@sankhyalabs/ezui 7.1.7 → 7.1.9

package/dist/cjs/{purify-62aeacfa.js → purify-ca9603eb.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 const _commonjsHelpers = require('./_commonjsHelpers-537d719a.js');
 
 var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
-/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.3 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.3/LICENSE */
+/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.8 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.8/LICENSE */
 
 (function (global, factory) {
   module.exports = factory() ;
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
   const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
   const text = freeze(['#text']);
 
-  const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
+  const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
   const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
   const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
   const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
@@ -340,11 +340,20 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
   // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
   const NODE_TYPE = {
     element: 1,
+    attribute: 2,
     text: 3,
+    cdataSection: 4,
+    entityReference: 5,
+    // Deprecated
+    entityNode: 6,
     // Deprecated
     progressingInstruction: 7,
     comment: 8,
-    document: 9};
+    document: 9,
+    documentType: 10,
+    documentFragment: 11,
+    notation: 12 // Deprecated
+  };
   const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
     return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
   };
@@ -401,7 +410,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
   function createDOMPurify() {
     let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
     const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-    DOMPurify.version = '3.4.3';
+    DOMPurify.version = '3.4.8';
     DOMPurify.removed = [];
     if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
       // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -412,15 +421,11 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
     let document = window.document;
     const originalDocument = document;
     const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
-    const DocumentFragment = window.DocumentFragment,
-      HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
+      const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
       Node = window.Node,
       Element = window.Element,
-      NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
-      _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap,
-      NamedNodeMap = _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap,
-      HTMLFormElement = window.HTMLFormElement,
-      DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
+      NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter;
+      const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
       trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
     const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
     const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
@@ -428,6 +433,10 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
     const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
     const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
     const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
+    const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
+    const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
+    const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
+    const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
     // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
     // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
     // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -442,6 +451,23 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
     }
     let trustedTypesPolicy;
     let emptyHTML = '';
+    // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
+    // policy's `createHTML`. If the supplied `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML`
+    // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
+    // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
+    // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead.
+    let IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML = 0;
+    const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
+      if (IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML > 0) {
+        throw typeErrorCreate('The configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML must not call ' + 'DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes infinite recursion. Do not pass ' + 'a policy whose createHTML wraps DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; ' + 'see the "DOMPurify and Trusted Types" section of the README.');
+      }
+      IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML++;
+      try {
+        return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
+      } finally {
+        IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML--;
+      }
+    };
     const _document = document,
       implementation = _document.implementation,
       createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
@@ -769,19 +795,47 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
           throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
         }
         // Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
+        const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
         trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
-        // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
-        emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+        // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
+        // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
+        // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
+        // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
+        try {
+          emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
+        } catch (error) {
+          trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
+          throw error;
+        }
       } else {
         // Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
-        if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
+        if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined && cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY !== null) {
           trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
         }
         // If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
-        if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
-          emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+        // Note: a falsy `trustedTypesPolicy` (null when policy creation failed or
+        // was skipped via `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null`, or undefined when no
+        // policy has been initialized yet) must be excluded here, otherwise we
+        // would call `.createHTML` on a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
+        if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
+          emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
         }
       }
+      /*
+       * Mirror the clone-before-mutate pattern already applied above for
+       * cfg.ADD_TAGS / cfg.ADD_ATTR: if any uponSanitize* hook is
+       * registered AND the set still points at the default constant,
+       * clone it. The hook then mutates the clone (in-call widening
+       * still works exactly as documented) and the next default-cfg
+       * call rebinds to the untouched original via the reassignment at
+       * the top of this function.
+       */
+      if ((hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) && ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
+        ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
+      }
+      if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0 && ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
+        ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
+      }
       // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
       // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
       if (freeze) {
@@ -941,7 +995,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
         dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
       }
-      const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+      const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
       /*
        * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
        * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
@@ -981,23 +1035,142 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
       // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
       NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
     };
+    /**
+     * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
+     * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
+     * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
+     * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
+     * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
+     *
+     * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
+     * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
+     * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
+     * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
+     * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
+     * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
+     *
+     * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
+     * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
+     *
+     * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
+     */
+    const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+      var _node$querySelectorAl, _node$querySelectorAl2;
+      node.normalize();
+      const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
+      NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
+      let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
+      while (currentNode) {
+        let data = currentNode.data;
+        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
+          data = stringReplace(data, expr, ' ');
+        });
+        currentNode.data = data;
+        currentNode = walker.nextNode();
+      }
+      // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
+      // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
+      // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
+      const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = (_node$querySelectorAl2 = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl2 === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl2.call(node, 'template')) !== null && _node$querySelectorAl !== void 0 ? _node$querySelectorAl : [];
+      arrayForEach(Array.from(templates), tmpl => {
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
+          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
+        }
+      });
+    };
     /**
      * _isClobbered
      *
+     * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
+     * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
+     * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
+     * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
+     * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
+     *
      * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
      * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
      */
     const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
-      return element instanceof HTMLFormElement && (typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' || !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function');
+      // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
+      // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
+      // (the caller's other defences still apply).
+      const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
+      if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
+        return false;
+      }
+      if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
+        return false;
+      }
+      return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
+      // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
+      // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
+      // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
+      // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
+      // canonical NamedNodeMap.
+      element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
+      // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
+      // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
+      // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
+      // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
+      // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
+      // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
+      // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
+      element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
+      // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
+      // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
+      // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
+      // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
+      // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
+      // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
+      // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
+      // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
+      // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
+      // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
+      // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
+      element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
     };
     /**
-     * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node.
+     * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
+     *
+     * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
+     * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
+     * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
+     * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
+     *
+     * @param value object to check
+     * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
+     */
+    const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
+      if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      try {
+        return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
+      } catch (_) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    };
+    /**
+     * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
+     * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
+     * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
+     * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
+     * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
+     * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
      *
      * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
-     * @return true is object is a DOM node
+     * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
      */
     const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
-      return typeof Node === 'function' && value instanceof Node;
+      if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      try {
+        return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
+      } catch (_) {
+        return false;
+      }
     };
     function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
       arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
@@ -1023,7 +1196,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         return true;
       }
       /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-      const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
+      const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
       /* Execute a hook if present */
       _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
         tagName,
@@ -1060,10 +1233,17 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
             return false;
           }
         }
-        /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */
+        /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
+           Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
+           had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
+           fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
+           value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
+           path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
+           ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
+           parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
         if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
-          const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;
-          const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;
+          const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
+          const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
           if (childNodes && parentNode) {
             const childCount = childNodes.length;
             for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
@@ -1075,8 +1255,14 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         _forceRemove(currentNode);
         return true;
       }
-      /* Check whether element has a valid namespace */
-      if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
+      /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
+         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
+         nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
+         bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
+         realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
+         slip past the namespace check entirely. */
+      const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
+      if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
         _forceRemove(currentNode);
         return true;
       }
@@ -1253,7 +1439,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
             switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
               case 'TrustedHTML':
                 {
-                  value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
+                  value = _createTrustedHTML(value);
                   break;
                 }
               case 'TrustedScriptURL':
@@ -1303,10 +1489,31 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
         /* Check attributes next */
         _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
-        /* Deep shadow DOM detected */
-        if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+        /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
+           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
+           DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
+           recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
         }
+        /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
+           shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
+           trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
+           previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
+           _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
+           doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
+           above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
+           Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
+           shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
+           iterator also surfaces. */
+        const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
+        if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+          const innerSr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(shadowNode) : shadowNode.shadowRoot;
+          if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
+            _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(innerSr);
+            _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
+          }
+        }
       }
       /* Execute a hook if present */
       _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
@@ -1331,18 +1538,28 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
      * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
      */
     const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2 = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
-      if (root.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element && root.shadowRoot instanceof DocumentFragment) {
-        const sr = root.shadowRoot;
-        // Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
-        // _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
-        _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
-        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
+      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(root) : root.nodeType;
+      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+        const sr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(root) : root.shadowRoot;
+        // Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType-based
+        // detection rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is
+        // realm-bound and silently skipped shadow roots whose host element
+        // belonged to a foreign realm (e.g. iframe.contentDocument
+        // attachShadow). A foreign-realm ShadowRoot extends the foreign
+        // realm's DocumentFragment, not ours, so the old instanceof check
+        // returned false and the shadow subtree was never walked.
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
+          // Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
+          // _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
+          _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
+          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
+        }
       }
       // Snapshot children before recursing. Sanitization of one subtree
       // (e.g. via an uponSanitizeShadowNode hook) may detach siblings,
       // and naive nextSibling traversal would silently skip the rest of
       // the list once a node is detached.
-      const childNodes = root.childNodes;
+      const childNodes = getChildNodes ? getChildNodes(root) : root.childNodes;
       if (!childNodes) {
         return;
       }
@@ -1353,6 +1570,16 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
       for (const child of snapshot) {
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(child);
       }
+      /* When the root is a <template>, also descend into root.content */
+      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+        const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(root) : null;
+        if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
+          const content = root.content;
+          if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
+            _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(content);
+          }
+        }
+      }
     };
     // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
     DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
@@ -1390,18 +1617,35 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         IN_PLACE = false;
       }
       if (IN_PLACE) {
-        /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */
-        const nn = dirty.nodeName;
+        /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
+           Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
+           child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
+           the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
+           validation entirely. */
+        const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
         if (typeof nn === 'string') {
           const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
           if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
             throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
           }
         }
+        /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
+           removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
+           falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
+           is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
+           then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
+           because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
+           result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
+           event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
+           the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
+           the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
+        if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
+          throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
+        }
         /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
            The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. */
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(dirty);
-      } else if (dirty instanceof Node) {
+      } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
         /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
            elements being stripped by the parser */
         body = _initDocument('<!---->');
@@ -1417,14 +1661,16 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         }
         /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
            them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
-           descend into shadow trees. */
+           descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
+           cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
+           cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(importedNode);
       } else {
         /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
         if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
         // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
         dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
-          return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+          return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
         }
         /* Initialize the document to work on */
         body = _initDocument(dirty);
@@ -1445,24 +1691,25 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
         _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
         /* Check attributes next */
         _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
-        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
-        if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
+           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+           instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
+           walked correctly. */
+        if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
         }
       }
       /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
       if (IN_PLACE) {
+        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
+        }
         return dirty;
       }
       /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
       if (RETURN_DOM) {
         if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-          body.normalize();
-          let html = body.innerHTML;
-          arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
-            html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
-          });
-          body.innerHTML = html;
+          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
         }
         if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
           returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
@@ -1496,7 +1743,7 @@ var purify = _commonjsHelpers.createCommonjsModule(function (module, exports) {
           serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
         });
       }
-      return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
+      return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
     };
     DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
       let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};