@rotorsoft/act-http 1.7.0 → 1.7.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -38,26 +38,35 @@ var API_ERROR_RESPONSE = {
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  }
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  }
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  };
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- function validate_options(options) {
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- if (!options.info?.title || options.info.title.trim() === "") {
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- throw new Error("openapi: info.title is required (non-empty string)");
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- }
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- if (!options.info?.version || options.info.version.trim() === "") {
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- throw new Error("openapi: info.version is required (non-empty string)");
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- }
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- if (options.servers) {
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- for (const server of options.servers) {
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- const stripped = server.url.replace(/\{[^{}]+\}/g, "x");
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- try {
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- new URL(stripped);
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- } catch {
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- throw new Error(
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- `openapi: invalid server url ${JSON.stringify(server.url)}`
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- );
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- }
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- }
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+ function is_valid_server_url(url) {
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+ try {
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+ new URL(url.replace(/\{[^{}]+\}/g, "x"));
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+ return true;
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+ } catch {
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+ return false;
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  }
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  }
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+ var OpenAPIOptionsSchema = external_exports.object({
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+ info: external_exports.object({
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+ title: external_exports.string({ message: "openapi: info.title is required (non-empty string)" }).trim().min(1, "openapi: info.title is required (non-empty string)"),
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+ version: external_exports.string({
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+ message: "openapi: info.version is required (non-empty string)"
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+ }).trim().min(1, "openapi: info.version is required (non-empty string)")
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+ }),
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+ servers: external_exports.array(
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+ external_exports.object({
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+ url: external_exports.string().refine(is_valid_server_url, {
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+ message: "openapi: invalid server url"
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+ })
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+ })
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+ ).optional()
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+ });
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+ function validate_options(options) {
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+ OpenAPIOptionsSchema.parse({
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+ info: { title: options.info?.title, version: options.info?.version },
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+ servers: options.servers
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+ });
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+ }
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  function strip_json_schema_meta(schema) {
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  const { $schema: _, ...rest } = schema;
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  return rest;
@@ -1 +1 @@
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- {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/openapi/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/openapi\n *\n * OpenAPI subpath for the auto-generated API epic (#835). Walks the\n * registry of a built `Act` once at function call and returns a\n * valid OpenAPI 3.1 document describing the same action surface the\n * Hono sibling at `@rotorsoft/act-http/hono` serves. The doc is\n * suitable for cross-language client codegen (Go, Python, Swift,\n * Kotlin, .NET), for serving over `/openapi.json` alongside a live\n * API, and for the broader OpenAPI tooling ecosystem (Postman,\n * Swagger UI, Redoc, schemathesis, API gateways).\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { openapi } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/openapi\";\n *\n * const doc = openapi(app, {\n * info: { title: \"Wolfdesk API\", version: \"1.0.0\" },\n * servers: [{ url: \"https://api.example.com\" }],\n * });\n * // doc: OpenAPIDocument — valid OpenAPI 3.1 object\n * ```\n *\n * **Pure data emit.** No runtime dep on Hono or tRPC. The subpath is\n * consumable standalone for hosts that serve their API some other\n * way (Fastify, Lambda, edge) or that only want the doc for client\n * codegen. The emit walks the registry once at function call; cost\n * is linear in `N actions × M Zod fields each`, single-digit\n * milliseconds for a 100-endpoint registry.\n *\n * **Determinism.** Output is stable across runs given the same\n * registry — entries land in `Object.entries(app.registry.actions)`\n * iteration order, schemas come from the action's Zod definition,\n * and the rest of the doc is fixed content. CI can snapshot the\n * result to catch unintended API surface changes.\n *\n * The same shared utilities at `@rotorsoft/act-http/api` underwrite\n * cross-transport consistency: the `ApiError` envelope is referenced\n * once from `components.schemas`, every error response points at it,\n * and the same shape ships from the tRPC and Hono siblings at\n * runtime. A client speaking the doc and the live REST API sees one\n * envelope per framework error.\n *\n * **The doc describes the Hono surface, not tRPC.** tRPC's URL\n * shape (`POST /trpc/<procedure>`, JSON-RPC-style body framing,\n * batching) doesn't model cleanly as OpenAPI operations — and tRPC\n * consumers already share types directly via `typeof router`, so\n * OpenAPI buys them nothing. The path shape this emitter produces\n * (`POST <basePath>/actions/<name>`) matches the\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/hono` sibling exactly: same default\n * `basePath`, same request/response shapes, same envelope. If the\n * operator overrides `basePath` on the Hono adapter, they pass the\n * same override here so the doc keeps matching the live routes by\n * construction. tRPC and Hono can run side-by-side at different\n * mount points on the same Act instance; the OpenAPI doc covers\n * the REST half only.\n */\nimport { z } from \"zod\";\n\n/**\n * Minimal OpenAPI 3.1 document type. The emitter targets the 3.1\n * spec; the type is intentionally a structural subset rather than\n * the full surface from `openapi-types` so callers can post-process\n * without fighting the type system. Cast to a fuller type from\n * `openapi-types` when downstream consumers need it.\n */\nexport type OpenAPIDocument = {\n readonly openapi: \"3.1.0\";\n readonly info: OpenAPIInfo;\n readonly servers?: ReadonlyArray<OpenAPIServer>;\n readonly paths: Record<string, OpenAPIPathItem>;\n readonly components: OpenAPIComponents;\n};\n\n/**\n * Per-call options for {@link openapi}. The host supplies the\n * document-shape fields the registry can't derive (title, version,\n * servers) and toggles for the cross-cutting headers that the live\n * REST API may accept.\n *\n * - `info` — required. `title` and `version` must be non-empty;\n * `info` may carry any other top-level OpenAPI info fields.\n * - `servers` — optional. Each entry's `url` may contain\n * `{variable}` template syntax; bare URLs are validated through\n * `URL`'s parser and reject malformed inputs.\n * - `basePath` — optional, default `/api`. Mirrors the Hono\n * sibling's default so the doc describes the same paths the\n * generated REST surface serves.\n * - `idempotency` — optional, default `false`. When `true`, every\n * mutation operation documents an optional `Idempotency-Key`\n * request header.\n * - `expectedVersion` — optional, default `false`. When `true`,\n * every mutation operation documents an optional `If-Match`\n * request header carrying the expected stream version.\n */\nexport type OpenAPIOptions = {\n readonly info: OpenAPIInfo;\n readonly servers?: ReadonlyArray<OpenAPIServer>;\n readonly basePath?: string;\n readonly idempotency?: boolean;\n readonly expectedVersion?: boolean;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIInfo = {\n readonly title: string;\n readonly version: string;\n readonly description?: string;\n readonly summary?: string;\n readonly termsOfService?: string;\n readonly contact?: {\n readonly name?: string;\n readonly url?: string;\n readonly email?: string;\n };\n readonly license?: {\n readonly name: string;\n readonly identifier?: string;\n readonly url?: string;\n };\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIServer = {\n readonly url: string;\n readonly description?: string;\n readonly variables?: Record<\n string,\n {\n readonly default: string;\n readonly enum?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n readonly description?: string;\n }\n >;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIPathItem = {\n readonly post?: OpenAPIOperation;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIOperation = {\n readonly operationId: string;\n readonly summary: string;\n readonly tags: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n readonly parameters?: ReadonlyArray<OpenAPIParameter>;\n readonly requestBody?: OpenAPIRequestBody;\n readonly responses: Record<string, OpenAPIResponse>;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIParameter = {\n readonly name: string;\n readonly in: \"header\" | \"query\" | \"path\" | \"cookie\";\n readonly required?: boolean;\n readonly description?: string;\n readonly schema?: Record<string, unknown>;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIRequestBody = {\n readonly required?: boolean;\n readonly content: Record<\n string,\n { readonly schema: Record<string, unknown> }\n >;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIResponse =\n | {\n readonly description: string;\n readonly content?: Record<\n string,\n { readonly schema: Record<string, unknown> }\n >;\n }\n | { readonly $ref: string };\n\nexport type OpenAPIComponents = {\n readonly schemas: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;\n readonly responses: Record<string, OpenAPIResponse>;\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_BASE_PATH = \"/api\";\n\n/**\n * The shared `ApiError` envelope schema, ref'd by every error\n * response. Matches the runtime envelope at\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/api`'s `toApiError` exactly — keep in sync if\n * the envelope shape evolves.\n */\nconst API_ERROR_SCHEMA: Record<string, unknown> = {\n type: \"object\",\n properties: {\n error: { type: \"string\" },\n detail: { type: \"string\" },\n code: { type: \"string\" },\n },\n required: [\"error\"],\n};\n\n/**\n * The generic snapshot-array response schema returned on a\n * successful mutation. Each action commits one or more events; the\n * shape here is `Snapshot[]` with the per-action state and event\n * data left as open `object` (deeper per-action typing would need\n * to walk `state.events[*]` and emit a discriminated union — a\n * future refinement once the doc consumers ask for it).\n */\nconst SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SCHEMA: Record<string, unknown> = {\n type: \"array\",\n items: {\n type: \"object\",\n properties: {\n state: { type: \"object\" },\n event: { type: \"object\" },\n version: { type: \"integer\" },\n patches: { type: \"integer\" },\n snaps: { type: \"integer\" },\n cache_hit: { type: \"boolean\" },\n replayed: { type: \"integer\" },\n },\n required: [\"state\", \"version\", \"patches\", \"snaps\", \"cache_hit\", \"replayed\"],\n },\n};\n\n/**\n * The error-response shape every operation references via\n * `$ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\"`. Single source of\n * truth — bug fixes to the envelope flow to every operation\n * automatically.\n */\nconst API_ERROR_RESPONSE: OpenAPIResponse = {\n description: \"Error envelope per @rotorsoft/act-http/api's toApiError.\",\n content: {\n \"application/json\": {\n schema: { $ref: \"#/components/schemas/ApiError\" },\n },\n },\n};\n\nfunction validate_options(options: OpenAPIOptions): void {\n if (!options.info?.title || options.info.title.trim() === \"\") {\n throw new Error(\"openapi: info.title is required (non-empty string)\");\n }\n if (!options.info?.version || options.info.version.trim() === \"\") {\n throw new Error(\"openapi: info.version is required (non-empty string)\");\n }\n if (options.servers) {\n for (const server of options.servers) {\n // Server URL may contain `{variable}` template syntax — substitute\n // each capture with `x` before parsing so the URL parser accepts\n // it. Anything that doesn't parse after substitution is malformed.\n // The character class forbids both `{` and `}` inside the template,\n // matching OpenAPI's variable-name grammar exactly and eliminating\n // the catastrophic-backtracking surface CodeQL flags on `[^}]+`.\n const stripped = server.url.replace(/\\{[^{}]+\\}/g, \"x\");\n try {\n new URL(stripped);\n } catch {\n throw new Error(\n `openapi: invalid server url ${JSON.stringify(server.url)}`\n );\n }\n }\n }\n}\n\nfunction strip_json_schema_meta(\n schema: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n // `$schema` at the top of an inline schema is harmless in OpenAPI\n // 3.1 but adds noise to the doc. Drop it.\n const { $schema: _, ...rest } = schema;\n return rest;\n}\n\nfunction build_operation(\n action_name: string,\n body_schema: Record<string, unknown>,\n options: OpenAPIOptions\n): OpenAPIOperation {\n const parameters: OpenAPIParameter[] = [];\n if (options.idempotency) {\n parameters.push({\n name: \"Idempotency-Key\",\n in: \"header\",\n required: false,\n description:\n \"Optional idempotency token. Duplicate values produce a 409 Conflict; first-claim result is not cached on the server.\",\n schema: { type: \"string\" },\n });\n }\n if (options.expectedVersion) {\n parameters.push({\n name: \"If-Match\",\n in: \"header\",\n required: false,\n description:\n \"Expected stream version for optimistic concurrency. Mismatch produces a 412 Precondition Failed via ConcurrencyError.\",\n schema: { type: \"string\" },\n });\n }\n\n return {\n operationId: action_name,\n summary: `Commit the ${action_name} action`,\n tags: [\"Actions\"],\n ...(parameters.length > 0 ? { parameters } : {}),\n requestBody: {\n required: true,\n content: {\n \"application/json\": { schema: body_schema },\n },\n },\n responses: {\n \"200\": {\n description: \"Action committed; returns the snapshot array.\",\n content: {\n \"application/json\": {\n schema: { $ref: \"#/components/schemas/SnapshotArray\" },\n },\n },\n },\n \"400\": { $ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\" },\n \"409\": { $ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\" },\n \"410\": { $ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\" },\n \"412\": { $ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\" },\n \"422\": { $ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\" },\n \"500\": { $ref: \"#/components/responses/ApiError\" },\n },\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an OpenAPI 3.1 document describing a built `Act` instance's\n * action surface.\n *\n * Walks `app.registry.actions` once and emits a `POST\n * <basePath>/actions/<actionName>` operation per action, deriving\n * the request-body schema from each action's Zod definition via\n * `z.toJSONSchema` (Zod 4's native JSON Schema 2020-12 emitter,\n * which is the OpenAPI 3.1 schema dialect — no conversion layer\n * needed). 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+ {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/openapi/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/openapi\n *\n * OpenAPI subpath for the auto-generated API epic (#835). Walks the\n * registry of a built `Act` once at function call and returns a\n * valid OpenAPI 3.1 document describing the same action surface the\n * Hono sibling at `@rotorsoft/act-http/hono` serves. The doc is\n * suitable for cross-language client codegen (Go, Python, Swift,\n * Kotlin, .NET), for serving over `/openapi.json` alongside a live\n * API, and for the broader OpenAPI tooling ecosystem (Postman,\n * Swagger UI, Redoc, schemathesis, API gateways).\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { openapi } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/openapi\";\n *\n * const doc = openapi(app, {\n * info: { title: \"Wolfdesk API\", version: \"1.0.0\" },\n * servers: [{ url: \"https://api.example.com\" }],\n * });\n * // doc: OpenAPIDocument — valid OpenAPI 3.1 object\n * ```\n *\n * **Pure data emit.** No runtime dep on Hono or tRPC. The subpath is\n * consumable standalone for hosts that serve their API some other\n * way (Fastify, Lambda, edge) or that only want the doc for client\n * codegen. The emit walks the registry once at function call; cost\n * is linear in `N actions × M Zod fields each`, single-digit\n * milliseconds for a 100-endpoint registry.\n *\n * **Determinism.** Output is stable across runs given the same\n * registry — entries land in `Object.entries(app.registry.actions)`\n * iteration order, schemas come from the action's Zod definition,\n * and the rest of the doc is fixed content. CI can snapshot the\n * result to catch unintended API surface changes.\n *\n * The same shared utilities at `@rotorsoft/act-http/api` underwrite\n * cross-transport consistency: the `ApiError` envelope is referenced\n * once from `components.schemas`, every error response points at it,\n * and the same shape ships from the tRPC and Hono siblings at\n * runtime. A client speaking the doc and the live REST API sees one\n * envelope per framework error.\n *\n * **The doc describes the Hono surface, not tRPC.** tRPC's URL\n * shape (`POST /trpc/<procedure>`, JSON-RPC-style body framing,\n * batching) doesn't model cleanly as OpenAPI operations — and tRPC\n * consumers already share types directly via `typeof router`, so\n * OpenAPI buys them nothing. The path shape this emitter produces\n * (`POST <basePath>/actions/<name>`) matches the\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/hono` sibling exactly: same default\n * `basePath`, same request/response shapes, same envelope. If the\n * operator overrides `basePath` on the Hono adapter, they pass the\n * same override here so the doc keeps matching the live routes by\n * construction. tRPC and Hono can run side-by-side at different\n * mount points on the same Act instance; the OpenAPI doc covers\n * the REST half only.\n */\nimport { z } from \"zod\";\n\n/**\n * Minimal OpenAPI 3.1 document type. The emitter targets the 3.1\n * spec; the type is intentionally a structural subset rather than\n * the full surface from `openapi-types` so callers can post-process\n * without fighting the type system. Cast to a fuller type from\n * `openapi-types` when downstream consumers need it.\n */\nexport type OpenAPIDocument = {\n readonly openapi: \"3.1.0\";\n readonly info: OpenAPIInfo;\n readonly servers?: ReadonlyArray<OpenAPIServer>;\n readonly paths: Record<string, OpenAPIPathItem>;\n readonly components: OpenAPIComponents;\n};\n\n/**\n * Per-call options for {@link openapi}. The host supplies the\n * document-shape fields the registry can't derive (title, version,\n * servers) and toggles for the cross-cutting headers that the live\n * REST API may accept.\n *\n * - `info` — required. `title` and `version` must be non-empty;\n * `info` may carry any other top-level OpenAPI info fields.\n * - `servers` — optional. Each entry's `url` may contain\n * `{variable}` template syntax; bare URLs are validated through\n * `URL`'s parser and reject malformed inputs.\n * - `basePath` — optional, default `/api`. Mirrors the Hono\n * sibling's default so the doc describes the same paths the\n * generated REST surface serves.\n * - `idempotency` — optional, default `false`. When `true`, every\n * mutation operation documents an optional `Idempotency-Key`\n * request header.\n * - `expectedVersion` — optional, default `false`. When `true`,\n * every mutation operation documents an optional `If-Match`\n * request header carrying the expected stream version.\n */\nexport type OpenAPIOptions = {\n readonly info: OpenAPIInfo;\n readonly servers?: ReadonlyArray<OpenAPIServer>;\n readonly basePath?: string;\n readonly idempotency?: boolean;\n readonly expectedVersion?: boolean;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIInfo = {\n readonly title: string;\n readonly version: string;\n readonly description?: string;\n readonly summary?: string;\n readonly termsOfService?: string;\n readonly contact?: {\n readonly name?: string;\n readonly url?: string;\n readonly email?: string;\n };\n readonly license?: {\n readonly name: string;\n readonly identifier?: string;\n readonly url?: string;\n };\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIServer = {\n readonly url: string;\n readonly description?: string;\n readonly variables?: Record<\n string,\n {\n readonly default: string;\n readonly enum?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n readonly description?: string;\n }\n >;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIPathItem = {\n readonly post?: OpenAPIOperation;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIOperation = {\n readonly operationId: string;\n readonly summary: string;\n readonly tags: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n readonly parameters?: ReadonlyArray<OpenAPIParameter>;\n readonly requestBody?: OpenAPIRequestBody;\n readonly responses: Record<string, OpenAPIResponse>;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIParameter = {\n readonly name: string;\n readonly in: \"header\" | \"query\" | \"path\" | \"cookie\";\n readonly required?: boolean;\n readonly description?: string;\n readonly schema?: Record<string, unknown>;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIRequestBody = {\n readonly required?: boolean;\n readonly content: Record<\n string,\n { readonly schema: Record<string, unknown> }\n >;\n};\n\nexport type OpenAPIResponse =\n | {\n readonly description: string;\n readonly content?: Record<\n string,\n { readonly schema: Record<string, unknown> }\n >;\n }\n | { readonly $ref: string };\n\nexport type OpenAPIComponents = {\n readonly schemas: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;\n readonly responses: Record<string, OpenAPIResponse>;\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_BASE_PATH = \"/api\";\n\n/**\n * The shared `ApiError` envelope schema, ref'd by every error\n * response. Matches the runtime envelope at\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/api`'s `toApiError` exactly — keep in sync if\n * the envelope shape evolves.\n */\nconst API_ERROR_SCHEMA: Record<string, unknown> = {\n type: \"object\",\n properties: {\n error: { type: \"string\" },\n detail: { type: \"string\" },\n code: { type: \"string\" },\n },\n required: [\"error\"],\n};\n\n/**\n * The generic snapshot-array response schema returned on a\n * successful mutation. 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Single source of\n * truth — bug fixes to the envelope flow to every operation\n * automatically.\n */\nconst API_ERROR_RESPONSE: OpenAPIResponse = {\n description: \"Error envelope per @rotorsoft/act-http/api's toApiError.\",\n content: {\n \"application/json\": {\n schema: { $ref: \"#/components/schemas/ApiError\" },\n },\n },\n};\n\n/**\n * Server URL refinement: OpenAPI permits `{variable}` template syntax\n * inside server URLs, so we substitute each capture with `x` before\n * parsing. 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Hosts overriding into\n * unusual shapes still get the rest of the doc emitted; this schema\n * only fails the construction call when `info.title` / `info.version`\n * is missing-or-empty or a `servers[].url` won't parse.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nconst OpenAPIOptionsSchema = z.object({\n info: z.object({\n title: z\n .string({ message: \"openapi: info.title is required (non-empty string)\" })\n .trim()\n .min(1, \"openapi: info.title is required (non-empty string)\"),\n version: z\n .string({\n message: \"openapi: info.version is required (non-empty string)\",\n })\n .trim()\n .min(1, \"openapi: info.version is required (non-empty string)\"),\n }),\n servers: z\n .array(\n z.object({\n url: z.string().refine(is_valid_server_url, {\n message: \"openapi: invalid server url\",\n }),\n })\n )\n .optional(),\n});\n\nfunction validate_options(options: OpenAPIOptions): void {\n OpenAPIOptionsSchema.parse({\n info: { title: options.info?.title, version: options.info?.version },\n servers: options.servers,\n });\n}\n\nfunction strip_json_schema_meta(\n schema: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n // `$schema` at the top of an inline schema is harmless in OpenAPI\n // 3.1 but adds noise to the doc. 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@@ -1 +1 @@
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- {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/receiver/index.ts","../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../src/receiver/check.ts","../../src/receiver/start.ts","../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver\n *\n * Server-side helpers for the inbound HTTP role — the receiver that\n * sits on the other end of an `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` POST.\n *\n * The subpath hosts two primitives today:\n *\n * - {@link extractIdempotencyKey} — case-insensitive\n * `Idempotency-Key` parser; pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n * from `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency` for dedup.\n * - {@link verifyWebhook} — HMAC-SHA256 signature + timestamp\n * verifier; pair with `webhook({ secret })` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` for authenticated, replay-resistant\n * delivery.\n *\n * The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these into request\n * handlers, plus per-framework adapters (tRPC / Express / Fastify /\n * Hono), lands in #744 (ACT-1116).\n *\n * Sibling subpaths in the same package:\n *\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` — the sender side: outbound POSTs,\n * automatic `Idempotency-Key`, status-classified retries, optional\n * HMAC signing.\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/sse` — incremental state broadcast over\n * Server-Sent Events.\n *\n * The receiver subpath ships from the same package as `/webhook` so\n * a service that both sends and receives webhooks installs one\n * dependency. The dedup contract that links them lives in\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`.\n */\n\nexport {\n type CheckFailureReason,\n type CheckResult,\n type CheckWebhookOptions,\n checkWebhook,\n} from \"./check.js\";\nexport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nexport { receiver } from \"./start.js\";\nexport {\n type VerifyOptions,\n type VerifyResult,\n verifyWebhook,\n} from \"./verify.js\";\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n * policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n * information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n | { ok: true }\n | {\n ok: false;\n reason:\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n /**\n * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n */\n maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n /**\n * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n */\n now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n * was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n * was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n * wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n * (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n body: string,\n secret: string,\n options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n }\n\n const delta = now - timestamp;\n if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n\n const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n .digest(\"hex\");\n\n const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n\n return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n return undefined;\n }\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n | \"missing-key\"\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n store: IdempotencyStore;\n /**\n * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n */\n secret?: string;\n /**\n * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n * timestamp window.\n */\n verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n * Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n * key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n * otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n * `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n * short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n body: string,\n options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n const verification = verifyWebhook(\n headers,\n body,\n options.secret,\n options.verify\n );\n if (!verification.ok) {\n return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n }\n }\n\n const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type {\n Receiver,\n ReceiverBuilder,\n ReceiverContext,\n ReceiverOptions,\n Validator,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/receiver\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { webhookMiddleware } from \"./hono/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Recommended factory for \"I want to receive webhooks.\" Returns a\n * {@link ReceiverBuilder} the operator configures fluently:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { receiver } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n * import { z } from \"zod\";\n *\n * const r = receiver({\n * port: 4001,\n * store: new InMemoryIdempotencyStore(),\n * secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n * })\n * .on(\"OrderConfirmed\", z.object({\n * orderId: z.string(),\n * total: z.number(),\n * }), async (event, ctx) => {\n * // event.orderId and event.total are typed\n * // ctx.key is the deduplicated Idempotency-Key\n * await process_order(event.orderId, event.total);\n * })\n * .build();\n *\n * await r.listen();\n * ```\n *\n * Matches Act's builder pattern: `receiver(...)` is the factory,\n * `.on()` registers handlers fluently, `.build()` finalizes and\n * produces an immutable {@link Receiver} — at which point the type\n * loses `.on()` and gains the runtime methods (`listen` / `close` /\n * `fetch`). The lifecycle phases are split at the type level.\n *\n * Internally uses Hono for routing — the universal-runtime choice\n * that gives one code path coverage across Node, AWS Lambda,\n * Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Bun, and Deno. For operators\n * with an existing tRPC / Express / Fastify / Hono app who need to\n * compose the receiver with their own middleware stack, the\n * lower-level `webhookMiddleware` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/<framework>` is the escape hatch.\n *\n * `@hono/node-server` is imported lazily inside `.listen()` so\n * Lambda / edge consumers (who never call `.listen()`) don't need\n * it installed.\n */\nexport function receiver(options: ReceiverOptions): ReceiverBuilder {\n const app = new Hono<{\n Variables: { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } };\n }>();\n\n const middleware = webhookMiddleware({\n store: options.store,\n secret: options.secret,\n });\n\n let built = false;\n\n const builder: ReceiverBuilder = {\n on<T>(\n name: string,\n schema: Validator<T>,\n handler: (event: T, ctx: ReceiverContext) => Promise<void>\n ): ReceiverBuilder {\n if (built) {\n throw new Error(\n `Cannot register handler \"${name}\" after .build() — handlers are frozen once the receiver is built.`\n );\n }\n\n app.post(`/${name}`, middleware, async (c) => {\n let validated: T;\n try {\n const body = await c.req.json();\n validated = schema.parse(body);\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"validation-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 422\n );\n }\n\n const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\");\n if (!idem.deduped) {\n try {\n await handler(validated, { key: idem.key });\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"handler-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 500\n );\n }\n }\n\n return c.body(null, 204);\n });\n\n return builder;\n },\n\n build(): Receiver {\n built = true;\n\n // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: server lifecycle handle from @hono/node-server\n let server: any | undefined;\n\n return {\n async listen(): Promise<void> {\n const { serve } = await import(\"@hono/node-server\");\n const launched = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: options.port });\n server = launched;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n launched.once(\"listening\", () => resolve());\n });\n },\n\n async close(): Promise<void> {\n if (!server) return;\n const s = server;\n server = undefined;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));\n },\n\n async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n return app.fetch(request);\n },\n };\n },\n };\n\n return builder;\n}\n","/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n * \"/webhooks/orders\",\n * webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n * async (c) => {\n * const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n * if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n * // ... process the inbound event ...\n * return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n * }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n return async function check(c, next) {\n const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n if (!result.ok) {\n return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n }\n c.set(\"idempotency\", { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped });\n await next();\n };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n out[key] = value;\n });\n return out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;;;ACsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,yBAA4C;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe;AAClE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,mBAAe,+BAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC7C,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EACjC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,MAAI,KAAC,oCAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SACA,YACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;ACnDA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAChC,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;ACpFA,kBAAqB;;;ACgDd,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AACjE,UAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EACb;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;;;ADvBO,SAAS,SAAS,SAA2C;AAClE,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,iBAEb;AAEH,QAAM,aAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACnC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,QAAM,UAA2B;AAAA,IAC/B,GACE,MACA,QACA,SACiB;AACjB,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,4BAA4B,IAAI;AAAA,QAClC;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAC5C,YAAI;AACJ,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AAC9B,sBAAY,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QAC/B,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,iBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,YACP;AAAA,cACE,OAAO;AAAA,cACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,YACzB;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,cAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,aAAa;AAChC,YAAI,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS;AACjB,cAAI;AACF,kBAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,mBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,cACP;AAAA,gBACE,OAAO;AAAA,gBACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,cACzB;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,YACF;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,eAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,MACzB,CAAC;AAED,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IAEA,QAAkB;AAChB,cAAQ;AAGR,UAAI;AAEJ,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM,SAAwB;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAClD,gBAAM,WAAW,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/D,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY;AACnC,qBAAS,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,QAAuB;AAC3B,cAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,gBAAM,IAAI;AACV,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/D;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,MAAM,SAAqC;AAC/C,iBAAO,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,QAC1B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
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+ {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/receiver/index.ts","../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../src/receiver/check.ts","../../src/receiver/start.ts","../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver\n *\n * Server-side helpers for the inbound HTTP role — the receiver that\n * sits on the other end of an `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` POST.\n *\n * The subpath hosts two primitives today:\n *\n * - {@link extractIdempotencyKey} — case-insensitive\n * `Idempotency-Key` parser; pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n * from `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency` for dedup.\n * - {@link verifyWebhook} — HMAC-SHA256 signature + timestamp\n * verifier; pair with `webhook({ secret })` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` for authenticated, replay-resistant\n * delivery.\n *\n * The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these into request\n * handlers, plus per-framework adapters (tRPC / Express / Fastify /\n * Hono), lands in #744 (ACT-1116).\n *\n * Sibling subpaths in the same package:\n *\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook` — the sender side: outbound POSTs,\n * automatic `Idempotency-Key`, status-classified retries, optional\n * HMAC signing.\n * - `@rotorsoft/act-http/sse` — incremental state broadcast over\n * Server-Sent Events.\n *\n * The receiver subpath ships from the same package as `/webhook` so\n * a service that both sends and receives webhooks installs one\n * dependency. The dedup contract that links them lives in\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`.\n */\n\nexport {\n type CheckFailureReason,\n type CheckResult,\n type CheckWebhookOptions,\n checkWebhook,\n} from \"./check.js\";\nexport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nexport { receiver } from \"./start.js\";\nexport {\n type VerifyOptions,\n type VerifyResult,\n verifyWebhook,\n} from \"./verify.js\";\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n * policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n * information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n | { ok: true }\n | {\n ok: false;\n reason:\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n /**\n * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n */\n maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n /**\n * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n */\n now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n * was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n * was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n * wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n * (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n body: string,\n secret: string,\n options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n }\n\n const delta = now - timestamp;\n if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n\n const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n .digest(\"hex\");\n\n const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n\n return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n return undefined;\n }\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n | \"missing-key\"\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n store: IdempotencyStore;\n /**\n * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n */\n secret?: string;\n /**\n * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n * timestamp window.\n */\n verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n * Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n * key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n * otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n * `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n * short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n body: string,\n options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n const verification = verifyWebhook(\n headers,\n body,\n options.secret,\n options.verify\n );\n if (!verification.ok) {\n return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n }\n }\n\n const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type {\n Receiver,\n ReceiverBuilder,\n ReceiverContext,\n ReceiverOptions,\n Validator,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/receiver\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { webhookMiddleware } from \"./hono/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Recommended factory for \"I want to receive webhooks.\" Returns a\n * {@link ReceiverBuilder} the operator configures fluently:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { receiver } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n * import { z } from \"zod\";\n *\n * const r = receiver({\n * port: 4001,\n * store: new InMemoryIdempotencyStore(),\n * secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n * })\n * .on(\"OrderConfirmed\", z.object({\n * orderId: z.string(),\n * total: z.number(),\n * }), async (event, ctx) => {\n * // event.orderId and event.total are typed\n * // ctx.key is the deduplicated Idempotency-Key\n * await process_order(event.orderId, event.total);\n * })\n * .build();\n *\n * await r.listen();\n * ```\n *\n * Matches Act's builder pattern: `receiver(...)` is the factory,\n * `.on()` registers handlers fluently, `.build()` finalizes and\n * produces an immutable {@link Receiver} — at which point the type\n * loses `.on()` and gains the runtime methods (`listen` / `close` /\n * `fetch`). The lifecycle phases are split at the type level.\n *\n * Internally uses Hono for routing — the universal-runtime choice\n * that gives one code path coverage across Node, AWS Lambda,\n * Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Bun, and Deno. For operators\n * with an existing tRPC / Express / Fastify / Hono app who need to\n * compose the receiver with their own middleware stack, the\n * lower-level `webhookMiddleware` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/<framework>` is the escape hatch.\n *\n * `@hono/node-server` is imported lazily inside `.listen()` so\n * Lambda / edge consumers (who never call `.listen()`) don't need\n * it installed.\n */\nexport function receiver(options: ReceiverOptions): ReceiverBuilder {\n const app = new Hono<{\n Variables: { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } };\n }>();\n\n const middleware = webhookMiddleware({\n store: options.store,\n secret: options.secret,\n });\n\n let built = false;\n\n const builder: ReceiverBuilder = {\n on<T>(\n name: string,\n schema: Validator<T>,\n handler: (event: T, ctx: ReceiverContext) => Promise<void>\n ): ReceiverBuilder {\n if (built) {\n throw new Error(\n `Cannot register handler \"${name}\" after .build() — handlers are frozen once the receiver is built.`\n );\n }\n\n app.post(`/${name}`, middleware, async (c) => {\n let validated: T;\n try {\n const body = await c.req.json();\n validated = schema.parse(body);\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"validation-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 422\n );\n }\n\n const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\");\n if (!idem.deduped) {\n try {\n await handler(validated, { key: idem.key });\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"handler-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 500\n );\n }\n }\n\n return c.body(null, 204);\n });\n\n return builder;\n },\n\n build(): Receiver {\n built = true;\n\n // `any`: server lifecycle handle from @hono/node-server\n let server: any | undefined;\n\n return {\n async listen(): Promise<void> {\n const { serve } = await import(\"@hono/node-server\");\n const launched = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: options.port });\n server = launched;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n launched.once(\"listening\", () => resolve());\n });\n },\n\n async close(): Promise<void> {\n if (!server) return;\n const s = server;\n server = undefined;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));\n },\n\n async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n return app.fetch(request);\n },\n };\n },\n };\n\n return builder;\n}\n","/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n * \"/webhooks/orders\",\n * webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n * async (c) => {\n * const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n * if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n * // ... process the inbound event ...\n * return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n * }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n return async function check(c, next) {\n const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n if (!result.ok) {\n return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n }\n c.set(\"idempotency\", { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped });\n await next();\n };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n out[key] = value;\n });\n return out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;;;ACsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,yBAA4C;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe;AAClE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,mBAAe,+BAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC7C,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EACjC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,MAAI,KAAC,oCAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SACA,YACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;ACnDA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAChC,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;ACpFA,kBAAqB;;;ACgDd,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AACjE,UAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EACb;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;;;ADvBO,SAAS,SAAS,SAA2C;AAClE,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,iBAEb;AAEH,QAAM,aAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACnC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,QAAM,UAA2B;AAAA,IAC/B,GACE,MACA,QACA,SACiB;AACjB,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,4BAA4B,IAAI;AAAA,QAClC;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAC5C,YAAI;AACJ,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AAC9B,sBAAY,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QAC/B,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,iBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,YACP;AAAA,cACE,OAAO;AAAA,cACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,YACzB;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,cAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,aAAa;AAChC,YAAI,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS;AACjB,cAAI;AACF,kBAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,mBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,cACP;AAAA,gBACE,OAAO;AAAA,gBACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,cACzB;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,YACF;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,eAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,MACzB,CAAC;AAED,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IAEA,QAAkB;AAChB,cAAQ;AAGR,UAAI;AAEJ,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM,SAAwB;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAClD,gBAAM,WAAW,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/D,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY;AACnC,qBAAS,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,QAAuB;AAC3B,cAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,gBAAM,IAAI;AACV,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/D;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,MAAM,SAAqC;AAC/C,iBAAO,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,QAC1B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
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- {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/receiver/start.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type {\n Receiver,\n ReceiverBuilder,\n ReceiverContext,\n ReceiverOptions,\n Validator,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/receiver\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { webhookMiddleware } from \"./hono/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Recommended factory for \"I want to receive webhooks.\" Returns a\n * {@link ReceiverBuilder} the operator configures fluently:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { receiver } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n * import { z } from \"zod\";\n *\n * const r = receiver({\n * port: 4001,\n * store: new InMemoryIdempotencyStore(),\n * secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n * })\n * .on(\"OrderConfirmed\", z.object({\n * orderId: z.string(),\n * total: z.number(),\n * }), async (event, ctx) => {\n * // event.orderId and event.total are typed\n * // ctx.key is the deduplicated Idempotency-Key\n * await process_order(event.orderId, event.total);\n * })\n * .build();\n *\n * await r.listen();\n * ```\n *\n * Matches Act's builder pattern: `receiver(...)` is the factory,\n * `.on()` registers handlers fluently, `.build()` finalizes and\n * produces an immutable {@link Receiver} — at which point the type\n * loses `.on()` and gains the runtime methods (`listen` / `close` /\n * `fetch`). The lifecycle phases are split at the type level.\n *\n * Internally uses Hono for routing — the universal-runtime choice\n * that gives one code path coverage across Node, AWS Lambda,\n * Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Bun, and Deno. For operators\n * with an existing tRPC / Express / Fastify / Hono app who need to\n * compose the receiver with their own middleware stack, the\n * lower-level `webhookMiddleware` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/<framework>` is the escape hatch.\n *\n * `@hono/node-server` is imported lazily inside `.listen()` so\n * Lambda / edge consumers (who never call `.listen()`) don't need\n * it installed.\n */\nexport function receiver(options: ReceiverOptions): ReceiverBuilder {\n const app = new Hono<{\n Variables: { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } };\n }>();\n\n const middleware = webhookMiddleware({\n store: options.store,\n secret: options.secret,\n });\n\n let built = false;\n\n const builder: ReceiverBuilder = {\n on<T>(\n name: string,\n schema: Validator<T>,\n handler: (event: T, ctx: ReceiverContext) => Promise<void>\n ): ReceiverBuilder {\n if (built) {\n throw new Error(\n `Cannot register handler \"${name}\" after .build() — handlers are frozen once the receiver is built.`\n );\n }\n\n app.post(`/${name}`, middleware, async (c) => {\n let validated: T;\n try {\n const body = await c.req.json();\n validated = schema.parse(body);\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"validation-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 422\n );\n }\n\n const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\");\n if (!idem.deduped) {\n try {\n await handler(validated, { key: idem.key });\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"handler-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 500\n );\n }\n }\n\n return c.body(null, 204);\n });\n\n return builder;\n },\n\n build(): Receiver {\n built = true;\n\n // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: server lifecycle handle from @hono/node-server\n let server: any | undefined;\n\n return {\n async listen(): Promise<void> {\n const { serve } = await import(\"@hono/node-server\");\n const launched = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: options.port });\n server = launched;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n launched.once(\"listening\", () => resolve());\n });\n },\n\n async close(): Promise<void> {\n if (!server) return;\n const s = server;\n server = undefined;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));\n },\n\n async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n return app.fetch(request);\n },\n };\n },\n };\n\n return builder;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AAOA,SAAS,YAAY;AAgDd,SAAS,SAAS,SAA2C;AAClE,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAEb;AAEH,QAAM,aAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACnC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,QAAM,UAA2B;AAAA,IAC/B,GACE,MACA,QACA,SACiB;AACjB,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,4BAA4B,IAAI;AAAA,QAClC;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAC5C,YAAI;AACJ,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AAC9B,sBAAY,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QAC/B,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,iBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,YACP;AAAA,cACE,OAAO;AAAA,cACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,YACzB;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,cAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,aAAa;AAChC,YAAI,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS;AACjB,cAAI;AACF,kBAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,mBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,cACP;AAAA,gBACE,OAAO;AAAA,gBACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,cACzB;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,YACF;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,eAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,MACzB,CAAC;AAED,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IAEA,QAAkB;AAChB,cAAQ;AAGR,UAAI;AAEJ,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM,SAAwB;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAClD,gBAAM,WAAW,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/D,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY;AACnC,qBAAS,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,QAAuB;AAC3B,cAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,gBAAM,IAAI;AACV,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/D;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,MAAM,SAAqC;AAC/C,iBAAO,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,QAC1B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
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+ {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/receiver/start.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type {\n Receiver,\n ReceiverBuilder,\n ReceiverContext,\n ReceiverOptions,\n Validator,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/receiver\";\nimport { Hono } from \"hono\";\nimport { webhookMiddleware } from \"./hono/index.js\";\n\n/**\n * Recommended factory for \"I want to receive webhooks.\" Returns a\n * {@link ReceiverBuilder} the operator configures fluently:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { receiver } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n * import { z } from \"zod\";\n *\n * const r = receiver({\n * port: 4001,\n * store: new InMemoryIdempotencyStore(),\n * secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n * })\n * .on(\"OrderConfirmed\", z.object({\n * orderId: z.string(),\n * total: z.number(),\n * }), async (event, ctx) => {\n * // event.orderId and event.total are typed\n * // ctx.key is the deduplicated Idempotency-Key\n * await process_order(event.orderId, event.total);\n * })\n * .build();\n *\n * await r.listen();\n * ```\n *\n * Matches Act's builder pattern: `receiver(...)` is the factory,\n * `.on()` registers handlers fluently, `.build()` finalizes and\n * produces an immutable {@link Receiver} — at which point the type\n * loses `.on()` and gains the runtime methods (`listen` / `close` /\n * `fetch`). The lifecycle phases are split at the type level.\n *\n * Internally uses Hono for routing — the universal-runtime choice\n * that gives one code path coverage across Node, AWS Lambda,\n * Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Bun, and Deno. For operators\n * with an existing tRPC / Express / Fastify / Hono app who need to\n * compose the receiver with their own middleware stack, the\n * lower-level `webhookMiddleware` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/<framework>` is the escape hatch.\n *\n * `@hono/node-server` is imported lazily inside `.listen()` so\n * Lambda / edge consumers (who never call `.listen()`) don't need\n * it installed.\n */\nexport function receiver(options: ReceiverOptions): ReceiverBuilder {\n const app = new Hono<{\n Variables: { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } };\n }>();\n\n const middleware = webhookMiddleware({\n store: options.store,\n secret: options.secret,\n });\n\n let built = false;\n\n const builder: ReceiverBuilder = {\n on<T>(\n name: string,\n schema: Validator<T>,\n handler: (event: T, ctx: ReceiverContext) => Promise<void>\n ): ReceiverBuilder {\n if (built) {\n throw new Error(\n `Cannot register handler \"${name}\" after .build() — handlers are frozen once the receiver is built.`\n );\n }\n\n app.post(`/${name}`, middleware, async (c) => {\n let validated: T;\n try {\n const body = await c.req.json();\n validated = schema.parse(body);\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"validation-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 422\n );\n }\n\n const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\");\n if (!idem.deduped) {\n try {\n await handler(validated, { key: idem.key });\n } catch (err) {\n return c.json(\n {\n error: \"handler-failed\",\n detail: (err as Error).message,\n },\n 500\n );\n }\n }\n\n return c.body(null, 204);\n });\n\n return builder;\n },\n\n build(): Receiver {\n built = true;\n\n // `any`: server lifecycle handle from @hono/node-server\n let server: any | undefined;\n\n return {\n async listen(): Promise<void> {\n const { serve } = await import(\"@hono/node-server\");\n const launched = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: options.port });\n server = launched;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n launched.once(\"listening\", () => resolve());\n });\n },\n\n async close(): Promise<void> {\n if (!server) return;\n const s = server;\n server = undefined;\n await new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));\n },\n\n async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {\n return app.fetch(request);\n },\n };\n },\n };\n\n return builder;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AAOA,SAAS,YAAY;AAgDd,SAAS,SAAS,SAA2C;AAClE,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAEb;AAEH,QAAM,aAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACnC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,QAAM,UAA2B;AAAA,IAC/B,GACE,MACA,QACA,SACiB;AACjB,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,4BAA4B,IAAI;AAAA,QAClC;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAC5C,YAAI;AACJ,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AAC9B,sBAAY,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QAC/B,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,iBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,YACP;AAAA,cACE,OAAO;AAAA,cACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,YACzB;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,cAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,aAAa;AAChC,YAAI,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS;AACjB,cAAI;AACF,kBAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,mBAAO,EAAE;AAAA,cACP;AAAA,gBACE,OAAO;AAAA,gBACP,QAAS,IAAc;AAAA,cACzB;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,YACF;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,eAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,MACzB,CAAC;AAED,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IAEA,QAAkB;AAChB,cAAQ;AAGR,UAAI;AAEJ,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM,SAAwB;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAClD,gBAAM,WAAW,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/D,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY;AACnC,qBAAS,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,UAC5C,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,QAAuB;AAC3B,cAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,gBAAM,IAAI;AACV,mBAAS;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,QAAc,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/D;AAAA,QAEA,MAAM,MAAM,SAAqC;AAC/C,iBAAO,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,QAC1B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/trpc/index.ts","../../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../../src/receiver/check.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/trpc\n *\n * tRPC adapter for the receiver-side webhook check. Composes\n * `extractIdempotencyKey` + `verifyWebhook` + `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n * into a single middleware factory.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/trpc\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * type Ctx = {\n * headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n * rawBody: string;\n * };\n *\n * const t = initTRPC.context<Ctx>().create();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * const idempotent = t.procedure.use(\n * webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET })\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * The middleware throws a `TRPCError` with `BAD_REQUEST` for\n * `missing-key` and `UNAUTHORIZED` for any verification failure.\n * On success it injects `{ key, deduped }` into the request context\n * under the `idempotency` property.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, the middleware\n * needs the raw request bytes for HMAC verification. Capture them in\n * `createContext` — most tRPC HTTP adapters expose the raw stream;\n * read it into a string and stash it on `ctx.rawBody`. Skip when\n * unsigned (no `secret`) — the middleware never reads `rawBody` in\n * that mode.\n */\nimport { TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Build a tRPC middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key on\n * the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n *\n * The returned function uses permissive `any` typing because tRPC's\n * `MiddlewareFunction` type lives in `unstable-core-do-not-import`\n * (internal namespace, not for external import). Type-safety at the\n * call site comes from `t.procedure.use(...)` validating the\n * middleware shape against the procedure's context — the operator's\n * tRPC context must include `headers` and `rawBody`, and downstream\n * handlers see `ctx.idempotency = { key, deduped }`.\n */\n// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: tRPC's internal middleware shape\nexport function webhookMiddleware(options: CheckWebhookOptions): any {\n return async function check(opts: {\n ctx: {\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n rawBody: string;\n };\n // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: see above\n next: (next: { ctx: any }) => Promise<any>;\n }) {\n const result = await checkWebhook(\n opts.ctx.headers,\n opts.ctx.rawBody,\n options\n );\n if (!result.ok) {\n throw new TRPCError({\n code: result.status === 400 ? \"BAD_REQUEST\" : \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n message: result.reason,\n });\n }\n return opts.next({\n ctx: {\n ...opts.ctx,\n idempotency: { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped },\n },\n });\n };\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n * policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n * information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n | { ok: true }\n | {\n ok: false;\n reason:\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n /**\n * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n */\n maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n /**\n * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n */\n now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n * was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n * was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n * wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n * (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n body: string,\n secret: string,\n options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n }\n\n const delta = now - timestamp;\n if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n\n const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n .digest(\"hex\");\n\n const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n }\n\n return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n return undefined;\n }\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n | \"missing-key\"\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n store: IdempotencyStore;\n /**\n * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n */\n secret?: string;\n /**\n * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n * timestamp window.\n */\n verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n * Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n * key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n * otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. 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Composes\n * `extractIdempotencyKey` + `verifyWebhook` + `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n * into a single middleware factory.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/trpc\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * type Ctx = {\n * headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n * rawBody: string;\n * };\n *\n * const t = initTRPC.context<Ctx>().create();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * const idempotent = t.procedure.use(\n * webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET })\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * The middleware throws a `TRPCError` with `BAD_REQUEST` for\n * `missing-key` and `UNAUTHORIZED` for any verification failure.\n * On success it injects `{ key, deduped }` into the request context\n * under the `idempotency` property.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, the middleware\n * needs the raw request bytes for HMAC verification. Capture them in\n * `createContext` — most tRPC HTTP adapters expose the raw stream;\n * read it into a string and stash it on `ctx.rawBody`. Skip when\n * unsigned (no `secret`) — the middleware never reads `rawBody` in\n * that mode.\n */\nimport { TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Build a tRPC middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key on\n * the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n *\n * The returned function uses permissive `any` typing because tRPC's\n * `MiddlewareFunction` type lives in `unstable-core-do-not-import`\n * (internal namespace, not for external import). Type-safety at the\n * call site comes from `t.procedure.use(...)` validating the\n * middleware shape against the procedure's context — the operator's\n * tRPC context must include `headers` and `rawBody`, and downstream\n * handlers see `ctx.idempotency = { key, deduped }`.\n */\n// `any`: tRPC's internal middleware shape\nexport function webhookMiddleware(options: CheckWebhookOptions): any {\n return async function check(opts: {\n ctx: {\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n rawBody: string;\n };\n // `any`: see above\n next: (next: { ctx: any }) => Promise<any>;\n }) {\n const result = await checkWebhook(\n opts.ctx.headers,\n opts.ctx.rawBody,\n options\n );\n if (!result.ok) {\n throw new TRPCError({\n code: result.status === 400 ? \"BAD_REQUEST\" : \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n message: result.reason,\n });\n }\n return opts.next({\n ctx: {\n ...opts.ctx,\n idempotency: { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped },\n },\n });\n };\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n * policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n * information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n return value;\n }\n return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n | { ok: true }\n | {\n ok: false;\n reason:\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n /**\n * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n */\n maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n /**\n * Current Unix-seconds time. 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Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n body: string,\n secret: string,\n options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n const now = options?.now ?? 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The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n | \"missing-key\"\n | \"missing-signature\"\n | \"missing-timestamp\"\n | \"stale\"\n | \"future\"\n | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n store: IdempotencyStore;\n /**\n * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n */\n secret?: string;\n /**\n * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n * timestamp window.\n */\n verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. 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@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- {"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/trpc/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/trpc\n *\n * tRPC adapter for the receiver-side webhook check. Composes\n * `extractIdempotencyKey` + `verifyWebhook` + `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n * into a single middleware factory.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/trpc\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * type Ctx = {\n * headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n * rawBody: string;\n * };\n *\n * const t = initTRPC.context<Ctx>().create();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * const idempotent = t.procedure.use(\n * webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET })\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * The middleware throws a `TRPCError` with `BAD_REQUEST` for\n * `missing-key` and `UNAUTHORIZED` for any verification failure.\n * On success it injects `{ key, deduped }` into the request context\n * under the `idempotency` property.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, the middleware\n * needs the raw request bytes for HMAC verification. Capture them in\n * `createContext` — most tRPC HTTP adapters expose the raw stream;\n * read it into a string and stash it on `ctx.rawBody`. Skip when\n * unsigned (no `secret`) — the middleware never reads `rawBody` in\n * that mode.\n */\nimport { TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Build a tRPC middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key on\n * the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n *\n * The returned function uses permissive `any` typing because tRPC's\n * `MiddlewareFunction` type lives in `unstable-core-do-not-import`\n * (internal namespace, not for external import). Type-safety at the\n * call site comes from `t.procedure.use(...)` validating the\n * middleware shape against the procedure's context — the operator's\n * tRPC context must include `headers` and `rawBody`, and downstream\n * handlers see `ctx.idempotency = { key, deduped }`.\n */\n// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: tRPC's internal middleware shape\nexport function webhookMiddleware(options: CheckWebhookOptions): any {\n return async function check(opts: {\n ctx: {\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n rawBody: string;\n };\n // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: see above\n next: (next: { ctx: any }) => Promise<any>;\n }) {\n const result = await checkWebhook(\n opts.ctx.headers,\n opts.ctx.rawBody,\n options\n );\n if (!result.ok) {\n throw new TRPCError({\n code: result.status === 400 ? \"BAD_REQUEST\" : \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n message: result.reason,\n });\n }\n return opts.next({\n ctx: {\n ...opts.ctx,\n idempotency: { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped },\n },\n });\n };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAwCA,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAiBnB,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAmC;AACnE,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,MAOzB;AACD,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACT,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,YAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,QAClB,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW,MAAM,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAC9C,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAClB,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,MACf,KAAK;AAAA,QACH,GAAG,KAAK;AAAA,QACR,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC1D;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;","names":[]}
1
+ {"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/trpc/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/trpc\n *\n * tRPC adapter for the receiver-side webhook check. Composes\n * `extractIdempotencyKey` + `verifyWebhook` + `IdempotencyStore.claim`\n * into a single middleware factory.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/trpc\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * type Ctx = {\n * headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n * rawBody: string;\n * };\n *\n * const t = initTRPC.context<Ctx>().create();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * const idempotent = t.procedure.use(\n * webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET })\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * The middleware throws a `TRPCError` with `BAD_REQUEST` for\n * `missing-key` and `UNAUTHORIZED` for any verification failure.\n * On success it injects `{ key, deduped }` into the request context\n * under the `idempotency` property.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, the middleware\n * needs the raw request bytes for HMAC verification. Capture them in\n * `createContext` — most tRPC HTTP adapters expose the raw stream;\n * read it into a string and stash it on `ctx.rawBody`. Skip when\n * unsigned (no `secret`) — the middleware never reads `rawBody` in\n * that mode.\n */\nimport { TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Build a tRPC middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key on\n * the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n *\n * The returned function uses permissive `any` typing because tRPC's\n * `MiddlewareFunction` type lives in `unstable-core-do-not-import`\n * (internal namespace, not for external import). Type-safety at the\n * call site comes from `t.procedure.use(...)` validating the\n * middleware shape against the procedure's context — the operator's\n * tRPC context must include `headers` and `rawBody`, and downstream\n * handlers see `ctx.idempotency = { key, deduped }`.\n */\n// `any`: tRPC's internal middleware shape\nexport function webhookMiddleware(options: CheckWebhookOptions): any {\n return async function check(opts: {\n ctx: {\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n rawBody: string;\n };\n // `any`: see above\n next: (next: { ctx: any }) => Promise<any>;\n }) {\n const result = await checkWebhook(\n opts.ctx.headers,\n opts.ctx.rawBody,\n options\n );\n if (!result.ok) {\n throw new TRPCError({\n code: result.status === 400 ? \"BAD_REQUEST\" : \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n message: result.reason,\n });\n }\n return opts.next({\n ctx: {\n ...opts.ctx,\n idempotency: { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped },\n },\n });\n };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAwCA,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAiBnB,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAmC;AACnE,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,MAOzB;AACD,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACT,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,YAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,QAClB,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW,MAAM,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAC9C,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAClB,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,MACf,KAAK;AAAA,QACH,GAAG,KAAK;AAAA,QACR,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC1D;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;","names":[]}
@@ -14594,27 +14594,19 @@ async function withIdempotency(store, key, handler) {
14594
14594
  // src/api/sse-wiring.ts
14595
14595
  var DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS = 500;
14596
14596
  var DEFAULT_SSE_HEARTBEAT_MS = 3e4;
14597
- var MAX_CONNECTIONS_MIN = 1;
14598
- var MAX_CONNECTIONS_MAX = 1e4;
14599
- var HEARTBEAT_MS_MIN = 15e3;
14600
- var HEARTBEAT_MS_MAX = 3e5;
14597
+ var SseOptionsSchema = external_exports.object({
14598
+ maxConnections: external_exports.number().min(1).max(1e4).default(DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS),
14599
+ heartbeatMs: external_exports.number().min(15e3).max(3e5).default(DEFAULT_SSE_HEARTBEAT_MS)
14600
+ });
14601
14601
  function resolveSseConfig(options) {
14602
- const max_connections = options.maxConnections ?? DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
14603
- const heartbeat_ms = options.heartbeatMs ?? DEFAULT_SSE_HEARTBEAT_MS;
14604
- if (!Number.isFinite(max_connections) || max_connections < MAX_CONNECTIONS_MIN || max_connections > MAX_CONNECTIONS_MAX) {
14605
- throw new RangeError(
14606
- `sse.maxConnections must be in [${MAX_CONNECTIONS_MIN}, ${MAX_CONNECTIONS_MAX}], got ${max_connections}`
14607
- );
14608
- }
14609
- if (!Number.isFinite(heartbeat_ms) || heartbeat_ms < HEARTBEAT_MS_MIN || heartbeat_ms > HEARTBEAT_MS_MAX) {
14610
- throw new RangeError(
14611
- `sse.heartbeatMs must be in [${HEARTBEAT_MS_MIN}, ${HEARTBEAT_MS_MAX}], got ${heartbeat_ms}`
14612
- );
14613
- }
14602
+ const parsed = SseOptionsSchema.parse({
14603
+ maxConnections: options.maxConnections,
14604
+ heartbeatMs: options.heartbeatMs
14605
+ });
14614
14606
  return {
14615
14607
  channel: options.channel,
14616
- maxConnections: max_connections,
14617
- heartbeatMs: heartbeat_ms
14608
+ maxConnections: parsed.maxConnections,
14609
+ heartbeatMs: parsed.heartbeatMs
14618
14610
  };
14619
14611
  }
14620
14612
  var SseConnectionCounter = class {