimeoutMs) &&
+        requestedTimeoutMs > 0
+        ? Math.floor(requestedTimeoutMs)
+        : undefined;
+    const statementTimeoutMs = requested === undefined
+        ? exports.MAX_MIGRATION_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS
+        : Math.min(requested, exports.MAX_MIGRATION_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    const deadlineMs = requested === undefined
+        ? exports.MAX_MIGRATION_DEADLINE_MS
+        : Math.min(requested, exports.MAX_MIGRATION_DEADLINE_MS);
+    return {
+        statementTimeoutMs,
+        deadlineMs,
+        lockTimeoutMs: Math.min(exports.MIGRATION_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS, statementTimeoutMs),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Refuse a plan whose entries are not exactly one statement each.
+ *
+ * node-postgres takes the simple query protocol whenever `values` is falsy, and
+ * that protocol executes *every* semicolon-separated statement in one round
+ * trip. `SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users` is therefore two commands to PostgreSQL and
+ * one string to everything above it — the C-01 mechanism, reachable through the
+ * migration path.
+ *
+ * The verdict comes from the PostgreSQL parse tree, so a `;` inside a string
+ * literal, a dollar-quoted body, a quoted identifier or a comment cannot trip
+ * it, a single trailing terminator is not a second statement, and a real second
+ * statement always is. Anything that does not parse exactly once is refused,
+ * which also covers a plan written for a PostgreSQL version this agent cannot
+ * parse: an unverifiable entry is never executed.
+ */
+async function assertOneStatementPerEntry(statements) {
+    const offenders = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < statements.length; i++) {
+        try {
+            await (0, statement_classifier_1.assertSingleReadStatement)(statements[i]);
+        }
+        catch {
+            offenders.push(i);
+        }
+    }
+    if (offenders.length === 0)
+        return;
+    throw new MigrationPlanUnsafeError(`Migration plan contains entries that are not exactly one statement ` +
+        `(index ${offenders.map((i) => i + 1).join(', ')}). Refusing the plan: an entry that ` +
+        'hides a second command behind a semicolon would be executed as two commands, and ' +
+        'one the agent could not parse cannot be verified.');
+}
+/**
+ * Read the `locked` column of a `pg_try_advisory_*_lock` result.
+ *
+ * Only an explicit `true` counts as taken: a missing or non-boolean answer fails
+ * closed, because a run that proceeded while believing it held the lock would
+ * have no mutual exclusion at all.
+ */
+function lockTaken(res) {
+    return res.rows[0]?.locked === true;
+}
+/**
+ * Advisory lock key for SW migrations.
+ *
+ * Keyed with HMAC-SHA256 over a per-installation secret. The previous version
+ * hashed the project name with a bare MD5, so anybody who could guess (or was
+ * told) a project name could compute the lock key, take the lock from another
+ * session, and deny migrations for that project indefinitely. A keyed MAC is
+ * not derivable by a third party with database access, because the secret never
+ * reaches the database.
+ */
+function advisoryLockKey(projectName, secret) {
+    const mac = crypto
+        .createHmac('sha256', secret)
+        .update(`schema-weaver:migration-lock:v1:${projectName}`)
+        .digest();
+    const key1 = mac.readInt32BE(0);
+    let key2 = mac.readInt32BE(4);
+    if (key1 === key2) {
+        key2 = key1 === 0x7fffffff ? key1 - 1 : key1 + 1;
+    }
+    return { key1, key2 };
+}
+class MigrationRunner {
+    poolManager;
+    injectedLockSecret;
+    resolvedLockSecret = null;
+    constructor(opts) {
+        this.poolManager = opts.poolManager;
+        this.injectedLockSecret = opts.lockSecret;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The installation secret the lock key is keyed with.
+     *
+     * An explicit option wins (tests, embedders). Otherwise the agent token from
+     * the machine config is used: it is per-installation, secret, and stable
+     * across processes, which is exactly what mutual exclusion between two agents
+     * needs. If the machine config cannot be read the fallback is a random
+     * per-process secret — still unguessable from outside, so the lock key cannot
+     * be pre-taken by anyone with database access.
+     */
+    lockSecret() {
+        if (this.injectedLockSecret && this.injectedLockSecret.length > 0) {
+            return this.injectedLockSecret;
+        }
+        if (this.resolvedLockSecret !== null)
+            return this.resolvedLockSecret;
+        try {
+            this.resolvedLockSecret = (0, machine_config_1.loadMachineConfig)().agent_token;
+        }
+        catch {
+            this.resolvedLockSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+        }
+        return this.resolvedLockSecret;
+    }
+    async run(payload, ctx) {
+        const startTime = Date.now();
+        // Step 1: Validate
+        if (payload.statements.length === 0) {
+            if (payload.dry_run) {
+                return {
+                    plan_id: payload.plan_id,
+                    status: 'dry_run_ok',
+                    statements: [],
+                    total_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
+                    rolled_back_indices: [],
+                };
+            }
+            throw new Error('Migration run payload contains no statements');
+        }
+        if (payload.statements.length > constants_1.LIMITS.MAX_STATEMENT_COUNT_PER_MIGRATION) {
+            throw new Error(`Migration statement count exceeds maximum limit (${constants_1.LIMITS.MAX_STATEMENT_COUNT_PER_MIGRATION})`);
+        }
+        for (const stmt of payload.statements) {
+            if (!stmt.trim()) {
+                throw new Error('Migration payload contains an empty statement');
+            }
+            if (Buffer.byteLength(stmt, 'utf8') > constants_1.LIMITS.MAX_STATEMENT_LENGTH) {
+                throw new Error(`Statement length exceeds maximum allowed limit (${constants_1.LIMITS.MAX_STATEMENT_LENGTH})`);
+            }
+        }
+        // Step 2: Verify the plan before a connection or a lock is taken. Two
+        // independent checks, both driven by the PostgreSQL parse tree and both
+        // failing closed: every entry must be EXACTLY ONE statement, and every
+        // entry must be one whose transactionality the agent can prove.
+        await assertOneStatementPerEntry(payload.statements);
+        const nonTxCheck = await (0, non_tx_detector_1.detectNonTransactional)(payload.statements);
+        if (nonTxCheck.unparseable_indices.length > 0) {
+            throw new MigrationPlanUnsafeError(`Migration plan contains statements that PostgreSQL cannot parse ` +
+                `(index ${nonTxCheck.unparseable_indices.map((i) => i + 1).join(', ')}). ` +
+                'Refusing to run an unverified plan.');
+        }
+        if (nonTxCheck.ambiguous_indices.length > 0) {
+            throw new MigrationPlanUnsafeError(`Migration plan contains statements that cannot be verified as transactional ` +
+                `(index ${nonTxCheck.ambiguous_indices.map((i) => i + 1).join(', ')}): ` +
+                `${nonTxCheck.summary}. Refusing to run an unverified plan.`);
+        }
+        const strategy = payload.strategy;
+        // Step 3: Dry run (parse only, no execution, no connection)
+        if (payload.dry_run) {
+            const statementResults = [];
+            const conflictIndices = new Set(strategy === 'single_tx' ? nonTxCheck.non_tx_indices : []);
+            let allPassed = true;
+            for (let i = 0; i < payload.statements.length; i++) {
+                const stmt = payload.statements[i];
+                const stmtStart = Date.now();
+                if (conflictIndices.has(i)) {
+                    allPassed = false;
+                    statementResults.push({
+                        index: i,
+                        status: 'failed',
+                        ms: Date.now() - stmtStart,
+                        rows_affected: 0,
+                        error: `${nonTxCheck.summary} — strategy='single_tx' cannot run this plan`,
+                    });
+                    continue;
+                }
+                try {
+                    // Parse-only validation. The previous implementation executed
+                    // transactional DDL inside BEGIN/ROLLBACK against the production
+                    // database during a "dry run"; anything the classifier wrongly
+                    // called transactional really ran.
+                    await (0, statement_classifier_1.assertSingleReadStatement)(stmt);
+                    statementResults.push({
+                        index: i,
+                        status: 'success',
+                        ms: Date.now() - stmtStart,
+                        rows_affected: 0,
+                    });
+                }
+                catch (err) {
+                    allPassed = false;
+                    statementResults.push({
+                        index: i,
+                        status: 'failed',
+                        ms: Date.now() - stmtStart,
+                        rows_affected: 0,
+                        error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+                        pg_error_code: err && typeof err === 'object' && 'code' in err
+                            ? String(err.code)
+                            : undefined,
+                    });
+                }
+            }
+            return {
+                plan_id: payload.plan_id,
+                status: allPassed ? 'dry_run_ok' : 'dry_run_failed',
+                statements: statementResults,
+                total_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
+                rolled_back_indices: [],
+            };
+        }
+        // Previously the runner silently rewrote a caller-requested single_tx
+        // migration into per_statement, which turns an all-or-nothing migration
+        // into a sequence of individually-committed statements. A partial
+        // migration leaves the schema half-applied and was reported as a success.
+        // Now the conflict is an explicit error the caller must resolve. A dry run
+        // reports it in the result instead of throwing, because that is what the
+        // caller asked dry runs for.
+        if (nonTxCheck.has_non_transactional && strategy === 'single_tx') {
+            throw new MigrationStrategyConflictError(`Migration requested single_tx but contains statements that cannot run inside a ` +
+                `transaction (${nonTxCheck.summary}). Re-submit with strategy='per_statement' ` +
+                'if partial application is acceptable.');
+        }
+        // Step 4: Budgets. Every statement runs under a server-controlled
+        // statement_timeout and lock_timeout, and the run's own wall-clock deadline
+        // is raced against each in-flight statement below, so the run cannot outlive
+        // its deadline even if a single statement is slow. `timeout_ms` from the
+        // caller is honoured but never trusted: `resolveMigrationBudget` clamps it.
+        const budget = resolveMigrationBudget(payload.timeout_ms);
+        // Step 5: Acquire a connection and take the advisory lock
+        const { client, release, pid } = await this.poolManager.acquire(ctx.dbEntry);
+        // A migration always leaves state that `release()` cannot undo: an open
+        // transaction, session-level GUCs, a session-scoped advisory lock. Declaring
+        // the session dirty HERE, before the first statement that can change it,
+        // means the pool destroys the connection on every exit path — including an
+        // exception thrown between BEGIN and the `finally` below — instead of
+        // handing a half-used session to the next request. The cost is one
+        // reconnect per migration.
+        (0, pool_1.markSessionDirty)(client);
+        // The overall deadline starts once the backend is in hand: connection
+        // setup is already bounded by the pool's connectionTimeoutMillis, and the
+        // lock is taken with pg_try_advisory_* so it never blocks either.
+        const deadlineAt = Date.now() + budget.deadlineMs;
+        /**
+         * Why the run was torn down early, if it was. `null` while it is healthy.
+         * First cause wins: a deadline that expires while a cancellation is already
+         * unwinding the run must not overwrite the reason its caller is waiting on.
+         */
+        let interruption = null;
+        let rejectInterrupt = () => undefined;
+        /**
+         * Rejects the instant the run is torn down. Every in-flight statement is
+         * raced against it, which is what makes the deadline a bound on the run's
+         * wall clock and not merely a check between statements: without the race a
+         * single statement that outlives the budget is still waited out in full,
+         * holding the advisory lock the whole time.
+         */
+        const interrupted = new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+            rejectInterrupt = reject;
+        });
+        // A run is usually torn down between statements, when nothing is racing
+        // this promise, and a rejection nobody awaits is an unhandled rejection at
+        // process level. Marking it handled here does not stop `Promise.race` from
+        // seeing it later.
+        void interrupted.catch(() => undefined);
+        const interrupt = (cause) => {
+            if (interruption !== null)
+                return;
+            interruption = cause;
+            rejectInterrupt(new RunInterrupted(cause));
+        };
+        const deadlineTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+            interrupt('deadline');
+        }, budget.deadlineMs);
+        const abortController = new AbortController();
+        const inFlightReq = {
+            request_id: ctx.request_id,
+            db_alias: ctx.dbEntry.db_alias,
+            pid,
+            started_at: Date.now(),
+            abort: abortController,
+            is_streaming: false,
+        };
+        // The listener is attached BEFORE the request is registered, and a signal
+        // that is already aborted is honoured immediately. An `abort` event that
+        // fired before `addEventListener` never fires again, so a canceller that
+        // aborts during registration (or a caller that hands in an aborted signal)
+        // would otherwise be ignored and the run would execute in full and take the
+        // advisory lock for a request nobody is waiting for.
+        const onAbort = () => {
+            // Abort whichever controller the canceller can reach: `registerInFlight`
+            // hands it `inFlightRequest.abort`, and the dispatcher substitutes its own
+            // controller there. Leaving that one unaborted would report
+            // `local_abort: false` for a cancellation the runner did act on.
+            if (!abortController.signal.aborted)
+                abortController.abort();
+            if (!inFlightReq.abort.signal.aborted)
+                inFlightReq.abort.abort();
+            interrupt('aborted');
+        };
+        if (ctx.abortSignal) {
+            ctx.abortSignal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort);
+        }
+        if (ctx.abortSignal?.aborted) {
+            onAbort();
+        }
+        // The canceller can only ever fire `InFlightRequest.abort`. It is observed
+        // here as well, so a caller that keeps this runner's own controller instead
+        // of substituting its own still stops the run instead of letting a
+        // cancelled migration carry on to its commit.
+        abortController.signal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort);
+        if (ctx.registerInFlight) {
+            ctx.registerInFlight(inFlightReq);
+        }
+        // `registerInFlight` can abort synchronously — the canceller, or a harness
+        // standing in for it — and `signal.aborted` is the only trace that leaves,
+        // so the state of both controllers is re-read after registration rather than
+        // trusted to have produced an event.
+        if (inFlightReq.abort.signal.aborted || ctx.abortSignal?.aborted === true) {
+            interrupt('aborted');
+        }
+        const { key1, key2 } = advisoryLockKey(ctx.project, this.lockSecret());
+        const statementResults = [];
+        const rolledBackIndices = [];
+        let migrationStatus = 'committed';
+        const outcome = () => migrationStatus;
+        let transactionOpen = false;
+        let sessionLockHeld = false;
+        let abandonedForDeadline = false;
+        /**
+         * A statement was still running on the backend when the run was torn down,
+         * so the session may have state nobody can see. It is destroyed rather than
+         * recycled, and the explicit unlock is skipped because it would be queued
+         * behind the very statement that overran.
+         */
+        let statementAbandonedInFlight = false;
+        let appliedStatementTimeout = null;
+        /**
+         * Topology that must not appear in anything this run puts on the wire.
+         * Every error PostgreSQL raises quotes the row, the literal or the value it
+         * choked on (`invalid input syntax for type integer: "alice@corp.com"`), and
+         * a connection failure names the host, port, user and database.
+         */
+        const topology = {
+            host: ctx.dbEntry.host,
+            port: ctx.dbEntry.port,
+            user: ctx.dbEntry.user,
+            database: ctx.dbEntry.database,
+            project: ctx.project,
+        };
+        /**
+         * Progress event for one statement.
+         *
+         * The preview is redacted and the error text is scrubbed, because both leave
+         * the process: a `migration_progress` event is a WebSocket frame bound for the
+         * cloud and the browser. The verbatim message is still recorded on
+         * {@link StatementResult.error} for the local audit log.
+         */
+        const emitProgress = (index, stmt, status, extra) => {
+            if (!ctx.onProgress)
+                return;
+            void ctx.onProgress({
+                v: 1,
+                id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+                type: 'event',
+                project: ctx.project,
+                user: ctx.user,
+                db_alias: ctx.db_alias,
+                ts: Date.now(),
+                payload: {
+                    kind: 'migration_progress',
+                    data: {
+                        plan_id: payload.plan_id,
+                        statement_index: index,
+                        statement_sql_preview: (0, redact_1.previewStatement)(stmt),
+                        status,
+                        ...(extra?.ms !== undefined ? { ms: extra.ms } : {}),
+                        ...(extra?.error !== undefined
+                            ? { error: (0, sanitize_1.sanitizeErrorText)(extra.error, { topology }) }
+                            : {}),
+                    },
+                },
+            });
+        };
+        /**
+         * Apply the timeouts for the next statement. Inside `single_tx` this is
+         * `SET LOCAL`, which PostgreSQL reverts at COMMIT/ROLLBACK; in
+         * `per_statement` each statement is its own implicit transaction, so the
+         * session form is the only one that takes effect — `SET LOCAL` outside a
+         * transaction block is a silent no-op (H-07), which is how migrations used
+         * to run with no timeout at all.
+         *
+         * The value is exactly the clamped budget, NOT the wall clock still left in
+         * the run. Capping it by the remaining budget made the number PostgreSQL was
+         * asked to enforce drift down by however long the run had already spent
+         * taking its lock, so a caller that asked for 60000 got 59999 and every
+         * statement of a long run got a different timeout than the one that was
+         * requested and audited. The overall deadline is enforced by the runner
+         * itself (`interrupted` above), which is what bounds the run — not by
+         * shaving the server-side timeout.
+         *
+         * Both values are re-validated by {@link safeTimeoutMs} and the `LOCAL`
+         * prefix is one of two literals, so this text cannot carry SQL. It still
+         * goes over the extended protocol like every other statement, so no code
+         * path in this file can silently acquire the simple protocol.
+         */
+        const applyBudget = async () => {
+            const statementTimeoutMs = safeTimeoutMs(budget.statementTimeoutMs, exports.MAX_MIGRATION_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+            const lockTimeoutMs = safeTimeoutMs(budget.lockTimeoutMs, exports.MIGRATION_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS);
+            const local = transactionOpen ? 'LOCAL ' : '';
+            if (appliedStatementTimeout !== statementTimeoutMs) {
+                await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, `SET ${local}statement_timeout = ${statementTimeoutMs}`);
+                await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, `SET ${local}lock_timeout = ${lockTimeoutMs}`);
+                appliedStatementTimeout = statementTimeoutMs;
+            }
+        };
+        const markRolledBack = (upToIndex) => {
+            for (let j = 0; j < upToIndex; j++) {
+                rolledBackIndices.push(j);
+            }
+        };
+        const endTransaction = async () => {
+            if (!transactionOpen)
+                return;
+            try {
+                await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, 'ROLLBACK');
+            }
+            catch {
+                // The transaction state is unknown. `markSessionDirty` above means this
+                // connection is destroyed rather than recycled, which is the only way
+                // the next request is guaranteed not to inherit it.
+            }
+            transactionOpen = false;
+        };
+        const abandonRun = async (index, timedOut) => {
+            if (timedOut)
+                abandonedForDeadline = true;
+            if (strategy === 'single_tx') {
+                migrationStatus = 'rolled_back';
+                await endTransaction();
+                markRolledBack(index);
+            }
+            else {
+                migrationStatus = 'partial';
+            }
+        };
+        try {
+            if (strategy === 'single_tx') {
+                await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, 'BEGIN');
+                transactionOpen = true;
+                // Transaction-scoped lock: PostgreSQL releases it at COMMIT/ROLLBACK,
+                // including when the connection dies mid-migration, so it cannot leak
+                // onto a pooled session.
+                const lockRes = await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, 'SELECT pg_try_advisory_xact_lock($1, $2) AS locked', [key1, key2]);
+                if (!lockTaken(lockRes)) {
+                    await endTransaction();
+                    throw new MigrationInProgressError('Database migration is currently in progress for this project.');
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                // No wrapping transaction in per_statement mode, so the lock is
+                // session-scoped and the `finally` below is the only thing that
+                // releases it. That is why the client is destroyed, never recycled.
+                const lockRes = await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, 'SELECT pg_try_advisory_lock($1, $2) AS locked', [
+                    key1,
+                    key2,
+                ]);
+                if (!lockTaken(lockRes)) {
+                    throw new MigrationInProgressError('Database migration is currently in progress for this project.');
+                }
+                sessionLockHeld = true;
+            }
+            // Step 6: Execute loop
+            for (let i = 0; i < payload.statements.length; i++) {
+                const stmt = payload.statements[i];
+                // Cooperative checkpoint. A cancellation or an expired deadline stops the
+                // run here, before the next statement is ever sent.
+                if (interruption !== null) {
+                    await abandonRun(i, interruption === 'deadline');
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (deadlineAt - Date.now() <= 0) {
+                    interrupt('deadline');
+                    await abandonRun(i, true);
+                    break;
+                }
+                await applyBudget();
+                const stmtStart = Date.now();
+                emitProgress(i, stmt, 'running');
+                try {
+                    // Extended query protocol: node-postgres only takes the simple
+                    // protocol (which executes every semicolon-separated command in one
+                    // round trip) when `values` is falsy, so this pins the statement
+                    // count to the one the plan declared. PostgreSQL answers a second
+                    // command in the same Parse with `42601`.
+                    //
+                    // Raced against `interrupted`, so a run that is cancelled or runs out
+                    // of deadline stops waiting on a statement the backend may still be
+                    // executing. The abandoned query is left to the server-side
+                    // `statement_timeout` above and to the cancellation the canceller
+                    // issues with `pg_cancel_backend`, both of which surface as `57014`.
+                    const runRes = await Promise.race([(0, types_1.runExtended)(client, stmt), interrupted]);
+                    const duration = Date.now() - stmtStart;
+                    statementResults.push({
+                        index: i,
+                        status: 'success',
+                        ms: duration,
+                        rows_affected: runRes.rowCount || 0,
+                    });
+                    emitProgress(i, stmt, 'success', { ms: duration });
+                }
+                catch (err) {
+                    const duration = Date.now() - stmtStart;
+                    const wasInterrupted = err instanceof RunInterrupted;
+                    const message = wasInterrupted
+                        ? err.reason === 'deadline'
+                            ? `Migration exceeded its overall deadline of ${budget.deadlineMs}ms ` +
+                                `while statement ${i + 1} was still running; the run was abandoned.`
+                            : `Migration was cancelled by the caller while statement ${i + 1} was still running.`
+                        : err instanceof Error
+                            ? err.message
+                            : String(err);
+                    statementResults.push({
+                        index: i,
+                        status: 'failed',
+                        ms: duration,
+                        rows_affected: 0,
+                        error: message,
+                        // A statement torn down locally has the same SQLSTATE PostgreSQL
+                        // would have produced: `57014`, query_canceled.
+                        pg_error_code: wasInterrupted
+                            ? PG_QUERY_CANCELED
+                            : err && typeof err === 'object' && 'code' in err
+                                ? String(err.code)
+                                : undefined,
+                    });
+                    emitProgress(i, stmt, 'failed', { ms: duration, error: message });
+                    if (wasInterrupted) {
+                        // The backend may still be running that statement, so nothing about
+                        // this session can be proven: the next request must not inherit it.
+                        // `markSessionDirty` destroys the connection, and terminating the
+                        // backend is what actually stops the statement and releases the
+                        // advisory lock.
+                        statementAbandonedInFlight = true;
+                    }
+                    await abandonRun(i, wasInterrupted && err.reason === 'deadline');
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (transactionOpen) {
+                // An interrupted run is never committed. In `single_tx` that is the whole
+                // difference between a migration that applied and one that did not, so
+                // the COMMIT is gated on the run still being healthy — not only on the
+                // statements having all succeeded.
+                if (interruption === null && outcome() === 'committed') {
+                    await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, 'COMMIT');
+                    transactionOpen = false;
+                }
+                else {
+                    if (interruption !== null && strategy === 'single_tx') {
+                        // The deadline or a cancellation landed after the last statement
+                        // succeeded. Rolling back is the only outcome that matches what the
+                        // database did, so the status must not stay `committed`.
+                        migrationStatus = 'rolled_back';
+                    }
+                    await endTransaction();
+                    markRolledBack(payload.statements.length);
+                }
+            }
+            const result = {
+                plan_id: payload.plan_id,
+                status: outcome(),
+                statements: statementResults,
+                total_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
+                rolled_back_indices: rolledBackIndices,
+            };
+            if (outcome() === 'partial') {
+                // Name the cause, because "partial" alone does not tell a caller whether
+                // it should retry the plan or ask for a bigger budget — and do not claim
+                // work is committed when the run was abandoned before any of it landed.
+                const appliedCount = result.statements.filter((s) => s.status === 'success').length;
+                const cause = interruption === 'deadline'
+                    ? `Migration exceeded its overall deadline of ${budget.deadlineMs}ms and was abandoned`
+                    : interruption === 'aborted'
+                        ? 'Migration was cancelled by the caller and was abandoned'
+                        : 'Migration stopped partway';
+                const consequence = appliedCount === 0
+                    ? 'Nothing was committed, but the run did not complete.'
+                    : `${appliedCount} earlier statement(s) are already committed and were not rolled ` +
+                        'back. Verify the applied schema before retrying.';
+                throw new MigrationPartiallyAppliedError(`${cause}: ${consequence}`, result);
+            }
+            if (abandonedForDeadline) {
+                throw new MigrationTimeoutError(`Migration exceeded its overall deadline of ${budget.deadlineMs}ms and was abandoned. ` +
+                    'Every statement was rolled back.');
+            }
+            return result;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            await endTransaction();
+            throw err;
+        }
+        finally {
+            clearTimeout(deadlineTimer);
+            // Release the advisory lock on every exit path. Without this a single
+            // failed migration left the lock held on a pooled connection, blocking
+            // every later migration for this project until the pool recycled it.
+            // `markSessionDirty` above already guarantees the connection is destroyed
+            // either way, so a failed unlock needs no separate handling here.
+            if (sessionLockHeld) {
+                // A statement abandoned in flight may still be executing on the backend,
+                // and node-postgres queues everything behind an in-flight query — this
+                // unlock included — so sending it would wait out the statement the
+                // deadline just gave up on. It is not needed either way: PostgreSQL
+                // releases a session-scoped advisory lock when the backend goes away,
+                // and the connection is destroyed on this path.
+                if (!statementAbandonedInFlight) {
+                    try {
+                        await (0, types_1.runExtended)(client, 'SELECT pg_advisory_unlock($1, $2)', [key1, key2]);
+                    }
+                    catch {
+                        // The lock may survive on a backend that is about to be destroyed.
+                    }
+                }
+                sessionLockHeld = false;
+            }
+            if (ctx.abortSignal) {
+                ctx.abortSignal.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);
+            }
+            abortController.signal.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);
+            if (ctx.unregisterInFlight) {
+                ctx.unregisterInFlight(ctx.request_id);
+            }
+            release();
+        }
+    }
+}
+exports.MigrationRunner = MigrationRunner;
+//# sourceMappingURL=migration-runner.js.map