@sankhyalabs/ezui 7.1.8 → 7.1.9

package/dist/cjs/{purify-29cc6f77.js → purify-ca9603eb.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 const _commonjsHelpers = require('./_commonjsHelpers-537d719a.js');
 
 var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
-/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.5 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.5/LICENSE */
+/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.8 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.8/LICENSE */
 
 (function (global, factory) {
   module.exports = factory() ;
@@ -340,11 +340,20 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
   // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
   const NODE_TYPE = {
     element: 1,
+    attribute: 2,
     text: 3,
+    cdataSection: 4,
+    entityReference: 5,
+    // Deprecated
+    entityNode: 6,
     // Deprecated
     progressingInstruction: 7,
     comment: 8,
-    document: 9};
+    document: 9,
+    documentType: 10,
+    documentFragment: 11,
+    notation: 12 // Deprecated
+  };
   const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
     return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
   };
@@ -401,7 +410,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
   function createDOMPurify() {
     let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
     const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-    DOMPurify.version = '3.4.5';
+    DOMPurify.version = '3.4.8';
     DOMPurify.removed = [];
     if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
       // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -412,15 +421,11 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
     let document = window.document;
     const originalDocument = document;
     const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
-    const DocumentFragment = window.DocumentFragment,
-      HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
+      const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
       Node = window.Node,
       Element = window.Element,
-      NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
-      _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap,
-      NamedNodeMap = _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap,
-      HTMLFormElement = window.HTMLFormElement,
-      DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
+      NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter;
+      const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
       trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
     const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
     const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
@@ -428,7 +433,10 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
     const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
     const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
     const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
+    const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
+    const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
     const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
+    const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
     // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
     // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
     // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -443,6 +451,23 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
     }
     let trustedTypesPolicy;
     let emptyHTML = '';
+    // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
+    // policy's `createHTML`. If the supplied `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML`
+    // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
+    // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
+    // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead.
+    let IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML = 0;
+    const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
+      if (IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML > 0) {
+        throw typeErrorCreate('The configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML must not call ' + 'DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes infinite recursion. Do not pass ' + 'a policy whose createHTML wraps DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; ' + 'see the "DOMPurify and Trusted Types" section of the README.');
+      }
+      IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML++;
+      try {
+        return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
+      } finally {
+        IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML--;
+      }
+    };
     const _document = document,
       implementation = _document.implementation,
       createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
@@ -770,19 +795,47 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
           throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
         }
         // Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
+        const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
         trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
-        // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
-        emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+        // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
+        // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
+        // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
+        // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
+        try {
+          emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
+        } catch (error) {
+          trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
+          throw error;
+        }
       } else {
         // Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
-        if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
+        if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined && cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY !== null) {
           trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
         }
         // If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
-        if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
-          emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+        // Note: a falsy `trustedTypesPolicy` (null when policy creation failed or
+        // was skipped via `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null`, or undefined when no
+        // policy has been initialized yet) must be excluded here, otherwise we
+        // would call `.createHTML` on a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
+        if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
+          emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
         }
       }
+      /*
+       * Mirror the clone-before-mutate pattern already applied above for
+       * cfg.ADD_TAGS / cfg.ADD_ATTR: if any uponSanitize* hook is
+       * registered AND the set still points at the default constant,
+       * clone it. The hook then mutates the clone (in-call widening
+       * still works exactly as documented) and the next default-cfg
+       * call rebinds to the untouched original via the reassignment at
+       * the top of this function.
+       */
+      if ((hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) && ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
+        ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
+      }
+      if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0 && ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
+        ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
+      }
       // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
       // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
       if (freeze) {
@@ -942,7 +995,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
         dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
       }
-      const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+      const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
       /*
        * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
        * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
@@ -1001,7 +1054,8 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
      *
      * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
      */
-    const _scrubTemplateExpressions = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+    const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+      var _node$querySelectorAl, _node$querySelectorAl2;
       node.normalize();
       const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
       // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
@@ -1015,15 +1069,87 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         currentNode.data = data;
         currentNode = walker.nextNode();
       }
+      // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
+      // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
+      // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
+      const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = (_node$querySelectorAl2 = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl2 === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl2.call(node, 'template')) !== null && _node$querySelectorAl !== void 0 ? _node$querySelectorAl : [];
+      arrayForEach(Array.from(templates), tmpl => {
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
+          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
+        }
+      });
     };
     /**
      * _isClobbered
      *
+     * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
+     * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
+     * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
+     * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
+     * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
+     *
      * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
      * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
      */
     const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
-      return element instanceof HTMLFormElement && (typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' || !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function');
+      // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
+      // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
+      // (the caller's other defences still apply).
+      const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
+      if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
+        return false;
+      }
+      if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
+        return false;
+      }
+      return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
+      // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
+      // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
+      // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
+      // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
+      // canonical NamedNodeMap.
+      element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
+      // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
+      // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
+      // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
+      // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
+      // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
+      // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
+      // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
+      element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
+      // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
+      // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
+      // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
+      // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
+      // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
+      // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
+      // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
+      // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
+      // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
+      // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
+      // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
+      element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
+    };
+    /**
+     * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
+     *
+     * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
+     * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
+     * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
+     * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
+     *
+     * @param value object to check
+     * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
+     */
+    const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
+      if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      try {
+        return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
+      } catch (_) {
+        return false;
+      }
     };
     /**
      * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
@@ -1033,12 +1159,6 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
      * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
      * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
      *
-     * Implementation: call the cached `nodeType` getter from Node.prototype
-     * directly on the value. This bypasses any clobbered instance property
-     * (e.g. a child element named "nodeType") and works across realms
-     * because the WebIDL `nodeType` getter reads an internal slot that
-     * every real Node has, regardless of which window minted it.
-     *
      * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
      * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
      */
@@ -1076,7 +1196,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         return true;
       }
       /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-      const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
+      const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
       /* Execute a hook if present */
       _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
         tagName,
@@ -1113,10 +1233,17 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
             return false;
           }
         }
-        /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */
+        /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
+           Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
+           had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
+           fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
+           value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
+           path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
+           ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
+           parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
         if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
-          const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;
-          const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;
+          const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
+          const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
           if (childNodes && parentNode) {
             const childCount = childNodes.length;
             for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
@@ -1128,8 +1255,14 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         _forceRemove(currentNode);
         return true;
       }
-      /* Check whether element has a valid namespace */
-      if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
+      /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
+         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
+         nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
+         bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
+         realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
+         slip past the namespace check entirely. */
+      const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
+      if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
         _forceRemove(currentNode);
         return true;
       }
@@ -1306,7 +1439,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
             switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
               case 'TrustedHTML':
                 {
-                  value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
+                  value = _createTrustedHTML(value);
                   break;
                 }
               case 'TrustedScriptURL':
@@ -1356,10 +1489,31 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
         /* Check attributes next */
         _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
-        /* Deep shadow DOM detected */
-        if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+        /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
+           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
+           DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
+           recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
         }
+        /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
+           shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
+           trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
+           previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
+           _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
+           doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
+           above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
+           Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
+           shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
+           iterator also surfaces. */
+        const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
+        if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+          const innerSr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(shadowNode) : shadowNode.shadowRoot;
+          if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
+            _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(innerSr);
+            _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
+          }
+        }
       }
       /* Execute a hook if present */
       _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
@@ -1384,18 +1538,28 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
      * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
      */
     const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2 = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
-      if (root.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element && root.shadowRoot instanceof DocumentFragment) {
-        const sr = root.shadowRoot;
-        // Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
-        // _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
-        _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
-        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
+      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(root) : root.nodeType;
+      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+        const sr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(root) : root.shadowRoot;
+        // Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType-based
+        // detection rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is
+        // realm-bound and silently skipped shadow roots whose host element
+        // belonged to a foreign realm (e.g. iframe.contentDocument
+        // attachShadow). A foreign-realm ShadowRoot extends the foreign
+        // realm's DocumentFragment, not ours, so the old instanceof check
+        // returned false and the shadow subtree was never walked.
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
+          // Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
+          // _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
+          _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
+          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
+        }
       }
       // Snapshot children before recursing. Sanitization of one subtree
       // (e.g. via an uponSanitizeShadowNode hook) may detach siblings,
       // and naive nextSibling traversal would silently skip the rest of
       // the list once a node is detached.
-      const childNodes = root.childNodes;
+      const childNodes = getChildNodes ? getChildNodes(root) : root.childNodes;
       if (!childNodes) {
         return;
       }
@@ -1406,6 +1570,16 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
       for (const child of snapshot) {
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(child);
       }
+      /* When the root is a <template>, also descend into root.content */
+      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+        const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(root) : null;
+        if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
+          const content = root.content;
+          if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
+            _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(content);
+          }
+        }
+      }
     };
     // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
     DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
@@ -1443,14 +1617,31 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         IN_PLACE = false;
       }
       if (IN_PLACE) {
-        /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */
-        const nn = dirty.nodeName;
+        /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
+           Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
+           child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
+           the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
+           validation entirely. */
+        const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
         if (typeof nn === 'string') {
           const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
           if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
             throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
           }
         }
+        /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
+           removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
+           falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
+           is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
+           then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
+           because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
+           result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
+           event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
+           the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
+           the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
+        if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
+          throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
+        }
         /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
            The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. */
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(dirty);
@@ -1470,14 +1661,16 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         }
         /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
            them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
-           descend into shadow trees. */
+           descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
+           cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
+           cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(importedNode);
       } else {
         /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
         if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
         // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
         dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
-          return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+          return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
         }
         /* Initialize the document to work on */
         body = _initDocument(dirty);
@@ -1498,22 +1691,25 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
         /* Check attributes next */
         _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
-        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
-        if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
+           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+           instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
+           walked correctly. */
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
         }
       }
       /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
       if (IN_PLACE) {
         if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-          _scrubTemplateExpressions(dirty);
+          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
         }
         return dirty;
       }
       /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
       if (RETURN_DOM) {
         if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-          _scrubTemplateExpressions(body);
+          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
         }
         if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
           returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
@@ -1547,7 +1743,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
           serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
         });
       }
-      return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
+      return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
     };
     DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
       let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};