@scalequality/cli 0.4.10 → 0.4.11

package/dist/connect.build.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
   "sdkVersion": "0.3.281",
-  "sha256": "c24a69671fea8929ec550bbb8672d703980af3c6389cf97f878cc71083b4972c",
-  "sourceCommit": "011350388f19c1ce50250458dd2810efa3113e84"
+  "sha256": "c2e9fefe31fcd4f9b46e4f5323336571b20380b6756c90b494584c1727d9f787",
+  "sourceCommit": "6437124ad656162948b2c83adfd87e5afc2d82a7"
 }

package/dist/connect.cjs

@@ -1290,13 +1290,14 @@ async function decideToolUse(toolName, input, ctx) {
 }
 
 // src/application/services/workspaceSandbox/protections.ts
-var NO_PROTECTIONS = Object.freeze({ secretFiles: false, protectedPush: false, deployApproval: false, destructiveCommands: false, unknownPackage: null });
+var NO_PROTECTIONS = Object.freeze({ secretFiles: false, protectedPush: false, deployApproval: false, destructiveCommands: false, unknownPackage: null, toolApproval: false });
 var KNOWN_RULES = {
   "secret-files": ["block"],
   "protected-push": ["require"],
   "deploy-approval": ["require"],
   "destructive-commands": ["require"],
-  "unknown-package": ["block", "warn"]
+  "unknown-package": ["block", "warn"],
+  "tool-approval": ["require"]
 };
 function protectionsWireOf(raw) {
   if (!raw || typeof raw !== "object" || Array.isArray(raw)) return null;
@@ -1318,7 +1319,8 @@ function parseProtections(raw) {
     protectedPush: r["protected-push"] === "require",
     deployApproval: r["deploy-approval"] === "require",
     destructiveCommands: r["destructive-commands"] === "require",
-    unknownPackage: r["unknown-package"] === "block" || r["unknown-package"] === "warn" ? r["unknown-package"] : null
+    unknownPackage: r["unknown-package"] === "block" || r["unknown-package"] === "warn" ? r["unknown-package"] : null,
+    toolApproval: r["tool-approval"] === "require"
   };
 }
 var SECRET_FILE_MESSAGE = "Blocked by your organization's protection: secret files are never sent to the model. Do not try to read this file another way; ask the user for the specific value your task needs, or use the example file (such as .env.example).";
@@ -1857,6 +1859,7 @@ var RegistryChecker = class {
   }
 };
 function mayNeedProtection(command, p) {
+  if (p.toolApproval) return true;
   if (p.destructiveCommands && isDestructiveCommand(command)) return true;
   if (p.deployApproval && isDeployCommand(command)) return true;
   if (p.protectedPush && gitPushes(command).length > 0) return true;
@@ -1889,6 +1892,7 @@ async function protectionVerdict(command, p, deps) {
   if (p.destructiveCommands && isDestructiveCommand(command)) reasons.push("PROTECTION_DESTRUCTIVE_COMMAND");
   if (p.deployApproval && isDeployCommand(command)) reasons.push("PROTECTION_DEPLOY");
   if (p.protectedPush && await isProtectedPush(command, deps.currentBranch)) reasons.push("PROTECTION_PROTECTED_PUSH");
+  if (p.toolApproval && !reasons.length) reasons.push("PROTECTION_TOOL_APPROVAL");
   if (!reasons.length) return { kind: "allow" };
   return { kind: "ask", reasons, ...pkg ? { package: pkg.name, packageReason: pkg.reason } : {} };
 }
@@ -1896,7 +1900,12 @@ var PROTECTION_MESSAGES = {
   rejected: "Your organization's protection requires a person to approve this command, and the user denied it. It did not run. Do not run it again or another way unless the user asks.",
   timedOut: (minutes) => `Your organization's protection requires a person to approve this command, and nobody answered within ${minutes} minutes. It did not run. Ask the user before trying it again.`,
   stopped: "The request was stopped before the command ran.",
-  unavailable: "Your organization's protection requires a person to approve this command, and the approval could not be requested. It did not run. Tell the user; do not try to run it another way."
+  unavailable: "Your organization's protection requires a person to approve this command, and the approval could not be requested. It did not run. Tell the user; do not try to run it another way.",
+  // A file change under tool-approval.
+  editRejected: (path) => `Your organization's protection requires a person to approve every change, and the user denied this change to ${path}. The file was not changed. Do not change it another way unless the user asks.`,
+  editTimedOut: (path, minutes) => `Your organization's protection requires a person to approve every change, and nobody answered about ${path} within ${minutes} minutes. The file was not changed. Ask the user before trying again.`,
+  editStopped: "The request was stopped before the file was changed.",
+  editUnavailable: (path) => `Your organization's protection requires a person to approve every change, and the approval for ${path} could not be requested. The file was not changed. Tell the user; do not change it another way.`
 };
 
 // src/application/services/workspaceSandbox/SessionTransport.ts
@@ -3031,6 +3040,15 @@ var BrowserCommandGate = class {
     this.chain = next.catch(() => void 0);
     return next;
   }
+  checkProtectedEdit(path, opts = {}) {
+    const next = this.chain.then(() => this.ask(`edit ${path}`, {
+      signal: opts.signal,
+      edit: { path, ...opts.preview ? { preview: opts.preview } : {} },
+      protection: { reasons: ["PROTECTION_TOOL_APPROVAL"] }
+    }));
+    this.chain = next.catch(() => void 0);
+    return next;
+  }
   checkEdit(path, opts = {}) {
     const next = this.chain.then(() => this.ask(`edit ${path}`, { signal: opts.signal, edit: { path, ...opts.preview ? { preview: opts.preview } : {} } }));
     this.chain = next.catch(() => void 0);
@@ -3047,7 +3065,7 @@ var BrowserCommandGate = class {
         command,
         cwd: this.o.root,
         ...opts.description ? { description: opts.description.slice(0, 1e3) } : {},
-        reasons: opts.edit ? [] : protection ? [...protection.reasons, ...approvalReasons(command)] : approvalReasons(command),
+        reasons: protection ? [...protection.reasons, ...opts.edit ? [] : approvalReasons(command)] : opts.edit ? [] : approvalReasons(command),
         suggestedRule: opts.edit || protection ? null : suggestRule(command),
         ...opts.edit ? { edit: { path: opts.edit.path, ...opts.edit.preview ? { preview: opts.edit.preview.slice(0, 4e3) } : {} } } : {},
         ...protection?.package ? { package: protection.package, ...protection.packageReason ? { packageReason: protection.packageReason } : {} } : {}
@@ -3055,6 +3073,7 @@ var BrowserCommandGate = class {
     } catch (e) {
       this.o.log?.(`command approval could not be requested: ${e.message}`);
       const code = e instanceof CommandApprovalError ? e.code : null;
+      if (protection && opts.edit) return { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editUnavailable(opts.edit.path) };
       if (protection && code !== "COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED") return { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.unavailable };
       return {
         allow: false,
@@ -3072,10 +3091,12 @@ var BrowserCommandGate = class {
     if (!decision) {
       const reason = opts.signal?.aborted ? "STOPPED" : "TIMED_OUT";
       void this.o.api.cancel(approvalId, reason).catch(() => void 0);
+      if (protection && opts.edit) return { allow: false, message: reason === "STOPPED" ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editStopped : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editTimedOut(opts.edit.path, Math.round(timeoutMs / 6e4)) };
       if (protection) return { allow: false, message: reason === "STOPPED" ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.stopped : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.timedOut(Math.round(timeoutMs / 6e4)) };
       return reason === "STOPPED" ? { allow: false, message: STOPPED } : { allow: false, message: `The user did not answer the approval for this command within ${Math.round(timeoutMs / 6e4)} minutes, so it did not run. Ask the user before trying it again.` };
     }
     if (decision.decision === "REJECT") {
+      if (protection && opts.edit) return { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editRejected(opts.edit.path) };
       if (protection) return { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.rejected };
       return opts.edit ? { allow: false, message: `The user declined this change to ${opts.edit.path} in the browser. The file was not changed. Ask the user what to do differently.` } : { allow: false, message: "The user denied this command in the browser. It did not run. Do not run the same command again unless the user asks; continue another way or ask the user." };
     }
@@ -4821,6 +4842,8 @@ function sandboxTestEnv() {
     "BUNDLE_PATH",
     "PUB_CACHE",
     "FLUTTER_ROOT",
+    "MIX_HOME",
+    "HEX_HOME",
     "MISE_DATA_DIR",
     "MISE_CACHE_DIR",
     "ELIXIR_ERL_OPTIONS"
@@ -4943,6 +4966,8 @@ var ENGINE_MESSAGES = {
   // Pull requests.
   BASE_ADVANCED: "The pull request could not be opened: the base branch in the repository is not at the commit this change was made on.",
   PR_FAILED: "The pull request could not be opened.",
+  PROVIDER_CONNECTION_REQUIRED: "The pull request could not be opened: the provider connection of {repoFullName} needs to be reconnected in ScaleQuality.",
+  REPOSITORY_NOT_IN_PROJECT: "The pull request could not be opened: {repoFullName} is no longer a repository of this project.",
   // Attachments and mentions.
   ATTACHMENT_SKIPPED: "An attached image could not be read and was left out.",
   MENTION_SKIPPED: "{path} could not be attached ({reason}).",
@@ -10000,12 +10025,16 @@ var TurnTiming = class {
 // src/application/services/workspaceSandbox/protectionApproval.ts
 function gateProtectionApprover(gate) {
   if (!gate.checkProtected) return null;
-  return { ask: (command, check) => gate.checkProtected(command, check) };
+  return {
+    ask: (command, check) => gate.checkProtected(command, check),
+    ...gate.checkProtectedEdit ? { askEdit: (path, check) => gate.checkProtectedEdit(path, check) } : {}
+  };
 }
 function cloudProtectionApprover(o) {
   let chain = Promise.resolve();
   const ask = async (command, check) => {
-    if (check.signal?.aborted) return { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.stopped };
+    const edit = check.edit;
+    if (check.signal?.aborted) return { allow: false, message: edit ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editStopped : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.stopped };
     let approvalId;
     try {
       ({ approvalId } = await o.calls.requestCommandApproval({
@@ -10014,11 +10043,12 @@ function cloudProtectionApprover(o) {
         ...check.description ? { description: check.description.slice(0, 1e3) } : {},
         reasons: [...check.reasons],
         suggestedRule: null,
+        ...edit ? { edit: { path: edit.path, ...edit.preview ? { preview: edit.preview.slice(0, 4e3) } : {} } } : {},
         ...check.package ? { package: check.package, ...check.packageReason ? { packageReason: check.packageReason } : {} } : {}
       }));
     } catch (e) {
       o.log?.(`protection approval could not be requested: ${e.message}`);
-      return { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.unavailable };
+      return { allow: false, message: edit ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editUnavailable(edit.path) : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.unavailable };
     }
     const timeoutMs = o.timeoutMs ?? COMMAND_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS;
     const timer = new AbortController();
@@ -10029,16 +10059,21 @@ function cloudProtectionApprover(o) {
     if (!decision) {
       const reason = check.signal?.aborted ? "STOPPED" : "TIMED_OUT";
       void o.calls.cancelCommandApproval(approvalId, reason).catch(() => void 0);
-      return { allow: false, message: reason === "STOPPED" ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.stopped : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.timedOut(Math.round(timeoutMs / 6e4)) };
+      const minutes = Math.round(timeoutMs / 6e4);
+      if (edit) return { allow: false, message: reason === "STOPPED" ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editStopped : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editTimedOut(edit.path, minutes) };
+      return { allow: false, message: reason === "STOPPED" ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.stopped : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.timedOut(minutes) };
     }
-    return decision.decision === "APPROVE" ? { allow: true } : { allow: false, message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.rejected };
+    if (decision.decision === "APPROVE") return { allow: true };
+    return { allow: false, message: edit ? PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editRejected(edit.path) : PROTECTION_MESSAGES.rejected };
+  };
+  const queued = (run2) => {
+    const next = chain.then(run2);
+    chain = next.catch(() => void 0);
+    return next;
   };
   return {
-    ask(command, check) {
-      const next = chain.then(() => ask(command, check));
-      chain = next.catch(() => void 0);
-      return next;
-    }
+    ask: (command, check) => queued(() => ask(command, check)),
+    askEdit: (path, check) => queued(() => ask(`edit ${path}`, { reasons: ["PROTECTION_TOOL_APPROVAL"], signal: check.signal, edit: { path, ...check.preview ? { preview: check.preview } : {} } }))
   };
 }
 
@@ -13150,16 +13185,33 @@ _Measured on an earlier version of this change._`);
       if (e instanceof TransportError && e.code === REPOSITORY_NOT_IN_SCOPE) {
         return text(`${REPOSITORY_NOT_IN_SCOPE}: ${target} left this session's scope before the pull request was opened. It was not opened.`, true);
       }
-      if (status === 409) {
-        const where = this.local ? " Update this folder to the latest commit of the base branch (git pull), then ask again." : "";
-        this.error("BASE_ADVANCED", { repoFullName: target, local: this.local });
-        return text(`The pull request could not be opened: the base branch in the repository is not at the commit this change was made on.${where} Tell the user; do not retry without being asked.`, true);
-      }
-      this.error("PR_FAILED", { repoFullName: target });
-      return text("The pull request could not be opened. Tell the user; do not retry without being asked.", true);
+      const failure = pullRequestFailure(status, e instanceof TransportError ? e.code : void 0, target, this.local);
+      this.error(failure.code, failure.params);
+      return text(`${failure.say} Tell the user; do not retry without being asked.`, true);
     }
   }
 };
+function pullRequestFailure(status, code, repoFullName, local) {
+  if (status === 409 && code === "PROVIDER_CONNECTION_REQUIRED") return {
+    code: "PROVIDER_CONNECTION_REQUIRED",
+    params: { repoFullName },
+    say: `The pull request could not be opened: the provider connection of ${repoFullName} needs to be reconnected in ScaleQuality.`
+  };
+  if (status === 409 && code === "REPOSITORY_NOT_IN_PROJECT") return {
+    code: "REPOSITORY_NOT_IN_PROJECT",
+    params: { repoFullName },
+    say: `The pull request could not be opened: ${repoFullName} is no longer a repository of this project.`
+  };
+  if (status === 409 && (!code || code === "BASE_ADVANCED")) {
+    const where = local ? " Update this folder to the latest commit of the base branch (git pull), then ask again." : "";
+    return {
+      code: "BASE_ADVANCED",
+      params: { repoFullName, local },
+      say: `The pull request could not be opened: the base branch in the repository is not at the commit this change was made on.${where}`
+    };
+  }
+  return { code: "PR_FAILED", params: { repoFullName, ...code ? { reason: code } : {} }, say: "The pull request could not be opened." };
+}
 var LOCAL_ENV_PASSTHROUGH = [
   "LOGNAME",
   "COLORTERM",
@@ -13312,11 +13364,11 @@ function buildQueryOptions(o) {
     }
     const protections = o.protections?.() ?? NO_PROTECTIONS;
     const d = await decideToolUse(name, input.tool_input ?? {}, { ...o.policy, protections });
-    const guarded = d.behavior === "allow" && name === "Bash" && mayNeedProtection(String(d.updatedInput.command ?? ""), protections);
+    const guarded = d.behavior === "allow" && (name === "Bash" && mayNeedProtection(String(d.updatedInput.command ?? ""), protections) || protections.toolApproval && !o.plan && name in WRITE_TOOL_PATHS);
     const gated = guarded || d.behavior === "allow" && !!gate && (name === "Bash" || !!gate.checkEdit && !o.plan && name in WRITE_TOOL_PATHS);
     if (d.behavior === "allow" && !gated) await beforeWrite(name, d.updatedInput);
     if (gated) {
-      return { hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "ask", permissionDecisionReason: guarded ? "This command follows the organization's protections." : "Commands and changes on this machine follow the person's permission mode." } };
+      return { hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "ask", permissionDecisionReason: guarded ? "This action follows the organization's protections." : "Commands and changes on this machine follow the person's permission mode." } };
     }
     return d.behavior === "allow" ? { hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "allow", updatedInput: d.updatedInput } } : { hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "deny", permissionDecisionReason: d.message } };
   };
@@ -13354,10 +13406,18 @@ function buildQueryOptions(o) {
         protectionApproved = true;
       }
     }
-    if (gate?.checkEdit && !o.plan && toolName in WRITE_TOOL_PATHS) {
+    const changes = !o.plan && toolName in WRITE_TOOL_PATHS;
+    const changePath = () => {
       const field = WRITE_TOOL_PATHS[toolName];
-      const path = typeof d.updatedInput[field] === "string" ? (0, import_path15.relative)(o.root, d.updatedInput[field]) || String(d.updatedInput[field]) : "";
-      const r = await gate.checkEdit(path, { preview: editPreview(toolName, d.updatedInput), signal: opts?.signal ?? o.abortController.signal });
+      return typeof d.updatedInput[field] === "string" ? (0, import_path15.relative)(o.root, d.updatedInput[field]) || String(d.updatedInput[field]) : "";
+    };
+    if (changes && protections.toolApproval) {
+      const path = changePath(), askEdit = o.protection?.approver?.askEdit;
+      if (!askEdit) return { behavior: "deny", message: PROTECTION_MESSAGES.editUnavailable(path) };
+      const r = await askEdit(path, { preview: editPreview(toolName, d.updatedInput), signal: opts?.signal ?? o.abortController.signal });
+      if (!r.allow) return { behavior: "deny", message: r.message };
+    } else if (gate?.checkEdit && changes) {
+      const r = await gate.checkEdit(changePath(), { preview: editPreview(toolName, d.updatedInput), signal: opts?.signal ?? o.abortController.signal });
       if (!r.allow) return { behavior: "deny", message: r.message };
     }
     await beforeWrite(toolName, d.updatedInput);
@@ -13420,7 +13480,8 @@ function timedGate(gate, took) {
   return {
     check: (command, opts) => timed(() => gate.check(command, opts)),
     ...gate.checkEdit ? { checkEdit: (path, opts) => timed(() => gate.checkEdit(path, opts)) } : {},
-    ...gate.checkProtected ? { checkProtected: (command, opts) => timed(() => gate.checkProtected(command, opts)) } : {}
+    ...gate.checkProtected ? { checkProtected: (command, opts) => timed(() => gate.checkProtected(command, opts)) } : {},
+    ...gate.checkProtectedEdit ? { checkProtectedEdit: (path, opts) => timed(() => gate.checkProtectedEdit(path, opts)) } : {}
   };
 }
 async function hasLocalTranscript(configDir, sessionId) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@scalequality/cli",
-  "version": "0.4.10",
+  "version": "0.4.11",
   "description": "ScaleQuality CLI. Connect your computer to the ScaleQuality AI Workspace (`scalequality login`), run its coding engine in any folder of your computer, and import your Claude Code and Codex conversations.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {