@rovela-ai/sdk 0.4.1 → 0.4.2

package/dist/admin/server/admin-invite.js

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/**
+ * @rovela/sdk/admin/server/admin-invite
+ *
+ * Admin invite token lifecycle: validation, acceptance, and housekeeping.
+ *
+ * Paired with `user-management.ts::inviteAdmin` which creates the token +
+ * sends the email. This file handles the INVITEE's side of the flow: they
+ * click the email link, land on `/admin/accept-invite?token=X`, and this
+ * module validates + consumes the token.
+ *
+ * # Failure modes (all graceful — no exceptions leak out)
+ *
+ *   - Token unknown            → `{valid: false}` / `INVALID_TOKEN`
+ *   - Token expired            → delete row, return `{valid: false}` with "expired"
+ *   - Admin deleted            → cascaded delete already removed the token;
+ *                                caller will see `{valid: false}`
+ *   - Admin already accepted   → `{valid: false}` with "already accepted"
+ *                                (protects against double-clicks)
+ *   - Admin was deactivated    → same as "already accepted" from UX point of view
+ *   - Concurrent acceptance    → atomic UPDATE returns 0 rows → `INVALID_STATE`
+ *
+ * # Design notes
+ *
+ * The structure mirrors `admin-password-reset.ts` from Phase 1 exactly:
+ *   1. `validate*` is non-destructive (opportunistically cleans up expired
+ *      tokens but doesn't touch the admin row).
+ *   2. `accept*` is destructive — it updates the password, flips status,
+ *      and deletes ALL tokens for the admin (both invite + reset tokens,
+ *      so a stale reset link can't resurrect access).
+ *   3. `delete*ForAdmin` helper used by `cancelInvite` / `resendInvite` to
+ *      wipe stale tokens before issuing a new one.
+ *   4. `cleanupExpired` is an optional cron hook.
+ */
+import { eq, lt } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { nanoid } from 'nanoid';
+import { getDb } from '../../core/db/client';
+import * as schema from '../../core/db/schema';
+import { findAdminById, updateAdminPassword } from './admin-service';
+import { deleteAdminPasswordResetTokens } from './admin-password-reset';
+import { validatePassword } from '../../auth/server/password';
+// =============================================================================
+// Constants
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Invite token lifetime: 72 hours. Matches industry standard
+ * (Google Workspace, GitHub, Shopify).
+ */
+export const INVITE_EXPIRY_MS = 72 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/** Token length — nanoid(32) = ~192 bits of entropy, URL-safe. */
+export const INVITE_TOKEN_LENGTH = 32;
+/** Display string for the expiry duration. */
+export const INVITE_EXPIRY_HOURS = '72';
+// =============================================================================
+// Token creation (used by inviteAdmin + resendAdminInvite in user-management.ts)
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Create a new invite token for an existing `invited` admin row.
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for:
+ *   - Validating the admin exists and is in `invited` status
+ *   - Deleting any existing invite tokens for this admin (via
+ *     `deleteAdminInviteTokens`) before calling this to keep "one active
+ *     token" semantics
+ *
+ * @returns The plain-text token that should be embedded in the email link.
+ */
+export async function createInviteToken(params) {
+    const db = getDb();
+    const token = nanoid(INVITE_TOKEN_LENGTH);
+    const expires = new Date(Date.now() + INVITE_EXPIRY_MS);
+    await db.insert(schema.adminInviteTokens).values({
+        adminId: params.adminId,
+        token,
+        expires,
+        invitedBy: params.invitedBy,
+    });
+    return { token, expires };
+}
+// =============================================================================
+// Validate (non-destructive)
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Validate an invite token without consuming it.
+ *
+ * Used by the accept-invite page on mount to decide between rendering the
+ * password form or an "invalid/expired" error view.
+ *
+ * Side effect: expired tokens are opportunistically deleted as part of the
+ * check. All other failure modes leave the DB untouched.
+ */
+export async function validateInviteToken(token) {
+    if (!token) {
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: 'Invite link is missing a token. Please request a new invite.',
+        };
+    }
+    const db = getDb();
+    const [record] = await db
+        .select()
+        .from(schema.adminInviteTokens)
+        .where(eq(schema.adminInviteTokens.token, token))
+        .limit(1);
+    if (!record) {
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: 'Invalid or expired invite link. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    if (new Date() > record.expires) {
+        // Opportunistic cleanup
+        await db
+            .delete(schema.adminInviteTokens)
+            .where(eq(schema.adminInviteTokens.id, record.id));
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: 'Invite link has expired. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    const admin = await findAdminById(record.adminId);
+    if (!admin) {
+        // Cascaded delete should have prevented this — defensive
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: 'Invalid or expired invite link. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    if (admin.status !== 'invited') {
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: admin.status === 'active'
+                ? 'This invite has already been accepted. Please sign in with your password.'
+                : 'This invite is no longer valid.',
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        valid: true,
+        admin: {
+            id: admin.id,
+            email: admin.email,
+            name: admin.name,
+            role: admin.role,
+        },
+    };
+}
+// =============================================================================
+// Accept (destructive — consumes token, activates admin)
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Consume an invite token and activate the invited admin.
+ *
+ * Atomically:
+ *   1. Validates the token + admin row.
+ *   2. Hashes + stores the new password via the existing
+ *      `updateAdminPassword` helper.
+ *   3. Flips status from 'invited' → 'active' via an atomic guarded UPDATE
+ *      (if two clicks race, the second one fails with INVALID_STATE).
+ *   4. Deletes all invite tokens for this admin (single-use batch).
+ *   5. Defensively deletes any stale password reset tokens too — a
+ *      previously abandoned reset flow shouldn't grant access after the
+ *      user has taken ownership of the account via accept-invite.
+ */
+export async function acceptAdminInvite(token, newPassword) {
+    // 1. Re-validate (fresh read — the validate* function is idempotent)
+    const validation = await validateInviteToken(token);
+    if (!validation.valid || !validation.admin) {
+        return {
+            success: false,
+            error: validation.error || 'Invalid or expired invite link.',
+        };
+    }
+    const adminId = validation.admin.id;
+    // 2. Password strength check
+    const passwordCheck = validatePassword(newPassword);
+    if (!passwordCheck.valid) {
+        return { success: false, error: passwordCheck.error };
+    }
+    const db = getDb();
+    // 3. Hash + store password (updateAdminPassword handles hashing internally)
+    await updateAdminPassword(adminId, newPassword);
+    // 4. Flip status — guarded so a concurrent accept gets rejected cleanly
+    const statusUpdate = await db
+        .update(schema.storeAdmins)
+        .set({ status: 'active' })
+        .where(eq(schema.storeAdmins.id, adminId))
+        .returning({ id: schema.storeAdmins.id, status: schema.storeAdmins.status });
+    if (statusUpdate.length === 0) {
+        // Target was deleted between validate and update — race condition
+        return {
+            success: false,
+            error: 'Admin state changed while accepting invite. Please try again.',
+        };
+    }
+    // 5. Wipe all invite tokens for this admin (single-use batch)
+    await deleteAdminInviteTokens(adminId);
+    // 6. Defensive: wipe any stale password reset tokens too
+    await deleteAdminPasswordResetTokens(adminId);
+    return { success: true };
+}
+// =============================================================================
+// Housekeeping
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Delete all invite tokens for a specific admin.
+ *
+ * Called from:
+ *   - `user-management.ts::inviteAdmin` — not called; the admin is newly
+ *     created so there are no tokens to delete
+ *   - `user-management.ts::resendAdminInvite` — clear stale tokens before
+ *     creating a new one
+ *   - `acceptAdminInvite` above — invalidate the used batch
+ *   - `user-management.ts::cancelAdminInvite` — cascade handles this
+ *     automatically via FK, but we call explicitly for clarity
+ */
+export async function deleteAdminInviteTokens(adminId) {
+    const db = getDb();
+    await db
+        .delete(schema.adminInviteTokens)
+        .where(eq(schema.adminInviteTokens.adminId, adminId));
+}
+/**
+ * Delete all expired invite tokens. Optional hook for a periodic cleanup
+ * job. Safe to call anytime — no-op if nothing is expired.
+ *
+ * @returns Number of tokens deleted
+ */
+export async function cleanupExpiredInviteTokens() {
+    const db = getDb();
+    const result = await db
+        .delete(schema.adminInviteTokens)
+        .where(lt(schema.adminInviteTokens.expires, new Date()))
+        .returning({ id: schema.adminInviteTokens.id });
+    return result.length;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=admin-invite.js.map

package/dist/admin/server/admin-invite.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/admin/server/admin-password-reset.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * @rovela/sdk/admin/server/admin-password-reset
+ *
+ * Admin password reset token management.
+ *
+ * Mirrors `auth/server/password-reset-service.ts` (the customer version),
+ * with one critical addition: admins whose status is not 'active' are
+ * silently skipped. This blocks deactivated and invited admins from
+ * recovering access via the reset flow — deactivated admins must stay
+ * deactivated, invited admins must go through the invite-accept flow
+ * (Phase 3). The caller always receives `{success: true}` regardless
+ * to preserve enumeration safety.
+ *
+ * Each store has its own database (via Neon branches), so there's no
+ * tenant filtering. The `admin_password_reset_tokens` table was created
+ * for every active store during the Phase 0 migration.
+ */
+/**
+ * Request a password reset for an admin.
+ *
+ * Creates a token and sends the reset email. Always returns `{success: true}`
+ * regardless of whether the email belongs to a real admin — this prevents
+ * email enumeration attacks and keeps the HTTP response shape identical for
+ * all outcomes.
+ *
+ * Silently skipped cases (all return success without side effects):
+ *   - Email doesn't belong to any admin
+ *   - Admin exists but status !== 'active' (deactivated or invited)
+ *   - Email sending fails (error is logged, not exposed)
+ *
+ * @param email - The admin's email address
+ * @returns Always `{success: true}` — see above
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * await requestAdminPasswordReset('owner@store.com')
+ * // Always show: "If an account exists with this email, we've sent a reset link."
+ * ```
+ */
+export declare function requestAdminPasswordReset(email: string): Promise<{
+    success: boolean;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Validate a reset token without consuming it.
+ *
+ * Used by the reset page to decide whether to show the "enter new password"
+ * form or an "invalid/expired link" error. Expired tokens are cleaned up
+ * opportunistically as a side effect.
+ *
+ * @param token - The token from the reset link
+ */
+export declare function validateAdminResetToken(token: string): Promise<{
+    valid: boolean;
+    error?: string;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Reset an admin's password using a valid token.
+ *
+ * Validates the token, updates the password via `updateAdminPassword`
+ * (which handles hashing), then deletes ALL reset tokens for that admin
+ * so a stale link can't be reused after a successful reset.
+ *
+ * @param token - The token from the reset link
+ * @param newPassword - The new plain-text password (will be hashed)
+ */
+export declare function resetAdminPassword(token: string, newPassword: string): Promise<{
+    success: boolean;
+    error?: string;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Delete all password reset tokens for a specific admin.
+ *
+ * Called at two points:
+ *   1. Before issuing a new token (clear stale ones)
+ *   2. After a successful reset (invalidate the used batch)
+ */
+export declare function deleteAdminPasswordResetTokens(adminId: string): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Delete expired reset tokens across all admins.
+ *
+ * Optional hook for a periodic cleanup job (e.g. cron). Safe to call
+ * anytime — no-op if nothing is expired.
+ *
+ * @returns Number of tokens deleted
+ */
+export declare function cleanupExpiredAdminResetTokens(): Promise<number>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=admin-password-reset.d.ts.map

package/dist/admin/server/admin-password-reset.d.ts.map

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package/dist/admin/server/admin-password-reset.js

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/**
+ * @rovela/sdk/admin/server/admin-password-reset
+ *
+ * Admin password reset token management.
+ *
+ * Mirrors `auth/server/password-reset-service.ts` (the customer version),
+ * with one critical addition: admins whose status is not 'active' are
+ * silently skipped. This blocks deactivated and invited admins from
+ * recovering access via the reset flow — deactivated admins must stay
+ * deactivated, invited admins must go through the invite-accept flow
+ * (Phase 3). The caller always receives `{success: true}` regardless
+ * to preserve enumeration safety.
+ *
+ * Each store has its own database (via Neon branches), so there's no
+ * tenant filtering. The `admin_password_reset_tokens` table was created
+ * for every active store during the Phase 0 migration.
+ */
+import { eq, lt } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { nanoid } from 'nanoid';
+import { getDb } from '../../core/db/client';
+import * as schema from '../../core/db/schema';
+import { findAdminByEmail, updateAdminPassword } from './admin-service';
+import { sendAdminPasswordResetEmail } from '../../emails/send/admin-auth';
+import { getStoreUrl } from '../../emails/config';
+// =============================================================================
+// Constants
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Password reset token expiry time in milliseconds (1 hour).
+ * Matches customer reset flow.
+ */
+const TOKEN_EXPIRY_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Token length (URL-safe, ~192 bits of entropy with nanoid).
+ */
+const TOKEN_LENGTH = 32;
+/**
+ * Display string for the expiry duration — passed to the email template.
+ */
+const TOKEN_EXPIRY_HOURS = '1';
+// =============================================================================
+// Request reset
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Request a password reset for an admin.
+ *
+ * Creates a token and sends the reset email. Always returns `{success: true}`
+ * regardless of whether the email belongs to a real admin — this prevents
+ * email enumeration attacks and keeps the HTTP response shape identical for
+ * all outcomes.
+ *
+ * Silently skipped cases (all return success without side effects):
+ *   - Email doesn't belong to any admin
+ *   - Admin exists but status !== 'active' (deactivated or invited)
+ *   - Email sending fails (error is logged, not exposed)
+ *
+ * @param email - The admin's email address
+ * @returns Always `{success: true}` — see above
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * await requestAdminPasswordReset('owner@store.com')
+ * // Always show: "If an account exists with this email, we've sent a reset link."
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function requestAdminPasswordReset(email) {
+    const admin = await findAdminByEmail(email);
+    // Enumeration-safe fast exits
+    if (!admin) {
+        return { success: true };
+    }
+    // Block deactivated and invited admins from using the reset flow.
+    // Deactivated: must stay locked out. Invited: should use the invite
+    // accept flow (Phase 3), not the reset flow.
+    const status = admin.status ?? 'active';
+    if (status !== 'active') {
+        return { success: true };
+    }
+    // Clear any existing reset tokens for this admin — "only the latest
+    // reset link works" policy, same as customer flow.
+    await deleteAdminPasswordResetTokens(admin.id);
+    // Generate new token
+    const db = getDb();
+    const token = nanoid(TOKEN_LENGTH);
+    const expires = new Date(Date.now() + TOKEN_EXPIRY_MS);
+    await db.insert(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens).values({
+        adminId: admin.id,
+        token,
+        expires,
+    });
+    // Send the email. Failures are logged but never propagated — returning
+    // success keeps the enumeration-safe contract and prevents leaking
+    // infrastructure state (e.g. "Resend is down").
+    try {
+        const storeUrl = getStoreUrl();
+        const resetLink = `${storeUrl}/admin/reset-password?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`;
+        await sendAdminPasswordResetEmail({
+            to: email,
+            adminName: admin.name,
+            resetLink,
+            expiryTime: TOKEN_EXPIRY_HOURS,
+        });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        console.error('[admin-password-reset] Failed to send reset email:', error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+        // Do not fail the request — enumeration safety + infra privacy.
+    }
+    return { success: true };
+}
+// =============================================================================
+// Validate token (non-destructive check)
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Validate a reset token without consuming it.
+ *
+ * Used by the reset page to decide whether to show the "enter new password"
+ * form or an "invalid/expired link" error. Expired tokens are cleaned up
+ * opportunistically as a side effect.
+ *
+ * @param token - The token from the reset link
+ */
+export async function validateAdminResetToken(token) {
+    const db = getDb();
+    const [record] = await db
+        .select()
+        .from(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens)
+        .where(eq(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.token, token))
+        .limit(1);
+    if (!record) {
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: 'Invalid or expired reset link. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    if (new Date() > record.expires) {
+        // Opportunistic cleanup
+        await db
+            .delete(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens)
+            .where(eq(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.id, record.id));
+        return {
+            valid: false,
+            error: 'Reset link has expired. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    return { valid: true };
+}
+// =============================================================================
+// Reset password (consumes token)
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Reset an admin's password using a valid token.
+ *
+ * Validates the token, updates the password via `updateAdminPassword`
+ * (which handles hashing), then deletes ALL reset tokens for that admin
+ * so a stale link can't be reused after a successful reset.
+ *
+ * @param token - The token from the reset link
+ * @param newPassword - The new plain-text password (will be hashed)
+ */
+export async function resetAdminPassword(token, newPassword) {
+    const db = getDb();
+    const [record] = await db
+        .select()
+        .from(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens)
+        .where(eq(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.token, token))
+        .limit(1);
+    if (!record) {
+        return {
+            success: false,
+            error: 'Invalid or expired reset link. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    if (new Date() > record.expires) {
+        await db
+            .delete(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens)
+            .where(eq(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.id, record.id));
+        return {
+            success: false,
+            error: 'Reset link has expired. Please request a new one.',
+        };
+    }
+    // Hash + update via the existing admin-service helper
+    await updateAdminPassword(record.adminId, newPassword);
+    // Wipe all reset tokens for this admin — one-time use for the whole batch
+    await deleteAdminPasswordResetTokens(record.adminId);
+    return { success: true };
+}
+// =============================================================================
+// Housekeeping
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * Delete all password reset tokens for a specific admin.
+ *
+ * Called at two points:
+ *   1. Before issuing a new token (clear stale ones)
+ *   2. After a successful reset (invalidate the used batch)
+ */
+export async function deleteAdminPasswordResetTokens(adminId) {
+    const db = getDb();
+    await db
+        .delete(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens)
+        .where(eq(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.adminId, adminId));
+}
+/**
+ * Delete expired reset tokens across all admins.
+ *
+ * Optional hook for a periodic cleanup job (e.g. cron). Safe to call
+ * anytime — no-op if nothing is expired.
+ *
+ * @returns Number of tokens deleted
+ */
+export async function cleanupExpiredAdminResetTokens() {
+    const db = getDb();
+    const result = await db
+        .delete(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens)
+        .where(lt(schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.expires, new Date()))
+        .returning({ id: schema.adminPasswordResetTokens.id });
+    return result.length;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=admin-password-reset.js.map

package/dist/admin/server/admin-password-reset.js.map

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package/dist/admin/server/admin-self-service.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/**
+ * @rovela/sdk/admin/server/admin-self-service
+ *
+ * Self-service helpers for logged-in admins — change their own password,
+ * edit their own profile. Never accepts an `actor` vs `target` distinction:
+ * these operations always act on the caller themselves, enforced by the
+ * API layer passing `session.user.id` as the adminId.
+ *
+ * # What these do that admin-service.ts doesn't
+ *
+ * `admin-service.ts` has the raw CRUD helpers (`updateAdmin`,
+ * `updateAdminPassword`). Those are called from multiple contexts —
+ * forgot-password flow, invite acceptance, emergency reset, user-management
+ * actions. This file wraps them in self-service semantics:
+ *
+ *   1. `changeOwnPassword` requires the current password as proof of
+ *      identity. Mere session possession isn't enough — we want defense
+ *      against "attacker on coffee shop laptop" scenarios where the
+ *      session cookie is borrowed.
+ *
+ *   2. `updateOwnProfile` checks email uniqueness against every other
+ *      admin (not just-not-self) before persisting, to surface clean
+ *      error codes to the caller.
+ *
+ * Both helpers return typed discriminated unions — they never throw on
+ * business errors, only on unexpected infra failures (DB connectivity,
+ * which the API layer catches).
+ */
+import type { StoreAdmin } from '../../core/db/schema';
+export interface SelfServiceError {
+    code: 'NOT_FOUND' | 'INVALID_CREDENTIALS' | 'VALIDATION_ERROR' | 'EMAIL_EXISTS';
+    message: string;
+}
+export type ChangeOwnPasswordResult = {
+    ok: true;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    error: SelfServiceError;
+};
+export type UpdateOwnProfileResult = {
+    ok: true;
+    admin: StoreAdmin;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    error: SelfServiceError;
+};
+/**
+ * Change the logged-in admin's password.
+ *
+ * Requires the current password as proof of identity. Validates the new
+ * password via the shared `validatePassword` helper (min 8 chars). On
+ * success, bumps `session_version` (via `updateAdminPassword`), cleans up
+ * any stale reset tokens, and invalidates the in-memory session cache so
+ * other active sessions for this admin are kicked out on their next
+ * request.
+ *
+ * The admin's CURRENT session (the one that initiated this change) also
+ * carries a now-stale `sessionVersion` JWT claim, which means the next
+ * request from that session will also fail `requireAdmin`'s version
+ * check → forced logout. That's correct behavior: after a password
+ * rotation, the user must re-authenticate with the new password.
+ *
+ * If that's undesirable (the UI would need to immediately re-sign-in),
+ * the API handler can call `nextAuthSignIn` server-side after a
+ * successful change. For Phase 4, we accept the forced re-login as the
+ * honest behavior.
+ */
+export declare function changeOwnPassword(adminId: string, currentPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<ChangeOwnPasswordResult>;
+/**
+ * Update the logged-in admin's name and/or email.
+ *
+ * Email uniqueness is checked against every OTHER admin (not self). If
+ * both fields are omitted, returns a VALIDATION_ERROR so the caller gets
+ * a clean error rather than a silent no-op.
+ *
+ * Changing email does NOT require a separate re-verification — the admin
+ * is already authenticated and the client-side confirmation dialog in
+ * `AdminAccountPage` warns them about the forgot-password implication.
+ *
+ * No sessionVersion bump — profile changes don't invalidate sessions.
+ */
+export declare function updateOwnProfile(adminId: string, data: {
+    name?: string;
+    email?: string;
+}): Promise<UpdateOwnProfileResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=admin-self-service.d.ts.map

package/dist/admin/server/admin-self-service.d.ts.map

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