@runpod/mcp-server 4.7.0 → 4.9.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@
 # @runpod/mcp-server
 
+## 4.9.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- 6b0400d: Export the hosted-service surface as `@runpod/mcp-server/hosted` (`handleMcpRequest`, `getBaseUrl`, `handleAlpSubmit`, `handleAlpJournalRead`, `handleSearch`, `DIRECTORY_PATH`) and the ALP contract the Convex sink shares as `@runpod/mcp-server/alp` (`ALP_ROUTES`, `ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES`, `isOncePerAccountRoute`, `scrubSubmission` and friends), so an HTTP host and its Convex functions can build on the package instead of `src/`.
+
+## 4.8.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- 8f53070: Export the server profile module as `@runpod/mcp-server/profile` (`ServerProfile`, `DIRECTORY_PATH`, `DIRECTORY_TOOLS`, `profileForPath`, `directoryIncludes`, `directoryOmittedInputs`) so an HTTP host can resolve the directory profile from the package instead of reaching into `src/`.
+- 4c51d2a: Resync the vendored v2 OpenAPI spec with production as of 2026-10-27 and regenerate the SDK schema and the tools. Adds `list-organization-users` and `get-organization-user`, documents the 413 response on list operations, and requires a non-empty mount `path`.
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- 2658966: Record the tool surface on each `runpod_mcp_tool_call` analytics event as `profile` (`directory` for `mcp.runpod.io/directory`, `default` otherwise), so directory traffic (the ChatGPT plugin and the Claude connector) can be told apart from custom connectors on `/`.
+- f3efa2e: Avoid suggesting immediate retries when a timed-out or failed create may already have completed upstream.
+
 ## 4.7.0
 
 ### Minor Changes

package/README.md

@@ -226,3 +226,12 @@ the new generated surface. Applications should connect to the server through
 MCP using the `runpod-mcp` CLI, or use `handleMcpRequest` from
 `@runpod/mcp-server/http` when embedding the HTTP handler. The HTTP entry point
 also no longer re-exports the legacy `registerTools` or `ToolContext`.
+
+An HTTP host that serves the directory profile can import `DIRECTORY_PATH`
+and `profileForPath` from `@runpod/mcp-server/profile`.
+
+The hosted service's own surface (the MCP request handler, the ALP submit and
+journal handlers and the knowledge search route) is `@runpod/mcp-server/hosted`.
+The ALP contract the Convex sink shares (route names, the once-per-account
+rule and the scrubber) is `@runpod/mcp-server/alp`, kept free of the HTTP
+handler so a Convex function can bundle it.

package/dist/alp.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+"use strict";
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+
+// src/alp.ts
+var alp_exports = {};
+__export(alp_exports, {
+  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES: () => ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,
+  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES: () => ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,
+  ALP_ROUTES: () => ALP_ROUTES,
+  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE: () => ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,
+  ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES: () => ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES,
+  isOncePerAccountRoute: () => isOncePerAccountRoute,
+  isSinkUrl: () => isSinkUrl,
+  scrubSubmission: () => scrubSubmission,
+  sinkRouteUrl: () => sinkRouteUrl
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(alp_exports);
+
+// src/alp/sink.ts
+var ALP_ROUTES = [
+  "feedback",
+  "journal",
+  "question",
+  "referral"
+];
+var ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES = ["referral"];
+function isOncePerAccountRoute(route) {
+  return ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES.includes(route);
+}
+var ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE = "This account has already made this one-time submission; nothing new was stored. Do not call this again on this account \u2014 continue your task.";
+var ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES = [
+  "searched",
+  "user_named",
+  "recommended",
+  "other"
+];
+var ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES = [
+  "inference",
+  "fine_tuning",
+  "training",
+  "image_video_generation",
+  "dev_environment",
+  "batch_processing",
+  "other"
+];
+function isSinkUrl(value) {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return url.protocol === "https:" && url.hostname.endsWith(".convex.site") && url.pathname === "/alp/submit";
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+function sinkRouteUrl(submitUrl, path) {
+  if (!isSinkUrl(submitUrl)) return null;
+  const url = new URL(submitUrl);
+  url.pathname = path;
+  return url.toString();
+}
+
+// src/alp/scrub.ts
+var SCRUB_VERSION = 5;
+var MARKER = /^["']?\[redacted:[a-z_]+\]["']?$/;
+var CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS = [
+  // Runpod API keys.
+  { name: "runpod_key", re: /\brpa_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b/g },
+  // Bearer credentials pasted with their header.
+  { name: "bearer", re: /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{16,}/g },
+  // Common vendor key prefixes.
+  {
+    name: "vendor_key",
+    re: /\b(?:sk|pk|ghp|gho|phc|phx|xoxb|xoxp)[-_][A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g
+  },
+  // Hugging Face access tokens.
+  { name: "hugging_face", re: /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/g },
+  // AWS access key ids.
+  { name: "aws_key", re: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g },
+  // Three-segment JWTs.
+  {
+    name: "jwt",
+    re: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g
+  }
+];
+function redactAnchoredCredentials(text) {
+  let redactions = 0;
+  let out = text;
+  for (const { name, re } of CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS) {
+    out = out.replace(re, () => {
+      redactions++;
+      return `[redacted:${name}]`;
+    });
+  }
+  return { text: out, redactions };
+}
+var AUTH_HEADER = /\b((?:proxy-)?authorization|x-api-key|x-auth-token|x-runpod-token)(\s*:\s*)((?:basic|bearer|token|digest|negotiate|ntlm|apikey)\s+[^\s|,]+|[^\s|,]+)/gi;
+var COOKIE_HEADER = /\b(cookie|set-cookie)(\s*:\s*)([^\s;=,|]+=[^\s;,|]*(?:\s*;\s*[^\s;=,|]+(?:=[^\s;,|]*)?)*)/gi;
+function redactHeaderValues(text) {
+  let redactions = 0;
+  const replace = (match, name, sep, value) => {
+    if (MARKER.test(value)) return match;
+    redactions++;
+    return `${name}${sep}[redacted:header]`;
+  };
+  const out = text.replace(AUTH_HEADER, replace).replace(COOKIE_HEADER, replace);
+  return { text: out, redactions };
+}
+function redactQuerySecrets(text) {
+  let redactions = 0;
+  const out = text.replace(
+    /([?&](?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|token|key|secret)=)([^&#\s"'<>`]+)/gi,
+    (match, prefix, value) => {
+      if (MARKER.test(value)) return match;
+      redactions++;
+      return `${prefix}[redacted:query]`;
+    }
+  );
+  return { text: out, redactions };
+}
+var SENSITIVE_SEGMENTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "password",
+  "passwd",
+  "secret",
+  "token",
+  "authorization",
+  "cookie",
+  "credential",
+  "credentials"
+]);
+var KEY_QUALIFIERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "api",
+  "access",
+  "private",
+  "signing",
+  "secret",
+  "client"
+]);
+function splitKey(key) {
+  return key.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, "$1_$2").toLowerCase().split(/[_\-.]+/).filter(Boolean);
+}
+function isSensitiveKey(key) {
+  const segments = splitKey(key);
+  if (segments.some((segment) => SENSITIVE_SEGMENTS.has(segment))) return true;
+  return segments.some(
+    (segment, i) => segment === "key" && i > 0 && KEY_QUALIFIERS.has(segments[i - 1]) || // No separator at all: `apikey`, `accesskey`.
+    segment.endsWith("key") && KEY_QUALIFIERS.has(segment.slice(0, -3))
+  );
+}
+var QUOTES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(['"', "'"]);
+var VALUE_TERMINATORS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([",", ";", "{", "}", '"', "'"]);
+var QUERY_TERMINATORS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["&", "#"]);
+function isAsciiLetter(ch) {
+  return ch >= "a" && ch <= "z" || ch >= "A" && ch <= "Z";
+}
+function isAsciiDigit(ch) {
+  return ch >= "0" && ch <= "9";
+}
+function isKeyStart(ch) {
+  return isAsciiLetter(ch) || ch === "_";
+}
+function isKeyBody(ch) {
+  return isAsciiLetter(ch) || isAsciiDigit(ch) || ch === "_" || ch === "." || ch === "-";
+}
+function isSpaceOrTab(ch) {
+  return ch === " " || ch === "	";
+}
+function isWhitespace(ch) {
+  return ch === " " || ch === "	" || ch === "\n" || ch === "\r" || ch === "\f" || ch === "\v";
+}
+function readQuotedValue(text, start) {
+  const quote = text[start];
+  let i = start + 1;
+  while (i < text.length) {
+    const ch = text[i];
+    if (ch === "\\") {
+      i += 2;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === quote) return i + 1;
+    if (ch === "\n" || ch === "\r") return i;
+    i++;
+  }
+  return text.length;
+}
+function readUnquotedValue(text, start, inQueryString) {
+  let i = start;
+  while (i < text.length) {
+    const ch = text[i];
+    if (isWhitespace(ch) || VALUE_TERMINATORS.has(ch)) break;
+    if (inQueryString && QUERY_TERMINATORS.has(ch)) break;
+    i++;
+  }
+  return i;
+}
+function parseAssignment(text, at) {
+  const before = at > 0 ? text[at - 1] : "";
+  if (isKeyBody(before)) return null;
+  let i = at;
+  const openingQuote = QUOTES.has(text[i] ?? "") ? text[i] : "";
+  if (openingQuote) i++;
+  if (!isKeyStart(text[i] ?? "")) return null;
+  const keyStart = i;
+  while (i < text.length && isKeyBody(text[i])) i++;
+  const key = text.slice(keyStart, i);
+  if (QUOTES.has(text[i] ?? "")) i++;
+  while (i < text.length && isSpaceOrTab(text[i])) i++;
+  if (text[i] !== ":" && text[i] !== "=") return null;
+  i++;
+  while (i < text.length && isSpaceOrTab(text[i])) i++;
+  const inQueryString = before === "?" || before === "&";
+  const start = i;
+  let end;
+  let quote = "";
+  if (QUOTES.has(text[start] ?? "")) {
+    quote = text[start];
+    end = readQuotedValue(text, start);
+  } else {
+    end = readUnquotedValue(text, start, inQueryString);
+  }
+  if (end === start) return null;
+  return { key, raw: text.slice(start, end), quote, start, end };
+}
+function redactAssignments(text) {
+  let redactions = 0;
+  let out = "";
+  let copiedTo = 0;
+  let cursor = 0;
+  while (cursor < text.length) {
+    const found = parseAssignment(text, cursor);
+    if (!found) {
+      cursor++;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (MARKER.test(found.raw)) {
+      cursor = found.end;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!isSensitiveKey(found.key)) {
+      cursor = found.start;
+      continue;
+    }
+    out += text.slice(copiedTo, found.start);
+    out += `${found.quote}[redacted:config]${found.quote}`;
+    copiedTo = found.end;
+    cursor = found.end;
+    redactions++;
+  }
+  out += text.slice(copiedTo);
+  return { text: out, redactions };
+}
+function scrub(text) {
+  let out = text;
+  let redactions = 0;
+  for (const stage of [
+    redactAnchoredCredentials,
+    redactHeaderValues,
+    redactQuerySecrets,
+    redactAssignments
+  ]) {
+    const result = stage(out);
+    out = result.text;
+    redactions += result.redactions;
+  }
+  return { text: out, redactions };
+}
+var SCRUBBED_FIELDS = [
+  "content",
+  "intention",
+  "modelType",
+  "severity",
+  "tool",
+  "workaround",
+  "trigger",
+  "source",
+  "useCase",
+  "harness",
+  "harnessSource",
+  "transport"
+];
+function scrubSubmission(row) {
+  const clean = { ...row };
+  for (const field of SCRUBBED_FIELDS) {
+    const value = clean[field];
+    if (typeof value !== "string") continue;
+    const result = scrub(value);
+    clean[field] = result.text;
+    clean.redactions += result.redactions;
+  }
+  clean.scrubVersion = SCRUB_VERSION;
+  return clean;
+}
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,
+  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,
+  ALP_ROUTES,
+  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,
+  ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES,
+  isOncePerAccountRoute,
+  isSinkUrl,
+  scrubSubmission,
+  sinkRouteUrl
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=alp.cjs.map

package/dist/alp.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/alp.ts","../src/alp/sink.ts","../src/alp/scrub.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// The ALP contract shared with the Convex sink: route names, the\n// once-per-account rule and the scrubber. Pure, so a Convex function can\n// bundle it without pulling the HTTP handler in.\nexport {\n  ALP_ROUTES,\n  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,\n  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,\n  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,\n  ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES,\n  isOncePerAccountRoute,\n  isSinkUrl,\n  sinkRouteUrl,\n} from './alp/sink.js';\nexport type {\n  AlpReferralSource,\n  AlpReferralUseCase,\n  AlpRoute,\n  OncePerAccountRoute,\n} from './alp/sink.js';\nexport { scrubSubmission } from './alp/scrub.js';\n","// The ALP constants and sink address that more than one side needs: the\n// hosted server, the Convex functions, and the tool definitions. This module\n// imports nothing, so anything can import it without a cycle; the ingest\n// handler cannot play that role because it imports src/http.ts.\n\n// Every ALP route. The Convex validators are built from this list.\nexport const ALP_ROUTES = [\n  'feedback',\n  'journal',\n  'question',\n  'referral',\n] as const;\nexport type AlpRoute = (typeof ALP_ROUTES)[number];\n\n// Routes that take ONE answer per account, ever (design doc, \"RT4\"). The\n// Convex mutation dedupes on this list and /alp/answered validates against it.\n// The next one (the agent NPS score, CON-1729) is a literal added here, in the\n// `oncePerAccountRoute` Convex validator, and in the route lists, plus the\n// tool itself and its own hasAnswered call.\nexport const ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES = ['referral'] as const;\nexport type OncePerAccountRoute = (typeof ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES)[number];\n\nexport function isOncePerAccountRoute(\n  route: unknown\n): route is OncePerAccountRoute {\n  return (ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES as readonly unknown[]).includes(route);\n}\n\n// What the agent reads when a once-per-account route already holds its\n// answer. The ingest sends it and the tool says it; one sentence, one place.\nexport const ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE =\n  'This account has already made this one-time submission; nothing new was stored. Do not call this again on this account — continue your task.';\n\n// Referral route: why Runpod came up. Constrained like severity so it counts.\n// Lives here, not in ingest.ts, so the tool file can import it without\n// pulling the ingest handler (and its import of src/http.ts) into a cycle.\nexport const ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES = [\n  'searched',\n  'user_named',\n  'recommended',\n  'other',\n] as const;\nexport type AlpReferralSource = (typeof ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES)[number];\n\n// Referral route: the kind of work that brought the user to Runpod. A\n// category instead of the user's words, so nothing they typed is stored.\nexport const ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES = [\n  'inference',\n  'fine_tuning',\n  'training',\n  'image_video_generation',\n  'dev_environment',\n  'batch_processing',\n  'other',\n] as const;\nexport type AlpReferralUseCase = (typeof ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES)[number];\n\n/** The sink is a Convex HTTP action, always. Anything else is a typo. */\nexport function isSinkUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(value);\n    return (\n      url.protocol === 'https:' &&\n      url.hostname.endsWith('.convex.site') &&\n      url.pathname === '/alp/submit'\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/** A sibling route on the same deployment as the configured submit URL.\n *  Derived, never configured, so no second variable can point elsewhere. */\nexport function sinkRouteUrl(submitUrl: string, path: string): string | null {\n  if (!isSinkUrl(submitUrl)) return null;\n  const url = new URL(submitUrl);\n  url.pathname = path;\n  return url.toString();\n}\n","// Best-effort secret redaction before forwarding to storage and again at the\n// Convex write boundary. This catches recognizable tokens and sensitive config\n// assignments; arbitrary unlabeled secrets cannot reliably be identified.\n//\n// Four stages, run in this order, each a pure function with its own table\n// of rules and its own tests:\n//\n//   A. anchored credentials  — shapes recognizable on their own (rpa_, JWT...)\n//   B. sensitive headers     — the WHOLE value of Authorization/Cookie/...\n//   C. URL query secrets   — api_key/token/key/secret parameters\n//   D. config assignments    — `key = value` / `key: value` by key name\n//\n// Specific before broad is the invariant. Several stage-A rules identify a\n// credential by the word in front of it (`Bearer <opaque>`), and stage D stops\n// an unquoted value at the first space or semicolon — so run in the other\n// order, C consumes \"Bearer\", destroys the anchor, and leaves the secret in\n// plaintext looking redacted. Stage B exists because header values are\n// DEFINED by containing spaces and semicolons (`Basic <cred>`, `a=1; b=2`),\n// which is exactly the shape the token-level matcher cannot hold whole.\n\nexport interface ScrubResult {\n  text: string;\n  /** How many redactions fired — a redaction rate is itself a metric. */\n  redactions: number;\n}\n\n// Bump when any stage's rules change so stored rows record which pass they got.\nexport const SCRUB_VERSION = 5;\n\nconst MARKER = /^[\"']?\\[redacted:[a-z_]+\\][\"']?$/;\n\n// ---- Stage A: anchored credential shapes --------------------------------\n\nconst CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS: Array<{ name: string; re: RegExp }> = [\n  // Runpod API keys.\n  { name: 'runpod_key', re: /\\brpa_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\\b/g },\n  // Bearer credentials pasted with their header.\n  { name: 'bearer', re: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{16,}/g },\n  // Common vendor key prefixes.\n  {\n    name: 'vendor_key',\n    re: /\\b(?:sk|pk|ghp|gho|phc|phx|xoxb|xoxp)[-_][A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  // Hugging Face access tokens.\n  { name: 'hugging_face', re: /\\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\\b/g },\n  // AWS access key ids.\n  { name: 'aws_key', re: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g },\n  // Three-segment JWTs.\n  {\n    name: 'jwt',\n    re: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\nexport function redactAnchoredCredentials(text: string): ScrubResult {\n  let redactions = 0;\n  let out = text;\n  for (const { name, re } of CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS) {\n    out = out.replace(re, () => {\n      redactions++;\n      return `[redacted:${name}]`;\n    });\n  }\n  return { text: out, redactions };\n}\n\n// ---- Stage B: sensitive headers, whole value ----------------------------\n\n// Headers are matched wherever they appear, not only at line start: pastes\n// arrive inline (\"… got 401 with Authorization: Basic xyz | cookie: a=1; b=2\")\n// and the first version, anchored ^…$, missed exactly that and fell through\n// to the token matcher — which redacted the word \"Basic\" and kept the\n// credential. So the VALUE is bounded by its own shape rather than by the end\n// of the line: an auth header is `<scheme> <token>` or a bare token; a cookie\n// header is a `k=v; k=v` chain. Header names are case-insensitive.\nconst AUTH_HEADER =\n  /\\b((?:proxy-)?authorization|x-api-key|x-auth-token|x-runpod-token)(\\s*:\\s*)((?:basic|bearer|token|digest|negotiate|ntlm|apikey)\\s+[^\\s|,]+|[^\\s|,]+)/gi;\nconst COOKIE_HEADER =\n  /\\b(cookie|set-cookie)(\\s*:\\s*)([^\\s;=,|]+=[^\\s;,|]*(?:\\s*;\\s*[^\\s;=,|]+(?:=[^\\s;,|]*)?)*)/gi;\n\nexport function redactHeaderValues(text: string): ScrubResult {\n  let redactions = 0;\n  const replace = (match: string, name: string, sep: string, value: string) => {\n    // Stage A may already have replaced the value; keep its marker.\n    if (MARKER.test(value)) return match;\n    redactions++;\n    return `${name}${sep}[redacted:header]`;\n  };\n  const out = text\n    .replace(AUTH_HEADER, replace)\n    .replace(COOKIE_HEADER, replace);\n  return { text: out, redactions };\n}\n\n// ---- Stage C: URL query credentials -----------------------------------\n\n// URL query credentials stop at the next query field, fragment or text boundary.\n// Preserve parameter names and non-secret query fields for diagnostics.\nexport function redactQuerySecrets(text: string): ScrubResult {\n  let redactions = 0;\n  const out = text.replace(\n    /([?&](?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|token|key|secret)=)([^&#\\s\"'<>`]+)/gi,\n    (match, prefix: string, value: string) => {\n      if (MARKER.test(value)) return match;\n      redactions++;\n      return `${prefix}[redacted:query]`;\n    }\n  );\n  return { text: out, redactions };\n}\n\n// ---- Stage D: config assignments, by key name ---------------------------\n\n// Keys are compared segment by segment, never by substring: a substring test\n// redacts `tokenizer: llama-3` because it contains \"token\". Split on\n// separators AND camelCase, so `databasePassword` and `clientSecret` become\n// segment lists rather than one opaque word.\nconst SENSITIVE_SEGMENTS = new Set([\n  'password',\n  'passwd',\n  'secret',\n  'token',\n  'authorization',\n  'cookie',\n  'credential',\n  'credentials',\n]);\n\n// `key` alone is too common to be sensitive (primary_key, cache_key). 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The field name is kept for diagnostic context.\n//\n// This was one regex with a lookbehind, two quoted-string alternatives, a\n// negated value class and a trailing lookahead. It was unreadable, and every\n// fix to one case broke another: excluding `&` from the value class so a URL's\n// second query parameter survived also truncated `password: p&ss#word123` at\n// the `&` and leaked the rest. Both behaviors were correct for their own\n// input and the character class had no way to tell the two apart, because the\n// distinction is context, not characters.\n//\n// So the scan is written out: a cursor, one small function per token, and the\n// value's terminator set chosen from where the key sits. Each rule below is a\n// named predicate that can be read and tested on its own.\n\nconst QUOTES = new Set(['\"', \"'\"]);\n\n// A value always ends at one of these: `{`/`}` and `,`/`;` close a JSON or\n// inline-YAML member, and a quote cannot appear inside an unquoted value.\nconst VALUE_TERMINATORS = new Set([',', ';', '{', '}', '\"', \"'\"]);\n\n// `&` and `#` end a value ONLY inside a URL query, where they begin the next\n// parameter and the fragment. In a config file they are ordinary password\n// characters — `p&ss#word` is one value, not three.\nconst QUERY_TERMINATORS = new Set(['&', '#']);\n\nfunction isAsciiLetter(ch: string): boolean {\n  return (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z');\n}\n\nfunction isAsciiDigit(ch: string): boolean {\n  return ch >= '0' && ch <= '9';\n}\n\n/** A key begins with a letter or underscore, never a digit — so `10:30` in a\n *  timestamp is not read as an assignment. */\nfunction isKeyStart(ch: string): boolean {\n  return isAsciiLetter(ch) || ch === '_';\n}\n\n/** Inside a key name: adds digits and the three separators that `splitKey`\n *  later splits on, so `aws.secretKey` and `DB_PASSWORD` arrive whole. */\nfunction isKeyBody(ch: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    isAsciiLetter(ch) ||\n    isAsciiDigit(ch) ||\n    ch === '_' ||\n    ch === '.' ||\n    ch === '-'\n  );\n}\n\n/** Horizontal space only. A newline after the separator means the value is on\n *  another line, so `db:\\n  password: x` must not read `password` as db's\n *  value — the bug that let nested YAML through entirely. */\nfunction isSpaceOrTab(ch: string): boolean {\n  return ch === ' ' || ch === '\\t';\n}\n\nfunction isWhitespace(ch: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    ch === ' ' ||\n    ch === '\\t' ||\n    ch === '\\n' ||\n    ch === '\\r' ||\n    ch === '\\f' ||\n    ch === '\\v'\n  );\n}\n\ninterface Assignment {\n  /** Bare key name: quotes and the separator stripped. */\n  key: string;\n  /** Raw value text as it appears, including its quotes when quoted. */\n  raw: string;\n  /** Quote character to reinstate around a replacement, or `''`. */\n  quote: string;\n  /** Half-open range of the value within the source text. */\n  start: number;\n  end: number;\n}\n\n/** Reads a quoted value, honoring backslash escapes. An unterminated quote is\n *  a truncated paste, so it reads to the end of the line rather than giving\n *  up: for a redactor, over-reading a secret is the safe direction. */\nfunction readQuotedValue(text: string, start: number): number {\n  const quote = text[start];\n  let i = start + 1;\n  while (i < text.length) {\n    const ch = text[i];\n    if (ch === '\\\\') {\n      i += 2;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === quote) return i + 1;\n    if (ch === '\\n' || ch === '\\r') return i;\n    i++;\n  }\n  return text.length;\n}\n\n/** Reads an unquoted value up to the first terminator for its context. */\nfunction readUnquotedValue(\n  text: string,\n  start: number,\n  inQueryString: boolean\n): number {\n  let i = start;\n  while (i < text.length) {\n    const ch = text[i];\n    if (isWhitespace(ch) || VALUE_TERMINATORS.has(ch)) break;\n    if (inQueryString && QUERY_TERMINATORS.has(ch)) break;\n    i++;\n  }\n  return i;\n}\n\n/** Parses `key: value` or `key = value` beginning at `at`, or null if there is\n *  no assignment there. */\nfunction parseAssignment(text: string, at: number): Assignment | null {\n  const before = at > 0 ? text[at - 1] : '';\n  // Mid-identifier: `my_password` must not also match as key `password`.\n  if (isKeyBody(before)) return null;\n\n  let i = at;\n  const openingQuote = QUOTES.has(text[i] ?? '') ? text[i] : '';\n  if (openingQuote) i++;\n  if (!isKeyStart(text[i] ?? '')) return null;\n\n  const keyStart = i;\n  while (i < text.length && isKeyBody(text[i])) i++;\n  const key = text.slice(keyStart, i);\n\n  // A closing quote is tolerated whether or not one opened: pasted snippets\n  // arrive truncated, and `password\": x` should still redact.\n  if (QUOTES.has(text[i] ?? '')) i++;\n\n  while (i < text.length && isSpaceOrTab(text[i])) i++;\n  if (text[i] !== ':' && text[i] !== '=') return null;\n  i++;\n  while (i < text.length && isSpaceOrTab(text[i])) i++;\n\n  // `?api_key=` or `&token=` — this key sits in a URL query string.\n  const inQueryString = before === '?' || before === '&';\n\n  const start = i;\n  let end: number;\n  let quote = '';\n  if (QUOTES.has(text[start] ?? '')) {\n    quote = text[start];\n    end = readQuotedValue(text, start);\n  } else {\n    end = readUnquotedValue(text, start, inQueryString);\n  }\n  // A parent key such as `db:` has no value of its own.\n  if (end === start) return null;\n\n  return { key, raw: text.slice(start, end), quote, start, end };\n}\n\nexport function redactAssignments(text: string): ScrubResult {\n  let redactions = 0;\n  let out = '';\n  let copiedTo = 0;\n  let cursor = 0;\n\n  while (cursor < text.length) {\n    const found = parseAssignment(text, cursor);\n    if (!found) {\n      cursor++;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Already handled by an earlier stage — keep its marker, do not count it\n    // twice, and resume past it.\n    if (MARKER.test(found.raw)) {\n      cursor = found.end;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    if (!isSensitiveKey(found.key)) {\n      // Resume INSIDE the value, not after it. A non-sensitive assignment can\n      // contain one: `https://h/?password=x` parses as key `https` whose value\n      // is the whole URL, and skipping it leaked the password outright.\n      cursor = found.start;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    out += text.slice(copiedTo, found.start);\n    out += `${found.quote}[redacted:config]${found.quote}`;\n    copiedTo = found.end;\n    cursor = found.end;\n    redactions++;\n  }\n\n  out += text.slice(copiedTo);\n  return { text: out, redactions };\n}\n\n// ---- Composition ---------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport function scrub(text: string): ScrubResult {\n  let out = text;\n  let redactions = 0;\n  for (const stage of [\n    redactAnchoredCredentials,\n    redactHeaderValues,\n    redactQuerySecrets,\n    redactAssignments,\n  ]) {\n    const result = stage(out);\n    out = result.text;\n    redactions += result.redactions;\n  }\n  return { text: out, redactions };\n}\n\n// Only user-authored text is scrubbed; resolved identity and server timestamps\n// remain authoritative. Reapplying this at the sink is safe and idempotent.\nexport const SCRUBBED_FIELDS = [\n  'content',\n  'intention',\n  'modelType',\n  'severity',\n  'tool',\n  'workaround',\n  'trigger',\n  'source',\n  'useCase',\n  'harness',\n  'harnessSource',\n  'transport',\n] as const;\n\nexport function scrubSubmission<\n  T extends {\n    content: string;\n    intention?: string;\n    modelType?: string;\n    severity?: string;\n    tool?: string;\n    workaround?: string;\n    trigger?: string;\n    source?: string;\n    useCase?: string;\n    harness?: string;\n    harnessSource?: string;\n    transport?: string;\n    redactions: number;\n    scrubVersion: number;\n  },\n>(row: T): T {\n  const clean = { ...row };\n  // EVERY agent-writable string field belongs in this list. A field added to\n  // the submission shape but not here is stored unscrubbed, which is how a\n  // pasted credential reaches the table — the fields most likely to carry one\n  // are exactly the free-text ones a new route adds. Guarded by a test that\n  // walks the submission type, so the omission fails CI rather than shipping.\n  for (const field of SCRUBBED_FIELDS) {\n    const value = clean[field];\n    if (typeof value !== 'string') continue;\n    const result = scrub(value);\n    clean[field] = result.text;\n    clean.redactions += result.redactions;\n  }\n  clean.scrubVersion = SCRUB_VERSION;\n  return 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package/dist/alp.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+export { a as ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES, b as ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES, A as ALP_ROUTES, c as ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE, e as AlpReferralSource, f as AlpReferralUseCase, g as AlpRoute, O as ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES, h as OncePerAccountRoute, i as isOncePerAccountRoute, d as isSinkUrl, s as sinkRouteUrl } from './sink-Cm8lp16D.cjs';
+
+declare function scrubSubmission<T extends {
+    content: string;
+    intention?: string;
+    modelType?: string;
+    severity?: string;
+    tool?: string;
+    workaround?: string;
+    trigger?: string;
+    source?: string;
+    useCase?: string;
+    harness?: string;
+    harnessSource?: string;
+    transport?: string;
+    redactions: number;
+    scrubVersion: number;
+}>(row: T): T;
+
+export { scrubSubmission };

package/dist/alp.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+export { a as ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES, b as ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES, A as ALP_ROUTES, c as ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE, e as AlpReferralSource, f as AlpReferralUseCase, g as AlpRoute, O as ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES, h as OncePerAccountRoute, i as isOncePerAccountRoute, d as isSinkUrl, s as sinkRouteUrl } from './sink-Cm8lp16D.js';
+
+declare function scrubSubmission<T extends {
+    content: string;
+    intention?: string;
+    modelType?: string;
+    severity?: string;
+    tool?: string;
+    workaround?: string;
+    trigger?: string;
+    source?: string;
+    useCase?: string;
+    harness?: string;
+    harnessSource?: string;
+    transport?: string;
+    redactions: number;
+    scrubVersion: number;
+}>(row: T): T;
+
+export { scrubSubmission };

package/dist/alp.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import {
+  scrubSubmission
+} from "./chunk-H3NZYQIB.mjs";
+import {
+  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,
+  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,
+  ALP_ROUTES,
+  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,
+  ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES,
+  isOncePerAccountRoute,
+  isSinkUrl,
+  sinkRouteUrl
+} from "./chunk-577IYCJT.mjs";
+export {
+  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,
+  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,
+  ALP_ROUTES,
+  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,
+  ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES,
+  isOncePerAccountRoute,
+  isSinkUrl,
+  scrubSubmission,
+  sinkRouteUrl
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=alp.mjs.map

package/dist/alp.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":[],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":"","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-577IYCJT.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// src/alp/sink.ts
+var ALP_ROUTES = [
+  "feedback",
+  "journal",
+  "question",
+  "referral"
+];
+var ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES = ["referral"];
+function isOncePerAccountRoute(route) {
+  return ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES.includes(route);
+}
+var ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE = "This account has already made this one-time submission; nothing new was stored. Do not call this again on this account \u2014 continue your task.";
+var ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES = [
+  "searched",
+  "user_named",
+  "recommended",
+  "other"
+];
+var ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES = [
+  "inference",
+  "fine_tuning",
+  "training",
+  "image_video_generation",
+  "dev_environment",
+  "batch_processing",
+  "other"
+];
+function isSinkUrl(value) {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return url.protocol === "https:" && url.hostname.endsWith(".convex.site") && url.pathname === "/alp/submit";
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+function sinkRouteUrl(submitUrl, path) {
+  if (!isSinkUrl(submitUrl)) return null;
+  const url = new URL(submitUrl);
+  url.pathname = path;
+  return url.toString();
+}
+
+export {
+  ALP_ROUTES,
+  ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES,
+  isOncePerAccountRoute,
+  ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE,
+  ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES,
+  ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES,
+  isSinkUrl,
+  sinkRouteUrl
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-577IYCJT.mjs.map

package/dist/chunk-577IYCJT.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/alp/sink.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// The ALP constants and sink address that more than one side needs: the\n// hosted server, the Convex functions, and the tool definitions. This module\n// imports nothing, so anything can import it without a cycle; the ingest\n// handler cannot play that role because it imports src/http.ts.\n\n// Every ALP route. The Convex validators are built from this list.\nexport const ALP_ROUTES = [\n  'feedback',\n  'journal',\n  'question',\n  'referral',\n] as const;\nexport type AlpRoute = (typeof ALP_ROUTES)[number];\n\n// Routes that take ONE answer per account, ever (design doc, \"RT4\"). The\n// Convex mutation dedupes on this list and /alp/answered validates against it.\n// The next one (the agent NPS score, CON-1729) is a literal added here, in the\n// `oncePerAccountRoute` Convex validator, and in the route lists, plus the\n// tool itself and its own hasAnswered call.\nexport const ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES = ['referral'] as const;\nexport type OncePerAccountRoute = (typeof ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES)[number];\n\nexport function isOncePerAccountRoute(\n  route: unknown\n): route is OncePerAccountRoute {\n  return (ONCE_PER_ACCOUNT_ROUTES as readonly unknown[]).includes(route);\n}\n\n// What the agent reads when a once-per-account route already holds its\n// answer. The ingest sends it and the tool says it; one sentence, one place.\nexport const ALREADY_SUBMITTED_NOTE =\n  'This account has already made this one-time submission; nothing new was stored. Do not call this again on this account — continue your task.';\n\n// Referral route: why Runpod came up. Constrained like severity so it counts.\n// Lives here, not in ingest.ts, so the tool file can import it without\n// pulling the ingest handler (and its import of src/http.ts) into a cycle.\nexport const ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES = [\n  'searched',\n  'user_named',\n  'recommended',\n  'other',\n] as const;\nexport type AlpReferralSource = (typeof ALP_REFERRAL_SOURCES)[number];\n\n// Referral route: the kind of work that brought the user to Runpod. A\n// category instead of the user's words, so nothing they typed is stored.\nexport const ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES = [\n  'inference',\n  'fine_tuning',\n  'training',\n  'image_video_generation',\n  'dev_environment',\n  'batch_processing',\n  'other',\n] as const;\nexport type AlpReferralUseCase = (typeof ALP_REFERRAL_USE_CASES)[number];\n\n/** The sink is a Convex HTTP action, always. Anything else is a typo. */\nexport function isSinkUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(value);\n    return (\n      url.protocol === 'https:' &&\n      url.hostname.endsWith('.convex.site') &&\n      url.pathname === '/alp/submit'\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/** A sibling route on the same deployment as the configured submit URL.\n *  Derived, never configured, so no second variable can point elsewhere. */\nexport function sinkRouteUrl(submitUrl: string, path: string): string | null {\n  if (!isSinkUrl(submitUrl)) return null;\n  const url = new URL(submitUrl);\n  url.pathname = path;\n  return url.toString();\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAMO,IAAM,aAAa;AAAA,EACxB;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAQO,IAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC,UAAU;AAG3C,SAAS,sBACd,OAC8B;AAC9B,SAAQ,wBAA+C,SAAS,KAAK;AACvE;AAIO,IAAM,yBACX;AAKK,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAKO,IAAM,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAIO,SAAS,UAAU,OAAwB;AAChD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACzB,WACE,IAAI,aAAa,YACjB,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,KACpC,IAAI,aAAa;AAAA,EAErB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAIO,SAAS,aAAa,WAAmB,MAA6B;AAC3E,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO;AAClC,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC7B,MAAI,WAAW;AACf,SAAO,IAAI,SAAS;AACtB;","names":[]}