@sanning/proof 0.6.0 → 0.8.0

package/dist/evidence.js

@@ -48,6 +48,32 @@ export const ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPES = [
 // operator attestations. verifyEvidenceBundle dispatches on it to
 // verifyExportBody (§5).
 export const EXPORT_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.evidence.export/v1";
+/**
+ * The Sanning-signed interval stamp body (evidence-bundle.md §5.2, DL-58).
+ *
+ * Its own `body_type` rather than a widened anchor-trace body, and the reason
+ * is the whole decision: an anchor-trace checkpoint carries a PRODUCER-signed
+ * `sanning.events/v1` envelope, and a stamp has no producer signature at all —
+ * Sanning places it, under DL-52, for a customer who holds no chain identity.
+ * The two rejected options were making `envelope` optional and synthesising an
+ * envelope that Sanning signs; the second would have made a Sanning
+ * attestation indistinguishable ON THE WIRE from a producer's, which is
+ * unrecoverable once witnessed.
+ */
+export const STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.stamp.trace/v1";
+export const STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.stamp.evidence/v1";
+/**
+ * The version string INSIDE a witnessed stamp body — a different string from
+ * the `body_type` above, and the two are easy to confuse.
+ *
+ * `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` discriminates the BUNDLE BODY: it is the reader's
+ * dispatch key. `sanning.stamp/v1` is the control plane's own version of the
+ * bytes it hands a witness (`control-plane/src/stamp-tree.ts`,
+ * `STAMP_BODY_VERSION`). A `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` body pins the inner
+ * version to exactly this value: two answers to one question inside one
+ * signature is the §5.1.2 mixed-vocabulary reject, one layer down.
+ */
+export const STAMP_BODY_VERSION = "sanning.stamp/v1";
 function isEvidenceMajorAccepted(specVersion) {
     if (typeof specVersion !== "string" || specVersion === "")
         return false;
@@ -164,6 +190,16 @@ export async function verifyEvidenceBundle(bundle, options = {}) {
     if (bodyType === EXPORT_BODY_TYPE) {
         return verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options);
     }
+    // The Sanning-signed interval stamp body (evidence-bundle.md §5.2). The
+    // wrapper is authentic — and for this body that IS "Sanning signed it", since
+    // a stamp carries no second signature of its own inside the bundle.
+    if (bodyType === STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE) {
+        return verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors);
+    }
+    // The DL-52 hand-over body (§5.3): stamps AND the customer's events, joined.
+    if (bodyType === STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE) {
+        return verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options);
+    }
     if (bodyType !== ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE && bodyType !== ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE_V1) {
         // The wrapper is authentic but we don't know this body's structure. Per
         // wrap-don't-merge, that is "partial" (cryptographically sound wrapper,
@@ -492,75 +528,10 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, bodyType, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, err
                 evErrors.push(`inclusion verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
             }
         }
-        // Content (raw-log) binding — the rawLog → content_hash link the rest of
-        // the chain (content_hash → record → payload_hash → signature → leaf →
-        // root) already covers. The committed hash lives in the RECORD
-        // (record.event.content_hash, minimal disclosure); for a promoted-disclosure
-        // envelope it falls back to the envelope's own committed hashes
-        // (contentHashes — NOT verifyEnvelope's path, which reads payload/event_type
-        // and yields nothing for a sanning.events/v1 envelope). Disclosed bytes come
-        // from the signed in-body `ev.content` FIRST, then the out-of-band
-        // options.content side input. Undetermined (null) when nothing is disclosed
-        // or nothing is committed; false ONLY on a real mismatch or an in-body vs
-        // side-input disagreement — mirroring payloadBindingOk's never-fail-on-absent
-        // discipline.
-        let contentOk = null;
-        {
-            const committed = [];
-            let recordContentHash;
-            if (recordBytes !== undefined) {
-                try {
-                    const record = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(recordBytes));
-                    const ch = record.event?.content_hash;
-                    if (typeof ch === "string" && ch)
-                        recordContentHash = ch.toLowerCase();
-                }
-                catch {
-                    // record not JSON — the payload binding already reflects that; content
-                    // stays undetermined rather than throwing.
-                }
-            }
-            if (recordContentHash !== undefined) {
-                committed.push(recordContentHash);
-            }
-            else if (ev.envelope && typeof ev.envelope === "object") {
-                // Promoted fallback. Guarded: contentHashes() dereferences env.payload,
-                // which throws on a null/non-object envelope — a verifier must never
-                // raise on adversarial input (such an event already fails via envelopeOk).
-                for (const c of contentHashes(ev.envelope))
-                    committed.push(c.hash.toLowerCase());
-            }
-            // Disclosed bytes, precedence: in-body (signed) → side input. A string
-            // side input is hex; a Uint8Array is used as-is. Resolved by the SHARED
-            // selector so `disclosedContent` hands a consumer the very bytes bound
-            // here — one decode, not two that can drift apart.
-            const selection = selectDisclosedBytes(ev, eventId, options.content);
-            const { inBody, side } = selection;
-            evErrors.push(...selection.errors);
-            if (inBody !== undefined && side !== undefined && !bytesEqual(inBody, side)) {
-                // Two disclosures that disagree: a genuine conflict, not undetermined.
-                contentOk = false;
-                evErrors.push("disclosed content disagreement: in-body events[].content and the supplied content differ");
-            }
-            else {
-                const disclosed = inBody ?? side;
-                if (disclosed === undefined || committed.length === 0) {
-                    contentOk = null;
-                    if (disclosed !== undefined && committed.length === 0) {
-                        evErrors.push("disclosed content present but no committed content_hash to bind to " +
-                            "(record withheld or record has no event.content_hash) — undetermined");
-                    }
-                }
-                else {
-                    const got = await sha256Hex(disclosed);
-                    contentOk = committed.includes(got);
-                    if (!contentOk) {
-                        evErrors.push("disclosed content does not match the committed content_hash: " +
-                            `sha256(disclosed)=${got} committed=${committed.join("|")}`);
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
+        // Content (raw-log) binding — shared with every other event-carrying body.
+        const contentRes = await verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, recordBytes, options.content);
+        const contentOk = contentRes.contentOk;
+        evErrors.push(...contentRes.errors);
         eventResults.push({
             eventId,
             envelopeOk,
@@ -663,6 +634,562 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, bodyType, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, err
         errors,
     };
 }
+// ===========================================================================
+// `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` — the Sanning-signed interval stamp (§5.2, DL-58)
+//
+// ── What this can prove, and what it deliberately does not claim ──
+//
+// A stamp is not a producer artifact. Under DL-52 the customer signs an
+// envelope and POSTs it; the commitment is witnessed later, on an interval, by
+// a stamp the customer never sees and holds no key for. So there is no
+// producer signature inside this body to check, and — this is the part worth
+// being precise about — there is no SECOND Sanning signature either. The
+// control plane stores the stamp's canonical bytes and hands them to a witness
+// as a signed chain data item; the signature lives on the chain, not in the
+// `stamps` table and not in this body.
+//
+// What "Sanning signed this" means for a stamp bundle is therefore exactly the
+// WRAPPER signature, verified generically before this function is reached. And
+// what makes the stamp evidence rather than an assertion is the witness, which
+// is on a chain and not checkable offline. Hence the rollup below: a stamp we
+// can read but nobody has witnessed holds the bundle at `partial`.
+//
+// So the checkable surface here is the stamp's INTERNAL consistency against
+// the one authority in the bundle — the witnessed bytes:
+//
+//   1. `stamp_ref` is SHA-256 of the DECODED bytes (derived, not asserted).
+//   2. Those bytes parse and re-canonicalize to themselves under JCS.
+//   3. Their `stamp_version` is the one this body_type pins.
+//   4. Every sub-tree range accounts for exactly one leaf of the stamp.
+//
+// (4) is the one that carries customer weight. R-8's whole per-agent story is
+// "prove this agent was under evidence over window W", answered by a
+// contiguous `first_leaf`/`leaf_count` slice of the org tree. Ranges that do
+// not tile `[0, leaf_count)` describe a partition that does not exist, so a
+// slice claim resting on them is unfounded — and unlike a bad signature,
+// nothing else in the stack would ever notice.
+// ===========================================================================
+/** Lowercase hex, even length, non-empty. The family's serialization rule. */
+function isLowerHex(s, nibbles) {
+    if (typeof s !== "string" || s.length === 0 || s.length % 2 !== 0)
+        return false;
+    if (nibbles !== undefined && s.length !== nibbles)
+        return false;
+    return /^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(s);
+}
+function isNonNegInt(n) {
+    return typeof n === "number" && Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 0;
+}
+/**
+ * Parse and check one stamp's witnessed bytes.
+ *
+ * Errors accumulate rather than short-circuit wherever a later check is still
+ * meaningful, so a bundle with two independent defects reports two — a
+ * verifier that stops at the first one turns a second fix into a second
+ * round-trip.
+ */
+// ===========================================================================
+// Disclosed-content binding, shared by every body that carries events.
+//
+// Extracted for `sanning.stamp.evidence/v1` (§5.3) rather than copied. The
+// rawLog -> content_hash link is the one step the chain
+// (content_hash -> record -> payload_hash -> signature -> leaf -> root) does
+// not otherwise cover, and a second copy of it is a second place for the
+// never-fail-on-absent discipline to drift. The rules are unchanged from the
+// anchor-trace path this came from: undetermined (null) when nothing is
+// disclosed or nothing is committed; false ONLY on a real mismatch or an
+// in-body vs side-input disagreement.
+// ===========================================================================
+async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, recordBytes, sideContent) {
+    const evErrors = [];
+    let contentOk = null;
+    const committed = [];
+    let recordContentHash;
+    if (recordBytes !== undefined) {
+        try {
+            const record = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(recordBytes));
+            const ch = record.event?.content_hash;
+            if (typeof ch === "string" && ch)
+                recordContentHash = ch.toLowerCase();
+        }
+        catch {
+            // record not JSON — the payload binding already reflects that; content
+            // stays undetermined rather than throwing.
+        }
+    }
+    if (recordContentHash !== undefined) {
+        committed.push(recordContentHash);
+    }
+    else if (ev.envelope && typeof ev.envelope === "object") {
+        // Promoted fallback. Guarded: contentHashes() dereferences env.payload,
+        // which throws on a null/non-object envelope — a verifier must never raise
+        // on adversarial input.
+        for (const c of contentHashes(ev.envelope))
+            committed.push(c.hash.toLowerCase());
+    }
+    const selection = selectDisclosedBytes(ev, eventId, sideContent);
+    const { inBody, side } = selection;
+    evErrors.push(...selection.errors);
+    if (inBody !== undefined && side !== undefined && !bytesEqual(inBody, side)) {
+        contentOk = false;
+        evErrors.push("disclosed content disagreement: in-body events[].content and the supplied content differ");
+    }
+    else {
+        const disclosed = inBody ?? side;
+        if (disclosed === undefined || committed.length === 0) {
+            contentOk = null;
+            if (disclosed !== undefined && committed.length === 0) {
+                evErrors.push("disclosed content present but no committed content_hash to bind to " +
+                    "(record withheld or record has no event.content_hash) — undetermined");
+            }
+        }
+        else {
+            const got = await sha256Hex(disclosed);
+            contentOk = committed.includes(got);
+            if (!contentOk) {
+                evErrors.push("disclosed content does not match the committed content_hash: " +
+                    `sha256(disclosed)=${got} committed=${committed.join("|")}`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return { contentOk, errors: evErrors };
+}
+async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
+    const errors = [];
+    const base = {
+        stampRef: "",
+        stampRefOk: false,
+        bodyOk: false,
+        stampVersion: null,
+        intervalStart: null,
+        intervalEnd: null,
+        merkleRoot: null,
+        leafCount: null,
+        subtreesOk: false,
+        subtrees: [],
+        anchorRef: null,
+        ok: false,
+        errors,
+    };
+    if (raw === null || typeof raw !== "object" || Array.isArray(raw)) {
+        errors.push("stamp entry is not an object");
+        return base;
+    }
+    const e = raw;
+    // --- the witnessed bytes, which are the only authority in this body -------
+    if (!isLowerHex(e.stamp_bytes)) {
+        errors.push("stamp_bytes is missing or not lowercase hex");
+        return base;
+    }
+    let bytes;
+    try {
+        bytes = hexToBytes(e.stamp_bytes);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        errors.push(`stamp_bytes is not hex: ${stringifyErr(err)}`);
+        return base;
+    }
+    // --- the derived identity -------------------------------------------------
+    const derived = await sha256Hex(bytes);
+    if (typeof e.stamp_ref !== "string" || e.stamp_ref === "") {
+        errors.push("stamp entry missing stamp_ref");
+    }
+    else if (e.stamp_ref.toLowerCase() !== derived) {
+        // The bytes were edited and the label was not — or the label was edited
+        // and the bytes were not. Either way the bundle names a stamp it is not
+        // carrying, and quoting that name to a witness would resolve to something
+        // else entirely.
+        errors.push(`stamp_ref does not match SHA-256(stamp_bytes): claimed=${e.stamp_ref} derived=${derived}`);
+    }
+    else {
+        base.stampRefOk = true;
+        base.stampRef = derived;
+        if (seen.has(derived)) {
+            errors.push(`duplicate stamp_ref ${derived}`);
+            base.stampRefOk = false;
+        }
+        else {
+            seen.add(derived);
+        }
+    }
+    // --- the body itself ------------------------------------------------------
+    let body;
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(bytes));
+        if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+            errors.push("stamp body is not a JSON object");
+            return base;
+        }
+        body = parsed;
+        // Re-canonicalize and compare. The plane replays these bytes verbatim on
+        // every submit attempt for exactly this reason: a non-canonical body makes
+        // a retry a DIFFERENT submission, and makes every independent re-derivation
+        // of the stamp disagree with the one that was witnessed.
+        if (jcs(body) !== new TextDecoder().decode(bytes)) {
+            errors.push("stamp_bytes are not JCS-canonical (RFC 8785)");
+            return base;
+        }
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        errors.push(`stamp body is not JSON: ${stringifyErr(err)}`);
+        return base;
+    }
+    if (body.stamp_version !== STAMP_BODY_VERSION) {
+        // A `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` body whose inner version is something else is
+        // two answers to one question inside one signature. The body_type is the
+        // reader's dispatch key and it said v1; honouring the other spelling is
+        // how a reader half-parses a shape it does not know.
+        errors.push(`unsupported stamp_version ${JSON.stringify(body.stamp_version)} in a ` +
+            `${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body (expected ${STAMP_BODY_VERSION})`);
+        return base;
+    }
+    base.stampVersion = body.stamp_version;
+    base.bodyOk = true;
+    for (const f of ["org_ref", "interval_start", "interval_end"]) {
+        if (typeof body[f] !== "string" || body[f] === "") {
+            errors.push(`stamp body ${f} is missing or not a non-empty string`);
+            base.bodyOk = false;
+        }
+    }
+    base.intervalStart = typeof body.interval_start === "string" ? body.interval_start : null;
+    base.intervalEnd = typeof body.interval_end === "string" ? body.interval_end : null;
+    if (!isLowerHex(body.merkle_root, 64)) {
+        errors.push("stamp body merkle_root is not 64 lowercase hex characters");
+        base.bodyOk = false;
+    }
+    else {
+        base.merkleRoot = body.merkle_root;
+    }
+    if (!isNonNegInt(body.leaf_count)) {
+        errors.push("stamp body leaf_count is not a non-negative integer");
+        base.bodyOk = false;
+    }
+    else {
+        base.leafCount = body.leaf_count;
+    }
+    // --- the sub-tree ranges --------------------------------------------------
+    base.subtreesOk = checkSubtrees(body, base, errors);
+    base.anchorRef = parseAnchorRef(e.anchor_ref, errors);
+    base.ok =
+        base.stampRefOk && base.bodyOk && base.subtreesOk && errors.length === 0;
+    return base;
+}
+/**
+ * The range arithmetic (§5.2), and the reason it is a hard check.
+ *
+ * `buildStampTree` orders a stamp's leaves agent-major, which is the only
+ * reason `first_leaf` + `leaf_count` can describe an agent's slice at all: the
+ * ranges partition `[0, leaf_count)` exactly, by construction. A body whose
+ * ranges do not is either not a stamp this stack built or one built wrong, and
+ * in both cases the per-agent claim the ranges exist to support is unfounded.
+ *
+ * The sum is checked BEFORE the tiling and reports its own message, so a body
+ * that is merely short does not get filed under a gap it does not have.
+ */
+function checkSubtrees(body, out, errors) {
+    const raw = body.subtrees;
+    if (raw === null || typeof raw !== "object" || Array.isArray(raw)) {
+        errors.push("stamp body subtrees is not an object");
+        return false;
+    }
+    let shapeOk = true;
+    const subtrees = [];
+    for (const [ref, v] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+        if (v === null || typeof v !== "object" || Array.isArray(v)) {
+            errors.push(`sub-tree ${ref} is not an object`);
+            shapeOk = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        const s = v;
+        if (!isNonNegInt(s.first_leaf)) {
+            errors.push(`sub-tree ${ref} first_leaf is not a non-negative integer`);
+            shapeOk = false;
+        }
+        // A zero-leaf sub-tree is not a slice of anything, and admitting one lets
+        // an arbitrary number of empty ranges sit inside a tiling that still adds
+        // up.
+        if (!isNonNegInt(s.leaf_count) || s.leaf_count === 0) {
+            errors.push(`sub-tree ${ref} leaf_count is not a positive integer`);
+            shapeOk = false;
+        }
+        if (!isLowerHex(s.root, 64)) {
+            errors.push(`sub-tree ${ref} root is not 64 lowercase hex characters`);
+            shapeOk = false;
+        }
+        if (!shapeOk)
+            continue;
+        subtrees.push({
+            ref,
+            firstLeaf: s.first_leaf,
+            leafCount: s.leaf_count,
+            root: s.root,
+        });
+    }
+    subtrees.sort((a, b) => a.firstLeaf - b.firstLeaf);
+    out.subtrees = subtrees;
+    if (!shapeOk)
+        return false;
+    const total = body.leaf_count;
+    if (!isNonNegInt(total))
+        return false; // already reported by the caller
+    const sum = subtrees.reduce((n, s) => n + s.leafCount, 0);
+    if (sum !== total) {
+        errors.push(`sub-tree leaf_count sum ${sum} does not equal the stamp's leaf_count ${total}`);
+        return false;
+    }
+    let next = 0;
+    for (const s of subtrees) {
+        if (s.firstLeaf !== next) {
+            errors.push(`sub-tree ranges do not tile [0, ${total}): expected a range at leaf ` +
+                `${next}, found one at ${s.firstLeaf}`);
+            return false;
+        }
+        next += s.leafCount;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors) {
+    const body = b.body;
+    if (!Array.isArray(body?.stamps)) {
+        return malformed(`${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[]`, true);
+    }
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const stamps = [];
+    for (const entry of body.stamps) {
+        stamps.push(await verifyStampEntry(entry, seen));
+    }
+    // --- Rollup ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    const anyHardFailure = stamps.some((s) => !s.ok);
+    const anyUnwitnessed = stamps.some((s) => s.anchorRef === null);
+    let status;
+    if (anyHardFailure) {
+        status = "failed";
+    }
+    else if (stamps.length === 0) {
+        // A bundle asserting nothing. Not a failure — nothing here is wrong — but
+        // it must never read `verified`, which a caller would take as a witness it
+        // does not have.
+        status = "partial";
+        errors.push(`${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body carries no stamps`);
+    }
+    else if (anyUnwitnessed) {
+        // The honest half of P-10, one layer up. A stamp with no `anchor_ref` is
+        // sealed and unwitnessed: `retained-by-sanning`, which is a statement about
+        // our coverage and never an accusation about their evidence. It is also not
+        // `verified`, because for a stamp the witness is the entire independent
+        // part — unlike an anchor-trace checkpoint, which still carries a producer
+        // signature and an inclusion proof that stand on their own offline.
+        status = "partial";
+        errors.push("one or more stamps carries no anchor_ref — sealed by Sanning, witnessed by nobody");
+    }
+    else {
+        status = "verified";
+    }
+    return {
+        status,
+        specVersionOk,
+        bodyHashOk: true,
+        signatureOk: true,
+        bodyType: STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE,
+        onChainChecked: false,
+        checkpoints: [],
+        events: [],
+        assertedStatus,
+        stamps,
+        errors,
+    };
+}
+// ===========================================================================
+// `sanning.stamp.evidence/v1` — the two halves, bound (evidence-bundle.md §5.3)
+//
+// The stamp half is §5.2's code unchanged (`verifyStampEntry`, which carries
+// the sub-tree partition check). The event half reuses the same primitives the
+// anchor-trace path uses — `verifyEnvelope`, `verifyInclusion`, `leafHash`,
+// `verifyDisclosedContent` — because a second copy of Merkle verification is a
+// second place for it to drift.
+//
+// What differs, and only this: the join. An event resolves `inclusion.stamp_ref`
+// to a stamps[] entry and walks its audit path to the root committed INSIDE
+// that stamp's witnessed bytes. There is no `merkle_root` field on the event to
+// read instead — repeating the root beside its own authoritative bytes would be
+// two answers to one question inside one signature (§5.1.2).
+// ===========================================================================
+async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
+    const body = b.body;
+    if (!Array.isArray(body?.stamps) || !Array.isArray(body?.events)) {
+        return malformed(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[] and events[]`, true);
+    }
+    // --- The stamp half: §5.2's rules, §5.2's code ----------------------------
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const stamps = [];
+    for (const entry of body.stamps)
+        stamps.push(await verifyStampEntry(entry, seen));
+    // The join table. ONLY a stamp whose derived ref and witnessed bytes both
+    // checked out is joinable: a root read out of bytes that failed their own
+    // verification is not a root anyone should walk a proof to, and admitting one
+    // would let a broken stamp lend its authority to an event.
+    const byRef = new Map();
+    for (const st of stamps) {
+        if (st.stampRef && st.stampRefOk && st.bodyOk)
+            byRef.set(st.stampRef, st);
+    }
+    // --- The event half -------------------------------------------------------
+    const eventResults = [];
+    for (const rawEv of body.events) {
+        const evErrors = [];
+        // A verifier must never RAISE on adversarial input — a caller handed a
+        // stack trace instead of a verdict cannot tell a malformed pack from a
+        // broken tool. `events[]` is attacker-shaped, so a null/non-object entry
+        // is coerced to an empty event and fails through the normal path, exactly
+        // as the Python kernel does. Found by adversarial review, not by the
+        // cross-kernel leg — whose cases did not include one, and now do.
+        if (rawEv === null || typeof rawEv !== "object" || Array.isArray(rawEv)) {
+            // NOT an event. Graded and reported as such rather than coerced to an
+            // empty one: probing verifyEnvelope with nothing asks the envelope layer
+            // a question about an object that was never an envelope, and the two
+            // kernels answer it differently (undetermined vs failed) — a real
+            // divergence, but not this body's to resolve. Reported separately.
+            eventResults.push({
+                eventId: "<unknown>",
+                envelopeOk: false,
+                payloadBindingOk: null,
+                inclusionOk: false,
+                checkpointBound: false,
+                contentOk: null,
+                ok: false,
+                errors: ["events[] entry is not an object"],
+            });
+            continue;
+        }
+        const ev = rawEv;
+        const eventId = getEventId(ev.envelope);
+        let envelopeOk = false;
+        let payloadBindingOk = null;
+        let recordBytes;
+        try {
+            if (typeof ev.record_bytes === "string")
+                recordBytes = hexToBytes(ev.record_bytes);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            evErrors.push(`event record_bytes is not hex: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+        }
+        try {
+            const res = await verifyEnvelope(ev.envelope, recordBytes !== undefined ? { payloadBytes: recordBytes } : {});
+            envelopeOk = res.ok; // tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            payloadBindingOk = res.payloadHashOk;
+            if (!res.signatureOk)
+                evErrors.push("event envelope signature failed");
+            if (res.payloadHashOk === false)
+                evErrors.push("event record does not bind to payload_hash");
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+        }
+        // --- The join (§5.3.3 rule 1) -------------------------------------------
+        const incl = ev.inclusion;
+        let st;
+        if (!incl || typeof incl !== "object") {
+            evErrors.push("event missing inclusion proof");
+        }
+        else if (incl.checkpoint_ref !== undefined || incl.checkpoint_tx_id !== undefined) {
+            // One bundle speaks one vocabulary. An inclusion carrying an anchor-trace
+            // join key inside this body is a mixed bundle, and resolving it anyway is
+            // how an event silently binds to something nobody meant (§5.1.2).
+            evErrors.push(`event inclusion carries an anchor-trace join key in a ${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body`);
+        }
+        else if (typeof incl.stamp_ref !== "string") {
+            evErrors.push("event inclusion missing stamp_ref");
+        }
+        else {
+            st = byRef.get(incl.stamp_ref);
+            if (st === undefined) {
+                // Hard reject, never undetermined: without a resolved stamp the
+                // inclusion proof has no root to check against at all.
+                evErrors.push(`event inclusion.stamp_ref ${JSON.stringify(incl.stamp_ref)} resolves to no verified stamp`);
+            }
+        }
+        const stampBound = st !== undefined;
+        let inclusionOk = false;
+        if (incl && stampBound && st) {
+            // Rule 3: the tree walked must be the tree the stamp committed to. A
+            // proof walked against a different leaf_count is a proof about a
+            // different tree, and RFC 9162's path shape depends on the size.
+            if (st.leafCount !== null && incl.leaf_count !== st.leafCount) {
+                evErrors.push(`inclusion leaf_count ${incl.leaf_count} does not equal the stamp's committed ` +
+                    `leaf_count ${st.leafCount}`);
+            }
+            else {
+                try {
+                    inclusionOk = await verifyInclusion(hexToBytes(incl.leaf_hash), incl.leaf_index, incl.leaf_count, (incl.audit_path ?? []).map((h) => hexToBytes(h)), hexToBytes(st.merkleRoot ?? ""));
+                    if (!inclusionOk) {
+                        evErrors.push("RFC 9162 inclusion proof did not reconstruct the stamp root");
+                    }
+                    // Defense in depth, as §5.1: the claimed leaf MUST be this event's
+                    // own signed envelope bytes, or a valid proof for an UNRELATED leaf
+                    // could be smuggled in.
+                    const expectedLeafHex = toHex(await leafHash(utf8(jcs(ev.envelope))));
+                    if (expectedLeafHex !== (incl.leaf_hash ?? "").toLowerCase()) {
+                        inclusionOk = false;
+                        evErrors.push("inclusion leaf_hash does not match SHA-256(0x00 || JCS(event envelope))");
+                    }
+                }
+                catch (e) {
+                    evErrors.push(`inclusion verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        const contentRes = await verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, recordBytes, options.content);
+        const contentOk = contentRes.contentOk;
+        evErrors.push(...contentRes.errors);
+        eventResults.push({
+            eventId,
+            envelopeOk,
+            payloadBindingOk,
+            inclusionOk,
+            // Named for §5.1's join; here it reports whether `stamp_ref` resolved.
+            checkpointBound: stampBound,
+            contentOk,
+            ok: envelopeOk && inclusionOk && stampBound && contentOk !== false,
+            errors: evErrors,
+        });
+    }
+    // --- Rollup ---------------------------------------------------------------
+    // Rule 4: a declared event MUST be checked. `events[]` present and unverified
+    // is the false green this body exists to prevent, so an event that did not
+    // verify fails the bundle — it is never rolled up as verified.
+    const anyHardFailure = stamps.some((st) => !st.ok) || eventResults.some((e) => !e.ok);
+    const anyUnwitnessed = stamps.some((st) => st.anchorRef === null);
+    let status;
+    if (anyHardFailure) {
+        status = "failed";
+    }
+    else if (stamps.length === 0 && eventResults.length === 0) {
+        status = "partial";
+        errors.push(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body carries no stamps and no events`);
+    }
+    else if (anyUnwitnessed) {
+        // §5.3.3 rule 6, inherited whole from §5.2.4: for a stamp the witness IS
+        // the independent part, so the events resting on it inherit `partial`.
+        status = "partial";
+        errors.push("one or more stamps carries no anchor_ref — sealed by Sanning, witnessed by nobody");
+    }
+    else {
+        status = "verified";
+    }
+    return {
+        status,
+        specVersionOk,
+        bodyHashOk: true,
+        signatureOk: true,
+        bodyType: STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE,
+        onChainChecked: false,
+        checkpoints: [],
+        events: eventResults,
+        assertedStatus,
+        stamps,
+        errors,
+    };
+}
 // How many `sanning.evidence.export/v1` wrappers deep the source bundle may be
 // nested before this path gives up. verifyEvidenceBundle's canonicalization
 // depth bound already rejects a pathological bundle, but the unwrap must be
@@ -779,7 +1306,13 @@ export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
 // wrapper(s) to the inline source bundle — mirroring how verifyEvidenceBundle
 // recurses into `source_bundle`, so the events line up with its results.
 // `undefined` when there is no anchor-trace body to materialize from.
-function resolveTraceEvents(bundle) {
+//
+// Exported for `chain.ts`, which needs the same descent and must not derive it
+// again: two answers to "which events is this bundle actually about" inside one
+// kernel is two implementations of one rule, and the one that drifted would be
+// the one nobody was looking at. Deliberately NOT re-exported from `index.ts` —
+// same posture as `side-content.ts`, internal and shared.
+export function resolveTraceEvents(bundle) {
     let cur = bundle;
     for (let depth = 0; depth < MAX_EXPORT_UNWRAP; depth++) {
         if (cur === null || typeof cur !== "object" || Array.isArray(cur))