@saihm/mcp-server-pro 0.1.5 → 0.1.7

package/README.md

@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ Production thin-client for **SAIHM non-custodial memory**.
 
 > **Key loss is unrecoverable by design.** If you lose your master secret you lose your KEK, and no one — including SAIHM — can open your cells. Back it up securely.
 
+## See it run
+
+- **Live cross-model demos** — offline, ~1 min each, no account: <https://citw2.github.io/saihm-demos/>. Ground a memory you own in Claude, GPT, DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, or GLM, then prove you can erase it. `demo-claude-code` runs a stdio MCP server exactly like this one for Claude Code and Cursor.
+- **Token benchmark** — recalling a bounded set of memory cells instead of re-sending the transcript cut input tokens by **62.8%–85.9%** (up to ~86%) across a realistic multi-session task; open, offline, reproducible: <https://github.com/citw2/saihm-token-benchmark>.
+
 ## Install
 
 ```sh
@@ -32,10 +37,10 @@ Claude Code, …) at it — paste this **once**:
         "SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL": "https://saihm.coti.global/mcp",
         "SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX": "<your 64+ hex master secret>",
         "SAIHM_TIER": "PRO",
-        "SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD": "stripe"
-      }
-    }
-  }
+        "SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD": "stripe",
+      },
+    },
+  },
 }
 ```
 
@@ -117,15 +122,15 @@ The derived `saihm.agentIdHash` is the `sub` the endpoint binds your tenant to
 
 ## Configuration
 
-| Env                       | Required | Meaning                                                                           |
-| ------------------------- | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL`      | yes      | `https://…/mcp` (or `http://` only for `127.0.0.1`/`localhost`).                  |
-| `SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER`       | no       | `Bearer <JWT>`, used verbatim. **Omit to self-onboard** (recommended): the client mints + auto-refreshes its own short-lived JWT from the master secret, so you paste one config once and never re-paste a token. |
-| `SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD`    | self-onboard only | Your entitlement rail (e.g. `stripe`). Required when `SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER` is unset; ignored otherwise. |
-| `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX` | yes\*    | ≥ 64 hex chars (≥ 32 bytes), high-entropy, client-held; never sent. \*Provide this **or** `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE`. |
-| `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE`| yes\*    | Path to a **mode-600** file holding the hex master secret. Preferred for operators: keeps the root seed out of a synced/shared MCP config. Takes precedence over `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX` when both are set. |
-| `SAIHM_TIER`              | self-onboard only | Tier label baked into sealed metadata. Required when self-onboarding; otherwise optional — resolved via `status()` if unset. |
-| `SAIHM_SEQ_STATE_PATH`    | no       | Persists per-cell sequence high-water marks (mode 600) for cross-restart updates. |
+| Env                        | Required          | Meaning                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
+| -------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL`       | yes               | `https://…/mcp` (or `http://` only for `127.0.0.1`/`localhost`).                                                                                                                                                  |
+| `SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER`        | no                | `Bearer <JWT>`, used verbatim. **Omit to self-onboard** (recommended): the client mints + auto-refreshes its own short-lived JWT from the master secret, so you paste one config once and never re-paste a token. |
+| `SAIHM_PAYMENT_METHOD`     | self-onboard only | Your entitlement rail (e.g. `stripe`). Required when `SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER` is unset; ignored otherwise.                                                                                                             |
+| `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX`  | yes\*             | ≥ 64 hex chars (≥ 32 bytes), high-entropy, client-held; never sent. \*Provide this **or** `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE`.                                                                                             |
+| `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE` | yes\*             | Path to a **mode-600** file holding the hex master secret. Preferred for operators: keeps the root seed out of a synced/shared MCP config. Takes precedence over `SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_HEX` when both are set.     |
+| `SAIHM_TIER`               | self-onboard only | Tier label baked into sealed metadata. Required when self-onboarding; otherwise optional — resolved via `status()` if unset.                                                                                      |
+| `SAIHM_SEQ_STATE_PATH`     | no                | Persists per-cell sequence high-water marks (mode 600) for cross-restart updates.                                                                                                                                 |
 
 > **Self-onboarding (paste once):** with `SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER` unset, the client proves
 > control of your identity via the endpoint's ML-DSA challenge/response and mints its own

package/dist/client.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
-import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync, writeFileSync, } from 'node:fs';
 import { dirname } from 'node:path';
 import { deriveIdentity, signChallenge, sealCell, openCell, shareCell, decodeShareEnvelope, unwrapSharedDek, verifyShareSig, openCellWithDek, verifyEnvelope, verifyIdentityRecord, encodeEnvelope, decodeEnvelope, encodeShareEnvelope, encodeIdentityRecord, decodeIdentityRecord, fromHex, toHex, utf8, fromUtf8, ctEqual, SeqHighWaterMark, } from '@saihm/client-pro';
 const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
@@ -160,7 +160,9 @@ export class SaihmProClient {
                 ? opts.requestTimeoutMs
                 : REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS;
         this.onboardBase = (opts.onboardBaseUrl ?? new URL(endpoint).origin).replace(/\/+$/, '');
-        const trimmedAuth = typeof authHeader === 'string' && authHeader.trim() ? authHeader : undefined;
+        const trimmedAuth = typeof authHeader === 'string' && authHeader.trim()
+            ? authHeader
+            : undefined;
         if (trimmedAuth) {
             this.staticAuthHeader = trimmedAuth;
         }
@@ -189,7 +191,8 @@ export class SaihmProClient {
                 throw new Error(`SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE could not be read: ${secretFile}`);
             }
             try {
-                if (process.platform !== 'win32' && (statSync(secretFile).mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
+                if (process.platform !== 'win32' &&
+                    (statSync(secretFile).mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
                     process.stderr.write(`warning: SAIHM_MASTER_SECRET_FILE ${secretFile} is group/world-accessible; chmod 600 it.\n`);
                 }
             }
@@ -288,12 +291,27 @@ export class SaihmProClient {
         if (this.tier === undefined) {
             throw new SaihmEndpointError(0, 'no_tier', 'join requires a tier (set SAIHM_TIER)');
         }
+        const ch = await this.onboardFetch(this.onboardBase + '/api/onboard/challenge', { method: 'GET' });
+        const nonce = ch.nonce;
+        if (typeof nonce !== 'string' || nonce.length === 0) {
+            throw new SaihmEndpointError(502, 'checkout_no_nonce', 'onboard challenge returned no nonce');
+        }
+        let nonceBytes;
+        try {
+            nonceBytes = fromHex(nonce);
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new SaihmEndpointError(502, 'checkout_bad_nonce', 'onboard challenge nonce is not hex');
+        }
+        const signature = toHex(signChallenge(this.identity.mldsaSecretKey, nonceBytes));
         const out = await this.onboardFetch(this.onboardBase + '/api/stripe/checkout', {
             method: 'POST',
             headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
             body: JSON.stringify({
                 tier: this.tier,
                 mldsaPubKey: toHex(this.identity.mldsaPubKey),
+                nonce,
+                signature,
                 uiMode: 'hosted',
             }),
         });
@@ -317,7 +335,8 @@ export class SaihmProClient {
                 }
                 catch {
                 }
-                throw new SaihmEndpointError(res.status, code, `SAIHM onboard failed: ${res.status} ${res.statusText}` + (code ? ` (${code})` : ''));
+                throw new SaihmEndpointError(res.status, code, `SAIHM onboard failed: ${res.status} ${res.statusText}` +
+                    (code ? ` (${code})` : ''));
             }
             try {
                 return JSON.parse(text);
@@ -344,7 +363,9 @@ export class SaihmProClient {
             return await this.doCall(method, params, header);
         }
         catch (e) {
-            if (!this.staticAuthHeader && e instanceof SaihmEndpointError && e.status === 401) {
+            if (!this.staticAuthHeader &&
+                e instanceof SaihmEndpointError &&
+                e.status === 401) {
                 this.cachedJwt = undefined;
                 const fresh = await this.currentAuthHeader();
                 return await this.doCall(method, params, fresh);

package/dist/server.js

@@ -82,13 +82,16 @@ server.tool('saihm_share', "Share a cell with another agent, end-to-end authenti
     recipientPinnedAgentIdHashHex: z
         .string()
         .describe("The grantee's agentIdHash (hex), pinned out-of-band"),
-    scope: z.enum(['read', 'write', 'readwrite']).optional().describe('Access scope (default read)'),
+    scope: z
+        .enum(['read', 'write', 'readwrite'])
+        .optional()
+        .describe('Access scope (default read)'),
     expiryEpoch: z
         .string()
         .regex(/^[0-9]+$/, 'expiryEpoch must be a decimal UNIX-epoch count')
         .optional()
         .describe('Optional expiry as a UNIX-epoch count (decimal string)'),
-}, async ({ cellId, recipientRecord, recipientPinnedAgentIdHashHex, scope, expiryEpoch }) => {
+}, async ({ cellId, recipientRecord, recipientPinnedAgentIdHashHex, scope, expiryEpoch, }) => {
     try {
         const r = await getClient().share({
             cellId,
@@ -105,7 +108,9 @@ server.tool('saihm_share', "Share a cell with another agent, end-to-end authenti
 });
 server.tool('saihm_revoke_share', 'Revoke a prior share grant to a recipient for a cell.', {
     cellId: z.string().describe('The shared cell id'),
-    recipientHex: z.string().describe("The grantee's agentIdHash (hex) to revoke"),
+    recipientHex: z
+        .string()
+        .describe("The grantee's agentIdHash (hex) to revoke"),
 }, async ({ cellId, recipientHex }) => {
     try {
         const r = await getClient().revokeShare(cellId, recipientHex);
@@ -116,8 +121,13 @@ server.tool('saihm_revoke_share', 'Revoke a prior share grant to a recipient for
     }
 });
 server.tool('saihm_governance_propose', "Submit a gSAIHM governance proposal. Scope MUST be 'emission_param' or 'protocol_upgrade'.", {
-    scope: z.enum(['emission_param', 'protocol_upgrade']).describe('Governable scope'),
-    paramKey: z.string().optional().describe('Parameter key (when scope=emission_param)'),
+    scope: z
+        .enum(['emission_param', 'protocol_upgrade'])
+        .describe('Governable scope'),
+    paramKey: z
+        .string()
+        .optional()
+        .describe('Parameter key (when scope=emission_param)'),
     proposedValue: z.string().optional().describe('Proposed value as string'),
 }, async ({ scope, paramKey, proposedValue }) => {
     try {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@saihm/mcp-server-pro",
-  "version": "0.1.5",
+  "version": "0.1.7",
   "description": "SAIHM production thin-client. Seals client-side via @saihm/client-pro (ML-DSA-65 identity, per-cell AES-256-GCM DEK wrapped under a client KEK, ML-KEM-768 authenticated sharing) and POSTs opaque ciphertext to the blind, non-custodial SAIHM /mcp endpoint. The master secret, KEK, and plaintext never leave this process. Apache-2.0.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
     "clean": "rm -rf dist coverage",
     "build": "npm run clean && tsc -p . && chmod +x dist/server.js",
     "typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.test.json",
-    "test": "tsx --test tests/client_pro.test.ts tests/server.test.ts",
+    "test": "tsx --test tests/smoke.test.ts tests/server.test.ts",
     "prepublishOnly": "npm run build && npm run typecheck && npm test"
   },
   "files": [