@rubytech/create-maxy-code 0.1.219 → 0.1.221

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@rubytech/create-maxy-code",
-  "version": "0.1.219",
+  "version": "0.1.221",
   "description": "Install Maxy — AI for Productive People",
   "bin": {
     "create-maxy-code": "./dist/index.js"

package/payload/platform/plugins/admin/PLUGIN.md

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ Tools are available via the `admin` MCP server.
 
 **Admin-seat authoring-skill gate (Task 516).** `skill-load` and `plugin-read` refuse to return the body of a content-producer-owned authoring skill — `professional-document`, `a4-print-documents`, `publish-site` — when the caller is the admin seat (`MAXY_SESSION_ROLE=admin` with no `MAXY_SPECIALIST`). The refusal relays one line — "This deliverable is owned by content-producer. Dispatch it with the Agent tool and subagent_type content-producer." — so the admin's next action is the dispatch, not inline authoring. `plugin-read` extracts the skill slug from a `skills/<slug>/…` file path (or a slug buried in `pluginName`), so the raw-SKILL.md read path can't bypass the gate; `PLUGIN.md` and plain `references/*` reads are untouched. content-producer's own spawns carry `MAXY_SPECIALIST=content-producer` and resolve these skills normally (it reaches them via the native `Skill` tool regardless), and the public seat is out of scope. The gate is a pure name+env check before any filesystem read and fails open for any non-admin or unidentified seat — it never bricks a legitimate load. Each block emits `[admin-skill-gate] role=admin skill=<name> decision=block reason=content-producer-owned`. This is the enforcement layer; the IDENTITY.md delegation paragraph documents the intent but is not the gate ([[feedback_deterministic_means_remove_llm]], [[feedback_doctrine_paragraph_is_not_a_gate]]). Skills the admin invokes directly are deliberately excluded: `unzip-attachment` (its SKILL.md says "Invoked by the admin agent directly — admin owns all unzipping", then routes the extracted tree to a specialist) and `deck-pages` (admin-owned, a content-producer refusal target). The set is each skill's own SKILL.md "Invoked by" declaration, not the admin plugin's skill catalogue (which lists these admin-hosted skills for discovery — the catalogue is the inline path this gate closes).
 
-**Three-store admin auth invariant.** `admin-add` writes to all three identity stores (`users.json` PIN auth at the persistent `~/{configDir}/users.json` location , `account.json` `admins[]` role, Neo4j `:AdminUser`/`:Person` graph identity) with per-leg `[admin-auth-store]` log lines plus the `[admins-write]` chokepoint line, and returns `is_error: true` on any leg failure naming what's already written. `admin-update-pin` writes `users.json` only and emits the same `[admin-auth-store]` line. **Single chokepoint:** every `users.json` + `account.json admins[]` mutation routes through `platform/lib/admins-write` (`writeAdminEntry` for admin-add/set-pin, `removeAdminFromAccount` for admin-remove); the static check `grep -rnE 'admins\.push\|config\.admins\s*=' platform/ \| grep -v lib/admins-write` returns 0. Direct `Edit`/`Write` on `account.json` is blocked at the `pre-tool-use` hook — mutations go through `account-update`, `plugin-toggle-enabled`, or the `admin-*` tools. **Install + boot invariants:** the installer and admin-server boot walk every account.json admins[] vs users.json; `[install-invariant]` / `[admin-invariant] direction=… userId=<id8> source=<file>` fires per divergence with a `check complete divergences=<n>` summary. Log-only — does not block. See `.docs/agents.md` § "Three-store admin auth invariant" for the full contract.
+**Three-store admin auth invariant.** `admin-add` writes to all three identity stores (`users.json` PIN auth at the persistent `~/{configDir}/users.json` location , `account.json` `admins[]` role, Neo4j `:AdminUser`/`:Person` graph identity) with per-leg `[admin-auth-store]` log lines plus the `[admins-write]` chokepoint line, and returns `is_error: true` on any leg failure naming what's already written. `admin-update-pin` writes `users.json` only and emits the same `[admin-auth-store]` line. **Single chokepoint:** every `users.json` + `account.json admins[]` mutation routes through `platform/lib/admins-write` (`writeAdminEntry` for admin-add/set-pin, `removeAdminFromAccount` for admin-remove); the static check `grep -rnE 'admins\.push\|config\.admins\s*=' platform/ \| grep -v lib/admins-write` returns 0. Direct `Edit`/`Write` on `account.json` is forbidden by IDENTITY.md doctrine — mutations go through `account-update`, `plugin-toggle-enabled`, or the `admin-*` tools. **Install + boot invariants:** the installer and admin-server boot walk every account.json admins[] vs users.json; `[install-invariant]` / `[admin-invariant] direction=… userId=<id8> source=<file>` fires per divergence with a `check complete divergences=<n>` summary. Log-only — does not block. See `.docs/agents.md` § "Three-store admin auth invariant" for the full contract.
 
 **AdminUser graph stamp + boot self-heal.** The seed cypher in `platform/scripts/seed-neo4j.sh` stamps `:AdminUser.accountId` + `:AdminUser.role='owner'` ON CREATE so the graph-write gate's account-scoped MATCH succeeds on the first user-domain write. Admin-server boot additionally runs `platform/ui/app/lib/adminuser-self-heal.ts` to repair legacy nodes whose `accountId` or `role` is null — emits `[adminuser-self-heal] healed=<N> userId=<8> accountId=<8>` once per boot, idempotent. The `graph-write-gate` reject log gains a `subReason=` field (`no-admin-user-node` / `admin-user-no-accountid` / `no-business-or-personal-profile`) for operator diagnosis. See `.docs/agents.md` § "AdminUser graph stamp contract" for the full contract.
 
@@ -139,12 +139,11 @@ Tools are available via the `admin` MCP server.
 
 ## Hooks
 
-- `hooks/pre-tool-use.sh` — enforces admin agent write boundaries
 - `hooks/webfetch-preflight.mjs` — short-circuits WebFetch on JS-SPA shells with a structured `WEBFETCH_CANNOT_READ_JS_SPA` error so the agent surfaces a loud failure to the owner instead of paying the 60s extraction timeout. Fail-open on any internal error.
 - `hooks/askuserquestion-investigate-gate.sh` — PreToolUse matcher=`AskUserQuestion`. Blocks the question (exit 2) when no read-only investigation tool has fired since the latest real user turn in the session JSONL. The structural fix for the failure class where the agent fabricates a menu before evidence-gathering (session `c085ec2c-46fb-4b73-8865-68cf85866ea8` 2026-05-22 — "change remote access password" → invented options "Admin PIN / Cloudflare tunnel / WiFi password" with zero prior tool_use; post-correction the agent immediately fired `remote-auth-status` → `ToolSearch` → `remote-auth-set-password`, proving it knew the moves). **Allowlist** (exact, with trailing `__<tool>` suffix-match for namespaced `mcp__plugin_<plugin>_<server>__<tool>` aliases): `ToolSearch`, `Grep`, `Glob`, `Read`, `LS`, `NotebookRead`, `Bash`, `WebFetch`, `WebSearch`, plus the read-only admin / memory MCP tools (`*-status`, `*-list`, `*-read`, `skill-find`, `memory-find-candidates`, `profile-read`, `conversation-list`, `memory-list-attachments`, `memory-read-attachment`). **Block message:** `Blocked: AskUserQuestion requires at least one investigation tool (ToolSearch, Grep, Read, *-list, *-status, *-read, skill-find, ...) earlier in this turn. Search the operator's literal phrase first.` **Log line** (stderr, one per call): `[ask-gate] decision=<allow|block> sessionId=<id8> seen=<csv|-> reason=<allowlist-hit|no-investigation|fail-open-no-transcript|fail-open-parse-error>`. **Fail-open** on missing transcript or parse error — nudges, never bricks the UI.
 - `hooks/session-end-retrospective.sh` — **Stop hook.** Fires on every assistant end_turn but exits 0 with `trigger-skipped reason=<role-not-admin|is-specialist|empty-stdin|missing-transcript|no-intent-match>` on every path EXCEPT when the operator's latest real-user message carries an end-intent token (`/end`, `/archive`, `end session`, `archive this session`, case-insensitive, must match the whole message or a standalone line — not embedded in prose). On that path the hook blocks (exit 2 + structured retrospective instruction on stderr per Stop-hook contract) and emits `[session-retrospective] gate-blocked sessionId=<id> reason=sentinel-absent` until the admin agent calls the `session-retrospective-mark-complete` MCP sentinel tool. Completion is recognised by greping the operator's own JSONL (`transcript_path` on the Stop envelope) for a `tool_use` block whose `name` equals that exact string — never by parsing prose ([[feedback_no_stdout_parsing_for_control_flow]], [[feedback_doctrine_paragraph_is_not_a_gate]]). The sentinel-grep doubles as the re-entry guard: every Stop after the sentinel call sees it and exits 0 with `gate-released sessionId=<id>`. Recursion guard: any session whose `MAXY_SPECIALIST` env is set (specialist subagent dispatched via Task tool) skips the gate. The Sidebar archive button POSTs `/:sessionId/archive` directly to the manager which kills the PTY — no Stop fires after that, so clicking archive is the operator's current escape hatch (opt-out remains deferred per the task spec). All emits go through `POST /api/admin/log-ingest`; the only stderr writer is the gate-blocked path (the instruction block the agent reads). The retrospective itself runs as one or more additional turns inside the operator's existing admin session — Task-tool delegation to `database-operator` is the existing IDENTITY.md "Recording" route, not a parallel admin session ([[feedback_deterministic_means_remove_llm]]).
 - `hooks/mcp-tool-missing.sh` — **PostToolUse hook on `mcp__.*` (Task 502, directive 3).** Defence-in-depth for the `No such tool available: mcp__…` failure class that the Task 502 name-binding is built to eliminate. Fires on any MCP tool call; no-op unless the `tool_response` carries `No such tool available` AND the qualified name resolves to a maxy plugin (read from the generated `hooks/lib/maxy-mcp-plugins.txt`). On a maxy match it logs one deterministic `[mcp-tool-missing] server=<server> tool=<tool>` line and exits 2 with a fixed envelope on stderr, so the agent relays a named server-unavailable failure instead of narrating "warming up" or blind-retrying. A missing non-maxy bridge tool (Playwright etc., upstream-owned) passes through (exit 0). The maxy-plugin list is regenerated and gate-diffed by `platform/scripts/check-canonical-tool-names.mjs`.
-- `hooks/post-tool-use-agent.sh` — **PostToolUse hook on `Agent` (Task 560).** Drains any subagent hook-decision buffers under `~/.maxy-code/logs/hook-decisions/` modified since this parent's previous PostToolUse-Agent fire (cursor file keyed by parent session id), prints one `[hook-propagate]` line per record to stdout — Claude Code attaches the stdout as a `hook_success` attachment on the parent JSONL, making the records grep-queryable from the parent session alone (Task 559 motivating case). Rotates consumed buffers to `consumed/`. Emits one `[hook-propagate-census] parentSession=<…> subagentHooksObserved=<N> attachmentsEmitted=<M>` line per fire to stdout and server.log; `N != M` is the propagation regression signal. The companion emitter library `hooks/lib/hook-emit.sh` is sourced by `pre-tool-use.sh` and writes one record per block decision (4 KB stderr truncation, `truncated=true` set on the record).
+- `hooks/post-tool-use-agent.sh` — **PostToolUse hook on `Agent` (Task 560).** Drains any subagent hook-decision buffers under `~/.maxy-code/logs/hook-decisions/` modified since this parent's previous PostToolUse-Agent fire (cursor file keyed by parent session id), prints one `[hook-propagate]` line per record to stdout — Claude Code attaches the stdout as a `hook_success` attachment on the parent JSONL, making the records grep-queryable from the parent session alone (Task 559 motivating case). Rotates consumed buffers to `consumed/`. Emits one `[hook-propagate-census] parentSession=<…> subagentHooksObserved=<N> attachmentsEmitted=<M>` line per fire to stdout and server.log; `N != M` is the propagation regression signal. The companion emitter library `hooks/lib/hook-emit.sh` is sourced by `post-tool-use-agent.sh` and any other hook that records a block decision (4 KB stderr truncation, `truncated=true` set on the record).
 - `hooks/admin-authoring-observer.sh` — **PostToolUse hook on Write and Edit (Task 486).** Observation only — never blocks; exits 0 on every path. Fires when the admin agent (not a specialist subagent — gated by `MAXY_SPECIALIST` env) writes or edits a file under `<accountDir>/output/`. Walks the session transcript from the latest real-user turn forward to detect any prior `Task` `tool_use` whose `subagent_type` starts with `specialists:`. Emits one stderr line `[admin-authoring] inline-write path=<rel> priorSpecialistSpawnInTurn=<true|false|unknown>`. A `false` value on a long-form prose file is the regression signal Task 486 was designed to make visible — the BioSymm proposal session (admin authored a customer-facing proposal inline despite content-producer being installed) is the failure mode this surfaces mechanically. Mechanical enforcement (refuse the write, force a re-spawn) is deferred per the task spec.
 - `hooks/turn-completed-graph-write.sh` — **Dormant since Task 214** — the Stop-hook registration is no longer written to account settings.json; admin delegates graph writes to `database-operator` via the Task tool. The script, envelope walker, loopback `/api/admin/claude-sessions` 127.0.0.1 bypass, `[turn-recorder]` emitters, recorder-auto-archive subscriber, and `initialMessage` envelope spec are preserved as reusable infrastructure for any future autonomous post-turn flow. Historical contract (still describes the dormant path): Stop hook fired once per completed admin-agent turn. Gates on `MAXY_SESSION_ROLE=admin` + `MAXY_SPECIALIST!=database-operator` so it never recurses into the recorder PTY or fires on public sessions. **Task 147** — the recorder is spawned via the same route Sidebar uses. ONE POST to `POST /api/admin/claude-sessions`, body carries `{specialist:'database-operator', model:'haiku', initialMessage:<json-envelope>, adminSessionId:<op>}` — no synthetic `senderId: 'turn-recorder'` marker. The Hono wrapper bypasses cookie auth on this exact method+path when the request originates from `127.0.0.1` (same trust boundary the claude-session-manager itself relies on), looks up the operator's senderId from the manager's `/<adminSessionId>/meta`, and forwards a Sidebar-shape spawn body. The `/recorder-spawn` sibling route is gone. The hook reads its UI port from `MAXY_UI_INTERNAL_PORT` (stamped on the manager systemd unit) — no fallback; absence emits `[turn-recorder] spawn-failed reason=missing-env env=MAXY_UI_INTERNAL_PORT` to stderr instead of silently 19199-ing. **Task 177** — `initialMessage` is a JSON-stringified envelope; the schema lives in [`platform/plugins/docs/references/admin-session.md`](../docs/references/admin-session.md) under "`initialMessage` JSON envelope (Task 177)". Top-level keys exactly: `turns`, `sessionId`, `accountId`, `occurredAt`. `turns` is the full conversation transcript, oldest first, newest last, with each entry `{ role: "user"|"assistant", text, ts, toolCalls? }`. No windowing, no truncation. Multi-record assistant messages collapse on `message.id`. `tool_use` and matching `tool_result` blocks attach as a single `toolCalls` entry on the owning assistant turn; the user record carrying only the `tool_result` does not create a separate user turn. No leading instruction prose. `toolCalls[].input` and `toolCalls[].output` are native JSON values, never re-stringified. (Replaces Task 175's `(operatorMessage, assistantReply)` pair, which asserted a temporal Q→A relationship the walker never enforced.) One observability line `[turn-recorder] envelope sessionId=<op> turnsCount=<n> userTurns=<n> assistantTurns=<n> toolCallTurns=<n>` precedes `spawn-request`. The envelope rides on the `/spawn` body as a trailing positional argv to `claude`, so the database-operator session's JSONL first `role=user` line is the JSON object verbatim. No separate `POST /:id/input` call, no bracketed-paste, no keystroke injection. The recorder-auto-archive subscriber stops the recorder PTY as soon as its JSONL contains an assistant message with `stop_reason === "end_turn"`. **Task 129** — every emit goes through `POST /api/admin/log-ingest` so the lines land in `server.log` keyed by the operator session id. The chain is `trigger` → `spawn-request` → `spawn-success` → `input-delivered` → `tool-call` × N → `tool-result` × N → `write-complete` → `auto-archive`; each gated-off path emits one `trigger-skipped reason=<role-not-admin|is-recorder|empty-stdin|missing-transcript|conversation-empty>` line. Failure modes — `spawn-failed`, `tool-surface-missing`, `input-failed`, `write-empty`, `auto-archive reason=stale-recorder` — each emit one named line; absence is itself a defect.
 

package/payload/platform/plugins/admin/hooks/archive-ingest-surface-gate.sh

@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@
 #    server.log alongside the [whatsapp-ingest] script lines.
 #
 # Exit codes follow Claude Code hook protocol: 0 = allow, 2 = block (stderr
-# message shown to the agent). Fail-closed on terminal stdin to match
-# pre-tool-use.sh.
+# message shown to the agent). Fail-closed on terminal stdin.
 
 set -uo pipefail
 

package/payload/platform/plugins/admin/hooks/lib/hook-emit.sh

@@ -130,8 +130,9 @@ PY
 
 # hook_block_with_emit <agentId> <hookName> <toolName> <reason>
 #                      <userMessage> [durationMs]
-# Convenience wrapper for pre-tool-use.sh: emits the propagation record,
-# echoes the user-facing block message to stderr, and exits 2.
+# Convenience wrapper for any PreToolUse hook that records a block decision:
+# emits the propagation record, echoes the user-facing block message to stderr,
+# and exits 2.
 hook_block_with_emit() {
   local agentId="$1" hookName="$2" toolName="$3" reason="$4"
   local userMessage="$5" durationMs="${6:-0}"

package/payload/platform/plugins/admin/mcp/dist/index.js

@@ -755,8 +755,8 @@ eagerTool(server, "account-update", "Update a user-configurable setting in accou
     }
 });
 // Plugin enable/disable: deterministic write to account.json.enabledPlugins.
-// The pre-tool-use hook denies the agent's direct Edit on account.json,
-// so the agent can no longer toggle enablement by hand-editing the file. This
+// IDENTITY.md doctrine forbids the agent's direct Edit on account.json,
+// so the agent must not toggle enablement by hand-editing the file. This
 // tool is the legitimate path: validates the plugin name, refuses core plugins,
 // confirms the plugin directory exists, and atomically updates the array.
 // Entitlement-bearing fields (tier, purchasedPlugins) are NOT writable here.