@runsec/mcp 1.0.35 → 1.0.37

package/dist/data/skills/integration-security/index.md

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+# Integration Security
+
+## Stack overview
+
+See [`patterns.md`](patterns.md) for Anti-Pattern / Safe-Pattern definitions for this domain.
+
+## Top threats
+
+- Map concrete rows from the pattern table to your architecture.
+
+## Pattern catalog
+
+Complete Anti-Pattern / Safe-Pattern definitions live in [`patterns.md`](patterns.md). The table below is a **table of contents** by metric ID.
+
+| ID | Metric | Stack |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ITS-001` | Keycloak JWT: отключена проверка подписи/issuer/audience | Использовать `authlib.jose.JsonWebKey`/`jwt.decode` с `key` из JWKS, явные `claims_options` для `iss`/`aud`; запретить `verify_signature=False`. |
+| `ITS-002` | Vault: хардкод секретов/токенов в коде и конфиге | Убрать plaintext: AppRole/K8s auth в Vault; для OAuth-клиентов к внешним IdP использовать `authlib.integrations` (token storage в защищённом хранилище, не в коде). |
+| `ITS-003` | K8s интеграции без External Secrets Operator | ESO + backend; секреты для webhook/OAuth подписей хранить в ESO/Vault, не в `stringData`; ключи HMAC для inbound webhooks — через secret reference. |
+| `ITS-004` | Circuit Breaker: голые вызовы Клинкера/API без предохранителей | Оборачивать исходящие вызовы в circuit breaker + таймауты; для OAuth2 client credentials к внешним API использовать `authlib.integrations.httpx_client` с лимитами и явной конфигурацией TLS. |
+| `ITS-005` | Bulkhead & Timeouts: HTTP-вызовы без timeout и без лимитов пула | `httpx.Client(timeout=..., limits=Limits(...))`; для подписанных исходящих запросов использовать middleware/обёртки с фиксированными лимитами и проверкой сертификата (`verify=True`). |
+| `ITS-006` | Retry Storm: без retry budget и jitter | Retry с backoff+jitter и circuit state; не повторять запросы с тем же телом без idempotency-key для небезопасных методов. |
+| `ITS-007` | Idempotency Gap: платежные API без idempotency ключей | Заголовок `Idempotency-Key` + серверная дедупликация; для webhook-ответов после обработки — идемпотентная запись по `event_id`. |
+| `ITS-008` | Webhook endpoint без проверки HMAC/подписи входящего запроса (CWE-345, CWE-924) | Middleware/FastAPI dependency: проверка подписи до парсинга JSON; Python: `hmac.compare_digest` + секрет из env/ESO; при OAuth/JWS inbound — `authlib.jose` для проверки JWS; Node: `crypto.timingSafeEqual` + express middleware. |
+| `ITS-009` | Межсервисный httpx с отключенной проверкой TLS (`verify=False`) | Убрать `verify=False`; задать доверенный bundle/CA; для mTLS — `cert=(client_cert, key)`; OAuth между сервисами — `authlib` + валидный TLS. |
+| `ITS-010` | Интеграционный вызов по HTTP без TLS (утечка токена/секрета по сети) | Все вызовы к IdP/partner API — HTTPS; токены через `authlib` OAuth2 session с TLS-only `metadata` URL; не передавать секреты по `http://`. |
+| `ITS-011` | Исходящий HTTP-запрос на URL из пользовательского ввода (SSRF в интеграции) | Валидация URL до запроса; для OAuth callbacks использовать зарегистрированные redirect_uri в `authlib` OAuth client. |
+| `ITS-012` | OAuth/OIDC `redirect_uri` / `return_to` без строгого allowlist | `authlib` OAuth2 client: фиксированный `redirect_uri`; на сервере — проверка `redirect_uri` против клиентской регистрации. |
+| `ITS-013` | Логирование сырого ответа внешнего API с токенами/PII | Structured logging без тел ответов; для отладки OAuth использовать `authlib` tracing hooks без raw tokens. |
+| `ITS-014` | Десериализация недоверенного payload от партнёра (pickle) | Только JSON/MessagePack с валидацией; для JWE/JWT — `authlib.jose`. |
+| `ITS-015` | Динамический `eval`/`exec` над данными интеграционного вебхука | Парсить JSON в типизированные модели; подпись вебхука (middleware + `authlib`/HMAC) до бизнес-логики. |
+| `ITS-016` | `subprocess` с аргументами из payload партнёра/вебхука | После проверки подписи вебхука маппить `action` на фиксированные команды; не передавать raw input в `subprocess`. |
+| `ITS-017` | Парсинг XML от партнёра без `defusedxml`/безопасных настроек | Безопасный XML-парсер; для SAML/OIDC metadata — `authlib` loaders с проверкой подписи. |
+| `ITS-018` | FastAPI: `Security(oauth2_scheme)` без `scopes` на интеграционном эндпоинте (CWE-285) | Явно задавать `scopes=[...]` в `Security(...)` / `OAuth2AuthorizationCodeBearer(..., scopes=...)`; проверять scope в dependency до бизнес-логики; для machine-to-machine — `authlib.integrations` + зарегистрированные scopes. |
+| `ITS-019` | Токен/API-ключ в query/`params` вместо заголовков (CWE-598) | Перенести секреты в headers; для OAuth2 — `authlib` OAuth2 client с token в Authorization; отключить логирование полных URL. |
+| `ITS-020` | Nginx/Squid: webhook location без лимита размера тела (CWE-770) | Задать лимит тела для webhook path; комбинировать с таймаутами; для подписанных тел — всё равно ограничивать размер до парсинга. |
+| `ITS-021` | JWT/OAuth: время жизни access token > 24h или декод без проверки `iss` (CWE-613) | Короткий access TTL, обязательный `iss`/`aud`; `authlib.jose.JWTClaims` с `claims_options` для issuer. |
+| `ITS-022` | SSRF: исходящий запрос к metadata IP `169.254.169.254` (CWE-918) | Единый egress wrapper с denylist IP (169.254.0.0/16, …); `authlib` только для зарегистрированных partner URL. |
+| `ITS-023` | SSRF Python: `httpx` к AWS metadata (CWE-918) | Общий egress-клиент с denylist metadata CIDR; `authlib` redirect только на зарегистрированные URI. |
+| `ITS-024` | SSRF Python: `urllib` к GCP metadata host (CWE-918) | DNS/IP validation + denylist cloud metadata hostnames. |
+| `ITS-025` | SSRF Node: `axios` к Alibaba metadata (CWE-918) | Центральный HTTP-клиент с blocklist облачных metadata адресов. |
+| `ITS-026` | SSRF Node: `fetch` к Azure IMDS (CWE-918) | Denylist + SDK вместо raw fetch к IMDS. |
+| `ITS-027` | SSRF Python: конкатенация URL с пользовательским путём к metadata (CWE-918) | Строгий URL parser + denylist перед `requests`. |
+| `ITS-028` | SSRF JS: IPv6 link-local metadata (CWE-918) | Egress allowlist + блок fd00::/8 для metadata-паттернов. |
+| `ITS-029` | SSRF: `httpx.AsyncClient` GET к link-local metadata (CWE-918) | Общий egress wrapper; запретить literal metadata URL в коде приложения. |
+| `ITS-030` | SSRF: `axios` instance с `baseURL` на metadata host (CWE-918) | Фабрика HTTP-клиентов с валидацией baseURL против blocklist. |
+
+## Verification
+
+**Verification:** Check the gold testbed file(s) below for `Vulnerable: <ID>` markers (static Semgrep + `detection-matrix.md` ground truth).
+
+- [`gold-standard-testbed/`](../gold-standard-testbed/) (see `detection-matrix.md` for ID → file mapping)
+
+After changing [`patterns.md`](patterns.md), run from the repo root:
+
+```bash
+python scripts/sync_semgrep.py
+```
+
+## Workflow: Recon → Scan → Verify
+
+### 1) Recon
+- Map entrypoints, data flows, and trust boundaries for this stack.
+- Identify which metrics in [`patterns.md`](patterns.md) apply to the code under review.
+
+### 2) Scan
+- Run Semgrep with `semgrep-rules/<skill>.yaml` (generated) and correlate with Anti-Patterns.
+- Eliminate findings that cannot bind to a metric row.
+
+### 3) Verify
+- Confirm markers or scanner hits for touched IDs in the gold testbed when adding metrics.
+- Emit findings as `Vulnerable: <PREFIX>-<NNN>` in written reviews.
+

package/dist/data/skills/integration-security/patterns.md

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+| ID | Название метрики | Anti-Pattern (Vulnerable Code/YAML) | Safe-Pattern (Remediation) | Stack | Источник | fix_template | Exploit scenario |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| ITS-001 | Keycloak JWT: отключена проверка подписи/issuer/audience | `jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})` | Валидация подписи (`JWKS`), `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, `nbf`, deny unknown alg. | Integration/API | `CWE-347` OIDC/JWT BCP | Использовать `authlib.jose.JsonWebKey`/`jwt.decode` с `key` из JWKS, явные `claims_options` для `iss`/`aud`; запретить `verify_signature=False`. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-001 keycloak jwt отключена проверка подписи issuer audience decode options verify signature false валидация jwks iss aud exp nbf alg -->
+| ITS-002 | Vault: хардкод секретов/токенов в коде и конфиге | `vault_token = "s.xxxx"`<br>`DB_PASS = "prod-pass"` | Аутентификация в Vault через AppRole/Kubernetes auth, short-lived tokens, secret retrieval только во время runtime. | Integration/API | `CWE-798` Vault security model | Убрать plaintext: AppRole/K8s auth в Vault; для OAuth-клиентов к внешним IdP использовать `authlib.integrations` (token storage в защищённом хранилище, не в коде). | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-002 vault хардкод секретов токенов код конфиг vault token db pass аутентификация approle kubernetes short lived runtime -->
+| ITS-003 | K8s интеграции без External Secrets Operator | `kind: Secret`<br>`stringData:`<br>`  password: plain-text` | Использовать External Secrets Operator + Vault/SM backend, исключить прямой plaintext секрет в манифестах. | Integration/API | `CWE-522` ESO best practices | ESO + backend; секреты для webhook/OAuth подписей хранить в ESO/Vault, не в `stringData`; ключи HMAC для inbound webhooks — через secret reference. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-003 k8s интеграции без external secrets operator kind secret stringdata password plain text использовать eso vault backend исключить plaintext -->
+| ITS-004 | Circuit Breaker: голые вызовы Клинкера/API без предохранителей | `resp = requests.post(CLINKER_URL, json=payload)` | Использовать circuit breaker (`pybreaker`, `resilience4j`, аналоги), fallback и метрики отказов по внешним интеграциям. | Integration/API | `CWE-400` Resiliency engineering | Оборачивать исходящие вызовы в circuit breaker + таймауты; для OAuth2 client credentials к внешним API использовать `authlib.integrations.httpx_client` с лимитами и явной конфигурацией TLS. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-004 circuit breaker clinker api pybreaker resilience4j fallback -->
+| ITS-005 | Bulkhead & Timeouts: HTTP-вызовы без timeout и без лимитов пула | `requests.get(url)`<br>`httpx.AsyncClient()` | Всегда задавать timeout и ограничивать connection pool (bulkhead), чтобы избежать каскадных сбоев при деградации внешних API. | Integration/API | `CWE-400` Reliability patterns (bulkhead/timeout) | `httpx.Client(timeout=..., limits=Limits(...))`; для подписанных исходящих запросов использовать middleware/обёртки с фиксированными лимитами и проверкой сертификата (`verify=True`). | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-005 bulkhead timeout connection pool httpx requests cascading failures -->
+| ITS-006 | Retry Storm: без retry budget и jitter | `for _ in range(10): call_api()` | Ограничивать retries через retry budget, exponential backoff и jitter; прерывать цикл при circuit-open состоянии. | Integration/API | `CWE-400` Resilience best practices | Retry с backoff+jitter и circuit state; не повторять запросы с тем же телом без idempotency-key для небезопасных методов. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-006 retry budget jitter exponential backoff circuit open -->
+| ITS-007 | Idempotency Gap: платежные API без idempotency ключей | `POST /payments/transfer`<br>`# no idempotency key` | Для критичных операций использовать `Idempotency-Key`, deduplication window и журнал повторных запросов. | Integration/API | Payment resiliency controls | Заголовок `Idempotency-Key` + серверная дедупликация; для webhook-ответов после обработки — идемпотентная запись по `event_id`. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-007 idempotency key payments transfer deduplication window -->
+| ITS-008 | Webhook endpoint без проверки HMAC/подписи входящего запроса (CWE-345, CWE-924) | `@app.post("/webhooks/github")`<br>`async def gh_hook(request: Request):`<br>`    payload = await request.json()`<br>`    return {"ok": True}`<br>`app.post('/webhooks/stripe')(req, res) => { const body = req.body; ... }` | Читать сырой body, вычислять HMAC-SHA256 от секрета, сравнивать с `X-Hub-Signature-256` / `Stripe-Signature` через `hmac.compare_digest`; отклонять при несовпадении или отсутствии заголовка. | Integration/API | `CWE-345`, `CWE-924` | Middleware/FastAPI dependency: проверка подписи до парсинга JSON; Python: `hmac.compare_digest` + секрет из env/ESO; при OAuth/JWS inbound — `authlib.jose` для проверки JWS; Node: `crypto.timingSafeEqual` + express middleware. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-008 webhook post webhooks github stripe x hub signature hmac body json -->
+| ITS-009 | Межсервисный httpx с отключенной проверкой TLS (`verify=False`) | `client = httpx.Client(verify=False)`<br>`httpx.get(url, verify=False)` | `verify=True` (default), корпоративный CA через `verify=ssl.create_default_context(cafile=...)` или `SSL_CERT_FILE`. | Python/FastAPI | `CWE-295` | Убрать `verify=False`; задать доверенный bundle/CA; для mTLS — `cert=(client_cert, key)`; OAuth между сервисами — `authlib` + валидный TLS. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-009 httpx client verify false tls inter service -->
+| ITS-010 | Интеграционный вызов по HTTP без TLS (утечка токена/секрета по сети) | `requests.post("http://partner.internal/oauth/token", data={"secret": client_secret})` | Только `https://`, pinning/корпоративный CA, отдельный канал для секретов (Vault/ESO). | Integration/API | `CWE-319` | Все вызовы к IdP/partner API — HTTPS; токены через `authlib` OAuth2 session с TLS-only `metadata` URL; не передавать секреты по `http://`. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-010 integration http cleartext oauth token partner internal secret -->
+| ITS-011 | Исходящий HTTP-запрос на URL из пользовательского ввода (SSRF в интеграции) | `requests.get(req.query_params["callback"])` | Allowlist хостов/схем, блок `169.254.169.254`, `file:`, `metadata` endpoints. | Integration/API | `CWE-918` | Валидация URL до запроса; для OAuth callbacks использовать зарегистрированные redirect_uri в `authlib` OAuth client. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-011 integration ssrf callback requests get query params -->
+| ITS-012 | OAuth/OIDC `redirect_uri` / `return_to` без строгого allowlist | `return redirect(request.args.get("next"))` | Сравнивать с предрегистрированным списком URI (exact match), запретить open redirect. | Integration/API | `CWE-601` | `authlib` OAuth2 client: фиксированный `redirect_uri`; на сервере — проверка `redirect_uri` против клиентской регистрации. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-012 oauth redirect next open redirect return -->
+| ITS-013 | Логирование сырого ответа внешнего API с токенами/PII | `logger.info("partner_response=%s", resp.text)` | Маскировать секреты, логировать только correlation-id и статус. | Integration/API | `CWE-532` | Structured logging без тел ответов; для отладки OAuth использовать `authlib` tracing hooks без raw tokens. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-013 integration log partner response resp text token -->
+| ITS-014 | Десериализация недоверенного payload от партнёра (pickle) | `pickle.loads(partner_blob)` | JSON + схема (`Pydantic`/`authlib` JSON), запрет pickle. | Integration/API | `CWE-502` | Только JSON/MessagePack с валидацией; для JWE/JWT — `authlib.jose`. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-014 integration pickle loads partner blob -->
+| ITS-015 | Динамический `eval`/`exec` над данными интеграционного вебхука | `eval(body["expr"])` | Запретить eval; использовать безопасные DSL/allowlist. | Integration/API | `CWE-94` | Парсить JSON в типизированные модели; подпись вебхука (middleware + `authlib`/HMAC) до бизнес-логики. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-015 integration eval webhook body expr -->
+| ITS-016 | `subprocess` с аргументами из payload партнёра/вебхука | `subprocess.run(payload["cmd"], shell=True)` | Allowlist команд, `shell=False`, без пользовательских строк в shell. | Integration/API | `CWE-78` | После проверки подписи вебхука маппить `action` на фиксированные команды; не передавать raw input в `subprocess`. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-016 integration subprocess webhook cmd shell true -->
+| ITS-017 | Парсинг XML от партнёра без `defusedxml`/безопасных настроек | `xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring(partner_xml)` | `defusedxml` или `lxml` с `resolve_entities=False`, отключить DTD. | Integration/API | `CWE-611` | Безопасный XML-парсер; для SAML/OIDC metadata — `authlib` loaders с проверкой подписи. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-017 integration xml etree fromstring partner xml -->
+| ITS-018 | FastAPI: `Security(oauth2_scheme)` без `scopes` на интеграционном эндпоинте (CWE-285) | `@app.get("/integration/partner")`<br>`async def partner_data(creds = Security(oauth2_scheme)):`<br>`    return await fetch_partner()` | `Security(oauth2_scheme, scopes=["read:partner"])` или отдельная dependency с проверкой scope/claims; OAuth2 client — `authlib` с required scopes. | Python/FastAPI | `CWE-285` | Явно задавать `scopes=[...]` в `Security(...)` / `OAuth2AuthorizationCodeBearer(..., scopes=...)`; проверять scope в dependency до бизнес-логики; для machine-to-machine — `authlib.integrations` + зарегистрированные scopes. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-018 fastapi security oauth2 scheme без scopes integration partner async def creds -->
+| ITS-019 | Токен/API-ключ в query/`params` вместо заголовков (CWE-598) | `requests.get(api_url, params={"api_key": api_key})`<br>`axios.get(url, { params: { access_token: tok } })` | Секреты только в `Authorization` / `X-Api-Key` / `authlib` header hooks; не класть секреты в URL (логи прокси, Referer, browser history). | Integration/API | `CWE-598` | Перенести секреты в headers; для OAuth2 — `authlib` OAuth2 client с token в Authorization; отключить логирование полных URL. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-019 requests get params api_key axios access token query -->
+| ITS-020 | Nginx/Squid: webhook location без лимита размера тела (CWE-770) | `location /webhooks/ {`<br>`    proxy_pass http://backend;`<br>`}`<br>`http_port 3128 accel`<br>`# request_body_max_size not set for /webhooks` | `client_max_body_size 512k;` в `location` или выше; Squid: `request_body_max_size 512 KB` для ACL `urlpath_regex /webhooks`. | Nginx/Squid | `CWE-770` | Задать лимит тела для webhook path; комбинировать с таймаутами; для подписанных тел — всё равно ограничивать размер до парсинга. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-020 nginx location webhooks proxy_pass backend client_max_body_size squid request_body_max_size -->
+| ITS-021 | JWT/OAuth: время жизни access token > 24h или декод без проверки `iss` (CWE-613) | `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES = 60 * 48`<br>`JwtModule.register({ signOptions: { expiresIn: "7d" } })`<br>`jwt.decode(token, SECRET, algorithms=["HS256"])` | `expiresIn`/`expire` ≤ 24h или refresh-token flow; `jwt.decode(..., issuer=ISS, options={"require": ["exp", "iss"]})`; OIDC — `authlib` + `iss` из discovery. | FastAPI/Node | `CWE-613` | Короткий access TTL, обязательный `iss`/`aud`; `authlib.jose.JWTClaims` с `claims_options` для issuer. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-021 jwt oauth access token expire minutes 48 jwmodule expiresin 7d jwt decode secret algorithms hs256 без issuer -->
+| ITS-022 | SSRF: исходящий запрос к metadata IP `169.254.169.254` (CWE-918) | `requests.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")`<br>`fetch("http://169.254.169.254/")` | Блокировать link-local/cloud-metadata диапазоны в клиенте; allowlist URL; не передавать пользовательский хост в интеграционный HTTP без фильтра. | Integration/API | `CWE-918` | Единый egress wrapper с denylist IP (169.254.0.0/16, …); `authlib` только для зарегистрированных partner URL. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-022 ssrf requests get 169 254 169 254 latest meta data fetch http -->
+| ITS-023 | SSRF Python: `httpx` к AWS metadata (CWE-918) | `httpx.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/")` | Блокировать 169.254.0.0/16 до запроса; allowlist partner URL. | Python | `CWE-918` | Общий egress-клиент с denylist metadata CIDR; `authlib` redirect только на зарегистрированные URI. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-023 httpx get 169 254 latest meta data iam security credentials -->
+| ITS-024 | SSRF Python: `urllib` к GCP metadata host (CWE-918) | `urllib.request.urlopen("http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/")` | Denylist `metadata.google.internal` и link-local; только явные partner endpoints. | Python | `CWE-918` | DNS/IP validation + denylist cloud metadata hostnames. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-024 urllib urlopen metadata google internal computemetadata v1 -->
+| ITS-025 | SSRF Node: `axios` к Alibaba metadata (CWE-918) | `axios.get("http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/")` | Блокировать vendor metadata IPs в egress proxy; allowlist. | Node.js | `CWE-918` | Центральный HTTP-клиент с blocklist облачных metadata адресов. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-025 axios get 100 100 100 200 latest meta data -->
+| ITS-026 | SSRF Node: `fetch` к Azure IMDS (CWE-918) | `fetch("http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01")` | Запретить прямые вызовы IMDS из app-кода; MSI только через managed identity SDK в контролируемом слое. | Node.js | `CWE-918` | Denylist + SDK вместо raw fetch к IMDS. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-026 fetch 169 254 metadata identity oauth2 token api version -->
+| ITS-027 | SSRF Python: конкатенация URL с пользовательским путём к metadata (CWE-918) | `requests.get("http://169.254.169.254" + user_path)` | Не допускать конкатенацию пути к metadata IP; parse URL и reject link-local. | Python | `CWE-918` | Строгий URL parser + denylist перед `requests`. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-027 requests get 169 254 user path concat -->
+| ITS-028 | SSRF JS: IPv6 link-local metadata (CWE-918) | `fetch("http://[fd00:ec2::254]/latest/meta-data/")` | Блокировать IPv6 link-local и известные metadata адреса. | JavaScript | `CWE-918` | Egress allowlist + блок fd00::/8 для metadata-паттернов. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-028 fetch fd00 ec2 latest meta data ipv6 -->
+| ITS-029 | SSRF: `httpx.AsyncClient` GET к link-local metadata (CWE-918) | `async with httpx.AsyncClient() as c:`<br>`    await c.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")` | Центральный async-клиент с denylist 169.254.0.0/16 до любого запроса. | Python | `CWE-918` | Общий egress wrapper; запретить literal metadata URL в коде приложения. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-029 httpx asyncclient get 169 254 latest meta data guardian -->
+| ITS-030 | SSRF: `axios` instance с `baseURL` на metadata host (CWE-918) | `axios.create({ baseURL: "http://169.254.169.254" }).get("/latest/meta-data/")` | Не задавать metadata host в клиентах; только allowlist partner API. | Node.js | `CWE-918` | Фабрика HTTP-клиентов с валидацией baseURL против blocklist. | Атакующий доставляет входные данные, соответствующие anti-pattern; реальный ущерб зависит от приёмника (sink), конфигурации и границ доверия. | <!-- semantic_anchor: its-030 axios create baseurl 169 254 meta data guardian -->
+| SDK-001 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-002 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-003 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-004 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-005 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-006 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-007 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-008 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-009 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-010 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-011 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-012 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-013 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-014 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-015 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-016 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-017 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-018 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-019 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-020 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-021 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-022 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-023 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-024 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-025 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-026 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-027 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-028 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-029 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-030 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-031 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-032 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-033 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-034 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-035 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-036 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-037 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-038 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-039 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-040 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-041 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-042 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-043 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-044 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-045 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-046 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-047 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-048 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-049 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-050 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-051 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-052 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-053 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-054 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-055 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-056 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-057 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-058 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-059 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-060 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-061 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-062 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-063 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-064 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-065 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-066 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-067 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-068 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-069 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-070 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-071 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-072 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-073 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-074 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-075 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-076 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-077 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-078 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-079 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-080 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-081 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-082 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-083 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-084 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-085 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-086 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-087 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-088 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-089 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-090 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-091 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-092 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-093 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-094 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-095 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |
+| SDK-096 | Stripe webhook handler missing signature verification | `app.post('/stripe', (req,res)=> handle(req.body))` | `const evt = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(raw, sig, secret)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-345 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unverified webhook payloads allow forged billing events. |
+| SDK-097 | Twilio callback endpoint accepts unsigned requests | `if (req.body.From) { process(req.body) }` | `if (!twilio.validateRequest(token, sig, url, params)) return 403` | Third-party SDK | CWE-347 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Missing signature checks enables spoofed SMS/call callbacks. |
+| SDK-098 | AWS SDK client uses hardcoded test key | `new S3Client({ credentials: { accessKeyId: 'AKIA_TEST', secretAccessKey: 'x' } })` | `new S3Client({ credentials: fromEnv() })` | Third-party SDK | CWE-798 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Embedded cloud credentials leak and can be reused by attackers. |
+| SDK-099 | SendGrid event webhook consumed without origin verification | `app.post('/sendgrid/events', jsonParser, processEvents)` | `verifySendgridSignature(req); processEvents(req.body)` | Third-party SDK | CWE-346 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Forged provider events can alter delivery and trust workflows. |
+| SDK-100 | Lambda invoke from external payload without allowlist | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: req.body.fn }))` | `lambda.send(new InvokeCommand({ FunctionName: ALLOWED_FN[req.body.action] }))` | Third-party SDK | CWE-20 | Autofix: verify webhook signatures, remove hardcoded keys, and enforce endpoint/function allowlists. | Unrestricted function invocation can execute privileged workflows. |

package/dist/data/skills/integration-security/skill.json

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+{
+  "skill_id": "integration-security",
+  "name": "Integration Security",
+  "activation_triggers": [
+    "keycloak-jwt-verify",
+    "vault-no-hardcode",
+    "external-secrets-operator",
+    "udi-uda-token-flow",
+    "circuit-breaker",
+    "bulkhead-timeout",
+    "retry-jitter",
+    "idempotency-key"
+  ],
+  "relevant_extensions": [
+    ".py",
+    ".ts",
+    ".js",
+    ".yaml",
+    ".yml",
+    ".json"
+  ],
+  "tools": [
+    "semgrep",
+    "syft",
+    "trufflehog"
+  ],
+  "rules_path": "core/skills/integration-security/patterns.md",
+  "few_shot_examples": "core/gold-standard-testbed/integration_security_vulnerable.py",
+  "security_priority": 9
+}

package/dist/data/skills/java-enterprise/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Java Enterprise Security
+
+## Stack overview
+
+Enterprise Java security patterns for `Java 21+`, `Spring Boot 3.3+`, `Camunda 7.20`, `PostgreSQL`, `Elasticsearch`, and deployment hardening (`Docker`, `Kubernetes`, `Nginx`).
+
+## Pattern families
+
+- `CAM-*`: Camunda process/auth/transaction threats.
+- `SPR-*`: Spring API, auth, deserialization, and error-handling threats.
+- `AK-*`: Keycloak/JWT/OAuth2 integration flaws.
+- `DB-*`: Database injection/access-control/resource risks.
+- `ES-*`: Elasticsearch query/auth/concurrency risks.
+- `INF-*`: Container and platform hardening anti-patterns.
+
+## Pattern catalog
+
+Canonical detections and remediations are maintained in [`patterns.md`](patterns.md).
+
+## Verification
+
+Use the gold testbed markers `// Vulnerable: <ID>` in:
+
+- [`core/gold-standard-testbed/enterprise_java_validation.java`](../../gold-standard-testbed/enterprise_java_validation.java)
+
+After updates, regenerate rules and matrix:
+
+```bash
+python scripts/sync_semgrep.py
+python scripts/generate_detection_matrix.py
+```