@runeditrun/rer 0.2.76 → 0.2.78
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +32 -0
- package/cli/README.md +55 -0
- package/cli/contract.mjs +1 -1
- package/cli/deploy-command.mjs +4 -2
- package/cli/deploy-inputs.mjs +15 -3
- package/cli/deploy-installation-key.mjs +71 -0
- package/cli/deploy-secrets.mjs +2 -0
- package/cli/deploy.mjs +13 -2
- package/cli/deployment-record.mjs +2 -0
- package/cli/export.mjs +1 -1
- package/cli/main.mjs +1 -1
- package/cli/parse.mjs +3 -2
- package/cli/portability-migrations.mjs +35 -14
- package/cli/portability-worker.mjs +2 -2
- package/cli/portability.mjs +2 -2
- package/cli/runtime-front-door.mjs +1 -1
- package/global/CHANGELOG.md +14 -0
- package/global/README.md +32 -0
- package/modules/dependencies/README.md +71 -1
- package/modules/dependencies/auth.mjs +4 -4
- package/modules/dependencies/crypto.mjs +6 -1
- package/modules/dependencies/custody.mjs +16 -0
- package/modules/dependencies/index.d.mts +1 -1
- package/modules/dependencies/index.mjs +6 -5
- package/modules/dependencies/schema/keys-sealed.sql +4 -0
- package/modules/dependencies/sealing.mjs +55 -0
- package/modules/dependencies/store.mjs +62 -9
- package/modules/deploy-kit/README.md +1 -0
- package/modules/deploy-kit/owner-cli.mjs +19 -7
- package/modules/deploy-kit/owner-rekey.mjs +69 -0
- package/modules/deploy-kit/provider.mjs +9 -4
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/README.md +1322 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/apply.ts +115 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/budget.ts +89 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/compressed-plan.ts +63 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/creation.ts +95 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/custody-fence.ts +27 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/custody-state-schema.ts +67 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/database.ts +163 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/entry-locator.ts +61 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erased-artifacts.ts +38 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erased-custody.ts +36 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erased-plan.ts +47 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erased-reversal.ts +19 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-bounded.ts +22 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-claims.ts +27 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-compiler.ts +67 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-disposition.ts +16 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-fragments.ts +86 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-index.ts +53 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-pages.ts +62 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-progress-schema.ts +8 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-progress.ts +61 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-related.ts +124 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-report.ts +31 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-schema.ts +24 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-selection.ts +77 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-snapshot.ts +15 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-stage.ts +146 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-step.ts +12 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-superseded.ts +98 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-values.ts +83 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure-writes.ts +46 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/erasure.ts +170 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/evolutions/0001-preserved-undo.ts +13 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/expected-state.ts +91 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/field-redaction.ts +86 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/guards.ts +37 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/history.ts +71 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/index.ts +88 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/integrity.ts +127 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/inventory-snapshot.ts +84 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/jobs.ts +97 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-set.ts +48 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-admission.ts +19 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-context.ts +44 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-lifecycle.ts +33 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-offset.ts +74 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-publication.ts +18 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-rows.ts +72 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-schema.ts +28 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging-state.ts +22 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/native-staging.ts +64 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/original-copies.ts +53 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/original-storage.ts +56 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/originals.ts +74 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/plan-dictionary.ts +80 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/plans.ts +121 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-fingerprint.ts +57 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-header.ts +33 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-reader.ts +98 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-schema.ts +16 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-state.ts +56 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-step-combine.ts +80 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-step-control.ts +48 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-step-hash.ts +131 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-step-pages.ts +77 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-steps-schema.ts +11 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparation-steps.ts +102 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preparations.ts +87 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preserved-preview.ts +89 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/preserved-reverse.ts +91 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/provenance-set.ts +87 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/publication-fence.ts +22 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/publication-receipt-schema.ts +15 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/published-stream.ts +11 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/read-fence.ts +64 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/read-results.ts +16 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/redacted-custody.ts +76 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/redaction-step.ts +125 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/referenced-plans.ts +136 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retained-values.ts +35 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement-bounded.ts +71 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement-door.ts +105 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement-schema.ts +39 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement-scope.ts +94 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement-steps.ts +76 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement-tally.ts +74 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/retirement.ts +136 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reversal-conversion-record.ts +19 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reversal-conversion-schema.ts +11 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reversal-conversion.ts +40 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reversal-fence-schema.ts +14 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reversal-fence.ts +106 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reversal-journal.ts +24 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reverse.ts +103 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/reviewed-source.ts +23 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/sets.ts +78 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staged-creation.ts +201 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-admission.ts +45 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-control.ts +43 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-erasure.ts +28 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-lifecycle.ts +49 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-plan.ts +15 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-privacy.ts +22 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-publication.ts +79 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-schema.ts +37 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-statements.ts +8 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/staging-transport.ts +70 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-boundary.ts +11 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-create.ts +55 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-identity-admission.ts +37 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-input.ts +18 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-layout.ts +43 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-origin.ts +44 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-page-integrity.ts +18 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-partition.ts +50 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-plan.ts +133 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-receipt.ts +45 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-revision-schema.ts +35 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-snapshot.ts +26 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-stage.ts +79 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-state.ts +25 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/stream-working-set.ts +30 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/streams.ts +39 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/target-guards.ts +9 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/target-identities.ts +17 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/transport.ts +10 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/types.ts +162 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/undo-observations.ts +39 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/undo-report.ts +22 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/undo-snapshot.ts +87 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/undo-state.ts +84 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/d1/undo-types.ts +110 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/journal/authority.ts +12 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/plan/budget.ts +60 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/plan/index.ts +123 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/plan/size.ts +122 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/canonical-hash.ts +130 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/canonical-stream.ts +85 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/credential-names.ts +131 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/credentials.ts +317 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/identity.ts +51 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/json-snapshot.ts +21 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/resumable-sha256.ts +75 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/provenance/validate-json.ts +19 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/storage/originals.ts +87 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/storage/provenance.ts +64 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/storage/schema.ts +42 -0
- package/modules/import-kit/src/types.ts +47 -0
- package/modules/operator-auth/docs/native-accounts.md +4 -1
- package/modules/operator-auth/identity/oidc/aes-gcm.mjs +21 -0
- package/modules/operator-auth/identity/oidc/crypto.mjs +5 -12
- package/modules/operator-auth/index.d.mts +1 -1
- package/modules/portability/README.md +98 -2
- package/modules/portability/backfills.mjs +42 -15
- package/modules/portability/ledgers.mjs +7 -1
- package/modules/portability/transient-tables.mjs +40 -0
- package/onboarding/local/environment.mjs +2 -2
- package/package.json +3 -1
- package/scripts/publish-check/reviewed.py +3 -1
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@@ -32,7 +32,77 @@ adapter adds OIDC discovery, sessions, domain policy and owner claims.
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same-origin `paths` as absolute URLs, and a per-interface `jwks_uri`.
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`GET /.well-known/rer-link/jwks/INTERFACE` publishes an ES256 public JWK only.
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The unqualified JWKS URL selects the identity interface. The application retains
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its private key in the server database
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its private key in the server database as an AES-256-GCM envelope
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`{version:1,kid,iv,ciphertext}`. The 96-bit random IV and 128-bit tag authenticate the
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AAD `rer-at-rest-v1|rer_dependency_keys|<interface>|1|<kid>`, binding the table,
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interface, envelope version and installation key ID. HKDF-SHA-256 derives a
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dedicated encryption key from
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`INSTALLATION_KEY` with the `rer-at-rest-v1:dependency-key` domain. The envelope's
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`kid` identifies that installation secret; it is separate from the signing JWK's ID.
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`INSTALLATION_KEY` requires the generated 256-bit key's 64 lowercase hex
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characters; passphrases and other formats are refused. `rer setup` generates the
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secret in the private settings file; hosted deploys
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keep their own generated secret in `.rer/deploy/<environment>.secrets.env`
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(mode 0600), exactly like `SESSION_SECRET`. Neither secret enters archives.
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Pass both installation bindings to `createDependencies` and `AuthConfig`.
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Legacy plaintext is accepted only before the installation records sealed
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custody; a read upgrades the requested interface, and full rekey upgrades every
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row in one D1 batch. After the last legacy key is upgraded, the durable
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`keys_sealed` marker prevents plaintext from being reintroduced. The non-secret
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`key_ids` history distinguishes retired versions from damaged envelopes. An
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optional `INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS` permits reads across rotation; old rows
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are re-sealed under the current key. Missing keys, malformed envelopes, wrong
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keys and changed interface AAD fail closed with `installation_key_missing` or
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`installation_key_unavailable` (503), without treating ciphertext as plaintext.
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Rotate hosted custody with `rer deploy --rotate-secret INSTALLATION_KEY`:
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rer retains both values privately, publishes both bindings in one Worker version,
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re-seals every row, checks that every row opens with only the current key, then
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retires the previous Worker binding. Routine rotation uses only the current/previous
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pair; older retired keys require explicit reopen. By default, every retired
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private value stays in the same 0600, Git-ignored file as `SESSION_SECRET`, in
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`INSTALLATION_KEY_RETIRED=<kid>:<value>[,<kid>:<value>...]`; none is routinely
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bound to the Worker. An interrupted operation resumes with the same pair. Back
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up this private custody securely and retain it when moving checkouts.
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Retain each retired key until no D1 Time Travel recovery point or exported backup
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predates the completed rotation that retired it or otherwise needs that key.
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After any rotation or reopen has finished, edit
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`.rer/deploy/<environment>.secrets.env` and remove only its `<kid>:<value>` entry
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from `INSTALLATION_KEY_RETIRED`, keeping valid comma separators; remove the
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assignment if no entries remain. Preserve the current key, all other entries
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and the file's owned 0600 permissions. There is no per-key removal command;
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reopening a removed ID refuses before provider writes unless its custody is restored.
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Restoring D1 backups or Time Travel from before a rotation may require an older
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key. `rer deploy --reopen-installation-key KID` explicitly publishes the current
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key and that retained retired key as `INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS`, re-seals and
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verifies every row under the current key, then removes the previous binding.
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CLI-side reopen rekey uses every validated retired key in private custody, so a
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mid-rotation snapshot containing rows under multiple retired keys can be reopened
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with either retained ID. Only the selected pair is published to the Worker.
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Reopen/rekey reports the D1 `key_ids` tail and whether each history ID is in
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custody before opening rows, including when the tail check refuses the restore.
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It retains retired custody and resumes the same pair after interruption. Missing
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retired custody refuses with `installation_key_unavailable`; recover the private
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file before reopening. A whole pre-rotation D1 restore also restores `key_ids`:
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if its tail is absent from configured custody, reads refuse with
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`installation_key_unavailable` before inspecting envelopes. When that custody
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check succeeds, a historically known envelope key ID whose key is no longer
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configured yields `installation_key_version_unknown` (for example, a row-only
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restore that retains the current installation history);
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wrong configuration, malformed ciphertext and unrecognised key IDs yield
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`installation_key_unavailable`. Neither failure generates a replacement key.
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Base before #367 cannot open sealed keys. Keep sealing-capable code or roll
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forward after restoring D1. Current Base refuses sealed envelopes on its
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plaintext signing path with `installation_key_sealed_rollback`; old binaries
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cannot acquire that check retroactively.
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Session rotation never changes this key.
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This protects signing keys in a D1 dump or backup obtained without the Worker
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secret. It does not protect them from a compromised Worker or someone holding
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both the database and the installation secret. Sector/install identity survives re-link,
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provider moves and export/import. Keys are isolated per interface.
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Provider origins and metadata endpoints require HTTPS. Under `rer dev` (the
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@@ -10,17 +10,17 @@ export function linkedProviders(options) {
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if(config.dependencies && (staticProviders?.ids.includes('auth') || staticProviders?.callbackPaths?.['/auth/oidc/auth/callback'])) throw new Error('dependency_provider_conflict');
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async function current() {
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if (!config.dependencies) return staticProviders;
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const store=dependencyStore(db),link=await store.link();
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const store=dependencyStore(db,config),link=await store.link();
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if(!link || link.needs_relink) return staticProviders;
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const row=await store.
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if(!row
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const row=await store.readKey();
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if(!row) return null;
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const unclaimed=native?()=>native.unclaimed():async()=>!await db.prepare('SELECT 1 FROM oa_operators LIMIT 1').first();
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return createOidcProviders({...options, enabled:async()=>await options.enabled() || await unclaimed(), claim:async(request,token,expectedPin)=>{
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if(!await unclaimed())return null;
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if(native)return native.claimOwner?native.claimOwner({request,token,expectedPin}):null;
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return createIdpOwnerClaimHandler({expectedPin,db,authConfig:config,clientIp:()=>options.clientIp(request),clock:options.clock,fetch:options.fetch})(new Request(config.origin+'/auth/owner-claim',{method:'POST',headers:{Host:new URL(config.origin).host,Origin:config.origin,'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({token})}));
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}, claimScope: unclaimed, config:{origin:config.origin,local:config.local,signInPath:config.branding.signInPath,transactionSecret:config.OIDC_TRANSACTION_SECRET ?? config.SESSION_SECRET+'-oidc',providers:[{
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id:'auth',preset:'auth',issuer:link.issuer,clientId:link.client_id,privateKey:
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id:'auth',preset:'auth',issuer:link.issuer,clientId:link.client_id,privateKey:row.key,
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}]}});
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}
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if(!config.dependencies) return staticProviders;
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@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
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import { AuthError } from '../operator-auth/errors.mjs';
|
|
1
2
|
const encode = bytes => btoa(String.fromCharCode(...bytes)).replaceAll('+','-').replaceAll('/','_').replace(/=+$/,'');
|
|
2
3
|
const json = value => encode(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(value)));
|
|
3
4
|
export async function keyPair() {
|
|
4
5
|
const pair = await crypto.subtle.generateKey({name:'ECDSA',namedCurve:'P-256'},true,['sign','verify']);
|
|
5
6
|
return {...await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk',pair.privateKey),kid:crypto.randomUUID(),alg:'ES256',use:'sig'};
|
|
6
7
|
}
|
|
7
|
-
|
|
8
|
+
function requirePlaintextKey(key) {
|
|
9
|
+
if (key && ['version','iv','ciphertext'].some(field => Object.hasOwn(key,field))) throw new AuthError('installation_key_sealed_rollback',503);
|
|
10
|
+
}
|
|
11
|
+
export function publicKey(key) { requirePlaintextKey(key);return {kty:key.kty,crv:key.crv,x:key.x,y:key.y,kid:key.kid,alg:'ES256',use:'sig',key_ops:['verify']}; }
|
|
8
12
|
export async function assertion(key, claims) {
|
|
13
|
+
requirePlaintextKey(key);
|
|
9
14
|
const encoded = `${json({alg:'ES256',typ:'JWT',kid:key.kid})}.${json(claims)}`;
|
|
10
15
|
const imported = await crypto.subtle.importKey('jwk',{...key,key_ops:['sign']},{name:'ECDSA',namedCurve:'P-256'},false,['sign']);
|
|
11
16
|
return `${encoded}.${encode(new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign({name:'ECDSA',hash:'SHA-256'},imported,new TextEncoder().encode(encoded))))}`;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { installationKeyId } from './sealing.mjs';
|
|
2
|
+
import { AuthError } from '../operator-auth/errors.mjs';
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
/** Private CLI custody only; never a Worker binding or an archive field. */
|
|
5
|
+
export async function retiredInstallationKeys(value) {
|
|
6
|
+
const retired = new Map();
|
|
7
|
+
if (!value) return retired;
|
|
8
|
+
try {
|
|
9
|
+
for (const entry of value.split(',')) {
|
|
10
|
+
const [kid, secret, extra] = entry.split(':');
|
|
11
|
+
if (extra !== undefined || !kid || retired.has(kid) || await installationKeyId(secret) !== kid) throw new Error('invalid-retired-custody');
|
|
12
|
+
retired.set(kid, secret);
|
|
13
|
+
}
|
|
14
|
+
} catch { throw new AuthError('installation_key_unavailable', 503); }
|
|
15
|
+
return retired;
|
|
16
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import type { Database, OperatorAuth } from '../operator-auth/index.mjs';
|
|
2
|
-
export function createDependencies<R extends string>(options: { db: Database; origin: string; name: string; provider?: string; local?: boolean; auth: OperatorAuth<R>; claimOwner?:(token:string)=>Promise<Response|null>; clock?: () => number; fetch?: typeof fetch; provides?:string[]; interfaces?: {interface:string;optional?:boolean;provider?:string;paths:string[]}[] }): {document():Promise<unknown>;handle(request:Request):Promise<Response|null>};
|
|
2
|
+
export function createDependencies<R extends string>(options: { db: Database; INSTALLATION_KEY?: string; INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS?: string; origin: string; name: string; provider?: string; local?: boolean; auth: OperatorAuth<R>; claimOwner?:(token:string)=>Promise<Response|null>; clock?: () => number; fetch?: typeof fetch; provides?:string[]; interfaces?: {interface:string;optional?:boolean;provider?:string;paths:string[]}[] }): {document():Promise<unknown>;handle(request:Request):Promise<Response|null>};
|
|
3
3
|
export const INTERFACE:string;
|
|
4
4
|
export const CALLBACK:string;
|
|
5
5
|
export const PATHS:string[];
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { nativeDependencyAuthority } from './native.mjs';
|
|
2
2
|
import { approveSetup, approveOwner, approvalFence, callbacksFor } from './approval.mjs';
|
|
3
3
|
import { dependencyStore } from './store.mjs';
|
|
4
|
+
import { openDependencyKey } from './sealing.mjs';
|
|
4
5
|
import { publicKey, assertion, digest } from './crypto.mjs';
|
|
5
6
|
import { isLoopbackHost } from '../operator-auth/loopback.mjs';
|
|
6
7
|
import { CALLBACK, INTERFACE, PATHS, NETWORK, insist, originOf, providerMetadata } from './protocol.mjs';
|
|
@@ -8,17 +9,17 @@ import { readJson } from '../operator-auth/identity/oidc/network.mjs';
|
|
|
8
9
|
import { readInput } from '../operator-auth/input.mjs';
|
|
9
10
|
import { ownerFence, pinStatement } from './authority.mjs';
|
|
10
11
|
export { INTERFACE, CALLBACK, PATHS } from './protocol.mjs';
|
|
11
|
-
export function createDependencies({db,origin,name,provider,interfaces=[{interface:INTERFACE,provider,paths:PATHS}],provides=[],local=false,auth,claimOwner,clock=Date.now,fetch:fetcher=globalThis.fetch}) {
|
|
12
|
+
export function createDependencies({db,origin,name,provider,interfaces=[{interface:INTERFACE,provider,paths:PATHS}],provides=[],local=false,INSTALLATION_KEY,INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS,auth,claimOwner,clock=Date.now,fetch:fetcher=globalThis.fetch}) {
|
|
12
13
|
originOf(origin,local);insist(!local || isLoopbackHost(new URL(origin).hostname));insist(Array.isArray(provides) && new Set(provides).size===provides.length && provides.every(value=>/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*@[1-9][0-9]*$/.test(value)));
|
|
13
14
|
insist(Array.isArray(interfaces) && new Set(interfaces.map(d=>d.interface)).size===interfaces.length && interfaces.every(d=>/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*@[1-9][0-9]*$/.test(d.interface) && Array.isArray(d.paths) && new Set(d.paths).size===d.paths.length && d.paths.every(p=>typeof p==='string' && /^\/[A-Za-z0-9_~/-]+$/.test(p) && !p.startsWith('//'))));
|
|
14
|
-
const store=dependencyStore(db);
|
|
15
|
+
const store=dependencyStore(db,{INSTALLATION_KEY,INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS});
|
|
15
16
|
const native=auth?.native?nativeDependencyAuthority(auth.accounts.dependencies):null;
|
|
16
17
|
async function owner(request,action) {
|
|
17
18
|
const actor=await auth.requireStepUp(request,action), current=await auth.accounts.owner();
|
|
18
19
|
insist(actor.operator.id===current?.id,'owner_required',403);return actor;
|
|
19
20
|
}
|
|
20
21
|
async function document() {
|
|
21
|
-
const installation=await store.
|
|
22
|
+
const installation=await store.identity();
|
|
22
23
|
const linked=await Promise.all(interfaces.map(d=>store.link(d.interface)));
|
|
23
24
|
return {name,version:1,origin,sector_id:installation.sector_id,dependencies:interfaces.map((d,i)=>({provider:linked[i]?.issuer??d.provider??null,interface:d.interface,optional:d.optional??true,cardinality:1,paths:d.paths.map(p=>origin+p),jwks_uri:origin+'/.well-known/rer-link/jwks/'+d.interface})),provides,
|
|
24
25
|
claim:interfaces.some(d=>d.interface===INTERFACE) && (native?await native.unclaimed():!await db.prepare('SELECT 1 FROM oa_operators LIMIT 1').first()),callback:origin+CALLBACK,jwks_uri:origin+'/.well-known/rer-link/jwks'};
|
|
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ export function createDependencies({db,origin,name,provider,interfaces=[{interfa
|
|
|
48
49
|
const unchanged=old?{sql:'EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_link WHERE interface=? AND issuer=? AND client_id=? AND metadata=? AND needs_relink=? AND linked_at=?)',args:[contract,old.issuer,old.client_id,JSON.stringify(old.metadata),old.needs_relink,old.linked_at]}:{sql:'NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_link WHERE interface=?)',args:[contract]};
|
|
49
50
|
const approval=await approvalFence(pending,contract,expected,callbacks,clock(),pendingPin,native);
|
|
50
51
|
await db.batch([
|
|
51
|
-
db.prepare(`UPDATE rer_dependency_codes SET created_at=CASE WHEN EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_keys WHERE interface=? AND
|
|
52
|
+
db.prepare(`UPDATE rer_dependency_codes SET created_at=CASE WHEN EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_keys WHERE interface=? AND private_key=?) AND ${unchanged.sql} AND ${approval.sql} THEN created_at ELSE -1 END WHERE digest=?`).bind(contract,installation.sealedKey,...unchanged.args,...approval.args,codeDigest),
|
|
52
53
|
db.prepare(`INSERT INTO rer_dependency_link(interface,issuer,client_id,metadata,needs_relink,linked_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,0,?) ON CONFLICT(interface) DO UPDATE SET issuer=excluded.issuer,client_id=excluded.client_id,metadata=excluded.metadata,needs_relink=0,linked_at=MAX(rer_dependency_link.linked_at+1,excluded.linked_at)`).bind(contract,expected,result.client_id,JSON.stringify(metadata),clock()),
|
|
53
54
|
...(native?await native.linkedStatements({pending,contract,old,issuer:expected,now:clock()}):[
|
|
54
55
|
...(contract===INTERFACE?[db.prepare("INSERT INTO oa_auth_audit(id,actor_id,action,value,created_at) SELECT ?,claim_id,'idpSignIn','true',? FROM oa_bootstrap WHERE EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM oa_auth_settings WHERE singleton=1 AND first_setup=1 AND idp_sign_in=0) AND EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM oa_setup_links WHERE interface='oidc-provider@1' AND attempt_id=? AND completed=0 AND owner_id=claim_id)").bind(crypto.randomUUID(),clock(),pending.attempt_id)]:[]),
|
|
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ export function createDependencies({db,origin,name,provider,interfaces=[{interfa
|
|
|
85
86
|
db.prepare("INSERT INTO oa_auth_audit VALUES(?,?,'provider:unlink',?,?)").bind(crypto.randomUUID(),actor.operator.id,contract,clock())]:[]),
|
|
86
87
|
]);
|
|
87
88
|
// Local removal is already complete. The provider may be offline.
|
|
88
|
-
if(link && key) {try {await readJson(fetcher,link.metadata.link.deregister,NETWORK,{method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({client_id:link.client_id,origin,interface:contract,client_assertion_type:'urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer',client_assertion:await assertion(
|
|
89
|
+
if(link && key) {try {await readJson(fetcher,link.metadata.link.deregister,NETWORK,{method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({client_id:link.client_id,origin,interface:contract,client_assertion_type:'urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer',client_assertion:await assertion((await openDependencyKey({INSTALLATION_KEY,INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS},contract,key.private_key)).key,{iss:link.client_id,sub:link.client_id,aud:link.metadata.link.deregister,iat:Math.floor(clock()/1000),exp:Math.floor(clock()/1000)+60,jti:crypto.randomUUID()})})});}catch{}}
|
|
89
90
|
return Response.json({unlinked:true});
|
|
90
91
|
}
|
|
91
92
|
return {document,async handle(request) {
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
ALTER TABLE rer_dependency_installation ADD COLUMN keys_sealed INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK(keys_sealed IN (0,1));
|
|
2
|
+
-- Nonsecret version history lets restored rows name an unavailable retired key
|
|
3
|
+
-- without confusing ciphertext tampering or a wrong current secret with restore.
|
|
4
|
+
ALTER TABLE rer_dependency_installation ADD COLUMN key_ids TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]' CHECK(json_valid(key_ids) AND json_type(key_ids)='array');
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { utf8, encode, encryptJson, decryptJson } from '../operator-auth/identity/oidc/aes-gcm.mjs';
|
|
2
|
+
import { AuthError } from '../operator-auth/errors.mjs';
|
|
3
|
+
const DOMAIN = 'rer-at-rest-v1:dependency-key';
|
|
4
|
+
const fail = () => { throw new AuthError('installation_key_unavailable', 503); };
|
|
5
|
+
function validSecret(secret) { return typeof secret === 'string' && /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(secret); }
|
|
6
|
+
export function requireInstallationKey(config) {
|
|
7
|
+
if (!validSecret(config.INSTALLATION_KEY)) throw new AuthError('installation_key_missing', 503);
|
|
8
|
+
}
|
|
9
|
+
export async function installationKeyId(secret) {
|
|
10
|
+
requireInstallationKey({ INSTALLATION_KEY: secret });
|
|
11
|
+
return encode(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', utf8.encode(`${DOMAIN}:key-id\0${secret}`)));
|
|
12
|
+
}
|
|
13
|
+
const aad = (contract, kid) => `rer-at-rest-v1|rer_dependency_keys|${contract}|1|${kid}`;
|
|
14
|
+
async function material(secret) {
|
|
15
|
+
const root = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', utf8.encode(secret), 'HKDF', false, ['deriveKey']);
|
|
16
|
+
const key = await crypto.subtle.deriveKey({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt: utf8.encode('rer-at-rest-v1'), info: utf8.encode(DOMAIN) }, root, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 }, false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt']);
|
|
17
|
+
const kid = await installationKeyId(secret);
|
|
18
|
+
return { key, kid };
|
|
19
|
+
}
|
|
20
|
+
function privateJwk(value) {
|
|
21
|
+
return value && value.kty === 'EC' && value.crv === 'P-256' && ['x','y','d'].every(k => typeof value[k] === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(value[k])) && typeof value.kid === 'string' && value.kid.length > 0;
|
|
22
|
+
}
|
|
23
|
+
export async function sealDependencyKey(config, contract, value) {
|
|
24
|
+
requireInstallationKey(config);
|
|
25
|
+
if (!privateJwk(value)) fail();
|
|
26
|
+
const { key, kid } = await material(config.INSTALLATION_KEY);
|
|
27
|
+
return JSON.stringify({ version: 1, kid, ...await encryptJson(key, aad(contract, kid), value) });
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
export async function openDependencyKey(config, contract, raw, { currentOnly = false, allowPlaintext = false, knownKeyIds, retiredKeys = [] } = {}) {
|
|
30
|
+
requireInstallationKey(config);
|
|
31
|
+
let value;try { value = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { fail(); }
|
|
32
|
+
// Only a complete legacy private JWK is upgradeable. An envelope, even a
|
|
33
|
+
// malformed/unknown one, can never take the legacy plaintext branch.
|
|
34
|
+
if (value && !['version','iv','ciphertext'].some(k => Object.hasOwn(value,k)) && privateJwk(value)) {
|
|
35
|
+
if (currentOnly || !allowPlaintext) fail();
|
|
36
|
+
return { key: value, reseal: true };
|
|
37
|
+
}
|
|
38
|
+
if (!value || value.version !== 1 || typeof value.kid !== 'string' || typeof value.iv !== 'string' || typeof value.ciphertext !== 'string' || Object.keys(value).sort().join(',') !== 'ciphertext,iv,kid,version') fail();
|
|
39
|
+
const secrets = [config.INSTALLATION_KEY, ...(!currentOnly ? [...(validSecret(config.INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS) ? [config.INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS] : []), ...retiredKeys] : [])];
|
|
40
|
+
let matched = false;
|
|
41
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < secrets.length; i++) {
|
|
42
|
+
try {
|
|
43
|
+
const { key, kid } = await material(secrets[i]);
|
|
44
|
+
if (kid !== value.kid) continue;
|
|
45
|
+
matched = true;
|
|
46
|
+
const jwk = await decryptJson(key, aad(contract, kid), value);
|
|
47
|
+
if (!privateJwk(jwk)) continue;
|
|
48
|
+
return { key: jwk, reseal: i > 0 };
|
|
49
|
+
} catch { /* Try the remaining explicitly supplied custody, then refuse. */ }
|
|
50
|
+
}
|
|
51
|
+
// Known version IDs contain no key material. They distinguish a missing
|
|
52
|
+
// retired version from tampering or a wrong supplied installation secret.
|
|
53
|
+
if (!matched && (!knownKeyIds || knownKeyIds.includes(value.kid))) throw new AuthError('installation_key_version_unknown', 503);
|
|
54
|
+
fail();
|
|
55
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -1,18 +1,71 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { keyPair } from './crypto.mjs';
|
|
2
|
-
|
|
2
|
+
import { requireInstallationKey, installationKeyId, sealDependencyKey, openDependencyKey } from './sealing.mjs';
|
|
3
|
+
import { AuthError } from '../operator-auth/errors.mjs';
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
async function sealingState(db, config, row, { retiredKeys = [], report } = {}) {
|
|
6
|
+
requireInstallationKey(config);
|
|
7
|
+
const state = row ?? await db.prepare('SELECT keys_sealed,key_ids FROM rer_dependency_installation WHERE singleton=1').first();
|
|
8
|
+
const ids = JSON.parse(state?.key_ids ?? '[]'), current = await installationKeyId(config.INSTALLATION_KEY);
|
|
9
|
+
const previous = config.INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS ? await installationKeyId(config.INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS) : null;
|
|
10
|
+
const available = [current, previous, ...await Promise.all(retiredKeys.map(installationKeyId))];
|
|
11
|
+
report?.({keyIds:ids, tail:ids.at(-1) ?? null, custody:ids.map(kid => ({kid, available:available.includes(kid)}))});
|
|
12
|
+
if (ids.length && !available.includes(ids.at(-1))) throw new AuthError('installation_key_unavailable', 503);
|
|
13
|
+
return { current, ids, options: { allowPlaintext: !state?.keys_sealed, knownKeyIds: ids.length ? ids : undefined, retiredKeys } };
|
|
14
|
+
}
|
|
15
|
+
// Closing the legacy branch is atomic with the last per-row upgrade. This SQL
|
|
16
|
+
// checks envelope shape only; reads never decrypt a sibling interface's key.
|
|
17
|
+
const finishUpgrade = (db, current) => db.prepare(`UPDATE rer_dependency_installation SET keys_sealed=1,key_ids=CASE WHEN json_array_length(key_ids)=0 THEN ? ELSE key_ids END WHERE singleton=1 AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_keys WHERE (CASE WHEN json_valid(private_key) THEN json_extract(private_key,'$.version')=1 AND json_type(private_key,'$.kid')='text' AND json_type(private_key,'$.iv')='text' AND json_type(private_key,'$.ciphertext')='text' ELSE 0 END) IS NOT 1)`).bind(JSON.stringify([current]));
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
// Rekey alone opens the entire table, then checks the complete current set
|
|
20
|
+
// (including concurrent replacements) before authorizing key retirement.
|
|
21
|
+
export async function resealDependencyKeys(db, config = {}, custody = {}) {
|
|
22
|
+
const state = await sealingState(db, config, undefined, custody);
|
|
23
|
+
const rows = (await db.prepare('SELECT interface,private_key FROM rer_dependency_keys').all()).results;
|
|
24
|
+
const updates = [];
|
|
25
|
+
for (const row of rows) {
|
|
26
|
+
const value = await openDependencyKey(config, row.interface, row.private_key, state.options);
|
|
27
|
+
if (value.reseal) updates.push(db.prepare('UPDATE rer_dependency_keys SET private_key=? WHERE interface=? AND private_key=?').bind(await sealDependencyKey(config, row.interface, value.key), row.interface, row.private_key));
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
// Keep all historical IDs, with the current ID last, including a reopen.
|
|
30
|
+
const ids = [...state.ids.filter(id => id !== state.current), state.current];
|
|
31
|
+
await db.batch([...updates, db.prepare('UPDATE rer_dependency_installation SET keys_sealed=1,key_ids=? WHERE singleton=1').bind(JSON.stringify(ids))]);
|
|
32
|
+
for (const row of (await db.prepare('SELECT interface,private_key FROM rer_dependency_keys').all()).results) await openDependencyKey(config, row.interface, row.private_key, { currentOnly: true, knownKeyIds: ids });
|
|
33
|
+
return { resealed: updates.length };
|
|
34
|
+
}
|
|
35
|
+
export function dependencyStore(db, config = {}) {
|
|
3
36
|
const first=(sql,...args)=>db.prepare(sql).bind(...args).first();
|
|
4
37
|
const run=(sql,...args)=>db.prepare(sql).bind(...args).run();
|
|
38
|
+
async function identity() {
|
|
39
|
+
requireInstallationKey(config);
|
|
40
|
+
const ids = JSON.stringify([await installationKeyId(config.INSTALLATION_KEY)]);
|
|
41
|
+
await run('INSERT INTO rer_dependency_installation(singleton,sector_id,keys_sealed,key_ids) VALUES(1,?,1,?) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING',crypto.randomUUID(),ids);
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// An archive retains the sector but omits signing keys. A fresh relink can
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// establish destination custody only while no private row needs an old key.
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await run('UPDATE rer_dependency_installation SET keys_sealed=1,key_ids=? WHERE singleton=1 AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_keys)',ids);
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return first('SELECT * FROM rer_dependency_installation WHERE singleton=1');
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}
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async function readKey(contract = 'oidc-provider@1') {
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requireInstallationKey(config);
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const row = await first('SELECT k.private_key,i.keys_sealed,i.key_ids FROM rer_dependency_keys k LEFT JOIN rer_dependency_installation i ON i.singleton=1 WHERE k.interface=?',contract);
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if (!row) return null;
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const state = await sealingState(db, config, row);
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const value = await openDependencyKey(config, contract, row.private_key, state.options);
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if (!value.reseal) return { key: value.key, sealedKey: row.private_key };
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await db.batch([
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db.prepare('UPDATE rer_dependency_keys SET private_key=? WHERE interface=? AND private_key=?').bind(await sealDependencyKey(config, contract, value.key), contract, row.private_key),
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56
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+
finishUpgrade(db, state.current),
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+
]);
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// Use the persisted winner if unlink/replacement raced our CAS.
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return readKey(contract);
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}
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5
61
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return {
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6
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-
first,run,
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+
first,run,readKey,identity,
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7
63
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async installation(contract = 'oidc-provider@1') {
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8
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-
await
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-
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10
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-
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-
if(!key) {
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-
await run('INSERT INTO rer_dependency_keys(interface,private_key) VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING',contract,JSON.stringify(await keyPair()));
|
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13
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-
key=await first('SELECT private_key FROM rer_dependency_keys WHERE interface=?',contract);
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+
const row=await identity();
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if(!await first('SELECT 1 FROM rer_dependency_keys WHERE interface=?',contract)) {
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await run('INSERT INTO rer_dependency_keys(interface,private_key) VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING',contract,await sealDependencyKey(config,contract,await keyPair()));
|
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14
67
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}
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-
return {...row
|
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+
return {...row,...await readKey(contract)};
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},
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async link(contract = 'oidc-provider@1') { const row=await first("SELECT * FROM rer_dependency_link WHERE interface=?",contract);return row?{...row,metadata:JSON.parse(row.metadata)}:null; },
|
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18
71
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};
|
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@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ A transport failure carries `providerTransport`: the operation, sanitized endpoi
|
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123
123
|
- **Hosted owner.** After deploy and health pass, rer claims the setup owner on the hosted app: it POSTs the setup token to the seed's standard owner step (`hooks.owner`, by default `/auth/bootstrap`). 303 means claimed; `409 already_initialized` means an owner was already claimed and is kept. Then rer deletes the token secret from the Worker, records the new Worker version in the state file, and lists the token in `retiredSecrets`, so later plans no longer declare it. The build fingerprint still names it, and the recorded claim stays as recorded, so an untouched repeat deploy writes nothing. A Worker that still holds a token rer did not upload in this run (an older deploy) first gets a fresh token through the same recorded secret change. Dependency approvals that need the token run before the claim. A seed with an owner step function, an identity-provider claim, or no declared token secret claims its owner its own way.
|
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124
124
|
- **Several secrets at once.** `rer deploy --set-secret MAIL_API_KEY --set-secret MAIL_FROM` or `rer deploy --set-secret MAIL_API_KEY,MAIL_FROM` (likewise `--unset-secret A,B`) changes all of them in one new Worker version or none: a group of secrets is never half set. Every named secret must be declared and, for `--set-secret`, have its value in the environment or `--env-file`; otherwise rer names each missing one and changes nothing. One secret uses Cloudflare's secret call. Several are one copy of the live version through the Versions API (its own modules, assets and compatibility settings, every other binding inherited), then deployed at 100%: Cloudflare's per-secret calls each make a version, and its settings call can add secrets but not remove them (measured 17 October 2026). The copy carries a marker rer records first, so a copy whose answer was lost is recognised, and one uploaded but not deployed is deployed by the same command run again.
|
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125
125
|
- **Secret changes.** `rer deploy --set-secret NAME` (value from the environment or `--env-file`, under the declaration's environment name), `--unset-secret NAME` and `--rotate-secret NAME[,NAME]` (a fresh value for a secret rer generates, kept in `.rer/deploy/<environment>.secrets.env` once set) change declared secrets of the recorded Worker without a build. Before writing, rer records the starting version and the exact live names of all other secrets, never their values. Accepted or ambiguous writes retain that intent until readback confirms the change; explicit refusals clear it. An ambiguous failure, or a later command's preflight, can clear an unapplied intent only when the live deployment still matches the receipt and the newest listed version matches it too. A surviving intent blocks further mutations until consistency returns; retry the same command then. Recovery requires the recorded immediate successor (or the recorded confirming rotation's successor), the receipt's script etag and fingerprint, the intended binding's presence, and an unchanged set of other secret names. Ambiguous rotations require a confirming PUT before reporting success. Older intents without names may recover only from the exact starting version's historical bindings, with its id, etag and fingerprint verified; unavailable or malformed historical bindings refuse adoption. Each historical binding must have an exact provider type supported by this kit; unrecognized types cannot prove that a name was not a secret. Added, removed or renamed other secrets refuse deploy and removal before writes. Values remain opaque: these checks cannot distinguish an otherwise identical outside change to the pending binding.
|
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126
|
+
- **Installation key custody.** The setup manifest generates `INSTALLATION_KEY` independently of `SESSION_SECRET`. Hosted deployment keeps it in the same private, Git-ignored `.rer/deploy/<environment>.secrets.env`, before its first upload; `INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS` is optional and never generated by setup. `rer deploy --rotate-secret INSTALLATION_KEY` first saves a new/current and old/previous pair there, publishes both bindings in one Worker version, then reseals every dependency-key row through the recorded D1 database and verifies that every row opens with the current key. Only then does it remove the previous Worker binding. Routine rotation uses only the current/previous pair; older retired keys require explicit reopen. By default, every retired key remains in the same private file as `SESSION_SECRET`, in `INSTALLATION_KEY_RETIRED=<kid>:<value>[,<kid>:<value>...]`; retired keys never enter routine Worker bindings or archives. Resealing uses the [D1 transactional batch API](https://developers.cloudflare.com/api/resources/d1/subresources/database/methods/query/). Worker receipt and D1 identity checks precede database access. Any failure retains both saved values; rerun the same rotation command to resume with that exact pair. A D1 backup or Time Travel restore older than a rotation needs the corresponding retired key: `rer deploy --reopen-installation-key KID` publishes current plus only that retired key as previous, reseals and verifies every row through the same recorded D1, then removes the previous binding while retaining all retired custody. CLI-side reopen rekey uses every validated retired key in private custody to open mixed mid-rotation snapshots; only the selected pair is published to the Worker. Before opening rows, rekey reports the D1 `key_ids` tail and custody availability for every history ID. A whole pre-rotation restore with an unavailable tail reports `installation_key_unavailable`; a known row ID without its key reports `installation_key_version_unknown` only after the tail custody check succeeds. Failures retain the reopen marker and exact pair; repeat that command to finish. Missing retired custody refuses with `installation_key_unavailable` before provider writes: recover the private file before reopening. Back up private custody securely for as long as older database recovery points exist. Retain each retired key until no D1 Time Travel recovery point or exported backup predates the completed rotation that retired it or otherwise needs that key. After any rotation or reopen has finished, edit `.rer/deploy/<environment>.secrets.env` and remove only its `<kid>:<value>` entry from `INSTALLATION_KEY_RETIRED`, keeping valid comma separators; remove the assignment if no entries remain. Preserve the current key, all other entries and the file's owned 0600 permissions. There is no per-key removal command; reopening a removed ID refuses before provider writes unless its custody is restored. Base before #367 cannot open sealed keys; roll forward to sealing-capable code. The CLI has neither a Base-version capability receipt nor a code rollback operation, so out-of-band provider rollbacks cannot be checked here; current Base rejects sealed envelopes passed to plaintext signing with `installation_key_sealed_rollback`. Other deployment changes wait for completion. Manual installation-key set/unset, a conflicting supplied current key and a supplied previous key are refused. Without the current private key, restore custody from the deploying checkout before rotating. Neither keys nor database ciphertext appear in output.
|
|
126
127
|
- **Removal.** `rer deploy --remove --yes` deletes what the state file says rer created for this environment: the Worker (schedules first; its Durable Objects go with it) and each D1, R2, KV and queue that is still the one rer created, after checking all of them before the first delete. A replaced or uncertain resource refuses the whole removal, except a D1 or KV whose create answer was lost: under this environment's derived name it is deleted once confirmed empty (a D1 with no tables, a KV namespace with no keys); one holding data is refused as `uncertain-resource-not-empty`, and an uncertain queue, whose backlog rer cannot read, as `uncertain-resource-unverifiable` (delete it by hand if it is the empty one from the interrupted run).
|
|
127
128
|
|
|
128
129
|
R2 removal requires a saved `created` identity (the bucket's creation date). Pending buckets or buckets missing that identity are refused as `uncertain-resource-create`, and same-named replacements as `owned-resource-replaced`, even if empty. For a confirmed bucket, removal automatically lists and deletes its objects before deleting the bucket, checking its identity again before every object delete and the bucket delete. Serialize outside bucket deletion and recreation with removal: the provider cannot make a delete conditional on that identity.
|
|
@@ -13,11 +13,12 @@ import { activeWorker, secretBindings } from './worker.mjs';
|
|
|
13
13
|
import { ownerSecret } from './owner-secret.mjs';
|
|
14
14
|
import { ownerRemove } from './owner-remove.mjs';
|
|
15
15
|
import { ownerSignin } from './owner-signin.mjs';
|
|
16
|
+
import { ownerRekey } from './owner-rekey.mjs';
|
|
16
17
|
import { refuseLocalModels } from './local-only.mjs';
|
|
17
18
|
import { publicOrigin } from './public-origin.mjs';
|
|
18
19
|
|
|
19
20
|
export const cronNotice = 'This Worker has a Cron Trigger. Cloudflare may take up to about two hours to start its first scheduled run on some accounts.';
|
|
20
|
-
const usage = 'usage: owner-cli.mjs deploy|dry-run|health|remove|inspect|record-owner|signin --declaration <file> --environment <name> [--product <dir>] [--state <file>] [--outcome claimed|kept] | secret ... --set NAME [--set NAME]|--unset NAME [--unset NAME]';
|
|
21
|
+
const usage = 'usage: owner-cli.mjs deploy|dry-run|health|remove|inspect|record-owner|signin|rekey --declaration <file> --environment <name> [--product <dir>] [--state <file>] [--outcome claimed|kept] | secret ... --set NAME [--set NAME]|--unset NAME [--unset NAME]';
|
|
21
22
|
|
|
22
23
|
/** The owner's committed source and existing local build. Run the seed's build first. */
|
|
23
24
|
async function ownerArtifact(root, product) {
|
|
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ export async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2), env = process.env, {fet
|
|
|
33
34
|
try { parsed = parseArgs({args:argv,allowPositionals:true,strict:true,options:{declaration:{type:'string'},environment:{type:'string'},product:{type:'string',default:''},state:{type:'string'},set:{type:'string',multiple:true},unset:{type:'string',multiple:true},outcome:{type:'string'}}}); }
|
|
34
35
|
catch { throw new Error('usage'); }
|
|
35
36
|
const {positionals:[command,...rest],values} = parsed;
|
|
36
|
-
if (!['deploy','dry-run','health','secret','remove','inspect','record-owner','signin'].includes(command) || rest.length || !values.declaration || !values.environment) throw new Error('usage');
|
|
37
|
+
if (!['deploy','dry-run','health','secret','remove','inspect','record-owner','signin','rekey'].includes(command) || rest.length || !values.declaration || !values.environment) throw new Error('usage');
|
|
37
38
|
if ((command === 'secret') !== (values.set !== undefined || values.unset !== undefined) || values.set !== undefined && values.unset !== undefined) throw new Error('usage');
|
|
38
39
|
if (values.outcome !== undefined && command !== 'record-owner' || command === 'record-owner' && !['claimed','kept'].includes(values.outcome)) throw new Error('usage');
|
|
39
40
|
await refuseLocalModels(resolve(cwd));
|
|
@@ -57,20 +58,31 @@ export async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2), env = process.env, {fet
|
|
|
57
58
|
// Bound each response, not the owner's bucket size; failures retain ownership.
|
|
58
59
|
let requestWindow = propagation?.uploaded ? propagation.window : undefined;
|
|
59
60
|
const request = fetch;
|
|
60
|
-
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
61
|
+
const guardedRequest = (input, init = {}) => {
|
|
62
|
+
init.signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
63
|
+
// The window clock can expire before its shared abort timer fires.
|
|
64
|
+
assert(!requestWindow?.active || requestWindow.remaining() > 0, 'deployment-readiness-timeout');
|
|
65
|
+
return request(input, init);
|
|
66
|
+
};
|
|
67
|
+
const requestSignal = () => {
|
|
68
|
+
if (!requestWindow?.active) return undefined;
|
|
62
69
|
const remaining = requestWindow.remaining();
|
|
63
70
|
assert(remaining > 0, 'deployment-readiness-timeout');
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
65
|
-
|
|
71
|
+
return AbortSignal.timeout(Math.max(1, Math.ceil(remaining)));
|
|
72
|
+
};
|
|
73
|
+
fetch = (input, init = {}) => {
|
|
74
|
+
const deadline = requestSignal();
|
|
75
|
+
return request(input, {...init,...(deadline ? {signal:init.signal ? AbortSignal.any([init.signal,deadline]) : deadline} : {})});
|
|
66
76
|
};
|
|
67
|
-
|
|
77
|
+
// Transport must see the same outer signal when deciding whether to retry.
|
|
78
|
+
const api = deploymentDiagnostics(cloudflare({accountId:env.CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID,token:env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN,fetch:guardedRequest,requestSignal,budgetMigrations:command === 'deploy',...(command === 'remove' ? {maxRequests:Infinity,removal:true} : {})}),{onCreated});
|
|
68
79
|
// Removal needs the recorded account/name identity, not a workers.dev route.
|
|
69
80
|
const target = command === 'remove'
|
|
70
81
|
? {accountId:api.accountId,project:declaration.project,environment:values.environment,worker:ownerWorkerName(declaration.project,values.environment)}
|
|
71
82
|
: await ownerTarget(api,{project:declaration.project,environment:values.environment});
|
|
72
83
|
const statePath = values.state ? resolve(root,values.state) : join(root,'.rer','deploy',`${target.environment}.json`);
|
|
73
84
|
if (command === 'remove') return {ok:true,...await ownerRemove({api,target,statePath}).catch(error => { throw api.annotateFailure(error,'remove'); })};
|
|
85
|
+
if (command === 'rekey') return ownerRekey({api,target,statePath,declaration,env,notice});
|
|
74
86
|
if (command === 'secret') {
|
|
75
87
|
// Every named secret is changed in one Worker version, or none is.
|
|
76
88
|
const named = [...new Set(values.set ?? values.unset)], declared = Array.isArray(declaration.secrets) ? declaration.secrets : [];
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { assert, uuid } from './validation.mjs';
|
|
2
|
+
import { activeWorker } from './worker.mjs';
|
|
3
|
+
import { checkResourceIdentity, readOwnerState, sameDeployment, withStateLock, ownerResourceName } from './owner.mjs';
|
|
4
|
+
import { retiredInstallationKeys } from '../dependencies/custody.mjs';
|
|
5
|
+
|
|
6
|
+
/** The D1 REST batch is one transaction, matching the Worker's db.batch contract.
|
|
7
|
+
* Nothing from query responses/errors is allowed into deployment diagnostics. */
|
|
8
|
+
function database(api, id) {
|
|
9
|
+
const execute = async body => {
|
|
10
|
+
try {
|
|
11
|
+
const rows = await api.request(`/d1/database/${id}/query`, { method: 'POST', body });
|
|
12
|
+
assert(Array.isArray(rows) && rows.every(row => row?.success === true && Array.isArray(row.results)), 'dependency-rekey-invalid-result');
|
|
13
|
+
return rows;
|
|
14
|
+
} catch { throw new Error('dependency-rekey-query-failed'); }
|
|
15
|
+
};
|
|
16
|
+
const prepare = (sql, params = []) => ({
|
|
17
|
+
sql, params,
|
|
18
|
+
bind(...values) { return prepare(sql, values); },
|
|
19
|
+
async all() { return (await execute({sql, params}))[0]; },
|
|
20
|
+
async first() { return (await this.all()).results[0] ?? null; },
|
|
21
|
+
async run() { return (await execute({sql, params}))[0]; },
|
|
22
|
+
});
|
|
23
|
+
return { prepare, batch: statements => statements.length ? execute({batch:statements.map(({sql,params}) => ({sql,params}))}) : Promise.resolve([]) };
|
|
24
|
+
}
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
/** Reseal the dependency rows in the declared DB only while the receipt still
|
|
27
|
+
* proves both the Worker and its recorded D1 resource belong to this deployment. */
|
|
28
|
+
export async function ownerRekey({ api, target, statePath, declaration, env, notice = line => console.error(line) }) {
|
|
29
|
+
return withStateLock(statePath, async () => {
|
|
30
|
+
const state = await readOwnerState(statePath, target);
|
|
31
|
+
assert(state.receipt && !state.pendingUpload && !state.pendingSecret, 'missing-owner-receipt');
|
|
32
|
+
const owned = async () => {
|
|
33
|
+
const live = await activeWorker(api, target.worker);
|
|
34
|
+
assert(live && sameDeployment(live, state.receipt.provider), 'owned-resource-replaced');
|
|
35
|
+
return live;
|
|
36
|
+
};
|
|
37
|
+
const live = await owned();
|
|
38
|
+
const binding = declaration.d1?.find(item => item.binding === 'DB');
|
|
39
|
+
assert(binding, 'dependency-rekey-missing-database');
|
|
40
|
+
const name = ownerResourceName(target.worker, binding.binding), entry = state.owned.d1[name];
|
|
41
|
+
assert(entry?.status === 'created' && uuid(entry.id), 'dependency-rekey-missing-database');
|
|
42
|
+
const resource = await api.request(`/d1/database/${entry.id}`);
|
|
43
|
+
checkResourceIdentity('d1', name, resource, entry);
|
|
44
|
+
assert(resource?.name === name, 'owned-resource-replaced');
|
|
45
|
+
assert(live.settings?.bindings?.some(item => item.name === binding.binding && item.type === 'd1' && item.id === entry.id), 'dependency-rekey-database-mismatch');
|
|
46
|
+
const config = {};
|
|
47
|
+
for (const key of ['INSTALLATION_KEY', 'INSTALLATION_KEY_PREVIOUS']) {
|
|
48
|
+
const secret = declaration.secrets?.find(item => item.binding === key);
|
|
49
|
+
assert(secret && typeof env[secret.environment] === 'string' && env[secret.environment].trim(), 'dependency-rekey-missing-key');
|
|
50
|
+
config[key] = env[secret.environment];
|
|
51
|
+
assert(live.settings?.bindings?.some(item => item.name === key && item.type === 'secret_text'), 'dependency-rekey-missing-key');
|
|
52
|
+
}
|
|
53
|
+
let result;
|
|
54
|
+
try {
|
|
55
|
+
const { resealDependencyKeys } = await import('../dependencies/store.mjs');
|
|
56
|
+
const retired = await retiredInstallationKeys(env.INSTALLATION_KEY_RETIRED);
|
|
57
|
+
result = await resealDependencyKeys(database(api, entry.id), config, {
|
|
58
|
+
retiredKeys:[...retired.values()],
|
|
59
|
+
report: status => {
|
|
60
|
+
// D1 is untrusted: only well-formed public key IDs enter diagnostics.
|
|
61
|
+
const publicId = kid => /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(kid) ? kid : '(invalid key ID)';
|
|
62
|
+
notice(`D1 key_ids tail: ${status.tail === null ? '(empty)' : publicId(status.tail)}; custody: ${status.custody.map(({kid,available}) => `${publicId(kid)}=${available ? 'in custody' : 'unavailable'}`).join(', ') || '(empty)'}`);
|
|
63
|
+
},
|
|
64
|
+
});
|
|
65
|
+
} catch { throw new Error('dependency-rekey-failed'); }
|
|
66
|
+
await owned();
|
|
67
|
+
return { ok: true, resealed: result.resealed };
|
|
68
|
+
});
|
|
69
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -28,9 +28,14 @@ export async function boundedJSON(response, limit) {
|
|
|
28
28
|
}
|
|
29
29
|
const redactValues = (text, values) => values.filter(Boolean).flatMap(value=>[value,encodeURIComponent(value),JSON.stringify(value).slice(1,-1)]).sort((a,b)=>b.length-a.length).reduce((value,secret)=>value.split(secret).join('[REDACTED]'),text);
|
|
30
30
|
/** Only this fixed origin and the explicitly selected account ever receive the token. */
|
|
31
|
-
export function cloudflare({ accountId, token, fetch: request = globalThis.fetch, objectDelete = deleteR2Object, timeoutMs = 30000, maxRequests = 500, removal = false, budgetMigrations = false }) {
|
|
31
|
+
export function cloudflare({ accountId, token, fetch: request = globalThis.fetch, objectDelete = deleteR2Object, timeoutMs = 30000, maxRequests = 500, removal = false, budgetMigrations = false, requestSignal = () => undefined }) {
|
|
32
32
|
assert(hexId(accountId), 'invalid-cloudflare-account-id');
|
|
33
33
|
assert(typeof token === 'string' && token.trim() && !/[\r\n]/.test(token), 'invalid-cloudflare-api-token');
|
|
34
|
+
// Capture an outer deadline once per operation, before transport retries.
|
|
35
|
+
const deadlineSignal = caller => {
|
|
36
|
+
const deadline = requestSignal();
|
|
37
|
+
return caller && deadline ? AbortSignal.any([caller,deadline]) : caller ?? deadline;
|
|
38
|
+
};
|
|
34
39
|
let requests = 0;
|
|
35
40
|
const migrationBudgets = new Set();
|
|
36
41
|
function reserveMigrationRequests(id, pending) {
|
|
@@ -64,7 +69,7 @@ export function cloudflare({ accountId, token, fetch: request = globalThis.fetch
|
|
|
64
69
|
error.providerTransport = {operation:redactCredentials(operation),endpoint,attempts,status,reason:transportReason(cause)};
|
|
65
70
|
return recordDeployFailure(error,{output:redactAuth(transportOutput(cause))});
|
|
66
71
|
};
|
|
67
|
-
const {response,output = ''} = await providerResponse({method,timeoutMs,callerSignal,removal,
|
|
72
|
+
const {response,output = ''} = await providerResponse({method,timeoutMs,callerSignal:deadlineSignal(callerSignal),removal,
|
|
68
73
|
replayableAsset:method === 'POST' && (/^\/workers\/scripts\/[^/]+\/assets-upload-session$/.test(path) || path === '/workers/assets/upload?base64=true'),
|
|
69
74
|
reserveRetry:() => requests < maxRequests && (++requests, true),failure:transportFailure,
|
|
70
75
|
consume:(response,attempts) => response.body ? boundedText(response,undefined,cause => transportFailure(cause,attempts,response.status)) : '',
|
|
@@ -135,7 +140,7 @@ export function cloudflare({ accountId, token, fetch: request = globalThis.fetch
|
|
|
135
140
|
assert(/^[a-z0-9-]{1,63}$/.test(worker) && /^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/.test(versionId), 'invalid-provider-path');
|
|
136
141
|
assert(++requests <= maxRequests, 'provider-request-budget');
|
|
137
142
|
const operation = 'GET /workers/scripts/[worker]/content/v2';
|
|
138
|
-
const {response,output} = await providerResponse({method:'GET',timeoutMs,reserveRetry:() => requests < maxRequests && (++requests, true),
|
|
143
|
+
const {response,output} = await providerResponse({method:'GET',timeoutMs,callerSignal:deadlineSignal(),reserveRetry:() => requests < maxRequests && (++requests, true),
|
|
139
144
|
send:signal => request(`https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/${accountId}/workers/scripts/${worker}/content/v2?version=${versionId}`, {method:'GET',redirect:'error',signal,headers:{Authorization:`Bearer ${token}`}}),
|
|
140
145
|
consume:response => response.body ? boundedBytes(response, 64 * 1024 * 1024) : Buffer.alloc(0),
|
|
141
146
|
failure:(cause,attempts) => Object.assign(new Error('provider-transport-failed'), {providerTransport:{operation,endpoint:`https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/[REDACTED]/workers/scripts/${worker}/content/v2`,attempts,status:null,reason:transportReason(cause)}})});
|
|
@@ -149,7 +154,7 @@ export function cloudflare({ accountId, token, fetch: request = globalThis.fetch
|
|
|
149
154
|
async function upload(url, bytes, etag) {
|
|
150
155
|
const destination = importUploadURL(url);
|
|
151
156
|
assert(++requests <= maxRequests, 'provider-request-budget');
|
|
152
|
-
const {response} = await providerResponse({method:'PUT',timeoutMs,
|
|
157
|
+
const {response} = await providerResponse({method:'PUT',timeoutMs,callerSignal:deadlineSignal(),
|
|
153
158
|
reserveRetry:() => requests < maxRequests && (++requests, true),
|
|
154
159
|
send:signal => request(destination, { method:'PUT', redirect:'error', signal, headers:{'Content-Length':String(bytes.length)}, body:bytes }),
|
|
155
160
|
failure:(cause,attempts) => Object.assign(new Error('d1-import-upload-transport-failed'), {providerTransport:{operation:'PUT D1 import upload',endpoint:'https://[REDACTED].r2.cloudflarestorage.com/[D1 import upload]',attempts,status:null,reason:transportReason(cause)}}),
|