@scalebun/react-native 1.13.0 → 2.0.0

package/src/specs/NativeScaleBunOta.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,15 @@ export interface Spec extends TurboModule {
    */
   getActiveBundle(): string | null;
 
+  /**
+   * JSON array (string) of the trusted key IDs embedded in the app package, e.g.
+   * `["production-2026-01"]`. Reported on OTA check-in for SDK trust coverage
+   * (CICDPAGE §12) so the dashboard can measure key-rotation adoption. This is
+   * telemetry ONLY — the server never trusts a key because a device claims it.
+   * Empty array when no keys are embedded.
+   */
+  getTrustedKeyIds(): string;
+
   /**
    * Returns JSON with current slot state:
    * { current: { bundleId, version, sha256, installedAt } | null,
@@ -87,28 +96,31 @@ export interface Spec extends TurboModule {
   restartApp(): void;
 
   /**
-   * Verify a detached ed25519 signature in NATIVE code.
-   *
-   * Exists because the JS verifier runs inside the very bundle it protects —
-   * an attacker who lands one malicious bundle can neuter a JS check for every
-   * update after it. Platform crypto is outside the bundle's reach, and it also
-   * removes the runtime dependency on the optional @noble peers wherever the OS
-   * provides ed25519 (iOS 13+ CryptoKit everywhere; Android API 33+).
+   * Verify a SB-OTA-RSA-SHA256-V1 release envelope in NATIVE code, with no side
+   * effects. `envelopeJson` is the JSON `{ protocol, keyId, signedPayload,
+   * signature, downloadUrl? }` from the check response. Verification uses the
+   * trusted RSA public keys EMBEDDED in the app package (never a key from JS or
+   * the server) and platform `SHA256withRSA` (present on every supported API
+   * level — no API-33 floor).
    *
-   * All three arguments are lowercase hex, pre-validated by the JS caller:
-   * the 32-byte bundle SHA-256 (the signature is over its RAW BYTES, matching
-   * the CLI's signing contract), the 64-byte signature, the 32-byte public key.
-   *
-   * Resolves a verdict STRING, not a boolean, because "the signature is wrong"
-   * and "this OS cannot check" must never collapse into one value:
-   *   'valid'       — signature verifies under the key
-   *   'invalid'     — it does not; the caller must refuse the bundle
-   *   'unavailable' — this OS level has no ed25519 (Android < 33); the caller
-   *                   falls back to the JS verifier
-   * A rejected promise is machinery failure and the caller treats it as
-   * 'unavailable' — never as 'valid'.
+   * Resolves a verdict JSON string: `{ ok: boolean, code?: string, message?,
+   * keyId?, releaseId?, bundleId?, releaseSequence?, artifactSha256?,
+   * artifactSize?, resultArtifactSha256?, fingerprint? }`. A failed check is
+   * `ok:false` with a stable `code`; a rejected promise is machinery failure and
+   * the caller must treat it as a failure, never as valid.
+   */
+  verifyRelease(envelopeJson: string): Promise<string>;
+
+  /**
+   * Native-ENFORCED install: verify the RSA signature (as `verifyRelease`), then
+   * download the artifact, enforce the SIGNED size + SHA-256, and stage it into
+   * the `next` slot — all natively. JavaScript cannot stage bytes that were not
+   * proven authentic (once trusted keys are embedded, the legacy `stageBundle`
+   * path refuses). Does not activate; call `applyUpdate` to promote per the
+   * install mode. Resolves the same verdict JSON as `verifyRelease` (`ok:true`
+   * once staged).
    */
-  verifyEd25519(messageHex: string, signatureHex: string, publicKeyHex: string): Promise<string>;
+  verifyAndStageRelease(envelopeJson: string): Promise<string>;
 }
 
 /**

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/builtinVerifier.js

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
-  value: true
-});
-exports._resetBuiltinVerifier = _resetBuiltinVerifier;
-exports.decodeSignature = decodeSignature;
-exports.getBuiltinVerifier = getBuiltinVerifier;
-var _loadEd = require("./loadEd25519");
-var _loadSha = require("./loadSha512");
-var _internalLogger = require("../../../core/logger/internalLogger");
-/**
- * Built-in ed25519 verifier, assembled from OPTIONAL peer dependencies.
- *
- * WHAT THIS REPLACES. Pinning `ota.publicSigningKey` used to require the host
- * app to write its own `verifySignature` — roughly a hundred lines of hex and
- * base64 decoding wrapped around a crypto library. That put the single most
- * security-critical operation in the product, the one deciding whether remote
- * code is authentic before it executes, in code the SDK could neither test nor
- * audit. Three failure modes all landed on the app author:
- *
- *   - A verifier that always returns `true` silently disables the feature, and
- *     nothing can detect it.
- *   - @noble's hash-provider property moved between major versions, so a
- *     routine dependency bump made every update fail closed with no signal
- *     pointing at the cause.
- *   - Hand-written base64 decoders tend to omit base64url, so a signature
- *     containing `-` or `_` is rejected as a forgery.
- *
- * All three are now the SDK's problem, which is where they belong. A host that
- * installs `@noble/ed25519` and `@noble/hashes` gets verification by pinning a
- * key and writing no code at all.
- *
- * WHY OPTIONAL AND NOT A HARD DEPENDENCY. Most apps never adopt bundle
- * signing, and they should not carry curve arithmetic they will not run. The
- * `verifySignature` hook remains supported and still WINS over this, for teams
- * with their own crypto policy or a native implementation to delegate to.
- *
- * WHAT THIS DOES NOT FIX. Verification still happens in JS, inside the very
- * bundle it protects. An attacker who lands one malicious bundle by other means
- * can neuter the check for every update after it. Closing that needs native
- * verification — CryptoKit on iOS (13.4+, already the deployment target) and
- * `Signature.getInstance("Ed25519")` on Android API 33+, with a fallback below.
- */
-
-const ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 64;
-const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = 32;
-
-/** Hex → bytes. Returns null rather than throwing; callers treat null as "reject". */
-function hexToBytes(hex) {
-  const clean = hex.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
-  if (clean.length === 0 || clean.length % 2 !== 0 || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
-  const out = new Uint8Array(clean.length / 2);
-  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {
-    out[i] = parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-const B64_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/';
-
-/**
- * Base64 → bytes, accepting base64url as well.
- *
- * The `-`/`_` handling is the point. A verifier that omits it rejects a
- * perfectly valid signature as a forgery the moment the signing side emits
- * base64url, and the resulting symptom — updates silently stop installing —
- * looks nothing like a decoding bug.
- */
-function base64ToBytes(b64) {
-  const s = b64.trim().replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/').replace(/=+$/, '');
-  if (s.length === 0) return null;
-  const out = [];
-  let buffer = 0;
-  let bits = 0;
-  for (const ch of s) {
-    const idx = B64_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch);
-    if (idx === -1) return null;
-    buffer = buffer << 6 | idx;
-    bits += 6;
-    if (bits >= 8) {
-      bits -= 8;
-      out.push(buffer >> bits & 0xff);
-    }
-  }
-  return Uint8Array.from(out);
-}
-
-/**
- * Decode a detached signature that may arrive hex- or base64-encoded.
- *
- * Tries the unambiguous case first: 128 hex characters is exactly 64 bytes and
- * cannot be anything else. Otherwise base64, then hex as a last resort. Only a
- * result of exactly 64 bytes is accepted, so a string that decodes under the
- * wrong scheme is rejected rather than fed to the curve code as garbage.
- */
-function decodeSignature(sig) {
-  const trimmed = sig.trim();
-  if (/^(0x)?[0-9a-fA-F]{128}$/.test(trimmed)) {
-    const hex = hexToBytes(trimmed);
-    if (hex && hex.length === ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES) return hex;
-  }
-  const b64 = base64ToBytes(trimmed);
-  if (b64 && b64.length === ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES) return b64;
-  const hex = hexToBytes(trimmed);
-  if (hex && hex.length === ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES) return hex;
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Give @noble its SHA-512 provider.
- *
- * The property it reads moved between major versions — v2 wants
- * `etc.sha512Sync`, v3 wants `hashes.sha512` — so both are populated when
- * present. Getting this wrong does not fail loudly: verification simply throws
- * from inside the curve code and the outer catch converts it to "rejected",
- * which is indistinguishable from an actual forgery. That ambiguity is exactly
- * what made this a bad thing to ask app authors to maintain.
- */
-function wireSha512(ed, sha512) {
-  // VARIADIC ON PURPOSE. @noble calls its hash provider with several byte
-  // arrays to be hashed as one concatenated message. A wrapper taking a
-  // single argument hashes only the first, silently produces the wrong
-  // digest, and every genuine signature is then reported as INVALID — no
-  // error, no exception, just an authenticity check that always says no.
-  // Verified against a real CLI-produced signature; the single-argument form
-  // failed every positive case while passing every negative one, which is
-  // the most misleading shape a bug of this kind can take.
-  const concat = parts => {
-    if (parts.length === 1) return parts[0];
-    let total = 0;
-    for (const p of parts) total += p.length;
-    const out = new Uint8Array(total);
-    let off = 0;
-    for (const p of parts) {
-      out.set(p, off);
-      off += p.length;
-    }
-    return out;
-  };
-  const sync = (...msgs) => sha512(concat(msgs));
-  const asyncFn = async (...msgs) => sha512(concat(msgs));
-
-  // EACH BRANCH GETS ITS OWN try. Wrapping both in one is a trap, and it cost
-  // an afternoon: under v3 the `hashes` assignment succeeds and the `etc`
-  // object is FROZEN, so the v2-shaped assignment throws "object is not
-  // extensible" — discarding a verifier that was, by then, already correctly
-  // wired. Only "neither shape took" means unavailable.
-  let wired = false;
-  try {
-    if (ed.hashes && typeof ed.hashes === 'object') {
-      if (typeof ed.hashes.sha512 !== 'function') ed.hashes.sha512 = sync;
-      if (typeof ed.hashes.sha512Async !== 'function') ed.hashes.sha512Async = asyncFn;
-      wired = typeof ed.hashes.sha512 === 'function';
-    }
-  } catch {
-    /* frozen or absent — try the other shape */
-  }
-  try {
-    if (ed.etc && typeof ed.etc === 'object') {
-      if (typeof ed.etc.sha512Sync !== 'function') ed.etc.sha512Sync = sync;
-      if (typeof ed.etc.sha512Async !== 'function') ed.etc.sha512Async = asyncFn;
-      wired = wired || typeof ed.etc.sha512Sync === 'function';
-    }
-  } catch {
-    /* frozen or absent — `wired` already records whether the other shape took */
-  }
-  return wired;
-}
-let resolved;
-
-/**
- * The built-in verifier, or null when the optional deps are not installed.
- * Resolution is cached, including the negative result — a missing dependency
- * does not become present at runtime, and retrying the require on every update
- * check would be pure overhead.
- */
-function getBuiltinVerifier() {
-  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
-  const ed = (0, _loadEd.loadEd25519)();
-  const sha512 = (0, _loadSha.loadSha512)();
-  if (!ed || !sha512) {
-    resolved = null;
-    return null;
-  }
-  if (!wireSha512(ed, sha512)) {
-    // A shape neither branch matched — a @noble major this SDK predates.
-    // Report "no verifier", which is actionable, rather than letting every
-    // update fail deep inside the curve code with an opaque error.
-    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] @noble/ed25519 is installed but its SHA-512 provider could not be ' + 'wired (unrecognised version shape). Supply `ota.verifySignature` ' + 'yourself, or pin a @noble/ed25519 version this SDK supports.');
-    resolved = null;
-    return null;
-  }
-  resolved = async ({
-    messageHex,
-    signature,
-    publicKey
-  }) => {
-    const message = hexToBytes(messageHex);
-    const pub = hexToBytes(publicKey);
-    const sig = decodeSignature(signature);
-    if (!message) {
-      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Bundle SHA-256 is not valid hex — refusing to stage.');
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (!pub || pub.length !== ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES) {
-      // Worth naming precisely: a mistyped or wrongly-encoded key would
-      // otherwise present as "every update is a forgery".
-      _internalLogger.logger.error(`[OTA] ota.publicSigningKey must be ${ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES} bytes of hex ` + `(${ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES * 2} characters) — got ` + `${pub ? `${pub.length} bytes` : 'a value that is not hex'}.`);
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (!sig) {
-      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Bundle signature is not a 64-byte hex/base64 value.');
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    // @noble THROWS rather than returning false for bytes that are not a
-    // well-formed point — which is most forgeries, since a tampered
-    // signature usually decodes to garbage rather than to a valid-but-wrong
-    // point. Swallowing that here is deliberate: from the SDK's side a
-    // malformed signature IS a rejection, and letting it escape would
-    // surface as `verifier_threw`, the outcome reserved for a HOST verifier
-    // misbehaving. Conflating "this bundle is forged" with "your verifier
-    // is broken" would point every investigation in the wrong direction.
-    try {
-      // SYNC FIRST, and this is not a style preference. @noble's
-      // `verifyAsync` reaches for `crypto.subtle` — "crypto.subtle must be
-      // defined, consider polyfill" — which React Native does not provide
-      // and neither does a plain Node test environment. The sync `verify`
-      // uses the SHA-512 provider wired above and needs no WebCrypto, so
-      // it is the path that actually works on a phone. Verification is a
-      // few hundred microseconds over a 32-byte digest, once per update
-      // check, so there is nothing to gain from the async form anyway.
-      if (typeof ed.verify === 'function') return ed.verify(sig, message, pub);
-      if (typeof ed.verifyAsync === 'function') return await ed.verifyAsync(sig, message, pub);
-      return false;
-    } catch {
-      return false;
-    }
-  };
-  __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug('[OTA] Using built-in ed25519 verifier (@noble/ed25519 detected).');
-  return resolved;
-}
-
-/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
-function _resetBuiltinVerifier() {
-  resolved = undefined;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=builtinVerifier.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/loadEd25519.js

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
-  value: true
-});
-exports.loadEd25519 = loadEd25519;
-/**
- * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/ed25519` dep.
- *
- * WHY ITS OWN FILE: Metro's dependency collector emits a dependency map one
- * entry short for a module containing TWO OR MORE different-string inline
- * `require()` calls, so the require indices desync and `_dependencyMap[N]`
- * reads `undefined` ("Requiring unknown module 'undefined'"). Exactly ONE
- * inline require per module avoids the miscount. `loadSha512` is a sibling file
- * for the same reason — see `push/adapters/loadNotifee.ts`, which hit this first.
- *
- * The string must still be STATICALLY resolvable at bundle time; hosts that do
- * not install it stub it via `withScaleBun`.
- */
-
-/** The subset of the @noble/ed25519 surface this SDK uses. */
-
-function loadEd25519() {
-  try {
-    const mod = require('@noble/ed25519');
-    const ed = mod?.default ?? mod;
-    // Validate the API actually used, not mere truthiness: when the package
-    // is absent `withScaleBun` resolves it to an EMPTY STUB MODULE, which is
-    // a perfectly truthy object. A stub must read as "unavailable", because
-    // treating it as available would make every signed update fail with a
-    // crypto error instead of the actionable "no verifier" message.
-    if (typeof ed?.verifyAsync === 'function' || typeof ed?.verify === 'function') {
-      return ed;
-    }
-    return null;
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=loadEd25519.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/loadSha512.js

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
-  value: true
-});
-exports.loadSha512 = loadSha512;
-/**
- * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/hashes` SHA-512.
- *
- * Separate file from `loadEd25519` because Metro miscounts a module holding two
- * different-string inline `require()` calls — see the comment there.
- *
- * ed25519 is defined in terms of SHA-512, and React Native has no native
- * SHA-512, so @noble/ed25519 cannot verify anything until a hash provider is
- * wired into it. Which property it expects differs by major version, so the
- * wiring lives in `builtinVerifier`, not here; this module only obtains the
- * function.
- */
-
-function loadSha512() {
-  try {
-    // The `.js` SUFFIX IS REQUIRED, not stylistic. @noble/hashes v2 declares
-    // its exports map with extensions — `"./sha2.js"`, not `"./sha2"` — so
-    // the extensionless form misses the map entirely. Node still resolves it
-    // by falling back to file-based lookup, which is why it passes here,
-    // but Metro prints
-    //   "Attempted to import … not listed in the exports … Falling back to
-    //    file-based resolution"
-    // on every bundle, and that fallback is exactly what a stricter resolver
-    // (or a future Metro) drops. Caught while bundling a real Expo app.
-    const mod = require('@noble/hashes/sha2.js');
-    const sha512 = mod?.sha512 ?? mod?.default?.sha512;
-    // A stubbed module yields undefined here, which correctly reads as
-    // "unavailable" rather than throwing deep inside the curve code later.
-    return typeof sha512 === 'function' ? sha512 : null;
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=loadSha512.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/nativeVerifier.js

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
-  value: true
-});
-exports._resetNativeVerifier = _resetNativeVerifier;
-exports.getNativeVerifier = getNativeVerifier;
-var _NativeScaleBunOta = _interopRequireDefault(require("../../../specs/NativeScaleBunOta"));
-var _internalLogger = require("../../../core/logger/internalLogger");
-var _builtinVerifier = require("./builtinVerifier");
-function _interopRequireDefault(e) { return e && e.__esModule ? e : { default: e }; }
-/**
- * Native ed25519 verifier — platform crypto wrapped as a SignatureVerifier.
- *
- * WHY IT EXISTS. The built-in @noble verifier runs in JS, inside the very
- * bundle it protects: an attacker who lands one malicious bundle can neuter a
- * JS check for every update after it. Platform crypto (CryptoKit on iOS,
- * Android's conscrypt on API 33+) sits outside the bundle's reach — and using
- * it also drops the runtime dependency on the optional @noble peers wherever
- * the OS provides ed25519.
- *
- * WHAT IT DOES NOT FIX, stated plainly: the ORCHESTRATION still lives in JS.
- * A hostile bundle can skip calling any verifier and drive the native staging
- * methods directly. Moving the crypto native shrinks the attack surface (no
- * more tampering with a bundled crypto lib to flip a verdict) but the full
- * close needs native-ENFORCED staging with a natively-pinned key — an
- * architectural change tracked separately, not smuggled into this one.
- *
- * VERDICT CONTRACT (mirrors the spec): the native side resolves
- * 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unavailable'. 'invalid' is a definitive NO.
- * 'unavailable' (Android < 33, malformed input, machinery failure) means this
- * source cannot answer — the composed verifier below then delegates to the
- * @noble builtin, and when that is absent too it THROWS, which the policy
- * layer converts to a rejection. Every path that cannot verify refuses.
- */
-
-const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS = 64;
-
-/** bytes → lowercase hex (the native side takes clean hex only). */
-function bytesToHex(bytes) {
-  let out = '';
-  for (const b of bytes) out += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
-  return out;
-}
-
-/** Strict lowercase-hex normalization; null when the value is not hex. */
-function normalizeHex(value, expectedChars) {
-  const clean = value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
-  if (clean.length !== expectedChars || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
-  return clean;
-}
-let resolved;
-
-/**
- * The native-first verifier, or null when the native module (or its
- * verifyEd25519 method — an app running new JS against an old binary) is
- * absent. Cached like the builtin: module availability does not change at
- * runtime, and this is consulted on every update check.
- */
-function getNativeVerifier() {
-  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
-  const native = _NativeScaleBunOta.default;
-  if (!native || typeof native.verifyEd25519 !== 'function') {
-    // Old binary, Jest, web/SSR — not an error, just not this source.
-    resolved = null;
-    return null;
-  }
-  resolved = async ({
-    messageHex,
-    signature,
-    publicKey
-  }) => {
-    // All decoding and validation happens HERE, in one place, so both
-    // platforms' native code only ever sees clean fixed-length hex. The
-    // signature may arrive hex or base64 (the wire allows both) — reuse
-    // the builtin's decoder rather than growing a second, subtly
-    // different one.
-    const message = normalizeHex(messageHex, 64);
-    const key = normalizeHex(publicKey, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS);
-    const sigBytes = (0, _builtinVerifier.decodeSignature)(signature);
-    if (!message || !key || !sigBytes) {
-      // Same messages-by-symptom philosophy as the builtin: a mistyped
-      // key must not present as "every update is a forgery".
-      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Signature inputs malformed (bundle hash, signature, or public key) — refusing to stage.');
-      return false;
-    }
-    let verdict;
-    try {
-      verdict = await native.verifyEd25519(message, bytesToHex(sigBytes), key);
-    } catch (err) {
-      // A rejected promise is machinery failure, not a forgery verdict.
-      _internalLogger.logger.warn(`[OTA] Native ed25519 verify failed to run: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
-      verdict = 'unavailable';
-    }
-    if (verdict === 'valid') return true;
-    if (verdict === 'invalid') return false;
-
-    // 'unavailable' (Android < 33) — fall back to the JS verifier so those
-    // devices keep verifying rather than losing enforcement.
-    const builtin = (0, _builtinVerifier.getBuiltinVerifier)();
-    if (builtin) {
-      return builtin({
-        messageHex,
-        signature,
-        publicKey
-      });
-    }
-    // No source can verify. Throwing (rather than returning false) keeps
-    // the policy layer's outcome labels honest: this surfaces as machinery
-    // failure with an actionable message, not as "the bundle is forged".
-    throw new Error('ed25519 unavailable: this OS has no native implementation (Android < 13) and the ' + 'optional peers @noble/ed25519 + @noble/hashes are not installed.');
-  };
-  __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug('[OTA] Using native ed25519 verifier (platform crypto).');
-  return resolved;
-}
-
-/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
-function _resetNativeVerifier() {
-  resolved = undefined;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=nativeVerifier.js.map