@rubytech/create-maxy-code 0.1.349 → 0.1.350

package/payload/platform/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-23-account-filesystem-schema-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# Account filesystem schema: seed it, and enforce file↔graph stewardship — design
+
+Source task: `.tasks/1091-account-filesystem-schema-enforcement.md`. Backstop
+(out of scope here): `.tasks/1092-account-dir-standing-reconcile-and-quarantine.md`.
+
+## Problem (recap)
+
+The account data dir (`data/accounts/<id>/`) should be a consistent projection of
+the graph ontology, but that doctrine lives only inside the `data-manager`
+specialist the main agent often routes around, nothing seeds a canonical file
+layout, and nothing stops an agent inventing folders. The observed failure: an
+agent invented `projects/<name>/deploy|sources|design|archive` with no ontology
+basis, justified as "there was no canonical schema to copy from."
+
+## Resolved gating decision
+
+`provision_account_dir` runs **unprivileged** on the Pi target — at install and
+at runtime when the `account_create` admin tool calls it via `execFileSync`
+inside the `systemctl --user` brand service. `chattr +i` needs root
+(`CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE`). So the task's Decision C1 (OS-immutable top level)
+**cannot take effect on the real target**.
+
+**Decision (operator, 2026-06-23): drop C1 entirely.** No `chattr`/`chflags`
+code ships. The PreToolUse Write-hook becomes the sole tool-layer hard guard;
+top-level strays created via bash fall to the Task 1092 reconcile. This also
+removes the chattr observability line and the upgrade/uninstall-unlock risk from
+the task.
+
+## What ships
+
+Three layers, honest about hard-enforceable vs cooperative.
+
+### A. Seeded schema (one standard, every account)
+
+`provision_account_dir` (the function both `setup-account.sh` and the
+`account_create` lifecycle tool call) gains an idempotent seed step:
+
+- **Create the operator-data skeleton:** `projects/`, `contacts/`, `documents/`.
+- **Create the tool-owned skeleton:** `url-get/`, `output/`, `generated/`,
+  `extracted/`, `uploads/` (`agents/`, `specialists/` already created earlier in
+  the function).
+- **Copy `SCHEMA.md`** to the account root from a shipped template
+  (`platform/templates/account-schema/SCHEMA.md`). The template is the **single
+  source of truth** for the allowed top-level set (see below) and the flatness
+  rule.
+- **Log** `[acct-schema] seeded dirs=<n>` once per provision. Idempotent: a
+  re-provision over an existing account re-creates nothing and overwrites
+  `SCHEMA.md` with the shipped version (Rubytech-controlled, like `IDENTITY.md`).
+
+Operator-data buckets are **flat**: files live directly under one entity folder
+(`projects/<name>/file`, `contacts/<name>/file`) or, for `documents/`, directly
+in the bucket or one document-folder deep. Flatness is what makes
+`projects/<name>/deploy/` a machine-detectable violation.
+
+### B. `DATA_STEWARDSHIP` directive (cooperative layer)
+
+A `DATA_STEWARDSHIP` const beside `PLATFORM_BOUNDARY` in
+`platform/services/claude-session-manager/src/system-prompt.ts`, rendered as a
+`<data-stewardship>` section in `renderAppendBlock` next to `<platform-boundary>`
+— joined into `--append-system-prompt` on **every spawn, every role**. It states:
+the account-dir layout is fixed by the seeded `SCHEMA.md`; never author new
+top-level folders or nested subtrees under an entity folder; route
+reorganisation/moves through `data-manager` and non-trivial graph writes through
+`database-operator`; the existing carve-out (a one-line update against an
+in-context, unambiguously-classified node) stays direct.
+
+`runSystemPromptSelfTest` is extended to assert `<data-stewardship>` /
+`</data-stewardship>` appear in the rendered block.
+
+### C. PreToolUse Write-hook (hard guard, no bash removal)
+
+A new hook `platform/plugins/admin/hooks/fs-schema-guard.sh`, seeded into the
+account `.claude/settings.json` as a PreToolUse hook on `Write`, `Edit`, and
+`NotebookEdit` (added alongside the existing `archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh`
+entries on those three matchers).
+
+Behaviour:
+
+1. Read the stdin JSON envelope. Fail **closed** on terminal stdin (no envelope).
+2. Extract the target path: `tool_input.file_path` for Write/Edit,
+   `tool_input.notebook_path` for NotebookEdit (via python3, matching the
+   existing `extract_tool_input_field` pattern — never jq, never command parsing).
+3. Resolve the path against the account dir. If the resolved path is **outside**
+   the account data dir, **allow** (exit 0) — this hook governs the account-dir
+   schema only; platform-source writes are PLATFORM_BOUNDARY's concern.
+4. Compute the path relative to the account dir. Let `seg0` be its first segment.
+5. **Top-level check:** if `seg0` is a single path segment (a top-level file or
+   dir) not in the allowed top-level set → **block** (exit 2),
+   `reason=top-level`.
+6. **Over-deep check:** if `seg0 ∈ {projects, contacts}` and the path has more
+   than `bucket/entity/file` depth (i.e. a directory component beyond the single
+   entity folder), or `seg0 == documents` and the path exceeds
+   `documents/folder/file` → **block** (exit 2), `reason=over-deep`.
+7. Tool-owned dirs (everything in the allowed set except the three operator-data
+   buckets) pass at **any** depth.
+8. Otherwise allow (exit 0).
+9. Every block logs `[fs-guard] blocked path=<rel> reason=<top-level|over-deep>`
+   to stderr (operator-greppable). No task numbers / internal refs in any
+   operator-visible string. The exit-2 stderr message cites the schema in plain
+   terms.
+
+**Allowed top-level set — single source.** The set lives once, as a fenced
+` ```allowed-top-level ` block in `platform/templates/account-schema/SCHEMA.md`
+(newline-delimited). The hook parses that fenced block from the **account's**
+seeded `SCHEMA.md` at runtime (deterministic structured data, not prose control
+flow). Shipped contents:
+
+```
+projects
+contacts
+documents
+url-get
+output
+generated
+extracted
+uploads
+agents
+specialists
+sites
+public
+cache
+secrets
+state
+logs
+tmp
+SCHEMA.md
+account.json
+AGENTS.md
+.claude
+.git
+.quarantine
+```
+
+A unit test asserts the hook's parse of the template equals this documented set,
+so the human doc and the enforcement never drift. Adding a future plugin
+top-level dir is a one-line edit to this block.
+
+## Out of scope (unchanged from task)
+
+- The standing reconcile / quarantine — Task 1092 (named as the backstop here,
+  not built).
+- Removing or narrowing the main agent's `Bash`/`Write`/`Edit` tools — rejected.
+- Auto-repairing drift — `data-manager` fixes on dispatch.
+- Per-account schema variants.
+- Any change to the graph schema or the `database-operator` write path.
+- `chattr`/`chflags` OS-immutability (Decision C1) — dropped per the gating
+  decision above.
+
+## Verification
+
+- **Seed:** a fresh `provision_account_dir` run produces the documented skeleton
+  and `SCHEMA.md`; the seeded allowed-top-level set matches the template exactly.
+  Re-provision is idempotent.
+- **Write-hook:** a `Write` to `projects/Acme/deploy/sources/a.txt` blocks
+  (`over-deep`); `projects/Acme/a.txt` and `documents/a.pdf` allow; a write into
+  `output/` or `generated/` at any depth allows; a write to a novel top-level dir
+  `whim/x` blocks (`top-level`); a write outside the account dir allows.
+- **Directive:** `runSystemPromptSelfTest` asserts the `<data-stewardship>` tag.
+- **No tool regression:** the main agent retains `Bash`/`Write`/`Edit`; existing
+  hook + spawn + specialist tests pass; `platform/ui` (if touched) builds/lints
+  clean. The new hook does not interfere with the existing PreToolUse gate on the
+  same matchers (both run; either can block).
+- **Device:** after publish + upgrade, a real account shows the seeded skeleton,
+  `SCHEMA.md`, and a blocked whim-write in the logs.
+
+## Observability
+
+- `provision_account_dir` logs `[acct-schema] seeded dirs=<n>`.
+- The Write-hook logs `[fs-guard] blocked path=<rel> reason=<top-level|over-deep>`
+  per block.

package/payload/platform/plugins/admin/hooks/__tests__/fs-schema-guard.test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression test for fs-schema-guard.sh.
+#
+# Covers:
+#   1. Non-Write/Edit/NotebookEdit tool                    -> ALLOW (early exit)
+#   2. Write to projects/Acme/a.txt (flat)                 -> ALLOW
+#   3. Write to documents/a.pdf (loose)                    -> ALLOW
+#   4. Write to output/deep/nested/x.png (tool-owned)      -> ALLOW (any depth)
+#   5. Write to projects/Acme/deploy/sources/a.txt         -> BLOCK over-deep
+#   6. Write to projects/Acme/deploy/a.txt                 -> BLOCK over-deep
+#   7. Write to whim/x.txt (novel top-level)               -> BLOCK top-level
+#   8. Write to an absolute path outside the account dir   -> ALLOW (not our concern)
+#   9. NotebookEdit over-deep (notebook_path)              -> BLOCK over-deep
+#  10. Empty stdin (cannot inspect)                        -> BLOCK fail-closed
+#  11. Allowed-set parse matches the documented set        -> assertion
+set -u
+
+HOOK="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)/fs-schema-guard.sh"
+[ -x "$HOOK" ] || { echo "FAIL: $HOOK not executable" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# A scratch account dir with a seeded SCHEMA.md (copied from the shipped template).
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../../../.." && pwd)"
+TEMPLATE="$REPO_ROOT/templates/account-schema/SCHEMA.md"
+[ -f "$TEMPLATE" ] || { echo "FAIL: template missing at $TEMPLATE" >&2; exit 1; }
+ACCT=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$ACCT"' EXIT
+cp "$TEMPLATE" "$ACCT/SCHEMA.md"
+mkdir -p "$ACCT/projects/Acme" "$ACCT/documents" "$ACCT/output"
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+# Run one case in the account dir as cwd.
+#   $1 name  $2 stdin  $3 expected_exit  $4 expected_log_re ("" = none)
+run_case() {
+  local name="$1" stdin="$2" exp="$3" re="$4" ef actual
+  ef=$(mktemp)
+  ( cd "$ACCT" && printf '%s' "$stdin" | bash "$HOOK" >/dev/null 2>"$ef" )
+  actual=$?
+  local sc; sc=$(cat "$ef"); rm -f "$ef"
+  local ok=1
+  [ "$actual" -eq "$exp" ] || ok=0
+  if [ -n "$re" ] && ! printf '%s' "$sc" | grep -Eq "$re"; then ok=0; fi
+  if [ $ok -eq 1 ]; then echo "PASS: $name (exit=$actual)"; PASS=$((PASS+1));
+  else echo "FAIL: $name (exit=$actual, want $exp; log want /$re/)" >&2; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); fi
+}
+
+mkenv() { printf '{"hook_event_name":"PreToolUse","tool_name":"%s","tool_input":{"%s":"%s"}}' "$1" "$2" "$3"; }
+
+run_case "non-write allow"       "$(mkenv Bash command 'ls')"                                  0 ""
+run_case "flat project allow"    "$(mkenv Write file_path 'projects/Acme/a.txt')"              0 ""
+run_case "loose document allow"  "$(mkenv Write file_path 'documents/a.pdf')"                  0 ""
+run_case "tool-owned deep allow" "$(mkenv Write file_path 'output/deep/nested/x.png')"         0 ""
+run_case "over-deep block"       "$(mkenv Write file_path 'projects/Acme/deploy/sources/a.txt')" 2 "fs-guard. blocked path=projects/Acme/deploy/sources/a.txt reason=over-deep"
+run_case "over-deep one block"   "$(mkenv Write file_path 'projects/Acme/deploy/a.txt')"       2 "reason=over-deep"
+run_case "top-level block"       "$(mkenv Write file_path 'whim/x.txt')"                       2 "fs-guard. blocked path=whim/x.txt reason=top-level"
+run_case "outside acct allow"    "$(mkenv Write file_path '/etc/passwd')"                      0 ""
+run_case "notebook over-deep"    "$(mkenv NotebookEdit notebook_path 'projects/Acme/deploy/n.ipynb')" 2 "reason=over-deep"
+run_case "empty stdin block"     ""                                                            2 "no stdin"
+# JSON null file_path must coerce to empty (allow), not the literal string "None".
+run_case "null path allow"       '{"hook_event_name":"PreToolUse","tool_name":"Write","tool_input":{"file_path":null}}' 0 ""
+
+# Allowed-set parse == documented set.
+EXPECT="projects contacts documents url-get output generated extracted uploads agents specialists sites public cache secrets state logs tmp SCHEMA.md account.json AGENTS.md .claude .git"
+GOT=$(awk '/^```allowed-top-level$/{f=1;next} /^```$/{f=0} f' "$ACCT/SCHEMA.md" | tr '\n' ' ' | sed 's/ *$//')
+if [ "$GOT" = "$EXPECT" ]; then echo "PASS: allowed-set parse"; PASS=$((PASS+1));
+else echo "FAIL: allowed-set parse: got [$GOT]" >&2; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); fi
+
+echo "----- $PASS passed, $FAIL failed -----"
+[ $FAIL -eq 0 ]

package/payload/platform/plugins/admin/hooks/fs-schema-guard.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# fs-schema-guard — PreToolUse Write/Edit/NotebookEdit path guard.
+#
+# Enforces the seeded account-dir file schema (see <accountDir>/SCHEMA.md):
+#   - the target's first path segment must be in the allowed top-level set
+#     (parsed from the fenced ```allowed-top-level block of the account's
+#     SCHEMA.md — our own structured data, not CLI prose);
+#   - a target under an operator-data bucket (projects/ contacts/) may be at
+#     most <bucket>/<entity>/<file> deep; documents/ may be at most
+#     <bucket>/<folder>/<file> deep. Tool-owned dirs pass at any depth.
+#
+# The hook governs the account dir only. A path resolving outside the account
+# dir (cwd) is allowed — platform-source writes are PLATFORM_BOUNDARY's concern.
+#
+# Exit codes: 0 = allow, 2 = block (stderr shown to the agent). Fail closed when
+# the tool call cannot be inspected (tty or empty stdin). Every block logs
+#   [fs-guard] blocked path=<rel> reason=<top-level|over-deep>
+# No task numbers / internal refs in any operator-visible string.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# Fail closed if attached to a terminal (no JSON envelope coming).
+if [ -t 0 ]; then
+  echo "Blocked: fs-schema-guard received no stdin (cannot inspect the write). Failing closed." >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+INPUT=$(cat)
+if [ -z "$INPUT" ]; then
+  echo "Blocked: fs-schema-guard received no stdin (cannot inspect the write). Failing closed." >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+field() {
+  printf '%s' "$INPUT" | python3 -c "
+import sys, json
+try:
+    d = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    v = (d.get('$1', {}) or {}).get('$2', '') if '$1' else d.get('$2', '')
+    print(v if isinstance(v, str) else '')
+except Exception:
+    print('')
+" 2>/dev/null || echo ""
+}
+
+TOOL_NAME=$(field '' tool_name)
+case "$TOOL_NAME" in
+  Write|Edit) FILE_PATH=$(field tool_input file_path) ;;
+  NotebookEdit) FILE_PATH=$(field tool_input notebook_path) ;;
+  *) exit 0 ;;
+esac
+[ -z "$FILE_PATH" ] && exit 0
+
+ACCOUNT_DIR="$PWD"
+
+# Resolve to an account-relative path; allow anything outside the account dir.
+REL=$(FILE_PATH="$FILE_PATH" ACCOUNT_DIR="$ACCOUNT_DIR" python3 -c '
+import os, sys
+fp = os.environ["FILE_PATH"]; acct = os.environ["ACCOUNT_DIR"]
+ab = fp if os.path.isabs(fp) else os.path.join(acct, fp)
+ab = os.path.normpath(ab); acct = os.path.normpath(acct)
+if ab == acct or not ab.startswith(acct + os.sep):
+    print("")  # outside the account dir (or the dir itself)
+else:
+    print(os.path.relpath(ab, acct))
+' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+[ -z "$REL" ] && exit 0
+
+# Parse the allowed top-level set from the account's seeded SCHEMA.md.
+ALLOWED=""
+if [ -f "$ACCOUNT_DIR/SCHEMA.md" ]; then
+  ALLOWED=$(awk '/^```allowed-top-level$/{f=1;next} /^```$/{f=0} f' "$ACCOUNT_DIR/SCHEMA.md")
+fi
+# Fail open on a missing/empty schema (an un-seeded legacy account must not have
+# every write blocked). A re-provision seeds SCHEMA.md, after which the guard
+# applies.
+[ -z "$ALLOWED" ] && exit 0
+
+SEG0=${REL%%/*}
+
+# Top-level check.
+if ! printf '%s\n' "$ALLOWED" | grep -qxF "$SEG0"; then
+  echo "[fs-guard] blocked path=$REL reason=top-level" >&2
+  echo "Blocked: '$SEG0' is not an allowed top-level entry in this account's data directory. The layout is fixed by SCHEMA.md — place operator data under projects/, contacts/, or documents/, and route any reorganisation through the data-manager specialist." >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+# Over-deep check for operator-data buckets. Count path segments.
+depth=$(printf '%s' "$REL" | awk -F/ '{print NF}')
+case "$SEG0" in
+  projects|contacts)
+    # Allowed: <bucket>/<entity>/<file> = 3 segments max; <bucket>/<file> = 2 ok.
+    if [ "$depth" -gt 3 ]; then
+      echo "[fs-guard] blocked path=$REL reason=over-deep" >&2
+      echo "Blocked: $SEG0/ is flat — one folder per entity, then files. '$REL' nests a subtree under an entity folder, which has no basis in the graph ontology. Keep files directly under $SEG0/<name>/, or route a reorganisation through the data-manager specialist." >&2
+      exit 2
+    fi
+    ;;
+  documents)
+    # Allowed: documents/<file> = 2, documents/<folder>/<file> = 3 max.
+    if [ "$depth" -gt 3 ]; then
+      echo "[fs-guard] blocked path=$REL reason=over-deep" >&2
+      echo "Blocked: documents/ holds files or one folder deep. '$REL' nests deeper, which has no basis in the graph ontology. Route a reorganisation through the data-manager specialist." >&2
+      exit 2
+    fi
+    ;;
+esac
+
+exit 0

package/payload/platform/scripts/lib/provision-account-dir.sh

@@ -22,6 +22,22 @@ provision_account_dir() {
 
   mkdir -p "$ACCOUNT_DIR/agents/admin" "$ACCOUNT_DIR/.claude" "$ACCOUNT_DIR/specialists/.claude-plugin" "$ACCOUNT_DIR/specialists/agents"
 
+  # --- Account filesystem schema seed (idempotent) ---------------------------
+  # Operator-data buckets (entity-anchored, flat) + tool-owned dirs. agents/ and
+  # specialists/ are created above. The seeded SCHEMA.md is the single source of
+  # the allowed top-level set, parsed at runtime by the fs-schema write guard.
+  local _seed_dirs=(projects contacts documents url-get output generated extracted uploads)
+  local _d _seeded=0
+  for _d in "${_seed_dirs[@]}"; do
+    [ -d "$ACCOUNT_DIR/$_d" ] || { mkdir -p "$ACCOUNT_DIR/$_d" && _seeded=$((_seeded+1)); }
+  done
+  if [ -f "$TEMPLATES_DIR/account-schema/SCHEMA.md" ]; then
+    cp "$TEMPLATES_DIR/account-schema/SCHEMA.md" "$ACCOUNT_DIR/SCHEMA.md"
+  else
+    echo "  [acct-schema] WARNING: template missing at $TEMPLATES_DIR/account-schema/SCHEMA.md — SCHEMA.md not seeded" >&2
+  fi
+  echo "  [acct-schema] seeded dirs=$_seeded"
+
   # Claude Code discovers project-level .claude/ relative to the nearest .git
   # root. Without a .git in the account dir it traverses up to ~/maxy/.git and
   # misses accountDir/.claude/. Initialise a repo so the account dir IS the root.
@@ -42,19 +58,22 @@ provision_account_dir() {
       {
         "matcher": "Write",
         "hooks": [
-          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh" }
+          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh" },
+          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/fs-schema-guard.sh" }
         ]
       },
       {
         "matcher": "Edit",
         "hooks": [
-          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh" }
+          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh" },
+          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/fs-schema-guard.sh" }
         ]
       },
       {
         "matcher": "NotebookEdit",
         "hooks": [
-          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh" }
+          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh" },
+          { "type": "command", "command": "bash $HOOKS_PATH/fs-schema-guard.sh" }
         ]
       },
       {

package/payload/platform/services/claude-session-manager/dist/http-server.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/payload/platform/services/claude-session-manager/dist/http-server.js

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
 import { buildRcChildEnv, reapplyAdminLevers } from './rc-daemon.js';
 import { isEffortLevel, isNewSessionEffortLevel, isPermissionMode, SONNET_MODEL } from '../../../lib/models/dist/index.js';
-import { spawnClaudeSession, stopSession, writeInputToPty, isLive, onPtyExit, livePtyCount, liveSessionIds, getPtyTrackerForTests, livePidForSession, classifyLiveness, priorExitedCountForSession, PERMISSION_MODES, openFdCount, registerRcSpawnPty, } from './pty-spawner.js';
+import { spawnClaudeSession, stopSession, writeInputToPty, writeInterruptToPty, isLive, onPtyExit, livePtyCount, liveSessionIds, getPtyTrackerForTests, livePidForSession, classifyLiveness, priorExitedCountForSession, PERMISSION_MODES, openFdCount, registerRcSpawnPty, } from './pty-spawner.js';
 import { writeScopeRecord, removeScopeRecord } from './scope-record.js';
 import { writeReseatMarker, resolveReseatChain, clearReseatMarker } from './reseat-ledger.js';
 import { getScopeMainPid, defaultProcessSignals, defaultSystemctlRunner } from './systemd-scope.js';
@@ -1567,6 +1567,50 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
         timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/input`, 200, Date.now() - start);
         return c.json({ ok: true, bytes: result.bytes }, 200);
     });
+    // Task 1090 Phase 1 — POST /:sessionId/interrupt writes one raw control byte
+    // (ESC or Ctrl-C) to the PTY master via writeInterruptToPty: the soft
+    // interrupt, session-preserving, distinct from /stop's SIGTERM recycle. The
+    // byte is a body parameter so the device spike can test both candidates
+    // against one live session. This logs the requested/sent lifecycle; the
+    // deeper post-conditions (generation-stopped, survival, tail-reconcile) are
+    // observed manually during the spike and engineered in Phase 2 on a GO.
+    app.post('/:sessionId/interrupt', async (c) => {
+        const start = Date.now();
+        const id = c.req.param('sessionId');
+        const row = resolveRow(deps.watcher, id);
+        const sessionId = row?.sessionId ?? id;
+        let body;
+        try {
+            body = await c.req.json();
+        }
+        catch {
+            timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/interrupt`, 400, Date.now() - start);
+            return c.json({ error: 'body-not-json' }, 400);
+        }
+        if (body.byte !== 'esc' && body.byte !== 'ctrl-c') {
+            timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/interrupt`, 400, Date.now() - start);
+            return c.json({ error: 'byte-invalid' }, 400);
+        }
+        const byte = body.byte;
+        const intId = `${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}-${start}`;
+        deps.logger(`[webchat-interrupt] op=interrupt-requested intId=${intId} sessionId=${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} trigger=manual-spike`);
+        const result = writeInterruptToPty(sessionId, byte, deps.logger);
+        if (!result.ok) {
+            if (result.error === 'not-found') {
+                timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/interrupt`, 404, Date.now() - start);
+                return c.json({ error: 'session-not-found' }, 404);
+            }
+            if (result.error === 'exited') {
+                timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/interrupt`, 410, Date.now() - start);
+                return c.json({ error: 'session-exited' }, 410);
+            }
+            timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/interrupt`, 500, Date.now() - start);
+            return c.json({ error: 'pty-write-failed', detail: result.detail }, 500);
+        }
+        deps.logger(`[webchat-interrupt] op=interrupt-sent intId=${intId} byte=${byte} bytes=${result.bytes}`);
+        timed(deps.logger, 'POST', `/${id}/interrupt`, 200, Date.now() - start);
+        return c.json({ ok: true, intId, byte, bytes: result.bytes }, 200);
+    });
     app.get('/:sessionId/log', (c) => {
         const start = Date.now();
         const id = c.req.param('sessionId');