@runeditrun/rer 0.2.9 → 0.2.11

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/cli/bounded.mjs CHANGED
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ export async function boundedCommand(project,options,argv,out){
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  const {createCommands}=await shared('commands.mjs');
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  store=await createCommands(directory,{logs:[]},{terminal:()=>{}});
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  result=await queuedCommand(process.execPath,[fileURLToPath(new URL('../bin/rer.mjs',import.meta.url)),...childArgs],{
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- cwd:project.root,signal:cancellation.signal,stdio:[!options.json&&!options.nonInteractive?'inherit':'ignore','pipe','pipe'],originalCI:policy.ci,env:{...process.env,...policy.environment,RER_BOUNDED_OUTPUT:'1'},
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+ cwd:project.root,verb:options.verb,signal:cancellation.signal,stdio:[!options.json&&!options.nonInteractive?'inherit':'ignore','pipe','pipe'],originalCI:policy.ci,env:{...process.env,...policy.environment,RER_BOUNDED_OUTPUT:'1'},
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  label:await queueLabel(project.root,options.verb,'workflow'),report:text=>out.progress(store.redact(text)+'\n'),onWaiting:options.json?details=>out.event('waiting',details):undefined,
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  spawn:(command,args,native)=>{
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  const child=store.spawn('Running bounded workflow',command,args,native);
@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@
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  # Changelog
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+ ## 0.2.11
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+
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+ - New Base foundations generate public Run instructions for the edition's planned product repository, distinct migration ordinals, and setup names matching the edition.
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+ - Owned early auth, OIDC, local dev and template refusals finish ordinary request bodies before responding. Oversized or stalled uploads are bounded while privacy headers are retained.
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+
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+ ### Upgrade notes
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+
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+ - Seeds receive these source changes with their next Base refresh; changing the npm pin alone does not refresh seed-owned runtime copies. Existing applied migration histories keep their names.
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+ - Optional import-kit selection remains deferred until a canonical complete migration schema can drive generation; product import flows still need their own authorized adapter.
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+
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+ ## 0.2.10
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+
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+ - First-owner bootstrap and signed owner claims use a client-IP rate budget, so junk setup-token requests from another client cannot block the correct claim. Repeated wrong tokens from one client remain limited.
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+
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+ ### Upgrade notes
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+
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+ - Seeds receive this auth runtime fix with their next Base refresh. Updating the rer package alone does not replace seed-owned runtime copies.
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+
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  ## 0.2.9
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  - `rer deploy --remove --yes` empties each R2 bucket whose saved creation identity proves rer owns it, deletes the bucket, and verifies removal. Buckets with uncertain or replaced ownership are refused; interrupted deletion retains the deployment record so removal can resume.
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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+ import { loadavg } from 'node:os';
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+ import { setTimeout as delay } from 'node:timers/promises';
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+ import { configuration } from './config.mjs';
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+ import { signalExit } from './command.mjs';
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+
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+ // CI and descendants sharing a live lease need no second queue slot, but each
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+ // verification command still waits for load before starting its own deadlines.
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+ // Once admitted, a running command is never suspended or polled here.
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+ export async function waitForLoad({ signal, onWaiting, report } = {}) {
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+ const controller = new AbortController();
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+ const interrupt = () => controller.abort('SIGINT'), terminate = () => controller.abort('SIGTERM');
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+ const external = () => controller.abort(signal.reason === 'SIGINT' ? 'SIGINT' : 'SIGTERM');
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+ process.on('SIGINT', interrupt); process.on('SIGTERM', terminate);
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+ signal?.addEventListener('abort', external, { once: true });
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+ if (signal?.aborted) external();
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+ try {
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+ const config = await configuration();
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+ let reportedAt;
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+ while (!controller.signal.aborted) {
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+ const load = loadavg()[0];
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+ if (Number.isFinite(load) && load <= config.loadThreshold) return null;
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+ if (reportedAt === undefined || Date.now() - reportedAt >= 15_000) {
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+ const reason = Number.isFinite(load)
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+ ? `the 1-minute load is ${load.toFixed(1)} and verification commands start at ${config.loadThreshold} or below (change with RER_JOBS_LOAD_THRESHOLD)`
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+ : 'this computer\'s load could not be read';
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+ const detail = { reason, reasonCodes: [Number.isFinite(load) ? 'load' : 'resources_unavailable'], resources: { load }, limits: { loadThreshold: config.loadThreshold } };
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+ if (onWaiting) await onWaiting(detail);
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+ else report?.(`Waiting to start verification command: ${reason}. Running commands finish uninterrupted.`);
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+ reportedAt = Date.now();
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+ }
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+ await delay(config.pollMs, undefined, { signal: controller.signal }).catch(error => { if (error.name !== 'AbortError') throw error; });
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+ }
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+ return { code: signalExit(controller.signal.reason), signal: controller.signal.reason };
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+ } finally {
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+ process.off('SIGINT', interrupt); process.off('SIGTERM', terminate);
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+ signal?.removeEventListener('abort', external);
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+ }
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+ }
@@ -285,7 +285,10 @@ an invitation whose issuer still has authority.
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  Durable fixed-window limits pair the client-IP resolver with a normalized email;
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  defaults are 30 per IP and 5 per email per 15 minutes. `limitWindowSeconds`,
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  `ipLimit` and `emailLimit` configure those defaults. Bootstrap, magic link,
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- invitation, confirmation and review use separate scopes. Confirmation limits bind
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+ invitation, confirmation and review use separate scopes. Bootstrap uses only
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+ the client-IP budget: its configured owner email is shared by every caller,
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+ so wrong setup tokens from one client cannot exhaust another client's budget.
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+ The same bootstrap policy applies to signed owner claims. Confirmation limits bind
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  the presented opaque token instead of the address. `clientIp` is mandatory;
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  unavailable addresses fail closed (503). Header trust belongs to the deployment
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  boundary. Do not trust X-Forwarded-For.
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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+ import { rejectedResponse } from '../rejected-response.mjs';
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  // Local dev identity. SERVER-ONLY and LOCAL-ONLY: load this layer only from a
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  // local-only Worker entry (a `wrangler dev` or Vite-serve entry), never from the
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  // deployed main. `rer build` refuses any build output containing the marker.
@@ -40,19 +41,20 @@ export function withDevIdentity(worker, { bindings = env => env, config: authCon
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  if (managedInstallation(env)) {
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  // Never admit a dev credential here; with dev identity on, serve nothing.
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  registerDevAdmission(null);
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- if (env.RER_DEV_IDENTITY !== 'off') return text(503, 'Dev identity refuses to run beside RER_INSTALLATION_ID with a non-loopback RER_MANAGEMENT_ORIGIN. Remove those bindings from local settings or use rer dev --login.');
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- return new URL(request.url).pathname === '/auth/dev/enter' || new URL(request.url).pathname === '/__dev/personas' ? devNotFound() : worker.fetch(request, original, execution);
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+ if (env.RER_DEV_IDENTITY !== 'off') return rejectedResponse(request, text(503, 'Dev identity refuses to run beside RER_INSTALLATION_ID with a non-loopback RER_MANAGEMENT_ORIGIN. Remove those bindings from local settings or use rer dev --login.'));
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+ return new URL(request.url).pathname === '/auth/dev/enter' || new URL(request.url).pathname === '/__dev/personas' ? rejectedResponse(request, devNotFound()) : worker.fetch(request, original, execution);
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  }
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  const gate = devGate({ key: env.RER_DEV_KEY, origin: env.AUTH_ORIGIN, local: env.AUTH_LOCAL === 'true' });
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  registerDevAdmission(gate ? r => gate.admits(r) : null);
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  const path = new URL(request.url).pathname;
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  if (path === '/auth/dev/enter' || path === '/__dev/personas') {
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- if (!gate || env.RER_DEV_IDENTITY === 'off' || !await gate.admits(request)) return devNotFound();
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+ if (!gate || env.RER_DEV_IDENTITY === 'off' || !await gate.admits(request)) return rejectedResponse(request, devNotFound());
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  const context = identity(env, authConfig, declared);
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  try {
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- return path === '/__dev/personas' ? Response.json(await context.list(), { headers }) : await enter(request, gate, context);
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+ const response = path === '/__dev/personas' ? Response.json(await context.list(), { headers }) : await enter(request, gate, context);
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+ return rejectedResponse(request, response);
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  } catch (error) {
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- if (error instanceof AuthError) return Response.json({ error: error.code }, { status: error.status, headers });
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+ if (error instanceof AuthError) return rejectedResponse(request, Response.json({ error: error.code }, { status: error.status, headers }));
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  throw error;
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  }
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  }
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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+ import { rejectedResponse } from './rejected-response.mjs';
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  import { constantEqual } from './crypto.mjs';
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  import { isLoopbackHost, localCookieName } from './http.mjs';
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@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ export function devGate({ key, origin, local }) {
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  return new Response(request.method === 'HEAD' ? null : body, { headers: { ...privateHeaders, 'content-type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
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  'content-security-policy': `default-src 'none'; script-src ${script}; style-src ${style}; connect-src 'self'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'` } });
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  }
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- if (request.method !== 'POST' || request.headers.get('sec-fetch-site') === 'cross-site' || !request.headers.get('content-type')?.startsWith('application/json')) return devNotFound();
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+ if (request.method !== 'POST' || request.headers.get('sec-fetch-site') === 'cross-site' || !request.headers.get('content-type')?.startsWith('application/json')) return rejectedResponse(request, devNotFound());
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  const text = await request.text();
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  let presented; try { presented = text.length <= 1024 ? JSON.parse(text)?.key : undefined; } catch {}
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  if (typeof presented !== 'string' || !constantEqual(presented, key)) return devNotFound();
@@ -24,10 +24,14 @@ export function createEmailLinkLifecycle({ config: input, clock = Date.now, mail
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  if ((scope === 'magic' || scope === 'bootstrap') && await isLocalCli(request, config)) return;
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  const ip = await clientIp(request);
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  if (typeof ip !== 'string' || !ip || ip.length > 128) deny('client_ip_unavailable', 503);
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- const keys = await Promise.all([hash('rate', `${scope}:ip:${ip}`), hash('rate', `${scope}:email:${email}`)]);
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+ // Bootstrap's email is the configured owner, shared by every caller. An
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+ // unauthenticated caller must not spend another client's setup budget.
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+ const subjects = [`${scope}:ip:${ip}`];
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+ if (scope !== 'bootstrap') subjects.push(`${scope}:email:${email}`);
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+ const keys = await Promise.all(subjects.map(subject => hash('rate', subject)));
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  const counts = await store.limits(keys, clock(), config.limitWindowSeconds * 1000);
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  if (!Array.isArray(counts) || counts.length !== keys.length || counts.some(value => !Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value < 0)) deny('invalid_proof_persistence', 503);
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- if (counts[0] > config.ipLimit || counts[1] > config.emailLimit) deny('rate_limited', 429);
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+ if (counts[0] > config.ipLimit || (scope !== 'bootstrap' && counts[1] > config.emailLimit)) deny('rate_limited', 429);
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  }
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  async function newToken(kind, returnTo) {
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  const token = opaqueToken();
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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+ import { rejectedResponse } from '../../rejected-response.mjs';
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  // Server-only entry. Never include this module or its configuration in a browser bundle.
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  // OpenID Connect sign-in for several pinned providers at once. Each provider
3
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  // has its own start and callback route; its output is a verified principal,
@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@ export function createOidcProviders({ admission, db, config: input, clientIp, fe
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280
 
280
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  // Exact routes only: /auth/oidc/<id>/start and /auth/oidc/<id>/callback.
281
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  export function createOidcHandler(oidc, { signInPath = oidc.signInPath ?? '/signin' } = {}) {
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- return async request => {
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+ const handle = async request => {
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  const path = new URL(request.url).pathname;
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  const callbackId = oidc.callbackPaths?.[path];
285
286
  if (callbackId) return oidc.callback(request, callbackId);
@@ -303,4 +304,8 @@ export function createOidcHandler(oidc, { signInPath = oidc.signInPath ?? '/sign
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  return oidc.begin(request, match[1], { returnTo: input.returnTo });
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  } catch (e) { return errorResponse(e instanceof OidcError ? e : new OidcError('oidc_invalid_input'), { signInPath }, request); }
305
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  };
307
+ return async request => {
308
+ const response = await handle(request);
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+ return response ? rejectedResponse(request, response) : response;
310
+ };
306
311
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
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+ const maximumDiscardBytes = 64 * 1024
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+ const maximumDiscardMs = 2000
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+
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+ function limitedResponse(response, message, status) {
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+ const headers = new Headers(response.headers)
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+ // Keep privacy/security policy, but never issue credentials or a redirect
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+ // when the upload itself was refused.
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+ for (const name of ['set-cookie', 'location', 'content-length', 'content-encoding']) headers.delete(name)
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+ headers.set('content-type', 'text/plain; charset=utf-8')
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+ void response.body?.cancel().catch(() => {})
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+ return new Response(message, { status, headers })
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Finish a rejected upload before returning its response. This preserves the
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+ * intended status through workerd's upload proxy without buffering input.
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+ * Oversized or stalled uploads receive explicit 413/408 responses instead.
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+ */
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+ export async function rejectedResponse(request, response) {
20
+ if (!request.body || request.bodyUsed || request.body.locked) return response
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+ const reader = request.body.getReader()
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+ let bytes = 0
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+ let timer
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+ const deadline = new Promise(resolve => {
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+ timer = setTimeout(() => resolve('timeout'), maximumDiscardMs)
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+ })
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+ try {
28
+ for (;;) {
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+ const result = await Promise.race([reader.read(), deadline])
30
+ if (result === 'timeout') {
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+ void reader.cancel('Rejected upload exceeded time limit').catch(() => {})
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+ return limitedResponse(response, 'Request body timeout', 408)
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+ }
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+ if (result.done) return response
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+ bytes += result.value.byteLength
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+ if (bytes > maximumDiscardBytes) {
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+ void reader.cancel('Rejected upload exceeded size limit').catch(() => {})
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+ return limitedResponse(response, 'Request body too large', 413)
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+ }
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+ }
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+ } finally {
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+ clearTimeout(timer)
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+ }
44
+ }
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
1
+ import { rejectedResponse } from './rejected-response.mjs';
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  import { identitySettingsPage } from './accounts/settings-page.mjs';
2
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  import { confirmationResponse } from './identity/email-link/confirmation.mjs';
3
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  import { createOidcHandler } from './identity/oidc/index.mjs';
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ function notice(auth, code, extra = {}) {
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  /** Fetch-compatible optional HTTP adapter. Returns null for paths it does not own. */
21
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  export function createAuthHandler(auth) {
22
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  const oidc = auth.providers ? createOidcHandler(auth.providers, { signInPath: auth.presentation.signInPath }) : null;
23
- return async function handleAuth(request) {
24
+ const handleAuth = async function(request) {
24
25
  const url = new URL(request.url);
25
26
  const path = url.pathname;
26
27
  let form = false;
@@ -88,4 +89,8 @@ export function createAuthHandler(auth) {
88
89
  return json({ error: 'auth_unavailable' }, 503);
89
90
  }
90
91
  };
92
+ return async function(request) {
93
+ const response = await handleAuth(request);
94
+ return response ? rejectedResponse(request, response) : response;
95
+ };
91
96
  }
@@ -109,12 +109,14 @@ COOP `same-origin` to these two cooperating screens.
109
109
 
110
110
  ## Atomic admission and checks
111
111
 
112
- Operator-auth normally commits rate limits before bootstrap. A request-local D1
113
- adapter reads actual existing limit counters and projects the real UPSERT result
114
- without writing. It defers those unchanged UPSERTs until the real bootstrap's
115
- unchanged three-statement batch. One D1 transaction inserts the single-use claim,
116
- checks an empty auth store, runs the original limits and bootstrap SQL, then
117
- checks owner/session identity and actual limit thresholds before committing.
112
+ Operator-auth normally commits its client-IP rate limit before bootstrap. This
113
+ budget is per client, so wrong setup tokens from another client cannot block a
114
+ valid signed claim. A request-local D1 adapter reads the actual existing counter
115
+ and projects the real UPSERT result without writing. It defers that unchanged
116
+ UPSERT until the real bootstrap's unchanged three-statement batch. One D1
117
+ transaction inserts the single-use claim, checks an empty auth store, runs the
118
+ original limit and bootstrap SQL, then checks owner/session identity and the
119
+ actual client-IP threshold before committing.
118
120
  A SQL CHECK failure or racing claim rolls the entire batch back. No application
119
121
  mock, substitute owner/session creation, in-memory lock or retry is involved.
120
122
  The adapter accepts only that exact SQL protocol and never serves other auth APIs.
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ export function bootstrapTransaction(db, claim, config, clock) {
36
36
  async batch(statements) {
37
37
  if (committed || !Array.isArray(statements) || statements.some(s => !owned.has(s))) return drift();
38
38
  if (!limits) {
39
- if (statements.length !== 2 || statements.some(s => normalize(s.sql) !== LIMIT || s.args.length !== 2) || statements[0].args[0] === statements[1].args[0]) return drift();
39
+ if (statements.length !== 1 || statements.some(s => normalize(s.sql) !== LIMIT || s.args.length !== 2)) return drift();
40
40
  limits = statements;
41
41
  // Read the exact counters which the real UPSERT will increment. Auth's
42
42
  // configured limit check still runs; repeat it on actual transaction
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ export function bootstrapTransaction(db, claim, config, clock) {
61
61
  EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM oa_operators WHERE id=? AND email=? AND role='owner' AND status='active') AND
62
62
  EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM oa_sessions WHERE id=? AND operator_id=?) AND
63
63
  ${claim.identity ? `EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_link WHERE interface='oidc-provider@1' AND issuer=? AND client_id=? AND metadata=? AND needs_relink=0 AND linked_at=?) AND EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_installation WHERE singleton=1 AND sector_id=?) AND` : ''}
64
- ${pin.sql} AND (SELECT count FROM oa_limits WHERE key=?)<=? AND (SELECT count FROM oa_limits WHERE key=?)<=?
64
+ ${pin.sql} AND (SELECT count FROM oa_limits WHERE key=?)<=?
65
65
  THEN 1 ELSE 2 END WHERE jti=?`).bind(owner, owner, claim.email, session, owner,
66
- ...(claim.identity?[claim.identity.issuer,claim.identity.clientId,claim.identity.metadata,claim.identity.linkedAt,claim.installationId]:[]), ...pin.args, limits[0].args[0], config.ipLimit, limits[1].args[0], config.emailLimit, claim.jti);
66
+ ...(claim.identity?[claim.identity.issuer,claim.identity.clientId,claim.identity.metadata,claim.identity.linkedAt,claim.installationId]:[]), ...pin.args, limits[0].args[0], config.ipLimit, claim.jti);
67
67
  try {
68
68
  const identity = claim.identity ? [
69
69
  db.prepare('INSERT INTO oc_idp_grants(issuer,client_id,jti,subject,sector_id) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)').bind(claim.identity.issuer,claim.identity.clientId,claim.jti,claim.identity.subject,claim.installationId),
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ export function bootstrapTransaction(db, claim, config, clock) {
76
76
  ] : [];
77
77
  const results = await db.batch([start, ...[...limits, ...statements].map(s => db.prepare(s.sql).bind(...s.args)), ...identity, finish]);
78
78
  committed = true;
79
- return results.slice(3, 6);
79
+ return results.slice(1 + limits.length, 1 + limits.length + statements.length);
80
80
  } catch {
81
81
  // Includes unique/empty-store fences and final CHECK failure. D1 has
82
82
  // rolled the whole batch back, including every original limit UPSERT.
@@ -141,7 +141,8 @@ export async function createCommands(directory,state,{terminal=text=>writeSync(1
141
141
  async run(label,command,args=[],options={}) {
142
142
  if(queuePolicy && options.heavy !== false) {
143
143
  let queuedChild;
144
- const result = await queuedCommand(command,args,{...options,originalCI:policy.ci,
144
+ const commandSignal=signal&&options.signal?AbortSignal.any([signal,options.signal]):options.signal||signal;
145
+ const result = await queuedCommand(command,args,{...options,verb:queuePolicy.verb,signal:commandSignal,originalCI:policy.ci,
145
146
  label:await queueLabel(options.cwd??process.cwd(),queuePolicy.verb,options.phase??'command'),report,onWaiting,
146
147
  spawn:(program,argv,native)=>(queuedChild=spawnCommand(label,program,argv,{...native,onChild:options.onChild})),cleanup:async(child,result)=>{await stopCommand(child);await options.afterCommand?.(result);}});
147
148
  if(result){if(result.code!==0)throw failure(label,result,captures.get(queuedChild));return result;}
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { readFile, realpath } from 'node:fs/promises';
5
5
  const portable = basename(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))) === 'base-onboarding';
6
6
  const queueURL = new URL(portable ? '../base-cli/modules/job-queue/' : '../modules/job-queue/', import.meta.url);
7
7
  export const heavyVerbs = new Set(['install', 'setup', 'build', 'verify', 'dev', 'preview', 'deploy', 'release', 'export', 'import', 'installer']);
8
+ export const verificationBoundary = verb => verb === 'release' || verb === 'verify' || verb?.startsWith('verify:');
8
9
  export async function queueLabel(root, verb, phase) {
9
10
  root = await realpath(root);
10
11
  let project='project';
@@ -35,7 +36,13 @@ export async function queuedCommand(command, args, options) {
35
36
  // Keep the human recipe relative while retaining the executable argv for tools.
36
37
  const statusCommandText = [basename(process.execPath), relative(options.cwd ?? process.cwd(), statusCommand[1]), ...statusCommand.slice(2)].map(shellQuote).join(' ');
37
38
  // Read the original caller's decision before an install synthesizes CI=true.
38
- if (options.originalCI === true || await liveMembership()) return null;
39
+ if (options.originalCI === true || await liveMembership()) {
40
+ if (verificationBoundary(options.verb)) {
41
+ const { waitForLoad } = await import(new URL('load-admission.mjs', queueURL));
42
+ return waitForLoad(options);
43
+ }
44
+ return null;
45
+ }
39
46
  const queue = await createQueue();
40
47
  try {
41
48
  const result = await queue.run([command, ...args], { ...options, kind: 'heavy', maxWait: 1200,
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ export async function queuedEntrypoint(url,verb='verify') {
16
16
  const policy=await commandPolicy();
17
17
  try{
18
18
  const result=await queuedCommand(process.execPath,[...process.execArgv,fileURLToPath(url),...process.argv.slice(2)],{
19
- cwd:process.cwd(),originalCI:policy.ci,label:await queueLabel(process.cwd(),verb,'suite'),report:text=>store.report(text),env:{...process.env,...policy.environment},
19
+ cwd:process.cwd(),verb,originalCI:policy.ci,label:await queueLabel(process.cwd(),verb,'suite'),report:text=>store.report(text),env:{...process.env,...policy.environment},
20
20
  spawn:(command,args,options)=>store.spawn(verb,command,args,options),cleanup:child=>store.stop(child)});
21
21
  return result?.code??null;
22
22
  }finally{await policy.close();}
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@runeditrun/rer",
3
- "version": "0.2.9",
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+ "version": "0.2.11",
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  "description": "The rer command: install, set up, run and launch Run Edit Run checkouts.",
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5
  "license": "MIT",
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  "type": "module",