@rozoai/checkout 0.1.0

package/README.zh.md

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+# rozo-checkout
+
+[English](README.md) | **简体中文** | [日本語](README.ja.md) | [Español](README.es.md)
+
+**[快速开始 →](QUICKSTART.zh.md)** —— 五分钟付掉一个链接，无需读完本文。
+
+```bash
+npx @rozoai/checkout pay <coinbase-link> --with usdt-solana
+```
+
+用一种 **OpenRouter Coinbase 收款链接 (Payment Link)** 本身无法直接接受的币种去付款 —— 走闪电网络的 BTC，或者 Solana、BNB Chain、Ethereum、Polygon、Base、Stellar 上的 USDT/USDC。
+
+Coinbase 收款链接只接受 Base 上的 USDC。本仓库是一个 agent skill（以及背后的 Node 脚本），它把上面这些币种通过一座桥 (bridge) 路由过去：你会拿到一个针对你实际持有的币种的一次性充值地址 (deposit address)，等你的充值到账后，一个出资钱包会代你结清这张 Coinbase 账单。
+
+在账单本身上**没有折扣**：`callerPays` 等于账单金额。你要发送的**充值金额**是另一个数字，而且通常更大 —— 它包含了把账单金额以 Base USDC 形式送达所需的跨桥费用和源链费用。永远严格按后端返回的 `deposit.amount` 发送；绝不要假定它等于账单金额。
+
+- `SKILL.md` —— 面向 agent 的指令（Claude Code skill 格式）。
+- `llms.txt` —— 给只读一个文件的 agent 准备的精简摘要。
+- `scripts/` —— Node 实现；`src/` 是源码，`dist/` 存放可以用纯 `node` 直接运行的自包含打包产物。
+- `test/` —— 针对资金处理与安全逻辑的离线单元测试。
+- `PLAN.md` —— 实现所遵循的设计文档。
+
+使用它**不**需要账号、API key，也不需要与运营方有任何关系。它调用的每一个端点都是公开且无需密钥的。
+
+## 工作原理
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TD
+    A["Coinbase Payment Link<br/>payments.coinbase.com/payment-links/pl_*"] --> B
+    B["quote-invoice<br/>(public POST)"] --> C["create-invoice<br/>(public POST)"]
+    C --> D["Bridge order<br/>one-time deposit address<br/>+ exact amount + expiry"]
+    D --> E["You send USDT/USDC/BTC<br/>on your chosen chain"]
+    E --> F["Bridge converts the pay-in"]
+    F --> G["Funder wallet settles<br/>the Coinbase invoice"]
+    G --> H["Merchant is paid<br/>(e.g. OpenRouter credit)"]
+```
+
+同样的流程用 ASCII 表示，供不支持 mermaid 的终端查看：
+
+```
+  Coinbase Payment Link (pl_* / paymentSession_*)
+            |
+            v
+  [ quote-invoice ]  ->  merchant, amount, expiry, short-lived quote receipt
+            |
+            v
+  [ create-invoice ] ->  bridge order:  rozoPaymentId + deposit address
+            |                            + exact amount + order expiry
+            v
+  you send USDT / USDC / BTC on your chain  ------> deposit address
+            |
+            v
+  bridge converts the pay-in  ------>  funder wallet pays the Coinbase invoice
+            |
+            v
+  merchant credited; poll until the state is `settled`
+```
+
+全文出现三个标识符，它们彼此绝不可混用：
+
+| 标识符 | 它是什么 |
+|---|---|
+| `linkId` | Coinbase 的 id：`pl_*`（收款链接）或 `paymentSession_*`（v3 会话） |
+| `rozoPaymentId` | 桥订单的 UUID —— 查充值详情和状态用它 |
+| `paymentLink` | 该桥订单对应的托管支付页面 URL（供人工兜底使用） |
+
+## 支持的来源
+
+| 链 | 链 id | 代币 | 备注 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Ethereum | `1` | USDC, USDT | 6 位小数 |
+| BNB Chain | `56` | USDC, USDT | **18 位小数** —— 差 10^12 这类 bug 的常见来源 |
+| Polygon | `137` | USDC, USDT | 6 位小数 |
+| Base | `8453` | USDC | 6 位小数 |
+| Solana | `900` | USDC, USDT | 6 位小数；SPL，可能需要 memo。原生 SOL **不**支持 |
+| Stellar | `1500` | USDC | 7 位小数；必须带 memo |
+| Bitcoin Lightning | `lightning` | BTC | 金额是整数**聪 (satoshis)**，通过闪电网络发票 (BOLT11) 支付 |
+
+原生 gas 币（SOL、BNB、ETH、MATIC）以及链上 BTC 均不接受。
+
+## 快速上手
+
+### 1. 用 curl 试试公开端点
+
+把 `pl_01YOURLINKID` 换成一个真实的 Coinbase 收款链接。下面所有请求都不需要任何 auth header。
+
+```bash
+MPP="https://apiserver.mpprouter.dev/v1/services/rozo-agent-api"
+INTENTS="https://intentapiv4.rozo.ai/functions/v1/payment-api"
+LINK="https://payments.coinbase.com/payment-links/pl_01YOURLINKID"
+
+# 报价：返回商家、金额、过期时间，以及一个约 60 秒有效的 quoteReceipt。
+curl -s -X POST "$MPP/quote-invoice" \
+  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+  -d "{\"url\":\"$LINK\"}"
+
+# 创建一个桥订单，比如用 Solana 上的 USDT。
+# 这一步只创建订单，不动任何资金；未付款的订单会自动过期。
+curl -s -X POST "$MPP/create-invoice" \
+  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+  -d "{\"url\":\"$LINK\",\"source\":{\"chainId\":\"900\",\"tokenSymbol\":\"USDT\"}}"
+
+# 充值指令（以此为准），用上一步拿到的 rozoPaymentId。
+curl -s "$INTENTS/payments/<rozoPaymentId>"
+
+# 履约状态，用 Coinbase 的 linkId 查询。
+curl -s "$MPP/invoice-status?payment_id=pl_01YOURLINKID"
+```
+
+`create-invoice` 按 IP 限流（约每小时 30 次）；读取类端点不限流。
+
+### 2. 使用 CLI
+
+无需安装任何东西 —— `npx` 会自动拉取并运行它：
+
+```bash
+npx @rozoai/checkout quote <coinbase-link>
+npx @rozoai/checkout pay   <coinbase-link> --with usdt-solana
+npx @rozoai/checkout status <rozoPaymentId>
+```
+
+`pay` 会把整个流程走完：报价、创建订单、展示打码后的核对信息、等你确认，然后打印充值指令并轮询直到结清。加 `--send` 就用热钱包付款而不是用你自己的钱包，加 `--json` 输出机器可读格式，其余选项看 `--help`。
+
+### 3. 或者直接运行脚本
+
+克隆本仓库后，你会拿到同样的流程，只不过是一个个独立脚本 —— agent skill 用的就是它们，CLI 底层调用的也是它们。
+
+每个脚本在 stdout 上只打印一个 JSON 对象。退出码 `0` 表示成功，`1` 表示被拒绝/失败（读 `error.code`），`2` 表示用法错误，`3` 表示已提交但未确认。
+
+```bash
+# 第 1 步 —— 只读报价，不产生任何费用
+node scripts/dist/quote.js --url "$LINK"
+
+# 第 2 步 —— 创建订单（不动资金；未付款的订单会过期）。
+#            此阶段完整充值地址会被扣留：你只拿到打码后的摘要用于核对，
+#            以及 `depositWithheld: true`。
+node scripts/dist/create-order.js --url "$LINK" --chain 900 --token USDT
+
+# 第 3 步 —— 核对金额、链、打码地址、是否需要 memo 以及过期时间。
+#            只有在你决定付款之后，才用 --confirm 重新执行同一条命令。
+#            这会释放完整的充值信息块，并记录下发送脚本所需的确认。
+node scripts/dist/create-order.js --url "$LINK" --chain 900 --token USDT --confirm
+
+# 第 4a 步 —— 模式 A：用你自己的钱包按充值信息块付款，
+#             然后观察它结清
+node scripts/dist/status.js --rozo-payment-id <uuid> --watch --timeout 600
+
+# 第 4b 步 —— 模式 B：让脚本从热钱包付款。--dry-run 不会签任何名；
+#             真正发送还额外需要 --send。
+ROZO_CHECKOUT_SOL_KEY=<base58 secret key> \
+  node scripts/dist/send-sol.js --rozo-payment-id <uuid> --dry-run
+```
+
+`scripts/dist/*.js` 是自包含的打包产物 —— 在调用现场无需 `npm install`。上面那个 CLI 就是同一份代码，只是外层更友好：它是导入这些流程，而不是重新实现一遍，所以下面列出的每一项检查，不管你从哪个入口进来都同样生效。
+
+## 构建与测试
+
+```bash
+npm install     # 只有重新构建或跑测试时才需要
+npm run build   # esbuild -> scripts/dist/*.js（node18 目标）+ blacklist.json
+npm test        # node:test，完全离线
+npm run check   # 构建 + 测试
+```
+
+测试**不发起任何网络调用**；每一个后端响应都是 `test/fixtures/` 里的 fixture。它们覆盖了原子金额换算（6/18 位小数与闪电网络的聪）、过期余量的算术、被盗地址归一化与 fail-closed 行为、订单复用决策、创建后的校验比对器，以及充值指令完整性规则。
+
+有两组测试会真正 spawn 子进程而不是直接调用函数，因为它们测的是单进程测试测不了的东西：并发测试组会让多个进程去抢同一个订单（只允许恰好一个赢）并把会话额度耗尽；入口点测试组会运行构建好的发送脚本，证明它们在缺少 `--send` 时、缺少确认时、以及已被先前的 claim 占用之后都会拒绝执行。
+
+## 安全设计
+
+这个仓库真正有意思的地方，在于它拒绝去做哪些事。
+
+- **两阶段确认，强制执行。** `create-order.js` 会扣留完整的充值地址、memo 和 BOLT11，直到用 `--confirm` 重新执行；此时会记录一条确认，并绑定到这份确切指令的 sha256 上。发送脚本在同时满足 `--send` 和一条摘要仍与实时数据匹配的确认之前，一律拒绝执行 —— 所以无论是误触发调用，还是被掉包的充值地址，都无法动用资金。
+- **足额付款，永远如此。** `callerPays` 必须等于账单金额，`discount` 必须是 `"0"`；任何其他情况都以 `NO_DISCOUNT_VIOLATION` 中止。安全攸关的字段（`linkId`、`merchant`、`original`、`callerPays`，以及回显的 source）不仅要相等，还必须存在 —— 字段缺失即视为漂移。
+- **复用防护。** 为一个已经存在未过期订单的链接再次创建订单，会返回那个已有订单 —— 哪怕它已经被付过款。因此每次运行都要求实时订单处于未付款状态（`payment_unpaid`，没有 tx hash、没有收到金额、没有确认），并且与调用方选择的链和代币一致。否则报：`ORDER_ALREADY_FUNDED` 或 `REUSED_SOURCE_MISMATCH`。
+- **一旦检测到资金即 fail closed。** 只要存在任何入账，工具就绝不报告为一个普通失败，绝不建议再付一次，也绝不重试去开一个新订单。一个非 null 但无法解析的 `amountReceived` 算作"有钱"，而不是"没钱"。后端不可读时报告 `unknown`，绝不报 `awaiting_deposit`。
+- **完整的充值指令。** 金额为零、为负或无法解析都会中止。闪电网络必须有 BOLT11（它随 `source.lnInvoice` 返回，同时地址为空）。Stellar 必须有它的 memo —— memo 缺失是硬性中止，绝不会被渲染成"无需 memo"。
+- **过期余量。** 取订单过期时间与 Coinbase 过期时间中较早的那个，除非它距现在超过按链设定的余量，否则拒绝付款（EVM 与 Stellar 为 10 分钟，Solana 为 5 分钟）。闪电网络还额外要求 BOLT11 至少还有 10 分钟有效期。截止时间缺失或无法解析都会中止。
+- **可支付性复检。** 有了 quote receipt，创建订单时会跳过实时的 Coinbase 检查，而该链接随时可能被别人消费掉 —— 所以在展示充值地址之前会立刻重新检查一次可支付性，并在完成全部 RPC 准备工作之后、广播之前的最后一刻再检查一次。Coinbase 状态不完整时按"无法证明可支付"处理，而不是按可支付处理。
+- **被盗地址清单，fail closed。** `scripts/src/lib/blacklist.json` 内置了一份 vendored 清单，带有来源出处头部以及对这些地址的 sha256。该摘要只能证明这份 vendored 副本自同步日期以来未被改动，它并不是上游来源的签名。充值地址和发送钱包都会被检查。如果该文件缺失、格式损坏、为空，或摘要对不上，那么所有发送都会被拒绝，而不是跳过检查继续执行。
+- **只发一次，跨进程有效。** 订单状态存放在 `$HOME/.rozo-checkout/state/<uuid>.json`，以原子方式写入（临时文件、fsync、rename）。对状态文件的每一次读-改-写 —— claim、花费额度、订单记录和确认 —— 都在同一把独占 lockfile 内进行，因此两个并发调用既不会都认为自己是第一个，也不会互相覆盖对方的发送记录。发送会在广播*之前*被 claim，所以一个语义不明的 RPC 错误永远不会变成第二次转账。交易在广播前就已签名，因此 hash 是提前已知的；遇到结果不明确时，脚本会去查这笔确切的交易，而不是重新广播。
+- **热钱包管控。** 私钥只从环境变量读取（`ROZO_CHECKOUT_EVM_KEY`、`ROZO_CHECKOUT_SOL_KEY`），永不打印，也绝不接受从命令行传入；库和 RPC 的错误在展示前会被脱敏，包括带凭据的 provider URL、bearer token 和形似密钥的字符串。当工作目录下任何 `.env`/`.env.*` 被 git 跟踪时，脚本拒绝运行；当 git 无法证明它未被跟踪时，同样坚决拒绝。签名前会校验 RPC 的链 id（Solana 则是 genesis hash）以及代币的链上小数位。额度上限：单笔 $100，单会话累计 $200。
+- **地址打码。** 正文中显示为 `first6...last4`。完整的充值地址、memo 和 BOLT11 字符串只出现在机器可读的 `deposit` 对象里，这样它们既保持可复制粘贴，又不会散落在各处日志中。
+
+## 许可证
+
+MIT。

package/llms.txt

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+# rozo-checkout
+
+> Pay an OpenRouter Coinbase Payment Link (payments.coinbase.com/payment-links/pl_* or
+> /payment-sessions/paymentSession_*) with BTC over Lightning, or USDT/USDC on Solana,
+> BNB Chain, Ethereum, Polygon, Base, or Stellar. Public HTTP endpoints, no API key.
+> The payer funds a one-time deposit address; a bridge and a funder wallet settle the
+> Coinbase link automatically. No discount: you pay the invoice amount, plus the
+> deposit normally carries a small bridge/source-chain fee on top.
+
+This file teaches the whole flow to any agent or script. Repo (scripts, safety rails,
+full docs): https://github.com/RozoAI/rozo-checkout-skill — see QUICKSTART.md.
+
+## Fastest path: the CLI (npm @rozoai/checkout)
+
+If you can run commands, skip the raw HTTP below — the CLI performs the same four
+calls with every safety rule already enforced:
+
+  npx @rozoai/checkout pay <coinbase-link> --with usdt-solana
+  npx @rozoai/checkout quote <coinbase-link>
+  npx @rozoai/checkout status <rozoPaymentId | coinbase-link>
+
+--with accepts usdt-solana, usdc-solana, usdt-bnb, usdc-bnb, usdt-ethereum,
+usdc-ethereum, usdt-polygon, usdc-polygon, usdc-base, usdc-stellar, btc-lightning
+(or raw: --chain 900 --token USDT). Flags: --send (pay from a hot wallet, keys from
+ROZO_CHECKOUT_EVM_KEY / ROZO_CHECKOUT_SOL_KEY, never from argv), --yes (skip the
+interactive confirm; required when stdin is not a TTY), --dry-run, --json (exactly
+one JSON object on stdout), --no-watch, --timeout <s>. Exit codes: 0 success,
+1 refused/failed (read error.code), 2 usage, 3 submitted but unconfirmed.
+
+`pay` withholds the full deposit address until you confirm, then prints it as a
+copy-pastable block. Creating an order moves no money; an unfunded order expires.
+
+## Supported sources
+
+chainId "1" Ethereum (USDC, USDT) · "56" BNB Chain (USDC, USDT; 18-decimals) ·
+"137" Polygon (USDC, USDT) · "8453" Base (USDC) · "900" Solana (USDC, USDT) ·
+"1500" Stellar (USDC; deposit memo REQUIRED) · "lightning" (BTC; BOLT11 invoice,
+amounts in integer satoshis via source.amountUnit=="sats").
+Native SOL/ETH/BNB are NOT supported — stablecoins (or Lightning BTC) only.
+
+## Flow (4 HTTP calls, all public)
+
+1) Quote (read-only, safe):
+   curl -X POST https://apiserver.mpprouter.dev/v1/services/rozo-agent-api/quote-invoice \
+     -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+     -d '{"url":"https://payments.coinbase.com/payment-links/pl_XXXX"}'
+   -> { linkId, merchant, original, callerPays, discount:"0", quoteReceipt, ... }
+   callerPays always equals the invoice amount (discount is always "0").
+
+2) Create (or reuse) the order:
+   curl -X POST https://apiserver.mpprouter.dev/v1/services/rozo-agent-api/create-invoice \
+     -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+     -d '{"url":"https://payments.coinbase.com/payment-links/pl_XXXX",
+          "source":{"chainId":"900","tokenSymbol":"USDT"}}'
+   -> { ok, reused, linkId, rozoPaymentId, paymentLink, expiresAt, source, ... }
+   WARNING: if an unexpired order already exists for this link it is REUSED as-is,
+   even with a different chain/token than you asked for. Always verify the returned
+   source matches your request; abort on mismatch.
+
+3) Fetch authoritative deposit instructions (public, keyless GET):
+   curl https://intentapiv4.rozo.ai/functions/v1/payment-api/payments/<rozoPaymentId>
+   -> { status, expiresAt, source:{ receiverAddress, receiverMemo, amount, amountUnit,
+        lnInvoice, txHash, amountReceived, confirmedAt, ... }, destination:{...} }
+   Pay EXACTLY source.amount of the requested token on the requested chain to
+   source.receiverAddress (include receiverMemo when present — Stellar requires it).
+   For Lightning, pay the BOLT11 in source.lnInvoice (receiverAddress is empty).
+
+4) Poll until settled:
+   curl "https://apiserver.mpprouter.dev/v1/services/rozo-agent-api/invoice-status?payment_id=<linkId>"
+   and re-GET the payments/<rozoPaymentId> URL above. The Coinbase link is settled
+   only when the router reports paid / coinbase.settled — an intents status of
+   payment_completed alone is the bridge lifecycle, not final settlement.
+
+## Safety rules (encode these, they prevent fund loss)
+
+- Before paying, require: status == "payment_unpaid" AND source.txHash == null AND
+  source.amountReceived in {null,"0"} AND source.confirmedAt == null. Anything else
+  means the order is already funded — do NOT pay again; escalate for reconciliation.
+- Deposit addresses are one-time and quote-bound. Never reuse an address from an old
+  order, a cached response, or a document. Always re-fetch step 3 in the same run.
+- Respect expiry with margin: do not send if now > min(order expiresAt, Coinbase
+  link expiry) minus a safety margin (10 min EVM/Stellar, 5 min Solana; Lightning:
+  only pay a BOLT11 with >= 10 min validity left).
+- Re-check step 4 payability immediately before broadcasting a transaction: the
+  Coinbase link can be consumed by another payer at any moment.
+- Wrong token, wrong network, wrong amount, or paying twice is usually unrecoverable.
+- After any on-chain payment is detected, never retry into a new order and never
+  label the payment a normal failure — keep the tx hash and rozoPaymentId, keep
+  polling, and escalate if it stays stuck.
+
+## Errors
+
+409 = link already used · 410 = link expired · UNSUPPORTED_SOURCE = the response's
+"supported" object lists valid (chainId, tokenSymbol) pairs (Lightning is supported
+but omitted from that list) · RATE_LIMITED = per-IP creation cap, retry later.

package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+  "name": "@rozoai/checkout",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "description": "Pay an OpenRouter Coinbase Payment Link with BTC Lightning, or USDT/USDC on Solana, BNB Chain, Ethereum, Polygon, Base or Stellar.",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "author": "Rozo AI",
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/RozoAI/rozo-checkout-skill#readme",
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/RozoAI/rozo-checkout-skill.git"
+  },
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/RozoAI/rozo-checkout-skill/issues"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "openrouter",
+    "coinbase",
+    "x402",
+    "lightning",
+    "solana",
+    "usdt",
+    "usdc",
+    "crypto-payments"
+  ],
+  "bin": {
+    "rozo-checkout": "scripts/dist/cli.js"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "scripts/dist",
+    "llms.txt",
+    "README.md",
+    "README.zh.md",
+    "README.ja.md",
+    "README.es.md",
+    "QUICKSTART.md",
+    "QUICKSTART.zh.md",
+    "QUICKSTART.ja.md",
+    "QUICKSTART.es.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "node scripts/build.mjs",
+    "test": "node --test test/*.test.mjs",
+    "check": "npm run build && npm test",
+    "prepack": "npm run build"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@solana/spl-token": "^0.4.9",
+    "@solana/web3.js": "^1.95.0",
+    "esbuild": "^0.24.0",
+    "viem": "^2.21.0"
+  }
+}

package/scripts/dist/blacklist.json

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+{
+  "provenance": {
+    "source": "compromised-wallet table in the ainative repository CLAUDE.md (operator security policy)",
+    "description": "Addresses recorded there as compromised (leaked key, drained wallet) or as attacker aggregation points, vendored into this repo so the check works offline and cannot be silently disabled.",
+    "syncDate": "2026-08-08",
+    "syncedOn": "2026-08-08",
+    "addressCount": 18,
+    "addressesSha256": "12cb2019f4b93bde94d8f5bea594009620a3e4ae9d6b6d4d389912da7144d085",
+    "shaAlgorithm": "sha256(JSON.stringify(entries.map(e => e.address)))",
+    "digestScope": "The digest proves only that this vendored list has not been edited since the sync date. It is NOT a signature by the upstream source and does not attest that the upstream table still matches.",
+    "failMode": "closed — if this file is missing, malformed, empty, or the digest does not match, every send is refused"
+  },
+  "entries": [
+    {
+      "address": "GD2UZOA5RFWILHTPQL6CDTLIT6XPEGZQXJX4NWQC7ZU7DCEXK5NSQ2GH",
+      "chain": "stellar",
+      "family": "stellar",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-05-24",
+      "note": "Reported compromised by the operator; blacklisted preemptively"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0x8FE7155119d2975780c9e19B07dD98393965Bc2a",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Wallet drained in a reported key-compromise incident"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0xa9E3Da13EF5eADFC6EcB2BB6BDddE95016B567dB",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Wallet drained in a reported key-compromise incident"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0x5772FBe7a7817ef7F586215CA8b23b8dD22C8897",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Wallet drained in a reported key-compromise incident"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "AEEtekA2EBYVy3e5Xx8fD3GkjWSoCsLvLzdD6pZTgHiH",
+      "chain": "solana",
+      "family": "solana",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Wallet drained in a reported key-compromise incident"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "TBcegJf63xa5r7hi5jmqSsTnSEAAFkUcGu",
+      "chain": "tron",
+      "family": "tron",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Wallet drained in a reported key-compromise incident"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0x44d6B5a11FFc5Ba1043734d88af5E5dea36a648A",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Attacker aggregation address — never interact"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0x467AeD16d024405116cF4Ba12976Bf63B404517b",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Attacker aggregation address — never interact"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "a23F2uanwzTDtWJmPK1y1DiKbnR7vCNZTqdQEacRz8W",
+      "chain": "solana",
+      "family": "solana",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Attacker aggregation address — never interact"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0xF621Ee3BaE3cbE924Ec05f795d14E31384Bd11b6",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Attacker aggregation address — never interact"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "9Ms2FNXMY9ucKwzxcnGxvqMcfSkBhRdPZhrsj1Ui1KiN",
+      "chain": "solana",
+      "family": "solana",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-06-26",
+      "note": "Attacker aggregation address — never interact"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0x49CD5655Cc9bf7c7C93fBb2DF36AA3020d11eEe0",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-07-03",
+      "note": "Retired test wallet declared leaked"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "EHhTSkqPpu4TENNpdyLewgxaMckSUke3c9hoNVu6zNMA",
+      "chain": "solana",
+      "family": "solana",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-07-03",
+      "note": "Retired test wallet declared leaked"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "He9F3sHpDLN1br4Ts7AHpqQbGZaDkqgu2QK6dw93RpAk",
+      "chain": "solana",
+      "family": "solana",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-07-03",
+      "note": "Retired test wallet declared leaked"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "GAN3YSPDH5VW7YFJJFUJH7LIYTJBWGH3GJMKOG6FP5RKHXGNMPX44UYY",
+      "chain": "stellar",
+      "family": "stellar",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-07-03",
+      "note": "Retired test wallet declared leaked"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "TE78sm1mFajxtPjKMWQkLQTaBKQVqJVum4",
+      "chain": "tron",
+      "family": "tron",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-07-09",
+      "note": "Reported leaked wallet"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0xa9BacE1614d6cFf8aa159A2A41eE8BaA9a91Cc7B",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-07-15",
+      "note": "Rotated-out hot wallet; private key leaked"
+    },
+    {
+      "address": "0xfD0e6fA2ABA8436e95f3Fb3523AC14Ba299c0e79",
+      "chain": "evm",
+      "family": "evm",
+      "reportedOn": "2026-08-06",
+      "note": "Hot wallet with a compromised key; sweeper assumed active"
+    }
+  ]
+}