@sanctuary-framework/mcp-server 0.10.0 → 0.10.2

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -2037,6 +2037,7 @@ var init_audit_log = __esm({
       maxTotalSizeBytes;
       maxEntries;
       rotationInFlight = false;
+      pendingWrites = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
       constructor(storage, masterKey, config) {
         this.storage = storage;
         this.encryptionKey = derivePurposeKey(masterKey, "audit-log");
@@ -2045,6 +2046,15 @@ var init_audit_log = __esm({
       }
       /**
        * Append an audit entry.
+       *
+       * The on-disk persist is async and tracked via `pendingWrites`. Long-lived
+       * callers (the main MCP server) can ignore that tracking and let writes
+       * drain naturally. Short-lived callers — the `sanctuary secrets` CLI which
+       * `process.exit()`s immediately after returning from a broker mutation —
+       * MUST await `flush()` before exiting, or in-flight writes get killed
+       * with the event loop and the entry is silently lost. That was the
+       * v0.10.0-rc.2 soak failure mode where `secrets audit` returned empty
+       * after a clean 7-verb lifecycle.
        */
       append(layer, operation, identityId, details, result = "success") {
         const entry = {
@@ -2056,8 +2066,22 @@ var init_audit_log = __esm({
           details
         };
         this.entries.push(entry);
-        this.persistEntry(entry).catch(() => {
+        const writePromise = this.persistEntry(entry).catch(() => {
         });
+        this.pendingWrites.add(writePromise);
+        void writePromise.finally(() => this.pendingWrites.delete(writePromise));
+      }
+      /**
+       * Wait for every in-flight `append()` persist (and its rotation pass) to
+       * settle. Safe to call multiple times — newly-appended entries during a
+       * flush are also awaited. Re-entrant only at the granularity of "drain
+       * everything queued so far". Short-lived CLIs MUST call this before
+       * `process.exit()` to keep audit writes durable.
+       */
+      async flush() {
+        while (this.pendingWrites.size > 0) {
+          await Promise.allSettled([...this.pendingWrites]);
+        }
       }
       async persistEntry(entry) {
         const key = `${Date.now()}-${this.counter++}`;
@@ -2068,7 +2092,7 @@ var init_audit_log = __esm({
           key,
           stringToBytes(JSON.stringify(encrypted))
         );
-        this.maybeRotate().catch(() => {
+        await this.maybeRotate().catch(() => {
         });
       }
       /**
@@ -8805,6 +8829,24 @@ var init_dashboard = __esm({
       rateLimits = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
       /** Whether the dashboard is running in standalone mode (no MCP server) */
       _standaloneMode = false;
+      /**
+       * v0.10.2: when set, requests from loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 / ::1)
+       * are treated as authenticated without requiring a Bearer token or
+       * dashboard session cookie. Only the `startStandaloneDashboard` boot
+       * path enables this, and ONLY after the supplied passphrase successfully
+       * decrypts at least one stored identity — proving the caller already
+       * holds the primary secret that protects every piece of Sanctuary state.
+       *
+       * Rationale: the dashboard auth token is a dashboard-access credential
+       * layered on top of the master-key unlock. Once the operator has already
+       * presented the passphrase on the command line (terminal-side auth), a
+       * second login prompt in the auto-opened browser just trains users to
+       * paste secrets into web forms — the exact habit Sanctuary exists to
+       * discourage. Remote (non-loopback) callers still require the bearer
+       * token, so this is a localhost-only ergonomics unlock, not a network
+       * policy change.
+       */
+      _autoAuthLocalhost = false;
       constructor(config) {
         this.config = config;
         this.authToken = config.auth_token;
@@ -8840,6 +8882,26 @@ var init_dashboard = __esm({
       setStandaloneMode(standalone) {
         this._standaloneMode = standalone;
       }
+      /**
+       * v0.10.2: enable (or disable) the loopback auto-auth fast path. See
+       * {@link _autoAuthLocalhost} for the rationale and threat model. Callers
+       * should gate this on both (a) the dashboard host being a loopback
+       * interface and (b) the master-key unlock having succeeded against
+       * on-disk state.
+       */
+      setAutoAuthLocalhost(enabled) {
+        this._autoAuthLocalhost = enabled;
+      }
+      /**
+       * v0.10.2: is this request from a loopback interface? We treat the
+       * standard IPv4/IPv6 loopback addresses plus the IPv4-mapped IPv6 form
+       * as loopback so LAN clients never accidentally hit the unauthenticated
+       * fast path even on hosts where the HTTP server binds 0.0.0.0.
+       */
+      isLoopbackRequest(req) {
+        const addr = this.getRemoteAddr(req);
+        return addr === "127.0.0.1" || addr === "::1" || addr === "localhost";
+      }
       /**
        * Start the HTTP(S) server for the dashboard.
        */
@@ -8989,6 +9051,9 @@ var init_dashboard = __esm({
        */
       checkAuth(req, url, res) {
         if (!this.authToken) return true;
+        if (this._autoAuthLocalhost && this.isLoopbackRequest(req)) {
+          return true;
+        }
         const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
         if (authHeader) {
           const parts = authHeader.split(" ");
@@ -9014,6 +9079,9 @@ var init_dashboard = __esm({
        */
       isAuthenticated(req, url) {
         if (!this.authToken) return true;
+        if (this._autoAuthLocalhost && this.isLoopbackRequest(req)) {
+          return true;
+        }
         const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
         if (authHeader) {
           const parts = authHeader.split(" ");
@@ -24128,11 +24196,13 @@ var init_runtime = __esm({
 var cli_exports = {};
 __export(cli_exports, {
   COCOON_GOVERNOR_DEFAULTS: () => COCOON_GOVERNOR_DEFAULTS,
+  PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS: () => PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS,
   formatWrapSuccess: () => formatWrapSuccess,
   parseCocoonArgs: () => parseCocoonArgs,
   parseWrapArgs: () => parseWrapArgs,
   runCocoon: () => runCocoon,
-  runWrap: () => runWrap
+  runWrap: () => runWrap,
+  startDashboardWithFallback: () => startDashboardWithFallback
 });
 async function runWrap(options, deps = {}) {
   if (options.unwrap) {
@@ -24376,7 +24446,8 @@ async function runCocoon(options) {
 }
 async function startDashboardWithFallback(startFn, preferredPort, authToken, serverVersion) {
   let lastErr;
-  for (let port = preferredPort; port <= MAX_PORT; port++) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
+    const port = preferredPort + i;
     try {
       const handle = await startFn({
         port,
@@ -24395,8 +24466,9 @@ async function startDashboardWithFallback(startFn, preferredPort, authToken, ser
       if (!isAddressInUse(err)) throw err;
     }
   }
+  const lastPort = preferredPort + PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS - 1;
   throw new Error(
-    `No free dashboard port in range ${preferredPort}-${MAX_PORT}: ${lastErr?.message ?? "unknown"}`
+    `No free dashboard port in the ${PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS} ports starting at ${preferredPort} (tried ${preferredPort}-${lastPort}): ${lastErr?.message ?? "unknown"}`
   );
 }
 function isAddressInUse(err) {
@@ -24644,7 +24716,7 @@ function printWrapHelp() {
     5. Every tool call is logged, scanned, and tier-gated
 `);
 }
-var COCOON_GOVERNOR_DEFAULTS, MAX_PORT, parseCocoonArgs;
+var COCOON_GOVERNOR_DEFAULTS, PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS, parseCocoonArgs;
 var init_cli = __esm({
   "src/cocoon/cli.ts"() {
     init_config_reader();
@@ -24658,7 +24730,7 @@ var init_cli = __esm({
       rate_limit_per_tool: 20,
       lifetime_limit: 1e3
     };
-    MAX_PORT = 3510;
+    PORT_FALLBACK_ATTEMPTS = 20;
     parseCocoonArgs = parseWrapArgs;
   }
 });
@@ -26162,6 +26234,7 @@ async function openBroker(opts = {}) {
   return {
     broker,
     close: async () => {
+      await auditLog.flush();
     }
   };
 }
@@ -27186,12 +27259,12 @@ function optionalNumber(args, key) {
   const v = args[key];
   return typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v) ? v : void 0;
 }
-var require4, PKG_VERSION3;
+var PKG_VERSION3;
 var init_broker_server = __esm({
   "src/mcp/broker-server.ts"() {
+    init_config();
     init_token_issuer();
-    require4 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
-    ({ version: PKG_VERSION3 } = require4("../../package.json"));
+    PKG_VERSION3 = SANCTUARY_VERSION;
   }
 });
 
@@ -27355,7 +27428,28 @@ async function startStandaloneDashboard(options = {}) {
   await mkdir(config.storage_path, { recursive: true, mode: 448 });
   const storage = new FilesystemStorage(`${config.storage_path}/state`);
   let masterKey;
-  const passphrase = options.passphrase ?? process.env.SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE;
+  let passphrase = options.passphrase ?? process.env.SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE;
+  let passphraseSource = null;
+  if (passphrase) {
+    passphraseSource = options.passphrase !== void 0 ? "option" : "env";
+  } else {
+    try {
+      const stored = await readStoredPassphrase({
+        storagePath: config.storage_path
+      });
+      if (stored) {
+        passphrase = stored.value;
+        passphraseSource = stored.source === "keychain" ? "keychain" : "fallback-file";
+        console.error(
+          `Passphrase: loaded from ${stored.location} (service ${keychainServiceFor(config.storage_path, homedir())})`
+        );
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof PassphraseUnreadableError) {
+        throw err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
   if (passphrase) {
     let existingParams;
     try {
@@ -27368,6 +27462,14 @@ async function startStandaloneDashboard(options = {}) {
     }
     const result = await deriveMasterKey(passphrase, existingParams);
     masterKey = result.key;
+    if (!existingParams) {
+      const { stringToBytes: stringToBytes2 } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_encoding(), encoding_exports));
+      await storage.write(
+        "_meta",
+        "key-params",
+        stringToBytes2(JSON.stringify(result.params))
+      );
+    }
   } else {
     const { hashToString: hashToString2 } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_hashing(), hashing_exports));
     const { stringToBytes: stringToBytes2, bytesToString: bytesToString2, fromBase64url: fromBase64url2, constantTimeEqual: constantTimeEqual2 } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_encoding(), encoding_exports));
@@ -27466,6 +27568,10 @@ async function startStandaloneDashboard(options = {}) {
     profileStore
   });
   dashboard.setStandaloneMode(true);
+  const hostIsLoopback = dashboardHost === "127.0.0.1" || dashboardHost === "::1" || dashboardHost === "localhost";
+  if (hostIsLoopback && loadResult.loaded > 0) {
+    dashboard.setAutoAuthLocalhost(true);
+  }
   await dashboard.start();
   await writeTenantRuntime(config.storage_path, {
     version: SANCTUARY_VERSION,
@@ -27491,21 +27597,29 @@ async function startStandaloneDashboard(options = {}) {
   console.error(`Identities loaded: ${loadResult.loaded}`);
   console.error(`Listening: http://${dashboardHost}:${dashboardPort}`);
   if (loadResult.total > 0 && loadResult.loaded === 0) {
+    const service = keychainServiceFor(config.storage_path, homedir());
+    const sourceLabel = passphraseSource === "option" ? "--passphrase option" : passphraseSource === "env" ? "SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE env var" : passphraseSource === "keychain" ? `macOS Keychain (service ${service})` : passphraseSource === "fallback-file" ? "encrypted fallback file" : "recovery key";
     console.error(
       `
-\u2554\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2557
-\u2551  \u26A0  WARNING: Encrypted identities found but NONE loaded     \u2551
-\u2560\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2563
-\u2551  ${loadResult.total} encrypted identity file(s) found on disk              \u2551
-\u2551  0 could be decrypted with the current master key            \u2551
-\u2551                                                              \u2551
-\u2551  This usually means SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE is missing or       \u2551
-\u2551  incorrect. The dashboard will show empty panels.            \u2551
-\u2551                                                              \u2551
-\u2551  To fix: restart with the correct SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE:      \u2551
-\u2551    SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE=<your-passphrase> npx \\              \u2551
-\u2551      @sanctuary-framework/mcp-server dashboard               \u2551
-\u255A\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u255D
+  \u26A0  WARNING: Encrypted identities found but NONE loaded
+     ${loadResult.total} encrypted identity file(s) in ${config.storage_path}/state/_identities/
+     0 could be decrypted with the master key derived from the ${sourceLabel}.
+
+     The dashboard will show empty panels. Since v0.10.0 each wrapped
+     tenant has its OWN passphrase, stored under a per-tenant Keychain
+     service name. A single SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE unlocks at most one
+     tenant \u2014 it is not a global master credential.
+
+     To diagnose:
+       \u2022 List tenants on this host:       sanctuary agents
+       \u2022 Multi-tenant overview (no decrypt): sanctuary dashboard --multi
+       \u2022 Point at a specific tenant:      SANCTUARY_STORAGE_PATH=<path> sanctuary dashboard
+       \u2022 Inspect this tenant's Keychain:  security find-generic-password -s '${service}' -w
+
+     If this tenant's passphrase lives only in a different Keychain item
+     or on another machine, restore it before this dashboard can read
+     any state. Sanctuary will never auto-regenerate \u2014 that would
+     permanently destroy the data encrypted under the prior key.
 `
     );
   } else if (loadResult.failed > 0) {
@@ -27535,6 +27649,7 @@ var init_dashboard_standalone = __esm({
     init_tools();
     init_sovereignty_profile();
     init_runtime();
+    init_passphrase();
   }
 });
 
@@ -27610,8 +27725,8 @@ async function checkForUpdate(currentVersion) {
   } catch {
   }
 }
-var require5 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
-var { version: PKG_VERSION4 } = require5("../package.json");
+var require4 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
+var { version: PKG_VERSION4 } = require4("../package.json");
 async function main() {
   const args = process.argv.slice(2);
   let passphrase = process.env.SANCTUARY_PASSPHRASE;