@sanning/proof 0.10.0 → 0.11.0

package/dist/evidence.js

@@ -15,9 +15,14 @@
 //
 // Scope: this verifies a SINGLE evidence bundle. Chain walking over
 // `previous_hash` across successive exports is consumer-layer logic above it.
-import { deriveOperatorAddress, ed25519Verify, hexToBytes, sha256Hex, utf8, verifyRsaPssSha256, } from "./crypto.js";
+import { deriveOperatorAddress, ed25519Verify, hexToBytes, 
+// The one hex-field test, which lives in `crypto.ts` beside the one hex
+// reader (proof#146). It was a second copy here until then, with the same
+// body: two copies of one rule is how two kernels drift apart one edit at a
+// time, which is the whole defect class this fix is about.
+isHexField, sha256Hex, utf8, verifyRsaPssSha256, } from "./crypto.js";
 import { leafHash, verifyInclusion } from "./merkle.js";
-import { MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH, contentHashes, exceedsDepth, jcs, verifyEnvelope, } from "./verifier.js";
+import { MAX_CANONICAL_DEPTH, contentHashes, exceedsDepth, jcs, jcsParse, verifyEnvelope, } from "./verifier.js";
 import { inBodyContentOffered, sideContentEntry, } from "./side-content.js";
 // Only the evidence-bundle major(s) this kernel verifies. A new major is a
 // deliberate one-entry addition HERE — same fail-closed discipline as the
@@ -113,12 +118,23 @@ function isEvidenceMajorAccepted(specVersion) {
         return minor.length > 0 && /^[0-9]+$/.test(minor);
     });
 }
-function malformed(error, specVersionOk = false) {
+/**
+ * A bundle this kernel cannot read.
+ *
+ * `wrapperOk` is true only where the wrapper signature and `body_hash` were
+ * CHECKED and held before the body was found unreadable. It is then reported
+ * as held, because it did: `signatureOk` and `bodyHashOk` are statements about
+ * the wrapper, and a body this kernel cannot parse does not unsign it. The
+ * case reader decides whose pack a bundle is on exactly those two fields
+ * (`evidence-bundle.md` 5.5.1), so reporting `false` here let a holder who
+ * broke its own body shape read as a forger.
+ */
+function malformed(error, specVersionOk = false, wrapperOk = false) {
     return {
         status: "malformed",
         specVersionOk,
-        bodyHashOk: false,
-        signatureOk: false,
+        bodyHashOk: wrapperOk,
+        signatureOk: wrapperOk,
         bodyType: null,
         onChainChecked: false,
         checkpoints: [],
@@ -127,8 +143,77 @@ function malformed(error, specVersionOk = false) {
         errors: [error],
     };
 }
-function stringifyErr(e) {
-    return e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
+/**
+ * The prefixes of the exception text this kernel writes ITSELF, in the words
+ * the Python kernel writes too. Anything outside this set comes from the host:
+ * a JSON parser, a codec, a crypto library. See `thrownDetail`.
+ */
+const KERNEL_WORDING = ["hexToBytes: "];
+/**
+ * The detail a finding may append about a caught exception.
+ *
+ * THE RULE: a finding carries the text of a caught exception only where this
+ * kernel wrote that text. A finding travels into a case reading through `case`
+ * `reasons`, and both kernels promise one reading and one rendered sentence for
+ * one set of bytes; a host JSON parser says `Unexpected token 'h', "hello" is
+ * not valid JSON` here and `Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)` there,
+ * for one pack anyone can build (gate 4 on proof#140, finding 1).
+ *
+ * Returns `": <text>"` for this kernel's own wording and the empty string for
+ * anything else. The label at the call site already names the check that
+ * failed and both kernels agree on it character for character; what is dropped
+ * is the host's parse offset, which no reader can act on and which was never
+ * the same in the two kernels.
+ */
+function thrownDetail(e) {
+    const text = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
+    return KERNEL_WORDING.some((w) => text.startsWith(w)) ? `: ${text}` : "";
+}
+/**
+ * Decode `bytes` as UTF-8 the way every other kernel does: a byte sequence that
+ * is not valid UTF-8 THROWS, and a leading byte-order mark is kept rather than
+ * eaten.
+ *
+ * ONE CALLER LEFT, and it is not a parse. `jcsParse` (`verifier.ts`) reads
+ * every set of signed bytes in this kernel now; this function survives only for
+ * the canonicality comparison on the stamp path, which needs the DECODED TEXT
+ * of bytes `jcsParse` has already accepted, to compare against `jcs(body)`. It
+ * performs exactly the decode `jcsParse` performs, so the comparison cannot
+ * read the bytes differently from the parse that produced `body`.
+ *
+ * `new TextDecoder()` alone is neither strict nor BOM-preserving: it replaces
+ * every invalid sequence with U+FFFD and strips a BOM. A stamp body carrying
+ * one raw `0x80` inside a string value read `verified` here and `failed` there
+ * because of it (gate 4 on proof#140). The symmetric claim the first version of
+ * this comment made, that "Python's `json.loads` raises on both", is FALSE and
+ * is what hid gate 5's defect for a round: `json.loads(<bytes>)` strips a BOM
+ * too. Python's strict reader is `jcs_loads`, and the rule both kernels hold to
+ * is stated once, in `jcsParse`.
+ */
+function decodeUtf8Strict(bytes) {
+    return new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true }).decode(bytes);
+}
+/**
+ * Name an envelope `public_key` or `signature` spelled outside the hex charset
+ * or at the wrong length (proof#142). This kernel's envelope layer already
+ * fails such an envelope, and the Python one's decoder accepts ASCII
+ * whitespace (proof#135), so both bundle verifiers name it here, in the same
+ * words, and the two kernels give one reading. Only a STRING is checked: a
+ * missing or non-string field is the envelope layer's to fail, and it does.
+ */
+function envelopeHexError(what, envelope) {
+    if (!isJsonObject(envelope))
+        return null;
+    for (const [name, nibbles] of [
+        ["public_key", 64],
+        ["signature", 128],
+    ]) {
+        const value = envelope[name];
+        if (typeof value === "string" && !isHexField(value, nibbles)) {
+            return `${what} envelope ${name} is not ${nibbles} hex characters`;
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
 }
 /**
  * Spell a value inside a finding the way the Python kernel spells it.
@@ -189,26 +274,47 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, options, exportSource) {
     }
     // --- Step 2: verify the wrapper signature + recompute body_hash ------------
     const errors = [];
+    // Every wrapper hex field is read STRICTLY, before any decoder sees it
+    // (proof#142). The Python decoder skipped ASCII whitespace, and the wrapper
+    // `signature` sits outside the signed scope, so one space in it, added by
+    // anyone and with no key, made a pack verify there and fail here. The same
+    // named failure in both kernels, for each field: `public_key` and
+    // `signature` are 64 and 128 hex characters in either case (proof#135,
+    // option B), and `body_hash` is 64 LOWER-case hex characters, the form it is
+    // recomputed in and compared against.
     let bodyHashOk = false;
-    try {
-        const recomputed = await sha256Hex(utf8(jcs(b.body)));
-        bodyHashOk = recomputed === b.body_hash;
-        if (!bodyHashOk) {
-            errors.push(`body_hash mismatch: bundle=${b.body_hash} recomputed=${recomputed}`);
-        }
+    if (!isHexField(b.body_hash, 64, true)) {
+        errors.push("wrapper body_hash is not 64 lowercase hex characters");
     }
-    catch (e) {
-        errors.push(`body canonicalization failed: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+    else {
+        try {
+            const recomputed = await sha256Hex(utf8(jcs(b.body)));
+            bodyHashOk = recomputed === b.body_hash;
+            if (!bodyHashOk) {
+                errors.push(`body_hash mismatch: bundle=${b.body_hash} recomputed=${recomputed}`);
+            }
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            errors.push(`body canonicalization failed${thrownDetail(e)}`);
+        }
     }
     let signatureOk = false;
-    try {
-        const { signature: _sig, co_signatures: _co, ...bundleForSig } = b;
-        signatureOk = await ed25519Verify(b.signature, utf8(jcs(bundleForSig)), b.public_key);
-        if (!signatureOk)
-            errors.push("wrapper Ed25519 signature verification failed");
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        errors.push(`wrapper signature verification error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+    const keyFormOk = isHexField(b.public_key, 64);
+    const signatureFormOk = isHexField(b.signature, 128);
+    if (!keyFormOk)
+        errors.push("wrapper public_key is not 64 hex characters");
+    if (!signatureFormOk)
+        errors.push("wrapper signature is not 128 hex characters");
+    if (keyFormOk && signatureFormOk) {
+        try {
+            const { signature: _sig, co_signatures: _co, ...bundleForSig } = b;
+            signatureOk = await ed25519Verify(b.signature, utf8(jcs(bundleForSig)), b.public_key);
+            if (!signatureOk)
+                errors.push("wrapper Ed25519 signature verification failed");
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            errors.push(`wrapper signature verification error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
+        }
     }
     const assertedStatus = typeof b.verdict?.status === "string" ? b.verdict.status : null;
     // A broken wrapper (bad signature or tampered body) is a hard failure — the
@@ -345,31 +451,39 @@ async function indexSourceCheckpoints(bundle) {
  */
 async function resolveCheckpointKey(cp, eventBytes) {
     const errors = [];
+    // Every early return below leaves before `anchor_ref` is ever looked at, so
+    // nothing there is "malformed": it is unexamined, which is not the same claim.
+    const unexamined = { key: null, anchorRef: null, anchorRefMalformed: false, errors };
     if (cp.tx_id !== undefined) {
         errors.push(`${ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} checkpoint carries legacy tx_id -- one bundle speaks one vocabulary`);
-        return { key: null, anchorRef: null, errors };
+        return unexamined;
     }
     const legacy = legacyEventBytesError(cp, "checkpoint", ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE);
     if (legacy !== null) {
         errors.push(legacy);
-        return { key: null, anchorRef: null, errors };
+        return unexamined;
     }
     if (typeof cp.checkpoint_ref !== "string" || cp.checkpoint_ref === "") {
         errors.push("checkpoint missing checkpoint_ref");
-        return { key: null, anchorRef: null, errors };
+        return unexamined;
     }
     if (eventBytes === undefined) {
         // Without the bytes the key cannot be recomputed, so it cannot be trusted.
         errors.push("checkpoint_ref cannot be verified -- event_bytes missing or not hex");
-        return { key: null, anchorRef: null, errors };
+        return unexamined;
     }
     const derived = await sha256Hex(eventBytes);
     if (derived !== cp.checkpoint_ref.toLowerCase()) {
         errors.push(`checkpoint_ref does not match SHA-256(event_bytes): claimed=${cp.checkpoint_ref} derived=${derived}`);
-        return { key: null, anchorRef: null, errors };
+        return unexamined;
     }
-    const anchorRef = parseAnchorRef(cp.anchor_ref, errors);
-    return { key: derived, anchorRef, errors };
+    const parsed = parseAnchorRef(cp.anchor_ref, errors);
+    return {
+        key: derived,
+        anchorRef: parsed.ref,
+        anchorRefMalformed: parsed.malformed,
+        errors,
+    };
 }
 /**
  * Validate an optional `anchor_ref` (§5.1.1).
@@ -388,39 +502,54 @@ async function resolveCheckpointKey(cp, eventBytes) {
  * So this validates the SHAPE and never the vocabulary. A malformed
  * `anchor_ref` is a defect in the bundle; an unknown `kind` is a defect in
  * the reader, and only the first is the bundle's fault.
+ *
+ * ── Absent and malformed are not the same null (proof#120) ──
+ *
+ * Both leave no `AnchorRef` to re-fetch, and both used to be reported the same
+ * way downstream: an all-`unreachable` on-chain result, although no gateway was
+ * asked in either case. For the ABSENT case that is at least the note
+ * `evidence-bundle.md` §5.1.1 reserves for "a checkpoint with no `anchor_ref`".
+ * For the MALFORMED case it is a manufactured outage: the bundle named a
+ * witness, the name was unreadable, and the reader was told the public record
+ * could not be reached. So the two come back as different facts, and `malformed`
+ * carries the difference.
  */
 function parseAnchorRef(raw, errors) {
-    if (raw === undefined || raw === null)
-        return null; // placed, not yet witnessed
+    if (raw === undefined || raw === null) {
+        return { ref: null, malformed: false }; // placed, not yet witnessed
+    }
     if (typeof raw !== "object" || Array.isArray(raw)) {
         errors.push("anchor_ref must be an object");
-        return null;
+        return { ref: null, malformed: true };
     }
     const o = raw;
     if (typeof o.kind !== "string" || !/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*$/.test(o.kind)) {
         errors.push(`anchor_ref.kind is missing or malformed: ${JSON.stringify(o.kind)}`);
-        return null;
+        return { ref: null, malformed: true };
     }
     if (typeof o.id !== "string" || o.id === "") {
         errors.push("anchor_ref.id is missing or empty");
-        return null;
+        return { ref: null, malformed: true };
     }
     const ref = o.ref;
     if (ref !== undefined && (typeof ref !== "object" || ref === null || Array.isArray(ref))) {
         errors.push("anchor_ref.ref must be an object when present");
-        return null;
+        return { ref: null, malformed: true };
     }
     return {
-        kind: o.kind,
-        id: o.id,
-        ...(ref === undefined ? {} : { ref: ref }),
+        ref: {
+            kind: o.kind,
+            id: o.id,
+            ...(ref === undefined ? {} : { ref: ref }),
+        },
+        malformed: false,
     };
 }
 async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
     const body = b.body;
     const bodyType = ANCHOR_TRACE_BODY_TYPE;
     if (!Array.isArray(body.checkpoints) || !Array.isArray(body.events)) {
-        return malformed(`${bodyType} body must have checkpoints[] and events[]`, true);
+        return malformed(`${bodyType} body must have checkpoints[] and events[]`, true, true);
     }
     const gateways = options.gateways ?? [];
     const onChainChecked = gateways.length > 0;
@@ -435,6 +564,11 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
     const byKey = new Map();
     const anchorByKey = new Map();
     const checkpointResults = [];
+    // proof#120. Kept beside the results rather than on them: "the bundle named
+    // a witness we could not read" is an input defect the checkpoint's own
+    // `errors` already states, not a new dimension of the published verdict, and
+    // `CheckpointResult` is a shape downstream surfaces render.
+    const malformedAnchorRef = new Set();
     for (const rawCp of body.checkpoints) {
         // `checkpoints[]` is attacker-shaped, and a verifier must never raise on
         // adversarial input: a null entry used to reach `cp.tx_id` and hand the
@@ -469,7 +603,7 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 eventBytes = hexToBytes(cp.event_bytes);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            cpErrors.push(`checkpoint event_bytes is not hex: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            cpErrors.push(`checkpoint event_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
         const keyed = await resolveCheckpointKey(cp, eventBytes);
         cpErrors.push(...keyed.errors);
@@ -500,12 +634,16 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             // A checkpoint must fully bind: signature + the committed record matching
             // payload_hash. An undetermined binding (no record) is not enough to
             // anchor the events' inclusion claims to a trustworthy root.
-            envelopeOk = res.ok && res.payloadHashOk === true;
+            const hexError = envelopeHexError("checkpoint", cp.envelope);
+            envelopeOk = res.ok && res.payloadHashOk === true && hexError === null;
             // See the event loop below: a degenerate envelope is a malformed input,
             // not a failed check (proof#76).
             if (!isJsonObject(cp.envelope)) {
                 cpErrors.push("checkpoint envelope is not a JSON object");
             }
+            else if (hexError !== null) {
+                cpErrors.push(hexError);
+            }
             else if (!res.signatureOk) {
                 cpErrors.push("checkpoint envelope signature failed");
             }
@@ -531,13 +669,13 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             }
         }
         catch (e) {
-            cpErrors.push(`checkpoint envelope verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            cpErrors.push(`checkpoint envelope verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
         // The committed record's merkle_root must equal the checkpoint's claimed
         // merkle_root (recompute, don't trust the bundle's top-level claim).
         if (eventBytes !== undefined) {
             try {
-                const record = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(eventBytes));
+                const record = jcsParse(eventBytes);
                 const committedRoot = record.event?.merkle_root;
                 merkleRootOk = typeof committedRoot === "string" && committedRoot === cp.merkle_root;
                 if (!merkleRootOk) {
@@ -546,7 +684,7 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 }
             }
             catch (e) {
-                cpErrors.push(`checkpoint record is not JSON: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+                cpErrors.push(`checkpoint record is not JSON${thrownDetail(e)}`);
             }
         }
         checkpointResults.push({
@@ -565,6 +703,9 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             ok: envelopeOk && merkleRootOk && keyed.errors.length === 0 && !duplicateKey,
             errors: cpErrors,
         });
+        if (keyed.anchorRefMalformed) {
+            malformedAnchorRef.add(checkpointResults[checkpointResults.length - 1]);
+        }
     }
     // --- Step 4: per-event ------------------------------------------------------
     const eventResults = [];
@@ -595,17 +736,36 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
         const legacyError = legacyEventBytesError(ev, "event", bodyType);
         if (legacyError !== null)
             evErrors.push(legacyError);
+        // MALFORMED IS A FAILURE; ABSENT IS UNDETERMINED (proof#85).
+        //
+        // `event_bytes` that will not decode leaves `eventBytes` undefined, and an
+        // undefined `eventBytes` is exactly how a WITHHELD record is spelled one
+        // line down. So an event carrying garbage in place of its record used to
+        // reach the same tri-state as an event carrying nothing: `payloadHashOk`
+        // null, `ok` true, a leading tick on the line, and a `verified` rollup over
+        // a record nobody could read. The only thing wrong with the pack was the
+        // bytes, and it was the one thing the verdict did not say.
+        //
+        // A record the producer chose not to disclose is the customer exercising
+        // minimum disclosure. A record that is present and unreadable is a defect
+        // in the artifact, and this kernel's standing rule (the same one
+        // `checkpoints[]` already applies through `keyed.errors`) is that a defect
+        // we can see fails.
         let eventBytes;
+        let eventBytesMalformed = false;
         try {
             if (typeof ev.event_bytes === "string")
                 eventBytes = hexToBytes(ev.event_bytes);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            evErrors.push(`event event_bytes is not hex: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            eventBytesMalformed = true;
+            evErrors.push(`event event_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
         try {
             const res = await verifyEnvelope(ev.envelope, eventBytes !== undefined ? { payloadBytes: eventBytes } : {});
-            envelopeOk = res.ok; // ok tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            const hexError = envelopeHexError("event", ev.envelope);
+            // ok tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            envelopeOk = res.ok && hexError === null;
             payloadBindingOk = res.payloadHashOk;
             // P-10: report what could not be determined, never a fault that was never
             // observed. There is no envelope here, so no signature was checked and no
@@ -617,6 +777,9 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             if (!isJsonObject(ev.envelope)) {
                 evErrors.push("event envelope is not a JSON object");
             }
+            else if (hexError !== null) {
+                evErrors.push(hexError);
+            }
             else if (!res.signatureOk) {
                 evErrors.push("event envelope signature failed");
             }
@@ -632,7 +795,7 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 evErrors.push(specFinding);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
         // Bind the event to exactly one checkpoint in the bundle, then verify
         // RFC 9162 inclusion against THAT checkpoint's merkle_root.
@@ -686,7 +849,7 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 }
             }
             catch (e) {
-                evErrors.push(`inclusion verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+                evErrors.push(`inclusion verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
             }
         }
         // Content (raw-log) binding — shared with every other event-carrying body.
@@ -705,7 +868,14 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
             // present checkpoint, and its disclosed content did not MISMATCH. A
             // withheld record or undisclosed content (binding/content null) does not
             // fail it.
-            ok: envelopeOk && inclusionOk && checkpointBound && contentOk !== false && legacyError === null,
+            // `!eventBytesMalformed`: present-and-unreadable record bytes are a
+            // defect in the artifact, never a disclosure choice (proof#85).
+            ok: envelopeOk &&
+                inclusionOk &&
+                checkpointBound &&
+                contentOk !== false &&
+                legacyError === null &&
+                !eventBytesMalformed,
             errors: evErrors,
         });
     }
@@ -730,6 +900,20 @@ async function verifyAnchorTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, optio
                 // the run to partial) and NEVER as a mismatch. Treating "we never
                 // anchored it yet" as "the chain disagrees" would be the same false
                 // accusation this whole change is removing.
+                // proof#120. An `anchor_ref` that failed structural validation is not
+                // an absent one. Nothing was fetched, so the witness dimension is NOT
+                // CHECKED — `onChain: null`, exactly as when the caller supplied no
+                // adapter — and it must not raise `gatewayUnavailable`, which is what
+                // puts "could not be re-fetched from the supplied gateways" on the
+                // bundle. Reporting an outage nobody observed is a claim about the
+                // public record made out of a defect in the artifact, and verify-page
+                // renders it word for word. The run still fails: the structural error
+                // is already in `cpr.errors` and already in `ok` above.
+                if (cpr.anchorRef === null && malformedAnchorRef.has(cpr)) {
+                    cpr.onChain = null;
+                    cpr.onChainOk = null;
+                    continue;
+                }
                 if (cpr.anchorRef === null) {
                     gatewayUnavailable = true;
                     cpr.onChain = {
@@ -896,7 +1080,7 @@ async function verifyDisclosedContent(ev, eventId, eventBytes, sideContent) {
     let recordContentHash;
     if (eventBytes !== undefined) {
         try {
-            const record = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(eventBytes));
+            const record = jcsParse(eventBytes);
             const ch = record.event?.content_hash;
             if (typeof ch === "string" && ch)
                 recordContentHash = ch.toLowerCase();
@@ -977,7 +1161,7 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
         bytes = hexToBytes(e.stamp_bytes);
     }
     catch (err) {
-        errors.push(`stamp_bytes is not hex: ${stringifyErr(err)}`);
+        errors.push(`stamp_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(err)}`);
         return { result: base };
     }
     // Gated by `isLowerHex` above, so this is already the exact lowercase hex of
@@ -1009,7 +1193,7 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
     // --- the body itself ------------------------------------------------------
     let body;
     try {
-        const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(bytes));
+        const parsed = jcsParse(bytes);
         if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
             errors.push("stamp body is not a JSON object");
             return { result: base, witnessedHex };
@@ -1019,13 +1203,13 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
         // every submit attempt for exactly this reason: a non-canonical body makes
         // a retry a DIFFERENT submission, and makes every independent re-derivation
         // of the stamp disagree with the one that was witnessed.
-        if (jcs(body) !== new TextDecoder().decode(bytes)) {
+        if (jcs(body) !== decodeUtf8Strict(bytes)) {
             errors.push("stamp_bytes are not JCS-canonical (RFC 8785)");
             return { result: base, witnessedHex };
         }
     }
     catch (err) {
-        errors.push(`stamp body is not JSON: ${stringifyErr(err)}`);
+        errors.push(`stamp body is not JSON${thrownDetail(err)}`);
         return { result: base, witnessedHex };
     }
     if (body.stamp_version !== STAMP_BODY_VERSION) {
@@ -1063,7 +1247,10 @@ async function verifyStampEntry(raw, seen) {
     }
     // --- the sub-tree ranges --------------------------------------------------
     base.subtreesOk = checkSubtrees(body, base, errors);
-    base.anchorRef = parseAnchorRef(e.anchor_ref, errors);
+    // A stamp needs no malformed/absent split: the §5.2 re-fetch path already
+    // leaves `onChain` null whenever there is no `AnchorRef`, so it never
+    // synthesised the outage proof#120 is about.
+    base.anchorRef = parseAnchorRef(e.anchor_ref, errors).ref;
     base.ok =
         base.stampRefOk && base.bodyOk && base.subtreesOk && errors.length === 0;
     return { result: base, witnessedHex };
@@ -1145,7 +1332,7 @@ function checkSubtrees(body, out, errors) {
 async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
     const body = b.body;
     if (!Array.isArray(body?.stamps)) {
-        return malformed(`${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[]`, true);
+        return malformed(`${STAMP_TRACE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[]`, true, true);
     }
     const seen = new Set();
     const stamps = [];
@@ -1232,7 +1419,7 @@ async function verifyStampTrace(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
 async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, options) {
     const body = b.body;
     if (!Array.isArray(body?.stamps) || !Array.isArray(body?.events)) {
-        return malformed(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[] and events[]`, true);
+        return malformed(`${STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE} body must have stamps[] and events[]`, true, true);
     }
     // --- The stamp half: §5.2's rules, §5.2's code ----------------------------
     const seen = new Set();
@@ -1289,17 +1476,36 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
         const legacyError = legacyEventBytesError(ev, "event", STAMP_EVIDENCE_BODY_TYPE);
         if (legacyError !== null)
             evErrors.push(legacyError);
+        // MALFORMED IS A FAILURE; ABSENT IS UNDETERMINED (proof#85).
+        //
+        // `event_bytes` that will not decode leaves `eventBytes` undefined, and an
+        // undefined `eventBytes` is exactly how a WITHHELD record is spelled one
+        // line down. So an event carrying garbage in place of its record used to
+        // reach the same tri-state as an event carrying nothing: `payloadHashOk`
+        // null, `ok` true, a leading tick on the line, and a `verified` rollup over
+        // a record nobody could read. The only thing wrong with the pack was the
+        // bytes, and it was the one thing the verdict did not say.
+        //
+        // A record the producer chose not to disclose is the customer exercising
+        // minimum disclosure. A record that is present and unreadable is a defect
+        // in the artifact, and this kernel's standing rule (the same one
+        // `checkpoints[]` already applies through `keyed.errors`) is that a defect
+        // we can see fails.
         let eventBytes;
+        let eventBytesMalformed = false;
         try {
             if (typeof ev.event_bytes === "string")
                 eventBytes = hexToBytes(ev.event_bytes);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            evErrors.push(`event event_bytes is not hex: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            eventBytesMalformed = true;
+            evErrors.push(`event event_bytes is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
         try {
             const res = await verifyEnvelope(ev.envelope, eventBytes !== undefined ? { payloadBytes: eventBytes } : {});
-            envelopeOk = res.ok; // tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            const hexError = envelopeHexError("event", ev.envelope);
+            // tolerates an undetermined binding (withheld record)
+            envelopeOk = res.ok && hexError === null;
             payloadBindingOk = res.payloadHashOk;
             // P-10: report what could not be determined, never a fault that was never
             // observed. There is no envelope here, so no signature was checked and no
@@ -1311,6 +1517,9 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
             if (!isJsonObject(ev.envelope)) {
                 evErrors.push("event envelope is not a JSON object");
             }
+            else if (hexError !== null) {
+                evErrors.push(hexError);
+            }
             else if (!res.signatureOk) {
                 evErrors.push("event envelope signature failed");
             }
@@ -1326,7 +1535,7 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
                 evErrors.push(specFinding);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            evErrors.push(`event envelope verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
         // --- The join (§5.3.3 rule 1) -------------------------------------------
         const incl = ev.inclusion;
@@ -1377,7 +1586,7 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
                     }
                 }
                 catch (e) {
-                    evErrors.push(`inclusion verify error: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+                    evErrors.push(`inclusion verify error${thrownDetail(e)}`);
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -1392,7 +1601,14 @@ async function verifyStampEvidence(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, opt
             // Named for §5.1's join; here it reports whether `stamp_ref` resolved.
             checkpointBound: stampBound,
             contentOk,
-            ok: envelopeOk && inclusionOk && stampBound && contentOk !== false && legacyError === null,
+            // `!eventBytesMalformed`: present-and-unreadable record bytes are a
+            // defect in the artifact, never a disclosure choice (proof#85).
+            ok: envelopeOk &&
+                inclusionOk &&
+                stampBound &&
+                contentOk !== false &&
+                legacyError === null &&
+                !eventBytesMalformed,
             errors: evErrors,
         });
     }
@@ -1765,7 +1981,7 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         }
     }
     catch (e) {
-        errors.push(`source_bundle canonicalization failed: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+        errors.push(`source_bundle canonicalization failed${thrownDetail(e)}`);
     }
     // --- Step 4: recompute the source verdict ---------------------------------
     // The existing evidence path over the inline source bundle — same primitives
@@ -1809,7 +2025,7 @@ async function verifyExportBody(b, specVersionOk, assertedStatus, errors, option
         }
     }
     catch (e) {
-        errors.push(`verdict agreement comparison failed: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+        errors.push(`verdict agreement comparison failed${thrownDetail(e)}`);
     }
     // --- Step 7 already folded in by the source recompute ---------------------
     // (verifyEvidenceBundle merged per-gateway outcomes into sourceResult.status:
@@ -2006,15 +2222,22 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
         payloadBytes = utf8(jcs(payload));
     }
     catch (e) {
-        return { result, malformed: `attestation payload canonicalization failed: ${stringifyErr(e)}` };
+        return { result, malformed: `attestation payload canonicalization failed${thrownDetail(e)}` };
     }
     try {
         result.signatureOk = await verifyRsaPssSha256(payloadBytes, rec.signature, rsaKey);
         if (!result.signatureOk)
             errs.push("attestation RSA-PSS signature verification failed");
     }
-    catch (e) {
-        return { result, malformed: `attestation ${stringifyErr(e)}` };
+    catch {
+        // A FIXED sentence, not the library's. This kernel throws
+        // `verifyRsaPssSha256: malformed signature hex: ...` and the Python kernel
+        // raises `malformed signature hex: ...`, so quoting either one split the
+        // two kernels on a finding a holder can put in an export body it signs,
+        // and an export pack's findings reach a case reading through `reasons`
+        // (gate 4 on proof#140, finding 1). Callers of `verifyRsaPssSha256` still
+        // get this kernel's own words.
+        return { result, malformed: "attestation signature or key is malformed" };
     }
     // (b) operator-address binding: base64url(SHA-256(modulus)) == payload.operator.
     try {
@@ -2025,7 +2248,7 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
         }
     }
     catch (e) {
-        return { result, malformed: `attestation operator key: ${stringifyErr(e)}` };
+        return { result, malformed: `attestation operator key${thrownDetail(e)}` };
     }
     // (c) checkpoint resolution + data_hash binding. The checkpoint tx data IS the
     // uploaded JCS(envelope) bytes (the same bytes the on-chain re-fetch compares
@@ -2047,7 +2270,7 @@ async function verifyAttestation(rec, sourceCheckpoints) {
             }
         }
         catch (e) {
-            errs.push(`cannot recompute checkpoint content hash: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            errs.push(`cannot recompute checkpoint content hash${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
     // (d) subject_ref (§3.2) — well-formedness only (no side-input subject channel
@@ -2358,7 +2581,7 @@ async function probeGateway(anchorRef, gateway, expectedHex, fetchImpl) {
     if (toHex(onChainBytes) === expectedHex)
         return "confirm";
     try {
-        const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(onChainBytes));
+        const parsed = jcsParse(onChainBytes);
         if (toHex(utf8(jcs(parsed))) === expectedHex)
             return "confirm";
     }
@@ -2402,7 +2625,7 @@ function selectDisclosedBytes(ev, eventId, sideContent) {
             inBody = hexToBytes(ev.content);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            errors.push(`event content is not hex: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            errors.push(`event content is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
     let side;
@@ -2415,7 +2638,7 @@ function selectDisclosedBytes(ev, eventId, sideContent) {
             side = hexToBytes(sideEntry.value);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            errors.push(`supplied content for ${eventId} is not hex: ${stringifyErr(e)}`);
+            errors.push(`supplied content for ${eventId} is not hex${thrownDetail(e)}`);
         }
     }
     // `offered` comes from the SAME test that produced the value, never from