@runpod/mcp-server 4.9.1 → 4.10.0

package/dist/hosted.mjs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   SCRUB_VERSION,
   scrubSubmission
-} from "./chunk-H3NZYQIB.mjs";
+} from "./chunk-WWXM5EES.mjs";
 import {
   defaultCredentialChecker,
   extractBearerToken,
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
   handleMcpRequest,
   parseSearchRequest,
   searchKnowledge
-} from "./chunk-N4OSRS4A.mjs";
+} from "./chunk-JTK6RETN.mjs";
 import {
   ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,
   ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,
@@ -20,13 +20,14 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-577IYCJT.mjs";
 import {
   DIRECTORY_PATH
-} from "./chunk-6IETGSON.mjs";
+} from "./chunk-FQJFKWUV.mjs";
 
 // src/alp/ingest.ts
 var MAX_CONTENT_CHARS = 2e4;
 var MAX_REFERRAL_CONTENT_CHARS = 200;
 var MAX_FIELD_CHARS = 500;
 var SINK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5e3;
+var TOOL_NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;
 var ALP_SEVERITIES = ["blocked", "degraded", "cosmetic"];
 function notRecorded(reason) {
   return {
@@ -99,7 +100,9 @@ async function handleAlpSubmit(req, res, opts = {}) {
     // ("critical", "high") turns a dimension back into prose, and the loss of
     // one label costs less than that.
     severity: !referral && ALP_SEVERITIES.includes(body.severity) ? body.severity : void 0,
-    tool: !referral && typeof body.tool === "string" ? body.tool : void 0,
+    // Same rule as severity: a free-text tool would turn a grouping key back
+    // into prose, so only a value shaped like a tool name is kept.
+    tool: !referral && typeof body.tool === "string" && TOOL_NAME.test(body.tool) ? body.tool : void 0,
     workaround: !referral && typeof body.workaround === "string" ? body.workaround : void 0,
     trigger: !referral && typeof body.trigger === "string" ? body.trigger : void 0,
     // Referral-only fields. source follows the severity rule (off-enum is
@@ -125,7 +128,7 @@ async function handleAlpSubmit(req, res, opts = {}) {
     intention: clean.intention?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),
     modelType: clean.modelType?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),
     severity: clean.severity,
-    tool: clean.tool?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),
+    tool: clean.tool,
     // Prose fields, so they get the content cap rather than the field cap: a
     // workaround worth reading is a paragraph, not a label.
     workaround: clean.workaround?.slice(0, MAX_CONTENT_CHARS),
@@ -157,6 +160,14 @@ async function handleAlpSubmit(req, res, opts = {}) {
       return;
     }
     const sinkBody = await response.json().catch(() => null);
+    if (sinkBody?.capped === true) {
+      console.log(
+        "alp_submit_capped",
+        JSON.stringify({ route: body.route, transport: row.transport })
+      );
+      send(200, notRecorded("this account reached its limit for this tool"));
+      return;
+    }
     if (sinkBody?.ok !== true || typeof sinkBody.id !== "string") {
       console.warn("alp_sink_unrecognized", { status: response.status });
       send(200, notRecorded("the store did not confirm the write"));

package/dist/hosted.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/alp/ingest.ts","../src/search/route.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// ALP ingest endpoint: POST /api/alp/submit (see docs/agent-learning-protocol.md).\n//\n// The shared write path for the four hosted ALP write tools.\n// Local stdio does not register these tools.\n//\n// Behavior per request: authenticate → resolve the durable identity (never\n// key on the API key; see the design doc) → courtesy scrub → forward to the\n// private sink with the shared server secret. The sink (a Convex HTTP action\n// in the hosted service's repository) owns storage, the authoritative scrub, and everything\n// downstream. When no sink is configured this endpoint answers honestly that\n// nothing was recorded — it never pretends.\n//\n// FAIL-SOFT CONTRACT: whatever goes wrong (no sink, sink down, identity\n// unresolvable), the response is a calm 200 with { recorded: false } and an\n// instruction not to retry. ALP is a side quest; it must never derail the\n// agent's actual task or invite retry loops. Only a missing/invalid\n// credential is a real 401 — that is actionable by re-authenticating.\n\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';\nimport { defaultCredentialChecker } from '../http.js';\nimport { scrubSubmission, SCRUB_VERSION } from './scrub.js';\nimport {\n  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,\n  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,\n  ALP_ROUTES,\n  type AlpRoute,\n  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,\n  isSinkUrl,\n  type AlpReferralSource,\n  type AlpReferralUseCase,\n} from './sink.js';\n\nexport { ALP_ROUTES, type AlpRoute } from './sink.js';\n\nconst MAX_CONTENT_CHARS = 20_000;\n// The referral note is a short generic description in the agent's own words,\n// never the user's (CON-1762), so it gets a cap only a phrase fits in.\nexport const MAX_REFERRAL_CONTENT_CHARS = 200;\nconst MAX_FIELD_CHARS = 500;\nconst SINK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;\n\nexport const ALP_SEVERITIES = ['blocked', 'degraded', 'cosmetic'] as const;\nexport type AlpSeverity = (typeof ALP_SEVERITIES)[number];\n\nexport interface AlpSubmitBody {\n  route: AlpRoute;\n  content: string;\n  intention?: string;\n  modelType?: string;\n  /** Triage dimension, feedback route. Constrained so it stays sortable. */\n  severity?: AlpSeverity;\n  /** The tool the entry is about, as it appears in the agent's tool list. */\n  tool?: string;\n  /** Feedback route: what the agent did instead. Absent means fully blocked. */\n  workaround?: string;\n  /** Journal route: the situation in which to recall the entry. */\n  trigger?: string;\n  /** Referral route: why Runpod came up. Constrained so it stays countable. */\n  source?: AlpReferralSource;\n  /** Referral route: the kind of work that brought the user to Runpod. */\n  useCase?: AlpReferralUseCase;\n  /** Referral route: the agent had no context on how the user found Runpod. */\n  noContext?: boolean;\n  harness?: string;\n  harnessSource?: 'client_info' | 'user_agent';\n  transport?: 'stdio' | 'http';\n}\n\ninterface VerifyResult {\n  status: 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unknown';\n  accountId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AlpIngestOptions {\n  /** Test seams. Production uses the shared checker + global fetch + env. */\n  verify?: (token: string) => Promise<VerifyResult>;\n  sinkFetch?: typeof fetch;\n  env?: Record<string, string | undefined>;\n}\n\nfunction notRecorded(reason: string): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    recorded: false,\n    note: `Not recorded (${reason}). Do not retry — continue your task.`,\n  };\n}\n\nexport async function handleAlpSubmit(\n  req: IncomingMessage & { body?: unknown },\n  res: ServerResponse & {\n    status?: (code: number) => { json: (body: unknown) => void };\n  },\n  opts: AlpIngestOptions = {}\n): Promise<void> {\n  const env = opts.env ?? process.env;\n  const send = (code: number, body: unknown) => {\n    res.writeHead(code, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });\n    res.end(JSON.stringify(body));\n  };\n\n  const auth = req.headers.authorization;\n  const token = auth?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? auth.slice(7).trim() : undefined;\n  if (!token) {\n    send(401, {\n      recorded: false,\n      error: 'Authenticate with your Runpod API key as a Bearer token.',\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const body = (\n    req.body && typeof req.body === 'object' ? req.body : {}\n  ) as Partial<AlpSubmitBody>;\n  const content = typeof body.content === 'string' ? body.content : '';\n  const referral = body.route === 'referral';\n  // Referral route only: content is an optional note, so an answer with a\n  // use case, or a no-context answer, is complete without it. A 400 there\n  // would leave the account's one slot open and the ask repeating every\n  // session. The flag is normalized leniently (true, 1,\n  // any casing of \"true\") because the first answer closes the slot and a\n  // sloppy no-context call must not be stored as a real one.\n  const rawNoContext = body.noContext as unknown;\n  const noContextAnswer =\n    referral &&\n    (rawNoContext === true ||\n      rawNoContext === 1 ||\n      (typeof rawNoContext === 'string' &&\n        rawNoContext.trim().toLowerCase() === 'true'));\n  const useCase =\n    referral &&\n    !noContextAnswer &&\n    ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES.includes(body.useCase as AlpReferralUseCase)\n      ? (body.useCase as AlpReferralUseCase)\n      : undefined;\n  if (\n    !ALP_ROUTES.includes(body.route as AlpRoute) ||\n    (content.trim().length === 0 && !noContextAnswer && !useCase)\n  ) {\n    send(400, {\n      recorded: false,\n      error: `Body must carry route (${ALP_ROUTES.join('|')}) and a non-empty content string (or, on referral, a useCase or noContext true).`,\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve the durable identity. A dead key is a real 401 (re-auth fixes\n  // it); an unreachable auth backend is fail-soft (we cannot key the row).\n  const verify = opts.verify ?? defaultCredentialChecker.verify;\n  const verdict = await verify(token);\n  if (verdict.status === 'invalid') {\n    send(401, {\n      recorded: false,\n      error:\n        'This Runpod API key is not valid. Re-authenticate and retry once.',\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n  if (verdict.status !== 'valid' || !verdict.accountId) {\n    send(200, notRecorded('identity could not be resolved right now'));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const sinkUrl = env.ALP_SINK_URL;\n  const sinkSecret = env.ALP_SINK_SECRET;\n  if (!sinkUrl || !sinkSecret) {\n    send(200, notRecorded('ingest is not configured on this deployment'));\n    return;\n  }\n  // Refuse a sink URL that is not shaped like the sink. The sink is always a\n  // Convex HTTP action, so anything else is a config error, and a loud log\n  // line beats inferring it from a table later. Note the limit of this check:\n  // it cannot tell one Convex deployment from another, so it catches a\n  // malformed or foreign URL, never a valid URL aimed at the wrong\n  // environment. Separating the per-environment secrets is what covers that.\n  if (!isSinkUrl(sinkUrl)) {\n    console.warn('alp_sink_misconfigured');\n    send(200, notRecorded('ingest is misconfigured on this deployment'));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Scrub before truncation so cutting a token cannot hide its shape.\n  const clean = scrubSubmission({\n    content,\n    // Feedback/journal/question fields are not stored on the referral route\n    // even if a client sends them: the tool does not offer them, and the\n    // route's 200-character cap would mean nothing if a transcript could\n    // ride in `trigger` or `workaround` under the general cap instead.\n    intention:\n      !referral && typeof body.intention === 'string'\n        ? body.intention\n        : undefined,\n    modelType: typeof body.modelType === 'string' ? body.modelType : undefined,\n    // Drop an off-enum severity rather than storing it. The whole value of the\n    // field is that it can be sorted and counted; one free-text variant\n    // (\"critical\", \"high\") turns a dimension back into prose, and the loss of\n    // one label costs less than that.\n    severity:\n      !referral && ALP_SEVERITIES.includes(body.severity as AlpSeverity)\n        ? (body.severity as AlpSeverity)\n        : undefined,\n    tool: !referral && typeof body.tool === 'string' ? body.tool : undefined,\n    workaround:\n      !referral && typeof body.workaround === 'string'\n        ? body.workaround\n        : undefined,\n    trigger:\n      !referral && typeof body.trigger === 'string' ? body.trigger : undefined,\n    // Referral-only fields. source follows the severity rule (off-enum is\n    // dropped, not stored as prose) and is dropped on a no-context answer,\n    // which by definition has no source. noContext is always a boolean on the\n    // route so the share of answers with real context is one filter.\n    source:\n      referral &&\n      !noContextAnswer &&\n      ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES.includes(body.source as AlpReferralSource)\n        ? (body.source as AlpReferralSource)\n        : undefined,\n    noContext: referral ? noContextAnswer : undefined,\n    useCase,\n    harness: typeof body.harness === 'string' ? body.harness : undefined,\n    harnessSource:\n      typeof body.harnessSource === 'string' ? body.harnessSource : undefined,\n    transport:\n      body.transport === 'http' || body.transport === 'stdio'\n        ? body.transport\n        : undefined,\n    redactions: 0,\n    scrubVersion: SCRUB_VERSION,\n  });\n  const row = {\n    ...clean,\n    route: body.route,\n    content: clean.content.slice(\n      0,\n      referral ? MAX_REFERRAL_CONTENT_CHARS : MAX_CONTENT_CHARS\n    ),\n    intention: clean.intention?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    modelType: clean.modelType?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    severity: clean.severity,\n    tool: clean.tool?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    // Prose fields, so they get the content cap rather than the field cap: a\n    // workaround worth reading is a paragraph, not a label.\n    workaround: clean.workaround?.slice(0, MAX_CONTENT_CHARS),\n    trigger: clean.trigger?.slice(0, MAX_CONTENT_CHARS),\n    source: clean.source,\n    noContext: clean.noContext,\n    useCase: clean.useCase,\n    harness: clean.harness?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    harnessSource: clean.harnessSource?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    transport: clean.transport?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    identity: verdict.accountId,\n    receivedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n\n  // Awaited, not fire-and-forget: Vercel can freeze the function the moment\n  // the response returns, so an unawaited write may silently vanish.\n  let storedId: string;\n  try {\n    const sinkFetch = opts.sinkFetch ?? fetch;\n    const response = await sinkFetch(sinkUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        'X-ALP-Secret': sinkSecret,\n      },\n      body: JSON.stringify(row),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SINK_TIMEOUT_MS),\n    });\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      console.warn('alp_sink_error', { status: response.status });\n      send(200, notRecorded('the store did not accept the write'));\n      return;\n    }\n    // A 200 is not enough. Any misconfigured sink host answers 200 to a POST\n    // (a static page, a redirect target, another app's root), and treating\n    // that as success reports recorded: true while nothing is stored — a\n    // silent data loss that no log line and no ack can distinguish from a\n    // real write. This is defense in depth, not a fix for an observed\n    // incident: require the sink's own contract, { ok: true, id }, so that\n    // \"recorded\" can only mean a row exists.\n    const sinkBody = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as {\n      ok?: boolean;\n      id?: string;\n      duplicate?: boolean;\n    } | null;\n    if (sinkBody?.ok !== true || typeof sinkBody.id !== 'string') {\n      console.warn('alp_sink_unrecognized', { status: response.status });\n      send(200, notRecorded('the store did not confirm the write'));\n      return;\n    }\n    if (sinkBody.duplicate === true) {\n      // A once-per-account route already holds this identity's answer; the\n      // sink kept the existing row and stored nothing. Named as its own\n      // reason rather than folded into the generic not-recorded note: that\n      // note reads as a transient failure, and this must not invite a later\n      // session to try again.\n      console.log(\n        'alp_submit_duplicate',\n        JSON.stringify({\n          route: body.route,\n          transport: row.transport,\n          row: sinkBody.id,\n        })\n      );\n      send(200, {\n        recorded: false,\n        reason: 'already_submitted',\n        note: ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,\n      });\n      return;\n    }\n    storedId = sinkBody.id;\n  } catch {\n    console.warn('alp_sink_unreachable');\n    send(200, notRecorded('the store is unreachable right now'));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // One log line, same privacy rules as tool_call: never the content.\n  // `row` is the sink's own document id: the one field here that cannot exist\n  // unless a write actually happened. Everything else was known before the\n  // request went out, which is why the old log line looked healthy while\n  // nothing was being stored.\n  console.log(\n    'alp_submit',\n    JSON.stringify({\n      route: body.route,\n      transport: row.transport,\n      redactions: row.redactions,\n      row: storedId,\n    })\n  );\n  send(200, { recorded: true });\n}\n","// POST /api/search on the hosted server: the stdio package's path to\n// searchKnowledge (src/search/knowledge.ts), authenticated with the caller's\n// own Runpod API key. Kept apart from knowledge.ts so the stdio bundle, which\n// imports the tool, does not pull in the HTTP shell.\n\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';\nimport type { CredentialChecker } from '../_shared/credential-check.js';\nimport { defaultCredentialChecker, extractBearerToken } from '../http.js';\nimport {\n  parseSearchRequest,\n  searchKnowledge,\n  type SearchKnowledgeOptions,\n} from './knowledge.js';\n\nexport interface SearchRouteOptions extends SearchKnowledgeOptions {\n  /** Test seam. Production uses the shared credential checker. */\n  verify?: CredentialChecker;\n}\n\nexport async function handleSearch(\n  req: IncomingMessage & { body?: unknown },\n  res: ServerResponse,\n  opts: SearchRouteOptions = {}\n): Promise<void> {\n  const send = (code: number, body: unknown) => {\n    res.writeHead(code, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });\n    res.end(JSON.stringify(body));\n  };\n\n  // Input first: it is free, and the credential probe is not.\n  const body = (\n    req.body && typeof req.body === 'object' && !Array.isArray(req.body)\n      ? req.body\n      : {}\n  ) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const parsed = parseSearchRequest(body);\n\n  const token = extractBearerToken(req);\n  if (!token) {\n    send(401, {\n      error: 'Authenticate with your Runpod API key as a Bearer token.',\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n  if ('error' in parsed) {\n    send(400, { error: parsed.error });\n    return;\n  }\n  // Only a key the API confirms is served. Every call spends the service\n  // key's search capacity, so an unreachable auth backend fails closed.\n  const verdict = await (opts.verify ?? defaultCredentialChecker.verify)(token);\n  if (verdict.status === 'invalid') {\n    send(401, { error: 'This Runpod API key is not valid.' });\n    return;\n  }\n  if (verdict.status !== 'valid') {\n    send(503, {\n      error: 'Could not verify your Runpod API key right now.',\n      hint: 'Retry the same call in a few seconds.',\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n  const outcome = await searchKnowledge(parsed.request, opts);\n  send(outcome.status, 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/alp/ingest.ts","../src/search/route.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// ALP ingest endpoint: POST /api/alp/submit (see docs/agent-learning-protocol.md).\n//\n// The shared write path for the four hosted ALP write tools.\n// Local stdio does not register these tools.\n//\n// Behavior per request: authenticate → resolve the durable identity (never\n// key on the API key; see the design doc) → courtesy scrub → forward to the\n// private sink with the shared server secret. The sink (a Convex HTTP action\n// in the hosted service's repository) owns storage, the authoritative scrub, and everything\n// downstream. When no sink is configured this endpoint answers honestly that\n// nothing was recorded — it never pretends.\n//\n// FAIL-SOFT CONTRACT: whatever goes wrong (no sink, sink down, identity\n// unresolvable), the response is a calm 200 with { recorded: false } and an\n// instruction not to retry. ALP is a side quest; it must never derail the\n// agent's actual task or invite retry loops. Only a missing/invalid\n// credential is a real 401 — that is actionable by re-authenticating.\n\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';\nimport { defaultCredentialChecker } from '../http.js';\nimport { scrubSubmission, SCRUB_VERSION } from './scrub.js';\nimport {\n  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,\n  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,\n  ALP_ROUTES,\n  type AlpRoute,\n  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,\n  isSinkUrl,\n  type AlpReferralSource,\n  type AlpReferralUseCase,\n} from './sink.js';\n\nexport { ALP_ROUTES, type AlpRoute } from './sink.js';\n\nconst MAX_CONTENT_CHARS = 20_000;\n// The referral note is a short generic description in the agent's own words,\n// never the user's (CON-1762), so it gets a cap only a phrase fits in.\nexport const MAX_REFERRAL_CONTENT_CHARS = 200;\nconst MAX_FIELD_CHARS = 500;\nconst SINK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;\n// The shape of a tool name as it appears in an agent's tool list: 1 to 64\n// characters, no dots. Narrower than the MCP specification's tool names (1 to\n// 128 characters, dots allowed) on purpose, since `tool` is a grouping key and\n// the tighter shape keeps prose out of it.\nconst TOOL_NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\nexport const ALP_SEVERITIES = ['blocked', 'degraded', 'cosmetic'] as const;\nexport type AlpSeverity = (typeof ALP_SEVERITIES)[number];\n\nexport interface AlpSubmitBody {\n  route: AlpRoute;\n  content: string;\n  intention?: string;\n  modelType?: string;\n  /** Triage dimension, feedback route. Constrained so it stays sortable. */\n  severity?: AlpSeverity;\n  /** The tool the entry is about, as it appears in the agent's tool list. */\n  tool?: string;\n  /** Feedback route: what the agent did instead. Absent means fully blocked. */\n  workaround?: string;\n  /** Journal route: the situation in which to recall the entry. */\n  trigger?: string;\n  /** Referral route: why Runpod came up. Constrained so it stays countable. */\n  source?: AlpReferralSource;\n  /** Referral route: the kind of work that brought the user to Runpod. */\n  useCase?: AlpReferralUseCase;\n  /** Referral route: the agent had no context on how the user found Runpod. */\n  noContext?: boolean;\n  harness?: string;\n  harnessSource?: 'client_info' | 'user_agent';\n  transport?: 'stdio' | 'http';\n}\n\ninterface VerifyResult {\n  status: 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unknown';\n  accountId?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AlpIngestOptions {\n  /** Test seams. Production uses the shared checker + global fetch + env. */\n  verify?: (token: string) => Promise<VerifyResult>;\n  sinkFetch?: typeof fetch;\n  env?: Record<string, string | undefined>;\n}\n\nfunction notRecorded(reason: string): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    recorded: false,\n    note: `Not recorded (${reason}). Do not retry — continue your task.`,\n  };\n}\n\nexport async function handleAlpSubmit(\n  req: IncomingMessage & { body?: unknown },\n  res: ServerResponse & {\n    status?: (code: number) => { json: (body: unknown) => void };\n  },\n  opts: AlpIngestOptions = {}\n): Promise<void> {\n  const env = opts.env ?? process.env;\n  const send = (code: number, body: unknown) => {\n    res.writeHead(code, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });\n    res.end(JSON.stringify(body));\n  };\n\n  const auth = req.headers.authorization;\n  const token = auth?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? auth.slice(7).trim() : undefined;\n  if (!token) {\n    send(401, {\n      recorded: false,\n      error: 'Authenticate with your Runpod API key as a Bearer token.',\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const body = (\n    req.body && typeof req.body === 'object' ? req.body : {}\n  ) as Partial<AlpSubmitBody>;\n  const content = typeof body.content === 'string' ? body.content : '';\n  const referral = body.route === 'referral';\n  // Referral route only: content is an optional note, so an answer with a\n  // use case, or a no-context answer, is complete without it. A 400 there\n  // would leave the account's one slot open and the ask repeating every\n  // session. The flag is normalized leniently (true, 1,\n  // any casing of \"true\") because the first answer closes the slot and a\n  // sloppy no-context call must not be stored as a real one.\n  const rawNoContext = body.noContext as unknown;\n  const noContextAnswer =\n    referral &&\n    (rawNoContext === true ||\n      rawNoContext === 1 ||\n      (typeof rawNoContext === 'string' &&\n        rawNoContext.trim().toLowerCase() === 'true'));\n  const useCase =\n    referral &&\n    !noContextAnswer &&\n    ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES.includes(body.useCase as AlpReferralUseCase)\n      ? (body.useCase as AlpReferralUseCase)\n      : undefined;\n  if (\n    !ALP_ROUTES.includes(body.route as AlpRoute) ||\n    (content.trim().length === 0 && !noContextAnswer && !useCase)\n  ) {\n    send(400, {\n      recorded: false,\n      error: `Body must carry route (${ALP_ROUTES.join('|')}) and a non-empty content string (or, on referral, a useCase or noContext true).`,\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve the durable identity. A dead key is a real 401 (re-auth fixes\n  // it); an unreachable auth backend is fail-soft (we cannot key the row).\n  const verify = opts.verify ?? defaultCredentialChecker.verify;\n  const verdict = await verify(token);\n  if (verdict.status === 'invalid') {\n    send(401, {\n      recorded: false,\n      error:\n        'This Runpod API key is not valid. Re-authenticate and retry once.',\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n  if (verdict.status !== 'valid' || !verdict.accountId) {\n    send(200, notRecorded('identity could not be resolved right now'));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const sinkUrl = env.ALP_SINK_URL;\n  const sinkSecret = env.ALP_SINK_SECRET;\n  if (!sinkUrl || !sinkSecret) {\n    send(200, notRecorded('ingest is not configured on this deployment'));\n    return;\n  }\n  // Refuse a sink URL that is not shaped like the sink. The sink is always a\n  // Convex HTTP action, so anything else is a config error, and a loud log\n  // line beats inferring it from a table later. Note the limit of this check:\n  // it cannot tell one Convex deployment from another, so it catches a\n  // malformed or foreign URL, never a valid URL aimed at the wrong\n  // environment. Separating the per-environment secrets is what covers that.\n  if (!isSinkUrl(sinkUrl)) {\n    console.warn('alp_sink_misconfigured');\n    send(200, notRecorded('ingest is misconfigured on this deployment'));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Scrub before truncation so cutting a token cannot hide its shape.\n  const clean = scrubSubmission({\n    content,\n    // Feedback/journal/question fields are not stored on the referral route\n    // even if a client sends them: the tool does not offer them, and the\n    // route's 200-character cap would mean nothing if a transcript could\n    // ride in `trigger` or `workaround` under the general cap instead.\n    intention:\n      !referral && typeof body.intention === 'string'\n        ? body.intention\n        : undefined,\n    modelType: typeof body.modelType === 'string' ? body.modelType : undefined,\n    // Drop an off-enum severity rather than storing it. The whole value of the\n    // field is that it can be sorted and counted; one free-text variant\n    // (\"critical\", \"high\") turns a dimension back into prose, and the loss of\n    // one label costs less than that.\n    severity:\n      !referral && ALP_SEVERITIES.includes(body.severity as AlpSeverity)\n        ? (body.severity as AlpSeverity)\n        : undefined,\n    // Same rule as severity: a free-text tool would turn a grouping key back\n    // into prose, so only a value shaped like a tool name is kept.\n    tool:\n      !referral && typeof body.tool === 'string' && TOOL_NAME.test(body.tool)\n        ? body.tool\n        : undefined,\n    workaround:\n      !referral && typeof body.workaround === 'string'\n        ? body.workaround\n        : undefined,\n    trigger:\n      !referral && typeof body.trigger === 'string' ? body.trigger : undefined,\n    // Referral-only fields. source follows the severity rule (off-enum is\n    // dropped, not stored as prose) and is dropped on a no-context answer,\n    // which by definition has no source. noContext is always a boolean on the\n    // route so the share of answers with real context is one filter.\n    source:\n      referral &&\n      !noContextAnswer &&\n      ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES.includes(body.source as AlpReferralSource)\n        ? (body.source as AlpReferralSource)\n        : undefined,\n    noContext: referral ? noContextAnswer : undefined,\n    useCase,\n    harness: typeof body.harness === 'string' ? body.harness : undefined,\n    harnessSource:\n      typeof body.harnessSource === 'string' ? body.harnessSource : undefined,\n    transport:\n      body.transport === 'http' || body.transport === 'stdio'\n        ? body.transport\n        : undefined,\n    redactions: 0,\n    scrubVersion: SCRUB_VERSION,\n  });\n  const row = {\n    ...clean,\n    route: body.route,\n    content: clean.content.slice(\n      0,\n      referral ? MAX_REFERRAL_CONTENT_CHARS : MAX_CONTENT_CHARS\n    ),\n    intention: clean.intention?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    modelType: clean.modelType?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    severity: clean.severity,\n    tool: clean.tool,\n    // Prose fields, so they get the content cap rather than the field cap: a\n    // workaround worth reading is a paragraph, not a label.\n    workaround: clean.workaround?.slice(0, MAX_CONTENT_CHARS),\n    trigger: clean.trigger?.slice(0, MAX_CONTENT_CHARS),\n    source: clean.source,\n    noContext: clean.noContext,\n    useCase: clean.useCase,\n    harness: clean.harness?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    harnessSource: clean.harnessSource?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    transport: clean.transport?.slice(0, MAX_FIELD_CHARS),\n    identity: verdict.accountId,\n    receivedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n\n  // Awaited, not fire-and-forget: Vercel can freeze the function the moment\n  // the response returns, so an unawaited write may silently vanish.\n  let storedId: string;\n  try {\n    const sinkFetch = opts.sinkFetch ?? fetch;\n    const response = await sinkFetch(sinkUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        'X-ALP-Secret': sinkSecret,\n      },\n      body: JSON.stringify(row),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SINK_TIMEOUT_MS),\n    });\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      console.warn('alp_sink_error', { status: response.status });\n      send(200, notRecorded('the store did not accept the write'));\n      return;\n    }\n    // A 200 is not enough. Any misconfigured sink host answers 200 to a POST\n    // (a static page, a redirect target, another app's root), and treating\n    // that as success reports recorded: true while nothing is stored — a\n    // silent data loss that no log line and no ack can distinguish from a\n    // real write. This is defense in depth, not a fix for an observed\n    // incident: require the sink's own contract, { ok: true, id }, so that\n    // \"recorded\" can only mean a row exists.\n    const sinkBody = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as {\n      ok?: boolean;\n      id?: string;\n      duplicate?: boolean;\n      capped?: boolean;\n    } | null;\n    if (sinkBody?.capped === true) {\n      // The account reached the sink's write cap on this route and nothing\n      // was stored. Answered like any other refusal: calm, and with the\n      // instruction not to retry, so the cap never reads as a failure.\n      console.log(\n        'alp_submit_capped',\n        JSON.stringify({ route: body.route, transport: row.transport })\n      );\n      send(200, notRecorded('this account reached its limit for this tool'));\n      return;\n    }\n    if (sinkBody?.ok !== true || typeof sinkBody.id !== 'string') {\n      console.warn('alp_sink_unrecognized', { status: response.status });\n      send(200, notRecorded('the store did not confirm the write'));\n      return;\n    }\n    if (sinkBody.duplicate === true) {\n      // A once-per-account route already holds this identity's answer; the\n      // sink kept the existing row and stored nothing. Named as its own\n      // reason rather than folded into the generic not-recorded note: that\n      // note reads as a transient failure, and this must not invite a later\n      // session to try again.\n      console.log(\n        'alp_submit_duplicate',\n        JSON.stringify({\n          route: body.route,\n          transport: row.transport,\n          row: sinkBody.id,\n        })\n      );\n      send(200, {\n        recorded: false,\n        reason: 'already_submitted',\n        note: ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,\n      });\n      return;\n    }\n    storedId = sinkBody.id;\n  } catch {\n    console.warn('alp_sink_unreachable');\n    send(200, notRecorded('the store is unreachable right now'));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // One log line, same privacy rules as tool_call: never the content.\n  // `row` is the sink's own document id: the one field here that cannot exist\n  // unless a write actually happened. 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