@rubytech/create-maxy-code 0.1.315 → 0.1.317

package/payload/platform/services/claude-session-manager/dist/http-server.js

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import { mergeTarget, isMultiTarget, targetKinds } from './channel-targets.js';
 import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
 import { buildRcChildEnv, reapplyAdminLevers } from './rc-daemon.js';
+import { isEffortLevel, isPermissionMode } from '../../../lib/models/dist/index.js';
 import { spawnClaudeSession, stopSession, writeInputToPty, isLive, onPtyExit, livePtyCount, liveSessionIds, getPtyTrackerForTests, livePidForSession, priorExitedCountForSession, PERMISSION_MODES, openFdCount, registerRcSpawnPty, } from './pty-spawner.js';
 import { writeScopeRecord, removeScopeRecord } from './scope-record.js';
 import { writeReseatMarker, resolveReseatChain, clearReseatMarker } from './reseat-ledger.js';
@@ -195,10 +196,9 @@ export function forkArgvSegment(fromSessionId, newSessionId, model) {
 // `--permission-mode` argv flag) and an optional effort (merged into the
 // per-spawn inline `--settings` as `effortLevel`). Both are validated here as a
 // shape defence-in-depth: the UI route is the authoritative allowlist gate, but
-// a malformed value must never reach the child argv. Mirrors the canonical sets
-// in webchat.ts / rc-daemon. `dontAsk` and `max` are excluded (not fork-writable).
-const FORK_PERMISSION_MODES = new Set(['default', 'acceptEdits', 'plan', 'auto', 'bypassPermissions']);
-const FORK_EFFORT_LEVELS = new Set(['low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh']);
+// a malformed value must never reach the child argv. The allowlists are the
+// canonical sets in lib/models (isPermissionMode / isEffortLevel); `dontAsk` and
+// `max` are excluded there (not fork-writable).
 // Task 879 — the re-seated fork inherits the source's history, including the
 // source's earlier self-identification on the OLD model. The rc-spawn path does
 // not compose --append-system-prompt (only fresh spawnSession does), so the
@@ -786,6 +786,11 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
             && typeof wc.serverPath === 'string' && wc.serverPath.startsWith('/')
             ? { key: wc.key, gatewayUrl: wc.gatewayUrl, serverPath: wc.serverPath }
             : undefined;
+        // Task 939 — gated-visitor read-back block, rendered UI-side. Shape-gated
+        // to a non-empty string with a generous ceiling; absent otherwise.
+        const previousContext = typeof body.previousContext === 'string' && body.previousContext.length > 0 && body.previousContext.length <= 20000
+            ? body.previousContext
+            : undefined;
         // Task 624 — maxy-composed public-session title. Validated by the same
         // validateUserTitle the /:sessionId/rename route uses; persisted only for
         // role=public after the sessionId is minted. An invalid/absent name leaves
@@ -864,6 +869,7 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
             personId,
             visitorId,
             webchatChannel,
+            previousContext,
         });
         if (!result.ok) {
             if ('rejected' in result) {
@@ -1747,8 +1753,9 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
         const sessions = [...seen.entries()].map(([sessionId, pid]) => ({ sessionId, pid }));
         return c.json({ sessions });
     });
-    // Task 543 — fire-and-forget `claude --remote-control [name] [--session-id <sid>]`
-    // spawn for the admin sessions pane. The new PTY registers itself in
+    // Task 543 — fire-and-forget `claude --remote-control [--session-id <sid>]`
+    // spawn for the admin sessions pane. (Task 945 removed the `name` positional —
+    // `name` is a display label, never a CLI prompt; do not re-add it to argv.) The new PTY registers itself in
     // claude.ai/code as its own Remote Control entry; reconciliation with the
     // rc-daemon is out of scope. The PID lands in
     // `<CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR>/sessions/<pid>.json` via claude's own bootstrap,
@@ -1785,8 +1792,8 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
         // Task 928 — fork-carried levers. `null` when the field is present but not in
         // the allowlist (rejected below, on the fork path only); `undefined` when
         // absent (the fork keeps the settings-resolved mode / the harness default effort).
-        const reseatPermissionMode = typeof body.permissionMode === 'string' ? (FORK_PERMISSION_MODES.has(body.permissionMode) ? body.permissionMode : null) : undefined;
-        const reseatEffort = typeof body.effort === 'string' ? (FORK_EFFORT_LEVELS.has(body.effort) ? body.effort : null) : undefined;
+        const reseatPermissionMode = typeof body.permissionMode === 'string' ? (isPermissionMode(body.permissionMode) ? body.permissionMode : null) : undefined;
+        const reseatEffort = typeof body.effort === 'string' ? (isEffortLevel(body.effort) ? body.effort : null) : undefined;
         // Task 626 — per-visitor slice ringfence for the public session-end review
         // rc session. Shape-gated identically to /public-spawn so a body-controlled
         // value cannot reach the child env. Absent on channel-admin / LinkedIn.
@@ -1956,8 +1963,12 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
         const existingJsonlPath = sessionId ? findExistingJsonlForSessionId(deps.claudeConfigDir, sessionId) : null;
         const mode = existingJsonlPath ? 'resume' : 'fresh';
         const argv = ['--remote-control'];
-        if (name)
-            argv.push(name);
+        // Task 945 — `name` is the row's display label, never a prompt. It must NOT
+        // be pushed as a positional: the CLI treats a bare positional as the initial
+        // prompt, so a long label (e.g. a first-message-derived title) became a
+        // multi-kilobyte prompt and the remote-control bind timed out. The sole
+        // positional is `initialMessage` (pushed below). `name` stays in the request
+        // body and the log lines for observability only.
         // Task 889 — append-system-prompt segments are accumulated and pushed once
         // (below, after channel resolution) so the re-seat model line and the
         // authenticated-identity line share a single flag.
@@ -2034,6 +2045,16 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
                 }
             }
         }
+        // Task 933 — read the persisted sidecar once so the identity gate below can
+        // resolve role + name + adminUserId from disk when the caller omitted them
+        // (a channel-driven resume passes only sessionId). Missing/unparseable
+        // yields null; the gate degrades to the not-resolvable identity form. Only
+        // the webchat identity gate + name-refresh consume it, so the read (and its
+        // log line) is scoped to a webchat-bound session — every other resume path
+        // skips the disk touch.
+        const priorSidecar = sessionId && effectiveWebchatChannel
+            ? readSidecar(sidecarPathForSessionId(deps.spawnCwd, sessionId), deps.logger).sidecar
+            : null;
         // Task 850 — assemble the bound target set and choose the channel server:
         //   - ≥2 kinds: ONE unified `channel` server (one reply tool fanning to every
         //     target's existing gateway endpoint). The mature per-kind servers are
@@ -2107,9 +2128,29 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
         // guessing the account email. Gated on the webchat binding + admin role so
         // public visitor spawns and the one-shot admin jobs are untouched. The
         // breadcrumb makes a silent resolution regression visible without a chat.
-        if (effectiveWebchatChannel && rcRole === 'admin') {
-            appendSegments.push(authenticatedIdentityPrompt(authenticatedName ?? null));
-            deps.logger(`[rc-spawn] op=identity-injected userId=${adminUserId ? adminUserId.slice(0, 8) : 'none'} resolved=${authenticatedName ? 1 : 0}`);
+        //
+        // Task 933 — make the gate caller-independent. A channel-driven resume
+        // recovers the webchat binding from the store but passes no role/name, so
+        // the body-only gate used to skip injection and the resumed agent ran with
+        // no identity. The admin role and the resolved name are now derived from
+        // the persisted sidecar when the body omits them; `source` records whether
+        // the identity came from the caller (body) or from disk (sidecar).
+        const adminBinding = rcRole === 'admin' || priorSidecar?.role === 'admin';
+        if (effectiveWebchatChannel && adminBinding) {
+            const resolvedName = authenticatedName ?? priorSidecar?.authenticatedName ?? null;
+            const resolvedAdminUserId = adminUserId ?? priorSidecar?.adminUserId ?? null;
+            // `source` follows where the resolved name actually came from. When no
+            // name resolves (resolved=0) it reports which signal marked the session
+            // admin: the caller's body role, else the persisted sidecar.
+            const identitySource = authenticatedName
+                ? 'body'
+                : priorSidecar?.authenticatedName
+                    ? 'sidecar'
+                    : rcRole === 'admin'
+                        ? 'body'
+                        : 'sidecar';
+            appendSegments.push(authenticatedIdentityPrompt(resolvedName));
+            deps.logger(`[rc-spawn] op=identity-injected userId=${resolvedAdminUserId ? resolvedAdminUserId.slice(0, 8) : 'none'} resolved=${resolvedName ? 1 : 0} source=${identitySource}`);
         }
         if (appendSegments.length > 0) {
             argv.push('--append-system-prompt', appendSegments.join('\n\n'));
@@ -2166,7 +2207,11 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
         // here is enough for an operator to reproduce by hand. The wrapped
         // argv is fully reconstructible from this line + the spawn adapter
         // source (Task 250 / 556).
-        deps.logger(`[rc-spawn] op=argv unitToken=${unitToken} cwd=${deps.spawnCwd} permissionMode=${effectiveRcPermissionMode} argv=${JSON.stringify([deps.claudeBin, ...argv])}`);
+        // Task 945 — record the byte count of the sole positional actually placed in
+        // argv (the trailing `initialMessage`, else 0) so a future oversized positional
+        // is visible without reconstructing it from the full argv dump.
+        const positionalBytes = initialMessage ? Buffer.byteLength(initialMessage, 'utf8') : 0;
+        deps.logger(`[rc-spawn] op=argv unitToken=${unitToken} cwd=${deps.spawnCwd} permissionMode=${effectiveRcPermissionMode} positionalBytes=${positionalBytes} argv=${JSON.stringify([deps.claudeBin, ...argv])}`);
         emitRcLife(deps.logger, 'argv', 'rc-spawn', 'node-pty', rcLifeMode, unitToken, {
             cwd: deps.spawnCwd,
             argv: JSON.stringify([deps.claudeBin, ...argv]),
@@ -2279,6 +2324,10 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
                         // Task 865 — admin-webchat author identity from the rc-spawn body;
                         // null for public and one-shot sessions, which carry none.
                         adminUserId: adminUserId ?? null,
+                        // Task 933 — resolved admin display name from the rc-spawn body,
+                        // persisted so a later caller-driven channel resume (which carries
+                        // no authenticatedName) can re-inject the identity segment.
+                        authenticatedName: authenticatedName ?? null,
                         // Task 884 — open-mode anchor + per-agent scope are stamped only on
                         // the /public-spawn path; the rc-spawn write carries neither, so
                         // both are null here.
@@ -2291,6 +2340,14 @@ export function buildHttpApp(deps) {
                     deps.logger(`[rc-spawn] op=channel-sidecar-write-failed sessionId=${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} channel=${classifyChannel} err=${JSON.stringify(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err))}`);
                 }
             }
+            else if (authenticatedName && priorSidecar && priorSidecar.authenticatedName !== authenticatedName) {
+                // Task 933 — the write above is write-once; refresh the persisted name
+                // when a later operator spawn carries a fresher one so a caller-driven
+                // resume injects the current identity, not the first-spawn snapshot.
+                const refreshed = updateSidecar(classifySidecarPath, { authenticatedName }, deps.logger);
+                if (refreshed)
+                    deps.watcher.refreshSidecar?.(sessionId);
+            }
         }
         // Task 626 — one-shot job (LinkedIn ingest, public session-end review):
         // stop the PTY once its single assistant turn lands `end_turn`. closeAfterTurn