@rotorsoft/act-http 1.8.18 → 1.8.20

package/dist/hono/index.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import {
 import "../chunk-WGFX4G27.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
-// ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@hono+zod-validator@0.9.0_hono@4.12.33_zod@4.4.3/node_modules/@hono/zod-validator/dist/index.mjs
+// ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@hono+zod-validator@0.9.0_hono@4.12.34_zod@4.4.3/node_modules/@hono/zod-validator/dist/index.mjs
 import { validator } from "hono/validator";
 function zValidatorFunction(target, schema, hook, options) {
   return validator(target, async (value, c) => {

package/dist/hono/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../node_modules/.pnpm/@hono+zod-validator@0.9.0_hono@4.12.33_zod@4.4.3/node_modules/@hono/zod-validator/src/index.ts","../../src/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any */\nimport type { Context, Env, Input, MiddlewareHandler, TypedResponse, ValidationTargets } from 'hono'\nimport { validator } from 'hono/validator'\nimport type { InferInput } from 'hono/validator'\nimport type * as v3 from 'zod/v3'\nimport type { ZodSafeParseResult as v4ZodSafeParseResult } from 'zod/v4'\nimport type * as v4 from 'zod/v4/core'\n\ntype ZodSchema = v3.ZodType | v4.$ZodType\ntype ZodError<T extends ZodSchema> = T extends v4.$ZodType\n  ? v4.$ZodError<v4.output<T>>\n  : v3.ZodError\ntype ZodSafeParseResult<T, T2, T3 extends ZodSchema> = T3 extends v4.$ZodType\n  ? v4ZodSafeParseResult<T>\n  : v3.SafeParseReturnType<T, T2>\ntype zInput<T> = T extends v3.ZodType ? v3.input<T> : T extends v4.$ZodType ? v4.input<T> : never\ntype zOutput<T> = T extends v3.ZodType ? v3.output<T> : T extends v4.$ZodType ? v4.output<T> : never\ntype zInfer<T> = T extends v3.ZodType ? v3.infer<T> : T extends v4.$ZodType ? v4.infer<T> : never\n\n// Failure variant of `safeParseAsync`'s return value.\n// Mirrors the runtime body returned by `c.json(result, 400)` on validation failure.\ntype ZodValidatorFailureBody<T extends ZodSchema> = T extends v4.$ZodType\n  ? Extract<v4ZodSafeParseResult<v4.output<T>>, { success: false }>\n  : T extends v3.ZodType\n    ? Extract<v3.SafeParseReturnType<v3.input<T>, v3.output<T>>, { success: false }>\n    : never\n\ntype ZodValidatorFailureResponse<T extends ZodSchema> = Response &\n  TypedResponse<ZodValidatorFailureBody<T>, 400, 'json'>\n\nexport type Hook<\n  T,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets = keyof ValidationTargets,\n  O = {},\n  Schema extends ZodSchema = any,\n> = (\n  result: ({ success: true; data: T } | { success: false; error: ZodError<Schema>; data: T }) & {\n    target: Target\n  },\n  c: Context<E, P>\n) => Response | void | TypedResponse<O> | Promise<Response | void | TypedResponse<O>>\n\ntype HasUndefined<T> = undefined extends T ? true : false\n\ntype ExtractValidationResponse<VF> = VF extends (value: any, c: any) => infer R\n  ? R extends Promise<infer PR>\n    ? PR extends TypedResponse<infer T, infer S, infer F>\n      ? Response & TypedResponse<T, S, F>\n      : PR extends Response\n        ? PR\n        : PR extends undefined\n          ? never\n          : never\n    : R extends TypedResponse<infer T, infer S, infer F>\n      ? Response & TypedResponse<T, S, F>\n      : R extends Response\n        ? R\n        : R extends undefined\n          ? never\n          : never\n  : never\n\ntype ValidationFunctionOption<T extends ZodSchema, Target extends keyof ValidationTargets> = {\n  validationFunction: (\n    schema: T,\n    value: ValidationTargets[Target]\n  ) => ZodSafeParseResult<any, any, T> | Promise<ZodSafeParseResult<any, any, T>>\n}\n\ntype DefaultInput<Target extends keyof ValidationTargets, In, Out> = {\n  in: HasUndefined<In> extends true\n    ? {\n        [K in Target]?: [In] extends [ValidationTargets[K]] ? In : InferInput<In, K>\n      }\n    : {\n        [K in Target]: [In] extends [ValidationTargets[K]] ? In : InferInput<In, K>\n      }\n  out: { [K in Target]: Out }\n}\n\n// without hook (with or without options)\nfunction zValidatorFunction<\n  T extends ZodSchema,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  In = zInput<T>,\n  Out = zOutput<T>,\n  I extends Input = DefaultInput<Target, In, Out>,\n  V extends I = I,\n>(\n  target: Target,\n  schema: T,\n  hook?: undefined,\n  options?: ValidationFunctionOption<T, Target>\n): MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ZodValidatorFailureResponse<T>>\n\n// with hook and options\nfunction zValidatorFunction<\n  T extends ZodSchema,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  HookFn extends Hook<InferredValue, E, P, Target, {}, T>,\n  In = zInput<T>,\n  Out = zOutput<T>,\n  I extends Input = DefaultInput<Target, In, Out>,\n  V extends I = I,\n  InferredValue = zInfer<T>,\n>(\n  target: Target,\n  schema: T,\n  hook?: HookFn,\n  options?: ValidationFunctionOption<T, Target>\n): MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ExtractValidationResponse<HookFn>>\n\n// implementation\nfunction zValidatorFunction<\n  T extends ZodSchema,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  HookFn extends Hook<InferredValue, E, P, Target, {}, T>,\n  In = zInput<T>,\n  Out = zOutput<T>,\n  I extends Input = DefaultInput<Target, In, Out>,\n  V extends I = I,\n  InferredValue = zInfer<T>,\n>(\n  target: Target,\n  schema: T,\n  hook?: HookFn,\n  options?: ValidationFunctionOption<T, Target>\n):\n  | MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ZodValidatorFailureResponse<T>>\n  | MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ExtractValidationResponse<HookFn>> {\n  // @ts-expect-error not typed well\n  return validator(target, async (value: ValidationTargets[Target], c) => {\n    let validatorValue = value\n\n    // in case where our `target` === `header`, Hono parses all of the headers into lowercase.\n    // this might not match the Zod schema, so we want to make sure that we account for that when parsing the schema.\n    if ((target === 'header' && '_def' in schema) || (target === 'header' && '_zod' in schema)) {\n      // create an object that maps lowercase schema keys to lowercase\n      // @ts-expect-error the schema is a Zod Schema\n      const schemaKeys = Object.keys('in' in schema ? schema.in.shape : schema.shape)\n      const caseInsensitiveKeymap = Object.fromEntries(\n        schemaKeys.map((key) => [key.toLowerCase(), key])\n      )\n\n      validatorValue = Object.fromEntries(\n        Object.entries(value).map(([key, value]) => [caseInsensitiveKeymap[key] || key, value])\n      )\n    }\n\n    const result =\n      options && options.validationFunction\n        ? await options.validationFunction(schema, validatorValue)\n        : // @ts-expect-error z4.$ZodType has safeParseAsync\n          await schema.safeParseAsync(validatorValue)\n\n    if (hook) {\n      const hookResult = await hook({ data: validatorValue, ...result, target }, c)\n      if (hookResult) {\n        if (hookResult instanceof Response) {\n          return hookResult\n        }\n\n        if ('response' in hookResult) {\n          return hookResult.response\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!result.success) {\n      return c.json(result, 400)\n    }\n\n    return result.data as zInfer<T>\n  })\n}\n\nexport const zValidator: typeof zValidatorFunction = zValidatorFunction\n","/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/hono\n *\n * Hono subpath for the auto-generated API epic (#835). Walks the\n * registry of a built `Act` once at function call and emits a Hono\n * app with one `POST /actions/<name>` route per registered action,\n * Zod-validated bodies, and the shared error envelope.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { hono } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/hono\";\n *\n * const api = hono(app, {\n *   actor: (c) => ({ id: c.req.header(\"x-user-id\")!, name: \"...\" }),\n *   stream: (action, input, c) => `tenant-${c.req.header(\"x-tenant\")}`,\n * });\n *\n * // Mounts at /api by default — pass `basePath` to override.\n * // POST /api/actions/OpenTicket  body: { title }  → 200 Snapshot[] | 4xx ApiError\n * ```\n *\n * The route shape matches the flat tRPC sibling at\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/trpc`: one endpoint per action, no\n * state-name tier. Action names are unique across the registry —\n * the framework enforces no duplicates — so an extra namespace\n * level would be overhead. Queries live in a follow-up; this\n * slice is mutations only.\n *\n * **Actor lives on the context.** The generator wires an internal\n * middleware that runs the host's\n * {@link HonoOptions.actor | actor extractor} once per call and\n * stashes the resolved {@link Actor} under `c.get(\"actor\")`. Every\n * generated route reads from there — auth resolves at one seam,\n * downstream middleware (logging, tracing) sees the same actor.\n * The middleware factory is also exported as {@link authenticated}\n * for hosts that want to compose it into their own Hono chain\n * alongside hand-written routes.\n *\n * Composes the shared utilities at `@rotorsoft/act-http/api`:\n * {@link ActorExtractor} for the auth seam, {@link toApiError} for\n * the uniform error → status / code mapping, {@link withIdempotency}\n * for `Idempotency-Key` dedup. Three transports (tRPC, this one,\n * OpenAPI) ride the same utilities so a client speaking two of\n * them never sees two shapes for the same framework error.\n */\nimport { zValidator } from \"@hono/zod-validator\";\nimport type { Actor, Target } from \"@rotorsoft/act\";\nimport type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { streamSSE } from \"hono/streaming\";\nimport {\n  type ActorExtractor,\n  type ApiError,\n  fireAndForget,\n  resolveSseConfig,\n  runSseSubscription,\n  SseConnectionCounter,\n  type SseOptions,\n  toApiError,\n  withIdempotency,\n} from \"../api/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Hono context variables this subpath contributes. The generic on\n * the returned middleware threads it through so routes downstream\n * of {@link authenticated} see `c.get(\"actor\")` typed without a\n * manual cast.\n */\nexport type ActMiddlewareVariables = {\n  actor: Actor;\n};\n\n/**\n * Per-call options for {@link hono}. The host supplies the four\n * seams the package can't make decisions on:\n *\n * - `actor` — auth resolver. Receives the Hono context, returns the\n *   `Actor` that flows onto `c.get(\"actor\")` for every generated\n *   route (via an internal {@link authenticated}).\n * - `stream` — stream-id resolver. Receives the action name, the\n *   validated body, and the Hono context; returns the target\n *   stream. Singleton aggregates return a constant; per-tenant\n *   aggregates pull from headers, path, or body.\n * - `expectedVersion` (optional) — optimistic-concurrency resolver.\n *   Hosts typically read it from an `If-Match` header on the\n *   request, or from the client's last-known snapshot. Returning\n *   `undefined` skips the check for that call — handy when only\n *   some actions are concurrency-sensitive.\n * - `idempotency` (optional) — when set, the route honors\n *   `Idempotency-Key` via {@link withIdempotency}. The host\n *   supplies the `IdempotencyStore`; `keyFrom` defaults to reading\n *   the `Idempotency-Key` header. On a duplicate claim, the route\n *   responds `409 Conflict` — the contract intentionally doesn't\n *   cache the original handler's result, matching the\n *   receiver-side \"ack the duplicate\" semantics.\n * - `basePath` (optional, default `\"/api\"`) — Hono basePath the\n *   routes mount under.\n */\nexport type HonoOptions = {\n  readonly actor: ActorExtractor;\n  readonly stream: (\n    action_name: string,\n    input: unknown,\n    c: Context\n  ) => string | Promise<string>;\n  readonly expectedVersion?: (\n    action_name: string,\n    input: unknown,\n    c: Context\n  ) => number | undefined | Promise<number | undefined>;\n  readonly idempotency?: {\n    readonly store: IdempotencyStore;\n    readonly keyFrom?: (c: Context) => string | undefined;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Optional SSE wiring. When set, the generator emits one\n   * `GET <basePath>/sse/<stateName>?stream=<streamId>` per unique\n   * state name in the registry. The endpoint runs the host\n   * {@link actor} extractor, looks up the streamId from\n   * `?stream=...`, opens a `text/event-stream`, yields the cached\n   * state (if any), and forwards every patch published to the\n   * shared {@link SseOptions.channel}. A heartbeat keeps proxies\n   * from idling the connection out; the per-process connection cap\n   * returns `503 Service Unavailable` (with `Retry-After: 1`) when\n   * full so operators never see silent stalls.\n   *\n   * Off by default — most APIs don't expose live state to every\n   * client, and opening one is widening both the auth and cost\n   * surface.\n   */\n  readonly sse?: SseOptions;\n  readonly basePath?: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that runs an {@link ActorExtractor} once\n * per call and stashes the resolved {@link Actor} under\n * `c.set(\"actor\", ...)` so downstream routes can read it via\n * `c.get(\"actor\")`. The generator at {@link hono} uses this\n * internally; it's also exported so hosts that want to compose\n * their own route chain (logging, tracing, custom auth flavors)\n * can wire it directly:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { authenticated, type ActMiddlewareVariables } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/hono\";\n *\n * const api = new Hono<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }>();\n * api.use(\"*\", authenticated((c) => resolveUserFromJwt(c)));\n * api.get(\"/me\", (c) => c.json(c.get(\"actor\"))); // typed\n * ```\n *\n * Errors thrown by the extractor surface as `401 Unauthorized` with\n * the shared {@link ApiError} envelope.\n */\nexport function authenticated(\n  extractor: ActorExtractor\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }> {\n  return async (c, next) => {\n    try {\n      const actor = await extractor(c);\n      c.set(\"actor\", actor);\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      const body: ApiError = {\n        error: \"Unauthorized\",\n        detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : undefined,\n        code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n      };\n      return c.json(body, 401);\n    }\n  };\n}\n\nconst default_key_from = (c: Context): string | undefined =>\n  c.req.header(\"idempotency-key\");\n\n/**\n * Build a typed Hono REST surface from a built `Act` instance.\n *\n * Walks `app.registry.actions` once and emits one\n * `POST /actions/<actionName>` per action under the configured\n * `basePath` (default `/api`). Each route:\n *\n * 1. Runs the internal {@link authenticated} middleware —\n *    `options.actor` resolves the {@link Actor} once and stashes\n *    it under `c.get(\"actor\")`.\n * 2. Validates the JSON body against the action's Zod schema via\n *    `@hono/zod-validator`. Failures short-circuit with `422`.\n * 3. Resolves the target stream via\n *    `options.stream(name, input, c)`.\n * 4. (Optionally) resolves `expectedVersion` for optimistic\n *    concurrency.\n * 5. (Optionally) claims the `Idempotency-Key` via\n *    {@link withIdempotency} — responds `409` on duplicate.\n * 6. Calls\n *    `app.do(name, { stream, actor, expectedVersion? }, input)`.\n * 7. Maps any thrown framework error onto the shared\n *    {@link ApiError} envelope via {@link toApiError}, returning\n *    the conventional HTTP status (`409` / `412` for concurrency,\n *    `422` for validation, `400` for non-retryable, etc.).\n *\n * @param app A built `Act` orchestrator.\n * @param options Auth, stream, expected-version, idempotency, and\n *   base-path seams.\n * @returns A Hono app covering every registered action under\n *   `<basePath>/actions/<name>`.\n */\n/**\n * Structural shape of the Act surface this generator walks at\n * runtime — the registry's action-name → owning-state map plus the\n * `do(...)` dispatch. Letting TApp infer to the caller's concrete\n * `Act<...>` against this structural bound keeps nested variance\n * out of the signature and avoids `any` in either direction.\n *\n * @internal\n */\ntype ActSurface = {\n  readonly registry: {\n    actions: Record<\n      string,\n      {\n        readonly name: string;\n        readonly actions: Record<string, unknown>;\n      }\n    >;\n  };\n  do(action: string, target: Target, payload: unknown): Promise<unknown>;\n};\n\nexport function hono<TApp extends ActSurface = ActSurface>(\n  app: TApp,\n  options: HonoOptions\n): Hono<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }> {\n  const base_path = options.basePath ?? \"/api\";\n  const api = new Hono<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }>().basePath(\n    base_path\n  );\n  api.use(\"*\", authenticated(options.actor));\n\n  const key_from = options.idempotency?.keyFrom ?? default_key_from;\n\n  // Wire SSE subscriptions before the mutation routes so the\n  // `/sse/*` paths sit alongside `/actions/*`. The cap counter is\n  // shared by every state-name's GET route on this generator\n  // instance so a noisy room on one state doesn't get a free pass\n  // on another.\n  if (options.sse) {\n    const sse_config = resolveSseConfig(options.sse);\n    const sse_counter = new SseConnectionCounter(sse_config.maxConnections);\n    const state_names = new Set<string>();\n    for (const action of Object.values(app.registry.actions)) {\n      state_names.add(action.name);\n    }\n    for (const state_name of state_names) {\n      api.get(`/sse/${state_name}`, async (c) => {\n        const stream_id = c.req.query(\"stream\");\n        if (!stream_id) {\n          const body: ApiError = {\n            error: \"BadRequest\",\n            detail: \"stream query parameter is required\",\n            code: \"BAD_REQUEST\",\n          };\n          return c.json(body, 400);\n        }\n        if (!sse_counter.acquire()) {\n          c.header(\"Retry-After\", \"1\");\n          const body: ApiError = {\n            error: \"ServiceUnavailable\",\n            detail: \"max concurrent SSE connections reached\",\n            code: \"SSE_BUSY\",\n          };\n          return c.json(body, 503);\n        }\n        // The route already acquired the slot above so streamSSE\n        // could return `503` before writing headers if the cap was\n        // full. The shared loop runs without accounting; the route\n        // releases the slot in `finally`.\n        const controller = new AbortController();\n        return streamSSE(c, async (sse_stream) => {\n          sse_stream.onAbort(() => controller.abort());\n          const heartbeat = setInterval(() => {\n            fireAndForget(() =>\n              sse_stream.writeSSE({ event: \"ping\", data: \"\" })\n            );\n          }, sse_config.heartbeatMs);\n          try {\n            for await (const frame of runSseSubscription(\n              sse_config.channel,\n              stream_id,\n              undefined,\n              controller.signal,\n              { maxPending: sse_config.maxPendingPerConnection }\n            )) {\n              await sse_stream.writeSSE({\n                event: frame.kind,\n                data: JSON.stringify(frame.data),\n              });\n            }\n          } finally {\n            clearInterval(heartbeat);\n            sse_counter.release();\n          }\n        });\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  for (const [action_name, state] of Object.entries(app.registry.actions)) {\n    const schema = state.actions[action_name];\n    api.post(\n      `/actions/${action_name}`,\n      // Custom hook funnels body-schema failures through the same\n      // ApiError envelope + 422 status an in-`do` ValidationError maps\n      // to (ERROR_MAP.ValidationError). Without it, @hono/zod-validator\n      // short-circuits with its own 400 + raw body — two statuses and\n      // two shapes for the same \"malformed input\" failure class on one\n      // endpoint. The OpenAPI doc only documents the 422/ApiError path.\n      zValidator(\"json\", schema as never, (result, c) => {\n        if (!result.success) {\n          // `result.error` is a ZodError; the schema's `never` typing\n          // erases its shape, so read `.message` through a narrow cast.\n          const message = (result.error as { message?: string }).message;\n          const body: ApiError = {\n            error: \"ValidationError\",\n            detail: message,\n            code: \"VALIDATION\",\n          };\n          return c.json(body, 422);\n        }\n      }),\n      async (c) => {\n        try {\n          const input = c.req.valid(\"json\" as never) as unknown;\n          const actor = c.get(\"actor\");\n          const stream = await options.stream(action_name, input, c);\n          const expected_version = options.expectedVersion\n            ? await options.expectedVersion(action_name, input, c)\n            : undefined;\n          const target =\n            expected_version === undefined\n              ? { stream, actor }\n              : { stream, actor, expectedVersion: expected_version };\n\n          if (options.idempotency) {\n            const key = key_from(c);\n            if (!key) {\n              const body: ApiError = {\n                error: \"BadRequest\",\n                detail: \"Idempotency-Key required\",\n                code: \"BAD_REQUEST\",\n              };\n              return c.json(body, 400);\n            }\n            const outcome = await withIdempotency(\n              options.idempotency.store,\n              key,\n              () =>\n                app.do(action_name as never, target as never, input as never)\n            );\n            if (outcome.deduped) {\n              const body: ApiError = {\n                error: \"Conflict\",\n                detail:\n                  \"Idempotency-Key already used; 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Extract<v4ZodSafeParseResult<v4.output<T>>, { success: false }>\n  : T extends v3.ZodType\n    ? Extract<v3.SafeParseReturnType<v3.input<T>, v3.output<T>>, { success: false }>\n    : never\n\ntype ZodValidatorFailureResponse<T extends ZodSchema> = Response &\n  TypedResponse<ZodValidatorFailureBody<T>, 400, 'json'>\n\nexport type Hook<\n  T,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets = keyof ValidationTargets,\n  O = {},\n  Schema extends ZodSchema = any,\n> = (\n  result: ({ success: true; data: T } | { success: false; error: ZodError<Schema>; data: T }) & {\n    target: Target\n  },\n  c: Context<E, P>\n) => Response | void | TypedResponse<O> | Promise<Response | void | TypedResponse<O>>\n\ntype HasUndefined<T> = undefined extends T ? true : false\n\ntype ExtractValidationResponse<VF> = VF extends (value: any, c: any) => infer R\n  ? R extends Promise<infer PR>\n    ? PR extends TypedResponse<infer T, infer S, infer F>\n      ? Response & TypedResponse<T, S, F>\n      : PR extends Response\n        ? PR\n        : PR extends undefined\n          ? never\n          : never\n    : R extends TypedResponse<infer T, infer S, infer F>\n      ? Response & TypedResponse<T, S, F>\n      : R extends Response\n        ? R\n        : R extends undefined\n          ? never\n          : never\n  : never\n\ntype ValidationFunctionOption<T extends ZodSchema, Target extends keyof ValidationTargets> = {\n  validationFunction: (\n    schema: T,\n    value: ValidationTargets[Target]\n  ) => ZodSafeParseResult<any, any, T> | Promise<ZodSafeParseResult<any, any, T>>\n}\n\ntype DefaultInput<Target extends keyof ValidationTargets, In, Out> = {\n  in: HasUndefined<In> extends true\n    ? {\n        [K in Target]?: [In] extends [ValidationTargets[K]] ? In : InferInput<In, K>\n      }\n    : {\n        [K in Target]: [In] extends [ValidationTargets[K]] ? In : InferInput<In, K>\n      }\n  out: { [K in Target]: Out }\n}\n\n// without hook (with or without options)\nfunction zValidatorFunction<\n  T extends ZodSchema,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  In = zInput<T>,\n  Out = zOutput<T>,\n  I extends Input = DefaultInput<Target, In, Out>,\n  V extends I = I,\n>(\n  target: Target,\n  schema: T,\n  hook?: undefined,\n  options?: ValidationFunctionOption<T, Target>\n): MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ZodValidatorFailureResponse<T>>\n\n// with hook and options\nfunction zValidatorFunction<\n  T extends ZodSchema,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  HookFn extends Hook<InferredValue, E, P, Target, {}, T>,\n  In = zInput<T>,\n  Out = zOutput<T>,\n  I extends Input = DefaultInput<Target, In, Out>,\n  V extends I = I,\n  InferredValue = zInfer<T>,\n>(\n  target: Target,\n  schema: T,\n  hook?: HookFn,\n  options?: ValidationFunctionOption<T, Target>\n): MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ExtractValidationResponse<HookFn>>\n\n// implementation\nfunction zValidatorFunction<\n  T extends ZodSchema,\n  Target extends keyof ValidationTargets,\n  E extends Env,\n  P extends string,\n  HookFn extends Hook<InferredValue, E, P, Target, {}, T>,\n  In = zInput<T>,\n  Out = zOutput<T>,\n  I extends Input = DefaultInput<Target, In, Out>,\n  V extends I = I,\n  InferredValue = zInfer<T>,\n>(\n  target: Target,\n  schema: T,\n  hook?: HookFn,\n  options?: ValidationFunctionOption<T, Target>\n):\n  | MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ZodValidatorFailureResponse<T>>\n  | MiddlewareHandler<E, P, V, ExtractValidationResponse<HookFn>> {\n  // @ts-expect-error not typed well\n  return validator(target, async (value: ValidationTargets[Target], c) => {\n    let validatorValue = value\n\n    // in case where our `target` === `header`, Hono parses all of the headers into lowercase.\n    // this might not match the Zod schema, so we want to make sure that we account for that when parsing the schema.\n    if ((target === 'header' && '_def' in schema) || (target === 'header' && '_zod' in schema)) {\n      // create an object that maps lowercase schema keys to lowercase\n      // @ts-expect-error the schema is a Zod Schema\n      const schemaKeys = Object.keys('in' in schema ? schema.in.shape : schema.shape)\n      const caseInsensitiveKeymap = Object.fromEntries(\n        schemaKeys.map((key) => [key.toLowerCase(), key])\n      )\n\n      validatorValue = Object.fromEntries(\n        Object.entries(value).map(([key, value]) => [caseInsensitiveKeymap[key] || key, value])\n      )\n    }\n\n    const result =\n      options && options.validationFunction\n        ? await options.validationFunction(schema, validatorValue)\n        : // @ts-expect-error z4.$ZodType has safeParseAsync\n          await schema.safeParseAsync(validatorValue)\n\n    if (hook) {\n      const hookResult = await hook({ data: validatorValue, ...result, target }, c)\n      if (hookResult) {\n        if (hookResult instanceof Response) {\n          return hookResult\n        }\n\n        if ('response' in hookResult) {\n          return hookResult.response\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!result.success) {\n      return c.json(result, 400)\n    }\n\n    return result.data as zInfer<T>\n  })\n}\n\nexport const zValidator: typeof zValidatorFunction = zValidatorFunction\n","/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/hono\n *\n * Hono subpath for the auto-generated API epic (#835). Walks the\n * registry of a built `Act` once at function call and emits a Hono\n * app with one `POST /actions/<name>` route per registered action,\n * Zod-validated bodies, and the shared error envelope.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { hono } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/hono\";\n *\n * const api = hono(app, {\n *   actor: (c) => ({ id: c.req.header(\"x-user-id\")!, name: \"...\" }),\n *   stream: (action, input, c) => `tenant-${c.req.header(\"x-tenant\")}`,\n * });\n *\n * // Mounts at /api by default — pass `basePath` to override.\n * // POST /api/actions/OpenTicket  body: { title }  → 200 Snapshot[] | 4xx ApiError\n * ```\n *\n * The route shape matches the flat tRPC sibling at\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/trpc`: one endpoint per action, no\n * state-name tier. Action names are unique across the registry —\n * the framework enforces no duplicates — so an extra namespace\n * level would be overhead. Queries live in a follow-up; this\n * slice is mutations only.\n *\n * **Actor lives on the context.** The generator wires an internal\n * middleware that runs the host's\n * {@link HonoOptions.actor | actor extractor} once per call and\n * stashes the resolved {@link Actor} under `c.get(\"actor\")`. Every\n * generated route reads from there — auth resolves at one seam,\n * downstream middleware (logging, tracing) sees the same actor.\n * The middleware factory is also exported as {@link authenticated}\n * for hosts that want to compose it into their own Hono chain\n * alongside hand-written routes.\n *\n * Composes the shared utilities at `@rotorsoft/act-http/api`:\n * {@link ActorExtractor} for the auth seam, {@link toApiError} for\n * the uniform error → status / code mapping, {@link withIdempotency}\n * for `Idempotency-Key` dedup. Three transports (tRPC, this one,\n * OpenAPI) ride the same utilities so a client speaking two of\n * them never sees two shapes for the same framework error.\n */\nimport { zValidator } from \"@hono/zod-validator\";\nimport type { Actor, Target } from \"@rotorsoft/act\";\nimport type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { streamSSE } from \"hono/streaming\";\nimport {\n  type ActorExtractor,\n  type ApiError,\n  fireAndForget,\n  resolveSseConfig,\n  runSseSubscription,\n  SseConnectionCounter,\n  type SseOptions,\n  toApiError,\n  withIdempotency,\n} from \"../api/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Hono context variables this subpath contributes. The generic on\n * the returned middleware threads it through so routes downstream\n * of {@link authenticated} see `c.get(\"actor\")` typed without a\n * manual cast.\n */\nexport type ActMiddlewareVariables = {\n  actor: Actor;\n};\n\n/**\n * Per-call options for {@link hono}. The host supplies the four\n * seams the package can't make decisions on:\n *\n * - `actor` — auth resolver. Receives the Hono context, returns the\n *   `Actor` that flows onto `c.get(\"actor\")` for every generated\n *   route (via an internal {@link authenticated}).\n * - `stream` — stream-id resolver. Receives the action name, the\n *   validated body, and the Hono context; returns the target\n *   stream. Singleton aggregates return a constant; per-tenant\n *   aggregates pull from headers, path, or body.\n * - `expectedVersion` (optional) — optimistic-concurrency resolver.\n *   Hosts typically read it from an `If-Match` header on the\n *   request, or from the client's last-known snapshot. Returning\n *   `undefined` skips the check for that call — handy when only\n *   some actions are concurrency-sensitive.\n * - `idempotency` (optional) — when set, the route honors\n *   `Idempotency-Key` via {@link withIdempotency}. The host\n *   supplies the `IdempotencyStore`; `keyFrom` defaults to reading\n *   the `Idempotency-Key` header. On a duplicate claim, the route\n *   responds `409 Conflict` — the contract intentionally doesn't\n *   cache the original handler's result, matching the\n *   receiver-side \"ack the duplicate\" semantics.\n * - `basePath` (optional, default `\"/api\"`) — Hono basePath the\n *   routes mount under.\n */\nexport type HonoOptions = {\n  readonly actor: ActorExtractor;\n  readonly stream: (\n    action_name: string,\n    input: unknown,\n    c: Context\n  ) => string | Promise<string>;\n  readonly expectedVersion?: (\n    action_name: string,\n    input: unknown,\n    c: Context\n  ) => number | undefined | Promise<number | undefined>;\n  readonly idempotency?: {\n    readonly store: IdempotencyStore;\n    readonly keyFrom?: (c: Context) => string | undefined;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Optional SSE wiring. When set, the generator emits one\n   * `GET <basePath>/sse/<stateName>?stream=<streamId>` per unique\n   * state name in the registry. The endpoint runs the host\n   * {@link actor} extractor, looks up the streamId from\n   * `?stream=...`, opens a `text/event-stream`, yields the cached\n   * state (if any), and forwards every patch published to the\n   * shared {@link SseOptions.channel}. A heartbeat keeps proxies\n   * from idling the connection out; the per-process connection cap\n   * returns `503 Service Unavailable` (with `Retry-After: 1`) when\n   * full so operators never see silent stalls.\n   *\n   * Off by default — most APIs don't expose live state to every\n   * client, and opening one is widening both the auth and cost\n   * surface.\n   */\n  readonly sse?: SseOptions;\n  readonly basePath?: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that runs an {@link ActorExtractor} once\n * per call and stashes the resolved {@link Actor} under\n * `c.set(\"actor\", ...)` so downstream routes can read it via\n * `c.get(\"actor\")`. The generator at {@link hono} uses this\n * internally; it's also exported so hosts that want to compose\n * their own route chain (logging, tracing, custom auth flavors)\n * can wire it directly:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { authenticated, type ActMiddlewareVariables } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/hono\";\n *\n * const api = new Hono<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }>();\n * api.use(\"*\", authenticated((c) => resolveUserFromJwt(c)));\n * api.get(\"/me\", (c) => c.json(c.get(\"actor\"))); // typed\n * ```\n *\n * Errors thrown by the extractor surface as `401 Unauthorized` with\n * the shared {@link ApiError} envelope.\n */\nexport function authenticated(\n  extractor: ActorExtractor\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }> {\n  return async (c, next) => {\n    try {\n      const actor = await extractor(c);\n      c.set(\"actor\", actor);\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      const body: ApiError = {\n        error: \"Unauthorized\",\n        detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : undefined,\n        code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n      };\n      return c.json(body, 401);\n    }\n  };\n}\n\nconst default_key_from = (c: Context): string | undefined =>\n  c.req.header(\"idempotency-key\");\n\n/**\n * Build a typed Hono REST surface from a built `Act` instance.\n *\n * Walks `app.registry.actions` once and emits one\n * `POST /actions/<actionName>` per action under the configured\n * `basePath` (default `/api`). Each route:\n *\n * 1. Runs the internal {@link authenticated} middleware —\n *    `options.actor` resolves the {@link Actor} once and stashes\n *    it under `c.get(\"actor\")`.\n * 2. Validates the JSON body against the action's Zod schema via\n *    `@hono/zod-validator`. Failures short-circuit with `422`.\n * 3. Resolves the target stream via\n *    `options.stream(name, input, c)`.\n * 4. (Optionally) resolves `expectedVersion` for optimistic\n *    concurrency.\n * 5. (Optionally) claims the `Idempotency-Key` via\n *    {@link withIdempotency} — responds `409` on duplicate.\n * 6. Calls\n *    `app.do(name, { stream, actor, expectedVersion? }, input)`.\n * 7. Maps any thrown framework error onto the shared\n *    {@link ApiError} envelope via {@link toApiError}, returning\n *    the conventional HTTP status (`409` / `412` for concurrency,\n *    `422` for validation, `400` for non-retryable, etc.).\n *\n * @param app A built `Act` orchestrator.\n * @param options Auth, stream, expected-version, idempotency, and\n *   base-path seams.\n * @returns A Hono app covering every registered action under\n *   `<basePath>/actions/<name>`.\n */\n/**\n * Structural shape of the Act surface this generator walks at\n * runtime — the registry's action-name → owning-state map plus the\n * `do(...)` dispatch. Letting TApp infer to the caller's concrete\n * `Act<...>` against this structural bound keeps nested variance\n * out of the signature and avoids `any` in either direction.\n *\n * @internal\n */\ntype ActSurface = {\n  readonly registry: {\n    actions: Record<\n      string,\n      {\n        readonly name: string;\n        readonly actions: Record<string, unknown>;\n      }\n    >;\n  };\n  do(action: string, target: Target, payload: unknown): Promise<unknown>;\n};\n\nexport function hono<TApp extends ActSurface = ActSurface>(\n  app: TApp,\n  options: HonoOptions\n): Hono<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }> {\n  const base_path = options.basePath ?? \"/api\";\n  const api = new Hono<{ Variables: ActMiddlewareVariables }>().basePath(\n    base_path\n  );\n  api.use(\"*\", authenticated(options.actor));\n\n  const key_from = options.idempotency?.keyFrom ?? default_key_from;\n\n  // Wire SSE subscriptions before the mutation routes so the\n  // `/sse/*` paths sit alongside `/actions/*`. The cap counter is\n  // shared by every state-name's GET route on this generator\n  // instance so a noisy room on one state doesn't get a free pass\n  // on another.\n  if (options.sse) {\n    const sse_config = resolveSseConfig(options.sse);\n    const sse_counter = new SseConnectionCounter(sse_config.maxConnections);\n    const state_names = new Set<string>();\n    for (const action of Object.values(app.registry.actions)) {\n      state_names.add(action.name);\n    }\n    for (const state_name of state_names) {\n      api.get(`/sse/${state_name}`, async (c) => {\n        const stream_id = c.req.query(\"stream\");\n        if (!stream_id) {\n          const body: ApiError = {\n            error: \"BadRequest\",\n            detail: \"stream query parameter is required\",\n            code: \"BAD_REQUEST\",\n          };\n          return c.json(body, 400);\n        }\n        if (!sse_counter.acquire()) {\n          c.header(\"Retry-After\", \"1\");\n          const body: ApiError = {\n            error: \"ServiceUnavailable\",\n            detail: \"max concurrent SSE connections reached\",\n            code: \"SSE_BUSY\",\n          };\n          return c.json(body, 503);\n        }\n        // The route already acquired the slot above so streamSSE\n        // could return `503` before writing headers if the cap was\n        // full. The shared loop runs without accounting; the route\n        // releases the slot in `finally`.\n        const controller = new AbortController();\n        return streamSSE(c, async (sse_stream) => {\n          sse_stream.onAbort(() => controller.abort());\n          const heartbeat = setInterval(() => {\n            fireAndForget(() =>\n              sse_stream.writeSSE({ event: \"ping\", data: \"\" })\n            );\n          }, sse_config.heartbeatMs);\n          try {\n            for await (const frame of runSseSubscription(\n              sse_config.channel,\n              stream_id,\n              undefined,\n              controller.signal,\n              { maxPending: sse_config.maxPendingPerConnection }\n            )) {\n              await sse_stream.writeSSE({\n                event: frame.kind,\n                data: JSON.stringify(frame.data),\n              });\n            }\n          } finally {\n            clearInterval(heartbeat);\n            sse_counter.release();\n          }\n        });\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  for (const [action_name, state] of Object.entries(app.registry.actions)) {\n    const schema = state.actions[action_name];\n    api.post(\n      `/actions/${action_name}`,\n      // Custom hook funnels body-schema failures through the same\n      // ApiError envelope + 422 status an in-`do` ValidationError maps\n      // to (ERROR_MAP.ValidationError). Without it, @hono/zod-validator\n      // short-circuits with its own 400 + raw body — two statuses and\n      // two shapes for the same \"malformed input\" failure class on one\n      // endpoint. The OpenAPI doc only documents the 422/ApiError path.\n      zValidator(\"json\", schema as never, (result, c) => {\n        if (!result.success) {\n          // `result.error` is a ZodError; the schema's `never` typing\n          // erases its shape, so read `.message` through a narrow cast.\n          const message = (result.error as { message?: string }).message;\n          const body: ApiError = {\n            error: \"ValidationError\",\n            detail: message,\n            code: \"VALIDATION\",\n          };\n          return c.json(body, 422);\n        }\n      }),\n      async (c) => {\n        try {\n          const input = c.req.valid(\"json\" as never) as unknown;\n          const actor = c.get(\"actor\");\n          const stream = await options.stream(action_name, input, c);\n          const expected_version = options.expectedVersion\n            ? await options.expectedVersion(action_name, input, c)\n            : undefined;\n          const target =\n            expected_version === undefined\n              ? { stream, actor }\n              : { stream, actor, expectedVersion: expected_version };\n\n          if (options.idempotency) {\n            const key = key_from(c);\n            if (!key) {\n              const body: ApiError = {\n                error: \"BadRequest\",\n                detail: \"Idempotency-Key required\",\n                code: \"BAD_REQUEST\",\n              };\n              return c.json(body, 400);\n            }\n            const outcome = await withIdempotency(\n              options.idempotency.store,\n              key,\n              () =>\n                app.do(action_name as never, target as never, input as never)\n            );\n            if (outcome.deduped) {\n              const body: ApiError = {\n                error: \"Conflict\",\n                detail:\n                  \"Idempotency-Key already used; original result not cached\",\n                code: \"CONFLICT\",\n              };\n              return c.json(body, 409);\n            }\n            return c.json(outcome.result);\n          }\n\n          const snapshots = await app.do(\n            action_name as never,\n            target as never,\n            input as never\n          );\n          return c.json(snapshots);\n        } catch (err) {\n          const { status, body } = toApiError(err);\n          // Hono types narrow `status` to its known status-number union;\n          // `toApiError` returns a numeric status from a closed set that\n          // matches but TypeScript can't prove it through the union.\n          return c.json(body, status as 400 | 409 | 410 | 412 | 422 | 500);\n        }\n      }\n    );\n  }\n\n  return api;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuHA,SAAS,mBAYP,QACA,QACA,MACA,SAGgE;AAEhE,SAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAkC,MAAM;AACtE,QAAI,iBAAiB;AAIrB,QAAK,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU,UAAY,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU,QAAS;AAG1F,YAAM,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK;AAC9E,YAAM,wBAAwB,OAAO,YACnC,WAAW,IAAA,CAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,YAAY,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,CAClD;AAEA,uBAAiB,OAAO,YACtB,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,KAAKA,MAAA,MAAW,CAAC,sBAAsB,GAAA,KAAQ,KAAKA,MAAK,CAAC,CACxF;IACF;AAEA,UAAM,SACJ,WAAW,QAAQ,qBACf,MAAM,QAAQ,mBAAmB,QAAQ,cAAc,IAEvD,MAAM,OAAO,eAAe,cAAc;AAEhD,QAAI,MAAM;AACR,YAAM,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK;QAAE,MAAM;QAAgB,GAAG;QAAQ;MAAO,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5E,UAAI,YAAY;AACd,YAAI,sBAAsB,SACxB,QAAO;AAGT,YAAI,cAAc,WAChB,QAAO,WAAW;MAEtB;IACF;AAEA,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,QACV,QAAO,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAG3B,WAAO,OAAO;EAChB,CAAC;AACH;AAEA,IAAa,aAAwC;;;ACrIrD,SAAS,YAAY;AACrB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AA0GnB,SAAS,cACd,WAC0D;AAC1D,SAAO,OAAO,GAAG,SAAS;AACxB,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAC/B,QAAE,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK;AACpB,YAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAM,OAAiB;AAAA,QACrB,OAAO;AAAA,QACP,QAAQ,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,QAC7C,MAAM;AAAA,MACR;AACA,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,IAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC,MACxB,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAuDzB,SAAS,KACd,KACA,SAC6C;AAC7C,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,YAAY;AACtC,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAA4C,EAAE;AAAA,IAC5D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,KAAK,cAAc,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAEzC,QAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,aAAa,WAAW;AAOjD,MAAI,QAAQ,KAAK;AACf,UAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC/C,UAAM,cAAc,IAAI,qBAAqB,WAAW,cAAc;AACtE,UAAM,cAAc,oBAAI,IAAY;AACpC,eAAW,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG;AACxD,kBAAY,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IAC7B;AACA,eAAW,cAAc,aAAa;AACpC,UAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACzC,cAAM,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ;AACtC,YAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,gBAAM,OAAiB;AAAA,YACrB,OAAO;AAAA,YACP,QAAQ;AAAA,YACR,MAAM;AAAA,UACR;AACA,iBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,QACzB;AACA,YAAI,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1B,YAAE,OAAO,eAAe,GAAG;AAC3B,gBAAM,OAAiB;AAAA,YACrB,OAAO;AAAA,YACP,QAAQ;AAAA,YACR,MAAM;AAAA,UACR;AACA,iBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,QACzB;AAKA,cAAM,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACvC,eAAO,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,eAAe;AACxC,qBAAW,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC;AAC3C,gBAAM,YAAY,YAAY,MAAM;AAClC;AAAA,cAAc,MACZ,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,YACjD;AAAA,UACF,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW;AACzB,cAAI;AACF,6BAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,cACxB,WAAW;AAAA,cACX;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,cACA,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,EAAE,YAAY,WAAW,wBAAwB;AAAA,YACnD,GAAG;AACD,oBAAM,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,gBACxB,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,gBACb,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,cACjC,CAAC;AAAA,YACH;AAAA,UACF,UAAE;AACA,0BAAc,SAAS;AACvB,wBAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,UACtB;AAAA,QACF,CAAC;AAAA,MACH,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,aAAW,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG;AACvE,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW;AACxC,QAAI;AAAA,MACF,YAAY,WAAW;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAOvB,WAAW,QAAQ,QAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM;AACjD,YAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS;AAGnB,gBAAM,UAAW,OAAO,MAA+B;AACvD,gBAAM,OAAiB;AAAA,YACrB,OAAO;AAAA,YACP,QAAQ;AAAA,YACR,MAAM;AAAA,UACR;AACA,iBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,QACzB;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AAAA,MACD,OAAO,MAAM;AACX,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,MAAe;AACzC,gBAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO;AAC3B,gBAAM,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,aAAa,OAAO,CAAC;AACzD,gBAAM,mBAAmB,QAAQ,kBAC7B,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,aAAa,OAAO,CAAC,IACnD;AACJ,gBAAM,SACJ,qBAAqB,SACjB,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,IAChB,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,iBAAiB,iBAAiB;AAEzD,cAAI,QAAQ,aAAa;AACvB,kBAAM,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AACtB,gBAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,oBAAM,OAAiB;AAAA,gBACrB,OAAO;AAAA,gBACP,QAAQ;AAAA,gBACR,MAAM;AAAA,cACR;AACA,qBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,YACzB;AACA,kBAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,cACpB,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,cACpB;AAAA,cACA,MACE,IAAI,GAAG,aAAsB,QAAiB,KAAc;AAAA,YAChE;AACA,gBAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AACnB,oBAAM,OAAiB;AAAA,gBACrB,OAAO;AAAA,gBACP,QACE;AAAA,gBACF,MAAM;AAAA,cACR;AACA,qBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,YACzB;AACA,mBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,UAC9B;AAEA,gBAAM,YAAY,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,YAC1B;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,UACF;AACA,iBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,QACzB,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,gBAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAIvC,iBAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,MAA2C;AAAA,QACjE;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;","names":["value"]}

package/dist/receiver/hono/index.cjs

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ function webhookMiddleware(options) {
       await release();
       throw err;
     }
-    if (c.res.status >= 500) await release();
+    if (c.res.status >= 400) await release();
     else await commit();
   };
 }

package/dist/receiver/hono/index.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts","../../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../../src/receiver/check.ts","../../../src/receiver/finalize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Two-phase dedup**: the claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*.\n * Because Hono middleware wraps the downstream chain, this adapter\n * finalizes the claim automatically after `await next()`: a downstream\n * 2xx **commits** the key (later retries dedup); a 5xx or a thrown\n * handler **releases** it (the sender's retry re-processes instead of\n * being silently dropped). Operators who need explicit control can\n * still call `c.get(\"idempotency\").commit()` / `.release()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\nimport { make_finalizers } from \"../finalize.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n *\n * `commit` / `release` finalize the tentative claim — call one after\n * the handler resolves its outcome. This adapter also finalizes\n * automatically based on the response status, so explicit calls are\n * only needed when the auto-detection doesn't fit.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: {\n    key: string;\n    deduped: boolean;\n    commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n    release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    const { commit, release } = make_finalizers(\n      options.store,\n      result.key,\n      result.deduped\n    );\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n      commit,\n      release,\n    });\n    try {\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      await release();\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (c.res.status >= 500) await release();\n    else await commit();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    out[key] = value;\n  });\n  return out;\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * client/configuration errors (`missing-key`, `empty-body` — HTTP 400)\n * from the five verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401)\n * so each maps to its own telemetry bucket. `empty-body` is the\n * misconfigured-raw-parser signal: `secret` is set but the resolved\n * body is empty, so hashing it would compute an HMAC over `${ts}.` and\n * reject every otherwise-valid signed request with a misleading\n * bad-signature — a distinct config error is far easier to diagnose.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"empty-body\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    // Raw body not captured (default JSON parser ate the bytes) but a\n    // secret is configured — hashing the empty string is a guaranteed\n    // bad-signature. Surface a distinct configuration error instead of a\n    // misleading 401 so the operator mounts the raw-body parser.\n    if (body === \"\") {\n      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"empty-body\" };\n    }\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * The two-phase finalizers a receiver adapter binds to a single\n * inbound delivery. The claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*;\n * exactly one of these promotes or drops it once the business handler\n * resolves its outcome.\n */\nexport type Finalizers = {\n  /**\n   * Promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every later\n   * retry of this key dedups. Call on handler success.\n   */\n  commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Drop the tentative claim so the sender's retry re-processes.\n   * Call on transient handler failure.\n   */\n  release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build the {@link Finalizers} for one delivery.\n *\n * Guarantees:\n *\n * - **Deduped deliveries are inert.** When `deduped` is `true` the key\n *   was already committed by an earlier delivery; both finalizers are\n *   no-ops so a duplicate can never release someone else's committed\n *   claim.\n * - **Finalize-once.** After the first `commit` or `release` fires,\n *   further calls are no-ops — an adapter that both auto-finalizes and\n *   lets the operator call `commit()`/`release()` can't double-fire.\n */\nexport function make_finalizers(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  key: string,\n  deduped: boolean\n): Finalizers {\n  let settled = deduped;\n  return {\n    async commit() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.commit(key);\n    },\n    async release() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.release(key);\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;;;ACsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,yBAA4C;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe;AAClE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,mBAAe,+BAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC7C,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EACjC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,MAAI,KAAC,oCAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SACA,YACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC9CA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAKhC,QAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AACf,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IACxD;AACA,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;ACrEO,SAAS,gBACd,OACA,KACA,SACY;AACZ,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,SAAS;AACb,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,UAAU;AACd,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AJsBO,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,OAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,MACZ,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAChB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAM,QAAQ;AACd,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AACA,QAAI,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,IAAK,OAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QAClC,OAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EACpB;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts","../../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../../src/receiver/check.ts","../../../src/receiver/finalize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Two-phase dedup**: the claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*.\n * Because Hono middleware wraps the downstream chain, this adapter\n * finalizes the claim automatically after `await next()`: a downstream\n * 2xx/3xx **commits** the key (later retries dedup); any **4xx or 5xx**\n * (or a thrown handler) **releases** it, so the sender's corrected retry\n * re-processes instead of being silently dropped (#1364). Fail-safe is\n * toward reprocessing: releasing a deterministic 4xx costs bounded\n * re-delivery, while committing it would lose a delivery the handler\n * never accepted (the shipped `receiver()` returns 422 on a schema\n * mismatch, where the handler never runs). Operators who need explicit\n * control can still call `c.get(\"idempotency\").commit()` / `.release()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\nimport { make_finalizers } from \"../finalize.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n *\n * `commit` / `release` finalize the tentative claim — call one after\n * the handler resolves its outcome. This adapter also finalizes\n * automatically based on the response status, so explicit calls are\n * only needed when the auto-detection doesn't fit.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: {\n    key: string;\n    deduped: boolean;\n    commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n    release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    const { commit, release } = make_finalizers(\n      options.store,\n      result.key,\n      result.deduped\n    );\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n      commit,\n      release,\n    });\n    try {\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      await release();\n      throw err;\n    }\n    // Commit only a genuine success (2xx/3xx); release on any 4xx/5xx so a\n    // failed delivery's corrected same-key retry re-processes instead of being\n    // deduped into a silent success (#1364).\n    if (c.res.status >= 400) await release();\n    else await commit();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    out[key] = value;\n  });\n  return out;\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * client/configuration errors (`missing-key`, `empty-body` — HTTP 400)\n * from the five verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401)\n * so each maps to its own telemetry bucket. `empty-body` is the\n * misconfigured-raw-parser signal: `secret` is set but the resolved\n * body is empty, so hashing it would compute an HMAC over `${ts}.` and\n * reject every otherwise-valid signed request with a misleading\n * bad-signature — a distinct config error is far easier to diagnose.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"empty-body\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    // Raw body not captured (default JSON parser ate the bytes) but a\n    // secret is configured — hashing the empty string is a guaranteed\n    // bad-signature. Surface a distinct configuration error instead of a\n    // misleading 401 so the operator mounts the raw-body parser.\n    if (body === \"\") {\n      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"empty-body\" };\n    }\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * The two-phase finalizers a receiver adapter binds to a single\n * inbound delivery. The claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*;\n * exactly one of these promotes or drops it once the business handler\n * resolves its outcome.\n */\nexport type Finalizers = {\n  /**\n   * Promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every later\n   * retry of this key dedups. Call on handler success.\n   */\n  commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Drop the tentative claim so the sender's retry re-processes.\n   * Call on transient handler failure.\n   */\n  release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build the {@link Finalizers} for one delivery.\n *\n * Guarantees:\n *\n * - **Deduped deliveries are inert.** When `deduped` is `true` the key\n *   was already committed by an earlier delivery; both finalizers are\n *   no-ops so a duplicate can never release someone else's committed\n *   claim.\n * - **Finalize-once.** After the first `commit` or `release` fires,\n *   further calls are no-ops — an adapter that both auto-finalizes and\n *   lets the operator call `commit()`/`release()` can't double-fire.\n */\nexport function make_finalizers(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  key: string,\n  deduped: boolean\n): Finalizers {\n  let settled = deduped;\n  return {\n    async commit() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.commit(key);\n    },\n    async release() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.release(key);\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;;;ACsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,yBAA4C;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe;AAClE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,mBAAe,+BAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC7C,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EACjC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,MAAI,KAAC,oCAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SACA,YACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC9CA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAKhC,QAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AACf,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IACxD;AACA,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;ACrEO,SAAS,gBACd,OACA,KACA,SACY;AACZ,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,SAAS;AACb,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,UAAU;AACd,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AJ0BO,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,OAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,MACZ,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAChB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAM,QAAQ;AACd,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAIA,QAAI,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,IAAK,OAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QAClC,OAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EACpB;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/receiver/hono/index.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   webhookMiddleware
-} from "../../chunk-M7XFCGYR.js";
+} from "../../chunk-KC2NW7XQ.js";
 import "../../chunk-DMDU25DN.js";
 import "../../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {

package/dist/receiver/index.cjs

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ function webhookMiddleware(options) {
       await release();
       throw err;
     }
-    if (c.res.status >= 500) await release();
+    if (c.res.status >= 400) await release();
     else await commit();
   };
 }

package/dist/receiver/index.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/receiver/index.ts","../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../src/receiver/check.ts","../../src/receiver/start.ts","../../src/receiver/finalize.ts","../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver\n *\n * Server-side helpers for the inbound HTTP role — the receiver that\n * sits on the other end of an `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` POST.\n *\n * The subpath hosts two primitives today:\n *\n * - {@link extractIdempotencyKey} — case-insensitive\n *   `Idempotency-Key` parser; pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n *   from `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency` for dedup.\n * - {@link verifyWebhook} — HMAC-SHA256 signature + timestamp\n *   verifier; pair with `webhook({ secret })` from\n *   `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` for authenticated, replay-resistant\n *   delivery.\n *\n * The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these into request\n * handlers, plus per-framework adapters (tRPC / Express / Fastify /\n * Hono), lands in #744 (ACT-1116).\n *\n * Sibling subpaths in the same package:\n *\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` — the sender side: outbound POSTs,\n *   automatic `Idempotency-Key`, status-classified retries, optional\n *   HMAC signing.\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/sse` — incremental state broadcast over\n *   Server-Sent Events.\n *\n * The receiver subpath ships from the same package as `/webhook` so\n * a service that both sends and receives webhooks installs one\n * dependency. The dedup contract that links them lives in\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`.\n */\n\nexport {\n  type CheckFailureReason,\n  type CheckResult,\n  type CheckWebhookOptions,\n  checkWebhook,\n} from \"./check.js\";\nexport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nexport { receiver } from \"./start.js\";\nexport {\n  type VerifyOptions,\n  type VerifyResult,\n  verifyWebhook,\n} from \"./verify.js\";\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * client/configuration errors (`missing-key`, `empty-body` — HTTP 400)\n * from the five verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401)\n * so each maps to its own telemetry bucket. `empty-body` is the\n * misconfigured-raw-parser signal: `secret` is set but the resolved\n * body is empty, so hashing it would compute an HMAC over `${ts}.` and\n * reject every otherwise-valid signed request with a misleading\n * bad-signature — a distinct config error is far easier to diagnose.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"empty-body\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    // Raw body not captured (default JSON parser ate the bytes) but a\n    // secret is configured — hashing the empty string is a guaranteed\n    // bad-signature. Surface a distinct configuration error instead of a\n    // misleading 401 so the operator mounts the raw-body parser.\n    if (body === \"\") {\n      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"empty-body\" };\n    }\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type {\n  Receiver,\n  ReceiverBuilder,\n  ReceiverContext,\n  ReceiverOptions,\n  Validator,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/receiver\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { webhookMiddleware } from \"./hono/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Recommended factory for \"I want to receive webhooks.\" Returns a\n * {@link ReceiverBuilder} the operator configures fluently:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { receiver } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n * import { z } from \"zod\";\n *\n * const r = receiver({\n *   port: 4001,\n *   store: new InMemoryIdempotencyStore(),\n *   secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n * })\n *   .on(\"OrderConfirmed\", z.object({\n *     orderId: z.string(),\n *     total: z.number(),\n *   }), async (event, ctx) => {\n *     // event.orderId and event.total are typed\n *     // ctx.key is the deduplicated Idempotency-Key\n *     await process_order(event.orderId, event.total);\n *   })\n *   .build();\n *\n * await r.listen();\n * ```\n *\n * Matches Act's builder pattern: `receiver(...)` is the factory,\n * `.on()` registers handlers fluently, `.build()` finalizes and\n * produces an immutable {@link Receiver} — at which point the type\n * loses `.on()` and gains the runtime methods (`listen` / `close` /\n * `fetch`). The lifecycle phases are split at the type level.\n *\n * Internally uses Hono for routing — the universal-runtime choice\n * that gives one code path coverage across Node, AWS Lambda,\n * Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Bun, and Deno. For operators\n * with an existing tRPC / Express / Fastify / Hono app who need to\n * compose the receiver with their own middleware stack, the\n * lower-level `webhookMiddleware` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/<framework>` is the escape hatch.\n *\n * `@hono/node-server` is imported lazily inside `.listen()` so\n * Lambda / edge consumers (who never call `.listen()`) don't need\n * it installed.\n */\nexport function receiver(options: ReceiverOptions): ReceiverBuilder {\n  const app = new Hono<{\n    Variables: { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } };\n  }>();\n\n  const middleware = webhookMiddleware({\n    store: options.store,\n    secret: options.secret,\n  });\n\n  let built = false;\n\n  const builder: ReceiverBuilder = {\n    on<T>(\n      name: string,\n      schema: Validator<T>,\n      handler: (event: T, ctx: ReceiverContext) => Promise<void>\n    ): ReceiverBuilder {\n      if (built) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `Cannot register handler \"${name}\" after .build() — handlers are frozen once the receiver is built.`\n        );\n      }\n\n      app.post(`/${name}`, middleware, async (c) => {\n        let validated: T;\n        try {\n          const body = await c.req.json();\n          validated = schema.parse(body);\n        } catch (err) {\n          return c.json(\n            {\n              error: \"validation-failed\",\n              detail: (err as Error).message,\n            },\n            422\n          );\n        }\n\n        const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\");\n        if (!idem.deduped) {\n          try {\n            await handler(validated, { key: idem.key });\n          } catch (err) {\n            // Transient failure: release the tentative claim so the\n            // sender's retry re-processes instead of being deduped\n            // into a silent success and permanently lost. Finalize through\n            // the context's `settled`-guarded finalizer, NOT the raw store —\n            // the `webhookMiddleware` this route mounts auto-finalizes after\n            // `next()` too, and hitting the raw store here double-fires (a\n            // stale second `release` can delete a concurrent retry's live\n            // claim, breaking exactly-once). The guard collapses both into\n            // one store call (#1293).\n            await idem.release();\n            return c.json(\n              {\n                error: \"handler-failed\",\n                detail: (err as Error).message,\n              },\n              500\n            );\n          }\n          // Success: promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every\n          // later retry of this key dedups — again via the guarded finalizer,\n          // not the raw store (#1293).\n          await idem.commit();\n        }\n\n        return c.body(null, 204);\n      });\n\n      return builder;\n    },\n\n    build(): Receiver {\n      built = true;\n\n      // `any`: server lifecycle handle from @hono/node-server\n      let server: any | undefined;\n\n      return {\n        async listen(): Promise<void> {\n          const { serve } = await import(\"@hono/node-server\");\n          const launched = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: options.port });\n          server = launched;\n          await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n            launched.once(\"listening\", () => resolve());\n          });\n        },\n\n        async close(): Promise<void> {\n          if (!server) return;\n          const s = server;\n          server = undefined;\n          await new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));\n        },\n\n        async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n          return app.fetch(request);\n        },\n      };\n    },\n  };\n\n  return builder;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * The two-phase finalizers a receiver adapter binds to a single\n * inbound delivery. The claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*;\n * exactly one of these promotes or drops it once the business handler\n * resolves its outcome.\n */\nexport type Finalizers = {\n  /**\n   * Promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every later\n   * retry of this key dedups. Call on handler success.\n   */\n  commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Drop the tentative claim so the sender's retry re-processes.\n   * Call on transient handler failure.\n   */\n  release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build the {@link Finalizers} for one delivery.\n *\n * Guarantees:\n *\n * - **Deduped deliveries are inert.** When `deduped` is `true` the key\n *   was already committed by an earlier delivery; both finalizers are\n *   no-ops so a duplicate can never release someone else's committed\n *   claim.\n * - **Finalize-once.** After the first `commit` or `release` fires,\n *   further calls are no-ops — an adapter that both auto-finalizes and\n *   lets the operator call `commit()`/`release()` can't double-fire.\n */\nexport function make_finalizers(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  key: string,\n  deduped: boolean\n): Finalizers {\n  let settled = deduped;\n  return {\n    async commit() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.commit(key);\n    },\n    async release() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.release(key);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Two-phase dedup**: the claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*.\n * Because Hono middleware wraps the downstream chain, this adapter\n * finalizes the claim automatically after `await next()`: a downstream\n * 2xx **commits** the key (later retries dedup); a 5xx or a thrown\n * handler **releases** it (the sender's retry re-processes instead of\n * being silently dropped). Operators who need explicit control can\n * still call `c.get(\"idempotency\").commit()` / `.release()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\nimport { make_finalizers } from \"../finalize.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n *\n * `commit` / `release` finalize the tentative claim — call one after\n * the handler resolves its outcome. This adapter also finalizes\n * automatically based on the response status, so explicit calls are\n * only needed when the auto-detection doesn't fit.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: {\n    key: string;\n    deduped: boolean;\n    commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n    release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    const { commit, release } = make_finalizers(\n      options.store,\n      result.key,\n      result.deduped\n    );\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n      commit,\n      release,\n    });\n    try {\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      await release();\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (c.res.status >= 500) await release();\n    else await commit();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/receiver/index.ts","../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../src/receiver/check.ts","../../src/receiver/start.ts","../../src/receiver/finalize.ts","../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver\n *\n * Server-side helpers for the inbound HTTP role — the receiver that\n * sits on the other end of an `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` POST.\n *\n * The subpath hosts two primitives today:\n *\n * - {@link extractIdempotencyKey} — case-insensitive\n *   `Idempotency-Key` parser; pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n *   from `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency` for dedup.\n * - {@link verifyWebhook} — HMAC-SHA256 signature + timestamp\n *   verifier; pair with `webhook({ secret })` from\n *   `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` for authenticated, replay-resistant\n *   delivery.\n *\n * The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these into request\n * handlers, plus per-framework adapters (tRPC / Express / Fastify /\n * Hono), lands in #744 (ACT-1116).\n *\n * Sibling subpaths in the same package:\n *\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` — the sender side: outbound POSTs,\n *   automatic `Idempotency-Key`, status-classified retries, optional\n *   HMAC signing.\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/sse` — incremental state broadcast over\n *   Server-Sent Events.\n *\n * The receiver subpath ships from the same package as `/webhook` so\n * a service that both sends and receives webhooks installs one\n * dependency. The dedup contract that links them lives in\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`.\n */\n\nexport {\n  type CheckFailureReason,\n  type CheckResult,\n  type CheckWebhookOptions,\n  checkWebhook,\n} from \"./check.js\";\nexport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nexport { receiver } from \"./start.js\";\nexport {\n  type VerifyOptions,\n  type VerifyResult,\n  verifyWebhook,\n} from \"./verify.js\";\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * client/configuration errors (`missing-key`, `empty-body` — HTTP 400)\n * from the five verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401)\n * so each maps to its own telemetry bucket. `empty-body` is the\n * misconfigured-raw-parser signal: `secret` is set but the resolved\n * body is empty, so hashing it would compute an HMAC over `${ts}.` and\n * reject every otherwise-valid signed request with a misleading\n * bad-signature — a distinct config error is far easier to diagnose.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"empty-body\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    // Raw body not captured (default JSON parser ate the bytes) but a\n    // secret is configured — hashing the empty string is a guaranteed\n    // bad-signature. Surface a distinct configuration error instead of a\n    // misleading 401 so the operator mounts the raw-body parser.\n    if (body === \"\") {\n      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"empty-body\" };\n    }\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type {\n  Receiver,\n  ReceiverBuilder,\n  ReceiverContext,\n  ReceiverOptions,\n  Validator,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/receiver\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { webhookMiddleware } from \"./hono/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Recommended factory for \"I want to receive webhooks.\" Returns a\n * {@link ReceiverBuilder} the operator configures fluently:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { receiver } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n * import { z } from \"zod\";\n *\n * const r = receiver({\n *   port: 4001,\n *   store: new InMemoryIdempotencyStore(),\n *   secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n * })\n *   .on(\"OrderConfirmed\", z.object({\n *     orderId: z.string(),\n *     total: z.number(),\n *   }), async (event, ctx) => {\n *     // event.orderId and event.total are typed\n *     // ctx.key is the deduplicated Idempotency-Key\n *     await process_order(event.orderId, event.total);\n *   })\n *   .build();\n *\n * await r.listen();\n * ```\n *\n * Matches Act's builder pattern: `receiver(...)` is the factory,\n * `.on()` registers handlers fluently, `.build()` finalizes and\n * produces an immutable {@link Receiver} — at which point the type\n * loses `.on()` and gains the runtime methods (`listen` / `close` /\n * `fetch`). The lifecycle phases are split at the type level.\n *\n * Internally uses Hono for routing — the universal-runtime choice\n * that gives one code path coverage across Node, AWS Lambda,\n * Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Bun, and Deno. For operators\n * with an existing tRPC / Express / Fastify / Hono app who need to\n * compose the receiver with their own middleware stack, the\n * lower-level `webhookMiddleware` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/<framework>` is the escape hatch.\n *\n * `@hono/node-server` is imported lazily inside `.listen()` so\n * Lambda / edge consumers (who never call `.listen()`) don't need\n * it installed.\n */\nexport function receiver(options: ReceiverOptions): ReceiverBuilder {\n  const app = new Hono<{\n    Variables: { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } };\n  }>();\n\n  const middleware = webhookMiddleware({\n    store: options.store,\n    secret: options.secret,\n  });\n\n  let built = false;\n\n  const builder: ReceiverBuilder = {\n    on<T>(\n      name: string,\n      schema: Validator<T>,\n      handler: (event: T, ctx: ReceiverContext) => Promise<void>\n    ): ReceiverBuilder {\n      if (built) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `Cannot register handler \"${name}\" after .build() — handlers are frozen once the receiver is built.`\n        );\n      }\n\n      app.post(`/${name}`, middleware, async (c) => {\n        let validated: T;\n        try {\n          const body = await c.req.json();\n          validated = schema.parse(body);\n        } catch (err) {\n          return c.json(\n            {\n              error: \"validation-failed\",\n              detail: (err as Error).message,\n            },\n            422\n          );\n        }\n\n        const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\");\n        if (!idem.deduped) {\n          try {\n            await handler(validated, { key: idem.key });\n          } catch (err) {\n            // Transient failure: release the tentative claim so the\n            // sender's retry re-processes instead of being deduped\n            // into a silent success and permanently lost. Finalize through\n            // the context's `settled`-guarded finalizer, NOT the raw store —\n            // the `webhookMiddleware` this route mounts auto-finalizes after\n            // `next()` too, and hitting the raw store here double-fires (a\n            // stale second `release` can delete a concurrent retry's live\n            // claim, breaking exactly-once). The guard collapses both into\n            // one store call (#1293).\n            await idem.release();\n            return c.json(\n              {\n                error: \"handler-failed\",\n                detail: (err as Error).message,\n              },\n              500\n            );\n          }\n          // Success: promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every\n          // later retry of this key dedups — again via the guarded finalizer,\n          // not the raw store (#1293).\n          await idem.commit();\n        }\n\n        return c.body(null, 204);\n      });\n\n      return builder;\n    },\n\n    build(): Receiver {\n      built = true;\n\n      // `any`: server lifecycle handle from @hono/node-server\n      let server: any | undefined;\n\n      return {\n        async listen(): Promise<void> {\n          const { serve } = await import(\"@hono/node-server\");\n          const launched = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: options.port });\n          server = launched;\n          await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n            launched.once(\"listening\", () => resolve());\n          });\n        },\n\n        async close(): Promise<void> {\n          if (!server) return;\n          const s = server;\n          server = undefined;\n          await new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));\n        },\n\n        async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n          return app.fetch(request);\n        },\n      };\n    },\n  };\n\n  return builder;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * The two-phase finalizers a receiver adapter binds to a single\n * inbound delivery. The claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*;\n * exactly one of these promotes or drops it once the business handler\n * resolves its outcome.\n */\nexport type Finalizers = {\n  /**\n   * Promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every later\n   * retry of this key dedups. Call on handler success.\n   */\n  commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Drop the tentative claim so the sender's retry re-processes.\n   * Call on transient handler failure.\n   */\n  release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build the {@link Finalizers} for one delivery.\n *\n * Guarantees:\n *\n * - **Deduped deliveries are inert.** When `deduped` is `true` the key\n *   was already committed by an earlier delivery; both finalizers are\n *   no-ops so a duplicate can never release someone else's committed\n *   claim.\n * - **Finalize-once.** After the first `commit` or `release` fires,\n *   further calls are no-ops — an adapter that both auto-finalizes and\n *   lets the operator call `commit()`/`release()` can't double-fire.\n */\nexport function make_finalizers(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  key: string,\n  deduped: boolean\n): Finalizers {\n  let settled = deduped;\n  return {\n    async commit() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.commit(key);\n    },\n    async release() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.release(key);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Two-phase dedup**: the claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*.\n * Because Hono middleware wraps the downstream chain, this adapter\n * finalizes the claim automatically after `await next()`: a downstream\n * 2xx/3xx **commits** the key (later retries dedup); any **4xx or 5xx**\n * (or a thrown handler) **releases** it, so the sender's corrected retry\n * re-processes instead of being silently dropped (#1364). Fail-safe is\n * toward reprocessing: releasing a deterministic 4xx costs bounded\n * re-delivery, while committing it would lose a delivery the handler\n * never accepted (the shipped `receiver()` returns 422 on a schema\n * mismatch, where the handler never runs). Operators who need explicit\n * control can still call `c.get(\"idempotency\").commit()` / `.release()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\nimport { make_finalizers } from \"../finalize.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n *\n * `commit` / `release` finalize the tentative claim — call one after\n * the handler resolves its outcome. This adapter also finalizes\n * automatically based on the response status, so explicit calls are\n * only needed when the auto-detection doesn't fit.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: {\n    key: string;\n    deduped: boolean;\n    commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n    release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    const { commit, release } = make_finalizers(\n      options.store,\n      result.key,\n      result.deduped\n    );\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n      commit,\n      release,\n    });\n    try {\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      await release();\n      throw err;\n    }\n    // Commit only a genuine success (2xx/3xx); release on any 4xx/5xx so a\n    // failed delivery's corrected same-key retry re-processes instead of being\n    // deduped into a silent success (#1364).\n    if (c.res.status >= 400) await release();\n    else await commit();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    out[key] = value;\n  });\n  return 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package/dist/receiver/index.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   webhookMiddleware
-} from "../chunk-M7XFCGYR.js";
+} from "../chunk-KC2NW7XQ.js";
 import {
   checkWebhook,
   extractIdempotencyKey,

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@rotorsoft/act-http",
   "type": "module",
-  "version": "1.8.18",
+  "version": "1.8.20",
   "description": "HTTP integrations for act apps — webhooks and SSE",
   "keywords": [
     "typescript",
@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@
     "@hono/node-server": "^2.0.12",
     "@trpc/server": ">=11.18.0",
     "express": "^5.2.1",
-    "fastify": "^5.10.0",
+    "fastify": "^5.11.0",
     "hono": "^4.12.32",
-    "@rotorsoft/act": "^1.23.21",
-    "@rotorsoft/act-ops": "^0.2.5"
+    "@rotorsoft/act": "^1.23.23",
+    "@rotorsoft/act-ops": "^0.2.6"
   },
   "peerDependenciesMeta": {
     "@rotorsoft/act-ops": {
@@ -129,10 +129,10 @@
     "@trpc/server": "^11.18.0",
     "@types/express": "^5.0.6",
     "express": "^5.2.1",
-    "fastify": "^5.10.0",
+    "fastify": "^5.11.0",
     "hono": "^4.12.32",
     "zod": "^4.4.3",
-    "@rotorsoft/act-ops": "^0.2.5"
+    "@rotorsoft/act-ops": "^0.2.6"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "clean": "rm -rf dist",

package/dist/chunk-M7XFCGYR.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/receiver/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Two-phase dedup**: the claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*.\n * Because Hono middleware wraps the downstream chain, this adapter\n * finalizes the claim automatically after `await next()`: a downstream\n * 2xx **commits** the key (later retries dedup); a 5xx or a thrown\n * handler **releases** it (the sender's retry re-processes instead of\n * being silently dropped). Operators who need explicit control can\n * still call `c.get(\"idempotency\").commit()` / `.release()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\nimport { make_finalizers } from \"../finalize.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n *\n * `commit` / `release` finalize the tentative claim — call one after\n * the handler resolves its outcome. This adapter also finalizes\n * automatically based on the response status, so explicit calls are\n * only needed when the auto-detection doesn't fit.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: {\n    key: string;\n    deduped: boolean;\n    commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n    release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    const { commit, release } = make_finalizers(\n      options.store,\n      result.key,\n      result.deduped\n    );\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n      commit,\n      release,\n    });\n    try {\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      await release();\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (c.res.status >= 500) await release();\n    else await commit();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    out[key] = value;\n  });\n  return out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AA0EO,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,OAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,MACZ,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAChB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAM,QAAQ;AACd,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AACA,QAAI,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,IAAK,OAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QAClC,OAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EACpB;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}