@sanqianx/project-knowledge 5.0.24 → 5.0.26

package/_site/_test/helpers/parallel-qa-engine-endpoint-guard.js

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+'use strict';
+// _site/_test/helpers/parallel-qa-engine-endpoint-guard.js — P-QA-ENGINE-ENDPOINT-FIX-R5
+//
+// Fail-closed endpoint discipline for every engine construction in this lane.
+// The engine coordinator ignores env for its vector/bridge legs (hardcoded
+// LIVE fallbacks 127.0.0.1:8787/8790), so tests must pass explicit OWN urls —
+// these helpers refuse anything else instead of silently defaulting live:
+//
+//   assertOwnedEndpoint(url, {role})      throws PK_ENGINE_ENDPOINT_REFUSED for
+//                                         missing/non-http/non-loopback/port-0/
+//                                         protected-port URLs; accepts ONLY
+//                                         http on loopback with an explicit
+//                                         non-protected port.
+//   guardedCreateEngineServer(options)    requires a safe options.vectorUrl AND
+//                                         (safe options.bridgeUrl OR an
+//                                         options.bridge double); only then
+//                                         lazily requires the product server.
+//                                         Refusals never load product code.
+//   installEgressGuard()                  patches global.fetch: protected ports
+//                                         and non-loopback hosts throw
+//                                         PK_PROTECTED_EGRESS_BLOCKED BEFORE
+//                                         any I/O (no socket is opened); every
+//                                         allowed call is recorded and passed
+//                                         through. Covers requestIndex
+//                                         (default-param fetch), retrieval
+//                                         recallIndex, coordinator health and
+//                                         ModuleBridge._fetch, which all read
+//                                         global fetch at call time.
+//   createEngineVectorStandin()           minimal OWN vector contract server
+//                                         (ephemeral loopback port): POST
+//                                         /api/import, POST /api/sync, GET
+//                                         /api/projects, GET /api/search.
+//                                         /api/search answers 503 so retrieval
+//                                         degrades to lexical — this stand-in
+//                                         proves request routing and contract
+//                                         parity, NOT real vector quality.
+//   createEngineBridgeDouble()            in-process bridge test double with
+//                                         the full drain surface; never opens
+//                                         a socket.
+const http = require('node:http');
+const path = require('node:path');
+const { PROTECTED_PORTS } = require('./parallel-qa-engine-endpoint-isolate');
+
+const REFUSAL_CODE = 'PK_ENGINE_ENDPOINT_REFUSED';
+const EGRESS_BLOCK_CODE = 'PK_PROTECTED_EGRESS_BLOCKED';
+const ENGINE_SERVER_MODULE = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', '..', '_modules', 'knowledge-engine', 'src', 'server.js');
+
+function refusal(message, extra = {}) {
+  return Object.assign(new Error(message), { code: REFUSAL_CODE, ...extra });
+}
+
+function assertOwnedEndpoint(value, { role = 'endpoint' } = {}) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value.trim()) throw refusal(`${role}: 缺少显式 URL，拒绝回落 LIVE 默认端口。`, { role });
+  let url;
+  try { url = new URL(value); } catch { throw refusal(`${role}: URL 无法解析（${value}）。`, { role }); }
+  if (url.protocol !== 'http:') throw refusal(`${role}: 只允许 http://（收到 ${url.protocol}//）。`, { role });
+  if (!['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]'].includes(url.hostname)) throw refusal(`${role}: 只允许回环地址（收到 ${url.hostname}）。`, { role });
+  const port = Number(url.port);
+  if (!url.port || !Number.isInteger(port) || port <= 0) throw refusal(`${role}: 必须显式指定非零端口（收到 ${value}）。`, { role });
+  if (PROTECTED_PORTS.has(port)) throw refusal(`${role}: 端口 ${port} 属于保护模块端口（${[...PROTECTED_PORTS].join('/')}），拒绝 LIVE 默认接触。`, { role, port });
+  return url;
+}
+
+function assertBridgeOption(options) {
+  if (options.bridge !== undefined) {
+    if (!options.bridge || typeof options.bridge !== 'object' || Array.isArray(options.bridge)) throw refusal('bridge 替身必须是对象。');
+    return options.bridge;
+  }
+  assertOwnedEndpoint(options.bridgeUrl, { role: 'bridgeUrl' });
+  return null;
+}
+
+function guardedCreateEngineServer(options = {}) {
+  assertOwnedEndpoint(options.vectorUrl, { role: 'vectorUrl' });
+  assertBridgeOption(options);
+  const { createEngineServer } = require(ENGINE_SERVER_MODULE);
+  return createEngineServer(options);
+}
+
+function installEgressGuard() {
+  const original = global.fetch;
+  if (typeof original !== 'function') throw new Error('global.fetch 不可用，无法安装出口守卫。');
+  const blocked = [];
+  const requests = [];
+  function judge(url) {
+    let port;
+    if (url.port === '') port = url.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : url.protocol === 'http:' ? 80 : NaN;
+    else port = Number(url.port);
+    if (Number.isInteger(port) && PROTECTED_PORTS.has(port)) return `protected-port:${port}`;
+    // URL.hostname keeps IPv6 literals in bracketed form — this list must
+    // match assertOwnedEndpoint's exactly ('[::1]', never bare '::1', which
+    // no URL.hostname ever yields).
+    if (!['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]'].includes(url.hostname)) return `non-loopback-host:${url.hostname}`;
+    return null;
+  }
+  const guard = async (input, init) => {
+    let href = null, method = null;
+    try {
+      const url = input instanceof URL ? new URL(input.href) : new URL(typeof input === 'string' ? input : input?.url);
+      href = url.href;
+      method = (init?.method) || (typeof input === 'object' && input?.method) || 'GET';
+      const reason = judge(url);
+      if (reason) {
+        const error = Object.assign(new Error(`出口守卫：${reason} — ${href}（已阻止，未建立任何连接）`), { code: EGRESS_BLOCK_CODE, target: href, reason });
+        blocked.push({ href, method, reason, at: Date.now() });
+        throw error;
+      }
+      requests.push({ href, method, at: Date.now() });
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error && error.code === EGRESS_BLOCK_CODE) throw error;
+      const record = { href: String(input), method: 'UNKNOWN', reason: 'unparseable-target', at: Date.now() };
+      blocked.push(record);
+      throw Object.assign(new Error(`出口守卫：无法解析目标，按拒绝处理 — ${record.href}`), { code: EGRESS_BLOCK_CODE, target: record.href, reason: 'unparseable-target' });
+    }
+    return original(input, init);
+  };
+  global.fetch = guard;
+  return {
+    blocked,
+    requests,
+    uninstall() { if (global.fetch === guard) global.fetch = original; },
+  };
+}
+
+function respondJson(res, status, payload) {
+  const body = JSON.stringify(payload);
+  res.writeHead(status, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8', 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body) });
+  res.end(body);
+}
+
+function createEngineVectorStandin({ label = 'r5-vector-standin' } = {}) {
+  const records = [];
+  const projects = new Map();
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    const chunks = [];
+    req.on('data', chunk => chunks.push(chunk));
+    req.on('end', () => {
+      let body = null;
+      try { const text = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8'); if (text) body = JSON.parse(text); } catch { body = null; }
+      records.push({ method: req.method, path: req.url, body, at: Date.now() });
+      const route = (req.url || '').split('?')[0];
+      if (req.method === 'POST' && route === '/api/import') {
+        const name = String(body?.projectName || '(missing-projectName)');
+        const sourceDir = String(body?.sourceDir || '');
+        projects.set(name, { name, hasIndex: true, sourceDir });
+        respondJson(res, 200, { ok: true, project: { name, hasIndex: true, sourceDir } });
+        return;
+      }
+      if (req.method === 'POST' && route === '/api/sync') {
+        const name = String(body?.project || '(missing-project)');
+        const sourceDir = String(body?.sourceDir || '');
+        projects.set(name, { name, hasIndex: true, sourceDir });
+        respondJson(res, 200, { ok: true });
+        return;
+      }
+      if (req.method === 'GET' && route === '/api/projects') {
+        respondJson(res, 200, { projects: [...projects.values()] });
+        return;
+      }
+      if (req.method === 'GET' && route === '/api/search') {
+        // Stand-in deliberately reports unavailable: retrieval must degrade to
+        // lexical. This fixture proves request routing and contract parity —
+        // it must never be cited as real vector retrieval quality.
+        respondJson(res, 503, { ok: false, error: { code: 'VECTOR_UNAVAILABLE_STANDIN', message: `${label}: 替身不提供向量检索质量` } });
+        return;
+      }
+      respondJson(res, 404, { ok: false, error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: `${label}: 未实现该向量契约路由` } });
+    });
+  });
+  const listening = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(server.address().port));
+  });
+  const standin = {
+    label,
+    records,
+    projects,
+    url: null,
+    async close() { await listening.catch(() => {}); await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); },
+  };
+  standin.ready = listening.then(port => { standin.url = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`; return standin.url; });
+  return standin;
+}
+
+function createEngineBridgeDouble() {
+  return {
+    double: 'r5-bridge-double',
+    calls: [],
+    async registerConsumer(consumer, options) { this.calls.push({ op: 'registerConsumer', consumer }); return { ok: true }; },
+    async listJournals() { this.calls.push({ op: 'listJournals' }); return []; },
+    async readEvents(query) { this.calls.push({ op: 'readEvents', query }); return []; },
+    async ackConsumerCursor(consumer, through, options) { this.calls.push({ op: 'ackConsumerCursor', consumer, through }); return { ok: true }; },
+    async close() { this.calls.push({ op: 'close' }); },
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  REFUSAL_CODE,
+  EGRESS_BLOCK_CODE,
+  PROTECTED_PORTS,
+  assertOwnedEndpoint,
+  guardedCreateEngineServer,
+  installEgressGuard,
+  createEngineVectorStandin,
+  createEngineBridgeDouble,
+};

package/_site/_test/helpers/parallel-qa-engine-endpoint-isolate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+'use strict';
+// _site/_test/helpers/parallel-qa-engine-endpoint-isolate.js — P-QA-ENGINE-ENDPOINT-FIX-R5
+//
+// Driver/child environment isolation for the engine-endpoint lane. Applied as
+// the FIRST action of a test's main phase, BEFORE any product module is
+// required: this process's environment is wiped and rebuilt from an explicit
+// case-insensitive SYSTEM whitelist (provider keys, NODE_OPTIONS, proxy URLs
+// and CLI injection vars are dropped by construction), then the complete
+// isolation map below points every product surface at one per-run layout:
+//   HOME/USERPROFILE/HOMEDRIVE/HOMEPATH, CODEX_HOME, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR,
+//   APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP/TMP/TMPDIR, PSModuleAnalysisCachePath,
+//   KB_DATA_DIR, KB_KNOWLEDGE_DATA_DIR, AI_CODING_EVENT_BRIDGE_HOME,
+//   AGENT_TERMINAL_DATA_DIR, CLAUDE_AI_WORKBENCH_DATA_DIR,
+//   KB_MODULES_AUTOSTART='0', and dead-zero module URLs so no ambient module
+//   address survives. Every env-pointed directory is MATERIALIZED and
+// statSync-verified before the map is applied (not string-only checks).
+//
+// Chrome (when the lane needs a browser) is captured with the REAL
+// environment BEFORE the wipe and carried through as KB_CHROME_PATH — the
+// find-chrome helper honours it first, so post-isolation lookups cannot fall
+// back to a wiped machine path. An empty default-shaped Chrome "User Data"
+// scaffold is pre-created under the isolated home (Chrome >= 136 gate).
+//
+// Lane overrides (own fixture URLs, lane markers) are applied AFTER the
+// cleanup through childEnv(extra) / the values this module returns — never
+// merged before the wipe.
+//
+// P-QA-ENGINE-ENDPOINT-REVIEW-R6 corrections, all in one place:
+//   * PSModuleAnalysisCachePath is a cache FILE PowerShell writes itself —
+//     only its PARENT is materialized and the target is asserted to never be
+//     a directory (R5 mkdir'd every layout value and turned it into one);
+//   * the dead module URLs use port 1, not port 0: :0 is an invalid address
+//     a ModulePortResolver may treat as "unset" and fall back LIVE, while :1
+//     (tcpmux) is a valid, near-certainly-dead explicit port;
+//   * POSIX uses short root/temp/data components and enforces a worst-case
+//     socket byte budget (Chrome SingletonSocket under the isolated temp +
+//     the runtime-control domain socket under the data dir; sun_path is 108
+//     bytes including NUL, budgeted in UTF-8 BYTES). The budget is asserted
+//     on the worst-case mkdtemp result BEFORE any filesystem write, and the
+//     full lane tag lives in owner.json inside the root so short names cost
+//     no post-mortem ownership. Windows keeps the descriptive R5 names.
+
+const fs = require('node:fs');
+const os = require('node:os');
+const path = require('node:path');
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', '..');
+const PROTECTED_PORTS = new Set([5757, 5760, 5789, 5790, 8787, 8790]);
+
+// Captured at module load, before any isolation rebuilds the environment.
+const LIVE_HOME = process.env.USERPROFILE || process.env.HOME || os.homedir();
+const IS_POSIX = process.platform !== 'win32';
+
+// POSIX socket budget (mirrors the R9 Nav helper constants — physical limits,
+// not tunables): sun_path is 108 bytes including the NUL terminator, so 107
+// chars is the hard ceiling, and Chrome's SingletonSocket suffix rand is
+// observed at ~6 chars but budgeted at 12.
+const POSIX_SOCKET_CHAR_LIMIT = 107;
+const CHROME_RAND_MAX_CHARS = 12;
+const POSIX_TEMP_NAME = 't';
+const POSIX_DATA_NAME = 'data';
+
+/** Worst-case POSIX socket paths this layout must be able to host. */
+function worstCaseSocketPaths(root) {
+  const base = String(root).replaceAll('\\', '/').replace(/\/+$/, '');
+  return {
+    chromeSingletonSocket: `${base}/${POSIX_TEMP_NAME}/com.google.Chrome.${'x'.repeat(CHROME_RAND_MAX_CHARS)}/SingletonSocket`,
+    productRuntimeControlSock: `${base}/${POSIX_DATA_NAME}/runtime-control.sock`,
+  };
+}
+
+function socketBudgetVerdict(root, limit = POSIX_SOCKET_CHAR_LIMIT) {
+  const paths = worstCaseSocketPaths(root);
+  const chromeSocketBytes = Buffer.byteLength(paths.chromeSingletonSocket, 'utf8');
+  const controlSocketBytes = Buffer.byteLength(paths.productRuntimeControlSock, 'utf8');
+  return { ok: chromeSocketBytes <= limit && controlSocketBytes <= limit, limit, chromeSocketBytes, controlSocketBytes, paths };
+}
+
+/** Fail fast — with the computed path in the message — when the budget cannot hold. */
+function assertSocketBudget(root, what) {
+  const verdict = socketBudgetVerdict(root);
+  if (!verdict.ok) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `POSIX socket path budget exceeded for ${what}: worst-case Chrome SingletonSocket is ${verdict.chromeSocketBytes} UTF-8 bytes, limit is ${verdict.limit} — ${verdict.paths.chromeSingletonSocket}`,
+    );
+  }
+  return verdict;
+}
+
+const SYSTEM_ENV_WHITELIST = [
+  'SystemRoot', 'SystemDrive', 'windir', 'ComSpec', 'PATHEXT',
+  'PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE', 'PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_W6432', 'PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER',
+  'PROCESSOR_LEVEL', 'PROCESSOR_REVISION', 'NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS',
+  'PROGRAMFILES', 'PROGRAMFILES(X86)', 'PROGRAMW6432',
+  'PATH', 'TEMP', 'TMP', 'TMPDIR',
+];
+
+const PRESERVED_VARS = ['PK_TEST_TEMP_ROOT'];
+
+function isInside(candidate, parent) {
+  const relative = path.relative(parent, candidate);
+  return relative === '' || (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative));
+}
+
+function systemBaseEnv(source = process.env) {
+  const allow = new Set(SYSTEM_ENV_WHITELIST.map(name => name.toLowerCase()));
+  const base = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
+    if (value !== undefined && allow.has(key.toLowerCase())) base[key] = value;
+  }
+  return base;
+}
+
+function resolveTempRoot() {
+  const candidates = [process.env.PK_TEST_TEMP_ROOT, process.env.TEMP, process.env.TMP, process.env.TMPDIR];
+  const chosen = candidates.find(value => value && String(value).trim());
+  const root = path.resolve(chosen ? String(chosen).trim() : os.tmpdir());
+  if (isInside(root, REPO_ROOT)) throw new Error(`refusing to use a temp root inside the repository: ${root}`);
+  return root;
+}
+
+let applied = null;
+
+function applyDriverIsolation({ prefix = 'pk-qa-engine-endpoint', captureChrome = false } = {}) {
+  if (applied) throw new Error('applyDriverIsolation must run exactly once per process');
+  // Discovery with the REAL environment, strictly before the wipe.
+  let chrome = null;
+  if (captureChrome) {
+    const { findChromeDetailed } = require('./find-chrome');
+    const detailed = findChromeDetailed();
+    chrome = detailed && detailed.path ? detailed.path : null;
+  }
+  const tempRoot = resolveTempRoot();
+  // POSIX shortens the mkdtemp prefix to 'pkq': every byte of the root is
+  // spent by every socket beneath it. The suffix adds exactly 6 ASCII chars,
+  // so the worst-case root is knowable BEFORE any filesystem write — a
+  // configured temp that cannot host the budget is refused up front.
+  const shortPrefix = IS_POSIX ? 'pkq' : `${prefix}-`;
+  const mkdtempPrefix = path.join(tempRoot, shortPrefix);
+  if (IS_POSIX) assertSocketBudget(`${mkdtempPrefix}xxxxxx`, `configured temp root ${tempRoot} + prefix ${shortPrefix} (checked before any filesystem write)`);
+  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(mkdtempPrefix);
+  if (isInside(root, REPO_ROOT)) throw new Error(`refusing to create an isolation layout inside the repository: ${root}`);
+  if (IS_POSIX) {
+    try {
+      assertSocketBudget(root, 'created isolation root');
+    } catch (error) {
+      try { fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+      throw error;
+    }
+  }
+  const layout = {
+    root,
+    home: path.join(root, 'home'),
+    appData: path.join(root, 'appdata'),
+    localAppData: path.join(root, 'localappdata'),
+    // POSIX 't'/'data': three fewer bytes on every Chrome socket path and a
+    // short runtime-control socket root; Windows keeps the descriptive names.
+    temp: path.join(root, IS_POSIX ? POSIX_TEMP_NAME : 'temp'),
+    codexHome: path.join(root, 'codex-home'),
+    claudeConfigDir: path.join(root, 'claude-config'),
+    bridgeHome: path.join(root, 'bridge-home'),
+    dataDir: path.join(root, IS_POSIX ? POSIX_DATA_NAME : 'workbench-data'),
+    knowledgeDataDir: path.join(root, IS_POSIX ? 'kb' : 'knowledge-data'),
+  };
+  for (const dir of Object.values(layout)) fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+  for (const dir of Object.values(layout)) {
+    if (!fs.statSync(dir).isDirectory()) throw new Error(`isolation directory does not really exist on disk: ${dir}`);
+  }
+  // PSModuleAnalysisCachePath is a cache FILE PowerShell writes itself: only
+  // the parent is materialized, and the target must never be a directory.
+  layout.psModuleCacheParent = path.join(root, IS_POSIX ? 'pm' : 'ps-module-analysis-cache');
+  layout.psModuleCache = path.join(layout.psModuleCacheParent, IS_POSIX ? 'm.bin' : 'AnalysisCache.bin');
+  fs.mkdirSync(layout.psModuleCacheParent, { recursive: true });
+  if (!fs.statSync(layout.psModuleCacheParent).isDirectory()) throw new Error(`PS cache parent does not really exist on disk: ${layout.psModuleCacheParent}`);
+  if (fs.existsSync(layout.psModuleCache) && fs.statSync(layout.psModuleCache).isDirectory()) {
+    throw new Error(`PSModuleAnalysisCachePath target must be a file path, never a directory: ${layout.psModuleCache}`);
+  }
+  // Short POSIX component names must cost no post-mortem ownership: the full
+  // lane tag, pid and creation time stay on disk inside the root.
+  const owner = {
+    schema: 'qa-autopilot/engine-endpoint-isolation-owner/v1',
+    tag: prefix,
+    platform: process.platform,
+    pid: process.pid,
+    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+    tempRoot,
+  };
+  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(root, 'owner.json'), JSON.stringify(owner, null, 2) + '\n', 'utf8');
+  // Chrome >= 136 refuses --remote-debugging-port unless it can resolve its
+  // DEFAULT user data dir under the home it sees. Empty default-shaped
+  // scaffold, entirely inside the isolated root.
+  fs.mkdirSync(path.join(layout.home, 'AppData', 'Local', 'Google', 'Chrome', 'User Data'), { recursive: true });
+  fs.mkdirSync(path.join(layout.home, 'AppData', 'Roaming'), { recursive: true });
+
+  const parsed = path.parse(layout.home);
+  const envMap = {
+    HOME: layout.home,
+    USERPROFILE: layout.home,
+    HOMEDRIVE: parsed.root,
+    HOMEPATH: parsed.root === path.sep ? layout.home.slice(1) : layout.home.slice(parsed.root.length),
+    CODEX_HOME: layout.codexHome,
+    CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: layout.claudeConfigDir,
+    APPDATA: layout.appData,
+    LOCALAPPDATA: layout.localAppData,
+    TEMP: layout.temp,
+    TMP: layout.temp,
+    TMPDIR: layout.temp,
+    PSModuleAnalysisCachePath: layout.psModuleCache,
+    KB_DATA_DIR: layout.dataDir,
+    KB_KNOWLEDGE_DATA_DIR: layout.knowledgeDataDir,
+    AI_CODING_EVENT_BRIDGE_HOME: layout.bridgeHome,
+    AGENT_TERMINAL_DATA_DIR: layout.dataDir,
+    CLAUDE_AI_WORKBENCH_DATA_DIR: layout.dataDir,
+    KB_MODULES_AUTOSTART: '0',
+    // Valid-but-dead explicit ports (R6): :0 is an invalid address a port
+    // resolver may treat as unset and fall back LIVE; :1 never runs these
+    // modules and remains a well-formed URL. Caller-owned actual URLs passed
+    // to childEnv() still win.
+    KB_TERMINAL_URL: 'http://127.0.0.1:1',
+    KB_VECTORHUB_URL: 'http://127.0.0.1:1',
+    KB_EVENTBRIDGE_URL: 'http://127.0.0.1:1',
+    KB_KNOWLEDGE_ENGINE_URL: 'http://127.0.0.1:1',
+  };
+  const preserved = systemBaseEnv(process.env);
+  for (const key of PRESERVED_VARS) {
+    if (process.env[key] !== undefined) preserved[key] = process.env[key];
+  }
+  for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) delete process.env[key];
+  Object.assign(process.env, preserved, envMap);
+  if (chrome) process.env.KB_CHROME_PATH = chrome;
+  applied = { layout, envMap, chrome, tempRoot, owner };
+  return applied;
+}
+
+// The environment an own child (product server, git helper) may inherit from
+// an already-isolated driver: the whitelisted+isolated env plus the caller's
+// EXPLICIT lane values, which win.
+function childEnv(extra = {}) {
+  if (!applied) throw new Error('applyDriverIsolation must run before childEnv');
+  return { ...systemBaseEnv(process.env), ...applied.envMap, ...extra };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  PROTECTED_PORTS,
+  SYSTEM_ENV_WHITELIST,
+  applyDriverIsolation,
+  childEnv,
+  systemBaseEnv,
+  isInside,
+  LIVE_HOME,
+  IS_POSIX,
+  POSIX_SOCKET_CHAR_LIMIT,
+  CHROME_RAND_MAX_CHARS,
+  worstCaseSocketPaths,
+  socketBudgetVerdict,
+  assertSocketBudget,
+};