@scalebun/react-native 1.11.1 → 2.0.0

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/OtaOrchestrator.js

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ var _OtaEventEmitter = require("./OtaEventEmitter");
 var _geoCountry = require("./geoCountry");
 var _deviceAttributes = require("./deviceAttributes");
 var _installationId = require("../../core/id/installationId");
-var _signature = require("./signature");
 var _environment = require("./environment");
 var _retry = require("./retry");
 var _StorageBackend = require("../../storage/StorageBackend");
@@ -155,9 +154,10 @@ class OtaOrchestrator {
   /**
    * Initialize the orchestrator. Checks for boot-guard recovery state.
    *
-   * `signature` is optional: an app that has not adopted signing keeps working
-   * on SHA-256 integrity alone. Once a public key IS configured, a bundle that
-   * cannot be verified is refused rather than installed (OTA-03).
+   * Signature enforcement is no longer a JS concern: signed releases are
+   * verified and staged in NATIVE code against RSA keys embedded in the app
+   * package (SB-OTA-RSA-SHA256-V1), and unsigned releases keep working on
+   * SHA-256 integrity alone. There is nothing for the host to configure here.
    */
   init(config) {
     (0, _crashSafe.noThrow)(() => {
@@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ class OtaOrchestrator {
       // them. Config is still refreshed so late signature setup works.
       if (this.initialized) {
         this.bootGuardConfig = config ?? this.bootGuardConfig;
-        this.signatureConfig = config?.signature ?? this.signatureConfig;
         return;
       }
       if (!_NativeScaleBunOta.default) {
@@ -205,7 +204,6 @@ class OtaOrchestrator {
       this.initialized = true;
       this.enabled = true;
       this.bootGuardConfig = config ?? {};
-      this.signatureConfig = config?.signature;
       __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug(`[OTA] Orchestrator initialized (RN ${this.environment.rnVersionString ?? 'unknown'}` + `${this.environment.bridgeless ? ', bridgeless' : ''}` + `${this.environment.hermes ? `, Hermes HBC v${this.environment.hermesBytecodeVersion ?? '?'}` : ''})`);
 
       // ONE read of the slot state, shared by both boot-time consumers.
@@ -485,12 +483,27 @@ class OtaOrchestrator {
       // OTA has no bundle for a non-mobile target; claiming Android there would install the wrong one.
       const mobileOS = (0, _device.resolveMobileOS)();
       if (!mobileOS) throw new Error('OTA is not supported on this platform');
+      // SDK trust coverage (CICDPAGE §12): report which trusted key IDs are
+      // embedded in this binary so the dashboard can measure key-rotation
+      // adoption. Telemetry only — the server never trusts a key a device claims.
+      // Defensive: optional native method, never let it break a check.
+      let trustedKeyIds;
+      try {
+        const raw = _NativeScaleBunOta.default?.getTrustedKeyIds?.();
+        if (raw) {
+          const arr = JSON.parse(raw);
+          if (Array.isArray(arr) && arr.length) trustedKeyIds = arr.slice(0, 16);
+        }
+      } catch {
+        /* trust reporting is best-effort — never break the update check */
+      }
       const payload = {
         appVersion: requestParams.appVersion,
         platform: mobileOS,
         installationId: requestParams.installationId,
         currentBundleId: this.currentBundle?.id,
         currentBundleHash: this.currentBundle?.sha256,
+        trustedKeyIds,
         channelName: requestParams.channelName,
         // Host-supplied country wins; otherwise the cached edge-Worker lookup
         // fills in (see geoCountry.ts). Undefined when neither knows — the
@@ -624,25 +637,12 @@ class OtaOrchestrator {
         version: bundle.version
       });
 
-      // ── VERIFY AUTHENTICITY (OTA-03) ─────────────────────────────────────
-      // Before anything touches the disk. SHA-256 proves the bytes arrived
-      // intact; only the signature proves they came from you. Checking after
-      // staging would mean writing unverified code to the slot directory first.
-      const signatureOutcome = await (0, _signature.verifyBundleSignature)(bundle.sha256, bundle.signature, this.signatureConfig);
-      if (!signatureOutcome.ok) {
-        _OtaEventEmitter.otaEventEmitter.emitSimple('APPLY_FAILED', bundle.id, {
-          releaseId: bundle.releaseId,
-          error: `Signature check failed: ${signatureOutcome.reason}`,
-          version: bundle.version
-        });
-        return {
-          status: 'ERROR',
-          error: `Bundle signature check failed (${signatureOutcome.reason})`,
-          bundle
-        };
-      }
-
       // ── DOWNLOAD ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      // Authenticity is enforced NATIVELY now (see the envelope branch below):
+      // SHA-256 proves the bytes arrived intact, and for signed releases the
+      // RSA signature — checked in native code against keys embedded in the app
+      // package — proves they came from you. JS neither pins keys nor verifies
+      // signatures.
       _OtaEventEmitter.otaEventEmitter.emitSimple('DOWNLOAD_STARTED', bundle.id, {
         releaseId: bundle.releaseId,
         version: bundle.version
@@ -696,46 +696,94 @@ class OtaOrchestrator {
         }
       });
       let staged = false;
-
-      // Sprint 7: Try patch first if offered, fall back to full bundle
-      if (bundle.patch && _NativeScaleBunOta.default.stagePatch) {
-        __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug(`[OTA] Patch available (${(bundle.patch.size / 1024).toFixed(0)} KB vs ` + `${(bundle.size / 1024).toFixed(0)} KB full) — trying patch…`);
+      if (bundle.envelope) {
+        // ── NATIVE-ENFORCED VERIFY + STAGE (SB-OTA-RSA-SHA256-V1) ───────────
+        // Hand the whole envelope to native code, which verifies the RSA
+        // signature against the keys EMBEDDED in the app package, then downloads
+        // the artifact, enforces the SIGNED size + SHA-256, and stages it into
+        // the `next` slot — all outside JS. JavaScript never stages bytes it has
+        // not proven authentic. No patch path here: a signed offer is always a
+        // full verified download (native patch is a documented follow-up).
+        const envelopeJson = JSON.stringify({
+          ...bundle.envelope,
+          downloadUrl: bundle.url
+        });
+        let verdict;
         try {
-          staged = await _NativeScaleBunOta.default.stagePatch(bundle.patch.url, bundle.patch.sha256, bundle.sha256 // expected full-bundle hash after patching
-          );
-          if (staged) {
-            patchUsed = true;
-            __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug('[OTA] Patch applied successfully');
-          } else {
-            _internalLogger.logger.warn('[OTA] Patch staging returned false — falling back to full bundle');
+          const verdictJson = await _NativeScaleBunOta.default.verifyAndStageRelease(envelopeJson);
+          verdict = JSON.parse(verdictJson);
+        } catch (err) {
+          // A rejected promise (or an unparseable verdict) is machinery failure,
+          // never a valid result — treat it as a hard failure.
+          verdict = {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'verify_stage_threw',
+            message: err?.message ?? String(err)
+          };
+        }
+        if (!verdict.ok) {
+          unsubscribeProgress();
+          postProgress(0, 'FAILED');
+          _internalLogger.logger.error(`[OTA] Native verify/stage refused the release: ${verdict.code ?? 'unknown'}` + `${verdict.message ? ` — ${verdict.message}` : ''}`);
+          _OtaEventEmitter.otaEventEmitter.emitSimple('APPLY_FAILED', bundle.id, {
+            releaseId: bundle.releaseId,
+            // `error` is mapped onto the wire `errorCode` by deliverOtaEvents —
+            // carry the stable native verdict code there.
+            error: verdict.code ?? 'verify_and_stage_release_failed',
+            version: bundle.version
+          });
+          return {
+            status: 'ERROR',
+            error: `Release verification failed (${verdict.code ?? 'unknown'})`,
+            bundle
+          };
+        }
+        staged = true;
+      } else {
+        // ── LEGACY / UNSIGNED (SHA-256 integrity only) ─────────────────────
+        // No envelope means the app embeds no trusted keys and the release is
+        // unsigned: keep the pre-RSA behaviour so those apps still update.
+
+        // Sprint 7: Try patch first if offered, fall back to full bundle
+        if (bundle.patch && _NativeScaleBunOta.default.stagePatch) {
+          __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug(`[OTA] Patch available (${(bundle.patch.size / 1024).toFixed(0)} KB vs ` + `${(bundle.size / 1024).toFixed(0)} KB full) — trying patch…`);
+          try {
+            staged = await _NativeScaleBunOta.default.stagePatch(bundle.patch.url, bundle.patch.sha256, bundle.sha256 // expected full-bundle hash after patching
+            );
+            if (staged) {
+              patchUsed = true;
+              __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug('[OTA] Patch applied successfully');
+            } else {
+              _internalLogger.logger.warn('[OTA] Patch staging returned false — falling back to full bundle');
+            }
+          } catch (patchErr) {
+            _internalLogger.logger.warn(`[OTA] Patch staging failed: ${patchErr.message} — falling back to full bundle`);
           }
-        } catch (patchErr) {
-          _internalLogger.logger.warn(`[OTA] Patch staging failed: ${patchErr.message} — falling back to full bundle`);
         }
-      }
 
-      // Full-bundle fallback (or primary path when no patch is available).
-      // Retried with backoff: on a mobile network a transient drop mid-download
-      // is the common case, and previously one failure meant waiting for the
-      // next cold start — often hours away, sometimes never.
-      if (!staged) {
-        try {
-          staged = await (0, _retry.retryWithBackoff)(async () => {
-            const ok = await _NativeScaleBunOta.default.stageBundle(bundle.url, bundle.sha256);
-            if (!ok) {
-              // Native returns a bare boolean, so a hash mismatch and a
-              // dropped connection are indistinguishable here. Retrying a
-              // genuine mismatch a couple of times is cheap; not retrying a
-              // dropped connection costs the whole update.
-              throw new Error('stageBundle returned false');
-            }
-            return ok;
-          }, {
-            label: `download v${bundle.version}`,
-            attempts: 3
-          });
-        } catch {
-          staged = false;
+        // Full-bundle fallback (or primary path when no patch is available).
+        // Retried with backoff: on a mobile network a transient drop mid-download
+        // is the common case, and previously one failure meant waiting for the
+        // next cold start — often hours away, sometimes never.
+        if (!staged) {
+          try {
+            staged = await (0, _retry.retryWithBackoff)(async () => {
+              const ok = await _NativeScaleBunOta.default.stageBundle(bundle.url, bundle.sha256);
+              if (!ok) {
+                // Native returns a bare boolean, so a hash mismatch and a
+                // dropped connection are indistinguishable here. Retrying a
+                // genuine mismatch a couple of times is cheap; not retrying a
+                // dropped connection costs the whole update.
+                throw new Error('stageBundle returned false');
+              }
+              return ok;
+            }, {
+              label: `download v${bundle.version}`,
+              attempts: 3
+            });
+          } catch {
+            staged = false;
+          }
         }
       }
       unsubscribeProgress();

package/lib/commonjs/public/ScaleBunFacade.js

@@ -215,17 +215,11 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   /**
    * Boot the OTA orchestrator when the init config asks for it.
    *
-   * `publicSigningKey` / `publicSigningKeys` are honoured here so signature
-   * enforcement is reachable from configuration alone. The list form exists
-   * for key ROTATION: a build pinning [old, new] keeps verifying while the
-   * server moves to the new key, so replacing a key never needs an emergency
-   * store release. Both fields merge (deduplicated) into one pinned set.
-   *
-   * Verification comes from `ota.verifySignature` when supplied, else the
-   * built-in @noble-based verifier (optional peers). Pinning keys with
-   * NEITHER available is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
-   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather
-   * than letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
+   * Signature enforcement is no longer configured from JS. Signed releases are
+   * verified and staged in NATIVE code against RSA keys embedded in the app
+   * package (SB-OTA-RSA-SHA256-V1); unsigned releases keep working on SHA-256
+   * integrity. There are no signing-key or `verifySignature` options to pass
+   * through — the host embeds its trusted keys natively.
    */
   _maybeStartOta(rawConfig) {
     const ota = rawConfig?.ota;
@@ -237,42 +231,12 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
       const {
         otaOrchestrator
       } = require('../features/ota/OtaOrchestrator');
-      const rawSingle = ota.publicSigningKey;
-      const rawList = ota.publicSigningKeys;
-      const publicKeys = Array.from(new Set([...(typeof rawSingle === 'string' && rawSingle ? [rawSingle] : []), ...(Array.isArray(rawList) ? rawList : [])].filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0)));
-      // Signing was REQUESTED if a usable key exists, or the host passed a
-      // keys array at all — an empty one included. `publicSigningKeys: []`
-      // is a broken attempt to enable signing, and it must flow through to
-      // signature.ts's fail-closed handling, not silently disable signing.
-      const signingRequested = publicKeys.length > 0 || Array.isArray(rawList);
-      const verifier = ota.verifySignature;
-      if (signingRequested && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
-        // A host verifier is optional since the built-in one landed — the
-        // old unconditional warning here told every correctly-configured
-        // app that its updates would be rejected. Warn only when neither
-        // verifier can actually be resolved.
-        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-var-requires
-        const {
-          getBuiltinVerifier
-        } = require('../features/ota/crypto/builtinVerifier');
-        if (!getBuiltinVerifier()) {
-          _internalLogger.logger.warn('[ScaleBun] A signing key is pinned but no signature verifier is available. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until one exists. ' + 'Install the optional peers `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` (no further ' + 'code needed), or supply `ota.verifySignature`.');
-        }
-      }
       // `healthyAfterMs` is the field BootGuardConfig actually declares.
       // This passed `healthyTimeoutMs`, which nothing reads, so a host that
       // tuned the boot-guard window silently got the 10s default instead.
       // Both spellings are accepted so the older one keeps working.
       const healthyAfterMs = typeof ota.healthyAfterMs === 'number' ? ota.healthyAfterMs : typeof ota.healthyTimeoutMs === 'number' ? ota.healthyTimeoutMs : undefined;
       otaOrchestrator.init({
-        ...(signingRequested ? {
-          signature: {
-            // Single key stays a plain string — the shape every
-            // existing consumer and test already handles.
-            publicKey: publicKeys.length === 1 ? publicKeys[0] : publicKeys,
-            verifier
-          }
-        } : {}),
         ...(healthyAfterMs !== undefined ? {
           healthyAfterMs
         } : {})

package/lib/module/core/config/schema.js

@@ -285,18 +285,9 @@ const SHAPE = {
         kind: 'str',
         opt: true
       },
-      publicSigningKey: {
-        kind: 'str',
-        opt: true
-      },
-      // Rotation support: several pinned keys, any of which may verify a
-      // bundle. Ship a build pinning [old, new], re-sign server-side with
-      // new, drop old next release — no emergency store submission when a
-      // key must be replaced. Merged with publicSigningKey by the facade.
-      publicSigningKeys: {
-        kind: 'strArr',
-        opt: true
-      },
+      // No signing-key fields: signed releases are verified natively against
+      // RSA keys embedded in the app package (SB-OTA-RSA-SHA256-V1). JS must
+      // not supply a trusted key.
       mandatoryBlocksUi: bool(false)
     }
   }

package/lib/module/core/constants/version.js

@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
  * value, so a stale one makes a rollout unobservable — which is the exact problem sending an SDK
  * version was introduced to solve.
  */
-export const SDK_VERSION = '1.11.1';
+export const SDK_VERSION = '2.0.0';
 //# sourceMappingURL=version.js.map

package/lib/module/features/network/NetworkFeature.js

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
  */
 
 import { installNetworkMonitoring } from './index';
+import { isThirdPartyBeacon } from './thirdParty';
 import { reportNetworkRequest } from '../replay/integrations/network/networkAdapter';
 import { SessionManager } from '../session/SessionManager';
 import { getTrackedScreen } from '../../debug/screenTracking';
@@ -44,12 +45,28 @@ export class NetworkFeature {
       // self-capture loop. Apply the SAME isSdkInternalUrl filter the replay
       // branch below already uses so genuine app requests still flow through.
       const isInternal = isSdkInternalUrl(data.url, this.options.sdkBaseUrl);
-      if (!isInternal) {
+      /**
+       * Beacons and denied URLs leave NO trace, in any lane.
+       *
+       * A network request reaches three places from here: the analytics echo
+       * (`$network_request`), the local replay pipeline, and the backend network endpoint
+       * that becomes the `network_requests` row the session panel renders. Filtering one
+       * and not the others is how a request half-disappears and two counts of the same
+       * call stop agreeing -- so this is applied to all three.
+       *
+       * Kept separate from `isInternal` rather than folded into it: the SDK's own uploads
+       * are already excluded from two of the three lanes and DELIBERATELY still reach the
+       * local replay pipeline. Widening that here would be an unrelated behaviour change
+       * riding along on a filter.
+       */
+      const isBeaconOrDenied = this.options.captureThirdParty !== true && isThirdPartyBeacon(data.url, this.options.thirdPartyHosts) || matchesDenyUrl(data.url, this.options.denyUrls);
+      const isExcluded = isInternal || isBeaconOrDenied;
+      if (!isExcluded) {
         this.trackFn('$network_request', data);
       }
 
       // Bridge the raw network event into the Session Replay pipeline
-      if (data.type === 'network') {
+      if (data.type === 'network' && !isBeaconOrDenied) {
         reportNetworkRequest({
           method: data.method,
           url: data.url,
@@ -72,8 +89,10 @@ export class NetworkFeature {
         // (correlated by sessionId+timestamp), so we no longer emit
         // NETWORK_REQUEST_* replay events here (that produced duplicate rows
         // and count divergence between replay_events and network_requests).
-        // Skip SDK's own upload calls to prevent recursive event spam.
-        if (!isInternal) {
+        // Skip SDK's own upload calls to prevent recursive event spam, and anything the
+        // beacon/denyUrls filter excluded -- this is the lane that becomes the
+        // network_requests row a person sees on the session panel.
+        if (!isExcluded) {
           const sessionManager = SessionManager.getExistingInstance();
           if (sessionManager) {
             const backendTransport = sessionManager.getBackendTransport();
@@ -107,6 +126,21 @@ export class NetworkFeature {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Substring or RegExp, the same rule as the web SDK's `matchUrl`.
+ *
+ * Spelled out rather than shared because the two SDKs have no common runtime package, and the
+ * rule is two lines. What must NOT differ is the beacon list, which is why that one is a
+ * byte-identical vendored copy with a hash gate rather than a retyped constant.
+ */
+function matchesDenyUrl(url, patterns) {
+  if (!patterns || !patterns.length || !url) return false;
+  for (const p of patterns) {
+    if (typeof p === 'string' ? url.includes(p) : p.test(url)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
 // Returns true if the URL is a ScaleBun SDK internal endpoint that must not be
 // captured — doing so would cause recursive network event spam.
 function isSdkInternalUrl(url, sdkBaseUrl) {

package/lib/module/features/network/thirdParty.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * THIRD-PARTY BEACON HOSTS — the one list, and the one matcher, for every layer that drops them.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS IS FOR
+ * A session on an instrumented site spends most of its network tab on traffic the app did not
+ * meaningfully make: analytics collectors, ad pixels, IP-enrichment calls, tag managers. It is
+ * captured, uploaded, stored and rendered, and none of it answers a question anyone asks a session
+ * replay. One real sign-in screen was 27 requests, most of them beacons.
+ *
+ * It is not only clutter. Session health scores `failedRequests` and `slowRequests`, so a tracker
+ * killed by an ad blocker (a transport error) or one that is simply slow moves a number that is
+ * supposed to describe the APP. That is the part that makes this a correctness fix rather than a
+ * tidy-up.
+ *
+ * WHY HOSTS ONLY, NEVER PATHS
+ * The obvious rules from looking at a network tab are `/collect`, `/p`, `/api/v2/pixel`. Every one
+ * of them is a path that a customer's own API is allowed to have, and dropping a real API call is
+ * far worse than keeping a beacon: the noise is visible and annoying, the missing request is
+ * invisible and misleading. So matching is on the HOSTNAME, with a dot boundary, and a request to
+ * `/collect` on the app's own origin is kept — correctly.
+ *
+ * WHY IT IS A SUFFIX LIST AND NOT A REGEX
+ * Two reasons, both practical. It is applied inside an SDK whose eager bundle is measured in bytes,
+ * and a comma-joined string of suffixes compresses to almost nothing next to an equivalent pattern
+ * source. And it has to be COPIED, byte for byte, into the React Native SDK and into the backend's
+ * ingest path — a list with no syntax is a list that cannot drift in meaning between three
+ * languages' worth of tooling. `third-party:parity` hashes all three copies.
+ *
+ * ZERO IMPORTS, DELIBERATELY. That is what makes the byte-identical copy possible. If an edit here
+ * ever needs an import, the parity gate is the thing that will say so — keep the module pure rather
+ * than weakening the gate.
+ *
+ * WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT ON THE LIST
+ * The rule is: a host whose ONLY purpose is to receive telemetry. Everything else stays, because a
+ * dropped request is invisible and a kept one is merely noisy.
+ *
+ *   - Feature-flag and experiment services (LaunchDarkly, Optimizely, Split). Their RESPONSES
+ *     change what the app does, so a failed flag fetch is an application incident and the single
+ *     most useful request in the session.
+ *   - Chat and support widgets (Intercom, Zendesk, Drift). A broken widget is a broken feature the
+ *     user can see.
+ *   - `facebook.com` as a whole. `graph.facebook.com` is an API real apps call; only the pixel
+ *     delivery hosts are listed.
+ *   - CDNs of any kind, even ones that mostly serve tags: they also serve application assets, and
+ *     dropping them would hide a real asset failure.
+ *
+ * When in doubt, leave it out. `denyUrls` stays the per-app escape hatch in both SDKs, and it can
+ * do what this list will not.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Known telemetry, advertising and enrichment endpoints, as hostname suffixes.
+ *
+ * One comma-joined string rather than an array: identical meaning, materially smaller once gzipped,
+ * and it keeps the copy in three repos a single line to compare by eye.
+ */
+export const THIRD_PARTY_BEACON_HOSTS = 'google-analytics.com,googletagmanager.com,analytics.google.com,doubleclick.net,googlesyndication.com,' + 'googleadservices.com,app-measurement.com,facebook.net,analytics.tiktok.com,' + 'ads-twitter.com,analytics.twitter.com,ct.pinterest.com,bat.bing.com,px.ads.linkedin.com,tr.snapchat.com,' + 'criteo.com,criteo.net,taboola.com,outbrain.com,adroll.com,adsrvr.org,quantserve.com,scorecardresearch.com,' + 'hotjar.com,hotjar.io,clarity.ms,fullstory.com,mouseflow.com,crazyegg.com,luckyorange.com,inspectlet.com,' + 'segment.io,mixpanel.com,amplitude.com,heap.io,heapanalytics.com,rudderstack.com,posthog.com,' + 'matomo.cloud,plausible.io,simpleanalytics.com,statcounter.com,' + 'appsflyer.com,adjust.com,branch.io,' + 'ipify.org,ipinfo.io,ipapi.co,ip-api.com,geolocation-db.com,cloudflareinsights.com,' + 'nr-data.net,browser-intake-datadoghq.com,sentry.io,bugsnag.com,rollbar.com';
+
+/**
+ * True when `url` is addressed to a known beacon host.
+ *
+ * Deliberately total: an unparseable or relative URL is NOT third party. A relative URL is
+ * same-origin by definition — the app's own call — and guessing on garbage input would drop real
+ * requests for no benefit.
+ */
+export function isThirdPartyBeacon(url, hosts) {
+  if (!url) return false;
+  let host = '';
+  try {
+    // A relative URL throws here, which is the answer we want: it is first-party.
+    host = new URL(url).hostname.toLowerCase();
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!host) return false;
+  for (const suffix of (hosts ?? THIRD_PARTY_BEACON_HOSTS).split(',')) {
+    // Dot boundary, so `notevil-facebook.com` does not match `facebook.com` while
+    // `connect.facebook.com` does. The bare-equality arm covers the apex domain itself.
+    if (host === suffix || host.endsWith('.' + suffix)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=thirdParty.js.map