@scalebun/react-native 1.10.6 → 1.11.0

package/lib/module/features/ota/crypto/loadSha512.js

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/**
+ * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/hashes` SHA-512.
+ *
+ * Separate file from `loadEd25519` because Metro miscounts a module holding two
+ * different-string inline `require()` calls — see the comment there.
+ *
+ * ed25519 is defined in terms of SHA-512, and React Native has no native
+ * SHA-512, so @noble/ed25519 cannot verify anything until a hash provider is
+ * wired into it. Which property it expects differs by major version, so the
+ * wiring lives in `builtinVerifier`, not here; this module only obtains the
+ * function.
+ */
+
+export function loadSha512() {
+  try {
+    // The `.js` SUFFIX IS REQUIRED, not stylistic. @noble/hashes v2 declares
+    // its exports map with extensions — `"./sha2.js"`, not `"./sha2"` — so
+    // the extensionless form misses the map entirely. Node still resolves it
+    // by falling back to file-based lookup, which is why it passes here,
+    // but Metro prints
+    //   "Attempted to import … not listed in the exports … Falling back to
+    //    file-based resolution"
+    // on every bundle, and that fallback is exactly what a stricter resolver
+    // (or a future Metro) drops. Caught while bundling a real Expo app.
+    const mod = require('@noble/hashes/sha2.js');
+    const sha512 = mod?.sha512 ?? mod?.default?.sha512;
+    // A stubbed module yields undefined here, which correctly reads as
+    // "unavailable" rather than throwing deep inside the curve code later.
+    return typeof sha512 === 'function' ? sha512 : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=loadSha512.js.map

package/lib/module/features/ota/crypto/nativeVerifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/**
+ * Native ed25519 verifier — platform crypto wrapped as a SignatureVerifier.
+ *
+ * WHY IT EXISTS. The built-in @noble verifier runs in JS, inside the very
+ * bundle it protects: an attacker who lands one malicious bundle can neuter a
+ * JS check for every update after it. Platform crypto (CryptoKit on iOS,
+ * Android's conscrypt on API 33+) sits outside the bundle's reach — and using
+ * it also drops the runtime dependency on the optional @noble peers wherever
+ * the OS provides ed25519.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT FIX, stated plainly: the ORCHESTRATION still lives in JS.
+ * A hostile bundle can skip calling any verifier and drive the native staging
+ * methods directly. Moving the crypto native shrinks the attack surface (no
+ * more tampering with a bundled crypto lib to flip a verdict) but the full
+ * close needs native-ENFORCED staging with a natively-pinned key — an
+ * architectural change tracked separately, not smuggled into this one.
+ *
+ * VERDICT CONTRACT (mirrors the spec): the native side resolves
+ * 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unavailable'. 'invalid' is a definitive NO.
+ * 'unavailable' (Android < 33, malformed input, machinery failure) means this
+ * source cannot answer — the composed verifier below then delegates to the
+ * @noble builtin, and when that is absent too it THROWS, which the policy
+ * layer converts to a rejection. Every path that cannot verify refuses.
+ */
+
+import NativeScaleBunOta from '../../../specs/NativeScaleBunOta';
+import { logger } from '../../../core/logger/internalLogger';
+import { decodeSignature, getBuiltinVerifier } from './builtinVerifier';
+const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS = 64;
+
+/** bytes → lowercase hex (the native side takes clean hex only). */
+function bytesToHex(bytes) {
+  let out = '';
+  for (const b of bytes) out += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Strict lowercase-hex normalization; null when the value is not hex. */
+function normalizeHex(value, expectedChars) {
+  const clean = value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+  if (clean.length !== expectedChars || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
+  return clean;
+}
+let resolved;
+
+/**
+ * The native-first verifier, or null when the native module (or its
+ * verifyEd25519 method — an app running new JS against an old binary) is
+ * absent. Cached like the builtin: module availability does not change at
+ * runtime, and this is consulted on every update check.
+ */
+export function getNativeVerifier() {
+  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
+  const native = NativeScaleBunOta;
+  if (!native || typeof native.verifyEd25519 !== 'function') {
+    // Old binary, Jest, web/SSR — not an error, just not this source.
+    resolved = null;
+    return null;
+  }
+  resolved = async ({
+    messageHex,
+    signature,
+    publicKey
+  }) => {
+    // All decoding and validation happens HERE, in one place, so both
+    // platforms' native code only ever sees clean fixed-length hex. The
+    // signature may arrive hex or base64 (the wire allows both) — reuse
+    // the builtin's decoder rather than growing a second, subtly
+    // different one.
+    const message = normalizeHex(messageHex, 64);
+    const key = normalizeHex(publicKey, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS);
+    const sigBytes = decodeSignature(signature);
+    if (!message || !key || !sigBytes) {
+      // Same messages-by-symptom philosophy as the builtin: a mistyped
+      // key must not present as "every update is a forgery".
+      logger.error('[OTA] Signature inputs malformed (bundle hash, signature, or public key) — refusing to stage.');
+      return false;
+    }
+    let verdict;
+    try {
+      verdict = await native.verifyEd25519(message, bytesToHex(sigBytes), key);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A rejected promise is machinery failure, not a forgery verdict.
+      logger.warn(`[OTA] Native ed25519 verify failed to run: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+      verdict = 'unavailable';
+    }
+    if (verdict === 'valid') return true;
+    if (verdict === 'invalid') return false;
+
+    // 'unavailable' (Android < 33) — fall back to the JS verifier so those
+    // devices keep verifying rather than losing enforcement.
+    const builtin = getBuiltinVerifier();
+    if (builtin) {
+      return builtin({
+        messageHex,
+        signature,
+        publicKey
+      });
+    }
+    // No source can verify. Throwing (rather than returning false) keeps
+    // the policy layer's outcome labels honest: this surfaces as machinery
+    // failure with an actionable message, not as "the bundle is forged".
+    throw new Error('ed25519 unavailable: this OS has no native implementation (Android < 13) and the ' + 'optional peers @noble/ed25519 + @noble/hashes are not installed.');
+  };
+  __DEV__ && logger.debug('[OTA] Using native ed25519 verifier (platform crypto).');
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
+export function _resetNativeVerifier() {
+  resolved = undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=nativeVerifier.js.map

package/lib/module/features/ota/signature.js

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 import { logger } from '../../core/logger/internalLogger';
+import { getBuiltinVerifier } from './crypto/builtinVerifier';
+import { getNativeVerifier } from './crypto/nativeVerifier';
 
 /**
  * Bundle signature verification (OTA-03).
@@ -13,10 +15,17 @@ import { logger } from '../../core/logger/internalLogger';
  * download and nothing else. On a platform whose entire purpose is remote code
  * delivery, that is the control that matters most.
  *
- * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. The SDK ships zero third-party runtime
- * dependencies, and React Native has no built-in ed25519. So verification is
- * delegated to a host-provided verifier when one is installed, and the SDK's job
- * is to decide — unambiguously — what happens when there is not one.
+ * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. React Native has no built-in ed25519, so the
+ * verification primitive has to come from somewhere. It is resolved in order:
+ * a host-supplied verifier, else the built-in one assembled from the OPTIONAL
+ * `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` peers, else nothing — and the SDK's job is
+ * to decide, unambiguously, what happens in that last case.
+ *
+ * The built-in path exists because requiring every adopter to hand-write a
+ * verifier put the most security-critical operation in the product in code the
+ * SDK could neither test nor audit, and made a routine dependency bump able to
+ * silently stop all updates. See `crypto/builtinVerifier.ts`. Signing stays
+ * opt-in, and apps that never adopt it carry no curve arithmetic.
  *
  * THE POLICY, which is the important part:
  *
@@ -46,10 +55,16 @@ let warnedNotConfigured = false;
  * different operational events and must not collapse into one.
  */
 export async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
-  const publicKey = config?.publicKey;
+  const rawKey = config?.publicKey;
+
+  // Normalize to a list. A single non-empty string is the pre-rotation config
+  // shape and behaves exactly as before; an array pins several keys at once.
+  const keys = (Array.isArray(rawKey) ? rawKey : rawKey ? [rawKey] : []).filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0);
 
-  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce.
-  if (!publicKey) {
+  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce. Parity note: a
+  // falsy single value (undefined, '') has always meant "not configured" and
+  // still does.
+  if (rawKey === undefined || rawKey === '' || rawKey === null) {
     if (!warnedNotConfigured) {
       warnedNotConfigured = true;
       logger.warn('[OTA] No signing public key configured — bundles are accepted on SHA-256 ' + 'integrity alone. Configure `ota.publicSigningKey` to enforce authenticity.');
@@ -60,6 +75,19 @@ export async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
     };
   }
 
+  // The host PROVIDED a key config that resolves to zero usable keys — an
+  // empty array, or an array of blank strings. That is a broken attempt to
+  // enable signing, not an absence of one, and the two must not collapse:
+  // treating `publicSigningKeys: []` as "not configured" would let a config
+  // mistake silently downgrade an app to unverified installs. Fail closed.
+  if (keys.length === 0) {
+    logger.error('[OTA] Signing key config resolves to zero usable keys (empty array or blank ' + 'strings) — refusing to stage. Remove the config to disable signing, or pin ' + 'at least one real key.');
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'no_keys'
+    };
+  }
+
   // The app opted in, so a bundle without a signature is a refusal, not a pass.
   if (!signature) {
     logger.error('[OTA] Bundle has no signature but a signing key is configured — refusing to stage.');
@@ -68,38 +96,70 @@ export async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
       reason: 'missing_signature'
     };
   }
-  if (typeof config?.verifier !== 'function') {
-    logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Provide `ota.verifySignature` so signatures can be checked.');
+
+  // Resolution order, and the order matters:
+  //   1. A host-supplied verifier ALWAYS wins. A team with its own crypto
+  //      policy must be able to override whatever the SDK would otherwise pick.
+  //   2. Otherwise the NATIVE verifier (CryptoKit / Android 13+ platform
+  //      ed25519). Preferred over the JS one because it runs outside the
+  //      bundle it protects and needs no optional peers; on OS levels without
+  //      ed25519 it delegates to the builtin internally.
+  //   3. Otherwise the built-in @noble verifier, if the optional peers are
+  //      installed. This is the path that removes ~100 lines of hand-written
+  //      crypto plumbing from every app that adopts signing.
+  //   4. Otherwise reject, because a configured key is a request for
+  //      enforcement and quietly installing unverified code would turn a
+  //      security feature into a placebo.
+  const verifier = typeof config?.verifier === 'function' ? config.verifier : getNativeVerifier() ?? getBuiltinVerifier();
+  if (!verifier) {
+    logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Either install the optional peers ' + '`@noble/ed25519` and `@noble/hashes` (the SDK then verifies with no ' + 'further code), or provide your own `ota.verifySignature`.');
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'no_verifier'
     };
   }
-  try {
-    const valid = await config.verifier({
-      messageHex: bundleSha256,
-      signature,
-      publicKey
-    });
-    if (!valid) {
-      logger.error('[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'invalid_signature'
+
+  // Try every pinned key; any single match accepts. The verifier contract is
+  // unchanged (one key per call) so host-supplied verifiers keep working.
+  //
+  // Outcome labelling when nothing matched, and why it matters: if at least
+  // one verifier call RAN TO COMPLETION and said no, the bundle failed
+  // verification — 'invalid_signature'. Only when EVERY call threw is the
+  // machinery itself suspect — 'verifier_threw'. Collapsing those (e.g. by
+  // letting the last key's throw win) would point an investigation at the
+  // host's verifier when the actual event was a forged bundle, or vice versa.
+  let sawThrow = false;
+  let sawCompletion = false;
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    try {
+      const valid = await verifier({
+        messageHex: bundleSha256,
+        signature,
+        publicKey: key
+      });
+      sawCompletion = true;
+      if (valid) return {
+        ok: true,
+        reason: 'verified'
       };
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification for this key,
+      // never as a pass — but the remaining keys still get their chance.
+      sawThrow = true;
+      logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
     }
-    return {
-      ok: true,
-      reason: 'verified'
-    };
-  } catch (err) {
-    // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification, never as a pass.
-    logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+  }
+  if (sawThrow && !sawCompletion) {
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'verifier_threw'
     };
   }
+  logger.error(keys.length > 1 ? `[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID under all ${keys.length} pinned keys — refusing to stage.` : '[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    reason: 'invalid_signature'
+  };
 }
 
 /** Test seam — resets the once-per-process "not configured" warning. */

package/lib/module/features/session/JourneyEventPipeline.js

@@ -65,26 +65,27 @@ export class JourneyEventPipeline {
   emit(type, opts) {
     try {
       const key = `${type}:${opts?.subtype ?? ''}`;
-      const now = Date.now();
-      if (key === this.lastEventKey && now - this.lastEventTs < this.config.dedupeWindowMs) {
+      const receivedAt = Date.now();
+      const occurredAt = opts?.timestamp ?? receivedAt;
+      if (key === this.lastEventKey && receivedAt - this.lastEventTs < this.config.dedupeWindowMs) {
         // Within dedup window — allow high-confidence native events to
         // REPLACE a prior low-confidence JS event for the same gesture.
         // This prevents the race where JS fires first and the pipeline
         // drops the native event that has more accurate coordinates.
         const incomingConfidence = opts?.payload?.confidence;
         if (incomingConfidence === 'high' && this.lastEventConfidence !== 'high') {
-          this._replaceLastEvent(key, now, opts);
+          this._replaceLastEvent(key, receivedAt, opts);
         }
         return null;
       }
       this.lastEventKey = key;
-      this.lastEventTs = now;
+      this.lastEventTs = receivedAt;
       this.lastEventConfidence = opts?.payload?.confidence ?? null;
       const event = {
         eventId: generateEventId(),
         sessionId: this.sessionId,
         journeyId: opts?.journeyId,
-        ts: now,
+        ts: occurredAt,
         type,
         subtype: opts?.subtype,
         severity: opts?.severity ?? inferSeverity(type),

package/lib/module/features/session/SessionManager.js

@@ -27,15 +27,11 @@ import { bridgeAdapter } from '../replay/bridge/adapters/bridgeAdapter';
 import { redactBody } from '../../debug/redaction';
 import { consumeCalibrationTarget } from '../journey/calibrationContext';
 import { resolvePlatformOS } from '../../core/context/device';
+import { emitAutomaticEvent } from '../../analytics/automaticEvents';
+import { INTERACTION_PROTOCOL_VERSION, automaticInteractionProperties, generateInteractionId } from '../journey/interactionProtocol';
 
 // ─── Types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-/**
- * Max analytics-lane heatmap interactions emitted per foreground (analytics
- * session) window. Bounds ingest volume now that capture defaults ON; enough to
- * resolve hotspot density, the long tail is dropped (drop-newest beyond cap).
- */
-const HEATMAP_MAX_INTERACTIONS_PER_WINDOW = 200;
 // ─── Singleton ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 let _instance = null;
@@ -51,15 +47,6 @@ export class SessionManager {
    * lane even when no replay recording is active. Additive, opt-in (default off).
    */
   _captureInteractionHeatmap = false;
-  /**
-   * Sampling cap for the analytics-lane heatmap emission. Now that capture is
-   * ON by default, an unbounded one-event-per-gesture stream could materially
-   * inflate ingest volume. We cap emitted interactions per analytics-session
-   * window (finalize-scoped per foreground): the first N gestures define the
-   * hotspot shape; the long tail is dropped. Resets when the window changes.
-   */
-  _heatmapWindowSessionId = null;
-  _heatmapWindowCount = 0;
   session = null;
   active = false;
   timeoutTimer = null;
@@ -661,21 +648,11 @@ export class SessionManager {
    *     injected sensitive keys (e.g. a label) are stripped before transport.
    *   - Never throws.
    */
-  _emitInteractionToAnalytics(gestureType, payload) {
-    if (!this._captureInteractionHeatmap) return;
-    if (this.active) return; // recording lane already carries this tap
+  _emitInteractionToAnalytics(gestureType, payload, occurredAt, screenName) {
+    if (!this._captureInteractionHeatmap) return false;
+    if (this.active) return false; // recording lane already carries this tap
     const adapter = this._backendTransport;
-    if (!adapter) return;
-
-    // Per-foreground sampling cap. Reset the counter when the analytics
-    // session window rolls over, then drop anything past the cap.
-    const windowId = adapter.analyticsSessionId ?? '';
-    if (windowId !== this._heatmapWindowSessionId) {
-      this._heatmapWindowSessionId = windowId;
-      this._heatmapWindowCount = 0;
-    }
-    if (this._heatmapWindowCount >= HEATMAP_MAX_INTERACTIONS_PER_WINDOW) return;
-    this._heatmapWindowCount++;
+    if (!adapter) return false;
     try {
       // Normalize coords in place (same logic as the recording lane).
       this._normalizeInteractionPayload(payload);
@@ -702,16 +679,18 @@ export class SessionManager {
         eventId: generateEventId(),
         // sessionId is (re)stamped by the analytics lane at flush time.
         sessionId: adapter.analyticsSessionId ?? '',
-        ts: Date.now(),
+        ts: occurredAt,
         type: 'USER_ACTION',
         subtype: `gesture:${gestureType}`,
-        screen: this._lastKnownScreen ?? undefined,
+        screen: screenName ?? this._lastKnownScreen ?? undefined,
         payload: safePayload,
         source: 'user'
       };
       adapter.trackEvent(event);
+      return true;
     } catch (err) {
       logger.error('[SessionManager] heatmap analytics emit failed:', err);
+      return false;
     }
   }
 
@@ -931,13 +910,14 @@ export class SessionManager {
    * Notify of a user interaction. Called by ScaleBunDebugRoot touch handlers.
    * Also triggers frame capture for desktop-initiated recordings.
    */
-  onUserAction(subtype, payload) {
+  onUserAction(subtype, payload, context) {
     if (!this.active) return; // Defense-in-depth: no emission when recording is OFF
     this.emitEvent('USER_ACTION', {
       subtype,
-      screen: this._lastKnownScreen ?? undefined,
+      screen: context?.screen ?? this._lastKnownScreen ?? undefined,
       payload,
-      source: 'user'
+      source: 'user',
+      timestamp: context?.timestamp
     });
     // NOTE: Do NOT call captureManager.onInteraction() here.
     // emitEvent() already triggers onInteraction() for USER_ACTION events (line ~405).
@@ -952,7 +932,8 @@ export class SessionManager {
     // Exact-duplicate suppression — see _lastGestureSig. Signature is the gesture type plus
     // raw coordinates verbatim; String() keeps undefined coords distinct from 0 (a payload
     // with no coords never collides with a real origin tap).
-    const dedupSig = `${gestureType}|${String(details?.x)}|${String(details?.y)}|${String(details?.endX)}|${String(details?.endY)}`;
+    const suppliedInteractionId = details?.interactionId;
+    const dedupSig = suppliedInteractionId ? `id:${suppliedInteractionId}` : `${gestureType}|${String(details?.x)}|${String(details?.y)}|${String(details?.endX)}|${String(details?.endY)}`;
     const nowTs = Date.now();
     if (dedupSig === this._lastGestureSig && nowTs - this._lastGestureTs <= SessionManager.GESTURE_DEDUP_WINDOW_MS) {
       this._lastGestureTs = nowTs; // a burst of 3 stays suppressed even if gaps chain past the window
@@ -964,7 +945,15 @@ export class SessionManager {
     // Build the canonical gesture payload ONCE so the recording lane and the
     // (additive) analytics lane carry byte-identical keys (normalizedX/Y,
     // gestureType, etc.). Same object shape that was previously inlined.
+    const interactionId = suppliedInteractionId ?? generateInteractionId();
+    const occurredAt = details?.occurredAt ?? Date.now();
+    const stateStatus = details?.stateStatus ?? (details?.ui ? 'captured_nonempty' : 'not_captured');
     const payload = {
+      interaction_id: interactionId,
+      interaction_protocol: details?.interactionProtocol ?? INTERACTION_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      state_status: stateStatus,
+      ui: details?.ui,
+      target_id: details?.targetId,
       gestureType,
       x: details?.x,
       y: details?.y,
@@ -1009,9 +998,16 @@ export class SessionManager {
     // when the flag is OFF, no backend transport is attached, or recording is
     // active (the recording path below already carries this tap). Uses a fresh
     // payload clone so analytics normalization never mutates the recording one.
-    this._emitInteractionToAnalytics(gestureType, {
+    const analyticsReplayCarrier = this._emitInteractionToAnalytics(gestureType, {
       ...payload
-    });
+    }, occurredAt, details?.screenName);
+    const replayCarrier = !!this._backendTransport && (this.active || analyticsReplayCarrier);
+    if (details?.emitAutomaticAnalytics) {
+      try {
+        const safePayload = redactBody(payload);
+        emitAutomaticEvent('element_interacted', automaticInteractionProperties(safePayload, details?.screenName ?? this._lastKnownScreen ?? undefined, replayCarrier), occurredAt);
+      } catch {/* automatic projection must never affect interaction capture */}
+    }
     if (!this.active) return; // Defense-in-depth: no emission when recording is OFF
     // The subtype becomes `ReplayEvent.label`, which is what the Events explorer GROUPS BY. Naming
     // the tapped control here is what splits taps per control instead of collapsing every tap in the
@@ -1021,7 +1017,10 @@ export class SessionManager {
     // ⚠️ `gestureType` also travels in the payload, and the backend's `resolveGesture` reads THAT
     // first — so enriching the label cannot change heatmap gesture classification.
     const target = typeof details?.target === 'string' ? details.target.trim() : '';
-    this.onUserAction(target ? `gesture:${gestureType} · ${target}` : `gesture:${gestureType}`, payload);
+    this.onUserAction(target ? `gesture:${gestureType} · ${target}` : `gesture:${gestureType}`, payload, {
+      screen: details?.screenName,
+      timestamp: occurredAt
+    });
   }
 
   /**

package/lib/module/metro/serializerCompose.js

@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ export function discoverArtifacts(packageRoot) {
   return out;
 }
 
+/** One-shot guard so an Expo build does not print the pass-through notice per bundle. */
+let warnedUnknownShape = false;
+
 /**
  * Build the composing serializer. `hostSerializer` is the app's own customSerializer, if any.
  */
@@ -85,6 +88,35 @@ export function createComposingSerializer(artifacts, internals, hostSerializer)
       const hostResult = await hostSerializer(entryPoint, preModules, graph, options);
       if (typeof hostResult === 'string') {
         code = hostResult;
+      } else if (hostResult && typeof hostResult.code !== 'string') {
+        /**
+         * A shape this wrapper does not understand — pass it back UNTOUCHED.
+         *
+         * Expo is the case that matters. `expo/metro-config` installs a
+         * serializer returning `{ artifacts: [...] }`, a multi-artifact
+         * shape with no top-level `code`. Reading `.code` off it yielded
+         * undefined, and returning `{ code: undefined, map }` made every
+         * `expo export:embed` die with:
+         *
+         *   Serializer did not return expected format. The project copy
+         *   of `expo/metro-config` may be out of date.
+         *
+         * — a message that sends you to upgrade Expo, which is not the
+         * problem. The result: `withScaleBun` broke PRODUCTION BUNDLING
+         * FOR EVERY EXPO APP, and the SDK's own marketing test app could
+         * not build. Found by bundling it.
+         *
+         * Passing it through costs ScaleBun's source-map composition on
+         * Expo (OTA stack traces stay mapped to the bundle rather than to
+         * original sources). That is a real loss and strictly better than
+         * a build that cannot run at all. Composing INTO an artifact
+         * array is the follow-up; it must not be guessed at here.
+         */
+        if (!warnedUnknownShape) {
+          warnedUnknownShape = true;
+          console.warn('[ScaleBun/metro] The host serializer returned a shape this SDK does not ' + 'compose (Expo returns { artifacts }). Passing it through unchanged — ' + 'the build is correct, but ScaleBun source-map composition is skipped.');
+        }
+        return hostResult;
       } else {
         code = hostResult.code;
         try {

package/lib/module/public/ScaleBunFacade.js

@@ -209,12 +209,17 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   /**
    * Boot the OTA orchestrator when the init config asks for it.
    *
-   * `publicSigningKey` is honoured here so signature enforcement is reachable
-   * from configuration alone. The SDK ships no ed25519 implementation, so a
-   * host that pins a key must also supply `ota.verifySignature`; pinning a key
-   * without a verifier is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
-   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather than
-   * letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
+   * `publicSigningKey` / `publicSigningKeys` are honoured here so signature
+   * enforcement is reachable from configuration alone. The list form exists
+   * for key ROTATION: a build pinning [old, new] keeps verifying while the
+   * server moves to the new key, so replacing a key never needs an emergency
+   * store release. Both fields merge (deduplicated) into one pinned set.
+   *
+   * Verification comes from `ota.verifySignature` when supplied, else the
+   * built-in @noble-based verifier (optional peers). Pinning keys with
+   * NEITHER available is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
+   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather
+   * than letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
    */
   _maybeStartOta(rawConfig) {
     const ota = rawConfig?.ota;
@@ -226,15 +231,34 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
       const {
         otaOrchestrator
       } = require('../features/ota/OtaOrchestrator');
-      const publicKey = ota.publicSigningKey;
+      const rawSingle = ota.publicSigningKey;
+      const rawList = ota.publicSigningKeys;
+      const publicKeys = Array.from(new Set([...(typeof rawSingle === 'string' && rawSingle ? [rawSingle] : []), ...(Array.isArray(rawList) ? rawList : [])].filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0)));
+      // Signing was REQUESTED if a usable key exists, or the host passed a
+      // keys array at all — an empty one included. `publicSigningKeys: []`
+      // is a broken attempt to enable signing, and it must flow through to
+      // signature.ts's fail-closed handling, not silently disable signing.
+      const signingRequested = publicKeys.length > 0 || Array.isArray(rawList);
       const verifier = ota.verifySignature;
-      if (publicKey && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
-        logger.warn('[ScaleBun] ota.publicSigningKey is set but ota.verifySignature is not a function. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until a verifier is supplied.');
+      if (signingRequested && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
+        // A host verifier is optional since the built-in one landed — the
+        // old unconditional warning here told every correctly-configured
+        // app that its updates would be rejected. Warn only when neither
+        // verifier can actually be resolved.
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-var-requires
+        const {
+          getBuiltinVerifier
+        } = require('../features/ota/crypto/builtinVerifier');
+        if (!getBuiltinVerifier()) {
+          logger.warn('[ScaleBun] A signing key is pinned but no signature verifier is available. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until one exists. ' + 'Install the optional peers `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` (no further ' + 'code needed), or supply `ota.verifySignature`.');
+        }
       }
       otaOrchestrator.init({
-        ...(publicKey ? {
+        ...(signingRequested ? {
           signature: {
-            publicKey,
+            // Single key stays a plain string — the shape every
+            // existing consumer and test already handles.
+            publicKey: publicKeys.length === 1 ? publicKeys[0] : publicKeys,
             verifier
           }
         } : {}),
@@ -471,6 +495,45 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   }
 
   /** Convenience: emit a Phase 1 purchase event (revenue + currency + transaction_id). */
+  /**
+   * Declare which UI state the user is looking at, so taps are attributed to the surface they
+   * happened on rather than averaged across every variant of the screen.
+   *
+   *     ScaleBun.setUiState('filter-sheet', 'open');
+   *     ScaleBun.setUiState('checkout-step', 'payment');
+   *
+   * Call it when the state CHANGES — the value is read at tap time, so it only has to be right by
+   * the time the next tap lands. On React Native this is the ONLY source of UI state: unlike the web,
+   * there is no queryable accessibility tree that says a sheet is up, and guessing would produce a
+   * state key that is right on some apps and silently wrong on others.
+   *
+   * Names and values are identifiers, not content: they become query keys in the dashboard, so a
+   * person's name or a cart total does not belong in one. `;`, `:` and `|` are stripped and both
+   * halves are capped at 32 characters.
+   */
+  setUiState(name, value) {
+    try {
+      const {
+        setUiState
+      } = require('../features/journey/uiState');
+      setUiState(name, value);
+    } catch {/* no-throw: a state declaration must never break the host */}
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Stop reporting a UI state dimension — or, with no argument, all of them.
+   *
+   * Clear on screen unmount. A declaration left behind follows the user onto a surface where it means
+   * nothing, and every tap there is filed under a state that was not on screen.
+   */
+  clearUiState(name) {
+    try {
+      const {
+        clearUiState
+      } = require('../features/journey/uiState');
+      clearUiState(name);
+    } catch {/* no-throw */}
+  }
   trackPurchase(input) {
     noThrow(() => this._eventTracker?.trackPurchase(input));
   }