@sanning/proof 0.19.1 → 0.20.0

package/dist/evidence.js

@@ -1,62 +1,36 @@
-// Evidence-bundle verification (sanning-io/proof specs/evidence-bundle.md).
+// Evidence-bundle verification (specs/evidence-bundle.md).
 //
-// A `sanning.evidence/v1` bundle is a SIGNED wrapper around a producer-specific
-// `body`. This module verifies the `sanning.anchor.trace/v3` body, the
-// @sanning/anchor SDK trace: a self-verifying serialization of InclusionReceipt[]
-// (per-event signed envelopes + their checkpoints + RFC 9162 inclusion proofs).
-//
-// The algorithm is the kernel discipline applied one level up (evidence-bundle
-// §1, §4): inherit-don't-invent (same JCS, SHA-256, Ed25519), wrap-don't-merge
-// (the body is opaque to the wrapper), recompute-don't-trust-the-verdict
-// (every claim is re-derived from `body`, never read off `verdict.status`),
-// reject-unknown-major. No Sanning service is in the trust path: the bundle is
-// self-verifying offline against the embedded `public_key`; the optional
-// gateway re-fetch only confirms the checkpoints are anchored on-chain.
-//
-// Scope: this verifies a SINGLE evidence bundle. Chain walking over
-// `previous_hash` across successive exports is consumer-layer logic above it.
-import { deriveOperatorAddress, ed25519Verify, hexToBytes, 
-// The one hex-field test, which lives in `crypto.ts` beside the one hex
-// reader (proof#146). It was a second copy here until then, with the same
-// body: two copies of one rule is how two kernels drift apart one edit at a
-// time, which is the whole defect class this fix is about.
-isHexField, sha256Hex, utf8, verifyRsaPssSha256, } from "./crypto.js";
+// A `sanning.evidence/v1` bundle is a signed wrapper around a producer-specific
+// `body`. Every claim is re-derived from `body` with the same JCS, SHA-256 and
+// Ed25519 as the envelope layer, never read off `verdict.status`, and an
+// unknown major is rejected. The bundle verifies offline against its embedded
+// `public_key`; the optional gateway re-fetch only confirms checkpoints are
+// witnessed on-chain.
+import { readAgentRecords } from "./agent-record.js";
+import { isObject } from "./json-schema.js";
+import { deriveOperatorAddress, ed25519Verify, hexToBytes, isHexField, sha256Hex, utf8, verifyRsaPssSha256, } from "./crypto.js";
 import { safeInteger, signedLeafCount } from "./grading.js";
 import { isConformantHandoffRecord, isHandoffNamespace } from "./handoff.js";
 import { leafHash, verifyInclusion } from "./merkle.js";
-import { DuplicateKeyError, MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH, contentHashes, exceedsDepth, isRfc3339UtcInstant, jcs, jcsParse, verifyEnvelope, } from "./verifier.js";
+import { MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH, contentHashes, exceedsDepth, isRfc3339UtcInstant, jcs, jcsParse, specVersionSupported, verifyEnvelope, } from "./verifier.js";
 import { inBodyContentOffered, sideContentEntry, } from "./side-content.js";
-// Only the evidence-bundle major(s) this kernel verifies. A new major is a
-// deliberate one-entry addition HERE — same fail-closed discipline as the
-// envelope verifier's ACCEPTED_SPEC_MAJORS.
-/** The accepted `sanning.evidence/v1` wrapper majors; exported in both kernels (P-01, 0.13.0). */
+import { ENVELOPE_FAULTS } from "./types.js";
+// Fail-closed, like ACCEPTED_SPEC_MAJORS: a new major is a one-entry addition here.
+/** The accepted evidence-bundle wrapper majors. */
 export const ACCEPTED_EVIDENCE_MAJORS = Object.freeze(["sanning.evidence/v1"]);
-// The body_type this module knows how to verify structurally. An unknown
-// body_type is not a hard failure of the WRAPPER (the signature + body_hash
-// still verify), but its body cannot be re-derived, so the per-body verdict is
-// "undetermined" rather than "verified".
-//
-// The producer-to-agent cut (W-3, DL-73) renamed `record_bytes` to
-// `event_bytes` and moved every body that carries it to a new major. This
-// kernel reads ONLY those majors: `sanning.anchor.trace/v1` and `/v2`,
-// `sanning.stamp.evidence/v1` and `sanning.evidence.export/v1` are unknown body
-// types here and answer `partial`. DL-73 releases evidence made before the cut
-// from any obligation to keep verifying, so there is no second field name to
-// read and no dual-accept path.
+// The anchor-trace body this module verifies structurally. An unknown
+// body_type does not fail the wrapper, but its body cannot be re-derived, so
+// it reads `incomplete`. Bodies before the `event_bytes` majors are unknown here.
 export const ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.anchor.trace/v3";
 /**
- * The name `event_bytes` replaced. Under the new majors a body entry that still
- * carries it is a hard reject, never an ignored unknown field: ignored, it
- * would read as a withheld record and the event would verify with nothing
- * checked, the fail-open the new majors exist to prevent (governance.md §8,
- * W-3).
+ * The field name `event_bytes` replaced. A body entry still carrying it is a
+ * hard reject: ignored, it would read as a withheld record and verify with
+ * nothing checked.
  */
 export const LEGACY_EVENT_BYTES_FIELD = "record_bytes";
 /**
- * Name an envelope the accept-set refused. Without this a bundle whose
- * envelopes carry a retired profile major (a half-migrated producer still
- * writing `sanning.events/v1`) fails with no reason at all. Spelled with
- * `JSON.stringify` so both kernels write the same sentence.
+ * Name an envelope the accept-set refused, so a retired profile major fails
+ * with a reason. The same sentence in both kernels.
  */
 function specVersionFinding(what, envelope, res) {
     if (!isJsonObject(envelope) || res.specVersionOk)
@@ -67,68 +41,39 @@ function specVersionFinding(what, envelope, res) {
     const sv = envelope.spec_version;
     return `${what} envelope spec_version ${JSON.stringify(sv)} is not accepted by this kernel`;
 }
-/**
- * The reject for an entry that still carries `record_bytes`. One sentence,
- * spelled the same in both kernels, so a negative vector can assert it.
- */
+/** The reject for an entry that still carries `record_bytes`. The same sentence in both kernels. */
 function legacyEventBytesError(entry, what, bodyType) {
     if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(entry, LEGACY_EVENT_BYTES_FIELD))
         return null;
     return (`${what} carries ${LEGACY_EVENT_BYTES_FIELD} in a ${bodyType} body ` +
         "(renamed event_bytes) -- one bundle speaks one vocabulary");
 }
-// The issuer-composed attested-evidence-export body (specs/evidence-export.md
-// §2). The wrapper is unchanged (`sanning.evidence/v1`, Ed25519-signed); this body
-// carries a cached verdict + the inline source bundle + embedded RSA-PSS
-// operator attestations. verifyEvidenceBundle dispatches on it to
-// verifyExportBody (§5).
+// The attested-evidence-export body (specs/evidence-export.md §2): a cached
+// verdict, the inline source bundle and RSA-PSS operator attestations.
 export const EXPORT_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.evidence.export/v2";
 /**
- * The Sanning-signed interval stamp body (evidence-bundle.md §5.2, DL-58).
- *
- * Its own `body_type` rather than a widened anchor-trace body, and the reason
- * is the whole decision: an anchor-trace checkpoint carries a PRODUCER-signed
- * `sanning.events/v2` envelope, and a stamp has no producer signature at all:
- * Sanning places it, under DL-52, for a customer who holds no chain identity.
- * The two rejected options were making `envelope` optional and synthesising an
- * envelope that Sanning signs; the second would have made a Sanning
- * attestation indistinguishable ON THE WIRE from a producer's, which is
- * unrecoverable once witnessed.
+ * The Sanning-signed interval stamp body (evidence-bundle.md §5.2). Its own
+ * body type, because a stamp has no producer signature: a Sanning attestation
+ * must never be indistinguishable on the wire from a producer's.
  */
 export const STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.stamp.trace/v1";
 export const STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE = "sanning.stamp.evidence/v2";
 /**
- * The version string INSIDE a witnessed stamp body — a different string from
- * the `body_type` above, and the two are easy to confuse.
- *
- * `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` discriminates the BUNDLE BODY: it is the reader's
- * dispatch key. `sanning.stamp/v1` is the control plane's own version of the
- * bytes it hands a witness (`control-plane/src/stamp-tree.ts`,
- * `STAMP_BODY_VERSION`). A `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` body pins the inner
- * version to exactly this value: two answers to one question inside one
- * signature is the §5.1.2 mixed-vocabulary reject, one layer down.
+ * The version string inside a witnessed stamp body, distinct from the
+ * `body_type` above (the dispatch key). A stamp trace body pins it to exactly
+ * this value (§5.1.2).
  */
 export const STAMP_BODY_VERSION = "sanning.stamp/v1";
 /**
- * A surface MUST NOT present a wrapper's `co_signatures` as evidence
- * (evidence-bundle.md §2, decided by Phil 2026-09-24 on proof#148): nothing
- * in either kernel verifies the field, and it sits outside the wrapper's
- * signed scope (`bundleForSig` below), so anyone holding a pack's bytes can
- * append it with no key at all. This is the one sentence both kernels attach
- * as a note, never a verdict, never an exit code.
+ * A wrapper's `co_signatures` is not evidence (evidence-bundle.md §2): nothing
+ * verifies it, and it sits outside the signed scope, so anyone can append it.
+ * Attached as a note, never a verdict or exit code.
  */
 export const CO_SIGNATURES_NOTE = "unverified co-signatures are present in this pack's wrapper and are not part of the evidence";
 /**
- * True iff the wrapper's reserved `co_signatures` field carries at least one
- * entry.
- *
- * Absence and an empty array read the same way here: the field asserts
- * nothing about a second signer until it holds one, and evidence-bundle.md's
- * own carve-out language for the analogous envelope field treats "absent"
- * and "an empty array" as one thing (envelope-spec.md §7.1). A non-array
- * value (malformed shape, but the field is reserved, not yet specified)
- * still counts as present: it is not the well-formed absence either rule
- * describes.
+ * Whether the wrapper's reserved `co_signatures` carries at least one entry.
+ * Absent and empty read the same (envelope-spec.md §7.1); a non-array value
+ * counts as present.
  */
 export function coSignaturesPresent(b) {
     if (b === null || typeof b !== "object" || Array.isArray(b))
@@ -156,22 +101,18 @@ function isEvidenceMajorAccepted(specVersion) {
         return minor.length > 0 && /^[0-9]+$/.test(minor);
     });
 }
+/** evidence-bundle.md §2. Byte-identical to the Python kernel's. */
+export const GENERATED_AT_MALFORMED = "malformed generated_at: not an RFC 3339 UTC date-time with Z naming a real date and time (evidence-bundle section 2)";
 /**
- * A bundle this kernel cannot read.
- *
- * `wrapperOk` is true only where the wrapper signature and `body_hash` were
- * CHECKED and held before the body was found unreadable. It is then reported
- * as held, because it did: `signatureOk` and `bodyHashOk` are statements about
- * the wrapper, and a body this kernel cannot parse does not unsign it. The
- * case reader decides whose pack a bundle is on exactly those two fields
- * (`evidence-bundle.md` 5.5.1), so reporting `false` here let a holder who
- * broke its own body shape read as a forger.
+ * A bundle this kernel cannot read. `wrapperOk` is true only where the wrapper
+ * signature and `body_hash` were checked and held: an unparseable body does not
+ * unsign the wrapper, and the case reader decides whose pack it is on those
+ * fields (§5.5.1).
  */
-/** evidence-bundle §2 (A31). Byte-identical to the Python kernel's. */
-export const GENERATED_AT_MALFORMED = "malformed generated_at: not an RFC 3339 UTC date-time with Z naming a real date and time (evidence-bundle §2)";
 function malformed(error, specVersionOk = false, wrapperOk = false) {
     return {
-        status: "malformed",
+        status: "incomplete",
+        unreadable: true,
         specVersionOk,
         bodyHashOk: wrapperOk,
         signatureOk: wrapperOk,
@@ -179,93 +120,136 @@ function malformed(error, specVersionOk = false, wrapperOk = false) {
         onChainChecked: false,
         checkpoints: [],
         events: [],
-        assertedStatus: null,
         errors: [error],
     };
 }
-/**
- * The prefixes of the exception text this kernel writes ITSELF, in the words
- * the Python kernel writes too. Anything outside this set comes from the host:
- * a JSON parser, a codec, a crypto library. See `thrownDetail`.
- */
-// `duplicate key ` is `DuplicateKeyError` in `verifier.ts`, which
-// `DuplicateKey` in the Python twin's `canonicalize.py` words identically.
+// The prefixes of exception text this kernel writes itself, identically in
+// Python. Anything else comes from the host. See `thrownDetail`.
 const KERNEL_WORDING = ["hexToBytes: ", "duplicate key "];
 /**
- * The detail a finding may append about a caught exception.
- *
- * THE RULE: a finding carries the text of a caught exception only where this
- * kernel wrote that text. A finding travels into a case reading through `case`
- * `reasons`, and both kernels promise one reading and one rendered sentence for
- * one set of bytes; a host JSON parser says `Unexpected token 'h', "hello" is
- * not valid JSON` here and `Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)` there,
- * for one pack anyone can build (gate 4 on proof#140, finding 1).
- *
- * Returns `": <text>"` for this kernel's own wording and the empty string for
- * anything else. The label at the call site already names the check that
- * failed and both kernels agree on it character for character; what is dropped
- * is the host's parse offset, which no reader can act on and which was never
- * the same in the two kernels.
+ * The record as the agent reader holds it, or `null` where it takes no part:
+ * only a `sanning.events/v2` record whose envelope verified and whose bytes
+ * bound to it (section 10).
  */
+function agentItem(ev, eventBytes, bound) {
+    if (!bound || eventBytes === undefined)
+        return null;
+    const envelope = ev.envelope;
+    if (!isObject(envelope) || !specVersionSupported(envelope.spec_version, AGENT_RECORD_PROFILES)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    let record;
+    try {
+        record = jcsParse(eventBytes);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return {
+        event_id: envelope.event_id,
+        public_key: envelope.public_key,
+        record,
+    };
+}
+// The profile whose records the agent vocabulary governs (agent-events.md section 3).
+const AGENT_RECORD_PROFILES = ["sanning.events/v2"];
+/** Read the bundle's records as one pile and put each agent record's reading on its result. */
+async function attachAgentReadings(results, items) {
+    const pile = items.filter((item) => item !== null);
+    const readings = await readAgentRecords(pile);
+    let next = 0;
+    for (const [i, item] of items.entries()) {
+        if (item !== null)
+            results[i].agent = readings[next++];
+    }
+}
 /**
- * The kernel's `duplicate key "<name>"` when a record repeats a member name,
- * else `undefined` (proof#144; `_record_duplicate_key` in the Python twin).
- *
- * ONLY A DUPLICATE, and not every unreadable record. Every reader below this
- * one that parses a record treats an unreadable one as absent, so the content
- * binding reads undetermined and the pack said "1 record discloses no bytes"
- * about a record whose bytes it had read. A record that repeats a name is
- * a defect in the artifact, and a defect this kernel can see fails, the rule
- * `event_bytes` that are not hex already follow.
+ * The finding for record bytes a producer signed that are not JSON, else
+ * `undefined` (`_record_not_json` in the Python twin): `event record is not
+ * JSON`, with the kernel's `duplicate key "<name>"` where the bytes repeat a
+ * member name. The bytes are signed, so the defect is the producer's and
+ * visible, and the record fails (evidence-bundle.md section 4), never reads as
+ * withheld.
  */
-function recordDuplicateKey(eventBytes) {
+function recordNotJson(eventBytes) {
     if (eventBytes === undefined)
         return undefined;
     try {
         jcsParse(eventBytes);
     }
     catch (e) {
-        if (e instanceof DuplicateKeyError)
-            return e.message;
+        return `event record is not JSON${thrownDetail(e)}`;
     }
     return undefined;
 }
+/**
+ * The detail a finding may append about a caught exception: `": <text>"` for
+ * this kernel's own wording, `""` for anything else. Host parser messages
+ * differ by kernel, and both kernels must render one sentence for one set of
+ * bytes.
+ */
 function thrownDetail(e) {
     const text = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
     return KERNEL_WORDING.some((w) => text.startsWith(w)) ? `: ${text}` : "";
 }
 /**
- * Decode `bytes` as UTF-8 the way every other kernel does: a byte sequence that
- * is not valid UTF-8 THROWS, and a leading byte-order mark is kept rather than
- * eaten.
- *
- * ONE CALLER LEFT, and it is not a parse. `jcsParse` (`verifier.ts`) reads
- * every set of signed bytes in this kernel now; this function survives only for
- * the canonicality comparison on the stamp path, which needs the DECODED TEXT
- * of bytes `jcsParse` has already accepted, to compare against `jcs(body)`. It
- * performs exactly the decode `jcsParse` performs, so the comparison cannot
- * read the bytes differently from the parse that produced `body`.
- *
- * `new TextDecoder()` alone is neither strict nor BOM-preserving: it replaces
- * every invalid sequence with U+FFFD and strips a BOM. A stamp body carrying
- * one raw `0x80` inside a string value read `verified` here and `failed` there
- * because of it (gate 4 on proof#140). The symmetric claim the first version of
- * this comment made, that "Python's `json.loads` raises on both", is FALSE and
- * is what hid gate 5's defect for a round: `json.loads(<bytes>)` strips a BOM
- * too. Python's strict reader is `jcs_loads`, and the rule both kernels hold to
- * is stated once, in `jcsParse`.
+ * Decode `bytes` as strict UTF-8, keeping a leading BOM: the decode `jcsParse`
+ * performs, for the stamp path's canonicality comparison on bytes `jcsParse`
+ * already accepted.
  */
 function decodeUtf8Strict(bytes) {
     return new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true }).decode(bytes);
 }
 /**
  * Name an envelope `public_key` or `signature` spelled outside the hex charset
- * or at the wrong length (proof#142). This kernel's envelope layer already
- * fails such an envelope, and the Python one's decoder accepts ASCII
- * whitespace (proof#135), so both bundle verifiers name it here, in the same
- * words, and the two kernels give one reading. Only a STRING is checked: a
- * missing or non-string field is the envelope layer's to fail, and it does.
+ * or at the wrong length, in the same words as Python, so both kernels give one
+ * reading. Only a string is checked; a missing one is the envelope layer's to
+ * fail.
+ */
+/**
+ * The envelope faults that leave a claim not proven rather than disproven: the record's
+ * envelope or key cannot be read, or its version is one this verifier does not know.
+ */
+export const UNPROVEN_ENVELOPE_FAULTS = [
+    "not_an_envelope",
+    "key_unreadable",
+    "spec_version_unknown",
+];
+/**
+ * A record that fails only on something not proven: a stamp or checkpoint the pack does not
+ * hold, an envelope or key that cannot be read, or a version this verifier does not know,
+ * while every check that runs without it holds (the binding, the inclusion proof and the
+ * content). It holds the bundle at `incomplete`, never `failed`.
+ */
+function unproven(e) {
+    const envelopeUnproven = e.envelopeFault !== undefined && e.envelopeFault !== null && UNPROVEN_ENVELOPE_FAULTS.includes(e.envelopeFault);
+    const stampAbsent = e.stampAbsent === true;
+    return ((stampAbsent || envelopeUnproven) &&
+        (e.envelopeOk || envelopeUnproven) &&
+        (envelopeUnproven || e.ownFormFailed !== true) &&
+        e.payloadBindingOk !== false &&
+        e.contentOk !== false &&
+        (stampAbsent || (e.inclusionOk && e.checkpointBound)));
+}
+/**
+ * Why a record's envelope does not verify, worst first: the envelope layer's own faults,
+ * and, where only this kernel's strict hex reading refuses a field, a key that cannot be read
+ * or a signature that does not hold. A field's form is not judged under either.
  */
+function eventEnvelopeFaults(faults, hexError) {
+    const found = new Set(faults);
+    if (hexError !== null) {
+        found.delete("nonconforming");
+        if (hexError.includes("public_key")) {
+            found.delete("signature_failed");
+            found.add("key_unreadable");
+        }
+        else {
+            found.add("signature_failed");
+        }
+    }
+    return ENVELOPE_FAULTS.filter((f) => found.has(f));
+}
 function envelopeHexError(what, envelope) {
     if (!isJsonObject(envelope))
         return null;
@@ -281,30 +265,20 @@ function envelopeHexError(what, envelope) {
     return null;
 }
 /**
- * Spell a value inside a finding the way the Python kernel spells it.
- *
- * `JSON.stringify(undefined)` is `undefined` (the value, not a string), so an
- * absent field interpolates as the word `undefined` where Python writes `null`.
- * One word, and a real difference in what an auditor reads: someone comparing
- * the two CLIs on one bundle sees two different sentences for one fact. Both
- * kernels route every quoted value through this spelling, and the cross-kernel
- * anchor-trace leg byte-compares them.
+ * Spell a value inside a finding as Python does: an absent value reads `null`,
+ * never `undefined`.
  */
 function jsonStr(value) {
     return JSON.stringify(value === undefined ? null : value) ?? "null";
 }
-// Verify a `sanning.evidence/v1` bundle and dispatch on its `body_type`.
-//
-// Returns a structured per-checkpoint + per-event result and a recomputed
-// rollup `status`. The producer's asserted `verdict.status` is surfaced
-// (`assertedStatus`) but NEVER trusted — the displayed status is the one this
-// function recomputes (evidence-bundle §1 principle 3 / §4 step 4).
+/**
+ * Verify a `sanning.evidence/v1` bundle, dispatching on its `body_type`. The
+ * returned `status` is recomputed from the body; a wrapper `verdict` member,
+ * where a producer still writes one, is never read (evidence-bundle.md section 4).
+ */
 export async function verifyEvidenceBundle(bundle, options = {}) {
-    // The ONE place a present `co_signatures` becomes a note, so every caller
-    // (including `case.ts`, which calls this function directly per pack) gets
-    // it, however the wrapper otherwise verifies. Never touches `status` or
-    // the exit code: a bundle that would otherwise verify still verifies, note
-    // or not (proof#148).
+    // The one place a present `co_signatures` becomes a note, so `case.ts` gets
+    // it too. Never touches `status`.
     const result = await verifyBundle(bundle, options, false);
     const note = coSignaturesNote(bundle);
     if (note !== undefined) {
@@ -313,31 +287,49 @@ export async function verifyEvidenceBundle(bundle, options = {}) {
     return result;
 }
 // `exportSource`: read the bundle as an export's source (evidence-export.md
-// §2.4), where the only recognised body is `sanning.anchor.trace/v3`.
+// §2.4), where only `sanning.anchor.trace/v3` is recognised.
 async function verifyBundle(bundle, options, exportSource) {
-    // --- Step 1: parse + reject unknown spec_version major ---------------------
+    // Step 1: parse and reject an unknown spec_version major.
     if (bundle === null || typeof bundle !== "object" || Array.isArray(bundle)) {
         return malformed("evidence bundle is not a JSON object");
     }
-    // Reject a pathologically deep bundle BEFORE any canonicalization (which
-    // recurses). A fixed shared bound keeps this a `malformed` verdict in every
-    // kernel rather than a stack-limit-dependent split verdict — see
-    // MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH.
+    // Reject a pathologically deep bundle before canonicalization recurses (see
+    // MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH).
     if (exceedsDepth(bundle, MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH)) {
         return malformed(`evidence bundle nesting exceeds the ${MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH}-level canonicalization depth bound`);
     }
     const b = bundle;
     const specVersionOk = isEvidenceMajorAccepted(b.spec_version);
     if (!specVersionOk) {
-        // `?? null`: an ABSENT field is spelled `null`, as the Python twin's
-        // `_json_str` spells it. `JSON.stringify(undefined)` is `undefined`, and
-        // the two kernels printed two different sentences for one bundle until
-        // `verify --json` compared them byte for byte (0.13.0).
-        return malformed(`unsupported evidence spec_version: ${JSON.stringify(b.spec_version ?? null)}`, false);
+        // An absent field is spelled `null`, as in Python.
+        const unknown = malformed(`unsupported evidence spec_version: ${JSON.stringify(b.spec_version ?? null)}`, false);
+        unknown.versionUnknown = typeof b.spec_version === "string";
+        if (unknown.versionUnknown && typeof b.public_key === "string" && typeof b.signature === "string") {
+            // A version this verifier does not know still carries a signature it can check: one
+            // that fails is a pack changed after it was signed.
+            const found = [];
+            const [keyFormOk, signatureOk] = await checkWrapperSignature(b, found);
+            if (keyFormOk && !signatureOk) {
+                return {
+                    status: "failed",
+                    specVersionOk: false,
+                    // Not checked under this version, so not the disproof here.
+                    bodyHashOk: true,
+                    signatureOk: false,
+                    bodyType: null,
+                    onChainChecked: false,
+                    checkpoints: [],
+                    events: [],
+                    errors: [...unknown.errors, ...found],
+                    versionUnknown: true,
+                };
+            }
+            unknown.signatureOk = signatureOk;
+        }
+        return unknown;
     }
     if (typeof b.signature_alg === "string" && b.signature_alg !== "ed25519") {
-        // The reference verifier implements ed25519 only (evidence-bundle §2 +
-        // decision #2); other algs are a deliberate future addition.
+        // Ed25519 only (evidence-bundle.md §2).
         return malformed(`unsupported signature_alg: ${JSON.stringify(b.signature_alg ?? null)}`, true);
     }
     if (typeof b.public_key !== "string" || typeof b.signature !== "string") {
@@ -347,20 +339,16 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, options, exportSource) {
         return malformed("evidence bundle is missing body_hash", true);
     }
     if (b.body === undefined || b.body === null) {
-        // body_ref (out-of-line body) is a defined growth hook but not part of the
-        // anchor-trace use case — refuse rather than silently pass.
+        // `body_ref` (out-of-line body) is refused rather than passed.
         return malformed("evidence bundle has no inline body (body_ref unsupported here)", true);
     }
-    // --- Step 2: verify the wrapper signature + recompute body_hash ------------
+    // Step 2: verify the wrapper signature and recompute `body_hash`.
     const errors = [];
-    // Every wrapper hex field is read STRICTLY, before any decoder sees it
-    // (proof#142). The Python decoder skipped ASCII whitespace, and the wrapper
-    // `signature` sits outside the signed scope, so one space in it, added by
-    // anyone and with no key, made a pack verify there and fail here. The same
-    // named failure in both kernels, for each field: `public_key` and
-    // `signature` are 64 and 128 hex characters in either case (proof#135,
-    // option B), and `body_hash` is 64 LOWER-case hex characters, the form it is
-    // recomputed in and compared against.
+    // Every wrapper hex field is read strictly, before any decoder sees it:
+    // `signature` is outside the signed scope, so a lenient decoder would let
+    // anyone flip a verdict by adding whitespace. `public_key` and `signature`
+    // are 64 and 128 hex characters in either case; `body_hash` is 64 lowercase,
+    // the form it is recomputed in.
     let bodyHashOk = false;
     if (!isHexField(b.body_hash, 64, true)) {
         errors.push("wrapper body_hash is not 64 lowercase hex characters");
@@ -377,6 +365,69 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, options, exportSource) {
             errors.push(`body canonicalization failed${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
+    const [keyFormOk, signatureOk] = await checkWrapperSignature(b, errors);
+    // A key that cannot be read checks no signature: `signed` is not proven on that claim
+    // only. A `body_hash` that does not hold still fails, and a body that holds is still read,
+    // so a disproof inside it stands.
+    if (!keyFormOk && bodyHashOk) {
+        // Form is judged only under a signature that holds, so the wrapper's time is not.
+        const result = await readWrappedBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options, exportSource, false);
+        result.signatureOk = false;
+        result.keyUnreadable = true;
+        if (result.status === "verified")
+            result.status = "incomplete";
+        return result;
+    }
+    if (!keyFormOk) {
+        return {
+            status: "failed",
+            specVersionOk,
+            bodyHashOk,
+            signatureOk: false,
+            bodyType: typeof b.body_type === "string" ? b.body_type : null,
+            onChainChecked: false,
+            checkpoints: [],
+            events: [],
+            errors,
+            keyUnreadable: true,
+        };
+    }
+    // A broken wrapper is a hard failure: the body is untrustworthy.
+    if (!signatureOk || !bodyHashOk) {
+        return {
+            status: "failed",
+            specVersionOk,
+            bodyHashOk,
+            signatureOk,
+            bodyType: typeof b.body_type === "string" ? b.body_type : null,
+            onChainChecked: false,
+            checkpoints: [],
+            events: [],
+            errors,
+        };
+    }
+    return readWrappedBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options, exportSource);
+}
+/** Everything a bundle says past its wrapper: its time, then its body by type. */
+async function readWrappedBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options, exportSource, judgeTime = true) {
+    const result = await readBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options, exportSource);
+    // The wrapper's `generated_at` (evidence-bundle.md §2) is printed beside every verdict
+    // and copied into `as_of`, so a present value that is not RFC 3339 UTC is a format the
+    // producer broke. The body is read first, so a disproof inside it stands beside this one.
+    if (judgeTime &&
+        Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, "generated_at") &&
+        !isRfc3339UtcInstant(b.generated_at)) {
+        result.status = "failed";
+        result.generatedAtMalformed = true;
+        result.errors = [GENERATED_AT_MALFORMED, ...result.errors.filter((e) => e !== GENERATED_AT_MALFORMED)];
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+/**
+ * `[keyFormOk, signatureOk]` for the wrapper's Ed25519 signature over every field but
+ * `signature` and `co_signatures`. `public_key` and `signature` are strings here.
+ */
+async function checkWrapperSignature(b, errors) {
     let signatureOk = false;
     const keyFormOk = isHexField(b.public_key, 64);
     const signatureFormOk = isHexField(b.signature, 128);
@@ -395,108 +446,71 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, options, exportSource) {
             errors.push(`wrapper signature verification error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
-    const assertedStatus = typeof b.verdict?.status === "string" ? b.verdict.status : null;
-    // A broken wrapper (bad signature or tampered body) is a hard failure — the
-    // body is untrustworthy, so we do not pretend to verify its contents.
-    if (!signatureOk || !bodyHashOk) {
-        return {
-            status: "failed",
-            specVersionOk,
-            bodyHashOk,
-            signatureOk,
-            bodyType: typeof b.body_type === "string" ? b.body_type : null,
-            onChainChecked: false,
-            checkpoints: [],
-            events: [],
-            assertedStatus,
-            errors,
-        };
-    }
-    // --- The wrapper's own time (evidence-bundle §2, A31) ---------------------
-    // `generated_at` is copied into a recomputed verdict's `as_of` (the export
-    // reading) and printed beside every verdict, so a present value that is not
-    // the RFC 3339 form `signed_at` already pins is a wrapper this kernel cannot
-    // render, whatever its signature. It is read only once the wrapper holds: a
-    // broken wrapper is `failed` above, as it was. Absence is unchanged.
-    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, "generated_at") &&
-        !isRfc3339UtcInstant(b.generated_at)) {
-        return malformed(GENERATED_AT_MALFORMED, specVersionOk, true);
-    }
-    // --- Body dispatch ---------------------------------------------------------
+    return [keyFormOk, signatureOk];
+}
+/** A wrapped body, read by its type. */
+async function readBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options, exportSource) {
     const bodyType = typeof b.body_type === "string" ? b.body_type : null;
-    // Read as an export's source (evidence-export.md §2.4), the only body this
-    // kernel recognises is sanning.anchor.trace/v3. Any other body, even one it
-    // verifies on its own, is undetermined here, after the wrapper checks above.
+    // As an export's source, only sanning.anchor.trace/v3 is recognised; any
+    // other body is undetermined.
     if (exportSource && bodyType !== ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE) {
         errors.push(`body_type ${JSON.stringify(bodyType)} is not an export source ` +
-            `(only ${ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE}); wrapper verified, body undetermined`);
+            `(only ${ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE}); wrapper verified, body not checked`);
         return {
-            status: "partial",
+            status: "incomplete",
             specVersionOk,
-            bodyHashOk,
-            signatureOk,
+            bodyHashOk: true,
+            signatureOk: true,
             bodyType,
             onChainChecked: false,
             checkpoints: [],
             events: [],
-            assertedStatus,
             errors,
         };
     }
-    // Attested-evidence-export body (evidence-export.md §5). The wrapper is
-    // authentic (Ed25519 issuer signature + body_hash verified above, §5 step 2);
-    // hand off to the export verifier for steps 3–9.
+    // The wrapper is authentic (§5 step 2); the export verifier runs steps 3 to 9.
     if (bodyType === EXPORT_BODY_TYPE) {
-        return verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options);
+        return verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options);
     }
-    // The Sanning-signed interval stamp body (evidence-bundle.md §5.2). The
-    // wrapper is authentic — and for this body that IS "Sanning signed it", since
-    // a stamp carries no second signature of its own inside the bundle.
+    // The stamp body (§5.2). For this body the wrapper signature is what
+    // "Sanning signed it" means: a stamp carries no second signature in the bundle.
     if (bodyType === STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE) {
-        return verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options);
+        return verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, errors, options);
     }
-    // The DL-52 hand-over body (§5.3): stamps AND the customer's events, joined.
+    // The hand-over body (§5.3): stamps and the customer's events, joined.
     if (bodyType === STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE) {
-        return verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options);
+        return verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, errors, options);
     }
     if (bodyType !== ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE) {
-        // The wrapper is authentic but we don't know this body's structure. Per
-        // wrap-don't-merge, that is "partial" (cryptographically sound wrapper,
-        // body verdict undetermined) — not a failure.
+        // An authentic wrapper over an unknown body: `incomplete`, not a failure.
         errors.push(`body_type ${JSON.stringify(bodyType)} is not verifiable by this kernel ` +
-            `(only ${ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE}); wrapper verified, body undetermined`);
+            `(only ${ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE}); wrapper verified, body not checked`);
         return {
-            status: "partial",
+            status: "incomplete",
             specVersionOk,
-            bodyHashOk,
-            signatureOk,
+            bodyHashOk: true,
+            signatureOk: true,
             bodyType,
             onChainChecked: false,
             checkpoints: [],
             events: [],
-            assertedStatus,
             errors,
         };
     }
-    return verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options);
+    return verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, errors, options);
 }
 /**
- * Recompute an export's source verdict (evidence-export.md §5 step 4).
- *
- * The only export source is `sanning.anchor.trace/v3` (§2.2, §2.4). Any other
- * inline source body is unrecognised *as a source*, even one this kernel
- * verifies on its own, such as a `sanning.stamp.evidence/v2` pack: §2.4 makes
- * its source verdict undetermined, so the export cannot reach `verified`. The
- * source wrapper is still checked first, because a forged source is a failure
- * whatever its body.
+ * Recompute an export's source verdict (evidence-export.md §5 step 4). Only a
+ * `sanning.anchor.trace/v3` source is recognised (§2.4); any other reads
+ * undetermined, so the export cannot reach `verified`. The source wrapper is
+ * checked first, because a forged source fails whatever its body.
  */
 async function verifyExportSource(source, options) {
     return verifyBundle(source, options, true);
 }
 /**
- * Index a source bundle's checkpoints by the key its attestations use: the
- * derived `checkpoint_ref`. Only a `sanning.anchor.trace/v3` source has
- * checkpoints an attestation can resolve (evidence-export.md §2.4).
+ * Index a source bundle's checkpoints by derived `checkpoint_ref`, the key
+ * attestations use (evidence-export.md §2.4).
  */
 async function indexSourceCheckpoints(bundle) {
     const out = new Map();
@@ -523,25 +537,14 @@ async function indexSourceCheckpoints(bundle) {
     return out;
 }
 /**
- * Resolve a checkpoint's join key and its witness reference.
- *
- * ── Why a retired spelling is a reject rather than a preference ──
- *
- * A checkpoint carrying a retired spelling beside the current one is two
- * answers to one question inside one signature. A reader that silently prefers
- * one gives a different answer from a reader that prefers the other, over the
- * same signed bytes, and both look like they verified. So `tx_id` and
- * `record_bytes` are rejected rather than resolved.
- *
- * ── Why the key is recomputed ──
- *
- * The key IS the bytes: relabelling a checkpoint and every event pointing at it
- * fails here, because nothing is taken from the label.
+ * Resolve a checkpoint's join key and witness reference. The key is recomputed
+ * from the bytes, never taken from the label. A retired spelling (`tx_id`,
+ * `record_bytes`) beside the current one is two answers inside one signature,
+ * so it is rejected rather than resolved.
  */
 async function resolveCheckpointKey(cp, eventBytes) {
     const errors = [];
-    // Every early return below leaves before `anchor_ref` is ever looked at, so
-    // nothing there is "malformed": it is unexamined, which is not the same claim.
+    // Early returns never look at `anchor_ref`, so it is unexamined, not malformed.
     const unexamined = { key: null, anchorRef: null, anchorRefMalformed: false, errors };
     if (cp.tx_id !== undefined) {
         errors.push(`${ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} checkpoint carries legacy tx_id -- one bundle speaks one vocabulary`);
@@ -575,33 +578,12 @@ async function resolveCheckpointKey(cp, eventBytes) {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Validate an optional `anchor_ref` (§5.1.1).
- *
- * ── An unrecognised `kind` is NOT a failure, and that is the point ──
- *
- * The offline verdict — signatures, payload binding, Merkle inclusion — is
- * computed with no witness access at all. A reader that cannot resolve a
- * witness has therefore learned NOTHING about whether the evidence was
- * altered, and must not say otherwise. The shipped issuer did the opposite:
- * an unrecognised signature type returned `false` rather than `null`, mapped
- * to `tampered`, and was cached as permanent — a false accusation, produced
- * by a coverage gap, for a company whose product is telling people whether
- * records were altered.
- *
- * So this validates the SHAPE and never the vocabulary. A malformed
- * `anchor_ref` is a defect in the bundle; an unknown `kind` is a defect in
- * the reader, and only the first is the bundle's fault.
+ * Validate an optional `anchor_ref` (§5.1.1): its shape, never its vocabulary.
  *
- * ── Absent and malformed are not the same null (proof#120) ──
- *
- * Both leave no `AnchorRef` to re-fetch, and both used to be reported the same
- * way downstream: an all-`unreachable` on-chain result, although no gateway was
- * asked in either case. For the ABSENT case that is at least the note
- * `evidence-bundle.md` §5.1.1 reserves for "a checkpoint with no `anchor_ref`".
- * For the MALFORMED case it is a manufactured outage: the bundle named a
- * witness, the name was unreadable, and the reader was told the public record
- * could not be reached. So the two come back as different facts, and `malformed`
- * carries the difference.
+ * An unrecognised `kind` is not a failure: the offline verdict needs no witness,
+ * so a reader that cannot resolve one has learned nothing about alteration and
+ * must not accuse. A malformed `anchor_ref` is a defect in the bundle, and is
+ * returned as `malformed` so it is never reported as an unreachable witness.
  */
 function parseAnchorRef(raw, errors) {
     if (raw === undefined || raw === null) {
@@ -634,7 +616,7 @@ function parseAnchorRef(raw, errors) {
         malformed: false,
     };
 }
-async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
+async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, errors, options) {
     const body = b.body;
     const bodyType = ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE;
     if (!Array.isArray(body.checkpoints) || !Array.isArray(body.events)) {
@@ -642,31 +624,17 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
     }
     const gateways = options.gateways ?? [];
     const onChainChecked = gateways.length > 0;
-    // --- Step 3: per-checkpoint -------------------------------------------------
-    //
-    // ── Why the join key is resolved BEFORE anything else ──
-    //
-    // `byKey` is what binds an event to the root its inclusion proof is checked
-    // against. Get it wrong and an event proves inclusion in a tree it was never
-    // in — the one failure in this file that produces a WRONG VERIFIED, not a
-    // failed verify. Everything below is downstream of it.
+    // Step 3: per checkpoint. `byKey` binds each event to the root its inclusion
+    // is checked against; a wrong key here would yield a wrong `verified`.
     const byKey = new Map();
     const anchorByKey = new Map();
     const checkpointResults = [];
-    // proof#120. Kept beside the results rather than on them: "the bundle named
-    // a witness we could not read" is an input defect the checkpoint's own
-    // `errors` already states, not a new dimension of the published verdict, and
-    // `CheckpointResult` is a shape downstream surfaces render.
+    // Kept beside the results: an unreadable witness name is an input defect the
+    // checkpoint's `errors` already states, not a verdict dimension.
     const malformedAnchorRef = new Set();
     for (const rawCp of body.checkpoints) {
-        // `checkpoints[]` is attacker-shaped, and a verifier must never raise on
-        // adversarial input: a null entry used to reach `cp.tx_id` and hand the
-        // caller a TypeError instead of a verdict, which an auditor cannot tell
-        // apart from a broken tool. Graded and reported as "not a checkpoint"
-        // rather than coerced into an empty one: probing the envelope layer with
-        // nothing asks it a question about an object that was never an envelope.
-        // Same treatment, same words, as the §5.3 path's `events[] entry is not an
-        // object`.
+        // `checkpoints[]` is attacker-shaped; a verifier never raises on it. A
+        // non-object entry is reported as not a checkpoint, never coerced.
         if (rawCp === null || typeof rawCp !== "object" || Array.isArray(rawCp)) {
             checkpointResults.push({
                 checkpointRef: "",
@@ -685,8 +653,7 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         let envelopeOk = false;
         let merkleRootOk = false;
         let leafCountOk = false;
-        // Decode event_bytes first: in v2 the join key is DERIVED from it, so it
-        // is an input to identity, not just to the payload binding below.
+        // The join key is derived from `event_bytes`, so decode them first.
         let eventBytes;
         try {
             if (typeof cp.event_bytes === "string")
@@ -697,15 +664,9 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         }
         const keyed = await resolveCheckpointKey(cp, eventBytes);
         cpErrors.push(...keyed.errors);
-        // A duplicate key is a HARD failure, not a note. `byKey` below keeps the
-        // FIRST occurrence, so a second checkpoint claiming the same key is
-        // verified against the first one's envelope and its own stated identity is
-        // never independently checked. Recording the finding and leaving `ok` true
-        // let the bundle roll up to `verified` while carrying a checkpoint nothing
-        // had verified: a false pass, which is what `evidence-bundle.md` §3
-        // principle 3 exists to prevent (the displayed verdict must be the
-        // recomputed one, and here the recomputation quietly dropped a finding it
-        // had made).
+        // A duplicate key is a hard failure: `byKey` keeps the first, so a second
+        // checkpoint's identity would otherwise never be checked and the bundle
+        // could roll up `verified` over it.
         let duplicateKey = false;
         if (keyed.key !== null) {
             if (byKey.has(keyed.key)) {
@@ -717,17 +678,14 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 anchorByKey.set(keyed.key, keyed.anchorRef);
             }
         }
-        // Verify the checkpoint envelope against its committed record (external
-        // commitment — the record is the payload these external envelopes bind to).
+        // The record is the payload these external-commitment envelopes bind to.
         try {
             const res = await verifyEnvelope(cp.envelope, eventBytes !== undefined ? { payloadBytes: eventBytes } : {});
-            // A checkpoint must fully bind: signature + the committed record matching
-            // payload_hash. An undetermined binding (no record) is not enough to
-            // anchor the events' inclusion claims to a trustworthy root.
+            // A checkpoint must fully bind: an undetermined binding cannot anchor the
+            // events' inclusion claims to a trustworthy root.
             const hexError = envelopeHexError("checkpoint", cp.envelope);
             envelopeOk = res.ok && res.payloadHashOk === true && hexError === null;
-            // See the event loop below: a degenerate envelope is a malformed input,
-            // not a failed check (proof#76).
+            // A degenerate envelope is malformed input, not a failed check.
             if (!isJsonObject(cp.envelope)) {
                 cpErrors.push("checkpoint envelope is not a JSON object");
             }
@@ -739,19 +697,15 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             }
             if (res.payloadHashOk === false)
                 cpErrors.push("checkpoint record does not bind to payload_hash");
-            // proof#95: a malformed skeleton field fails the envelope with a valid
-            // signature and binding; name it rather than fail with no reason.
+            // Name a malformed skeleton field, which fails an otherwise valid envelope.
             for (const m of res.errors)
                 if (m.startsWith("malformed "))
                     cpErrors.push(`checkpoint envelope ${m}`);
             const specFinding = specVersionFinding("checkpoint", cp.envelope, res);
             if (specFinding !== null)
                 cpErrors.push(specFinding);
-            // WHY the binding is undetermined decides which sentence is true.
-            // event_bytes really absent is one thing; event_bytes present and
-            // unbindable (a degenerate envelope, unreadable hex) is another, and
-            // naming the wrong cause sends a reader to look for a field that is
-            // sitting right there (proof#76).
+            // Name why the binding is undetermined: absent bytes and unbindable bytes
+            // are different causes.
             if (res.payloadHashOk === null) {
                 cpErrors.push(eventBytes === undefined
                     ? "checkpoint event_bytes missing -- root untrusted"
@@ -761,8 +715,7 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         catch (e) {
             cpErrors.push(`checkpoint envelope verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
-        // The committed record's merkle_root must equal the checkpoint's claimed
-        // merkle_root (recompute, don't trust the bundle's top-level claim).
+        // Recompute: the committed record's merkle_root must equal the claimed one.
         if (eventBytes !== undefined) {
             try {
                 const record = jcsParse(eventBytes);
@@ -772,12 +725,9 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                     cpErrors.push(`checkpoint merkle_root mismatch: claimed=${jsonStr(cp.merkle_root)} ` +
                         `committed=${jsonStr(committedRoot)}`);
                 }
-                // §5.1, A38 (proof#197), decided by Phil 2026-10-06: fail closed. The
-                // count the record signs is what every inclusion bound to this
-                // checkpoint is held to, so a record that signs no integer count fails
-                // the checkpoint, as a record that signs no merkle_root does. Read by
-                // value through the one reader the inclusion compare and the
-                // completeness notes share, so `3.0` and `3e0` are 3.
+                // Fail closed (§5.1): every inclusion is held to the count the record
+                // signs, so a record that signs no integer count fails the checkpoint.
+                // Read by value through the shared reader, so `3.0` and `3e0` are 3.
                 leafCountOk = signedLeafCount(cp) !== null;
                 if (!leafCountOk)
                     cpErrors.push("checkpoint record leaf_count is not an integer");
@@ -793,25 +743,30 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             merkleRootOk,
             onChainOk: null, // filled in step 5 if a gateway re-fetch was requested
             onChain: null, // per-gateway (§4.2), filled in step 5
-            // `keyed.errors` is load-bearing here, not decorative. A structurally
-            // invalid anchor_ref rides INSIDE the signature, so it is a defect we
-            // can see rather than a coverage gap we cannot — and this kernel's
-            // standing rule is that malformed is a failure while absent is
-            // undetermined (the same rule disclosed `content` follows). Without
-            // this term the vector `trace-v2-malformed-anchor-ref` verified GREEN.
+            // A malformed `anchor_ref` is inside the signature: a visible defect,
+            // which fails, while an absent one is undetermined.
             ok: envelopeOk && merkleRootOk && leafCountOk && keyed.errors.length === 0 && !duplicateKey,
             errors: cpErrors,
+            anchorRefMalformed: keyed.anchorRefMalformed && envelopeOk && merkleRootOk && leafCountOk && !duplicateKey,
         });
         if (keyed.anchorRefMalformed) {
             malformedAnchorRef.add(checkpointResults[checkpointResults.length - 1]);
         }
     }
-    // --- Step 4: per-event ------------------------------------------------------
+    // Every checkpoint ref the pack holds, derived or stated, compared as hex is. A ref
+    // outside it names a checkpoint the pack does not hold, which is a stamp missing, never a
+    // stamp proven wrong (section 5.1, as section 5.3.3 rule 1 reads a stamp).
+    const heldRefs = new Set([...byKey.keys()].map((k) => k.toLowerCase()));
+    for (const raw of body.checkpoints) {
+        const ref = isJsonObject(raw) ? raw.checkpoint_ref : undefined;
+        if (typeof ref === "string")
+            heldRefs.add(ref.toLowerCase());
+    }
+    // Step 4: per event.
     const eventResults = [];
+    const agentItems = [];
     for (const rawEv of body.events) {
-        // Same rule as `checkpoints[]` above, and the same words the §5.3 path
-        // already uses: a null or non-object entry is graded as not an event,
-        // never raised on.
+        // A non-object entry is graded as not an event, never raised on.
         if (rawEv === null || typeof rawEv !== "object" || Array.isArray(rawEv)) {
             eventResults.push({
                 eventId: "<unknown>",
@@ -822,34 +777,23 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 contentOk: null,
                 ok: false,
                 errors: ["events[] entry is not an object"],
+                agent: null,
             });
+            agentItems.push(null);
             continue;
         }
         const ev = rawEv;
         const evErrors = [];
         const eventId = getEventId(ev.envelope);
         let envelopeOk = false;
+        let envelopeFaults = [];
         let payloadBindingOk = null;
-        // A retired field name under this major is a reject, never an ignored
-        // unknown field: ignored, it reads as a withheld record (W-3).
+        // A retired field name is a reject: ignored, it would read as withheld.
         const legacyError = legacyEventBytesError(ev, "event", bodyType);
         if (legacyError !== null)
             evErrors.push(legacyError);
-        // MALFORMED IS A FAILURE; ABSENT IS UNDETERMINED (proof#85).
-        //
-        // `event_bytes` that will not decode leaves `eventBytes` undefined, and an
-        // undefined `eventBytes` is exactly how a WITHHELD record is spelled one
-        // line down. So an event carrying garbage in place of its record used to
-        // reach the same tri-state as an event carrying nothing: `payloadHashOk`
-        // null, `ok` true, a leading tick on the line, and a `verified` rollup over
-        // a record nobody could read. The only thing wrong with the pack was the
-        // bytes, and it was the one thing the verdict did not say.
-        //
-        // A record the producer chose not to disclose is the customer exercising
-        // minimum disclosure. A record that is present and unreadable is a defect
-        // in the artifact, and this kernel's standing rule (the same one
-        // `checkpoints[]` already applies through `keyed.errors`) is that a defect
-        // we can see fails.
+        // Malformed is a failure; absent is undetermined. Undecodable `event_bytes`
+        // would otherwise look exactly like a withheld record and verify.
         let eventBytes;
         let eventBytesMalformed = false;
         try {
@@ -860,24 +804,20 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             eventBytesMalformed = true;
             evErrors.push(`event event_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
-        const duplicate = recordDuplicateKey(eventBytes);
-        if (duplicate !== undefined) {
+        const notJson = recordNotJson(eventBytes);
+        if (notJson !== undefined) {
             eventBytesMalformed = true;
-            evErrors.push(`event record is not JSON: ${duplicate}`);
+            evErrors.push(notJson);
         }
         try {
             const res = await verifyEnvelope(ev.envelope, eventBytes !== undefined ? { payloadBytes: eventBytes } : {});
             const hexError = envelopeHexError("event", ev.envelope);
-            // ok tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            // Tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record).
             envelopeOk = res.ok && hexError === null;
+            envelopeFaults = eventEnvelopeFaults(res.faults, hexError);
             payloadBindingOk = res.payloadHashOk;
-            // P-10: report what could not be determined, never a fault that was never
-            // observed. There is no envelope here, so no signature was checked and no
-            // binding was attempted. "signature failed" named a check that never ran,
-            // and it was the only thing said about an event whose undetermined
-            // binding then rendered as a WITHHELD record, a claim about the
-            // producer's disclosure choice out of an input that says nothing about
-            // the producer at all (proof#76).
+            // No envelope, so no signature was checked: report it as malformed, not as
+            // a failed signature or a withheld record.
             if (!isJsonObject(ev.envelope)) {
                 evErrors.push("event envelope is not a JSON object");
             }
@@ -889,11 +829,12 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             }
             if (res.payloadHashOk === false)
                 evErrors.push("event record does not bind to payload_hash");
-            // A malformed skeleton field fails the envelope with a valid signature
-            // and binding (proof#95), so without this the event fails with no reason.
+            // Name a malformed skeleton field, which fails an otherwise valid envelope.
             for (const m of res.errors)
                 if (m.startsWith("malformed "))
                     evErrors.push(`event envelope ${m}`);
+            if (res.errors.some((m) => m.startsWith("missing payload_hash")))
+                evErrors.push("event envelope missing payload_hash");
             const specFinding = specVersionFinding("event", ev.envelope, res);
             if (specFinding !== null)
                 evErrors.push(specFinding);
@@ -901,18 +842,18 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         catch (e) {
             evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
-        // Bind the event to exactly one checkpoint in the bundle, then verify
-        // RFC 9162 inclusion against THAT checkpoint's merkle_root.
+        // Bind the event to exactly one checkpoint, then verify RFC 9162 inclusion
+        // against that checkpoint's merkle_root.
         const incl = ev.inclusion;
-        // An inclusion carrying the retired `checkpoint_tx_id` spelling is a mixed
-        // bundle, and resolving it anyway is how an event silently binds to a
-        // checkpoint nobody meant.
+        // The retired `checkpoint_tx_id` spelling marks a mixed bundle; resolving
+        // it could bind the event to an unintended checkpoint.
         const keyField = "checkpoint_ref";
         const wrongField = "checkpoint_tx_id";
         const inclAsRecord = incl;
         const rawKey = inclAsRecord ? inclAsRecord[keyField] : undefined;
         const strayKey = inclAsRecord ? inclAsRecord[wrongField] : undefined;
         let cp;
+        let stampAbsent = false;
         if (!incl || typeof incl !== "object") {
             evErrors.push("event missing inclusion proof");
         }
@@ -924,28 +865,24 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         }
         else {
             cp = byKey.get(rawKey);
-            if (cp === undefined) {
+            if (cp === undefined && !heldRefs.has(rawKey.toLowerCase())) {
+                // The pack does not hold the checkpoint the record names: `witnessed` is not
+                // proven (`missing`).
+                stampAbsent = true;
+                evErrors.push(`event inclusion.${keyField} ${JSON.stringify(rawKey)} names a checkpoint this pack does not hold`);
+            }
+            else if (cp === undefined) {
                 evErrors.push(`event inclusion.${keyField} ${JSON.stringify(rawKey)} resolves to no checkpoint`);
             }
         }
         const checkpointBound = cp !== undefined;
         let inclusionOk = false;
-        // §5.1, A38 (proof#197): the tree walked must be the tree the checkpoint
-        // record signed, the same rule and the same sentence as the stamp path's
-        // rule 3. RFC 9162's walk reads one audit path as valid at more than one
-        // (leaf_index, leaf_count), so without this a real proof at (2, 3) also
-        // verified as (1, 2) or (4, 5). A signed count that cannot be read is not
-        // compared here: it has already failed its checkpoint (above), so the
-        // bundle cannot verify. One reader of the signed count, shared with the
-        // completeness notes, so the verdict and the grade never read two
-        // different numbers.
-        //
-        // Every number here is read BY VALUE (`Number.isSafeInteger`), the model
-        // JCS signs, and the Python kernel reads the same way (`_safe_integer`):
-        // JCS writes `3.0` as `3`, so a stated `3.0` is the integer 3 under the
-        // same wrapper signature. A value that is not a safe integer is malformed,
-        // with one sentence that prints no value, because the two kernels cannot
-        // print `2.5`, `1e400` or `9007199254740993` the same way.
+        // The tree walked must be the tree the checkpoint record signed (§5.1): an
+        // RFC 9162 audit path is valid at more than one (leaf_index, leaf_count),
+        // so a proof at (2, 3) would also verify as (1, 2). An unreadable signed
+        // count already failed its checkpoint. Numbers are read by value, as JCS
+        // signs them; a non-safe-integer is malformed, in a sentence that prints no
+        // value because the kernels cannot print it alike.
         const signedCount = cp ? signedLeafCount(cp) : null;
         if (incl && checkpointBound && cp) {
             const statedCount = safeInteger(incl.leaf_count);
@@ -963,18 +900,13 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             else {
                 try {
                     inclusionOk = await verifyInclusion(hexToBytes(incl.leaf_hash), statedIndex, statedCount, (incl.audit_path ?? []).map((h) => hexToBytes(h)), 
-                    // No `?? ""` fallback. A checkpoint that claims NO root must not be
-                    // handed an invented empty one: the Python kernel refuses the same
-                    // value and reports the decode failure, so substituting "" here had
-                    // the two kernels say different things about one bundle (TS: "the
-                    // proof did not reconstruct the checkpoint root", which is not what
-                    // happened: there was no claimed root to reconstruct).
+                    // No `?? ""` fallback: a checkpoint claiming no root must not be
+                    // handed an invented one.
                     hexToBytes(cp.merkle_root));
                     if (!inclusionOk)
                         evErrors.push("RFC 9162 inclusion proof did not reconstruct the checkpoint root");
-                    // Defense in depth: the claimed leaf_hash MUST be the hash of the
-                    // event's own signed envelope bytes (profile §6) — otherwise a valid
-                    // inclusion proof for an UNRELATED leaf could be smuggled in.
+                    // The claimed leaf_hash must hash the event's own signed envelope
+                    // (profile §6), or a proof for an unrelated leaf could be smuggled in.
                     const expectedLeaf = await leafHash(utf8(jcs(ev.envelope)));
                     const expectedLeafHex = toHex(expectedLeaf);
                     if (expectedLeafHex !== (incl.leaf_hash ?? "").toLowerCase()) {
@@ -987,10 +919,10 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 }
             }
         }
-        // Content (raw-log) binding — shared with every other event-carrying body.
         const contentRes = await verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, options.content);
         const contentOk = contentRes.contentOk;
         evErrors.push(...contentRes.errors);
+        agentItems.push(agentItem(ev, eventBytes, envelopeOk && payloadBindingOk === true && !eventBytesMalformed));
         eventResults.push({
             eventId,
             envelopeOk,
@@ -998,13 +930,9 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             inclusionOk,
             checkpointBound,
             contentOk,
-            // An event is "ok" when its envelope is authentic (signature + binding
-            // not-failed), its inclusion proof reconstructs the root, it binds to a
-            // present checkpoint, and its disclosed content did not MISMATCH. A
-            // withheld record or undisclosed content (binding/content null) does not
-            // fail it.
-            // `!eventBytesMalformed`: present-and-unreadable record bytes are a
-            // defect in the artifact, never a disclosure choice (proof#85).
+            // Ok when the envelope is authentic, inclusion reconstructs the root, the
+            // checkpoint is present, and disclosed content did not mismatch. Withheld
+            // or undisclosed content does not fail it; unreadable record bytes do.
             ok: envelopeOk &&
                 inclusionOk &&
                 checkpointBound &&
@@ -1012,15 +940,22 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 legacyError === null &&
                 !eventBytesMalformed,
             errors: evErrors,
+            agent: null,
+            envelopeFault: envelopeFaults[0] ?? null,
+            envelopeFaults,
+            recordNotJson: notJson !== undefined && envelopeOk && payloadBindingOk === true,
+            contentUnsigned: contentOk === false && contentRes.unsigned,
+            stampAbsent,
+            ownFormFailed: legacyError !== null || eventBytesMalformed,
         });
     }
-    // --- Step 5: optional on-chain re-fetch ------------------------------------
+    await attachAgentReadings(eventResults, agentItems);
+    // Step 5: optional on-chain re-fetch.
     const fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? globalThis.fetch;
     let gatewayUnavailable = false;
     let uncheckedKind = false;
     let uncheckedId = false;
-    // Simulated witnesses against witnesses of any other kind, counted over the
-    // checkpoints that name one, as `refetchStamps` counts stamps.
+    // Simulated witnesses against any other kind, as `refetchStamps` counts.
     let simulated = 0;
     let onChainKinds = 0;
     if (onChainChecked) {
@@ -1033,21 +968,11 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 const cp = byKey.get(cpr.checkpointRef);
                 if (!cp)
                     continue;
-                // A checkpoint with no anchor_ref has NOTHING to re-fetch. Under DL-52
-                // that is the normal state inside a stamp interval — placed, readable,
-                // not yet witnessed — so it reports as unreachable (which downgrades
-                // the run to partial) and NEVER as a mismatch. Treating "we never
-                // anchored it yet" as "the chain disagrees" would be the same false
-                // accusation this whole change is removing.
-                // proof#120. An `anchor_ref` that failed structural validation is not
-                // an absent one. Nothing was fetched, so the witness dimension is NOT
-                // CHECKED — `onChain: null`, exactly as when the caller supplied no
-                // adapter — and it must not raise `gatewayUnavailable`, which is what
-                // puts "could not be re-fetched from the supplied gateways" on the
-                // bundle. Reporting an outage nobody observed is a claim about the
-                // public record made out of a defect in the artifact, and verify-page
-                // renders it word for word. The run still fails: the structural error
-                // is already in `cpr.errors` and already in `ok` above.
+                // No `anchor_ref`: nothing to re-fetch. Absent (placed, not yet
+                // witnessed) reports as unreachable, downgrading the run to partial and
+                // never to a mismatch. Malformed reports as not checked (`onChain:
+                // null`) and must not raise `gatewayUnavailable`: no outage was
+                // observed, and the structural error already fails the run.
                 if (cpr.anchorRef === null && malformedAnchorRef.has(cpr)) {
                     cpr.onChain = null;
                     cpr.onChainOk = null;
@@ -1079,55 +1004,47 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                     uncheckedId = true;
                 if (outcome.error)
                     cpr.errors.push(outcome.error);
-                // Fold the on-chain dimension in: a MISMATCH (false) fails the
-                // checkpoint — the proof was not anchored as claimed. An UNREACHABLE
-                // gateway (null) leaves the offline-sound checkpoint ok; the run
-                // downgrades to "partial" (exit 3) via gatewayUnavailable, not a hard
-                // failure. A match (true) keeps it ok.
-                // AND into the verdict already computed, never rebuild it from a
-                // hand-listed set of dimensions. Rebuilding silently dropped every
-                // term not in that list: the duplicate-key gate (proof#28) and the
-                // `keyed.errors` term with it, so supplying a gateway turned a hard
-                // reject back into `verified` and an UNREACHABLE gateway turned it
-                // into `partial` (exit 3), which reads as a network problem an
-                // operator retries. Neither is conditioned on a gateway by the spec:
-                // `evidence-bundle.md` says two checkpoints carrying one key is a
-                // hard reject, full stop. Written this way, a term added at
-                // construction survives here by construction.
+                // A mismatch fails the checkpoint; unreachable leaves it ok and
+                // downgrades the run to partial. AND into the verdict already computed,
+                // never rebuild it, so every construction-time term (the duplicate-key
+                // gate included) survives.
                 cpr.ok = cpr.ok && cpr.onChainOk !== false;
             }
         }
     }
-    // --- Rollup ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    // Rollup.
     const allCheckpointsOk = checkpointResults.length > 0 && checkpointResults.every((c) => c.ok);
     const allEventsOk = eventResults.every((e) => e.ok);
-    const anyHardFailure = checkpointResults.some((c) => !c.ok) || eventResults.some((e) => !e.ok);
+    const anyHardFailure = checkpointResults.some((c) => !c.ok) || eventResults.some((e) => !e.ok && !unproven(e));
     const anyWithheldRecord = eventResults.some((e) => e.payloadBindingOk === null);
+    const anyStampAbsent = eventResults.some((e) => e.stampAbsent === true);
+    // A lookup that did not settle is the witness line's to say, never the status's: the
+    // witness is proven offline by the checkpoint and its inclusion proof, and only a lookup
+    // that finds other bytes (a hard failure above) moves anything.
+    pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, "checkpoints", {
+        unavailable: gatewayUnavailable,
+        kind: uncheckedKind,
+        id: uncheckedId,
+    });
+    // A checkpoint nobody has witnessed yet (no anchor_ref) is placed, not witnessed: the
+    // `witnessed` claim is not proven (evidence-bundle.md section 3), as for a stamp.
+    const anyUnwitnessed = checkpointResults.some((c) => c.anchorRef === null);
     let status;
     if (anyHardFailure) {
         status = "failed";
     }
-    else if (gatewayUnavailable || uncheckedKind || uncheckedId) {
-        // Every offline check passed and nothing MISMATCHED, but a requested
-        // on-chain confirmation could not be made — the bundle is offline-sound,
-        // its anchored state unconfirmed. "partial" + a note the CLI maps to exit 3.
-        status = "partial";
-        pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, "checkpoints", {
-            unavailable: gatewayUnavailable,
-            kind: uncheckedKind,
-            id: uncheckedId,
-        });
+    else if (anyUnwitnessed || anyStampAbsent || eventResults.some(unproven)) {
+        status = "incomplete";
     }
     else if (anyWithheldRecord) {
-        // Everything that COULD be checked passed; some record bytes were withheld
-        // so their semantic binding is undetermined (not a failure) — "partial".
-        status = "partial";
+        // Some record bytes were withheld, so their binding is not checked.
+        status = "incomplete";
     }
     else if (allCheckpointsOk && allEventsOk) {
         status = "verified";
     }
     else {
-        status = "partial";
+        status = "incomplete";
     }
     return {
         status,
@@ -1135,60 +1052,20 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         bodyHashOk: true,
         signatureOk: true,
         bodyType,
-        // A run whose only witnessed checkpoints are simulated looked nothing up
-        // on a chain, so it is not counted as checked on one (the stamp rule in
-        // `refetchStamps`). The checkpoints stay not checked and the run partial.
+        // Simulated-only witnesses looked nothing up on a chain, so the run is not
+        // counted as checked on one.
         onChainChecked: onChainChecked && !(simulated > 0 && onChainKinds === 0),
         checkpoints: checkpointResults,
         events: eventResults,
-        assertedStatus,
         errors,
     };
 }
-// ===========================================================================
-// `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` — the Sanning-signed interval stamp (§5.2, DL-58)
-//
-// ── What this can prove, and what it deliberately does not claim ──
-//
-// A stamp is not a producer artifact. Under DL-52 the customer signs an
-// envelope and POSTs it; the commitment is witnessed later, on an interval, by
-// a stamp the customer never sees and holds no key for. So there is no
-// producer signature inside this body to check, and — this is the part worth
-// being precise about — there is no SECOND Sanning signature either. The
-// control plane stores the stamp's canonical bytes and hands them to a witness
-// as a signed chain data item; the signature lives on the chain, not in the
-// `stamps` table and not in this body.
-//
-// What "Sanning signed this" means for a stamp bundle is therefore exactly the
-// WRAPPER signature, verified generically before this function is reached. And
-// what makes the stamp evidence rather than an assertion is the witness, which
-// is on a chain and not checkable offline. Hence the rollup below: a stamp we
-// can read but nobody has witnessed holds the bundle at `partial`.
-//
-// So the checkable surface here is the stamp's INTERNAL consistency against
-// the one authority in the bundle — the witnessed bytes:
-//
-//   1. `stamp_ref` is SHA-256 of the DECODED bytes (derived, not asserted).
-//   2. Those bytes parse and re-canonicalize to themselves under JCS.
-//   3. Their `stamp_version` is the one this body_type pins.
-//   4. Every sub-tree range accounts for exactly one leaf of the stamp.
-//
-// (4) is the one that carries customer weight. R-8's whole per-agent story is
-// "prove this agent was under evidence over window W", answered by a
-// contiguous `first_leaf`/`leaf_count` slice of the org tree. Ranges that do
-// not tile `[0, leaf_count)` describe a partition that does not exist, so a
-// slice claim resting on them is unfounded — and unlike a bad signature,
-// nothing else in the stack would ever notice.
-// ===========================================================================
-// A JSON object, as opposed to null, an array, a string or a number. Used at
-// every point where a nested field MUST be an object before any check of it
-// means anything: probing a verifier with a non-object asks a question about
-// something that was never the thing, and the answer must say so rather than
-// name a check that never ran (proof#76).
+// A JSON object, as opposed to null, an array, a string or a number. A nested
+// field must be one before any check of it means anything.
 function isJsonObject(v) {
     return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
 }
-/** Lowercase hex, even length, non-empty. The family's serialization rule. */
+/** Lowercase hex, even length, non-empty. */
 function isLowerHex(s, nibbles) {
     if (typeof s !== "string" || s.length === 0 || s.length % 2 !== 0)
         return false;
@@ -1197,54 +1074,29 @@ function isLowerHex(s, nibbles) {
     return /^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(s);
 }
 /**
- * A JSON number read BY VALUE as a non-negative safe integer, or null.
- * `safeInteger`, the reader every leaf count and leaf index in this kernel
- * goes through (A38), mirrored by `_non_neg_integer` in
- * `src/sanning_proof/evidence.py`. `Number.isInteger` alone accepted `1e+21`,
- * JCS's own spelling of a count past 2**53 - 1, which Python refused.
+ * A JSON number read by value as a non-negative safe integer, or null. Matches
+ * Python's `_non_neg_integer`; `Number.isInteger` alone would accept `1e+21`.
  */
 function nonNegInteger(n) {
     const v = safeInteger(n);
     return v !== null && v >= 0 ? v : null;
 }
-/**
- * Parse and check one stamp's witnessed bytes.
- *
- * Errors accumulate rather than short-circuit wherever a later check is still
- * meaningful, so a bundle with two independent defects reports two — a
- * verifier that stops at the first one turns a second fix into a second
- * round-trip.
- */
-// ===========================================================================
-// Disclosed-content binding, shared by every body that carries events.
-//
-// Extracted for `sanning.stamp.evidence/v2` (§5.3) rather than copied. The
-// rawLog -> content_hash link is the one step the chain
-// (content_hash -> record -> payload_hash -> signature -> leaf -> root) does
-// not otherwise cover, and a second copy of it is a second place for the
-// never-fail-on-absent discipline to drift. The rules are unchanged from the
-// anchor-trace path this came from: undetermined (null) when nothing is
-// disclosed or nothing is committed; false ONLY on a real mismatch or an
-// in-body vs side-input disagreement.
-// ===========================================================================
+// Disclosed-content binding, shared by every body that carries events. The
+// raw log to `content_hash` link is the one step the signature chain does not
+// cover. Undetermined (null) when nothing is disclosed or committed; false only
+// on a real mismatch or an in-body vs side-input disagreement.
 async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
     const evErrors = [];
     let contentOk = null;
-    // WHICH hash in the record is decided by the record's STRUCTURE
-    // (evidence-bundle §5.1 v1.19, A20). A record `envelope-spec.md` §4.1
-    // governs (`isHandoffNamespace`) commits to its message through
-    // `event.message_hash`, SHA-256 of `JCS(message object)`, and has no
-    // `content_hash`, so until A20 its disclosure bound to nothing and an honest
-    // hand-off pack could never grade `verified`. For such a record the committed
-    // hash is `event.message_hash` and nothing else: not a `content_hash` it also
-    // carries, and not the envelope's. It binds only when the record is a
-    // CONFORMANT hand-off record under the key that signed it
-    // (`isConformantHandoffRecord`) and the value is 64 characters of lowercase
-    // hex. Anything short of that commits nothing this reader will bind to, so
-    // the reading is undetermined and never true: a record dressed as a hand-off
-    // record gains no binding from the dress, and a record outside §4.1 keeps its
-    // `content_hash` exactly as before, whatever `message_hash` field it writes.
-    // The Python twin is `evidence._evaluate_content`.
+    // Whether a `false` rests on side bytes nobody signed: the side input checked alone, or
+    // side bytes that differ from in-body bytes that do not fail on their own.
+    let unsigned = false;
+    // Which hash binds depends on the record's structure (§5.1). A record §4.1
+    // governs commits through `event.message_hash` (SHA-256 of the message's
+    // JCS), and binds only when it is a conformant hand-off record and the value
+    // is 64 lowercase hex characters; otherwise the reading is undetermined, never
+    // true. Any other record binds through `content_hash`. Python's twin is
+    // `_evaluate_content`.
     const committed = [];
     let recordContentHash;
     let governed = false;
@@ -1277,8 +1129,8 @@ async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
             }
         }
         catch {
-            // record not JSON — the payload binding already reflects that; content
-            // stays undetermined rather than throwing.
+            // Record not JSON: the payload binding reflects that; content stays
+            // undetermined.
         }
     }
     if (governed) {
@@ -1289,9 +1141,8 @@ async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
         committed.push(recordContentHash);
     }
     else if (ev.envelope && typeof ev.envelope === "object") {
-        // Promoted fallback. Guarded: contentHashes() dereferences env.payload,
-        // which throws on a null/non-object envelope — a verifier must never raise
-        // on adversarial input.
+        // Promoted fallback, guarded: `contentHashes` would throw on a non-object
+        // envelope.
         for (const c of contentHashes(ev.envelope))
             committed.push(c.hash.toLowerCase());
     }
@@ -1301,6 +1152,8 @@ async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
     if (inBody !== undefined && side !== undefined && !bytesEqual(inBody, side)) {
         contentOk = false;
         evErrors.push("disclosed content disagreement: in-body events[].content and the supplied content differ");
+        // Unsigned unless the in-body bytes, which the wrapper signs, fail on their own.
+        unsigned = committed.length === 0 || committed.includes(await sha256Hex(inBody));
     }
     else {
         const disclosed = inBody ?? side;
@@ -1310,14 +1163,15 @@ async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
                 evErrors.push(governed
                     ? "disclosed content present but this hand-off record commits no " +
                         "message_hash a reader can bind to (not a conformant hand-off " +
-                        "record, or message_hash is not 64 lowercase hex) -- undetermined"
+                        "record, or message_hash is not 64 lowercase hex) -- not checked"
                     : "disclosed content present but no committed content_hash to bind to " +
-                        "(record withheld or record has no event.content_hash) -- undetermined");
+                        "(record withheld or record has no event.content_hash) -- not checked");
             }
         }
         else {
             const got = await sha256Hex(disclosed);
             contentOk = committed.includes(got);
+            unsigned = !contentOk && inBody === undefined;
             if (!contentOk) {
                 const fieldName = governed ? "message_hash" : "content_hash";
                 evErrors.push(`disclosed content does not match the committed ${fieldName}: ` +
@@ -1325,8 +1179,12 @@ async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
             }
         }
     }
-    return { contentOk, errors: evErrors };
+    return { contentOk, unsigned, errors: evErrors };
 }
+/**
+ * Parse and check one stamp's witnessed bytes. Errors accumulate wherever a
+ * later check still means something, so independent defects are all reported.
+ */
 async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
     const errors = [];
     const base = {
@@ -1351,7 +1209,7 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
         return { result: base };
     }
     const e = raw;
-    // --- the witnessed bytes, which are the only authority in this body -------
+    // The witnessed bytes are the only authority in this body.
     if (!isLowerHex(e.stamp_bytes)) {
         errors.push("stamp_bytes is missing or not lowercase hex");
         return { result: base };
@@ -1364,19 +1222,14 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
         errors.push(`stamp_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(err)}`);
         return { result: base };
     }
-    // Gated by `isLowerHex` above, so this is already the exact lowercase hex of
-    // the exact witnessed bytes — §5.2.2's "one authority in this body".
+    // Gated by `isLowerHex` above: already the exact witnessed bytes' hex (§5.2.2).
     const witnessedHex = e.stamp_bytes;
-    // --- the derived identity -------------------------------------------------
     const derived = await sha256Hex(bytes);
     if (typeof e.stamp_ref !== "string" || e.stamp_ref === "") {
         errors.push("stamp entry missing stamp_ref");
     }
     else if (e.stamp_ref.toLowerCase() !== derived) {
-        // The bytes were edited and the label was not — or the label was edited
-        // and the bytes were not. Either way the bundle names a stamp it is not
-        // carrying, and quoting that name to a witness would resolve to something
-        // else entirely.
+        // Bytes and label disagree: the bundle names a stamp it is not carrying.
         errors.push(`stamp_ref does not match SHA-256(stamp_bytes): claimed=${e.stamp_ref} derived=${derived}`);
     }
     else {
@@ -1390,7 +1243,6 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
             seen.add(derived);
         }
     }
-    // --- the body itself ------------------------------------------------------
     let body;
     try {
         const parsed = jcsParse(bytes);
@@ -1399,10 +1251,8 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
             return { result: base, witnessedHex };
         }
         body = parsed;
-        // Re-canonicalize and compare. The plane replays these bytes verbatim on
-        // every submit attempt for exactly this reason: a non-canonical body makes
-        // a retry a DIFFERENT submission, and makes every independent re-derivation
-        // of the stamp disagree with the one that was witnessed.
+        // Must re-canonicalize to itself: a non-canonical body makes every
+        // independent re-derivation disagree with what was witnessed.
         if (jcs(body) !== decodeUtf8Strict(bytes)) {
             errors.push("stamp_bytes are not JCS-canonical (RFC 8785)");
             return { result: base, witnessedHex };
@@ -1413,10 +1263,8 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
         return { result: base, witnessedHex };
     }
     if (body.stamp_version !== STAMP_BODY_VERSION) {
-        // A `sanning.stamp.trace/v1` body whose inner version is something else is
-        // two answers to one question inside one signature. The body_type is the
-        // reader's dispatch key and it said v1; honouring the other spelling is
-        // how a reader half-parses a shape it does not know.
+        // The inner version must match the body type: two answers inside one
+        // signature are rejected.
         errors.push(`unsupported stamp_version ${JSON.stringify(body.stamp_version ?? null)} in a ` +
             `${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body (expected ${STAMP_BODY_VERSION})`);
         return { result: base, witnessedHex };
@@ -1429,7 +1277,7 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
             base.bodyOk = false;
         }
         else if (f !== "org_ref" && !isRfc3339UtcInstant(body[f])) {
-            // §5.2 (A31): the promise window is the form `signed_at` pins.
+            // The promise window uses the form `signed_at` pins (§5.2).
             errors.push(`stamp body ${f} is not an RFC 3339 UTC date-time with Z naming a real date and time`);
             base.bodyOk = false;
         }
@@ -1451,27 +1299,23 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
     else {
         base.leafCount = stampCount;
     }
-    // --- the sub-tree ranges --------------------------------------------------
     base.subtreesOk = checkSubtrees(body, base, errors);
-    // A stamp needs no malformed/absent split: the §5.2 re-fetch path already
-    // leaves `onChain` null whenever there is no `AnchorRef`, so it never
-    // synthesised the outage proof#120 is about.
-    base.anchorRef = parseAnchorRef(e.anchor_ref, errors).ref;
+    // No malformed/absent split is needed: the re-fetch leaves `onChain` null
+    // whenever there is no `AnchorRef`.
+    const clean = errors.length === 0;
+    const parsedRef = parseAnchorRef(e.anchor_ref, errors);
+    base.anchorRef = parsedRef.ref;
     base.ok =
         base.stampRefOk && base.bodyOk && base.subtreesOk && errors.length === 0;
+    base.anchorRefMalformed =
+        parsedRef.malformed && clean && base.stampRefOk && base.bodyOk && base.subtreesOk;
     return { result: base, witnessedHex };
 }
 /**
- * The range arithmetic (§5.2), and the reason it is a hard check.
- *
- * `buildStampTree` orders a stamp's leaves agent-major, which is the only
- * reason `first_leaf` + `leaf_count` can describe an agent's slice at all: the
- * ranges partition `[0, leaf_count)` exactly, by construction. A body whose
- * ranges do not is either not a stamp this stack built or one built wrong, and
- * in both cases the per-agent claim the ranges exist to support is unfounded.
- *
- * The sum is checked BEFORE the tiling and reports its own message, so a body
- * that is merely short does not get filed under a gap it does not have.
+ * The range arithmetic (§5.2). Leaves are agent-major, so the ranges must
+ * partition `[0, leaf_count)` exactly, or the per-agent slice claims they
+ * support are unfounded. The sum is checked before the tiling so a short body
+ * is not reported as a gap.
  */
 function checkSubtrees(body, out, errors) {
     const raw = body.subtrees;
@@ -1494,9 +1338,8 @@ function checkSubtrees(body, out, errors) {
             errors.push(`sub-tree ${ref} first_leaf is not a non-negative integer`);
             shapeOk = false;
         }
-        // A zero-leaf sub-tree is not a slice of anything, and admitting one lets
-        // an arbitrary number of empty ranges sit inside a tiling that still adds
-        // up.
+        // A zero-leaf range is a slice of nothing, and empty ranges could pad a
+        // tiling that still adds up.
         if (subCount === null || subCount === 0) {
             errors.push(`sub-tree ${ref} leaf_count is not a positive integer`);
             shapeOk = false;
@@ -1521,9 +1364,7 @@ function checkSubtrees(body, out, errors) {
     const total = out.leafCount;
     if (total === null)
         return false; // already reported by the caller
-    // Summed exactly. Each count is a safe integer but their sum need not be,
-    // and a float sum past 2**53 prints a different number than Python's
-    // unbounded one in the sentence below.
+    // Summed exactly: the sum can pass 2**53 and must print as Python's does.
     const sum = subtrees.reduce((n, s) => n + BigInt(s.leafCount), 0n);
     if (sum !== BigInt(total)) {
         errors.push(`sub-tree leaf_count sum ${sum} does not equal the stamp's leaf_count ${total}`);
@@ -1540,7 +1381,19 @@ function checkSubtrees(body, out, errors) {
     }
     return true;
 }
-async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
+// `sanning.stamp.trace/v1`: the Sanning-signed interval stamp (§5.2).
+//
+// A stamp has no producer signature and no second Sanning signature in the
+// bundle: "Sanning signed this" is the wrapper signature, and the witness on a
+// chain is what makes it evidence. So an unwitnessed stamp holds the bundle at
+// `partial`. Offline, this checks the stamp against its witnessed bytes:
+//
+//   1. `stamp_ref` is SHA-256 of the decoded bytes.
+//   2. The bytes parse and re-canonicalize to themselves under JCS.
+//   3. Their `stamp_version` is the one this body type pins.
+//   4. The sub-tree ranges tile the stamp's leaves exactly: per-agent slice
+//      claims rest on that, and nothing else in the stack would notice.
+async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, errors, options) {
     const body = b.body;
     if (!Array.isArray(body?.stamps)) {
         return malformed(`${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[]`, true, true);
@@ -1553,46 +1406,34 @@ async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         stamps.push(outcome.result);
         witnessed.push(outcome.witnessedHex);
     }
-    // --- The optional on-chain re-fetch (§5.2.4's "online act") ---------------
-    //
-    // The SAME stamps[] array §5.3 carries, so it gets the same capability. The
-    // alternative — a stamp that can be re-fetched inside one body and not the
-    // other — asks every consumer to remember which wrapper it is holding before
-    // it can trust `onChain: null`, and that is exactly the kind of per-body
-    // exception a reader eventually gets wrong.
+    // The optional on-chain re-fetch (§5.2.4), shared with §5.3 so `onChain:
+    // null` means the same thing in both bodies.
     const { onChainChecked, gatewayUnavailable, uncheckedKind, uncheckedId } = await refetchStamps(stamps, witnessed, options, errors);
-    // --- Rollup ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    // Rollup.
     const anyHardFailure = stamps.some((s) => !s.ok);
     const anyUnwitnessed = stamps.some((s) => s.anchorRef === null);
+    // A lookup that did not settle is said here and moves nothing (the witness line says it).
+    pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, "stamps", {
+        unavailable: gatewayUnavailable,
+        kind: uncheckedKind,
+        id: uncheckedId,
+    });
     let status;
     if (anyHardFailure) {
         status = "failed";
     }
     else if (stamps.length === 0) {
-        // A bundle asserting nothing. Not a failure — nothing here is wrong — but
-        // it must never read `verified`, which a caller would take as a witness it
-        // does not have.
-        status = "partial";
+        // Asserts nothing: not a failure, but never `verified`.
+        status = "incomplete";
         errors.push(`${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body carries no stamps`);
     }
-    else if (gatewayUnavailable || uncheckedKind || uncheckedId || anyUnwitnessed) {
-        // Both hold the bundle at `partial`, and both get said — see §5.3's rollup
-        // for why one note is not enough when there are two different gaps.
-        status = "partial";
-        pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, "stamps", {
-            unavailable: gatewayUnavailable,
-            kind: uncheckedKind,
-            id: uncheckedId,
-        });
-        if (anyUnwitnessed) {
-            // The honest half of P-10, one layer up. A stamp with no `anchor_ref` is
-            // sealed and unwitnessed: `retained-by-sanning`, which is a statement
-            // about our coverage and never an accusation about their evidence. It is
-            // also not `verified`, because for a stamp the witness is the entire
-            // independent part — unlike an anchor-trace checkpoint, which still
-            // carries a producer signature and an inclusion proof that stand on
-            // their own offline.
-            errors.push("one or more stamps carries no anchor_ref — sealed by Sanning, witnessed by nobody");
+    else if (anyUnwitnessed) {
+        status = "incomplete";
+        {
+            // A stamp with no `anchor_ref` is sealed and unwitnessed: a statement
+            // about Sanning's coverage, never an accusation. Not `verified` either:
+            // for a stamp the witness is the whole independent part.
+            errors.push("one or more stamps carries no anchor_ref: sealed by Sanning, witnessed by nobody");
         }
     }
     else {
@@ -1607,32 +1448,21 @@ async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         onChainChecked,
         checkpoints: [],
         events: [],
-        assertedStatus,
         stamps,
         errors,
     };
 }
-// ===========================================================================
-// `sanning.stamp.evidence/v2`: the two halves, bound (evidence-bundle.md §5.3)
-//
-// The stamp half is §5.2's code unchanged (`verifyStampEntry`, which carries
-// the sub-tree partition check). The event half reuses the same primitives the
-// anchor-trace path uses — `verifyEnvelope`, `verifyInclusion`, `leafHash`,
-// `verifyDisclosedContent` — because a second copy of Merkle verification is a
-// second place for it to drift.
-//
-// What differs, and only this: the join. An event resolves `inclusion.stamp_ref`
-// to a stamps[] entry and walks its audit path to the root committed INSIDE
-// that stamp's witnessed bytes. There is no `merkle_root` field on the event to
-// read instead — repeating the root beside its own authoritative bytes would be
-// two answers to one question inside one signature (§5.1.2).
-// ===========================================================================
-async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
+// `sanning.stamp.evidence/v2`: both halves, bound (evidence-bundle.md §5.3).
+// The stamp half is `verifyStampEntry`; the event half reuses the anchor-trace
+// primitives. Only the join differs: an event resolves `inclusion.stamp_ref`
+// and walks to the root inside that stamp's witnessed bytes. There is no
+// `merkle_root` on the event, which would be a second answer (§5.1.2).
+async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, errors, options) {
     const body = b.body;
     if (!Array.isArray(body?.stamps) || !Array.isArray(body?.events)) {
         return malformed(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[] and events[]`, true, true);
     }
-    // --- The stamp half: §5.2's rules, §5.2's code ----------------------------
+    // The stamp half.
     const seen = new Set();
     const stamps = [];
     const witnessed = [];
@@ -1641,31 +1471,35 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
         stamps.push(outcome.result);
         witnessed.push(outcome.witnessedHex);
     }
-    // The join table. ONLY a stamp whose derived ref and witnessed bytes both
-    // checked out is joinable: a root read out of bytes that failed their own
-    // verification is not a root anyone should walk a proof to, and admitting one
-    // would let a broken stamp lend its authority to an event.
+    // Only a stamp whose derived ref and witnessed bytes both checked out is
+    // joinable: a failed stamp must not lend its root to an event.
     const byRef = new Map();
     for (const st of stamps) {
         if (st.stampRef && st.stampRefOk && st.bodyOk)
             byRef.set(st.stampRef, st);
     }
-    // --- The event half -------------------------------------------------------
+    // Every ref a stamp entry claims or derives. A ref outside it names a stamp the pack
+    // does not hold, which is a stamp missing, never a stamp proven wrong (section 5.3.3
+    // rule 1).
+    const heldRefs = new Set();
+    for (const st of stamps)
+        if (st.stampRef)
+            heldRefs.add(st.stampRef);
+    for (const raw of body.stamps) {
+        if (raw !== null && typeof raw === "object" && !Array.isArray(raw)) {
+            const claimed = raw.stamp_ref;
+            if (typeof claimed === "string")
+                heldRefs.add(claimed);
+        }
+    }
+    // The event half.
     const eventResults = [];
+    const agentItems = [];
     for (const rawEv of body.events) {
         const evErrors = [];
-        // A verifier must never RAISE on adversarial input — a caller handed a
-        // stack trace instead of a verdict cannot tell a malformed pack from a
-        // broken tool. `events[]` is attacker-shaped, so a null/non-object entry
-        // is coerced to an empty event and fails through the normal path, exactly
-        // as the Python kernel does. Found by adversarial review, not by the
-        // cross-kernel leg — whose cases did not include one, and now do.
+        // `events[]` is attacker-shaped; a verifier never raises on it.
         if (rawEv === null || typeof rawEv !== "object" || Array.isArray(rawEv)) {
-            // NOT an event. Graded and reported as such rather than coerced to an
-            // empty one: probing verifyEnvelope with nothing asks the envelope layer
-            // a question about an object that was never an envelope, and the two
-            // kernels answer it differently (undetermined vs failed) — a real
-            // divergence, but not this body's to resolve. Reported separately.
+            // Graded as not an event, never coerced to an empty one.
             eventResults.push({
                 eventId: "<unknown>",
                 envelopeOk: false,
@@ -1675,33 +1509,22 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
                 contentOk: null,
                 ok: false,
                 errors: ["events[] entry is not an object"],
+                agent: null,
             });
+            agentItems.push(null);
             continue;
         }
         const ev = rawEv;
         const eventId = getEventId(ev.envelope);
         let envelopeOk = false;
+        let envelopeFaults = [];
         let payloadBindingOk = null;
-        // A retired field name under this major is a reject, never an ignored
-        // unknown field: ignored, it reads as a withheld record (W-3).
+        // A retired field name is a reject: ignored, it would read as withheld.
         const legacyError = legacyEventBytesError(ev, "event", STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE);
         if (legacyError !== null)
             evErrors.push(legacyError);
-        // MALFORMED IS A FAILURE; ABSENT IS UNDETERMINED (proof#85).
-        //
-        // `event_bytes` that will not decode leaves `eventBytes` undefined, and an
-        // undefined `eventBytes` is exactly how a WITHHELD record is spelled one
-        // line down. So an event carrying garbage in place of its record used to
-        // reach the same tri-state as an event carrying nothing: `payloadHashOk`
-        // null, `ok` true, a leading tick on the line, and a `verified` rollup over
-        // a record nobody could read. The only thing wrong with the pack was the
-        // bytes, and it was the one thing the verdict did not say.
-        //
-        // A record the producer chose not to disclose is the customer exercising
-        // minimum disclosure. A record that is present and unreadable is a defect
-        // in the artifact, and this kernel's standing rule (the same one
-        // `checkpoints[]` already applies through `keyed.errors`) is that a defect
-        // we can see fails.
+        // Malformed is a failure; absent is undetermined. Undecodable `event_bytes`
+        // would otherwise look exactly like a withheld record and verify.
         let eventBytes;
         let eventBytesMalformed = false;
         try {
@@ -1712,24 +1535,20 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
             eventBytesMalformed = true;
             evErrors.push(`event event_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
-        const duplicate = recordDuplicateKey(eventBytes);
-        if (duplicate !== undefined) {
+        const notJson = recordNotJson(eventBytes);
+        if (notJson !== undefined) {
             eventBytesMalformed = true;
-            evErrors.push(`event record is not JSON: ${duplicate}`);
+            evErrors.push(notJson);
         }
         try {
             const res = await verifyEnvelope(ev.envelope, eventBytes !== undefined ? { payloadBytes: eventBytes } : {});
             const hexError = envelopeHexError("event", ev.envelope);
-            // tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            // Tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record).
             envelopeOk = res.ok && hexError === null;
+            envelopeFaults = eventEnvelopeFaults(res.faults, hexError);
             payloadBindingOk = res.payloadHashOk;
-            // P-10: report what could not be determined, never a fault that was never
-            // observed. There is no envelope here, so no signature was checked and no
-            // binding was attempted. "signature failed" named a check that never ran,
-            // and it was the only thing said about an event whose undetermined
-            // binding then rendered as a WITHHELD record, a claim about the
-            // producer's disclosure choice out of an input that says nothing about
-            // the producer at all (proof#76).
+            // No envelope, so no signature was checked: report it as malformed, not as
+            // a failed signature or a withheld record.
             if (!isJsonObject(ev.envelope)) {
                 evErrors.push("event envelope is not a JSON object");
             }
@@ -1741,11 +1560,12 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
             }
             if (res.payloadHashOk === false)
                 evErrors.push("event record does not bind to payload_hash");
-            // A malformed skeleton field fails the envelope with a valid signature
-            // and binding (proof#95), so without this the event fails with no reason.
+            // Name a malformed skeleton field, which fails an otherwise valid envelope.
             for (const m of res.errors)
                 if (m.startsWith("malformed "))
                     evErrors.push(`event envelope ${m}`);
+            if (res.errors.some((m) => m.startsWith("missing payload_hash")))
+                evErrors.push("event envelope missing payload_hash");
             const specFinding = specVersionFinding("event", ev.envelope, res);
             if (specFinding !== null)
                 evErrors.push(specFinding);
@@ -1753,16 +1573,15 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
         catch (e) {
             evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
-        // --- The join (§5.3.3 rule 1) -------------------------------------------
+        // The join (§5.3.3 rule 1).
         const incl = ev.inclusion;
         let st;
+        let stampAbsent = false;
         if (!incl || typeof incl !== "object") {
             evErrors.push("event missing inclusion proof");
         }
         else if (incl.checkpoint_ref !== undefined || incl.checkpoint_tx_id !== undefined) {
-            // One bundle speaks one vocabulary. An inclusion carrying an anchor-trace
-            // join key inside this body is a mixed bundle, and resolving it anyway is
-            // how an event silently binds to something nobody meant (§5.1.2).
+            // An anchor-trace join key inside this body is a mixed bundle (§5.1.2).
             evErrors.push(`event inclusion carries an anchor-trace join key in a ${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body`);
         }
         else if (typeof incl.stamp_ref !== "string") {
@@ -1770,24 +1589,22 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
         }
         else {
             st = byRef.get(incl.stamp_ref);
-            if (st === undefined) {
-                // Hard reject, never undetermined: without a resolved stamp the
-                // inclusion proof has no root to check against at all.
+            if (st === undefined && !heldRefs.has(incl.stamp_ref)) {
+                // The pack does not hold the stamp the record names: the inclusion has no root to
+                // check against, so `witnessed` is not proven (`missing`).
+                stampAbsent = true;
+                evErrors.push(`event inclusion.stamp_ref ${JSON.stringify(incl.stamp_ref)} names a stamp this pack does not hold`);
+            }
+            else if (st === undefined) {
                 evErrors.push(`event inclusion.stamp_ref ${JSON.stringify(incl.stamp_ref)} resolves to no verified stamp`);
             }
         }
         const stampBound = st !== undefined;
         let inclusionOk = false;
         if (incl && stampBound && st) {
-            // Rule 3: the tree walked must be the tree the stamp committed to. A
-            // proof walked against a different leaf_count is a proof about a
-            // different tree, and RFC 9162's path shape depends on the size.
-            //
-            // Read BY VALUE, as the anchor-trace path reads them (A38), and as the
-            // Python kernel does (`_safe_integer`): the wrapper signs JCS(body),
-            // which writes `3.0` as `3`, so a stated `3.0` is 3 under the same
-            // signature. Anything that is not a safe integer is malformed, with a
-            // sentence that prints no value.
+            // Rule 3: the tree walked must be the tree the stamp committed to; RFC
+            // 9162's path shape depends on the size. Read by value, as JCS signs it
+            // (`3.0` is 3); anything not a safe integer is malformed.
             const statedCount = safeInteger(incl.leaf_count);
             const statedIndex = safeInteger(incl.leaf_index);
             if (statedCount === null) {
@@ -1806,9 +1623,7 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
                     if (!inclusionOk) {
                         evErrors.push("RFC 9162 inclusion proof did not reconstruct the stamp root");
                     }
-                    // Defense in depth, as §5.1: the claimed leaf MUST be this event's
-                    // own signed envelope bytes, or a valid proof for an UNRELATED leaf
-                    // could be smuggled in.
+                    // As §5.1: the claimed leaf must be this event's own signed envelope.
                     const expectedLeafHex = toHex(await leafHash(utf8(jcs(ev.envelope))));
                     if (expectedLeafHex !== (incl.leaf_hash ?? "").toLowerCase()) {
                         inclusionOk = false;
@@ -1823,16 +1638,16 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
         const contentRes = await verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, options.content);
         const contentOk = contentRes.contentOk;
         evErrors.push(...contentRes.errors);
+        agentItems.push(agentItem(ev, eventBytes, envelopeOk && payloadBindingOk === true && !eventBytesMalformed));
         eventResults.push({
             eventId,
             envelopeOk,
             payloadBindingOk,
             inclusionOk,
-            // Named for §5.1's join; here it reports whether `stamp_ref` resolved.
+            // Here: whether `stamp_ref` resolved.
             checkpointBound: stampBound,
             contentOk,
-            // `!eventBytesMalformed`: present-and-unreadable record bytes are a
-            // defect in the artifact, never a disclosure choice (proof#85).
+            // Unreadable record bytes are a defect, never a disclosure choice.
             ok: envelopeOk &&
                 inclusionOk &&
                 stampBound &&
@@ -1840,49 +1655,48 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
                 legacyError === null &&
                 !eventBytesMalformed,
             errors: evErrors,
+            agent: null,
+            envelopeFault: envelopeFaults[0] ?? null,
+            envelopeFaults,
+            recordNotJson: notJson !== undefined && envelopeOk && payloadBindingOk === true,
+            contentUnsigned: contentOk === false && contentRes.unsigned,
+            stampAbsent,
+            ownFormFailed: legacyError !== null || eventBytesMalformed,
         });
     }
-    // --- The optional on-chain re-fetch (§5.2.4's "online act") ---------------
+    await attachAgentReadings(eventResults, agentItems);
+    // The optional on-chain re-fetch (§5.2.4).
     const { onChainChecked, gatewayUnavailable, uncheckedKind, uncheckedId } = await refetchStamps(stamps, witnessed, options, errors);
-    // --- Rollup ---------------------------------------------------------------
-    // Rule 4: a declared event MUST be checked. `events[]` present and unverified
-    // is the false green this body exists to prevent, so an event that did not
-    // verify fails the bundle — it is never rolled up as verified.
-    const anyHardFailure = stamps.some((st) => !st.ok) || eventResults.some((e) => !e.ok);
+    // Rollup. Rule 4: a declared event must be checked, so an event that did
+    // not verify fails the bundle.
+    const anyHardFailure = stamps.some((st) => !st.ok) || eventResults.some((e) => !e.ok && !unproven(e));
     const anyUnwitnessed = stamps.some((st) => st.anchorRef === null);
+    const anyStampAbsent = eventResults.some((e) => e.stampAbsent === true);
+    pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, "stamps", {
+        unavailable: gatewayUnavailable,
+        kind: uncheckedKind,
+        id: uncheckedId,
+    });
     let status;
     if (anyHardFailure) {
         status = "failed";
     }
     else if (stamps.length === 0 && eventResults.length === 0) {
-        status = "partial";
+        status = "incomplete";
         errors.push(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body carries no stamps and no events`);
     }
-    else if (eventResults.length === 0 ||
-        gatewayUnavailable ||
-        uncheckedKind ||
-        uncheckedId ||
-        anyUnwitnessed) {
-        // Each holds the bundle at `partial`, and EACH gets said. A pack with no
-        // events, a stamp nobody witnessed and a witness we could not reach are
-        // different gaps with different fixes, and an auditor told only about one
-        // would read the others as fine. The order is fixed so the two kernels
-        // emit the same list.
-        status = "partial";
+    else if (eventResults.length === 0 || anyUnwitnessed || anyStampAbsent || eventResults.some(unproven)) {
+        // Each gap holds the bundle at `incomplete` and each is named, in a fixed order
+        // so both kernels emit the same list.
+        status = "incomplete";
         if (eventResults.length === 0) {
-            // §5.3.2: an events-empty body is exactly a §5.2 stamp trace, and is
-            // partial, never verified. It says nothing about any event.
+            // Section 5.3.2: an events-empty body is a section 5.2 stamp trace: incomplete, never
+            // verified.
             errors.push(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body carries no events -- it evidences no event, only its stamps`);
         }
-        pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, "stamps", {
-            unavailable: gatewayUnavailable,
-            kind: uncheckedKind,
-            id: uncheckedId,
-        });
         if (anyUnwitnessed) {
-            // §5.3.3 rule 6, inherited whole from §5.2.4: for a stamp the witness IS
-            // the independent part, so the events resting on it inherit `partial`.
-            errors.push("one or more stamps carries no anchor_ref — sealed by Sanning, witnessed by nobody");
+            // Section 5.3.3 rule 6: events resting on an unwitnessed stamp inherit `incomplete`.
+            errors.push("one or more stamps carries no anchor_ref: sealed by Sanning, witnessed by nobody");
         }
     }
     else {
@@ -1897,44 +1711,16 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
         onChainChecked,
         checkpoints: [],
         events: eventResults,
-        assertedStatus,
         stamps,
         errors,
     };
 }
 /**
  * The optional on-chain re-fetch over `stamps[]`, shared by §5.2 and §5.3.
- *
- * ── Why the results land on `stamps[]` and `checkpoints` stays empty ──
- *
- * A stamp body carries no checkpoints. Synthesising `CheckpointResult`s to
- * carry these outcomes would make a stamp indistinguishable from a checkpoint
- * in every consumer that reads `checkpoints[]` — the exact conflation §5.2.1
- * and §5.3.1 refused twice, most sharply in "a Sanning attestation
- * indistinguishable on the wire from a producer's". They are different
- * artifacts with different signers and different meanings when absent, and a
- * reader must never have to guess which one it is holding. So the stamp
- * results go on the stamps, and `checkpoints: []` keeps saying the true thing:
- * this body has none.
- *
- * ── Why an unwitnessed stamp gets `onChain: null` and NOT all-unreachable ──
- *
- * The anchor-trace path synthesises an all-`unreachable` result for a
- * checkpoint with no `anchor_ref`. That is not copied here, for two reasons.
- *
- * It would be untrue: nothing was asked of any gateway, so reporting that
- * every gateway failed to answer invents a network event. "Not checked" and
- * "we asked and nobody answered" are different facts, and collapsing them is
- * precisely the defect that had a surface reporting an unreachable gateway
- * when it had contacted none.
- *
- * And it would be load-bearing in the wrong direction. Over there the
- * synthesis exists to drive `gatewayUnavailable`, which is what downgrades that
- * run to `partial`. Here §5.2.4 already downgrades an unwitnessed stamp to
- * `partial` on its own, with a better error. Copying the synthesis would add
- * nothing to the status, which is `partial` either way, and would add an
- * unreachable-gateway note for a network event that never happened, based on
- * nothing but whether the caller happened to pass a gateway list.
+ * Results land on the stamps and `checkpoints` stays empty: a stamp must never
+ * be mistaken for a producer checkpoint. An unwitnessed stamp gets `onChain:
+ * null`, not a synthesized all-unreachable result: no gateway was asked, and
+ * §5.2.4 already holds it at `partial`.
  */
 async function refetchStamps(stamps, witnessed, options, errors) {
     const gateways = options.gateways ?? [];
@@ -1955,8 +1741,7 @@ async function refetchStamps(stamps, witnessed, options, errors) {
     for (let i = 0; i < stamps.length; i++) {
         const st = stamps[i];
         const witnessedHex = witnessed[i];
-        // No witness named, or bytes we could not read: nothing to re-fetch, and
-        // nothing a gateway could confirm or deny. Left as `onChain: null`.
+        // No witness named, or unreadable bytes: nothing to re-fetch.
         if (st.anchorRef === null || witnessedHex === undefined)
             continue;
         if (st.anchorRef.kind === SIMULATED_WITNESS_KIND)
@@ -1974,22 +1759,13 @@ async function refetchStamps(stamps, witnessed, options, errors) {
             uncheckedId = true;
         if (outcome.error)
             st.errors.push(outcome.error);
-        // Fold the on-chain dimension in exactly as a checkpoint does: a MISMATCH
-        // (false) fails the stamp — the chain does not hold what the bundle says
-        // was witnessed. UNREACHABLE (null) leaves an offline-sound stamp ok and
-        // downgrades the run to `partial` via gatewayUnavailable. A confirm (true)
-        // changes nothing that was not already true offline.
-        //
-        // `st.ok` is kept and narrowed rather than recomputed: its offline form
-        // includes `errors.length === 0`, and re-evaluating that AFTER pushing an
-        // unreachable note would fail a stamp for a gateway being down.
+        // As for a checkpoint: a mismatch fails the stamp, unreachable downgrades
+        // the run to `partial`. Narrowed, not recomputed, so an unreachable note
+        // does not fail the stamp.
         st.ok = st.ok && st.onChainOk !== false;
     }
-    // A simulated witness is a sandbox plane's stand-in for a chain: there is no
-    // chain to look it up on, so it is never counted as checked on one.
-    // It stays not checked like any kind this verifier has no adapter for, and
-    // the run stays undetermined; what changes is that a run whose only
-    // witnesses are simulated no longer says it checked anything on a chain.
+    // A simulated witness has no chain to look up, so it is never counted as
+    // checked on one; the run stays undetermined.
     if (simulated > 0 && onChainKinds === 0) {
         return { onChainChecked: false, gatewayUnavailable, uncheckedKind, uncheckedId };
     }
@@ -2001,24 +1777,17 @@ async function refetchStamps(stamps, witnessed, options, errors) {
  * on a chain.
  */
 export const SIMULATED_WITNESS_KIND = "simulated";
-// How many `sanning.evidence.export/v2` wrappers deep the source bundle may be
-// nested before this path gives up. verifyEvidenceBundle's canonicalization
-// depth bound already rejects a pathological bundle, but the unwrap must be
-// independently bounded rather than trusting that it ran first.
+// How many export wrappers deep the source bundle may nest. Bounded here
+// independently of the canonicalization depth bound.
 const MAX_EXPORT_UNWRAP = 4;
 /**
- * Materialize the disclosed raw bytes of a received bundle (evidence-bundle §5.1).
+ * Materialize the disclosed raw bytes of a received bundle (evidence-bundle.md
+ * §5.1). The bundle is verified with {@link verifyEvidenceBundle}, and an
+ * event's bytes are returned only when that verification bound them to the
+ * committed `content_hash`.
  *
- * Verify-then-return: the bundle is verified with {@link verifyEvidenceBundle}
- * (same options — gateways, out-of-band `content`, `fetchImpl`), and an event's
- * bytes are returned ONLY when that verification bound them to the committed
- * `content_hash`. There is no path through this function that yields bytes
- * whose SHA-256 is not the commitment.
- *
- * Returns `Uint8Array`, never a string: the spec commits to raw bytes, and a
- * UTF-8 decode is lossy for any payload that is not valid UTF-8 — re-encoding
- * such a string would produce different bytes and a different hash. Callers who
- * know their payload is text decode it themselves and own that assumption.
+ * Returns `Uint8Array`, never a string: a UTF-8 decode is lossy and would
+ * change the hash.
  */
 export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
     const verification = await verifyEvidenceBundle(bundle, options);
@@ -2039,11 +1808,9 @@ export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
             `(body_type ${JSON.stringify(verification.bodyType)})`);
         return empty();
     }
-    // Fail closed on any drift between the body we are decoding and the results
-    // we are trusting. Both must be the same events in the same order, or the
-    // "these bytes are the bytes that verified" guarantee is void — which is the
-    // only guarantee this function makes. A broken wrapper lands here too:
-    // verifyEvidenceBundle returns zero event results, so nothing is emitted.
+    // Fail closed unless the decoded body and the trusted results are the same
+    // events in the same order. A broken wrapper yields zero results, so nothing
+    // is emitted.
     if (traceEvents.length !== verification.events.length) {
         errors.push("the bundle did not verify far enough to materialize content: " +
             `${verification.events.length} verified event result(s) for ${traceEvents.length} body event(s)`);
@@ -2066,17 +1833,15 @@ export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
         const evErrors = [];
         let status;
         if (!res.ok || res.contentOk === false) {
-            // The event itself is not trustworthy (bad signature, broken inclusion,
-            // unbound checkpoint) or its disclosure contradicts the commitment.
+            // The event is not trustworthy, or its disclosure contradicts the commitment.
             status = "failed";
             evErrors.push(res.contentOk === false
-                ? "disclosed content does not bind to the committed content_hash — withheld"
-                : "the event's own proof chain did not verify — nothing here is safe to materialize");
+                ? "disclosed content does not bind to the committed content_hash; withheld"
+                : "the event's own proof chain did not verify; nothing here is safe to materialize");
             evErrors.push(...res.errors);
         }
         else if (!selection.offered) {
-            // Minimal disclosure: the committed hash is there, the bytes are not.
-            // Distinct from empty bytes, and never an error.
+            // Minimal disclosure: distinct from empty bytes, and never an error.
             status = "not_disclosed";
         }
         else if (bytes === undefined) {
@@ -2085,11 +1850,9 @@ export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
             evErrors.push(...selection.errors);
         }
         else if (res.contentOk !== true) {
-            // Disclosed and decodable, but there is no commitment to check it against
-            // (withheld record, or a record committing no content_hash). Unbound
-            // bytes are exactly what a consumer must not silently write out.
+            // Nothing to check the bytes against: unbound bytes must not be written.
             status = "undetermined";
-            evErrors.push("disclosed bytes are not bound to any committed content_hash — withheld rather than returned");
+            evErrors.push("disclosed bytes are not bound to any committed content_hash; withheld rather than returned");
             evErrors.push(...res.errors);
         }
         else {
@@ -2099,7 +1862,7 @@ export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
         if (verified) {
             if (content.has(res.eventId)) {
                 errors.push(`duplicate event_id ${JSON.stringify(res.eventId)}: the content map keeps the first ` +
-                    "occurrence — read events[] for every event");
+                    "occurrence; read events[] for every event");
             }
             else {
                 content.set(res.eventId, bytes);
@@ -2114,21 +1877,12 @@ export async function disclosedContent(bundle, options = {}) {
     }
     return { status: verification.status, verification, events, content, errors };
 }
-// The events a bundle carries, unwrapping any evidence-export wrapper(s) to
-// the inline source bundle — mirroring how verifyEvidenceBundle recurses into
-// `source_bundle`, so the events line up with its results.
-// `undefined` when the bundle carries no events this reader understands, which
-// a caller must distinguish from a body that has events and no links.
-//
-// BOTH event-carrying bodies, not just anchor-trace (proof#73): §5.3's
-// `sanning.stamp.evidence/v2` is the hand-over pack, and it presents the same
-// event shape.
-//
-// Exported for `chain.ts`, which needs the same descent and must not derive it
-// again: two answers to "which events is this bundle actually about" inside one
-// kernel is two implementations of one rule, and the one that drifted would be
-// the one nobody was looking at. Deliberately NOT re-exported from `index.ts` —
-// same posture as `side-content.ts`, internal and shared.
+// The events a bundle carries, through any export wrappers to the inline
+// source, as `verifyEvidenceBundle` recurses, so they line up with its results.
+// Both event-carrying bodies (anchor trace and §5.3 stamp evidence). `undefined`
+// when the bundle carries no events this reader understands. Exported for
+// `chain.ts`, so there is one answer to which events a bundle is about; not
+// re-exported from `index.ts`.
 export function resolveTraceEvents(bundle) {
     let cur = bundle;
     for (let depth = 0; depth < MAX_EXPORT_UNWRAP; depth++) {
@@ -2136,14 +1890,6 @@ export function resolveTraceEvents(bundle) {
             return undefined;
         const b = cur;
         const bodyType = typeof b.body_type === "string" ? b.body_type : null;
-        // Both event-carrying bodies, not just anchor-trace (proof#73). §5.3's
-        // `sanning.stamp.evidence/v2` presents the SAME event shape (a
-        // producer-signed envelope, optional `event_bytes`, an inclusion proof),
-        // and it is the HAND-OVER PACK: the only artifact an auditor is ever
-        // handed. Dispatching on anchor-trace alone meant `readChains` reported
-        // zero chains on every pack, however well-formed the links inside its
-        // records were, so "is it in order?" read as NOT CHECKED on the one shape
-        // that matters. The writers have been emitting those links the whole time.
         if (bodyType === ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE ||
             bodyType === STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE) {
             const body = b.body;
@@ -2160,20 +1906,15 @@ export function resolveTraceEvents(bundle) {
     }
     return undefined;
 }
-// ===========================================================================
-// Attested-evidence-export verification (evidence-export.md §5, steps 3–9).
-// Reached from verifyEvidenceBundle AFTER the wrapper (Ed25519 issuer signature
-// + body_hash) has already verified (steps 1–2). This composes the existing
-// evidence path (recompute the inline source verdict) with the one new
-// primitive (embedded RSA-PSS operator attestations, verifyRsaPssSha256).
-// ===========================================================================
-async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
-    // Malformed-as-an-export (§5 exit 2): a required field is missing or a key is
-    // unparseable — the wrapper verified, but no verdict can be rendered. The
-    // wrapper fields stay true (they DID verify) for any consumer that inspects
-    // them; the CLI's malformed branch shows the errors and exits 2.
+// Attested-evidence-export verification (evidence-export.md §5, steps 3 to 9),
+// reached after the wrapper verified. Recomputes the inline source verdict and
+// checks the embedded RSA-PSS operator attestations.
+async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, errors, options) {
+    // The wrapper verified but no verdict can be rendered: unreadable as an export.
+    // The wrapper fields stay true, because they did verify.
     const exportMalformed = (error) => ({
-        status: "malformed",
+        status: "incomplete",
+        unreadable: true,
         specVersionOk,
         bodyHashOk: true,
         signatureOk: true,
@@ -2181,7 +1922,6 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         onChainChecked: false,
         checkpoints: [],
         events: [],
-        assertedStatus,
         errors: [...errors, error],
     });
     const body = b.body;
@@ -2199,14 +1939,13 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         Array.isArray(body.kernel_verdict)) {
         return exportMalformed("export body missing kernel_verdict");
     }
-    // --- Step 3: source-bundle linkage ----------------------------------------
+    // Step 3: source-bundle linkage.
     const inline = body.source_bundle;
     if (inline === undefined || inline === null) {
-        // source_bundle_ref (out-of-line) is not verifiable on a network-isolated
-        // machine unless the referenced bytes are co-delivered — the source-
-        // dependent checks are UNDETERMINED (exit 3), NOT a failure (§5 step 3).
+        // An out-of-line source is not verifiable offline unless co-delivered: the
+        // source-dependent checks are not checked, never failed.
         return {
-            status: "partial",
+            status: "incomplete",
             specVersionOk,
             bodyHashOk: true,
             signatureOk: true,
@@ -2214,11 +1953,10 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
             onChainChecked: false,
             checkpoints: [],
             events: [],
-            assertedStatus,
             errors: [
                 ...errors,
-                "source_bundle is not inline (source_bundle_ref) — bytes unavailable offline; " +
-                    "source-dependent checks undetermined",
+                "source_bundle is not inline (source_bundle_ref): bytes unavailable offline; " +
+                    "source-dependent checks not checked",
             ],
         };
     }
@@ -2233,80 +1971,65 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
     catch (e) {
         errors.push(`source_bundle canonicalization failed${thrownDetail(e)}`);
     }
-    // --- Step 4: recompute the source verdict ---------------------------------
-    // The existing evidence path over the inline source bundle — same primitives
-    // (Ed25519 envelopes, payload binding, RFC 9162 inclusion, merkle roots,
-    // content_ok, and the optional per-gateway on-chain re-fetch, §4.2 / step 7).
+    // Step 4: recompute the source verdict, including the optional re-fetch.
     const sourceResult = await verifyExportSource(inline, options);
-    // Attestation data_hash binding (§5 6c).
+    // For the attestation data_hash binding (§5 step 6c).
     const sourceCheckpoints = await indexSourceCheckpoints(inline);
-    // --- Step 6: embedded attestation records ---------------------------------
+    // Step 6: embedded attestation records.
     const attestations = [];
     for (const rec of body.attestations) {
         const r = await verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints);
         if (r.malformed !== undefined)
             return exportMalformed(r.malformed);
+        if (typeof r.result.fieldError === "string")
+            errors.push(r.result.fieldError);
         attestations.push(r.result);
     }
-    // --- Build the recomputed §4 verdict object -------------------------------
     const verdict = buildVerdictObject(sourceResult, attestations);
     if (typeof b.generated_at === "string")
         verdict.as_of = b.generated_at;
-    // --- Step 5: verdict agreement (DETERMINISTIC dimensions only) ------------
-    // The cached body.kernel_verdict is recompute-don't-trust (principle 3). But
-    // agreement compares ONLY the deterministic, offline-recomputable dimensions:
-    // per-event signature/payload-binding/inclusion/content, per-checkpoint
-    // merkle roots, and per-attestation signature/operator-address/data_hash
-    // binding. The on-chain per-gateway dimension is environment/time-dependent —
-    // the issuer observed it online at compose time; an offline verifier
-    // legitimately sees `null` — so it is INFORMATIONAL and MUST NOT by itself
-    // trigger an exit-1 tamper verdict (the verifier's own on-chain outcomes fold
-    // in at step 7 only if it re-fetches). Advisory rollups (status / counts /
-    // summary / as_of / custody_chain) are derived, not compared. See the §5
-    // step-5 erratum flagged in the slice report.
+    // Step 5: the cached `kernel_verdict` is never trusted, and agreement compares
+    // only the deterministic, offline-recomputable dimensions. The on-chain
+    // dimension depends on when and where it was observed, so it must not by
+    // itself read as tamper. Derived rollups are not compared.
     let verdictAgreementOk = false;
     try {
         const cached = projectVerdictForAgreement(body.kernel_verdict);
         const fresh = projectVerdictForAgreement(verdict);
-        toleratePreA20Content(cached, fresh, sourceEventsGoverned(inline));
+        tolerateUnboundMessageContent(cached, fresh, sourceEventsGoverned(inline));
         const cachedProjection = jcs(cached);
         const freshProjection = jcs(fresh);
         verdictAgreementOk = cachedProjection === freshProjection;
         if (!verdictAgreementOk) {
             errors.push("recomputed verdict disagrees with the cached kernel_verdict " +
-                "(deterministic dimensions) — recompute-don't-trust");
+                "(deterministic dimensions); recompute-don't-trust");
         }
     }
     catch (e) {
         errors.push(`verdict agreement comparison failed${thrownDetail(e)}`);
     }
-    // --- Step 7 already folded in by the source recompute ---------------------
-    // (verifyEvidenceBundle merged per-gateway outcomes into sourceResult.status:
-    // a checkpoint `mismatch` made it "failed"; an all-`unreachable` checkpoint
-    // made it "partial" + an unreachable note → exit 3.)
-    // Propagate the source recompute's notes so the auditor — and the CLI's
-    // exit-3 detection (which keys off "unreachable") — see them.
+    // Step 7 is already folded into `sourceResult.status` by the source recompute.
+    // The CLI's exit-3 detection keys off "unreachable" in these notes.
     for (const e of sourceResult.errors)
         errors.push(`source: ${e}`);
-    // --- Step 9: export rollup + exit -----------------------------------------
+    // Step 9: export rollup.
     const anyAttestationFailed = attestations.some((a) => !a.ok);
     let status;
     if (!sourceLinkageOk ||
         !verdictAgreementOk ||
         sourceResult.status === "failed" ||
-        sourceResult.status === "malformed" ||
+        sourceResult.unreadable === true ||
         anyAttestationFailed) {
         status = "failed";
     }
-    else if (sourceResult.status === "partial") {
-        // Undetermined source (a withheld record, or an unreachable gateway):
-        // exit 3 either way since 0.13.0. Never a failure.
-        status = "partial";
+    else if (sourceResult.status === "incomplete") {
+        // A source not fully checked (a withheld record). Never a failure.
+        status = "incomplete";
     }
     else {
         status = "verified";
     }
-    // The DISPLAYED verdict reflects the full recompute (incl. attestations).
+    // The displayed verdict reflects the full recompute, attestations included.
     verdict.status = status;
     verdict.summary = summarizeExport(status, sourceResult, attestations);
     return {
@@ -2316,11 +2039,9 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         signatureOk: true,
         bodyType: EXPORT_BODY_TYPE,
         onChainChecked: sourceResult.onChainChecked,
-        // The top-level per-checkpoint / per-event results ARE the recomputed source
-        // results, so the CLI's existing rendering shows them unchanged.
+        // The recomputed source results, so the CLI renders them unchanged.
         checkpoints: sourceResult.checkpoints,
         events: sourceResult.events,
-        assertedStatus,
         export: {
             sourceLinkageOk,
             sourceStatus: sourceResult.status,
@@ -2328,38 +2049,39 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
             attestations,
             verdict,
             status,
+            // A source whose own wrapper time breaks its format is a source that does not follow
+            // its format, as one that cannot be read is.
+            sourceUnreadable: (sourceResult.unreadable === true || sourceResult.generatedAtMalformed === true) && sourceLinkageOk,
         },
         errors,
     };
 }
 export async function recomputeExportVerdict(sourceBundle, attestationRecords, generatedAt, options = {}) {
     const sourceResult = await verifyExportSource(sourceBundle, options);
-    // Attestation data_hash binding (§5 6c) — the SAME index construction as
-    // verifyExportBody, deliberately shared rather than restated.
+    // The same index `verifyExportBody` builds (§5 step 6c).
     const sourceCheckpoints = await indexSourceCheckpoints(sourceBundle);
     const attestations = [];
     for (const rec of attestationRecords) {
         const r = await verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints);
-        if (r.malformed !== undefined) {
-            throw new Error(`attestation record is malformed: ${r.malformed}`);
+        const malformedField = r.malformed ?? r.result.fieldError ?? undefined;
+        if (malformedField !== undefined) {
+            throw new Error(`attestation record is malformed: ${malformedField}`);
         }
         attestations.push(r.result);
     }
     const verdict = buildVerdictObject(sourceResult, attestations);
     verdict.as_of = generatedAt;
-    // Export rollup (§5 step 9). Source linkage and verdict agreement are always
-    // satisfied at compose time (the composer computes the source hash itself and
-    // there is no prior cached verdict to disagree with), so the only failure
-    // inputs here are the recomputed source status and any failed attestation.
+    // Linkage and agreement always hold at compose time, so only the source
+    // status and the attestations can fail the rollup.
     const anyAttestationFailed = attestations.some((a) => !a.ok);
     let status;
     if (sourceResult.status === "failed" ||
-        sourceResult.status === "malformed" ||
+        sourceResult.unreadable === true ||
         anyAttestationFailed) {
         status = "failed";
     }
-    else if (sourceResult.status === "partial") {
-        status = "partial";
+    else if (sourceResult.status === "incomplete") {
+        status = "incomplete";
     }
     else {
         status = "verified";
@@ -2368,19 +2090,10 @@ export async function recomputeExportVerdict(sourceBundle, attestationRecords, g
     verdict.summary = summarizeExport(status, sourceResult, attestations);
     return { verdict, sourceStatus: sourceResult.status, status, attestations };
 }
-// Verify one embedded attestation record (§5 step 6a–d). Returns `malformed`
-// (→ exit 2) for an unparseable RSA key / signature hex or a missing required
-// field; otherwise a per-dimension AttestationResult whose `ok` gates on the
-// three binding checks (sig / operator-address / data_hash). subject_ref is
-// undetermined-tolerant and never gates.
-// The attestation payload fields evidence-export.md §3.1 marks Required, with
-// the type it gives each. A record whose payload lacks one, or carries another
-// type (null included), is malformed: §5 step 9 and §4.5 make "a missing
-// required field" an export the verifier cannot render (exit 2). §5 step 6
-// gates a WELL-FORMED record on signature, operator and data_hash only; these
-// checks decide whether the record is well-formed at all. `level` is the §3.1
-// enum 1 | 2 | 3. The integers are non-negative and within 2**53 - 1 (the
-// §3.1 clarification).
+// The payload fields evidence-export.md section 3.1 requires, with their types. Read only
+// under a signature that verifies: a record then missing one, or carrying another type
+// (null included), is one the issuer signed that does not follow its format (section 4.5,
+// `follows_rules` disproven). `level` is 1, 2 or 3; integers are non-negative safe integers.
 const PAYLOAD_REQUIRED = [
     ["attested_at", "string"],
     ["tx_id", "string"],
@@ -2408,7 +2121,6 @@ function payloadFieldError(payload) {
             want = "a boolean";
         }
         else if (kind === "integer") {
-            // §3.1 (clarified): a non-negative integer no larger than 2**53 - 1.
             ok = typeof v === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(v) && v >= 0;
             want = "a non-negative integer";
         }
@@ -2419,12 +2131,16 @@ function payloadFieldError(payload) {
         if (!ok)
             return `attestation payload field ${JSON.stringify(name)} is missing or not ${want}`;
         if (name === "attested_at" && !isRfc3339UtcInstant(v)) {
-            // evidence-export §3.1 (v3.4): the form `signed_at` pins.
+            // The form `signed_at` pins (evidence-export.md §3.1).
             return 'attestation payload field "attested_at" is not an RFC 3339 UTC date-time with Z naming a real date and time';
         }
     }
     return null;
 }
+// Verify one embedded attestation record (section 5 step 6). Returns `malformed` (exit 2)
+// where the signature cannot be checked (no payload, an unparseable key or signature);
+// otherwise `ok` gates on the signature, then the payload fields under it (`fieldError`),
+// then the operator address and data_hash. `subject_ref` never gates.
 async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
     const errs = [];
     const result = {
@@ -2464,16 +2180,12 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
     if (typeof rec.signature !== "string") {
         return { result, malformed: "attestation record missing signature" };
     }
-    const fieldError = payloadFieldError(payload);
-    if (fieldError !== null)
-        return { result, malformed: fieldError };
     const rsaKey = { kty: "RSA", n: pub.n, e: pub.e };
     result.operator = typeof payload.operator === "string" ? payload.operator : "";
     result.gateway = typeof payload.gateway === "string" ? payload.gateway : null;
-    result.level = typeof payload.level === "number" ? payload.level : null;
-    // (a) RSA-PSS-SHA-256 signature over JCS(payload). A malformed sig hex or
-    // unimportable key THROWS (malformed → exit 2); a well-formed key that simply
-    // fails to verify returns false (→ exit 1).
+    result.level = safeInteger(payload.level);
+    // (a) RSA-PSS-SHA-256 over JCS(payload). Malformed hex or an unimportable key
+    // is malformed (exit 2); a signature that does not verify is false (exit 1).
     let payloadBytes;
     try {
         payloadBytes = utf8(jcs(payload));
@@ -2487,16 +2199,17 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
             errs.push("attestation RSA-PSS signature verification failed");
     }
     catch {
-        // A FIXED sentence, not the library's. This kernel throws
-        // `verifyRsaPssSha256: malformed signature hex: ...` and the Python kernel
-        // raises `malformed signature hex: ...`, so quoting either one split the
-        // two kernels on a finding a holder can put in an export body it signs,
-        // and an export pack's findings reach a case reading through `reasons`
-        // (gate 4 on proof#140, finding 1). Callers of `verifyRsaPssSha256` still
-        // get this kernel's own words.
+        // A fixed sentence, not the library's, so both kernels report one finding.
         return { result, malformed: "attestation signature or key is malformed" };
     }
-    // (b) operator-address binding: base64url(SHA-256(modulus)) == payload.operator.
+    // The fields are read only under a signature that holds: over bytes the issuer did not
+    // sign, a bad field says nothing the failed signature does not.
+    if (result.signatureOk) {
+        result.fieldError = payloadFieldError(payload);
+        if (result.fieldError !== null)
+            errs.push(result.fieldError);
+    }
+    // (b) base64url(SHA-256(modulus)) == payload.operator.
     try {
         const derived = await deriveOperatorAddress(pub.n);
         result.operatorAddressBound = result.operator !== "" && derived === result.operator;
@@ -2507,10 +2220,8 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
     catch (e) {
         return { result, malformed: `attestation operator key${thrownDetail(e)}` };
     }
-    // (c) checkpoint resolution + data_hash binding. The checkpoint tx data IS the
-    // uploaded JCS(envelope) bytes (the same bytes the on-chain re-fetch compares
-    // against, §4.2), so the checkpoint's committed content hash is
-    // SHA-256(JCS(checkpoint.envelope)).
+    // (c) data_hash binding. The checkpoint's witnessed data is its uploaded
+    // JCS(envelope), so the committed hash is SHA-256(JCS(checkpoint.envelope)).
     const cp = sourceCheckpoints.get(result.checkpointRef);
     result.checkpointResolved = cp !== undefined;
     if (!cp) {
@@ -2530,19 +2241,18 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
             errs.push(`cannot recompute checkpoint content hash${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
-    // (d) subject_ref (§3.2) — well-formedness only (no side-input subject channel
-    // in v1); undetermined (null), never a hard failure.
+    // (d) subject_ref (§3.2): well-formedness only; null, never a failure.
     result.subjectRefOk = evaluateSubjectRef(payload.subject_ref, errs);
     result.ok =
         result.signatureOk &&
+            (result.fieldError ?? null) === null &&
             result.operatorAddressBound &&
             result.dataHashBound &&
             result.checkpointResolved;
     return { result };
 }
-// subject_ref (§3.2): absent → null (unbound). Present + well-formed but no
-// side-input subject supplied → null (undetermined, mirrors disclosed-content).
-// Present + malformed → null + a surfaced note (never gates the attestation).
+// subject_ref (§3.2): null when absent, when well-formed with no side input to
+// compare against, and when malformed (with a note). Never gates.
 function evaluateSubjectRef(subjectRef, errs) {
     if (subjectRef === undefined || subjectRef === null)
         return null;
@@ -2557,12 +2267,10 @@ function evaluateSubjectRef(subjectRef, errs) {
         errs.push("subject_ref is present but not well-formed ({hash: sha256-hex, type: token})");
         return null;
     }
-    return null; // well-formed, no side input → undetermined
+    return null;
 }
-// Build the §4 verdict object (snake_case, spec-canonical) from the recomputed
-// source result + the attestation results. This is the recomputed copy the
-// renderer/verify-API display; it is compared (over its deterministic subset)
-// to the cached body.kernel_verdict in step 5.
+// Build the §4 verdict object from the recomputed source result and the
+// attestations: what surfaces display, compared with the cached copy in step 5.
 function buildVerdictObject(source, attestations) {
     const attByCheckpoint = new Map();
     for (const a of attestations) {
@@ -2611,7 +2319,7 @@ function buildVerdictObject(source, attestations) {
     }
     return {
         schema_version: "sanning.evidence.verdict/v1",
-        status: source.status === "malformed" ? "failed" : source.status,
+        status: source.unreadable === true ? "failed" : source.status,
         counts: { verified, failed, undetermined },
         events,
         checkpoints,
@@ -2622,8 +2330,7 @@ function toVerdictOnChain(o) {
     return {
         rollup: o.rollup,
         on_chain_ok: o.onChainOk,
-        // The kernel emits {gateway, outcome}; block_height is issuer-side
-        // enrichment (optional in the §4.4 schema) the offline verifier does not
+        // `block_height` is issuer-side enrichment the offline verifier does not
         // recompute.
         per_gateway: o.perGateway.map((g) => ({ gateway: g.gateway, outcome: g.outcome })),
     };
@@ -2632,15 +2339,12 @@ function eventVerdictStatus(e) {
     if (!e.ok)
         return "failed";
     if (e.payloadBindingOk === null)
-        return "partial"; // withheld record — undetermined
+        return "incomplete"; // withheld record
     return "verified";
 }
-// The §5 step-5 agreement projection: strip every environment/time-dependent
-// and derived dimension, leaving only what an offline verifier deterministically
-// recomputes. Tolerant of a hostile/garbled cached verdict (optional chaining +
-// nullish normalization) — a structural difference surfaces as disagreement,
-// which is the correct tamper signal. Works on both the cached snake_case JSON
-// and the freshly built VerdictObject.
+// The §5 step 5 projection: only what an offline verifier deterministically
+// recomputes. Tolerates a garbled cached verdict: a structural difference
+// reads as disagreement, which is the right signal.
 function projectVerdictForAgreement(v) {
     const o = (v ?? {});
     const events = Array.isArray(o.events) ? o.events : [];
@@ -2663,7 +2367,7 @@ function projectVerdictForAgreement(v) {
             return {
                 checkpoint_ref: cp.checkpoint_ref ?? null,
                 merkle_root_ok: cp.merkle_root_ok ?? null,
-                // on_chain DELIBERATELY OMITTED — environment/time-dependent (see step 5).
+                // on_chain omitted: environment and time dependent.
                 attestations: atts.map((a) => {
                     const at = (a ?? {});
                     return {
@@ -2678,11 +2382,9 @@ function projectVerdictForAgreement(v) {
         }),
     };
 }
-// Per event of an export's inline `sanning.anchor.trace/v3` source, in order:
-// whether `envelope-spec.md` §4.1 governs its record. Decoded the way the
-// content binding decodes it, so an event whose record is withheld, not hex or
-// not JCS is not governed here either. The Python twin is
-// `evidence._source_events_governed`.
+// Per event of an export's inline source, in order: whether §4.1 governs its
+// record, decoded as the content binding decodes it. Python's twin is
+// `_source_events_governed`.
 function sourceEventsGoverned(source) {
     if (source === null || typeof source !== "object" || Array.isArray(source))
         return [];
@@ -2718,17 +2420,13 @@ function sourceEventsGoverned(source) {
         }
     });
 }
-// The one difference §5 step 5 does not read as a disagreement
-// (evidence-export.md, evidence-bundle.md v1.19, A20): a cached `content_ok` of
-// `null` against a recomputed `true`, on an event whose record §4.1 governs. A
-// kernel before A20 could not bind a hand-off record's disclosed message, so an
-// export it composed claims less than the recompute proves, and reading that
-// as tamper failed an honest export. Only that direction: a cached `true`
-// against a recomputed `false` or `null`, `null` against `false`, and any
-// difference on a record outside §4.1 still disagree. Edits `fresh` in place
-// to match `cached` on those events. The Python twin is
-// `evidence._tolerate_pre_a20_content`.
-function toleratePreA20Content(cached, fresh, governed) {
+// The one difference §5 step 5 tolerates: a cached `content_ok` of `null`
+// against a recomputed `true`, on an event whose record §4.1 governs. A composer
+// that could not bind hand-off messages claims less than the recompute proves,
+// which is not tamper. Only that direction; every other difference still
+// disagrees. Edits `fresh` in place. Python's twin is
+// `_tolerate_unbound_message_content`.
+function tolerateUnboundMessageContent(cached, fresh, governed) {
     const n = Math.min(cached.events.length, fresh.events.length);
     for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {
         if (governed[i] === true &&
@@ -2744,69 +2442,35 @@ function summarizeExport(status, source, attestations) {
         `(${source.events.length} event(s) across ${source.checkpoints.length} checkpoint(s)); ` +
         `${attOk}/${attestations.length} operator attestation(s) valid.`);
 }
-// Re-fetch a checkpoint's raw bytes from EACH gateway and classify every
-// gateway's individual outcome (evidence-export.md §4.2), then roll them up
-// worst-finding-wins. Unlike the pre-§4.2 first-responsive-wins collapse, this
-// records a per-gateway array so a confirm/mismatch/unreachable MIX across
-// gateways is preserved; the derived collapsed `onChainOk` reproduces the old
-// single-boolean exactly for a single gateway.
+// Re-fetch a checkpoint's bytes from each gateway and record each outcome
+// (evidence-export.md §4.2), then roll them up worst-finding-wins.
 async function refetchCheckpoint(cp, anchorRef, gateways, fetchImpl) {
     let expectedHex;
     try {
-        // A checkpoint's witnessed bytes are its envelope RE-CANONICALIZED. The
-        // bundle carries the envelope as a JSON object, not as bytes, so what was
-        // uploaded has to be recomputed from it. See `refetchStamp` for the case
-        // where this step is not merely unnecessary but WRONG.
+        // The bundle carries the envelope as an object, so its witnessed bytes are
+        // recomputed as JCS. Stamps differ: see `refetchStamp`.
         expectedHex = toHex(utf8(jcs(cp.envelope)));
     }
     catch {
-        // Cannot canonicalize the checkpoint envelope — every gateway is a mismatch
-        // (we can never confirm bytes we cannot compute).
+        // Bytes we cannot compute can never be confirmed: every gateway mismatches.
         expectedHex = undefined;
     }
     return refetchAnchored("checkpoint", expectedHex, anchorRef, gateways, fetchImpl);
 }
-// Re-fetch a STAMP's witnessed bytes (evidence-bundle.md §5.2.2 / §5.3.2).
-//
-// ── The one step this path must NOT copy from the checkpoint path ──
-//
-// `refetchCheckpoint` recomputes `JCS(envelope)` because a checkpoint's
-// witnessed bytes are not in the bundle — only the object they were derived
-// from is. A stamp is the opposite case: §5.2.2 defines `stamp_bytes` as
-// "lowercase hex of the exact JCS bytes that were handed to the witness", and
-// §5.3.2 repeats it — *"the EXACT bytes that were witnessed, verbatim"*. They
-// are already the bytes, already hex, already lowercase (`isLowerHex` gated
-// them), and `stamp_ref` is their SHA-256.
-//
-// So the expected hex IS `stamp_bytes`, and re-canonicalizing would be a
-// defect, not a redundancy: it would compare the chain against bytes NOBODY
-// SIGNED. On a canonical body the two agree and the bug hides; on a body that
-// is not canonical — the exact case §5.2.2 makes the kernel check for, because
-// the plane replays these bytes as text precisely so a normalizing serializer
-// cannot alter them — a re-canonicalizing verifier reports `mismatch` against
-// a chain that faithfully holds what it was given. A false accusation, from
-// the verifier, about untampered evidence.
-//
-// The bytes handed here are the SAME value `verifyStampEntry` hashed to derive
-// `stamp_ref`, threaded through rather than re-read from the body, so the bytes
-// graded and the bytes compared cannot drift apart.
+// Re-fetch a stamp's witnessed bytes (§5.2.2, §5.3.2). Unlike a checkpoint,
+// `stamp_bytes` already are the exact witnessed bytes, so they are compared
+// verbatim: re-canonicalizing would compare the chain against bytes nobody
+// signed and accuse a faithful chain of mismatch on a non-canonical body. The
+// hex is the same value `verifyStampEntry` hashed for `stamp_ref`.
 async function refetchStamp(witnessedHex, anchorRef, gateways, fetchImpl) {
     return refetchAnchored("stamp", witnessedHex, anchorRef, gateways, fetchImpl);
 }
-// The part both paths share: probe every gateway, roll the outcomes up under
-// the ONE rule (`rollupOnChain`), and phrase the finding. Extracted rather than
-// copied — a second rollup rule is a second place for "mismatch beats confirm
-// beats unreachable" to drift, and the drifted copy is the one nobody reads.
-// The subject only ever selects wording; it never changes a verdict.
+// Shared by both paths: probe every gateway, roll up with `rollupOnChain`, and
+// phrase the finding. The subject selects wording only, never a verdict.
 async function refetchAnchored(subject, expectedHex, anchorRef, gateways, fetchImpl) {
-    // Only a `kind` this kernel has a witness adapter for is re-fetched
-    // (evidence-bundle.md §5.1: "where the verifier has an adapter for its
-    // `kind`"; §5.1.1: an unrecognised kind MUST NOT fail verification). An `id`
-    // of any other kind is not an Arweave id, so whatever a gateway serves at
-    // that path says nothing about the witness, and comparing it would turn an
-    // unrelated 200 into a false mismatch. No fetch, `onChain: null`, and the
-    // run goes `partial`: the caller asked for the witness check and it was not
-    // made.
+    // Only a `kind` with a witness adapter is re-fetched (§5.1.1: an unrecognised
+    // kind must not fail verification). No fetch, `onChain: null`, and the run is
+    // `partial`.
     if (!WITNESS_ADAPTER_KINDS.has(anchorRef.kind)) {
         return {
             onChain: null,
@@ -2815,11 +2479,9 @@ async function refetchAnchored(subject, expectedHex, anchorRef, gateways, fetchI
             error: `no witness adapter for kind '${anchorRef.kind}'; the witness was not checked`,
         };
     }
-    // The id becomes a URL path segment. Anything but a 43-character base64url
-    // transaction id can leave the gateway's base path once URL parsing
-    // normalises it (`../x`, `%2e%2e/x`), or drop part of the path (`a#b`,
-    // `a?b`), and the two kernels would then request different URLs. Such an id
-    // is never fetched and never failed: the witness is not checked.
+    // The id becomes a URL path segment: anything but a 43-character base64url id
+    // could escape the gateway's base path or make the kernels request different
+    // URLs. Never fetched, never failed: the witness is not checked.
     if (!ARWEAVE_ID_RE.test(anchorRef.id)) {
         return {
             onChain: null,
@@ -2848,16 +2510,13 @@ async function refetchAnchored(subject, expectedHex, anchorRef, gateways, fetchI
     }
     return { onChain, unavailable: onChain.rollup === "unreachable", unchecked: null, error };
 }
-// The `anchor_ref.kind` values this kernel can re-fetch from a gateway
-// (evidence-bundle.md §5.1.1 registers exactly `arweave`). Any other kind is
-// left unchecked by `refetchAnchored`, never probed.
+// The `anchor_ref.kind` values with a witness adapter (§5.1.1 registers `arweave`).
 const WITNESS_ADAPTER_KINDS = new Set(["arweave"]);
 // The only `arweave` ids the adapter looks up: a 43-character base64url
 // transaction or data-item id.
 const ARWEAVE_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
-// The bundle-level notes for a run where requested re-fetches were not made.
-// Each note keeps the phrase "could not be re-fetched", which is what both
-// CLIs map to exit 3. The order is fixed so the two kernels emit the same list.
+// Notes for requested re-fetches that were not made. Each keeps "could not be
+// re-fetched", which both CLIs map to exit 3. Fixed order across kernels.
 function pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, subject, gaps) {
     if (gaps.unavailable) {
         errors.push(`one or more ${subject} could not be re-fetched from the supplied gateways`);
@@ -2869,8 +2528,7 @@ function pushRefetchGapNotes(errors, subject, gaps) {
         errors.push(`one or more ${subject} name an Arweave witness id this verifier cannot look up, so it could not be re-fetched`);
     }
 }
-// One gateway's outcome for one checkpoint tx: confirm (bytes match), mismatch
-// (bytes disagree), or unreachable (no response / !ok / network error).
+// One gateway's outcome: confirm, mismatch, or unreachable.
 async function probeGateway(anchorRef, gateway, expectedHex, fetchImpl) {
     const url = `${gateway.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/${anchorRef.id}`;
     let resp;
@@ -2891,10 +2549,9 @@ async function probeGateway(anchorRef, gateway, expectedHex, fetchImpl) {
     }
     if (expectedHex === undefined)
         return "mismatch";
-    // The on-chain bytes are the uploaded envelope bytes (JCS-canonical, per the
-    // family upload invariant). Compare structurally too, so a gateway that
-    // re-pretty-prints does not spuriously fail — but the canonical re-hash is
-    // the load-bearing check.
+    // The on-chain bytes are the uploaded JCS bytes. The structural compare
+    // tolerates a gateway that re-pretty-prints; the canonical match is the
+    // load-bearing check.
     if (toHex(onChainBytes) === expectedHex)
         return "confirm";
     try {
@@ -2903,14 +2560,12 @@ async function probeGateway(anchorRef, gateway, expectedHex, fetchImpl) {
             return "confirm";
     }
     catch {
-        // not JSON / not parseable — a genuine mismatch
+        // Not parseable: a genuine mismatch.
     }
     return "mismatch";
 }
-// Rollup rule (§4.2): mismatch if ANY gateway is mismatch; else confirm if ANY
-// is confirm; else unreachable. The collapsed `onChainOk`: false on mismatch,
-// true on confirm, null on all-unreachable. An empty gateway list is treated as
-// all-unreachable (no signal).
+// Rollup (§4.2): mismatch if any gateway mismatched, else confirm if any
+// confirmed, else unreachable. An empty list is all-unreachable.
 function rollupOnChain(perGateway) {
     let rollup = "unreachable";
     if (perGateway.some((g) => g.outcome === "mismatch"))
@@ -2926,14 +2581,7 @@ function getEventId(env) {
     }
     return "<unknown>";
 }
-// The side-input presence rule lives in `side-content.ts`, stated ONCE.
-//
-// It used to live here as a private `lookupSideContent`, and `grading.ts`
-// carried a second, laxer answer to the same question (`hasEntry`: own +
-// enumerable, nothing more). On one and the same content map the grader said
-// PRESENT while this verifier said nothing was offered, and `gradePack` then
-// returned `incomplete` with ZERO causes. Read `side-content.ts` for the rule
-// and for what each clause of it cost.
+// The side-input presence rule lives in `./side-content.ts`, stated once.
 function selectDisclosedBytes(ev, eventId, sideContent) {
     const errors = [];
     let inBody;
@@ -2958,15 +2606,8 @@ function selectDisclosedBytes(ev, eventId, sideContent) {
             errors.push(`supplied content for ${eventId} is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
-    // `offered` comes from the SAME test that produced the value, never from
-    // `value !== undefined` — that is the conflation this whole guard exists to
-    // remove, and it was removed from ONE of the two operands. The left one
-    // carried it unchanged: an in-body `"content": null` is `!== undefined`, so
-    // the event was marked offered while no bytes were selected, and the kernel
-    // split against itself — `verifyEvidenceBundle` VERIFIED, `disclosedContent`
-    // FAILED, on one bundle. `null` is how an optional field's absence
-    // serializes; `inBodyContentOffered` states that once, beside the side-input
-    // rule it mirrors.
+    // `offered` comes from the same tests that selected the value, never from
+    // `value !== undefined`: an in-body `null` is an absent optional field.
     return {
         inBody,
         side,