@safepassage/sdk 3.0.3 → 3.0.5

package/dist/utils/crypto.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Crypto utilities for SafePassage SDK - Browser compatible
+ *
+ * Provides cryptographic functions for the SafePassage SDK using Web Crypto API.
+ * These utilities handle HMAC signing, state parameter protection, and secure
+ * token generation for client-side security measures.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTE:
+ * Client-side cryptography provides defense-in-depth but cannot be considered
+ * secure against determined attackers. True security comes from server-side
+ * validation. These functions are primarily for tamper resistance and
+ * integrity checking.
+ *
+ * Features:
+ * - HMAC-SHA256 signing and verification using Web Crypto API
+ * - Constant-time string comparison to prevent timing attacks
+ * - Secure random token generation
+ * - Signed state parameter creation and parsing
+ * - Environment-specific secret derivation
+ * - Timestamp and nonce-based replay protection
+ *
+ * @author SafePassage Engineering
+ * @version 1.0.0
+ */
+/**
+ * Generate HMAC-SHA256 signature using Web Crypto API
+ *
+ * Creates an HMAC-SHA256 signature for the given data using the provided secret.
+ * Uses the browser's Web Crypto API for cryptographic operations.
+ *
+ * SECURITY NOTE: This is client-side HMAC where the secret is known to the client.
+ * It provides tamper resistance but not true security. Server-side verification
+ * is required for actual security.
+ *
+ * @param {string} data - Data to sign
+ * @param {string} secret - HMAC secret key
+ * @returns {Promise<string>} Promise resolving to hex-encoded HMAC signature
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare function generateHMAC(data: string, secret: string): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Verify HMAC-SHA256 signature using Web Crypto API
+ *
+ * Verifies an HMAC-SHA256 signature against the provided data and secret.
+ * Uses constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
+ *
+ * @param {string} data - Original data that was signed
+ * @param {string} signature - HMAC signature to verify
+ * @param {string} secret - HMAC secret key
+ * @returns {Promise<boolean>} Promise resolving to true if signature is valid
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare function verifyHMAC(data: string, signature: string, secret: string): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Generate a secure random token for client-side use
+ *
+ * Creates a cryptographically secure random token using the browser's
+ * crypto.getRandomValues() function.
+ *
+ * @param {number} [length=32] - Token length in bytes
+ * @returns {string} Hex-encoded random token
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare function generateSecureToken(length?: number): string;
+/**
+ * Environment-specific secret derivation
+ *
+ * Returns environment-specific secrets for HMAC signing. In a real implementation,
+ * this would derive from environment variables. For client-side use, this provides
+ * basic tamper resistance only.
+ *
+ * WARNING: Client-side secrets are NOT secure against determined attackers.
+ * This is defense-in-depth only. Real security comes from server-side validation.
+ *
+ * @param {'production' | 'staging' | 'development'} environment - Target environment
+ * @returns {string} Environment-specific secret
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare function getSigningSecret(environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): string;
+/**
+ * Create signed state parameter with timestamp and integrity protection
+ *
+ * Creates a signed state parameter containing the payload with added timestamp
+ * and nonce for freshness and replay protection. The entire payload is signed
+ * using HMAC-SHA256 and base64 encoded for URL safety.
+ *
+ * @param {unknown} payload - Data to include in state parameter
+ * @param {'production' | 'staging' | 'development'} environment - Target environment
+ * @returns {Promise<string>} Promise resolving to base64-encoded signed state
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare function createSignedState(payload: unknown, environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Verify and parse signed state parameter
+ *
+ * Parses and verifies a signed state parameter, checking the HMAC signature
+ * and timestamp freshness. Returns the original payload if validation succeeds.
+ *
+ * @param {string} signedState - Base64-encoded signed state parameter
+ * @param {'production' | 'staging' | 'development'} environment - Source environment
+ * @param {number} [maxAge] - Maximum age in milliseconds
+ * @returns {Promise<unknown | null>} Promise resolving to payload or null if invalid
+ * @export
+ */
+export declare function parseSignedState(signedState: string, environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development', maxAge?: number): Promise<unknown | null>;

package/dist/utils/crypto.js

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/**
+ * Crypto utilities for SafePassage SDK - Browser compatible
+ *
+ * Provides cryptographic functions for the SafePassage SDK using Web Crypto API.
+ * These utilities handle HMAC signing, state parameter protection, and secure
+ * token generation for client-side security measures.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTE:
+ * Client-side cryptography provides defense-in-depth but cannot be considered
+ * secure against determined attackers. True security comes from server-side
+ * validation. These functions are primarily for tamper resistance and
+ * integrity checking.
+ *
+ * Features:
+ * - HMAC-SHA256 signing and verification using Web Crypto API
+ * - Constant-time string comparison to prevent timing attacks
+ * - Secure random token generation
+ * - Signed state parameter creation and parsing
+ * - Environment-specific secret derivation
+ * - Timestamp and nonce-based replay protection
+ *
+ * @author SafePassage Engineering
+ * @version 1.0.0
+ */
+import { STATE_EXPIRY_MS } from './validation';
+/**
+ * Generate HMAC-SHA256 signature using Web Crypto API
+ *
+ * Creates an HMAC-SHA256 signature for the given data using the provided secret.
+ * Uses the browser's Web Crypto API for cryptographic operations.
+ *
+ * SECURITY NOTE: This is client-side HMAC where the secret is known to the client.
+ * It provides tamper resistance but not true security. Server-side verification
+ * is required for actual security.
+ *
+ * @param {string} data - Data to sign
+ * @param {string} secret - HMAC secret key
+ * @returns {Promise<string>} Promise resolving to hex-encoded HMAC signature
+ * @export
+ */
+export async function generateHMAC(data, secret) {
+    // Encode the secret and data as Uint8Array
+    const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+    const keyData = encoder.encode(secret);
+    const dataBuffer = encoder.encode(data);
+    // Import the secret as a key
+    const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', keyData, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign']);
+    // Generate the signature
+    const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, dataBuffer);
+    // Convert to hex string
+    return Array.from(new Uint8Array(signature))
+        .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))
+        .join('');
+}
+/**
+ * Verify HMAC-SHA256 signature using Web Crypto API
+ *
+ * Verifies an HMAC-SHA256 signature against the provided data and secret.
+ * Uses constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
+ *
+ * @param {string} data - Original data that was signed
+ * @param {string} signature - HMAC signature to verify
+ * @param {string} secret - HMAC secret key
+ * @returns {Promise<boolean>} Promise resolving to true if signature is valid
+ * @export
+ */
+export async function verifyHMAC(data, signature, secret) {
+    try {
+        const expectedSignature = await generateHMAC(data, secret);
+        return constantTimeCompare(signature, expectedSignature);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Constant-time string comparison to prevent timing attacks
+ *
+ * Compares two strings in constant time to prevent timing-based attacks
+ * that could leak information about the expected signature.
+ *
+ * @param {string} a - First string to compare
+ * @param {string} b - Second string to compare
+ * @returns {boolean} True if strings are equal
+ */
+function constantTimeCompare(a, b) {
+    if (a.length !== b.length) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let result = 0;
+    for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
+        result |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
+    }
+    return result === 0;
+}
+/**
+ * Generate a secure random token for client-side use
+ *
+ * Creates a cryptographically secure random token using the browser's
+ * crypto.getRandomValues() function.
+ *
+ * @param {number} [length=32] - Token length in bytes
+ * @returns {string} Hex-encoded random token
+ * @export
+ */
+export function generateSecureToken(length = 32) {
+    const array = new Uint8Array(length);
+    crypto.getRandomValues(array);
+    return Array.from(array, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+}
+/**
+ * Environment-specific secret derivation
+ *
+ * Returns environment-specific secrets for HMAC signing. In a real implementation,
+ * this would derive from environment variables. For client-side use, this provides
+ * basic tamper resistance only.
+ *
+ * WARNING: Client-side secrets are NOT secure against determined attackers.
+ * This is defense-in-depth only. Real security comes from server-side validation.
+ *
+ * @param {'production' | 'staging' | 'development'} environment - Target environment
+ * @returns {string} Environment-specific secret
+ * @export
+ */
+export function getSigningSecret(environment) {
+    // WARNING: Client-side secrets are NOT secure against determined attackers
+    // This is defense-in-depth only. Real security comes from server-side validation.
+    const baseSecrets = {
+        production: 'safepassage-prod-hmac-2025',
+        staging: 'safepassage-prod-hmac-2025', // Use production secrets for staging
+        development: 'safepassage-dev-hmac-2025',
+    };
+    return baseSecrets[environment];
+}
+/**
+ * Create signed state parameter with timestamp and integrity protection
+ *
+ * Creates a signed state parameter containing the payload with added timestamp
+ * and nonce for freshness and replay protection. The entire payload is signed
+ * using HMAC-SHA256 and base64 encoded for URL safety.
+ *
+ * @param {unknown} payload - Data to include in state parameter
+ * @param {'production' | 'staging' | 'development'} environment - Target environment
+ * @returns {Promise<string>} Promise resolving to base64-encoded signed state
+ * @export
+ */
+export async function createSignedState(payload, environment) {
+    // Add timestamp for freshness
+    const timestampedPayload = {
+        ...payload,
+        timestamp: Date.now(),
+        nonce: generateSecureToken(16), // Add nonce to prevent replay attacks
+    };
+    const dataString = JSON.stringify(timestampedPayload);
+    const secret = getSigningSecret(environment);
+    const signature = await generateHMAC(dataString, secret);
+    // Combine data and signature
+    const signedPayload = {
+        data: timestampedPayload,
+        signature,
+    };
+    return btoa(JSON.stringify(signedPayload));
+}
+/**
+ * Verify and parse signed state parameter
+ *
+ * Parses and verifies a signed state parameter, checking the HMAC signature
+ * and timestamp freshness. Returns the original payload if validation succeeds.
+ *
+ * @param {string} signedState - Base64-encoded signed state parameter
+ * @param {'production' | 'staging' | 'development'} environment - Source environment
+ * @param {number} [maxAge] - Maximum age in milliseconds
+ * @returns {Promise<unknown | null>} Promise resolving to payload or null if invalid
+ * @export
+ */
+export async function parseSignedState(signedState, environment, maxAge = STATE_EXPIRY_MS) {
+    try {
+        const json = atob(signedState);
+        const signedPayload = JSON.parse(json);
+        if (!signedPayload.data || !signedPayload.signature) {
+            console.warn('SafePassage: Invalid signed state format');
+            return null;
+        }
+        const { data, signature } = signedPayload;
+        const dataString = JSON.stringify(data);
+        const secret = getSigningSecret(environment);
+        // Verify signature
+        const isValid = await verifyHMAC(dataString, signature, secret);
+        if (!isValid) {
+            console.warn('SafePassage: State signature verification failed');
+            return null;
+        }
+        // Check timestamp freshness
+        if (data.timestamp) {
+            const age = Date.now() - data.timestamp;
+            if (age > maxAge) {
+                console.warn('SafePassage: State parameter expired', { age, maxAge });
+                return null;
+            }
+        }
+        // Remove internal fields before returning
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars
+        const { timestamp, nonce, ...payload } = data;
+        return payload;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        console.warn('SafePassage: Failed to parse signed state', error);
+        return null;
+    }
+}

package/dist/utils/environment.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/**
+ * Environment utilities for SafePassage SDK with security enforcement
+ */
+export declare function getEnvironmentUrl(environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): string;
+export declare function getApiUrl(environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): string;
+/**
+ * Detect environment with security warnings
+ */
+export declare function detectEnvironment(): 'production' | 'staging' | 'development';
+/**
+ * Validate environment configuration on startup
+ */
+export declare function validateEnvironmentSecurity(environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): void;

package/dist/utils/environment.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/**
+ * Environment utilities for SafePassage SDK with security enforcement
+ */
+const ENVIRONMENT_URLS = {
+    production: 'https://av.safepassageapp.com',
+    staging: 'https://av.safepassageapp.com',
+    development: 'http://localhost:5173',
+};
+export function getEnvironmentUrl(environment) {
+    const url = ENVIRONMENT_URLS[environment];
+    // Security check: Ensure production/staging always use HTTPS
+    if ((environment === 'production' || environment === 'staging') &&
+        !url.startsWith('https://')) {
+        throw new Error(`HTTPS required for ${environment} environment`);
+    }
+    return url;
+}
+export function getApiUrl(environment) {
+    const apiUrls = {
+        production: 'https://api.safepassageapp.com',
+        staging: 'https://api.safepassageapp.com',
+        development: 'http://localhost:3001',
+    };
+    const url = apiUrls[environment];
+    // Security check: Ensure production/staging always use HTTPS
+    if ((environment === 'production' || environment === 'staging') &&
+        !url.startsWith('https://')) {
+        throw new Error(`HTTPS required for API URLs in ${environment} environment`);
+    }
+    return url;
+}
+/**
+ * Detect environment with security warnings
+ */
+export function detectEnvironment() {
+    const hostname = window.location.hostname;
+    if (hostname === 'localhost' ||
+        hostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
+        hostname.includes('.local')) {
+        // Warn if using HTTP in development with non-localhost domains
+        if (window.location.protocol === 'http:' &&
+            !hostname.match(/^(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)$/)) {
+            console.warn('SafePassage Security Warning: Using HTTP with non-localhost domain in development');
+        }
+        return 'development';
+    }
+    if (hostname.includes('staging') || hostname.includes('stage')) {
+        // Enforce HTTPS in staging
+        if (window.location.protocol !== 'https:') {
+            console.error('SafePassage Security Error: HTTPS required in staging environment');
+        }
+        return 'staging';
+    }
+    // Production environment - strict HTTPS enforcement
+    if (window.location.protocol !== 'https:') {
+        console.error('SafePassage Security Error: HTTPS required in production environment');
+    }
+    return 'production';
+}
+/**
+ * Validate environment configuration on startup
+ */
+export function validateEnvironmentSecurity(environment) {
+    // Check current page protocol
+    const isSecure = window.location.protocol === 'https:';
+    const hostname = window.location.hostname;
+    switch (environment) {
+        case 'production':
+            if (!isSecure) {
+                throw new Error('SafePassage requires HTTPS in production environment');
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'staging':
+            if (!isSecure) {
+                console.warn('SafePassage Warning: HTTPS strongly recommended in staging environment');
+            }
+            break;
+        case 'development': {
+            const isLocalhost = hostname === 'localhost' ||
+                hostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
+                hostname.includes('.local');
+            if (!isSecure && !isLocalhost) {
+                console.warn('SafePassage Warning: HTTPS recommended for non-localhost development');
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    // Validate environment URLs
+    try {
+        getEnvironmentUrl(environment);
+        getApiUrl(environment);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        throw new Error(`Environment configuration validation failed: ${error}`);
+    }
+}

package/dist/utils/polyfills.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/**
+ * Polyfills for browser compatibility
+ */
+/**
+ * Polyfill for crypto.randomUUID (not supported in older browsers)
+ * Generates a UUID v4 using crypto.getRandomValues
+ */
+export declare function setupPolyfills(): void;
+/**
+ * Check browser compatibility and warn about unsupported features
+ */
+export declare function checkBrowserCompatibility(): void;

package/dist/utils/polyfills.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * Polyfills for browser compatibility
+ */
+/**
+ * Polyfill for crypto.randomUUID (not supported in older browsers)
+ * Generates a UUID v4 using crypto.getRandomValues
+ */
+export function setupPolyfills() {
+    // Polyfill crypto.randomUUID if not available
+    if (!crypto.randomUUID) {
+        crypto.randomUUID =
+            function () {
+                // Generate 16 random bytes
+                const array = new Uint8Array(16);
+                crypto.getRandomValues(array);
+                // Set version (4) and variant bits
+                array[6] = (array[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40; // Version 4
+                array[8] = (array[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80; // Variant 10
+                // Convert to hex string with dashes
+                const hex = Array.from(array)
+                    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))
+                    .join('');
+                return [
+                    hex.slice(0, 8),
+                    hex.slice(8, 12),
+                    hex.slice(12, 16),
+                    hex.slice(16, 20),
+                    hex.slice(20, 32),
+                ].join('-');
+            };
+    }
+    // Note: URLSearchParams is widely supported (IE 11 doesn't support it, but we're not targeting IE 11)
+    // If needed, a polyfill can be added here
+}
+/**
+ * Check browser compatibility and warn about unsupported features
+ */
+export function checkBrowserCompatibility() {
+    const warnings = [];
+    // Check for required features
+    if (!window.crypto || !window.crypto.getRandomValues) {
+        throw new Error('SafePassage SDK requires Web Crypto API support');
+    }
+    if (!window.crypto.subtle) {
+        throw new Error('SafePassage SDK requires Web Crypto subtle API for HMAC operations');
+    }
+    // Check for features that we can polyfill
+    if (!crypto.randomUUID) {
+        warnings.push('crypto.randomUUID not supported, using polyfill');
+    }
+    if (!window.URLSearchParams) {
+        warnings.push('URLSearchParams not supported, consider adding a polyfill for IE 11 support');
+    }
+    // Check for modern JavaScript features
+    try {
+        // Test optional chaining
+        const test = { a: { b: 1 } };
+        const result = test?.a?.b;
+        if (result !== 1)
+            throw new Error();
+    }
+    catch {
+        warnings.push('Optional chaining (?.) not supported, ensure transpilation for older browsers');
+    }
+    // Log warnings if any
+    if (warnings.length > 0) {
+        console.warn('SafePassage SDK Browser Compatibility:', warnings.join('; '));
+    }
+}

package/dist/utils/security.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * Security utilities for SafePassage SDK
+ * Enhanced origin validation and security enforcement
+ */
+/**
+ * Validate if an origin is trusted for the given environment
+ */
+export declare function isOriginTrusted(origin: string, environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): boolean;
+/**
+ * Enhanced origin validation with logging and strict allowlist
+ */
+export declare function validatePostMessageOrigin(event: MessageEvent, environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development', allowedCustomOrigins?: string[]): boolean;
+/**
+ * Validate SafePassage message format and content
+ */
+export declare function validateSafePassageMessage(event: MessageEvent, expectedSessionId: string): {
+    isValid: boolean;
+    error?: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Enforce HTTPS in production environment
+ */
+export declare function enforceHTTPS(environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): void;
+/**
+ * Validate URL security for return/cancel URLs
+ */
+export declare function validateReturnUrl(url: string, environment: 'production' | 'staging' | 'development'): {
+    isValid: boolean;
+    error?: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Generate secure session ID with entropy validation
+ */
+export declare function generateSecureSessionId(): string;
+/**
+ * Rate limiting for verification attempts
+ */
+declare class VerificationRateLimit {
+    private attempts;
+    private readonly maxAttempts;
+    private readonly timeWindow;
+    isAllowed(identifier: string): boolean;
+    reset(identifier: string): void;
+}
+export declare const verificationRateLimit: VerificationRateLimit;
+/**
+ * Security event logging for monitoring
+ */
+export declare function logSecurityEvent(event: string, details: unknown): void;
+export {};