@sanctuary-framework/mcp-server 1.1.7 → 1.2.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -2965,6 +2965,9 @@ type HubDisplayTemplateArg = {
 } | {
     kind: "policy_id";
     value: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "channel_template_id";
+    value: string;
 } | {
     kind: "destination_category";
     value: PrivacyDestinationCategory;
@@ -4130,10 +4133,981 @@ type HubInboxAction = (typeof HUB_INBOX_ACTIONS)[number];
 declare const HUB_AGENT_CONTROL_ACTIONS: readonly ["pause", "resume", "restart", "unwrap", "lockdown"];
 type HubAgentControlAction = (typeof HUB_AGENT_CONTROL_ACTIONS)[number];
 
-/** Channel-template identifiers per Walkthrough Key 10 LOCKED starter set. */
-declare const CHANNEL_TEMPLATE_IDS: readonly ["read-outputs-only", "bidirectional-sync", "credential-share-scoped", "plan-inspect-read-only", "escrow-handoff"];
+/** Channel-template identifiers per v1.2 design-canonical starter set. */
+declare const CHANNEL_TEMPLATE_IDS: readonly ["request-approve-act", "read-then-report", "scheduled-digest", "plan-draft-only", "fortress-relay", "concierge-loop"];
 type ChannelTemplateId = (typeof CHANNEL_TEMPLATE_IDS)[number];
 
+/**
+ * Sanctuary MCP Server — Intelligence Substrate Selector Types
+ *
+ * The substrate selector lets operators pick (and re-pick) the LLM substrate
+ * that powers Sanctuary's intelligence-layer surfaces: concierge, sentinel
+ * scoring, gate explanation, privacy filter Tier 2, template suggestion,
+ * direct-agent gate advisory.
+ *
+ * Per Erik directive 2026-04-29: the selector IS the architecture. Sanctuary's
+ * job is to make the tradeoffs visible and let the operator choose. Multi-option
+ * framing is preserved; no single substrate is surfaced as a winner.
+ *
+ * Per the position paper Intelligence_Layer_Drift_Audit_and_Substrate_Resolution_2026-04-29.md
+ * (sections 4 + 5), four substrates ship as operator-pickable:
+ *
+ *   - local:                  Ollama-hosted local model (Gemma 2 2B / Phi-4 Mini / Llama 3.1 8B)
+ *   - venice:                 Venice.ai privacy-respecting hosted relay
+ *   - frontier-with-filter:   operator's frontier API account, Privacy Filter Tier 2 pre-egress
+ *   - hybrid:                 per-surface routing across the above
+ *   - disabled:               surface refuses LLM calls; Tier 1 regex fallback for privacy filter
+ *
+ * Per-surface defaults (Erik ratification 2026-04-29):
+ *   - concierge:                       local (Gemma 2 2B)
+ *   - sentinel-scoring:                local (rules + Phi-4 Mini on escalation)
+ *   - gate-explanation:                templates v1.2; small LLM v1.3+ for custom policies
+ *   - privacy-filter-tier-2:           local (NER + small LLM PII classifier)
+ *   - direct-agent-gate-advisor:       same as concierge by default
+ *   - template-suggestion:             same as concierge by default
+ */
+/**
+ * The set of intelligence-layer surfaces the selector routes for.
+ *
+ * The enum is closed. Adding a surface requires updating the selector's
+ * default-config builder, the audit emission shape registry, and the
+ * transparency UI in the same PR.
+ */
+type Surface = "concierge" | "direct-agent-gate-advisor" | "sentinel-scoring" | "gate-explanation" | "privacy-filter-tier-2" | "template-suggestion";
+/**
+ * The substrate choice an operator may bind to a surface.
+ */
+type SubstrateChoice = "local" | "venice" | "frontier-with-filter" | "hybrid" | "disabled";
+/**
+ * Local-model picks for the Ollama-backed local substrate.
+ *
+ * Bundled tiers per position paper §5 hardware-tier table:
+ *   - gemma-2-2b   (Baseline / 8GB RAM)
+ *   - phi-4-mini   (Mid / 16GB RAM)
+ *   - llama-3.1-8b (Pro / 32GB+ RAM)
+ *
+ * Custom Ollama-installed models can be specified via `customModelTag` on the
+ * substrate config; the selector probes Ollama for availability at runtime.
+ */
+type LocalModelPick = "gemma-2-2b" | "phi-4-mini" | "llama-3.1-8b";
+/**
+ * Frontier providers operator may pick for the frontier-with-filter substrate.
+ * v1.2 ships three; v1.3+ may add Mistral / xAI / Cohere.
+ */
+type FrontierProvider = "anthropic" | "openai" | "google";
+/**
+ * What the selector does when its chosen substrate fails (e.g. Ollama not
+ * running, Venice API unreachable, frontier API key revoked).
+ *
+ * Per surface, operator-configurable. Defaults per position paper §5:
+ *   - concierge:               degrade-silent (next-tier substrate)
+ *   - sentinel-scoring:        conservative-deny (refuse rather than route elsewhere)
+ *   - privacy-filter-tier-2:   degrade-silent (Tier 1 regex always works)
+ *   - others:                  conservative-deny
+ */
+type FallbackBehavior = "conservative-deny" | "degrade-silent" | "disable-surface";
+/**
+ * Per-surface routing rules for the hybrid substrate.
+ *
+ * v1.2 ships per-surface routing only — operator pre-binds each surface to a
+ * concrete substrate. Per-query sensitivity classification routing is deferred
+ * to v1.3+.
+ */
+interface HybridRoutingRules {
+    perSurface: Record<Surface, Exclude<SubstrateChoice, "hybrid">>;
+}
+/**
+ * Operator-readable status badge for the transparency UI and chat headers.
+ *
+ * Backends emit a stable shape (no free-form prose); the dashboard's template
+ * registry renders it. This mirrors the v1.1 hub `HubDisplayTemplateArg`
+ * discipline so secret-leakage into operator-facing copy stays structurally
+ * impossible.
+ */
+interface SubstrateBadge {
+    surface: Surface;
+    substrate: SubstrateChoice;
+    /** Stable badge label key resolved by dashboard template registry. */
+    labelKey: string;
+    /** Stable tradeoff body key resolved by dashboard template registry. */
+    tradeoffKey: string;
+    /** Stable status; green = working; yellow = degraded; red = disabled / failing. */
+    status: "green" | "yellow" | "red";
+}
+/**
+ * Frontier provider configs. Operator's API key per provider is stored
+ * encrypted; never leaves the fortress except as outbound HTTPS to the
+ * provider after Privacy Filter Tier 2 redaction.
+ */
+interface FrontierProviderConfig {
+    /** Operator's per-provider API key (encrypted at rest). */
+    anthropic?: string;
+    openai?: string;
+    google?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Operator-overridable substrate config. Persisted encrypted under the
+ * fortress master key in storage namespace `_intelligence`.
+ *
+ * v1.0 of this shape (`version: 1`) is the only shape this PR ships. Future
+ * v1.x extensions (per-query sensitivity classifier, MLX runtime pick,
+ * per-patron substrate scoping) MUST bump this version and provide a
+ * forward-compat migration in the selector.
+ */
+interface SubstrateConfig {
+    version: 1;
+    /** Operator's per-surface choice. Defaults from position paper §5. */
+    perSurface: Record<Surface, SubstrateChoice>;
+    /** Operator's local-model picks per surface, when 'local' is chosen. */
+    localModelPicks: Partial<Record<Surface, LocalModelPick>>;
+    /** Custom Ollama model tag override per surface (overrides localModelPicks if set). */
+    customLocalModelTags?: Partial<Record<Surface, string>>;
+    /** Ollama HTTP endpoint; defaults to http://localhost:11434. */
+    ollamaEndpoint?: string;
+    /** Venice API key, if 'venice' chosen for any surface. Encrypted at rest. */
+    veniceApiKey?: string;
+    /** Venice model selection; defaults to llama-3.1-70b. */
+    veniceModel?: string;
+    /** Frontier provider configs, if 'frontier-with-filter' chosen. */
+    frontierConfig: FrontierProviderConfig;
+    /** Hybrid routing rules, if 'hybrid' chosen for any surface. */
+    hybridRules?: HybridRoutingRules;
+    /** Fallback behavior per surface. */
+    fallback: Record<Surface, FallbackBehavior>;
+    /**
+     * Operator preference for the picker modal: when true, picking a
+     * substrate + key for any one surface fans out to every surface in one
+     * save (Finding SS, v1.2.0-rc.1). Defaults to true; operators wanting
+     * per-surface granularity flip the picker toggle off and the next
+     * single-surface choice persists this back to false.
+     */
+    applyToAllSurfaces?: boolean;
+    /** ISO8601 timestamp of last operator change. */
+    updatedAt: string;
+}
+interface SummarizeRequest {
+    kind: "summarize";
+    context: string;
+    query: string;
+    maxTokens?: number;
+}
+interface ClassifyRequest {
+    kind: "classify";
+    items: string[];
+    categories: string[];
+    maxTokens?: number;
+}
+interface RedactRequest {
+    kind: "redact";
+    text: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Per-substrate response envelope. Substrate clients return content + telemetry;
+ * audit-emission and badge-rendering happen at the selector layer.
+ */
+interface SubstrateResponse {
+    /** The substrate that actually served this invocation (may differ from chosen if fallback fired). */
+    servedBy: SubstrateChoice;
+    /** Stable failure-class enum on failure; null on success. */
+    failureClass: SubstrateFailureClass | null;
+    /** Body shape varies by request kind. */
+    body: {
+        kind: "summarize";
+        text: string;
+    } | {
+        kind: "classify";
+        results: {
+            category: string;
+            confidence: number;
+        }[];
+    } | {
+        kind: "redact";
+        redacted: string;
+        placeholders: Record<string, string>;
+    } | {
+        kind: "failure";
+        message: string;
+    };
+    /** ISO8601 of when invocation completed. */
+    completedAt: string;
+    /** Total wall-clock latency in ms. */
+    latencyMs: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Stable failure-class enum. Backends return one of these when a substrate
+ * invocation fails; the selector's audit emission carries this verbatim.
+ *
+ * Adding a new failure class requires updating the audit-event consumer and
+ * the dashboard status-mapping in the same PR.
+ */
+type SubstrateFailureClass = "substrate_unavailable" | "substrate_misconfigured" | "substrate_rate_limited" | "substrate_auth_failed" | "substrate_timeout" | "substrate_capability_unsupported" | "substrate_disabled" | "internal_error";
+/**
+ * Capability profile for each substrate. Surfaces consult this before
+ * invoking; if the substrate cannot serve the request kind, the selector
+ * applies the fallback policy.
+ */
+interface SubstrateCapability {
+    summarize: boolean;
+    classify: boolean;
+    redact: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * The handle a surface holds after `selector.getSubstrate(surface)`. The
+ * surface invokes via the typed methods; the substrate client implements them.
+ *
+ * Surfaces MUST treat any thrown error as a `substrate_unavailable` failure;
+ * the selector's invoke wrapper catches and emits the audit event.
+ */
+interface SubstrateHandle {
+    surface: Surface;
+    substrate: SubstrateChoice;
+    badge: SubstrateBadge;
+    capability: SubstrateCapability;
+    /**
+     * Optional operator-readable display string for the chat / dashboard headers.
+     * Resolved from the badge labelKey; produced by the selector at handle issue,
+     * not by the substrate client.
+     */
+    displayLabel: string;
+    summarize?: (req: SummarizeRequest) => Promise<SubstrateResponse>;
+    classify?: (req: ClassifyRequest) => Promise<SubstrateResponse>;
+    redact?: (req: RedactRequest) => Promise<SubstrateResponse>;
+}
+/**
+ * Operator-visible per-surface status report rendered by the transparency UI.
+ *
+ * The dashboard SPA consumes this via the `/api/hub/intelligence/status`
+ * route; the picker modal consumes it before substrate selection to surface
+ * hardware-capability hints.
+ */
+interface SubstrateStatusReport {
+    version: "1.2";
+    generatedAt: string;
+    surfaces: SurfaceStatus[];
+    hardware: HardwareCapabilityReport;
+}
+interface SurfaceStatus {
+    surface: Surface;
+    chosen: SubstrateChoice;
+    badge: SubstrateBadge;
+    /** Substrate-side health probe result. */
+    health: "ok" | "degraded" | "unavailable";
+    /** Stable failure class when health != "ok"; null when "ok". */
+    failureClass: SubstrateFailureClass | null;
+    /**
+     * Recent runtime + validation failures for this surface, capped at 5
+     * entries and time-windowed to 24 hours. Sourced from real chat-call
+     * outcomes (and validateKey results for substrates that expose it),
+     * NOT from the static probe-time misconfig check.
+     *
+     * Per Finding VV (v1.2.0-rc.1): the operator-visible badge degrades to
+     * "yellow" / "degraded" whenever this array is non-empty even if the
+     * static probe still says ok. This closes the truth-telling gap where
+     * the dashboard reported all surfaces healthy after the runtime chat
+     * had already failed against the same substrate.
+     */
+    recentFailures: RecentFailureEntry[];
+}
+/**
+ * One observed substrate failure surfaced via `/api/hub/intelligence/status`.
+ * Carries enough metadata for the operator to triage (when, what failure
+ * class, brief operator-safe snippet) without leaking request bodies,
+ * response bodies, or operator credentials.
+ *
+ * Snippets are bounded human-readable strings (e.g. "venice configured
+ * model not found") drawn from the substrate failure-message field; the
+ * selector strips anything resembling an API key or PII before retention.
+ * Operators wanting full forensic detail consult the L2 audit log; this
+ * surface is the at-a-glance triage path.
+ */
+interface RecentFailureEntry {
+    /** ISO8601 timestamp of when the failure was observed. */
+    ts: string;
+    /** Stable failure-class enum carried verbatim from the substrate response. */
+    failureClass: SubstrateFailureClass;
+    /** Bounded operator-safe snippet describing the failure. */
+    snippet: string;
+}
+interface HardwareCapabilityReport {
+    /** Detected total RAM in GB. Self-reported via os.totalmem(). */
+    totalRamGb: number;
+    /** Apple Silicon family if detectable, or "other". */
+    cpuArch: "apple-silicon-m1" | "apple-silicon-m2" | "apple-silicon-m3" | "apple-silicon-m4" | "apple-silicon-other" | "x86_64" | "other";
+    /** Computed tier per position paper §5 (baseline / mid / pro / below-baseline). */
+    tier: "below-baseline" | "baseline" | "mid" | "pro";
+    /** Recommended local model tier per detected hardware. */
+    recommendedLocalModel: LocalModelPick | null;
+    /** Whether Ollama is reachable at the configured endpoint. */
+    ollamaReachable: boolean;
+    /** Models present in Ollama at the time of the report. Empty if not reachable. */
+    ollamaModels: string[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanctuary MCP Server — Frontier-with-Filter Substrate
+ *
+ * Operator's frontier API account (Anthropic / OpenAI / Google) wrapped with
+ * mandatory pre-egress Privacy Filter Tier 2 redaction.
+ *
+ * Per position paper §5: every query routes through Privacy Filter Tier 2
+ * BEFORE the frontier API call. The Privacy Filter event log captures the
+ * pre-redaction match count so the operator can audit what was sent.
+ *
+ * Honesty discipline (CLAUDE.md):
+ *   - Tradeoff badge text explicitly names the leakage
+ *   - Required caveat about subtle PII (paraphrased addresses, contextual
+ *     identifiers) appears in tradeoff text
+ *   - Operator MUST acknowledge before configuration completes (enforced
+ *     by the picker modal in the dashboard SPA, deferred to the v1.2 UI
+ *     follow-up commit)
+ *
+ * Provider clients are kept minimal: one Chat Completions / Messages call
+ * per surface request, no streaming in v1.2 (streaming is a v1.3 chat
+ * surface enhancement).
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Pre-egress redaction hook. The substrate adapter calls this on every
+ * outbound text; returns the redacted text + placeholder map. The Privacy
+ * Filter Tier 2 implementation lives in `l2-operational/privacy-filter.ts`
+ * (extended in this PR to wire the substrate-aware Tier 2 path).
+ *
+ * For v1.2, the redactor passed in is responsible for emitting the audit
+ * event `intelligence_pii_redaction_event` via the selector's auditLog
+ * binding. The frontier substrate is provider-agnostic about how redaction
+ * happens; it just refuses to call the frontier API on `failureClass !== null`.
+ */
+type FrontierRedactor = (text: string) => Promise<{
+    redacted: string;
+    matchCount: number;
+}>;
+
+/**
+ * Sanctuary MCP Server — Intelligence Substrate Selector
+ *
+ * The selector IS the architecture (Erik directive 2026-04-29). Operators
+ * pick (and re-pick) the LLM substrate that powers each intelligence-layer
+ * surface; the selector binds choices to surfaces, provides a typed
+ * `SubstrateHandle` to consumers, applies operator-configured fallback
+ * behavior on substrate failure, and emits audit events for every change
+ * and every invocation.
+ *
+ * Architecture per position paper section 5:
+ *   ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
+ *   │ concierge│  │ sentinel │  │ gate-expl│ │ priv-f-2 │  ... surfaces
+ *   └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
+ *        ▼             ▼             ▼            ▼
+ *   ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+ *   │    SubstrateSelector (per-surface routing)       │
+ *   └────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────────┘
+ *        ▼          ▼          ▼          ▼
+ *   ┌────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
+ *   │ Local  │ │ Venice   │ │ Frontier │ │ Disabled │
+ *   │(Ollama)│ │ (relay)  │ │ + filter │ │ (refuse) │
+ *   └────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘
+ *
+ * The hybrid substrate is per-surface routing only at v1.2 — operator
+ * pre-binds each surface to a concrete substrate; per-query sensitivity
+ * classification routing is deferred to v1.3+.
+ *
+ * Audit emission discipline:
+ * Every public method that changes config or invokes a substrate appends
+ * an `IntelligenceAuditPayload` to the L2 audit log. The selector never
+ * stores raw request bodies, response bodies, or operator credentials in
+ * audit details; only safe metadata (surface, substrate, hashes, latency,
+ * failure-class enum). The event payload contracts live in
+ * `contracts/v1.2/intelligence-events.ts`.
+ *
+ * Sovereignty invariants preserved:
+ * - Operator API keys live in the encrypted SubstrateConfig persisted
+ *   under the fortress master key.
+ * - Frontier-with-filter substrate ALWAYS routes through a redactor
+ *   before any frontier API call; the redactor argument is required in
+ *   the constructor; passing a null redactor disables the substrate.
+ * - Sentinel-scoring surface defaults to `conservative-deny` fallback so
+ *   substrate failure cannot silently allow an unverified tool call.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Configuration the selector needs at construction. The audit-log binding
+ * is required: a selector without an audit log violates the audit-emission
+ * invariant and is structurally rejected.
+ */
+interface SelectorConfig {
+    storage: StorageBackend;
+    masterKey: Uint8Array;
+    auditLog: AuditLog;
+    /** Identity that owns the substrate config. Stamped on every audit event. */
+    identityId: string;
+    /**
+     * Pre-egress redactor for the frontier-with-filter substrate. Defaults
+     * to `IDENTITY_REDACTOR` until Privacy Filter Tier 2 wires through.
+     * Passing a custom redactor at construction allows tests + the Tier 2
+     * commit to install a real implementation without modifying the
+     * selector.
+     */
+    redactor?: FrontierRedactor;
+    /**
+     * Optional fetch override for substrate clients. Forwarded to Ollama,
+     * Venice, and frontier client constructors so tests can stub out
+     * network calls.
+     */
+    fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+}
+declare class SubstrateSelector {
+    private store;
+    private auditLog;
+    private identityId;
+    private redactor;
+    private fetchImpl;
+    private config;
+    private loaded;
+    /**
+     * Per-surface ring buffer of recent runtime + validation failures. See
+     * `RECENT_FAILURES_CAP` and `RECENT_FAILURES_WINDOW_MS`. Populated by
+     * `recordRecentFailure()` from the `invoke()` failure path and from the
+     * post-config validation hook on substrates that expose validateKey.
+     * Drives the operator-visible degrade in `getOperatorVisibleStatus()`.
+     */
+    private recentFailures;
+    constructor(cfg: SelectorConfig);
+    /**
+     * Load (or initialize) the operator's substrate config. Emits the
+     * `intelligence_config_loaded` audit event regardless of branch so the
+     * audit chain shows config-load activity on boot.
+     */
+    load(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Operator picked (or re-picked) a substrate for a surface. Persists the
+     * change and emits `intelligence_substrate_chosen`. The picker modal
+     * surfaces the tradeoff text BEFORE invoking this method; the audit
+     * payload captures the hash of that text for auditor verification.
+     */
+    setPerSurfaceChoice(surface: Surface, substrate: SubstrateChoice): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Apply a substrate choice to every surface in one save. Used by the
+     * picker modal's "Apply to all surfaces" affordance (Finding SS,
+     * v1.2.0-rc.1). Persists the per-surface map mutation in a single
+     * write and emits ONE `intelligence_bulk_substrate_chosen` audit
+     * event rather than six per-surface events.
+     *
+     * If `localModelPick` is provided AND substrate === "local", the same
+     * pick is applied to every surface; ignored for other substrates.
+     *
+     * Per-surface bindings the operator had previously customized are
+     * captured in the audit payload's `prior_substrates` map so the
+     * forensic record makes the configuration discontinuity visible.
+     */
+    applyChoiceToAllSurfaces(substrate: SubstrateChoice, opts?: {
+        localModelPick?: LocalModelPick | null;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Persist the operator's "Apply to all surfaces" preference. The
+     * picker modal calls this when the operator flips the toggle so the
+     * preference survives a dashboard reload. Does not emit a discrete
+     * audit event; the next bulk or per-surface choice carries the
+     * operator-visible signal.
+     */
+    setApplyToAllPreference(value: boolean): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Operator picked a local model for a surface bound to the local
+     * substrate. Mirrors `setPerSurfaceChoice` for the model-picker case.
+     * Does not emit a separate audit event class; the next
+     * `intelligence_substrate_chosen` event captures the change and the
+     * dashboard transparency UI calls this method only as part of a binding
+     * flow that already audited the substrate choice.
+     */
+    setLocalModelPick(surface: Surface, pick: LocalModelPick | null): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Set the Venice API key. Stored as part of the encrypted
+     * SubstrateConfig record. Does not emit a substrate_chosen event by
+     * itself; the dashboard flow always pairs key entry with a substrate
+     * choice and the choice carries the audit semantics.
+     *
+     * Post-set validation (Finding VV, v1.2.0-rc.1): if a non-null key is
+     * provided, the selector probes Venice with `validateKey()` and records
+     * a failure entry on every Venice-bound surface when the result is not
+     * `"ok"`. This lets the operator-visible status degrade from validation
+     * outcomes alone, not just from runtime chat-call failures, so a broken
+     * key or drifted model is visible before the operator's first chat
+     * attempt. Probe failures (timeout, transport) are not recorded; the
+     * runtime path will surface those when the operator actually invokes.
+     */
+    setVeniceApiKey(apiKey: string | null): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Probe Venice with the given API key and record a failure entry on
+     * every surface bound to Venice when the probe returns anything other
+     * than `"ok"`. Failures map to stable substrate failure-class enum
+     * values: `invalid-key` -> `substrate_auth_failed`, `invalid-model` ->
+     * `substrate_misconfigured`, `unreachable` -> swallow (runtime path
+     * will surface).
+     */
+    private validateVeniceAndRecord;
+    /**
+     * Set a frontier provider's API key. See `setVeniceApiKey` for the
+     * audit-semantics rationale.
+     */
+    setFrontierApiKey(provider: FrontierProvider, apiKey: string | null): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Set the hybrid routing rules. The picker modal calls this when the
+     * operator saves the hybrid configuration tab. Validates the rules
+     * (every surface bound, no `hybrid` recursion) before persist; throws
+     * on invalid input so the operator-facing form can surface the failure.
+     *
+     * Setting rules does NOT change any surface's per-surface choice; the
+     * operator must also pick `hybrid` for the surfaces they want routed
+     * through these rules. This separation keeps the flow obvious in the
+     * UI (set rules + then choose hybrid for each surface that should use
+     * them) and lets the operator test rule changes without mass-flipping
+     * surfaces to hybrid.
+     */
+    setHybridRules(rules: HybridRoutingRules): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Override the per-surface fallback behavior. Defaults are set per
+     * position paper section 5; the picker modal surfaces the tradeoff and
+     * the operator can override.
+     */
+    setFallbackBehavior(surface: Surface, fallback: FallbackBehavior): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Reset every binding to the per-surface defaults. Emits
+     * `intelligence_config_reset` so post-reset audit trails make the
+     * configuration discontinuity visible.
+     */
+    resetToDefaults(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Snapshot the current config (read-only). Tests + the dashboard
+     * transparency UI consume this; mutations always go through the
+     * setter methods so audit-emission stays consistent.
+     */
+    getConfig(): SubstrateConfig;
+    /**
+     * Install (or replace) the redactor used by the frontier-with-filter
+     * substrate. Bootstrap code calls this after constructing the selector
+     * with the default IDENTITY_REDACTOR; the Privacy Filter Tier 2
+     * commit's `buildPrivacyTier2Redactor` produces the redactor that
+     * closes over the selector for audit emission. Late-binding via this
+     * method avoids the circular construction dependency
+     * (selector needs redactor; redactor needs selector for emit).
+     *
+     * Subsequent calls to getSubstrate("...frontier-with-filter") will use
+     * the installed redactor; already-issued handles continue to use the
+     * redactor that was installed at handle-issue time. Consumers that
+     * cache handles SHOULD re-issue after installRedactor.
+     */
+    installRedactor(redactor: FrontierRedactor): void;
+    /**
+     * Build a typed SubstrateHandle for the given surface. Lazily
+     * instantiates the substrate client based on the operator's binding;
+     * the handle carries the substrate label, tradeoff badge, capability
+     * surface, and bound `summarize` / `classify` / `redact` methods that
+     * delegate to the substrate client.
+     *
+     * For the `disabled` substrate, the returned handle has the capability
+     * surface zeroed and no methods bound; consumers checking
+     * `handle.capability.summarize === false` short-circuit to the
+     * surface's static fallback (templates for gate-explanation, Tier 1
+     * regex for privacy-filter-tier-2, etc.).
+     *
+     * For the `hybrid` substrate, this method delegates to the per-surface
+     * routing rules (set via `setPerSurfaceChoice` on a substrate other
+     * than `hybrid`); v1.2 ships per-surface routing only.
+     */
+    getSubstrate(surface: Surface): Promise<SubstrateHandle>;
+    /**
+     * Operator-visible per-surface status report. Consumers: the dashboard
+     * transparency UI and the `/api/hub/intelligence/status` route.
+     *
+     * Probes hardware + Ollama at call time. The dashboard re-fetches every
+     * 5 minutes to refresh status badges (degraded -> ok flip when Ollama
+     * comes back up, and so on).
+     */
+    getOperatorVisibleStatus(): Promise<SubstrateStatusReport>;
+    /**
+     * Probe the host machine's hardware capability. v1.2 reports total RAM
+     * + CPU arch (Apple Silicon family if detectable) and computes the tier
+     * per position paper section 5. Used by the picker modal to surface
+     * "below-baseline -> recommend Venice" guidance.
+     */
+    probeHardware(): Promise<HardwareCapabilityReport>;
+    /**
+     * Invoke a substrate with audit emission. Wraps the underlying
+     * SubstrateHandle method, applies fallback behavior on failure per the
+     * operator's per-surface config, and emits `intelligence_substrate_invoked`
+     * + (on failure) `intelligence_substrate_failure`.
+     *
+     * Consumers SHOULD call this method rather than calling `handle.summarize`
+     * etc. directly; the handle is exposed for cases where audit emission
+     * needs to be explicitly skipped (probe paths, tests).
+     */
+    invokeSummarize(surface: Surface, req: SummarizeRequest): Promise<SubstrateResponse>;
+    invokeClassify(surface: Surface, req: ClassifyRequest): Promise<SubstrateResponse>;
+    invokeRedact(surface: Surface, req: RedactRequest): Promise<SubstrateResponse>;
+    private ensureLoaded;
+    private invoke;
+    /**
+     * Append a failure entry to the per-surface ring buffer. The selector
+     * uses this in the `invoke()` failure path and in the post-config
+     * `setVeniceApiKey` validation hook so the operator-visible badge
+     * degrades from runtime AND from validation outcomes.
+     *
+     * Operator-safe by construction: snippets are bounded by
+     * `FAILURE_SNIPPET_MAX_LEN` and pulled from substrate `failure.message`
+     * fields (which substrates produce for operator-readable output and
+     * never include API keys or PII). The cap + window prune happen on
+     * every read in `recentFailuresFor()` so the ring buffer never grows.
+     */
+    private recordRecentFailure;
+    /**
+     * Read recent failures for a surface, pruning entries older than the
+     * 24-hour window. Pruning happens lazily on read so a long-quiet surface
+     * does not retain stale entries from yesterday's debugging.
+     */
+    private recentFailuresFor;
+    /**
+     * Test-only seam: lets selector tests assert on recorded failures
+     * without poking the private ring buffer. Returns a defensive copy.
+     */
+    getRecentFailuresForTest(surface: Surface): RecentFailureEntry[];
+    /**
+     * Test-only seam: lets selector tests seed a recent-failure entry on a
+     * surface so the buffer-clear behavior added for Finding ZZ (v1.2.0-rc.2)
+     * can be exercised without spinning up a real failing substrate. Mirrors
+     * `getRecentFailuresForTest`; never call from production paths.
+     */
+    recordRecentFailureForTest(surface: Surface, failureClass: SubstrateFailureClass, snippet: string): void;
+    /**
+     * Build a substrate handle for a surface bound to a concrete choice.
+     * The substrate-client constructor is paid lazily so the selector
+     * doesn't pre-spawn HTTP clients for substrates the operator never
+     * touches.
+     */
+    private buildHandle;
+    private disabledHandle;
+    private localHandle;
+    private veniceHandle;
+    private frontierHandle;
+    private probeSurfaceHealth;
+    private makeBadge;
+    private fallbackAction;
+    /**
+     * Internal hook for the Privacy Filter Tier 2 commit. Lets a redactor
+     * audit-emit a `pii_redaction_event` payload through the selector
+     * without exposing the AuditLog binding directly to redactor
+     * implementations.
+     */
+    emitRedactionEvent(args: {
+        surface: Surface;
+        substrate: SubstrateChoice;
+        matchCount: number;
+        filterTier: 1 | 2;
+    }): void;
+    private emit;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanctuary MCP Server — Operator Chat Types
+ *
+ * Distinct from the existing agent-to-agent mesh chat (`chat-service.ts`).
+ * Operator chat is the operator-fortress concierge surface: an operator
+ * types into the v1.1 dashboard, Sanctuary persists the conversation,
+ * audits every message, and routes responses through the substrate
+ * selector.
+ *
+ * The direct-agent surface (operator-to-wrapped-agent conversation) was
+ * removed in the v1.2 reshape. The concierge surface (operator-to-
+ * Sanctuary) is the only operator chat surface that ships in v1.2.
+ *
+ * Sovereignty invariants:
+ * - Conversation history is encrypted at rest under the fortress master
+ *   key via an HKDF-derived purpose key.
+ * - Audit emission is non-optional: every operator submit and every
+ *   concierge reply lands in the L2 audit log.
+ * - No raw message bodies are stored in audit `details`; only message
+ *   hashes and safe metadata. Bodies live in the encrypted chat store
+ *   that the operator can export, delete, or rotate.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The chat surface a message belongs to. Concierge is the only operator
+ * chat surface in v1.2; the type stays a single-member union for
+ * forward-compatibility if additional Sanctuary-side surfaces land later.
+ */
+type OperatorChatSurface = "concierge";
+/**
+ * Message-role enum. Concierge has two roles: `operator` (the human) and
+ * `concierge` (Sanctuary's response).
+ */
+type OperatorChatRole = "operator" | "concierge";
+/**
+ * One message in a concierge thread. The body is stored encrypted at
+ * rest; the in-memory shape carries the cleartext for service consumers,
+ * and the audit emission carries only `message_hash` + safe metadata.
+ */
+interface OperatorChatMessage {
+    /** Stable message id (uuid) assigned at create time. */
+    message_id: string;
+    /** Surface this message belongs to. */
+    surface: OperatorChatSurface;
+    /** Sender role. */
+    role: OperatorChatRole;
+    /** Cleartext body. NEVER appears in audit `details`. */
+    body: string;
+    /** ISO8601 timestamp the message was created. */
+    created_at: string;
+    /**
+     * For concierge response messages: which substrate served the response.
+     * Null on operator-sent messages. Surfaces in the chat header badge.
+     */
+    served_by?: SubstrateChoice;
+    /**
+     * For concierge response messages: latency of the substrate call in ms.
+     * Operator-side surfaces this in the message tooltip / activity feed.
+     */
+    substrate_latency_ms?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * The shape persisted to disk under `_chat/<surface>/<thread-key>`.
+ *
+ * Threads are append-only; the persisted record is read-rewritten on
+ * every message append. v1.2 caps thread length at
+ * `OPERATOR_CHAT_MAX_THREAD_LENGTH`; older messages drop off when the
+ * cap is exceeded.
+ */
+interface OperatorChatThread {
+    /** Forward-compat field. v1.2 uses 1; bump on schema change. */
+    version: 1;
+    /** Surface (concierge in v1.2). */
+    surface: OperatorChatSurface;
+    /** Thread key; concierge is fortress-scoped under `CONCIERGE_THREAD_KEY`. */
+    thread_key: string;
+    /** Append-only message log; oldest first. */
+    messages: OperatorChatMessage[];
+    /** ISO8601 timestamp the thread was last updated. */
+    updated_at: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Concierge response envelope. Carries the substrate response (or
+ * fallback message) plus the operator-visible substrate badge.
+ */
+interface ConciergeResponse {
+    /** The response message persisted into the concierge thread. */
+    message: OperatorChatMessage;
+    /** The substrate that served this query. */
+    served_by: SubstrateChoice;
+    /** Operator-visible label rendered next to the response. */
+    display_label: string;
+    /** Outcome class for activity-feed projection. */
+    outcome: "ok" | "substrate_failure" | "substrate_disabled";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanctuary MCP Server — Operator Chat Persistence
+ *
+ * Encrypted at-rest store for the operator-chat concierge thread.
+ * Mirrors the `IntelligenceConfigStore` shape but addresses records by
+ * `(surface, thread-key)` for forward-compatibility.
+ *
+ * Storage layout:
+ *   namespace: `_chat`              (underscore-prefixed = reserved L1 namespace)
+ *   key:       `concierge.{thread_key}`
+ *   payload:   AES-256-GCM-encrypted `OperatorChatThread` JSON, key
+ *              derived via HKDF from the fortress master key with info
+ *              string `operator-chat-store-v1`.
+ *
+ * The direct-agent surface (per-agent threads + session records) was
+ * removed in the v1.2 reshape. The concierge surface stores under a
+ * single record with sentinel thread-key `_fortress`
+ * (CONCIERGE_THREAD_KEY).
+ *
+ * Append-only semantics:
+ * Threads are append-only at the message level. Persist is full-record
+ * read-modify-write; the cap on thread length is enforced at append time
+ * (oldest messages fall off when `OPERATOR_CHAT_MAX_THREAD_LENGTH` is
+ * exceeded). The audit log retains every message regardless.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Encrypted operator chat persistence.
+ */
+declare class OperatorChatStore {
+    private storage;
+    private encryptionKey;
+    constructor(storage: StorageBackend, masterKey: Uint8Array);
+    /**
+     * Load a thread. Returns null if no record exists or if the on-disk
+     * record is corrupt; callers treat both as "empty thread, start
+     * fresh" and emit no audit event for the absence.
+     */
+    loadThread(surface: OperatorChatSurface, threadKey: string): Promise<OperatorChatThread | null>;
+    /**
+     * Persist a thread. Caller is responsible for cap enforcement; the
+     * `appendMessage` helper below drops oldest messages before persist
+     * when the cap is exceeded.
+     */
+    saveThread(thread: OperatorChatThread): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Append a message to a thread, creating the thread if it doesn't
+     * exist, and persist. Enforces the per-thread length cap by dropping
+     * oldest messages first. Returns the persisted thread.
+     */
+    appendMessage(surface: OperatorChatSurface, threadKey: string, message: OperatorChatMessage): Promise<OperatorChatThread>;
+    /**
+     * Delete a thread. Used by operator-driven thread reset. The audit
+     * log retains the per-message history regardless.
+     */
+    deleteThread(surface: OperatorChatSurface, threadKey: string): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanctuary MCP Server — Operator Chat Service
+ *
+ * The operator-fortress concierge surface. Distinct from the
+ * agent-to-agent mesh chat (`chat-service.ts`) which handles libp2p +
+ * OpenMLS group sessions among wrapped agents.
+ *
+ * The direct-agent surface (operator-to-wrapped-agent conversation) was
+ * removed in the v1.2 reshape; the concierge surface is the only
+ * operator-chat surface in v1.2.
+ *
+ * Concierge surface (path: `sendConcierge`):
+ *   1. PII-filter the operator query (Tier 1 regex).
+ *   2. Build fortress context from audit log + activity feed +
+ *      agent registry (`assembleConciergeContext`).
+ *   3. Invoke the substrate selector at `surface: "concierge"`.
+ *   4. Persist operator query + concierge response in the concierge
+ *      thread under `_chat/concierge.<sentinel>`.
+ *   5. Emit `operator_concierge_chat` audit event with safe metadata.
+ *
+ * Sovereignty invariants:
+ * - Audit emission is non-optional on every public method that mutates
+ *   the chat state. Construction with no audit log is structurally
+ *   rejected.
+ * - The substrate selector is OPTIONAL: a service constructed without
+ *   one degrades to "Concierge unavailable; substrate not configured".
+ *   The wiring layer can instantiate the service before the substrate
+ *   selector when bootstrap order requires it.
+ * - The PII filter is the Tier 1 regex shipped in
+ *   `l2-operational/privacy-filter.ts`; Tier 2 NER+LLM redaction lives
+ *   in the substrate-selector layer (substrate-routed), not here.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Snapshot of fortress state surfaces the concierge consults to
+ * answer operator queries. Caller (the hub-service wiring) supplies
+ * the providers; the service wires them into the substrate prompt.
+ *
+ * Each provider returns plain strings the substrate selector folds
+ * into a single context blob; the service does not attempt to
+ * structure the prompt beyond stitching with newlines. Keeping the
+ * prompt-shape decisions in the service-construction layer (rather
+ * than in the wiring) lets the dashboard team iterate concierge
+ * prompts without touching server code.
+ */
+interface ConciergeContextProviders {
+    /** Recent activity-feed entries as a free-form string, oldest first. */
+    recentActivity: () => Promise<string>;
+    /** Wrapped-agent inventory as a free-form string. */
+    agentInventory: () => Promise<string>;
+    /** Open inbox items as a free-form string. */
+    openInbox: () => Promise<string>;
+}
+/**
+ * PII filter the concierge applies to operator queries before passing
+ * them to the substrate. v1.2 wires the Tier 1 regex; the substrate
+ * selector handles Tier 2 NER+LLM redaction internally on egress paths.
+ *
+ * Returns the filtered query plus the count of redactions performed
+ * (surfaced in the audit event for operator visibility).
+ */
+interface ConciergePiiFilter {
+    filter(input: string): {
+        filtered: string;
+        redactions: number;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Construction inputs for the operator chat service.
+ */
+interface OperatorChatServiceDeps {
+    /** Encrypted at-rest store; built from fortress master key. */
+    store: OperatorChatStore;
+    /** Audit log for `operator_concierge_chat` events. */
+    auditLog: AuditLog;
+    /** Operator identity that owns the chat session. */
+    identityId: string;
+    /**
+     * Substrate selector for concierge LLM calls. Optional: when omitted
+     * the concierge surface degrades to a "substrate not configured"
+     * response.
+     */
+    substrateSelector?: SubstrateSelector;
+    /**
+     * Concierge context providers. Required when a substrate selector
+     * is wired; otherwise unused. Wiring layer assembles these from the
+     * activity feed, agent registry, and inbox aggregator.
+     */
+    conciergeContextProviders?: ConciergeContextProviders;
+    /**
+     * PII filter applied to concierge queries pre-substrate. Optional;
+     * when omitted the service still works (no redactions performed).
+     * v1.2 wiring passes the Tier 1 regex.
+     */
+    conciergePiiFilter?: ConciergePiiFilter;
+    /**
+     * Stable max tokens for concierge responses. Defaults to 512 (small
+     * enough for snappy local-model latency, large enough for a useful
+     * summary). Operator-tunable via dashboard config.
+     */
+    conciergeMaxTokens?: number;
+}
+declare class OperatorChatService {
+    private store;
+    private auditLog;
+    private identityId;
+    private substrateSelector?;
+    private contextProviders?;
+    private piiFilter?;
+    private conciergeMaxTokens;
+    constructor(deps: OperatorChatServiceDeps);
+    /**
+     * Operator submit on the concierge surface. Persists the operator's
+     * query, fans out to the substrate selector, persists the response,
+     * and emits the audit event.
+     *
+     * On substrate failure or absence: persists an honest "concierge
+     * unavailable" response and audit-emits with `outcome` = the
+     * appropriate failure class. The chat history reflects what the
+     * operator sees on the page (no silent dropping).
+     */
+    sendConcierge(query: string): Promise<ConciergeResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Read the persisted concierge thread, oldest message first. Returns
+     * an empty array when no thread exists yet.
+     */
+    getConciergeHistory(): Promise<OperatorChatMessage[]>;
+    /**
+     * Stitch fortress state into a single context blob the substrate
+     * folds into its summarization prompt.
+     *
+     * The blob is intentionally plain text (not structured JSON) because
+     * small local models (Gemma 2 2B) handle plain text more reliably
+     * than nested structures. Format:
+     *
+     *   ```
+     *   ## Recent activity
+     *   <recentActivity output>
+     *
+     *   ## Wrapped agents
+     *   <agentInventory output>
+     *
+     *   ## Open inbox
+     *   <openInbox output>
+     *   ```
+     */
+    private assembleConciergeContext;
+    private emit;
+}
+
 /**
  * Sanctuary v1.1. Operator Hub API Types
  *
@@ -4171,6 +5145,11 @@ interface HubTier1ApprovalEnqueuedResult {
      */
     operation_category: HubApprovalPendingItem["operation_category"];
 }
+interface HubTemplateBindingApprovalEnqueuedResult extends HubTier1ApprovalEnqueuedResult {
+    current_template_id?: ChannelTemplateId;
+    proposed_template_id: ChannelTemplateId;
+    compiled_policy_id: string;
+}
 /**
  * Result returned from a fortress-scope Tier-1 action that has been
  * deferred to operator approval. Distinguished from the per-agent shape by
@@ -4225,11 +5204,7 @@ interface HubAgentController {
      * approval lands.
      */
     bindPolicy(agentId: string, policyId: string): Promise<void>;
-    /**
-     * Apply a non-Tier-1 channel-template binding. Channel templates are
-     * compositions over the canonical four slots; binding does not require
-     * Tier 1 approval at v1.1.
-     */
+    /** Apply an operator-approved channel-template binding. */
     bindChannelTemplate(agentId: string, templateId: ChannelTemplateId): Promise<void>;
 }
 /**
@@ -4362,6 +5337,11 @@ interface HubServiceDeps {
      * returning the in-memory projection.
      */
     readPersistedLocalAgents?: () => LocalAgentRecord[];
+    /**
+     * Optional persisted agent writer. Used when approved hub actions mutate
+     * registry-local fields that should survive refresh and restart.
+     */
+    writePersistedLocalAgents?: (records: LocalAgentRecord[]) => void;
     /** Inbox aggregation sources. */
     inboxSources: HubInboxSources;
     /** Activity feed sources. */
@@ -4391,6 +5371,44 @@ interface HubServiceDeps {
      * Defaults to `() => new Date()` when omitted.
      */
     now?: () => Date;
+    /**
+     * Optional operator-chat service. When supplied, the hub exposes the
+     * concierge chat endpoints; when omitted, those routes return
+     * HubCapabilityError. Construction-time injection lets the dashboard
+     * wiring layer build the chat service against the same audit log +
+     * master key + storage backend as the rest of the v1.1 hub without
+     * forcing the chat-service constructor through a circular import.
+     * The direct-agent chat surface was removed in the v1.2 reshape
+     * (2026-04-30); the field name is retained for source compatibility.
+     */
+    operatorChat?: OperatorChatService;
+}
+/**
+ * Click-to-inspect panel returned by `openAgentInspectPanel`. The panel
+ * surfaces the agent's recent activity, pending approvals routed through
+ * this agent, and policy summary at a glance, repurposing the click-
+ * to-chat wire-up shipped in PR #98 + PR #100. The direct-agent chat
+ * surface was removed in the v1.2 reshape; this panel is the operational
+ * destination for the click.
+ */
+interface HubAgentInspectPanel {
+    /** The agent the panel was opened on. */
+    agent_id: string;
+    /** ISO8601 timestamp the panel was opened. */
+    opened_at: string;
+    /** Recent activity-feed entries for this agent, oldest first. */
+    recent_activity: HubActivityFeedEntry[];
+    /**
+     * Open Tier 1 inbox items routed through this agent. Empty when the
+     * agent has no pending approvals.
+     */
+    pending_approvals: HubInboxItem[];
+    /**
+     * Bound policy summary for this agent. Null when the agent has no
+     * channel-template binding (e.g. immediately after wrap, before the
+     * operator picks a template).
+     */
+    policy_summary: HubPolicySummary | null;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4438,10 +5456,10 @@ declare class HubService {
      */
     bindAgentPolicy(agentId: string, policyId: string): HubTier1ApprovalEnqueuedResult;
     /**
-     * Bind a different channel template. Not Tier 1; channel templates are
-     * compositions over the four canonical slots and bind synchronously.
+     * Bind a different channel template. Tier 1: enqueues a policy_change
+     * approval item and only applies the binding after operator approval.
      */
-    bindAgentChannelTemplate(agentId: string, rawTemplateId: unknown): Promise<LocalAgentRecord>;
+    bindAgentChannelTemplate(agentId: string, rawTemplateId: unknown): HubTemplateBindingApprovalEnqueuedResult;
     /**
      * Enqueue a fortress-scope Tier 1 lockdown. One inbox item is created;
      * on operator approval the handler iterates `agentController.lockdown`
@@ -4484,6 +5502,33 @@ declare class HubService {
      * Test/inspection helper. Not part of the public service surface.
      */
     inboxStoreSize(): number;
+    private requireOperatorChat;
+    /**
+     * Operator submit on the concierge chat surface. Pass-through to the
+     * operator-chat-service which owns substrate-selector routing, PII
+     * filtering, persistence, and audit emission.
+     */
+    sendConcierge(query: string): Promise<ConciergeResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Read the persisted concierge thread.
+     */
+    getConciergeHistory(): Promise<OperatorChatMessage[]>;
+    /**
+     * Open the click-to-inspect/approve panel for a wrapped agent. The
+     * panel surfaces recent activity routed through this agent, pending
+     * Tier 1 approvals on this agent, and the bound policy summary,
+     * repurposing the click-to-chat wire-up from PR #98 + PR #100 to a
+     * substrate-aligned inspect destination after the v1.2 reshape removed
+     * direct-agent chat.
+     *
+     * Synchronous open shape preserved (caller's `await` semantics
+     * unchanged from the prior `openDirectAgentSession` surface). The
+     * panel is read-only; no side effects beyond the audit-event emission
+     * for the panel-open itself.
+     */
+    openAgentInspectPanel(agentId: string, options?: {
+        activityLimit?: number;
+    }): Promise<HubAgentInspectPanel>;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4509,16 +5554,29 @@ declare class HubService {
  *     the v1.2 work to project those into operator cards.
  *   - Activity feed reads from the real audit log. This is the one source
  *     that's already complete in v1.1.0 and just needs to be plugged in.
- *   - Agent controller errors on every action. v1.1.1 cannot honestly
- *     pause / unwrap / lockdown anything because no agent registry yet
- *     exists; the wiring returns `HubCapabilityError` rather than lying
- *     about what shipped.
+ *   - Agent controller errors on runtime harness actions that v1.1 cannot
+ *     honestly execute. Channel-template binding is registry-local in v1.2,
+ *     so its controller hook is a no-op and HubService persists the binding
+ *     after Tier 1 approval.
  */
 
 interface V11Bindings {
     hubService: HubService;
     identityId: string;
     fortressId: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional Intelligence Substrate Selector. Dispatch layer routes
+     * `/api/hub/intelligence/*` here when set; absent means the routes
+     * 503 with a "selector not configured" body.
+     */
+    intelligenceSelector?: SubstrateSelector;
+    /**
+     * Optional Operator Chat Service. Constructed when storage + masterKey
+     * are passed to `buildV11Bindings`. The HubService accepts this
+     * directly via its `operatorChat` dep; callers that want the harness-
+     * side `recordAgentReply` integration also need the service handle.
+     */
+    operatorChatService?: OperatorChatService;
 }
 
 /**